


UNESCO International Scientific Committee for the New Volumes of the General History of Africa

GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA · XI

Global Africa Today

EDITOR HILARY BECKLES



unesco

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Global Africa Today

UNESCO General History of Africa

- Volume I Methodology and African Prehistory
(Editor J. Ki-Zerbo)
- Volume II Ancient Civilizations of Africa
(Editor G. Mokhtar)
- Volume III Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century
(Editor M. El Fasi)
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(Editor B. A. Ogot)
- Volume VI Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s
(Editor J. F. A. Ajayi)
- Volume VII Africa under Colonial Domination, 1880-1935
(Editor A. A. Boahen)
- Volume VIII Africa since 1935
(Editor A. A. Mazrui)
(Assistant Editor C. Wondji)
- Volume IX General History of Africa: Revisited
(Editor Augustin F. C. Holl)
- Volume X Africa and Its Diasporas
(Editor Vanicléia Silva Santos)
- Volume XI Global Africa Today
(Editor Hilary Beckles)

UNESCO International Committee for the New Volumes of the General History of Africa

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Global Africa Today

EDITOR HILARY BECKLES



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FOREWORD

by Audrey Azoulay, Director-General of UNESCO

A famous African proverb, found across the entire continent, says that “until lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.” This adage reflects the plight of Africa, whose historical accounts are all too often imbued with the biases and prejudices of colonizers.

Recognizing this failing and this injustice, UNESCO launched the *General History of Africa* in 1964, seeking to tell a different story of the African continent and its peoples: one that was objective and grounded in facts analyzed from an African perspective. This generational undertaking, carried out by some of the continent’s most distinguished historians, was the culmination of a centuries-long struggle led by African political leaders, trade unionists, scholars and intellectuals to defend the historicity of African societies.

Between 1981 and 1993, eight volumes of the landmark *General History of Africa* were published, and we are now building on this legacy with three new volumes. Volume XI, *Global Africa Today*, honours UNESCO’s longstanding commitment to assisting its African Member States in writing their own history, and reflects the major evolutions of the last three decades.

This new work, resulting from cooperation between 69 scholars from 32 countries, is structured around the concept of Global Africa. By considering the major dimensions of African identity on a global scale, from initial human migrations out of Africa through to contemporary population movements, it

examines how present-day Africa and its diasporas have been shaped by the complex legacies of enslavement, colonialism and postcolonial dynamics. In addition, it highlights the many challenges African societies have faced in their pursuit of sovereignty, identity and development following independence.

On the international stage, independent Africa has had to navigate the tensions of the Cold War and the constraints of the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the early momentum of panAfricanism, the continent's unity has been, and continues to be, undermined. Volume XI of the *General History of Africa* revisits the final struggles for liberation and the sometimes-disappointed hopes of young African States, while also highlighting prospects for renewal.

Complementing the continent-centred focus of earlier historiography, this volume shines a light on the diasporic experience as a vital dimension of modern Africanness. It advances a new epistemological framework that transcends classical oppositions and affirms a global, inclusive, dynamic and critically engaged vision of African history. Moreover, it explores the methodological challenges inherent to writing contemporary history, while further discussing the ambivalent effects of globalization on Africans and members of the diasporas.

This volume also presents an in-depth examination of complex current challenges – including demographic growth, rapid urbanization, public health, migration, debt, gender equality and environmental justice – while underscoring the extraordinary vitality of African and diasporic cultural expressions, reflecting an ever-evolving, resilient and creative continent.

I am certain that Volume XI of the *General History of Africa*, through its decolonized and inclusive approach, will contribute to strengthening UNESCO's mission to build inclusive and peaceful societies, while combating racism, discrimination, inequalities and exclusion and affirming diasporas as active historical agents and contributors to African development and identity.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to all members of the International Scientific Committee, including its Chair and Vice Chairs, as well as the editor and authors of this volume of the *General History of Africa* and everyone who contributed to the realization of this collective effort. My thanks also go to the donors and partners, both public and private, whose generosity has made this work possible.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Reconceptualizing the History of Africa and its Diasporas

Augustin F. C. Holl

Introduction

The UNESCO *General History of Africa* (GHA) project consists of a three-stage process. The first stage, ‘the *General History of Africa*’ *stricto-sensu*, was launched in the early 1960s, the second, ‘the Pedagogical Use of the *General History of Africa*’, in 2009, and the third and last, ‘Volume IX of the *General History of Africa*’, in 2013.

The Volume IX of the GHA project was initially shaped at the Expert Meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the auspices of the African Union, from 20 to 22 May 2013. Some 50 experts from different parts of world were invited to share ideas and make recommendations on the best ways to proceed. The initiative was spearheaded and initially funded by the Federal Government of Brazil. The International Scientific Committee for the Preparation and Publication of Volume IX of the General History of Africa, composed of 16 members appointed by the UNESCO Director-General, met later in the year in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, to craft the project agenda and set it in motion. From 2013 to 2017, the Committee met successively in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil (November 2013), Paris, France (June 2014), São Carlos, Brazil (October 2015), Luanda, Angola (February 2016), Havana, Cuba (January 2017) and finally, in Xiamen, China (December 2017). The Committee crafted the initial structure of Volume IX in three tomes, organized the editorial teams

and selected some 250-300 authors worldwide. During the last meeting in Xiamen, it was decided to produce three volumes (IX, X and XI) instead of one Volume IX comprising three tomes. When the last stage of the process is complete, the GHA will be an impressive eleven-volume series.

The launch of the *General History of Africa*

The middle of the twentieth century was the crest of a wave of independence of African countries. The legacy of World War II, which pitted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact military alliances against each other, was the key variable of international geopolitics. The Cold War, spreading its frozen wings over all international affairs, was at its peak. The raw ideological and geopolitical tensions manifested themselves on all continents. In Africa, Patrice Emery Lumumba, the Prime Minister of the newly independent State of Congo-Leopoldville, was deposed and assassinated on 17 January 1961. In Europe, the construction of the Berlin Wall, a palpable symbol of the Iron Curtain, started on 13 August 1961. In the Americas, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which lasted from 16 to 28 October 1962, brought the world to the brink of a nuclear conflagration. And finally, in Asia, following the implementation of the 'containment' doctrine, the United States Air Force attacked North Vietnam in 1964, triggering a sustained escalation in a war that lasted up until 1975.

The World War II alliance to defeat fascism and German-Japanese militarism was shattered in the immediate post-war years. The Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang and the Chinese Nationalist Party, and proclaimed the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. The Berlin Blockade, implemented from 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949, signalled the onset of a new era of ideological rivalry, political confrontations and an arms race. Newly independent countries, pressured to choose sides, were faced with difficult and unpalatable choices. They attempted to create a space between the antagonistic blocks with the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement during the decade 1950-1960. The Bandung Conference, which took place from 18-24 April 1955 in Indonesia, was an epoch-marking event. It brought together Asian and African leaders and called for a rapid end to colonial domination. The movement toward independence of former colonies – predominantly in Africa – kicked off and the outcome was inevitable. The *General History of Africa* (GHA) project was born in that tense context. The

move was motivated by the strong will of newly independent African countries to take their destiny into their own hands, improve their present, shape their future and reflect on their history from their own perspective.

The history curriculum taught in colonized Africa was inadequate in many aspects. Schoolchildren in French colonies were taught to sing 'Our Ancestors the Gauls'. The European self-assigned 'civilizing mission' was predicated on the erasure of African historical agency. A new approach to Africa's past was an absolute necessity. The process of writing the GHA was consequently launched by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1964. Its main goal was to write the history of Africa from an African perspective. The monumental task undertaken then took some 20 years, at the end of which, in the early 1980s, the first volumes were produced. Eight volumes, numbered I-VIII, initially in French, English and Arabic, and translated later into 10 other languages, were published between 1981 and 1999. Some 350 historians and scientists, two thirds of them Africans, were involved. Their work was coordinated by the International Scientific Committee for the drafting of a General History of Africa, comprising 39 experts. They had to challenge the colonial library and rebuild an African historiography free of colonialist imprints and stereotypes. The history of Africa was not confined to enslavement, poverty, famines and civil unrest. The rich and diverse tapestry of Africa's past had to be rendered as thoroughly and precisely as possible through sound and rigorous scholarship. The GHA project pioneered an alternative way of writing history (Schmidt and Patterson, 1993). It brought to the fore marginalized and silenced people's voices and promoted a 'de-nationalized' historical narrative, featuring hidden space and time connections between different countries and regions of the world.

Starting with the GHA, UNESCO launched a series of general and regional histories, including the *History of Humanity*, a *History of the Civilizations of Central Asia*, a *General History of Latin America*, a *General History of the Caribbean*, and the *Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*. The process was triggered by the liberation of different parts of the world from colonial rule. It showcased new knowledge allowing for the build-up of a new universalism, a universalism that takes into consideration different historical legacies and worldviews. The pluralist and multidisciplinary approaches relied on for the writing of these histories shifted the narrative from the chronicles of kings, princes and dominant elites to the histories of political, social and cultural transformations, as well as scientific and artistic developments in different geocultural areas.

The *General History of Africa* as an alternative

The GHA was crafted as an alternative to the Eurocentric views of world history. The search for an alternative to the situation of alienation, domination and dependency has been part of the activities of some individuals or organized groups as early as the nineteenth century, with activists like Marcus Garvey, intellectuals like E. W. Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, and more recently Cheikh Anta Diop, to name but a few towering figures. Surfing the waves of political independence of African countries in the middle of the twentieth century, UNESCO's GHA project was launched to decolonize African history. The product that emerged from that initiative ended up as an important collection of eight volumes, published between 1981 and 1999. They are arranged along a chronological sequence, with some unavoidable overlap, each volume coordinated by one or two editors. In his preface, A. M. M'Bow, then Director-General of UNESCO, summarized what was at stake in the writing of the eight-volume *General History of Africa*. His presentation focused on a number of key issues, including 'the denial' of history, the false assumption of a 'balkanized' continent, and the conception of Africans and Afrodescendants as 'the wretched of the Earth'. He explained the genesis of the project and its scientific ambitions, and asserted the imperative for a widespread circulation and the need for pedagogical use of the published works.

Centuries of enslavement, followed by destructive conquest and colonial domination have generated peculiar conceptions of Africans, their past and their position in the world, as well as their future. Despite important contributions of a small number of scholars – Leo Frobenius, Maurice Delafosse and Arturo Labriola – mentioned in his text, M'Bow points to a common theme that emerged during the nineteenth century and spread during the colonial period. According to that theme, derived from the Hegelian conception of world history, African communities were societies unlikely to have a history. The core of the issue was that of the nature of the sources needed to write history. The lack of written sources in most ancient African societies was erroneously equated with the absence of history. Oral sources were paradoxically disparaged. Most of African history was still written from an outsider's perspective, based on external sources and relying on a European template as a model. African history was filtered through a series of preconceptions. It thus appears crucial for the historians to reshuffle their methodological tools and abandon the misleading preconceptions.

The dominant perception of Africa was that of a continent with juxtaposed subsets. North Africa, known as 'white' and sub-Saharan Africa, known as 'black' were thought to have lived separately on account of an insurmountable obstacle, namely the Saharan desert. Ancient Egypt and Nubia were also thought to have evolved independently from the rest of the continent. Consequently, Africa was not considered to be a historical entity. While each of the regions of Africa possesses its own originality, those regions have maintained uninterrupted exchanges between each other. North Africa, for example, was a bridgehead between the Mediterranean world and sub-Saharan Africa, and as for the margins of the Sahara, they have always been fluctuating. Egypt and Nubia have an interwoven history and share many cultural characteristics with the rest of Africa.

Racial stereotypes linked to the slave trade and colonial domination have distorted the very basis of African historiography. The use of discriminatory categories, for example, establishing white superiority and the '*essentialisation du nègre*' have distorted this historiography. In fact, Africa had to fight against twofold enslavement, economic and psychological. The hierarchy established among races as featured in colonial historiography served to justify colonial domination and the 'civilizing mission'. Changes that occurred after World War II, particularly the entry of African States onto the international scene, contributed to the evolution of the situation.

In this particular context, the Africans themselves felt the profound need to re-establish the historicity of their societies on solid foundations. This was one of the main stakes involved in the GHA project. The methodological innovation required gave great importance to African sources, particularly oral traditions (which require a systematic critical approach for satisfactory exploitation).

GHA volumes I to VIII

UNESCO's GHA includes the following eight volumes:

Volume I – *Methodology and African Prehistory*, edited by J. Ki-Zerbo (1981), has 28 chapters and three themes: methodology; archaeology and its techniques; and environmental change and regional sequences.

Volume II – *Ancient Civilizations of Africa*, edited by G. Mokhtar (1981), has 29 chapters and four themes. It deals with the evolution and emergence of the continent's early States up to 500 CE, with Egypt and Nubia having the lion's share.

Volume III – *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*, edited by M. Elfasi and I. Hrbek (1988), comprises 28 chapters and five themes. It focuses on the expansion of Islam and its consequences on peoples and cultures of the African continent.

Volume IV – *Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*, edited by D. T. Niane (1984), partly overlaps chronologically with the previous volume. It comprises 27 chapters and four themes, dealing with the diversity of Africa's political, social and economic organizations as well as the 'Africanization' of Islam.

Volume V – *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, edited by B. A. Ogot (1992), focuses on Ottoman expansion in North Africa, the development of the Atlantic slave trade, and their consequences on African societies. It has 29 chapters organized into thematic subsets: global processes on the one hand, and regional and local syntheses on the other hand.

Volume VI – *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*, edited by J. F. Ade Ajayi (1989), consists of 29 chapters and four themes, dealing with European settlements in northern and southern Africa, the formation of new States, Islam revivalist movements in West Africa, and the general state of the continent on the eve of European colonization.

Volume VII – *Africa under Colonial Domination 1880–1935*, edited by A. Adu Boahen (1985), has 30 chapters on the comparative analysis of European colonial systems and the multifaceted response of African societies, including the emergence and development of nationalist movements.

Volume VIII – *Africa since 1935*, edited by Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (1999), has 30 chapters and seven themes. It explores the effects of major world crises and their impacts on the emergence and development of African nationalisms, pan-Africanism, the struggle for liberation and the place of independent African countries on the world scene.

Unfortunately, the impressive achievement of the GHA project was not widely disseminated in African bookstores, libraries or research institutions. Its impact on history curricula was virtually non-existent in most, if not all, African countries. A new initiative was necessary. The opportunity for launching that new initiative was found on 9 September 1999, with the Sirte Declaration, the founding act of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which changed its name to the African Union (AU) in 2002.

The pedagogical use of the *General History of Africa*

The Pedagogical Use of the *General History of Africa* project is but the second phase of the GHA long-term objectives. It is geared to shift the momentum back into the hands of Africans and people of African descent. Building on the political dynamics triggered by the Sirte Declaration and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, the Libyan Government provided funds for an ambitious project geared to support the movement toward the integration and construction of a united continent. Following a request from the African Union, UNESCO launched the Pedagogical Use of the *General History of Africa* project, first through an extensive review of the published volumes and an international meeting in Tripoli from 10-17 June 2010. Once the programme was launched, expert meetings were organized successively in Harare, Zimbabwe, in Accra, Ghana, and in Khartoum, Sudan. The foundational idea was to generate a common frame of mind, and shape a manifest destiny based on a common history and shared future that would further the construction of a peaceful, united and prosperous continent.

The dense and rich material assembled in the eight volumes of the GHA had to be analysed and included in the history curriculum of all the continent's school systems, from elementary schools to higher education institutions. Africans and Afrodescendants have to learn a history written from their own perspective, away from narrow national histories inherited from the colonial library. Despite significant transformations and sustained curricula changes in almost all African countries, the legacy of the colonial period is still present and resilient. The use of African languages at all levels of the education institutions will be critical for the future success of this project. The destruction in Libya left the project without funding. Alternative funding sources are being explored, with the project moving forward, but at a slower pace.

The post-colonial imperative and new epistemology

Some 60 years after the wave of independence of African countries, it was possible to pause and think. The Bretton Woods institutions – the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, more recently, the World Trade Organization – set the rules and imposed liberal capitalism as the economic norm. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ensuing collapse of

the Soviet empire, some authors wrote about the 'end of history' (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992) and 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1993, 1996). By way of an introduction to his 1992 book, Fukuyama wrote:

In it, I argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constituted the "end of history" (<https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/fukuyama.htm>).

Imposed structural adjustments, deregulation, privatization and laissez-faire have proven to be double-edged swords. The consequences were disastrous for most, if not all, African countries. What is the place of former colonies, caught in the neo-colonial net of their former colonizers – the CFA franc being an emblematic case of neo-colonial domination – in such an international system?

Without having to cut ties with former colonial powers, it is time to explore new spaces and times as well as distant and present connections with South America and Asia. Despite its current political crisis, Brazil, with the largest population of people of African descent outside Africa, will be a crucial partner in the years to come. In most American and Caribbean countries, people of African descent are fighting for their human and civil rights. The history of the African diaspora in the Indian Ocean, Asia and the South Pacific has to complement and dilute the dominant focus on the Atlantic world. China, already the first economic partner of Africa and the second largest economy in the world, has had multi-secular relationships with Africa (Li Anshan, 2005).

Past Chinese presence in Africa

It is not known precisely when Chinese goods reached Africa for the first time. Archaeological research provides a number of clues. An Austrian expedition excavating in Thebes, at Deir el-Madina, found the remains of silk in the hair of a 30-50 year-old female mummy discovered in the burial ground of the kings' workers. The burial is dated to the Hyksos period, belonging to the Twenty-First Dynasty, i.e. 1075-945 BCE (Li Anshan, 2005; Lubec et al., 1993). The silk industry certainly originated in China, where archaeologists have found textiles in a mysterious tomb dating back nearly 2,500 years in eastern Jiangxi Province, the oldest to be discovered in China's history. The silk industry,

trade and consequently the Silk Road, are thus much older than thought, and probably reached Egypt through Persia. Trade and cultural exchange between China and Egypt were well established during the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) (Sun Tang, 1979 in Li Anshan, 2005). According to Li Anshan (2005, p. 60), Du Huan, a Chinese soldier of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) and war captive in Baghdad, where he spent several years, visited Africa in the eighth century, sometime around 762. His book, *Jingxingji* [经行记, *Record of My Travels*], was lost and is now known only through quotes in other books. It is therefore not known which part of Africa he may have visited, although Egypt and Northeast Africa appear to have been the most reachable.

In the first half of the fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty decided to project Chinese naval power all over the Indian Ocean. The Yongle emperor (1403–1424) appointed Zheng He as the Chief Admiral of a large fleet – the *Treasure Fleet*. The latter organized a total of seven expeditions, from 1405 to 1433, generally known as ‘Zheng He’s voyages’ (Deng, 2005; Dreyer, 2006; Ferrand, 1919, 1922; Files, 1970; Levathes, 1997; Viviano, 2005). The *Treasure Fleet* sailed to the coast of East Africa on the fourth (1413–1415), fifth (1416–1419) and sixth (1421–1422) voyages, docking in Mogadishu, present-day Somalia, as well as Malindi and Mombasa, present-day Kenya. They exchanged Chinese goods for African ones, including live animals such as zebras and giraffes. Chinese celadon pottery of the kind produced in Longquan, found in the Limpopo valley on Mapungubwe Hill in the 1930s, is now firmly dated to the late Yuan (1279–1368) and early Ming (1368–1644) dynasties (Prinsloo et al., 2005). Such evidence is distributed over a large geographic zone in Eastern Africa, including Great Zimbabwe, the Swahili city-states, the Comoros and Madagascar (Beaujard, 2007). In addition, some of the descendants of Chinese sailors from Admiral Zheng He’s fleet living on the small island of Pate were interviewed by Nicholas Kristof (1999) for *The New York Times*. In summary, there is scattered but significant evidence of the presence of Chinese goods and people in Africa’s past. This interaction peaked in the fifteenth century and was cut short by the succeeding dynasty’s imperial ban on foreign trade and naval expeditions.

Past African presence in China

Beyond the presence of surprising animals, such as zebras and giraffes (Chau Ju-Kua, 1911; Ferrand, 1919, 1922; Filesi, 1970; Wheatley, 1961; Talib and Samir, 1988), a number of Africans, through different indirect channels, ended up living in China as early as the first quarter of the eighth century. According to the *Chronicle of the Tang Dynasty*, in 724, the King of Srinijaya, from Palembang, Sumatra, offered a Zanj [black] girl, among other things, as tribute to the Emperor (Talib and Samir, 1988, p. 732; Ferrand, 1922). This practice was repeated several times during the following centuries, in 813, 818 and 976. In 813 and 818, the rulers from Kalinga, an Indonesian kingdom, offered several Zanj boys and girls in three successive missions to the Tang Emperor Hsien-Tsung. In 976, under the Sung dynasty, the Imperial court received 'a black K'un Lun slave with deep set eyes and black body' (Chau Ju-Kua, 1911) from an Arab trader (Talib and Samir, 1988, p. 732).

Although, indirectly and through Arab and Indonesian intermediaries, the slave trade reached China, mainly through the entry port and distribution hub of Guangzhou (Canton). The enslaved Africans were 'employed on shipboard to caulk leaky seams below the water-line from the outside as they were expert swimmers who do not close their eyes under water' (Chau Ju-Kua, 1911, pp. 31-2; Talib and Samir, 1988, p. 732; Wheatley, 1961, p. 55). Others were gate guards and household servants for the wealthy families in metropolitan areas. According to Chau Ju-Kua (1911, p. 32), 'many families buy black people to make gatekeepers of; they are called *kui-nu*, or "devil-slaves" or *hei siau ssi* (black slaves or servants)'. There is clearly much more research to be done in this direction, if oral histories and family archives can be collected systematically.

The great Moroccan world traveller and explorer Abu Abdullah Muhammad Ibn Abdullah al-Lawati al-Tanji Ibn Battuta – Ibn Battuta for short – visited China in the middle of the fourteenth century. He travelled all over the ancient world, covering some 120,000 kilometres in 29 years. Ibn Battuta arrived at Guangzhou (Canton) in China in 1345 (Ibn Battuta, 1982). He was particularly interested in local crafts, boat construction and porcelain making, and visited a number of places and towns. He travelled north to Hangzhou, which he described as the largest city he had ever seen. He could not reach Beijing and returned to Guangzhou in 1346 to sail to Sumatra.

It is also claimed that Admiral Zheng He's *Treasure Fleet* took some foreign dignitaries back to China to pay homage to the Ming emperors. It is not clear if

some Africans from the Swahili city-states of Mogadishu, Malindi or Mombasa were involved in these visits. In summary, from as early as the eighth century, Africans were present in Chinese imperial courts and in some wealthy families in southern China.

An exciting new conjuncture

A conjuncture is the convergence of independent factors that generates a new and unpredictable situation that lasts. The new and exciting conjuncture referred to here is made of four distinct developments: (1) a new institutional framework; (2) the improvement of the general economic and social outlook of Africa, despite persistent problems; (3) the expansion and acceleration of economic cooperation between Africa, Asia and South America; and (4) the development of a multipolar world.

A new institutional framework

The end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed important changes in Africa's political map. After long wars of national liberation, the former Portuguese colonies became sovereign States in the 1970s: Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde celebrated their independence on 24 September 1973; Angola followed on 11 November 1974; and finally, Mozambique on 25 June 1975. It was the turn of Namibia and South Africa to go through profound changes in the 1990s. The former gained independence from South Africa's mandate on 21 March 1990. Nelson Mandela was freed from Robben Island jail on 11 February 1990 and was elected shortly after as the first post-apartheid South African president. Two new sovereign States entered the African political scene during the same time, after long and painful wars of liberation: Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia on 24 May 1991, and South Sudan separated from the Republic of Sudan and celebrated its independence on 9 July 2011.

The establishment of the African Union in 1999 and the initiation of the regional integration process sparked a new momentum, challenging the divisions of the continent and the identity and nation construction model inherited from the colonial period. The major changes in the areas of economic cooperation and international relations that have influenced our globalized world since the end of the 1990s have paved the way for new opportunities as well as new

challenges and threats for Africa. Indeed, the accelerated pace of urbanization, Africa's wealth in terms of natural and strategic resources and the aspirations and creativity of young people pose new challenges for the people of Africa, thus emphasizing the need to take control of their destiny.

Moreover, people of African descent in South, Central and North America, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and elsewhere are attaching increasing importance to the links that tie them to Africa and African heritage. The countries in which people of African descent reside are increasingly recognizing the important contribution of these citizens to the construction of their societies. These countries are currently establishing public policies that aim to rectify historical distortions and combat racism, racial discrimination and the inequalities of the past, including positive discrimination measures. In that spirit, the initiatives taken by the Brazilian Government – in particular the adoption of a law on the mandatory teaching of the history of Africans and of Afrodescendants at all levels of education by using the GHA – set a standard in this regard. The preparation and publication of Volume IX of the GHA is a positive response to the above-mentioned trends and the requests formulated by Member States at the African Union summit held in Syrte, Libya, in 2009.

Africa's economic outlook

The economic outlook of the entire continent has shifted in the right direction during the last two decades, starting from the 2010s. There are significant variations between regions and countries, but on average, the situation has improved. Globally, major European weekly magazines, such as *Le Point* in France and *The Economist* in the United Kingdom, have praised Africa's economic performances. It is a far cry from the description of Africa as 'the hopeless continent', in the thundering headline of *The Economist* in 2000. The economic growth rate has been sustained for the last few years, averaging 5% per year, with double-digit rates in countries like Ethiopia and Ghana. The European-American financial crisis did not significantly affect Africa, partly because of its loose banks. There are still major obstacles to the freeing of all the potential creative energy, but many African entrepreneurs are more optimistic and less risk-averse. According to demographic projections, there are 500 million Africans of working age and there will be 1.1 billion in 2040, more than in China or India (*Le Point*, 9 August 2012). The potential for greener development is also higher in Africa than anywhere else in the world.

The expansion and acceleration of economic cooperation between Africa, Asia and South America

The multilateral cooperation between African countries and Asian and South American partners is on the increase. Most Asian economic powerhouses, whether large, like China, India and Japan, or smaller, like South Korea, are launching cooperation programmes with African countries in a broad range of domains. A new cooperation alliance, BRIC – including Brazil, Russia, India and China – working for an alternative to the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization) was formed in 2009. South Africa joined the alliance later, which changed its acronym to BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. BRICS financial institutions are being created and they are expected to affect international cooperation and financial systems in the years to come. Despite its current political crisis, Brazil, with the largest Afrodescendant population out of Africa, is positioned to play an important role in the cooperation with African countries.

The development of a multipolar world

The collapse of the Soviet empire, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, took all political commentators by surprise. Starting with *glasnost*, the attempted reform movement launched by President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet empire unravelled within a few months (Sebestyen, 2010). The world was left with a single dominant imperial power that tried to impose its political views on the rest of the planet. Building on the collapse of the Soviet Union, viewed by some as the triumph over the ‘evil empire’ (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992; Huntington, 1993, 1996; Sebestyen, 2010), a power group of ideologues termed ‘neoconservatives’ took control of the foreign policy of the United States of America and devised a new doctrine of ‘pre-emptive strikes’ against whoever challenged the world domination of the United States. The first Gulf War, triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, took place in 1990-1991. The invading army was expelled by an international coalition led by the United States of America. The neoconservatives rose to full executive power with the election of G. W. Bush and Dick Cheney, respectively as President and Vice-President of the United States, in November 2000. During the chaotic rule of President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), the Russian Federation was totally absent from the international stage. On 11 September 2001, the attack on the World Trade

Center in New York unleashed the implementation of the new doctrine. The war in Afghanistan started on 7 October 2001 and continues today. Under the pretext of the presence of weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq War was launched on 20 March 2003 and lasted until 18 December 2011. Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation on 31 December 1999, and was elected to that post a few months later in 2000. He initiated a series of reforms of Russian governing institutions and launched a ferocious war in Chechnya. A few years later, he restored the pride of the average Russian citizen and brought Russian diplomacy and military back on the world scene. The rise of China as the world's second economic powerhouse and its military build-up led to the emergence of a new multipolar world.

The new *General History of Africa*: an exponential growth

The Volume IX of the *General History of Africa* project is the third phase, launched in 2013, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The impetus came from Brazil. The Brazilian parliament passed a law on the mandatory teaching of the history of Africans and of Afrodescendants at all levels of public education in the country. The Brazilian Government offered funding for an additional volume in the GHA series, a volume that would feature the history of African diasporas worldwide. The new project, anchored on the key concept of 'Global Africa', encourages literary and artistic approaches to gain better insight into certain aspects of the experiences of Africans and people of African descent. It advocates the use of concepts or notions in African languages, allowing people to think in African terms, realizes comparative studies in relation to South America and Asia, and offers a balanced and positive history of Africa and its diasporas.

The contributors were asked to think about writing history differently and to invent another way of portraying history. They were particularly encouraged to take into account the literary and artistic productions concerning historic African experiences as essential materials in the writing of the endogenous history of Africa and Africans. The contexts and their specific implementation of the concept of race would be central to understanding how Africans and people of African descent refer to themselves. It would also involve critical observation of the dynamics of the relationship between Africa and its diasporas, African 'globality', movements back and forth and the ways in which Africa could connect to the rest of the world.

An epistemic shift: Global Africa

This project implies writing a serene history of Africans and people of African descent on a global scale. That is what is subsumed under the concept of ‘Global Africa’; in other words, taking into account the many dimensions of Africanness worldwide, from the initial expansion of humans from the African continent to the successive diasporas over time, right up to the present day (Harris, 1993; Hodgson and Byfield, 2017). The concept allows us to overcome the customary dichotomies and divisions between Africa and the African diasporas, enabling a balanced understanding of the African diasporas, in the long term and in their diversity. It equally allows us to reassess approaches to the period of enslavement, to study the relationship between pan-Africanism and the diasporas, and the enhancement of pan-Africanist thinking nurtured by contributions from different diasporic experiences. In other words, it allows us to address actively and transversally the different issues linking Africa and its diasporas.

The decolonization of concepts

The decolonization of the concepts, paradigms and categorizations used in social and human sciences, particularly in history, is regarded as an epistemological necessity throughout the scientific and intellectual communities in the former colonies and beyond (Mudimbe, 1988; Said, 1979) and as yet another component of the cultural and political emancipation of peoples who, not without difficulty, have thrown off the yoke of European colonization (Mignolo, 2011). Thanks to post-colonial studies, researchers in Latin America, Asia and Africa now select topics on the structural, protean remnants of colonial relations in the post-colonial era – a sort of ‘coloniality’ – that perpetuates age-old images and epistemological racism, disparaging non-Western cultural output. This inextinguishably burning issue somewhat informs the endogenous African approach taken in writing the *General History of Africa*. The approach to the decolonization of knowledge on Africa, providing an opportunity to write an innovative history from within and with a different outlook on the world, makes a crucial contribution to what the poet and thinker Aimé Césaire called the ‘meeting place for giving and taking’, a rearranged universal, a ‘pluriversal’, illustrating the great variety of human nature.

The current project, initially known as Volume IX of the *General History of Africa*, is consequently different from all the previous ones. It now comprises

three volumes – IX, X and XI – each with an editorial team consisting of section coordinators, co-editors and editors, with three main goals: (1) to update the *General History of Africa* and theories on human origins and the earliest human civilizations; (2) to explore and flesh out the formation process of ‘Global Africa’ and its consolidation in the rest of the world through its diasporas; and (3) to look at the opportunities and new challenges of ‘Global Africa’ in the contemporary world.

The General History of Africa Revisited

Volume IX, *The General History of Africa Revisited*, essentially aims to update the GHA. After four decades of intensive archaeological, historical and anthropological research, most of the content of the first three GHA volumes is partially or totally outdated. This updating is particularly challenging partly because of tightly limited space. It is divided into four sections, each under the editorial responsibility of coordinators.

Section 1, coordinated by Olabiyi B. Joseph Yäi and Martial Ze Belinga and entitled ‘Writing History of Africans and their Diasporas Today’ explores the epistemological and theoretical conditions for the production of historical narratives in the contemporary world. The concept of ‘historical sources’ is ‘stretchable’ ad infinitum. Objects, monuments, words, songs, poems and artefacts are historical sources depending on the purpose of the investigations being conducted. The assembled contributions interrogate the meaning and contribution to historical scholarship of such concepts as ‘Africa’, ‘history’ and ‘oral traditions’. What is the translation of the word ‘history’ in African languages, in ancient Egyptian or in Yoruba? The authors discuss and explore the intricacies of long-term versus short-term histories, the possible contribution of native African writing systems, and the use and misuse of oral traditions in the chronicle of historical experiences of Africans and Afrodescendants.

Section 2, ‘Review of the General History of Africa: Volumes I-VIII’, is coordinated by Doulaye Konaté. It comprises the reviews of the contents of GHA volumes I to VIII, published between 1981 and 1999, in order to determine what needs to be updated.

Section 3, entitled ‘The Initial History of Africa: An Update’, is coordinated by Augustin F. C. Holl. The new formulation is a substitute for the term ‘prehistory’ that tends to be misread by an increasing number of people. Human history is a continuum from its remote hominid beginnings to the present.

Periodization is a necessity but it does not have to be constructed on a ‘before’ – prehistory – and a standard, genuine ‘after’ – history – viewed as a civilization threshold. The scheme suggested in this section is made of successive stages, as follows: initial, ancient, modern and contemporary history.

The update of the initial history of the continent is carried out in seven topical entries, each with two to four contributions. The first, ‘general topics’, deals with paleoenvironmental and paleoclimatological research, paleogenomics and African language classifications. Paleoanthropological research has completely changed our understanding of human origins and evolution. The speciation events and radiation episodes that resulted in the emergence of (1) the Ardipithecines – *Sahelanthropus tchadensis*, *Orrorin tugenensis*, *Ardipithecus ramidus* and *Ardipithecus kadabba* – dated to 7-4.5 million years ago, (2) the Australopithecines dated to 4.5-1.7 million years ago, (3) *Homo* dated to 2.5 million years ago and finally, (4) *Homo sapiens sapiens* dated to around 300,000 years ago, all took place in Africa. Three contributions under the second topic feature the oldest 7 million-year-old hominid from the Djurab desert in the Republic of Chad, an informed discussion on hominid subsistence and lifeways, and the presentation of the earliest stone tool complexes. Pleistocene hunting and gathering communities are dealt with under the third topic, in two chapters; and the emergence and expansion of food production is covered under the fourth topic, in three chapters. New directions in Egyptology are featured under the fifth topic, in four chapters. The discussions are evidence-based and serene, staying away from entrenched orthodoxies. Technological inventions and innovations are dealt with under the sixth topic, in two chapters, one on pottery and the other on metallurgies. Finally, the seventh topic explores the emergence of social complexity, in four chapters.

Section 4, coordinated by Doulaye Konaté and entitled ‘Ancient and Modern History of Africa: An Update’, features 12 contributions organized under four themes: (1) regional processes in the inland Niger delta, the Maghreb and Madagascar; (2) histories of religious systems; (3) trade diasporas in West and East Africa and the Indian Ocean; and finally, (4) enslavement and resistances.

Africa and Its Diasporas

Volume X, *Africa and Its Diasporas*, includes three sections. Section 1, coordinated by Carole Boyce-Davies and entitled ‘Redefining Global Africanity and Blackness’ includes 16 contributions, organized into two parts: (1) ‘Race,

Location, Diaspora and Global Blackness', containing nine contributions; and (2) 'Global Africanity and the African Diaspora: New Epistemological Considerations', comprising seven chapters. The introduction by Boyce-Davies sets the stage, explores the origins of colour systematics in different settings and scholarly traditions, and traces the genealogies of the concept of 'Global Africa'.

Section 2, 'Mapping the African Diasporas', is coordinated by Vanicléia Silva Santos. The entire section deals with different aspects of the formation and resilience of African diasporas in different parts of the world. It comprises 36 contributions organized under six topics.

The first topic, geographies of the African diasporas, comprises four chapters tracing African presence in China, Australia, India and Iran. African revolutions and resistance to oppression, under the second topic, features revolts and resistances of enslaved peoples in North America, Brazil, Colombia and Madagascar. The third topic, African diasporic religions, includes six chapters ranging from Black brotherhoods in Angola, Portugal and Brazil, to Muslim resistance in North America and religious experiences of Africans in the Middle East. The fourth topic, oral genres, under the title 'Ties that bind: wisdom tales, orature and literature' are represented by three contributions on the Caribbean, Latin America and Brazil. The transfer of skills and knowledge is dealt with under the fifth topic, African diasporic knowledge and technologies, through four contributions featuring agriculture, foodways, navigation and mining. Finally, the sixth topic, the return to Africa, in three contributions, focuses on the returnees from Brazil to West Africa and India to East Africa. Cases from Liberia and Sierra Leone, not dealt with here, are relatively well-known.

Section 3, 'Life Stories and Freedom Narratives of Global Africa' is coordinated by Paul Lovejoy. It comprises 18 contributions featuring the life trajectories of enslaved individuals who were written about or who wrote autobiographies. The selected narratives range from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century, with the largest proportion dated to the nineteenth century. As can be expected in the present state of research, there are many more narratives from the Atlantic world, including the west coast of Africa, the Caribbean and the Americas. The situations in the Indian Ocean and mainland Asia, in this case during the Ottoman Empire, are featured in two contributions. The potential for new discoveries is particularly high in these parts of the African diasporas that are still underinvestigated. The narratives of 'returnees' feature the situations in nineteenth-century Sierra Leone, the Bight of Benin and Calabar. All the situations described in the narratives attest to the individual

agency, bargaining skills and resilience of those involved. They bring a direct textured human touch to past African diasporic experiences.

Global Africa Today

The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century witnessed the complete liberation of Africa from direct colonialism. The newly launched African Union created a sixth region for 'Africans from the diaspora'. All these developments open new opportunities and pose difficult challenges. These are the issues dealt with in Volume XI, *Global Africa Today*. It is a very difficult foray into the 'history of present times' or 'immediate history'. The distancing that allows for a serene writing of history is missing from the picture. Historians have to write history while being involved in it.

The volume is divided into three sections. The first explores the current trends in contemporary historical scholarship and the theoretical and epistemological conditions for writing the history of Global Africa today, the second deals with the specific situation of Africa in the contemporary world and the third and last focuses on challenges to Global Africa at the turn of the third millennium.

Section 1, 'Global Africa Today', coordinated by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch comprises 26 chapters. The assembled contributions are organized under seven topics with two to six chapters each. The four chapters under the first topic address the new paradigms that shape historical research of contemporary Africa and its diasporas. The second topic, comprising six contributions, deals with emerging new approaches on previously neglected issues. What is the intellectual and cultural impact of the transatlantic slave trade in West African collective memories? How did gender relations shape the structures of African and diasporic societies? What does it mean to be poor? Is the current meaning, crafted by international organizations, applicable to African contexts? This is a sample of the issues addressed by the contributors to this topic. Religious factors are explored under the third topic through two chapters addressing the Africanization of Christianity through black churches, on the one hand, and the recent emergence of new religions, on the other. Issues of political renewal are discussed under the fourth topic. The contributors explore the rift between long-lasting African 'territorial-political' organization and the current 'national-territorial' State inherited from the colonial period. Some of the key questions addressed can be spelled out as follows: What is the relationship between nationality and nationalism? What does nationalism mean in African

multinationality States? What is the genesis of African contemporary chiefdoms and how do they fit in the contemporary State model? The fifth and sixth topics shift from continental Africa to a diasporic perspective. The fifth topic focuses on the concepts of 'Creolization', 'hybridization', and 'miscegenation' as they are relied upon in the Caribbean identity discourses, aesthetics and performing arts. The sixth topic consists of three contributions focusing on how Africa is viewed and conceptualized from the Caribbean. The exploration is carried out via the academic lenses and the development of African studies programmes, and the Caribbean revitalization movement. Lastly, the seventh topic explores present-day visions with a focus on blackness, race and representation, economics and African views on globalization.

Section 2, 'Africa in the Contemporary World', coordinated by Tayeb Chenntouf, comprises 29 contributions arranged in three rubrics. The first rubric features the permanence of the Global Africa project weaved through a broad range of topics, from political initiatives to the performing arts. The Global Africa project can be said to have started with the very deportation of Africans across the Atlantic Ocean. Music, technology, cuisine and religions were key elements of the survival kits of those who landed in the Americas and the Caribbean. The concept of pan-Africanism was coined and nurtured by intellectuals of the diaspora mostly in the nineteenth century. It expanded through a series of meetings in the early part of the twentieth century and became a mobilizing force in the movements for the liberation of the continent from colonial domination. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU) are, so far, the clearest political materialization of pan-Africanist ideas on the continent. The second rubric focuses on the challenges of current globalization and the new world geopolitics. What can be the role of Africa in this emerging new geopolitical world characterized by increasing connectivity through the Internet and faster air transportation? Africa, with its marginal 2% contribution to world trade, tends to witness a regression in its economic development. With very few exceptions, the continent is confined to the exportation of raw materials and unprocessed agricultural products. The influx of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has destabilizing consequences on the operation of local governments. Political and military interference from former colonial powers and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as peace-maintenance operations in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali preclude any pragmatic preparation of a future united, peaceful and prosperous Africa. The third rubric, exploring the role of culture and intellectuals, asks the programmatic question: 'What should be done?'

Debates on the role of Africa in the expanding globalized world are taking shape in different cultural and intellectual contexts. With significant variations between countries, African institutions of higher education are generally underfunded and have been unable to play their rightful role as laboratories of ideas. Narrow State boundaries affect the nature and scope of the ideas explored in different forums. New positive developments are nonetheless taking place. Free movement of people and goods is now in place in West Africa. The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area was signed recently in Kigali, Rwanda, on 21 March 2018, by 44 heads of State and government.

Section 3, 'Africa at the Turn of the 3rd Millennium: Challenges and Dynamics', coordinated by Faranirina V. Rajaonah, comprises 22 contributions organized into four rubrics. The first rubric focuses on demography and urbanization. It explores the implications of African population growth in terms of economics, public health through the lenses of epidemiology, food security and urban growth, both in average-sized towns as well as megalopolises. The second rubric deals with issues of gender and generations. The assembled contributions discuss patterns of age and generation successions in sampled countries, the integration of African college graduates in Russia, social and economic landscapes, institutionalized social promotion as well as women in education and their increased roles and visibility in public affairs, both on national and international scenes. The third rubric, on partnership, envy and integration, explores different aspects of regional integration as well as new opportunities offered by cooperation between Africa and the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Is this really an alternative to the predatory practices of dominant multinationals and the unilateral ukases of the Bretton Woods institutions? We will have to wait and see. Envy and the rush to African lands and the ensuing 'land-grabbing' are featured, and their implications assessed, along with an African perspective on migrations and development and the emerging new African financial hubs. Finally, the fourth rubric, 'Africa in Tempo with the World', delves into worldwide cultural circulations. These circulations are manifest in the emergence of new religious practices, such as Salafism and new Christianities, as well as in the worldwide appeal of black cosmopolitan aesthetics in African popular music, African cinema, fabrics and contemporary art.

The general picture that emerges from this volume is that of Global Africans and Afrodescendant communities on the move, slowly carving their paths and shaping their futures.

Conclusion

The project that has resulted in these three volumes was extraordinarily ambitious, original and inspiring. It aimed at setting a new way of writing history, taking into account current debates in social and human sciences, with epistemological ruptures and sustained reconceptualization. Competences and skills are available to move historical scholarship in new directions, in a multipolar world, rather than a closed relationship with the west. It is a fantastic challenge spelled out in the chapters of these three volumes.

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GLOBAL AFRICA TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION

Hilary BECKLES

Introduction

The concept of 'Global Africa', within the context of the *General History of Africa* (GHA) publication project, erupted and took centre-stage during the Meeting of Experts on the Development of Volume IX held in Addis Ababa from 20 to 22 May 2013. As a lead advocate of the concept in the discussion, my proposition was intended to be at once celebratory and critical. The project was first launched in 1964, and eight volumes were published by 1999, which is an extraordinary academic achievement. Some 350 eminent interdisciplinary scholars, but mostly historians of Africa, had successfully executed the seminal literary series in a sensational fashion.

But there was considerable concern throughout Africa's diasporas that the magnificent potential of the project had fallen short and would be fulfilled only when it took greater conceptual cognizance of the epic history of Africans beyond the continent's shores. The significance of the globalization in the commodity trade in enslaved African labour and people, for example, before and during the tragedy of the transatlantic holocaust, was considered a critical missing link. Diaspora scholars especially insisted that African communities are to be found everywhere on Planet Earth, a reality they thought should have found epistemic focus and empirical expression in the texts of these histories of Africa.

Critically promoting the concept of 'Global Africa' was intended, therefore, to engender an academic pause in the trajectory of the project, to be followed by the adoption of a revised agenda that would embrace the global paradigm in depth. One of the five objectives of the grand *General History of Africa* was to stimulate the awareness of the ties that unite African people globally and to recognize their shared values. It seemed clear that this objective had not been met fully in the eight published volumes. The push was for a dedicated ninth volume that would remedy and repair the legacies of diasporic marginalization associated with the eight prior volumes.

Thus, diaspora scholars promoted the 'Global Africa' agenda, beginning in Addis Ababa and on to Brazil where the concept was workshopped, resolved and approved. Africans, on leaving the continent, voluntarily and by force of arms, had been written out of Africa's history. This tragic circumstance needed to be recognized and reversed. People neither walk out on, nor sail away from their history. The agreed Volume IX would address specifically global migration, and the emergence over time and across space the empirical dimensions and epistemology of 'Global Africa', treated as a new and innovative paradigm especially for historians of all African people.

Social science scholars living and working on the continent, and beyond, had long been developing conceptual tools to examine and illuminate the impact of global migration on popular identity and political ontology. The analytic tools they produced generated contentious concepts, methodologies and measurements. However, everywhere, there was discursive dissatisfaction with the theoretical and empirical constraints found in mainstream historical narratives. In the second half of the twentieth century, African historiography was institutionalized in university research agendas, history curricula and teaching pedagogies. It was adjudged in the diaspora to be excessively continent-centred, with an affinity to over-utilize the concept of 'creole' to cover global communities created by voluntary migrants and enchained exported souls. The historiography, from a diasporic perspective, was considered as statist and static, alienating and unstimulating, until now (MacGaffey, 1986; Konadu, 2010).

This introduction to Volume XI addresses frontally these discursive features of African historical scholarship and calls for the formal integration of the global journeys of African peoples. It critiques the traditional categories of seeing, thinking and writing. It is an assertive call for a new, coherent global African history, and an unravelling and discrediting of old dichotomous histories. It rejects polarities found in traditional historical narratives that support normative cultural and cosmological differences ascribed to African peoples in their geographic dispersions.

The authors of these chapters, whose work serves here to lay claim to the urgent need to move forward with integrative insights rather than preserve celebrated historiographic traditions, are neither easily grouped nor conceptually corralled. Indeed, the theoretical threads that bind them, in the absence of any coherence and consensual clarity around Global Africa, may not be immediately obvious. Hence, the editorialized call for openness, as if on a friendly frontier.

The narrative thread

Essays are presented in three categories that seek to promote the call for a conscious, conceptual transition from African to Global African history. They begin with an epistemological forum in which old and new ideas about Africa and diasporas are able to confront each other, creating an elastic space in which the notion of Global Africa is historicized and theorized. This recasting of analytic boundaries is presented as both lived conditions and a reimagined world of Africanness.

This forum, edited by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, inevitably reflects a diversity of dimensions that captures at once the fluidity and concreteness of the global dispersion of African epistome and cultural energy. The framework constitutes a unique and transformative approach that brings into sharper focus the important issues around global African identity. The very nature of the epistemic production enables academic global access and agency. In turn, it stimulates the conceptual creativity of these historians of African journeys.

In her summary, Coquery-Vidrovitch interrogates the idea of Global Africa as an organizing tool for twenty-first century Pan-African discourse. She finds multiple challenges in its usage arising from its casual and specific application. The borders between global Africa and pan-Africa are considered porous and potentially misleading. The absence of conceptual clarity, as a result, has blurred the very notion of an epistemic transition. A critical part of the recognized difficulty is understanding the enormous significance of the evolution of African diasporic post-colonial communities into nation states. Such nations, particularly those in the Caribbean, are older than those in ancestral Africa. Together, they pursued the same post-colonial nation-building status within the context of the Western modernity project. In modern African states, the tendency has been to see diaspora communities as scattered communities in search of cultural coherence and identity, thus producing a historiography that is spiritually, conceptually and empirically unembraced within and across those spaces.

Global Africa, then, as a concept, seeks to imagine formerly diasporic colonized communities as equals rather than peripheral to African post-colonial nations. While Coquery-Vidrovitch believes that traditional Pan-Africanism, as a coherent body of ideas and action, could accommodate the eruptive reality of Global Africa, she recognizes the need to include and embrace diasporic demands for cultural and epistemic equality. In effect, Global Africa gives demographic diffusion, and the radical cosmology of creolization, its literary license.

Section II sets up an interactive conversation that features some of the finest writings on the contemporary condition of Africans within the continent and beyond its physical parameters. Challenging the idea of 'border' within the spaces occupied by Africans, as diaspora and continent, these essays suggest a new way of gestating geography by focusing instead on African communities as worlds within African cosmologies. Edited by Tayeb Chenntouf, these essays delve into the specific challenges Africans on the continent are facing and will continue to face in the medium to long term in a globalized world. While he sees a growing anxiety about their capacity to cope, there is clearly evidence of phenomenal innovativeness arising from their refusal to be further marginalized. Furthermore, he recognizes an emerging global Africanity that draws upon the intellectual and entrepreneurial vitality of Africans everywhere they have formed communities.

Chenntouf specifies the constraints to twenty-first century 'development' – both internal and external – as articulated by positivist portrayals of a people with a greater memory of colonial oppression than national achievements. In contrast to China, for example, and to a lesser extent India, African state systems and power are still undeveloped, vulnerable, weak and dependent on Western global centres. But, for Chenntouf, there is scope for optimism in the proven record of community resilience that constitutes sources of tremendous energy for the journey to equalitarian development. For example, he argues that South Africa and Nigeria are promoting industrial agendas with promising potential for super-power hubs in Global Africa networks and, of course, in Western capitalism and South-South alliances.

For Chenntouf, the idea of Africa's global emergence, driven by its favourable demographic profile, energy industry and relevant raw materials for industrialization, represents sources of a new centring of Africa within Global Africa, representing both a blessing and a bruising for diasporic nations that demand equality in any twenty-first century Global Africa paradigm. Chenntouf's reasoning is at once rational and respectful of optimism.

In contrast, the colonial concept of Africa as representing inertia, and not participating in the pulsating global changes around its physical and philosophical

self, has no defenders. Disruptively, a new geometry is presented that thematically connects communities in Africa with their dispersed 'family', in a 'cousin culture' that knows no boundaries. The suggestion is that bonds of blood and the footprints of spirits are neither meaningfully diluted nor erased by colonialism.

Section III focuses on Africa on the move, energized by grassroots movements in quiet subtle moments, Africa is shaping the contemporary world and is both a witness and a voice to an African global sense and sensibility. Edited by Faranirina Rajaonah, this section skilfully presents critical notions of Africa in modernity with specific foci on race and the politics of global liberation. Ideas are presented discursively for dissection, revealing a residual need to reject the persistent idea of African victimhood. Filling the void is a vision of Africanness that has infused every stage of the globalizing world.

Rajaonah's framework and analysis begin with the pressing need to dispose of the duality endemic to Africa's globality. The world has long claimed that Africa, at some level of engagement and for millennia, was driven to know the world. Writing African history, then, should move on from any attachment to internal hegemonic localism. In this regard, Global Africa, noted Rajaonah, should be seen as both an activist and a core concept, which has the potential for extraordinary resilience. Its promotion as an alternative to a twenty-first-century 'second Pan-Africanism' will inevitably generate notions of historical discontinuity.

But the political fracturing of twentieth-century Pan-Africanism in the face of aggressive, post-apartheid Western imperialism in Africa, and in the nations of democratized diasporas, has created the ontological opportunity that made space to recognize the 'elephant in the room', namely, the unifying, real revolutionary potential of 'Global Africa' as the new rationality. Rajaonah writes cautiously of the need to renew Pan-Africanism rather than call for its abandonment. Critically, she sees the idea of Global Africa as intrinsic to African history rather than an alternate paradigm.

The African Union's inclusion of the diaspora as the sixth African subregion, for example, is interpreted by Rajaonah as progressive proof of the organic evolution of Africa's globality. In the diasporas, however, the inclination has been to read the strategic reform as a tactical attempt to freeze the oppressive duality that is structurally inherent in the conception of Mother Africa as the core, and 'creole communities' as peripheral.

Despite the positive, progressive implication of this analytic confrontation, Rajaonah remains deeply disturbed rather than merely concerned. She sees twenty-first-century globalization as charged up to financially enchain Africans everywhere. She references global networks of financial corporations that

promote Africa's foreign debt while advocating for discursive development paradigms that seek to valorize exploitative commercial access to its human and natural resources in ways detrimental to any notion of Global Africa. She imagines little room for development in Africa, but sees greater potential in the diaspora, hence her attachment to the concept of Global Africa. For her it is the vehicle that can move all Africans away from the colonial structure, shedding the baggage of Eurocentrism.

In this way, the perception of the African as an enchained, enslaved passenger of European colonizing missions is therefore seen as moribund in meaning as the notion of the dark, frozen, tropical continent. Alive and liberated is the African who is globally recognized, a transformative figure in the world it has long shaped, and acknowledged for their creativity in the evolution and survival of humanity. This twenty-first-century Global Africa perspective represents, therefore, an empowering time that shines a light on the role of Africans. The intellectual frameworks that support and hold together this structure therefore hosts this emerging literature on African power and its presence in multiple worlds.

The broadest possible understanding of geography underpins the concept of Global Africa. The challenge undertaken here has been to bring about an understanding of what physical dispersion has meant for African life, culture and consciousness (Morrison, 1992). Decades of discussions around global spaces defined as the African diaspora, for example, have created a sense that dispersed African communities around the world are in a more aggressive state of cultural transformation and evolution than those in Africa. The chapters suggest that there is no discernible, static sense of self in African communities. The notion of mobility abroad (and not at home) undermines the specificities of cultural formation everywhere. In all communities and on all continents, there are references to commonalities in the politics of movements like civil rights, economic empowerment, Pan-Africanism, and post-colonial liberation. These actions can be identified in specific spaces in diverse communities, constituting coherent ideological moments over a millennium (Brazier and Mannur, 2003; Cohen, 1997).

The issue of scholars privileging specific African diasporas is considered a divisive yet significant development. Gilroy's work, *The Black Atlantic*, for example, forcefully centres the Anglo-language of 'New World' diasporas, which features massive African transatlantic enslavement. The impact of his intervention was wide and swift. Critiques of his narrative generally make reference to his 'Western' pedagogical perspective. Recent research has skillfully revealed a 'Black Pacific', a 'Black Indian Ocean' and a 'Black Mediterranean', which will greatly facilitate

the comparative analysis necessary to refine Global Africa. Today, Africa then, is embedded in multi-layered global contexts that exist physically and are challenging phenomenologically (Gilroy, 1993, 2000a, 2000b).

In addition, the tendency has been for historians of Africans peoples to be less formal in the specification of diasporic issues, such as racism, ethnicity, economic marginalization and cultural delegitimization. Their willingness to centre Africa in a vague fashion, within diaspora discussions, is now considered problematic. In this regard, the history essays in this volume attempt to catch up with current discourses in the social sciences. This volume seeks to integrate all Africans within an intellectual strategy that makes room for new rhetorical opportunities (Zezeza, 2005).

In this new space, there is a race to reject traditional analyses that minimize and marginalize diasporas in the monumental thrust of continental empiricism. In the social sciences, the focus has been on finding innovative ways of 'getting Africa back into African studies' and, critically, 'African studies back in Africa' (Konadu, 2006). While 'African studies' have recently been cast aside in preference for 'Africana studies' as a more effective way of imagining diasporas in both hemispheres, this shift favours a deeper critical conversation around the limitations of the 'homeland-diaspora' dichotomy. Consequently, it has been said: 'African studies focused on the geographical entity of Africa rather than the movement and development of its people, thus suggesting that Africans who were forcibly brought to the United States and elsewhere stopped being Africans' (Konadu, 2006).

All history is revisionist. It is perspective shaped by consensus that presents history as a tense and turbulent experience. This volume calls for an examination of African history through a global lens. Its boundaries reach far beyond the continent, yet it is also introspective. 'Colony' and 'country' are imagined together but are invested with different values. The colonial concept of 'creole', for example, as a de-tribalized, trans-ethnic, 'socially dead' person of no fixed ethnicity is no longer considered a diaspora creation. The chapters presented illustrate that the concept has long been applicable to African port communities, and recently to the inner cities of many African states (Palmer, 2000).

This volume celebrates the urge to revise the idea of 'creole' in Africa and its diasporas, fully cognizant of the fact that the long-established notion of their inauthenticity is driving the call for a new Global Africa paradigm. The rejection of 'privileging' in Africa or in diasporas is the conceptual cornerstone of this call. Equally dismissed is the practice of using an 'African essence' barometer by which African global communities were measured, a kind of litmus test that measured

tribal, cultural content and its retention. These aspects are examined in 'case studies' that assess the African presence globally (Edwards, 2001).

Stuart Hall (2003) has insisted on the idea of a migrant consciousness mobilized by multiple identities and, therefore, replete with complex 'histories'. This approach found little traction among historians of African diasporas, particularly those in the Atlantic context. An exception can be found in the social history of Brazil where scholars have effectively applied Hall's concept, setting out typologies to explain the evolution of the African presence. Writing African history in this specific postcolonial context cannot escape the conclusion that Africa exists deep within the genealogical awareness of most citizens whose cultural connections, though spatially severed from the continent, are carried in every aspect of their everyday life (Hall, 2003).

Equally disruptive is the comparative study that highlights conceptual similarities between Africans in the Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius, Madagascar and Reunion with those of the Mediterranean. Issues of multiple identity, the idea of proximity rather than 'far-flung', offshore and onshore, all raise probing questions about distance as a determining feature in diasporic formation and cultural creolization. Many of these societies, which began with African enslavement on large sugar plantations, reflect experiences found in the 'Black Atlantic', though comparisons are quickly exhausted. It has been an easier task to align and integrate these 'in sight' diasporas into the mainstream of African empirical history, which has privileged the power of proximity and its related concept of 'line of sight' (Segal, 2001).

It is essential to challenge how distance is discussed when assessing diaspora integration into African history to facilitate the concept of Global Africa taking shape in future histories. Research into African diasporas that exist further east into Asia, beyond the inner rim, will yield rich returns in much the same way that the concept of 'Black Atlantic' bolstered five decades of historicism. Centuries before the 'Black Atlantic' came into being, Africans were traced in East Asia, thereby bringing China and Japan into focus, as Prof. Shiha de Silva Jayasuriya has shown. Equally significant is the African penetration of Russia, beginning with scattered communities along the Black Sea. These frontiers in African historiography are challenged and considered prime targets for deeper engagement (Segal, 2001).

Refusing to reason about cultural retention is as aggressive as the colonial creation of creolity. Pan-Africanism, for example, rendered futile the idea of geography as culturally hegemonic. Africans everywhere forged a 'politic' as the essential strategy for collective action within the specific context of communities. At the core of incipient Pan-Africanism were global diasporas, home to an

emerging international capitalism driven by the criminal trans-oceanic and continental trades in African lives.

The vast majority of some 15 million Africans who survived the Maafa, the holocaust of the Atlantic Middle Passage, were taken from West and Central Africa. The sons and daughters of 'Guinea', as African communities were called by Europeans, collectively represent the cultural construct now referred to as the 'Black Atlantic'. This relatively 'new' world hosted old African identities that were rooted in a traditional vision of community, civil relations of justice, and the moral authority of ancestors. Dispersion over land and sea for survivors, therefore, meant the building of bridges over which some of Africa's cosmologies travelled and brought with them the continent's most matured thoughts.

Traditions of Pan-Africanism thus emerged against the background of the enslavement of Africans across the Sahara, into the Mediterranean, through the Middle East, and far beyond the Indian Ocean into Far East Asia. Everywhere Africans went, or were taken, they emerged with a political paradigm built around the ideal of self-determination and the celebration of their culture. The movement of bodies was a profound relocation of epistemologies that served to secure the intellectual and political consciousness necessary for the monumental, multi-continental Pan-African movement. It was reconstituted everywhere as a barrage against bondage, and the mythical ritualization of an idyllic 'motherland'; the home of a spiritual essence and a hell-raising battle for salvation. Pan-Africanism gave globalizing Africans an ethos filled with unrelenting political energy.

The very idea of Black collectivism, of African global identification and the cultural idealization of Africa were in themselves sufficient to frame Pan-Africanism as the first phase of Global Africa. The political activation of the belief that Africans must be freed of colonial rule and all forms of European military domination, and restored to their prior development trajectory, was a commitment crafted to correctly redress the contemporary world. The global dispersion provided the fuel that fanned the flames. The fire was not confined to plantation diasporas; rather, it blazed a vision of liberty that empowered all cultures within sight of its corridors.

Diasporas, as sources of Pan-Africanism, therefore brought forth the definition of Africans as dichotomized persons existing in a 'home and abroad' typology. Western anthropology has provided the main tools for this early explanatory framework. The 'creole', separated by oceans of oppression and deemed de-tribalized, diasporically, fought back with intellectual weapons that gave birth to Africana studies. Rejecting notions of decentring and dissipation, 'creole' communities effectively railed against the idea of cultural dilution and seeing themselves as devalued due to the distance of their homeland (Esedebe, 1982).

The double description of diaspora as de-Africanized and cast adrift drove some early Pan-Africans to descend deeper into the disrespected dimensions of the dichotomy. Forced to come to terms with the notions of 'creolization', 'detrribalization', 'inter-tribalization' and 'trans-Africanization' discourses in the Black Atlantic, the diaspora asserted their belief in 'double identity'. The historical concept behind African creole also served to empower European colonizers in the Americas, driving the belief that their African 'chattel' in the colonies were lesser people, devoid of a recognized language and literature. Some Pan-Africans clung to their performance culture; others took to the woods, mountains and caves to save traces and elements of their Africanness that could not be stored in the soul.

The centre-periphery paradigm infantilized the diasporic creole and needed little clarification, as the break in cultural lineage and legacy were clear for all to see. The 'mother' had been raped and plundered, and her children creolized, manacled and murdered. The crime was stored in the cargo holds, and tears filled oceans, deserts, rivers, lakes and lagoons. But the hot springs in the African soul erupted in its declaration of 'oneness' for the onward march (Ayodele, 2006).

Diasporas have increasingly refused to accept creolity as 'cultural inferiority', a sense of 'lesser than' and therefore reductive. Pan-Africanists and now global Africans maintain the vigil. Even in the face of a mother's occasional ontological scorn, the child looked beyond itself and identified its political maturity within the mantra of her maternity. As Pan-Africanism took shape, creole siblings promoted their own rivalry; language quickly came into being, which also reflected the divisive thinking of the colonizer. The creole, said the enslaver, was de-tribalized; we agree, replied the creole, but look out for our sociological sword as it swings. The African identity is being stretched to the limit in order to breathe life and to embody Global Africa as a praxis of identity and existential being.

All Africans, whether evolving diasporic creoles or crystallized citizens on the continent, are called upon to focus on the post-modernity metaphysical project – Global Africa. We must deem as trivial all tribal identity discourses in Africa and colour-coded creolity in diasporas. Global Africa is demanding an amnesia of distance, setting aside the disconnection and loss which were suppressed, even if temporarily, until the battle is won. For these reasons Pan-Africanism could not have been, and was not intended to be, a 'popular grassroots movement' or an ideology based on the common reality of everyday life. It was not framed as a philosophy for social living but a call to arms. The idea that freedom has been fulfilled has now spawned a new reflection that has led inexorably to the concept of Global Africa as a twenty-first-century way of making African history.

Shattered expectations

Then came Durban, and the insurgence, once again, of the diaspora at the 2001 United Nations Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in South Africa. The world gathered to examine the legacies of colonialism, chattel slavery, native genocide and neocolonial relations that had remained in place, still defining the post-liberation era of African history. Diasporas arrived at Durban with an agenda to discuss reparatory justice for the crimes against humanity committed against Africans. African governments broke with diasporas and their own civil society, to join forces with the 'West', sending shivers down the spine of Pan-African organizers and scholars. The shared popular vision and unity, built over 500 years, was shattered by the political leaders.

African leaders told the 'West' that they had nothing to fear in terms of reparations from the diaspora, who were cast in the conference as disruptors. The territory we know today as the Nigerian State had lost more than four million souls to the sugar plantations in the West Indies. Its president aligned with the 'West' against the West Indian call for reparations. Likewise, with the territory now ruled by the state of Ghana, which was gutted by European slave trade companies, many of which were owned by the royals of Europe, had its president stand against Barbados, the first 'Gold Coast' Atlantic diaspora. The Senegal river, from where it all began, the route that sent the first captives to the galleys of slave ships bound for the Atlantic, was represented by a president aggressive in his objection to reparatory justice for the diaspora. But civil society throughout Africa stood in solidarity with global diasporas and spoke against their state leaders. African governments and their societies were at odds. Their public legitimacy was challenged (Beckles, 2013).

The crisis drove a wedge through the body politic of the old Pan-Africanism. Erupting from the ashes of the aftermath is the 'Global Africa' paradigm. It seeks to rescue Pan-Africanism from its internal contradictions. At the centre of this new idealism is a liberating horizontalism: the twenty-first-century face of Pan-Africanism. African and diaspora Black states now move as equal partners in the Global African world. Gone is the hierarchy of core and periphery. The diaspora has found freedom in its rejection. As home to developing nations with their own internal concerns, for the first time, it was forced look more deeply inward.

Global Africa thus seeks to integrate dozens of Black majority nations, and communities on multiple continents, all seeking solidarity around a range of ideas and actions that facilitate their collective well-being. Political and

economic mutualism has replaced cultural hierarchy. African states can now be seen more clearly for what they have become, and diasporas are less obscured by the mysticism of their yearning for ancestral recognition.

When French-speaking Africa, for example, aligns with France in the UN against the Caribbean quest for the independence of Martinique and Guadeloupe, the vote is not interpreted as a regression. When Angola minimizes its commercial relations with Cuba, its revolutionary partner against Portuguese aggression, and maximizes its investment in Lisbon, expediency is understood as the new Global African normal.

It was inevitable that twentieth-century Pan-Africanism would shed its hegemonic political and military skin and help frame an evolved discourse. The new network of cultural and commercial alliances is devoid of a liberationist neocolonial impulse and is shaped by a more familiar focus on domestic nation-building imperatives. The conflation of parochialism and nationalism is the new infrastructure for Global Africa. It challenges Pan-Africanists to choose between tradition and change. It will be no easy task for scholars to imagine or embrace the positives in this approach and to contemplate its epistemic power. But all would agree that Durban was the moment of this ontological awakening.

More than fifty nation-states were created in Africa out of the twentieth-century Pan-African paradigm, of which the diaspora produced dozens. Their leaders stood apart in the next phase of liberation, that is, building the reparatory justice movement as the largest political strategy of the twenty-first century. The opportunity now exists for scholars to frame multiple narratives of Global Africa as an organizing and operational discourse capable of promoting a better understanding of the contemporary world and the place of Africans in it.

This volume, separate from earlier concepts of diaspora, is at once a declaration of existential conditions and an attempt to develop an evolving epistemic field. It speaks to both moment and movement. It seeks to frame a future path that offers historians of the African people greater options for creative thinking and writing.

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SECTION I

GLOBAL AFRICA TODAY

INTRODUCTION

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch

The first section of this volume devoted to contemporary Global Africa aims to re-examine our knowledge in order to highlight the importance of Africa and its interrelationships with diasporas. Many new avenues of reflection have emerged since the earlier volumes of the GHA were written. This first part is not only about updating knowledge ('Writing Africa', which is the objective of volumes IX to XI) in this volume covering the contemporary period up to the time of writing. It is first and foremost about showing what the foundations of this historical reflection are now ('Thinking Africa'). In order to place Africa at the heart of global history, we must first define the principles of good research in African history with a dual objective that is not simple. On the one hand, we must engage with the most important currents of world history that need to be known and used; they have evolved considerably since the beginning of this century, and published African historiography has lagged somewhat behind these international changes in knowledge. But on the other hand, and at the same time, it is out of the question to repeat what has been done too often in the past: applying recipes from outside without filtering them through the prism of data, heritage and realities specific to Africa.

This section therefore emphasizes the necessary changes and how to approach them. To this end, we have taken a variety of approaches: first, we have devoted several in-depth epistemological articles to establishing the principles that are

1 Mabankou, A. (ed). 2017. *Penser et écrire l'Afrique aujourd'hui*. Paris, Seuil.

essential to the new avenues of reflection to be explored. Second, we show how historians now intend to renew the study of politics, this time focusing on a few examples from across the continent. The third theme is the increasingly widespread process of cultural exchange and sharing, involving the concepts of hybridization, creolization and even miscegenation in various forms, which nevertheless share at least some common issues, as this process is both universal and unique in each case. Added to this is a perspective that has been little analysed until now: not that of Africa *and* its diasporas, but that of Africa *as seen by* its diasporas. This implies a somewhat inverted vision. Finally, the last theme proposes to problematize the African future of today and tomorrow, through examples from across Africa as a whole.

New lines of thought

Souleymane Bachir Diagne immediately restores Africa to its multicultural entirety, with its very long history and the richness of its languages, peoples and cultures, from ancient Berber Ifriqiya to international Pan-Africanism and from there to the African realities of contemporary globalization. This long-term view of time allows us to grasp the importance of measuring all the developments that have led to the present day in order to understand contemporary changes. Today's world is itself in constant motion towards a future whose long-term analysis allows us to better understand and experience the plurality of identities.

Bogumil Jewsiewicki, in order to appreciate this past, warns of the complex and sometimes contradictory relationships between the writing of history, which we are attempting to do here, and the contribution of memories. These are essential tools and sources for the historian, but they are not history as historians strive to reconstruct and understand it. Resources of memory are even more important in African history – history written today – because they are based on an ancient and profound process of oral transmission. It remains difficult, however, to identify the points of articulation between the various methods of producing knowledge about the past. We still lack analyses of social relations in the past based on the model of *lieux de mémoire* (places of memory) initiated by Pierre Nora². This is due to the lack of analysis of the local reception of written history both in schools and universities and, until recently, to the

2 Nora, P. (ed). 1986. *Les lieux de mémoire*. Paris, Gallimard.

limited number of national/regional histories written in a manner other than the Western model of the 'national narrative' – precisely what this volume seeks to address.

Pierre Kipré demonstrates the extent to which knowledge is in flux today. The places of production of African thought highlight a desire for a dynamic and renewed expression of global Africanity that can be seen in the theoretical advances made by intellectuals on the continent and in the diaspora. Increasingly recognized for their talents, often surpassing the contributions of previous generations, some African researchers, writers, artists and filmmakers are introducing new paradigms to their perception of Africa, to their aesthetics, and regarding the modernity and future of Africanity. However, the challenges remain numerous and are far from being surmounted.

In the following essay, Ibrahima Thioub dissects one of these challenges, based on the case of the Atlantic slave trade: everything in today's African societies that reveals the impact of yesterday's slavery. We began to renew the questions and methodological approaches in the study of the slave trade in African societies, at the political, economic and demographic level, in the process of absorbing external shocks. However, until now, we have neglected the cultural dimensions that have affected all aspects of the internal social life of African societies, whether in the religious sphere, forms of worship or divination, the administration of justice, or even in the meaning of so-called *joking* kinship relationships and the hidden meaning of royal celebrations. This analysis permits an appreciation of a topic recently emphasized by Joseph Tonda³: an imaginary Africa filled with darkness that 'colonizes' the souls of our contemporaries. In other words, the fabrication of 'Black' as a negative image is not just by the Americas and old Europe: Africans on the continent have helped and may continue to co-produce this racial representation, which they have absorbed through its long imposition, not only through colonization but also through slavery.

Myriam Cottias extends this analysis to the entire historiography of Atlantic slavery. The objectivity of this history has been thwarted by divergent and even contradictory memories, which began with a generalized denial by the various actors, descendants of both the enslaved and the slave owners. Breaking the silence was one of the central arguments of the UNESCO programme The Slave Route, launched in 1994 in Ouidah, Benin on the proposal of Haiti. It was only after

3 Tonda, J. 2015. *L'impérialisme postcolonial : Critique de la société des éblouissements*. Paris, Karthala. (Les Afriques).

this date, thanks to the demands of the Afro-descendants, that historic initiatives emerged. They were boosted by the declarations of the Durban conference in 2001, and by the initiative of the Senegalese historian Ibrahima Thioub at the Congress of the Association of African Historians (Bamako 2001), which led to the Pan-African Congress on the history of slavery in African societies (Nairobi 2014). They have been helped by decisive laws: those of 2003 in Brazil or 2001 in France, introducing African history into the compulsory school curriculum. As a result, the work of remembrance now contributes to the recognition of the importance of the history of slavery, a recognition that is expressed, among other things, by the memorial monuments that are being erected all over the world, but whose significance is not necessarily the same in Africa and in the West, for the descendants of enslaved people and the descendants of slave traders, and by the current movements demanding 'reparation'.

In his concise contribution, Frederick Cooper presents the ambiguities and paradoxes of colonialism, from the European powers' conquest of Africa – minus Ethiopia and Liberia – to independence. He presents the competing options: 'exploit' the countries and their resources, 'civilize' the local populations, but ensure that they remain in their place, submissive and compliant with the colonial military-administrative apparatus; or Christianize and Europeanize the local elites, ensuring their participation in the colonial model for Christian missions and humanitarian organizations. Between these two options, however, a third way emerged, that of the political awareness of local elites and the struggle for independence, fueled by world events, the two world wars and the Great Depression (1929-30). These struggles first succeeded in the British colonies, then the French colonies, and continued for several years in the Portuguese and South African colonies.

The following selections are also innovative. Those of Vincent Bonnacase suggest questioning the concept of *poverty* defined by modern international institutions: what does it mean to be poor in Africa, and is the official international definition the only one possible? The same question arises about the concept of *food insecurity* examined by Alpha Gado Boureima. In both cases, an accurate analysis of the human and social context is required, which does not necessarily fit with the definitions adopted without sufficient critical thinking by experts from all sides who study African processes.

The next topic, in the context of African historical research, is an important new development (as it was absent from previous volumes): the role of women in society, in what has become a classic field of study, *gender relations*. The article by sociologist Fatou Sow provides a precise and modern overview of gender

issues in Africa. Women are no longer just mothers or providers; they have become agents, even drivers, of social, economic and political life and should now be studied as such. Esi Sutherland-Addy gives them a voice through a recent, rich, varied, and often overlooked, literary history.

Religious revivals

Finally, it is impossible to consider any aspect of African history without questioning the place of religion: religions that are most often intertwined between so-called 'traditional' cults and religions imported in the past or more recently, whose encounter will sometimes have unexpected effects in the African context. Wyatt MacGaffey demonstrates how predictions made at the end of the twentieth century have proved to be obsolete. Focusing instead on Christian religions (Catholicism and Protestantism) he also shows how so-called 'traditional' religions have become so diversified that they can no longer be described as such. This term is nevertheless retained in English (in the form of ATRs, African Traditional Religions), while the French language now prefers to use the plural '*religions du terroir*' (local religions) to emphasize their roots in the past, but with a wide variety of recent forms. These have spread outside Africa, encountering and interacting symbiotically with other religious currents of all denominations, both in the diasporas and in the rest of the world. African religions are now as influential in the world as Christianity was in Africa in the last century.

Olusegun Morakinyo expands on this topic of 'new African religions'. He demonstrates that the reductive qualifier of 'new religions' is ambiguous because these spiritualities structure everyday life and social and political values being developed today. They are also connected to other trends, such as a strong reliance on witchcraft, and link ancestral heritage with more recent practices in the Caribbean in particular (voodoo and Candomblé). He raises the question of the continuation and spread of these movements: how can we maximize the advantages generated by these new religions to favour Global Africa?

Joseph Tonda focuses on the analysis of popular 'idioms' in which the political and the economic are expressed. The magical view of economic, political and social facts is undeniable in the African universe. It has different names – witchcraft, evil eye, bad luck, magic, curse, etc. Reality always has two sides, one empirical and visible, and the other mystical and hidden. This psychic dimension has strong implications for colonial and current fantasies about Africans, men

and women, in Africa and in the diasporas. The hyper-sexualization of Africans is one facet of what Joseph Tonda calls Black imperialism. Many examples presented in this remarkable contribution illustrate the importance of this psychic reading of historical facts.

Reviving political studies

The next topic, that of politics, so prevalent in today's Africa, gives rise to several developments that highlight the complexity and hence the richness of current research focused on new paradigms. Mamadou Fall, using Senegambia as an example, shows the inadequacy of the concept of *ethnicity* invented by colonial ethnologists that petrified a shifting political and social reality. During the nineteenth century, Westerners denied African political parties the right to describe themselves as a 'state', as this was a concept that could only relate to the West. So, the Greek word *ethnos* (meaning people) was used to replace the phrase 'tribe' which was seen as negative. The colonial power wanted to define, map and territorialize these 'ethnic groups' and several were 'created' at that time. The concept of '*terroir*' is better to describe these political societies and relates to groups that recognized themselves as such, not just because they spoke the same language but also because they lived and exploited the same environment, which greatly contributed to constructing and identifying a common culture and identity. Therefore, the current difficulty is not going from 'ethnicity to a state', but from a 'political *terroir* culture to one of a nation-state', with a tendency towards inclusion rather than exclusion.

Pierre Kipré tackles the sensitive question of *nationalism*, a dangerous avatar in so-called identity research initiatives because it engenders an abhorrence of 'living together'. These are concepts that drew their arguments about the 'nation' and 'nationalism' from European ideology. This is demonstrated by the 'single party' or 'party-state' system of the early years of independence, which sought to respond to the difficulty of national integration with authoritarian administration of social diversity. In the immediate post-colonial era, 'nationalities' (formerly known as 'ethnic groups') were institutional spaces symbolized by the state, which sought to build the nation through the forced integration of communities within its territory. This led to the development of methods for creating and excluding 'foreigners'. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, violence continues to disrupt the project of nation-building, while national liberation struggles have enabled certain societies to develop a common reference point

and a catalyst for national construction (the idea of a 'rainbow nation' in South Africa). Today, demographic upheavals, ongoing changes and the divisions that accompany them, along with violence, point to a dimension of collective consciousness that remains poorly defined in post-colonial Africa.

Using the example of the Yoruba of Nigeria, Jean-Luc Martineau suggests another way to study the construction of the modern state: the processes of reciprocal manipulation of the legacies of the past, rigidified by colonization in the form of chiefdoms that today hold a large part of the political power. Through measures that were sometimes contradictory but often joint between colonial and local powers, the Yoruba *oba* have become one of the keys to a complex system that must be deconstructed in detail to understand its ins and outs; independence in 1960 did little to change the fundamentals of the relationship between the protagonists. The proliferation of administrative territories has generated a plurality of neo-identity ethno-urban references, the sum of which has constructed the contemporary pan-Yoruba regional space.

Continuing on the theme of the nation's conflictual origins, H  l  ne Charton considers the long history of Kenya, where access to land resources has structured power relations. The mobilization of ethnic rivalries for political ends has tragically highlighted the permanence of power practices rooted in the country's long history, where the invisible categories of ethno-nationalism, partly inherited from colonization, have been institutionalized by successive regimes since independence.

Finally, on the question of insularity, Tovonirina Rakotondrabe takes the case of Madagascar: what are the consequences for the process of nation-state building and the very idea of territory? Is the concept of insularity part of a collective unconscious or a deliberate assimilation of specificity? The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which includes R  union, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Mayotte and the Comoros, is struggling to achieve convincing results because of, among other factors, the great geographical, historical and cultural diversity of its member states and the lack of synergy between the island economies that comprise it. Have the absence of linear borders and Madagascar's turbulent relationship with the African continent contributed to forging an endogenous construction of the state and laying the foundations for a national consciousness? Despite some breaches, internal borders have remained intact in the post-colonial era for geo-historical, political and economic reasons. From the eighteenth to the twenty-first century, the country has evolved from natural borders (oceans) to the prevalence of internal insularity, shaped as much by history (wars of conquest, ethnic particularisms) as by geography

(compartmentalized relief) and by the shortcomings of the policies implemented by successive authorities, whose matrix is the excessive centralization of power and resources. All these factors make it difficult to establish the cohesion of a potentially emerging nation and to anchor a truly solid and sustainable national project in the territory.

A key theme: creolization, hybridization of cultures

The next topic follows naturally from the above: the prevalence of the concepts of creolization/hybridization/*métissage* (cultural mixing) seen in both Africa and the Caribbean. This is a recurring theme in all societies, but one that takes on particular importance in the context of Global Africa.

Dominique Thomas immediately tackles the ideas expressed on this subject by a series of African thinkers, from Léopold Sédar Senghor to Aimé Césaire, Paulin Hountondj and Achille Mbembé. Given internal mobility and international dispersion, the parameters of the continent are constantly being redefined in the intertwining of here and elsewhere, the presence of elsewhere in the here and vice versa, and this way of embracing the strange, the foreign and the distant, through the interpenetration of Africa as a continent, Africa as a diaspora, and Africa as a concept that is ultimately fluid and variable. Being Black refers to a transcontinental history, with Africa being the source of a diaspora scattered across the world. It is not something extra, it is something different. Being African in today's world and in the world of tomorrow means knowing how to reactivate, in the conditions of the time, these *resources of multiplicity, circulation and movement*.

Alan Copley examines how, from the nineteenth century onwards, an identity was constructed through a travelling community: Afro-Caribbean sailors across time and the ocean. They played an essential role in transmitting Pan-African ideas across space, as well as transferring international labour demands to the Atlantic world. None of this would have been possible without this Afro-Caribbean self-awareness born of a long history of hybridity.

Hence the interest of the following subject, which reverses the perspective. This time, we see Africa through the eyes of Caribbean people. This formidable task was undertaken by the Marxist thinker Walter Rodney – assassinated in his country, Guyana, in 1980 – to whom Aaron Kamugisha devotes his reflections. Rodney taught in both Jamaica and Dar es Salaam. Developing the idea of 'Black Power', he exerted his influence both in the Caribbean and on the African continent.

Alan Copley analyses the reasons for the complexity that underlies relationships of identity between Caribbeans and Africans from the continent, and which makes it difficult for them to adopt a common economic and geopolitical approach from the starting point of stories that diverged over time during many successive waves of immigration. Many Caribbean people do not feel the need for a visceral connection with '*Mother Africa*'. However, there are signs of the durability of common factors from the era of slavery to the phase of active resistance against colonization and segregation. In addition, this legacy doesn't just concern the descendants of Africans. It has spread across the whole of society because of the political dynamism of Pan-African ideas and movements. All Caribbean people feel the need to understand 'the compromise I am'.

Wariboko Waibinte analyses this compromise through the processes of evolution of black consciousness over time. The consciousness of being black was neither necessary nor, until colonization, felt in Africa, since the vast majority of Africans had always shared this characteristic of colour. In contrast, it has always been very strong in the Caribbean diasporas where, even though Africans outnumbered whites ten to one, they were continually discriminated against because of their colour. Due to the expansion and dominance of white racial theories, African Americans, more so than Africans on the continent, had to work to restore a positive image of their common continent of origin, based on their colour. Anti-Black racism legitimized by science spread throughout the West throughout the nineteenth century. This is why Pan-Africanism first emerged in the Americas, both in the Caribbean and in the United States, with connotations of liberation from white domination. Caribbean Pan-Africanism has a particular tone, heavily influenced in the nineteenth century by evangelists, then from the beginning of the twentieth century by great political thinkers, the most famous of whom include Edward W. Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey and George Padmore. Horton, a Jamaican missionary in Liberia, had already noted in 1921 that 'the black man will not be free until Africa is independent'. He could not have put it better: independence came rapidly in the 1960s, at the same time as desegregation began in the US (1963). This demonstrates the convergence between the transatlantic movements of Pan-Africanism.

We now come to the final part of this reflection: what about Global Africa today and in the future?

Visions of the future

Economist Samir Amin brings us back to the realities of today with perhaps exaggerated pessimism. Africa is the opposite of marginalized: it is even, contrary to global assertions, more integrated into the global system than any other region. Africa was integrated into the global system from the very beginning of its construction, by providing the world with the gold it needed since the High Middle Ages. During the mercantilist phase of capitalism (sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) the major periphery of the era was colonial America, where an outward-looking export economy was established, based on the exploitation of slaves. The slave trade assimilated vast areas of Africa south of the Sahara and the Americas into the global system in the most destructive way. Much of the continent's subsequent 'backwardness' is due to this form of integration that led to the dismantling of pre-existing organizations to be substituted by brutal military systems in a state of permanent warfare with one another. The next wave of Africa's integration into the global system occurred during the colonial period. The outcome would prove to be catastrophic, retarding the start of any agricultural revolution by a century. Nevertheless, having achieved independence, African peoples pursued development initiatives from 1960 onwards, the objectives of which were similar to those pursued in Asia and Latin America.

The dominant narrative suggests that these tragic realities are only temporary because increasing globalization would favour the emergence of countries in the South, including in Africa, which was considered to be 'the continent of the future'. It is still too early to know if African peoples have embarked upon this path of promised emergence. That is because no emergence can occur without a state policy based on a social bloc giving it legitimacy that is able to consistently implement a project to build a self-centred national system of production and strengthen its effectiveness through systematic policies to ensure that the vast majority of the working classes share in the benefits of growth. The factors of emergence are progressing, but *lumpen-development* processes remain a threat.

Heather Russell tackles global African modernisms with an obvious observation in mind: 'The original Africa no longer exists'. History is, in this sense, irreversible. The concept of a diasporic African culture perceived as an outcome of slavery, diluted and in perpetual change, emanating from an original and essential Africa that is therefore 'real' and retrievable, is highly problematic. On the other hand, the transfer of African cultures as expressed in Yoruba

cults and voodoo beliefs to the Americas has revealed philosophical principles that highlight contingency, fluidity, complexity and nuance. Via the conduit of the Bois Caïman ceremony (*Bwa Kayiman*) in Haïti, *voodoo*, *interpretation* and *insurrection* are interlinked. This synergy between philosophical thought, discourse and revolution is both a legacy and a promise. The same complexity is found in the making of African and African American quilts: there is a 'cultural hybrid', with multiple layers of meaning. By assembling geometric patterns, improvised abstract drawings, strips of fabric in vivid and melodious colours, diverse stitches, the role of the quilt maker is similar to that of an African griot as a historical resource, a cultural depository and a conduit for community-based stories. Hence, global African modernisms, in all their incarnations, reject the notion of a single concept of history and shatter any simplification of it and of any linear narrative voice.

Hélène Lauer questions her own identity and raises the issue of what Africans should call themselves.

These various economic, political and cultural considerations leave the field of possibilities open. The work to be done is far from complete; a considerable amount is left to do. The *sine qua non* condition, expressed in the texts that follow, is to ensure that we definitively break a number of bad habits inherited from the dominant historiography, which we can broadly describe as Eurocentric, practised for several centuries in both the West and Africa itself. Despite the undeniable progress made since the beginning of this century by so-called 'postcolonial' studies, which have stressed the need to study history from the perspective of the '*subaltern*', many traces of this remain unconsciously in our thinking, including in Africa, if only in the vocabulary used, which is too often taken from English, French or Portuguese translations, without immediately referring to the terms used by the African actors in this history in their original languages. This has led to the generalization of concepts that today need to be questioned, or even challenged, such as those of *ethnicity*, *state*, *chiefdom*, *tradition*, *race* and many others. This exercise in reflection is necessary in order to rethink a refocused, internalized history of Global Africa. It is no longer the world that offers an off-centre diagnosis of Africans and Afro-descendants, but rather Africans, the actors of their own history, who look at the world.

CHAPTER 1

THE CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF GLOBAL AFRICA

Souleymane Bachir Diagne

Introduction

What is happening and what will happen to African existence in its different modalities and to its influence in a world that has become finite, encircled by all sorts of flows – financial, economic, human, electronic and cultural – that are all aspects of globalization? What is the situation and what will be the future situation of the influence, or rather the value, of what we are, our ways of being in the world, these African faces of the human adventure that we present? Certainly, these questions have already been asked when responding to colonial negation. The answers were, for example, Negritude, the African personality and the Arab renaissance, so many figures of political and cultural nationalism, so many ways of saying identity, which we wanted to believe would all converge towards the realization of a Pan-African ideal. What about these answers and this ideal *today*? In other words, what do the answers become *today*, in a world where it is no longer an issue of negation, even if this sometimes reappears in the remarks by politicians of a different age, from the former colonial powers, when they allow that Africans have not sufficiently entered in history or that colonization was nothing more than the desire to share one's culture? It can be argued that from a reactive, mass Africanity, which was the response to colonial negation, we have now moved to a reflection suited to the demands of

a situation that requires Africanity be understood as open, diverse and plural. It will therefore be considered here that a shift occurred, from a sense of the African existence and presence as resistance, defense and illustration of an identity, to that of the question of futures and pluralism.

How was the idea, the ideal of a Global Africa, Africa as a whole, established? This is the first issue we will investigate. We will then examine the forms this ideal takes today.

Establishing Africa from its diaspora

Let's remember that the word '*Ifriqiyya*', '*Africa*' first described a territory around the historic city of Carthage. The Roman conquest after the last Punic War would spread the Latin name of '*Africa*' to Africa south of the Mediterranean and west of Egypt and Cyrenaica. The Europeans would later apply the name to the entire continent as it was revealed by circumnavigations.¹

So, this is how *Africa* was firstly a name given by the exterior, although its origin is Berber, to the purely geographic, objective reality of a continent. The history of this name would then be that of the subjective, cultural and political value which it assumed at the same time as it became an ideal, a project for those who discovered and called themselves 'Africans'. It was undoubtedly natural that this movement, this *becoming African*, first occurred within the diaspora that the slave trade had created in the New World. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the consciousness of Africa as a whole was born and has developed within the populations that were dragged from the continent by slavery, because this abduction was reflected by the removal of individual memories in favour of a Global African imagination. The slave, newly arrived in the Americas, who hoped to return 'to Guinea' at his death, is now the Black American who refers to Africa as an origin in general.

It was therefore first through the diaspora that Africa was thought of as global and took on a subjective value as a name of origin, the ultimate home, the mother herself. Thus, the cultural and political project that is Pan-Africanism was first defined as 'return' in the vision of the Jamaican Marcus Garvey (1887–1940).

1 Léonora Miano recalls the Berber origins of the name and notes the irony of situations where Maghrebis talk of Africa as if they were not living there themselves: 'the name by which our land is known', she writes, 'is of Berber origin, therefore continental. No matter that most Maghrebis living on the continent reserve the name *Africans* for *Sub-Saharans*.' (Miano, L. 2017. *De quoi l'Afrique est-il le nom?* In Mbembe, A. and Sarr, F. (eds). *Ecrire l'Afrique-Monde*. Paris and Dakar, Philippe Rey/Jimsaan, p. 102).

Marcus Garvey's Pan-Africanism was mainly that of an activist and agitator. It would fall to William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963) to turn it into a philosophy and a project focused on emancipation and cultural renaissance.

In 1900, in Westminster, an 'African Association' organized a meeting called 'Pan-African' thus creating the word. This meeting called for the rights of the natives of Africa to be respected. It was in Paris in 1919 that the first Pan-African *congress* would be held. The Deputy of Senegal, Blaise Diagne, provided assistance and support to its organization. The congress would demand the adoption of an international code which would protect the Africans of the continent from any abuse. It would be followed in 1921 by another congress in London, Brussels and Paris, where the important role of W. E. B. Du Bois would be confirmed. The same would apply to the third congress in London and Lisbon in 1923, then the fourth, which was held in 1927 in New York. This congress was marked by storm of controversy, which saw Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. Du Bois, among others, clash over the understanding of the slogan 'Africa for Africans', the second insisting on the rights of the native populations of the continent and considering that Garvey's view was instead of an Africa for the Afro-descendants of America. It should be noted that this congress recognized the anti-colonialism of the USSR, which then appeared as allied with the Africans in their struggle for emancipation.

Continuing from this point, the Manchester congress in 1945 would make Pan-Africanism a socialist project. The Trinidadian George Padmore (1903–1959) and the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972) played an important role in this meeting at the end of which Nkrumah presented a Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World which asserts 'the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny', demands that 'all colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control' and closes with a paraphrase from the Communist Party Manifesto: 'Colonial and suppressed peoples of the world, unite!'

The Pan-African project also gave itself a cultural basis that can be presented as the equation between *Africanity* and *Ethiopianity*. It is known that the ancient Greeks had named the peoples to the south of Egypt, the Nubians and more broadly Africans to the south of the Sahara, as *Ethiopians* (a word referring to 'burnt faces'). In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, an appropriation of this name took place in the diaspora, which saw 'Ethiopia' become a synecdoche to refer to Africa as a whole. When the Bible mentions Ethiopia, for example, in Psalm 68:31 where it says that 'Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands unto God', this name, *Ethiopia* is understood

as Africa in general.² W. E. B. Du Bois repeats this Biblical reference during his ‘commencement’ speech that he gave at Harvard in 1890. He finished his speech by declaring to the predominantly white auditorium: ‘You owe a debt to humanity for this *Ethiopia of the Outstretched Arm*, who has made her beauty, patience, and her grandeur, law.’³ The historic pageant that he created in 1913, entitled *The Star of Ethiopia*, as he explained, pursued the objective of educating a broad audience about the main aspects of Africa’s history to show that the continent was an important cradle of civilization. At the same time, he sought to indicate that Egypt itself was a gift from this first Ethiopian matrix.

The romantic and almost mystical vision of Ethiopianity⁴ as the spirit of African cultures and as a basis for their deep, transatlantic organic continuity would also be central to this philosophy of African unity which is Negritude. Thus, Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor declared that they had found inspiration in the work of the German ethnologist Leo Frobenius and, in particular, in his *Histoire de la civilisation africaine* translated into French in 1936.⁵ For the ethnologist, various aspects of the African cultures converge in the sense of being diverse manifestations of the same spirit defining a shared civilization; the spirit, or as he calls it, the Ethiopian *paideuma*, which he also highlights as being the sister of the German soul. Ethiopianism is a constant presence in Senghor’s poetry, evidenced by his many references to the Queen of Sheba that reflect the notion that Africans are the children of this Biblical and Qur’anic figure.

The 1930s were generally a ‘golden age of black internationalism’,⁶ founded on Ethiopianism but also expressed as political solidarity with the State of Ethiopia after the Italian invasion of this country, which had never experienced formal colonization. F. Gebrekidan wrote about the inspiration of this Black internationalism: ‘this was the flood of sympathy for Ethiopia, last bastion of African independence’, in response to Italy’s wanton aggression. In London, Marxist intellectuals such as George Padmore, T. R. Makonnen and C. L. R. James lobbied for Ethiopia. In Jamaica, the new Rastafari movement saw the invasion of Ethiopia as a reason for a millenarian call to arms.⁷ This also refers

2 Quirin, J. 2011. W. E. B. Du Bois, Ethiopianism and Ethiopia, 1890-1955. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Fall/Winter 2010-2011). www.jstor.org/stable/41757589. (consulted 19-6-2017).

3 Quoted by Quirin, J. op.cit.

4 This is seen in Rastafari philosophy.

5 Frobenius, L. 1936. *Histoire de la civilisation africaine*. Paris, Gallimard.

6 Negash Gebrekidan, F. 2015. Ethiopia in Black Studies from W. E. B. Du Bois to Henry Louis Gates, Jr., *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1. muse.jhu.edu/article/581164 (consulted 19-06-2017).

7 Ibid. p. 8 of the online version.

to the way in which the aggression of this country by Mussolini's Italy fuelled anti-colonial feeling in the Caribbean and major American cities with a large Black population; it was expressed in Black newspapers such as *The New York Amsterdam News*, the *Pittsburgh Courier*, the *Chicago Defender*, the *Atlanta World* and even *Voice of Ethiopia* published in Harlem, or *Crisis*, the voice of the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) founded in 1919 by W. E. B. Du Bois.⁸

Continentalizing the Pan-African project

Manchester 1945 was the last Pan-African Congress to be held outside Africa. The important role that Kwame Nkrumah played in this heralded the continentalism of the Pan-Africanist project in both of the following senses. It would firstly mean that this project was now primarily the business of Africans of the continent and no longer those of the diaspora; secondly, that 'Pan-African' refers to the unity of all Africans, north and south of the Sahara and no longer the unity between Black Africans and their brothers and sisters of the diaspora. Thus, when Kwame Nkrumah's independent Ghana organized the 'All-African People's Conference' in 1958, which followed on from the five Pan-African Congresses, he recalled in his opening speech that Pan-Africanism had until then been supported by 'those who were living outside Africa while committed to the cause of African freedom'. In saying this, he paid tribute to W. E. B. Du Bois for the role he had played in the various congresses up to Manchester. In 1963, in Addis Ababa, Nkrumah's address was dedicated to sharing the conviction on which all his political thought and action was based, that independence or the development of African countries would only be real on condition of the unity of the continent as a whole: 'We meet here today not as Ghanaians, Guineans, Egyptians, Algerians, Moroccans, Malians, Liberians, Congolese or Nigerians, but as Africans', he stressed. Of this unity, about which he would readily mention the example of the Federation of the United States of America, Nkrumah repeated that it would primarily be achieved by political will and even voluntarism. While he also mentioned the cultural basis of an 'African personality', for him, this was mostly about conquering the 'political kingdom' of unity, and the rest would be a bonus.

The cultural foundations of unity are central to the approach of other African figures who have made this the core of their thought. Among them is Léopold

8 Ibid. p. 9 of the online version.

Sédar Senghor, who long opposed what he called the Balkanization of Africa in a process of decolonization that would grant independence to the French colonies, territory by territory, thus dismantling the major Federations, that of French West Africa (AOF, 1895–1958) and that of French Equatorial Africa (AEF, 1910–1958) set up by imperial France. Once it became clear that the separating force of what he would call ‘territorialism’ was the same as France’s commitment to recognize the independence of micro-states, which would continue to depend heavily on it, Senghor often delivered the speech about cultural unity as the foundation for a future economic and political unity.

But can this foundation be Negritude now that the Pan-African project is ‘continentalized’? Such was the question posed by the organization in Senegal in 1966 of the World Festival of Black Arts (FESMAN), which Senghor saw as a crowning of his philosophical, cultural and political approach. For him, it was a celebration of the ‘values of Negro-African civilization affirming the ‘African presence’ in the world, in particular through its arts that have helped to give it a face in the modern era. The organization in 1969 in Algiers of the second Pan-African Cultural Festival (PANAF) could not fail to appear as a counterpoint focusing on *Africanity* rather than *Negritude*. And also on the political project, which was above all the unity of global Africa in the world: Algiers was then the capital of revolutionary liberation movements in Africa⁹. The Congolese writer Henri Lopes perfectly expresses how PANAF was a response to Fesman:

Algiers. That was in 1969. The first Pan-African cultural festival. Another festival took place a few years earlier in Dakar, in Senegal, but that was for the *Negro* arts. Its organizers had not invited either the Africans from the Maghreb or those from the Masriqui, although Blacks from the diasporas, those whose ancestors were deported to the West Indies and the Americas were present. For our generation, Algiers and Algeria were a political reference.¹⁰

However, beyond this Fesman/PANAF conflict, Léopold Sédar Senghor can also be reread usefully today when considering and experiencing the plurality of the identities. Let us return to his texts, where he creates Africanity from Arabism and Negritude.¹¹ For a better understanding of the significance

9 The same thing can be said of Cairo, recalling the Pan-African policy of President Nasser.

10 Lopes, H. 2003. *Ma grand-mère bantoue et mes ancêtres les Gaulois*. Paris, Gallimard, p. 73. The author also recalls that Stanislas Adotevi and himself were quick to launch diatribes during the festival against the philosophy of Negritude.

11 “Les fondements de l’affricanité ou négritude et arabité” (Conference at Cairo University in February 1967). “Etre arabe en assimilant toutes les civilisations méditerranéennes avec les africaines” (Algiers University, also in February 1967). Both texts appear in *Liberté 3: Négritude et Civilisation de l’Universel*. Paris, Seuil, 1977.

of what he wrote and its meaning for us today, let us once again recall Hegel; when basing the historical future of the spirit on geography¹², he wanted to read the African identity directly on the continent's map. The result was that he distinguished and separated out an Egyptian identity, an identity for Mediterranean North Africa, and an Africa 'proper' (this is how Hegel speaks of it) defined as the very spirit of non-separation from the natural element, that of a dark land, closed in on itself and thus ignorant of progress. He attached Egypt to Asia. As for North Africa, he made it an extension of Europe in a whole where the Mediterranean became an inland sea: thus, in 1830, he laid the groundwork for French colonization of Algeria, which he welcomed as a normal gesture of appropriation in accordance with the movement of the Spirit.

Our continent's great thinkers provided a response to this carving up of Africanity. Any work by Cheikh Anta Diop may be taken as *another* philosophy of history, in reaction to the Hegelian negation. This work reinstated ancient Egypt within the continent and restored a still to be explored, historical depth to African intellectual history at the same time as it established continuity between this history and that of the Muslim world in general, in North Africa, in Egypt and in the holy sites of Islam. The Sahara can no longer be used as the wall that it has never been, and when the precious manuscripts of Timbuktu and elsewhere have finished giving African sciences and humanities their written traditions, we will have refuted the prejudice that wants the Black African identity to always be expressed orally.¹³

What Léopold S. Senghor had in mind, in his writings on Arabism, Negritude and their convergence in Africanity, was less to describe the essences and their composition than to ward off the violence that reductive identities, unaware of pluralism, could generate. At a public lecture in front of intellectuals from North Africa, the poet concentrated on flows, reciprocal information, connections and not on essences. In African Arabism, naturally part of the continuity with the Middle East, he said how much it was determined by its situation, related as it was internally and inseparably to the Berber, Mediterranean and Negro-African identities, and how much it evidenced what would fashionably be called 'hybridity'. However, wanting to reduce hybridity, crushing the multiplicity of identities to a single dimension is violence, which may lead to conflicts that will then take on cultural, linguistic or sometimes also military forms.

12 In the introductory chapter to his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*.

13 Cf. Hunwick, J. and O'Fahey, R. S. 2005. *Arabic Literature of Africa, 1994–2004*. Leiden and New York, Cologne, E. J. Brill.

Today, throughout the Maghreb, a dynamic Berber cultural, linguistic, and sometimes political movement, a true return of the repressed from under reductive Arabization, is demanding that multiculturalism be an attitude and a policy where Berber and Black African identities – the Gnawa cultures, as they are called from a distortion of the word ‘Guinea’ – will occupy their rightful place. Generally, and beyond this region, it is now obvious that the African union will be built on pluralism and multiculturalism as a principle throughout our continent.

On this point, we will contrast the perspectives of Cheikh Anta Diop and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o regarding African languages in relation to the Pan-African project. Both share a genuine commitment to what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o calls ‘remembering Africa’, playing on the double meaning of a word that in English can mean both ‘re-mem-bering’ in other words, to reconstruct as a unit, and ‘to recall’, in other words, to recall Africa to oneself, to its own self-generated future.¹⁴ Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o and Cheikh Anta Diop are convinced that, in the process of totalization and reconnection with its memory and its own future, Africa will only be able to reinvent itself if it makes its languages not just idioms confined to the sphere of private interactions, but languages of creation and science.

However, one difference should be noted. C. A. Diop’s notion of unity is one that could be said to be ‘organicist’. The belief that the whole is necessarily organic, therefore, explains the constant desire of the author of *Fondements économiques et culturels d’un Etat fédéral d’Afrique noire*¹⁵ to seek a language of unification that reflects an organic unity of culture.

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o focuses instead on cultural and linguistic multiplicity that he sees as wealth to be preserved¹⁶ and on which alone ‘remembering’ can be built, as an open and pluralist Pan-Africanism project.

An open and pluralist Pan-Africanism

In 2003, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) created in 1963 became the African Union (AU). More than a change of name, this was a change of philosophy for the Pan-African project. The African Union, turning its back on what could be called the federalist impatience that was at the core of Kwame

14 Cf. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. 2009. *Re-Membering Africa*. Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers; and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. 2009a. *Something Torn and New: An African Renaissance*. New York, Basic Civitas Books.

15 Diop, C. A. 1974. *Les fondements économiques et culturels d’un Etat fédéral d’Afrique noire*. Paris, Présence Africaine. It should be noted that the planned Federal State only concerns so-called ‘Black’ Africa.

16 Thus, he wrote in Kikuyu and not the ‘unification language’, which is Swahili.

Nkrumah's thinking and action¹⁷, defined five major African regions for which it was now agreed that they would quickly become integrated spaces. The basis for this regional and gradualist approach to unity was this idea that these five regions established historical, cultural and economic consistencies and that if an integrated space was offered to populations, they would naturally rediscover the ancient dynamics and use them to create new ones.

To these five regions, that of North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa, the African Union added a sixth, that of the diaspora. This meant recognizing that global Africa was not just in Africa since the continent continues to create new diasporas throughout the world that are added to the old one. Such new diasporas incidentally are playing a significant role in the continent's economic development, but also in the assertion of an African presence in the world, in the arts, literature, sciences, etc. In this sixth region, it also meant recognizing the historical role of the diaspora of the Americas in establishing the Pan-African project: in a fitting reversal, this is the continent that is now making way for the diaspora in its reconstruction project for Global Africa.

Finally, it is important to say a few words about the current context in which the project for Global Africa has taken shape today. In 2000, *The Economist* called Africa 'the hopeless continent' and eleven years later ran a headline on 'Africa, the hopeful continent' and talked about 'Africa rising'. Between the two titles, certain parameters and seeds of change have imposed themselves on the perspective on Africa. First, there is the demography. Global Africa is a figure of 1.2 billion inhabitants that will double by 2050. A quarter of the world's population will then be African with some of the most demographically important countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia. This means an expanding productive population for today's Africa, while the productive population in Europe and China will be declining. It is not simply a question of mass and quantity. While the youth may seem like a problem, with all the consequences of unemployment that particularly affect them, they are also an asset. They are a promise of creativity, of a capacity for innovation that is associated with what may be called urban intensification: Africa is already and will increasingly be a continent of sprawling megacities such as Lagos, Nairobi, Kinshasa, and others, with all the obvious problems (transport, housing, jobs, infrastructure, etc.) that arise but also with the opportunity that urbanization can represent. This also means the rise of the young and urban middle classes and therefore of demand. Moreover, figures

17 In many ways, this federalist impatience continued to manifest itself with the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.

from the World Bank indicate that social progress is real: the extreme poverty of 57% in 1995 had fallen to 43% in 2012.

Nothing symbolizes the development of creativity and innovation better than the African appropriation of the mobile telephone resulting in, for example, the development of *mobile banking*.

There is now more private investment in a continent that has diversified and continues to diversify from genuine partnerships, with an increasingly significant presence of countries such as India, Brazil and Turkey. There is obviously China whose new, rapidly developing presence has led to talk of 'Chinafrica'. It is important to stress that these partnerships are reflected by an infrastructure development that offers real integration. One symbol of this is the Nairobi Mombasa railway line completed in 2017 with Chinese backing, which was the largest infrastructure project since Kenya's independence in 1963.

Genuine horizontal, intra-African relationships are being established, one example of which is the African policy of Morocco, which has even expressed a wish to join the ECOWAS, the regional West African organization. It must be added that real political progress is being made. In 1980, the lawyer Benoît Saliou Ngom spoke of Africa as the 'forgotten continent of human rights'. Today, democracy is making progress despite the regressions and challenges that can be violent on a continent that has an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

That said, it must be remembered that transnational threats are faced in many regions where inequalities – as elsewhere in the world a crucial issue – are revealed. Such is the briefly presented context in which the project of a Global Africa is being considered and developed today, combining regional integration and an inclusion in globalization that will increasingly be less dependent on the vertical links that individual countries maintain with former colonial powers. It is already happening and will undoubtedly happen more and more through other channels such as, for example, the new 'silk roads' set up by China. Thus will it be openness and becoming, this *Ethiopia of the outstretched arm*, which, echoing the Psalms, W. E. B. Du Bois made the symbol of Africa.

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CHAPTER 2

AFRICAN HISTORY AND MEMORY

Bogumil Jewsiewicki Koss

The broad sense of the phrase *social memory* – the presence of the past in the collective consciousness of a community – has always been used by societies on the African continent to negotiate the relationship between what has passed and what is to come. The centrality of this memory is not due only to the importance of orality. It stems mainly from the importance of performance for almost all the group's activities, whether cultural, social or political. In conjunction with speech, visual and aural elements, as well as the flow of emotions, transmit experiences drawn from memory, whether incorporated or reported to the expected future. The function of social memory is to update the memories considered to be pertinent in current issues, a transition zone between the past and the future. The performative modality of communication links several levels of exchange:

- between memories of experience and their preservation in social memory,
- between memories of prior performance and current performance,
- between personal memories of participants and the social memory updated by each performance.

Unlike writing, orality means that all knowledge of the past is subject to the work of memory. The materiality of the event that took place is not at issue; but the power of the mobilization of actors comes from the interplay between individual memory and shared memory. The performance of this memory places more importance on the emotions than on the reading of a text about the past.

The emotions shared as a catalyst for adherence to a re-presentation (making the present absent) of the past are a major oversight by social science research. The sharing of emotions during an oral performance constitutes, in African societies, a distinctive feature of the interplay between field of experience and the horizon of aspiration.

The connection between oral words and written record is complex when experts produce a re-presentation of the past for public use – genealogy, tributes, migration narratives, etc. As numerous Indigenous modes of writing have been invented and practiced in Africa, the predominance of orality does not stem from a lack of knowledge of the written word, but from the mode of social communication. Across the continent, collective memory is inseparable from the production of history as a corpus of knowledge about the past preserved by experts and presented to update the social/political connection.¹

The colonial view, derived from the master's view of the slave, regarded African societies as having no knowledge of history because the past had no written record. This perspective is false, especially in relation to trans-Saharan Africa that had been in contact with Islam. Political decolonization on the Western model fostered the emergence of an academic written history of state entities that shows that Western historical knowledge prevailed in Africa prior to the colonial impact. The stance taken by Western or African historians trained in Western institutions only considered local knowledge practices that responded to this imperative. In the 1950s and 1960s, collective memory was not regarded as being knowledge that was deemed useful in legitimizing political sovereignty, and historians barely retained any original practices of knowledge about the past.

In the early 1960s, the rehabilitation of oral history/oral tradition was revolutionary in nature. A pioneering book by Jan Vansina² turned academic history upside down. It allowed us to appreciate the unwritten practices of knowledge of the past as being part of a historical process. Unfortunately, high demand for the state history of institutions caused academics to forget that experts on knowledge of the past were their colleagues rather than 'informants' and conservators of oral archives.

At the end of the twentieth century, two movements helped to change the historians' viewpoint. On the one hand, the successful rebellion of the first generation against authoritarian state regimes and the end of the last colonial

1 In 1994, historian Elikia M'Bokolo began producing on Radio France International a programme on Africa's past entitled "Mémoire d'un continent".

2 Vansina, J. 1961. *De la tradition orale, essai de méthode historique*. Tervuren, Royal Museum of Central Africa. (Translated as *Oral Tradition as History*, 1985, University of Wisconsin Press).

regime in Africa (South Africa). A number of 'national sovereign conferences' and, above all, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), gave visibility and legitimacy to ways of relating to the past by means of collective memory. On the other hand, internal transformations within Western societies including the collapse of the Soviet bloc have forced social sciences to recognize other ways of practicing knowledge of the past than historian-led initiatives. South Africa's singular Truth and Reconciliation Commission has made us forget the richness and diversity of practices of this knowledge on the African continent. Certainly, popular urban movements for the appropriation of social and political spaces, such as the *set setal* in Dakar, have attracted people's attention for a moment. Over the past decade, urban and occasionally rural artistic practices have been analysed not only from an aesthetic point of view but also as collective approaches to the construction of long-term knowledge. As a result of interest in the West for life stories and autobiographies, numerous volumes of transcripts of this kind of orality in Africa have been published. But historians have insufficiently analysed the long-term relationships that should be read here. We are unaware of the regimes of historicity other than those governing the oral history of political entities. The same applies to social frameworks of memory, ideological and cultural contexts that make it possible, notwithstanding the singularity of each life experience, for social memory to be not just possible, but also the fruit of individual memory.³ Recently, the impact of religious frameworks on the function of memory has been demonstrated by Doulaye Konaté, both with regard to the memory of the Djénne-Djénno in Mali⁴ and to that of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

We do not yet have analyses of social reports of the past based on the places of memory model initiated by Pierre Nora.⁵ This is because of our ignorance of the local reception of written history, both scholarly and academic, and poor recognition of essays on national/regional history based on anything other than the Western model. It remains difficult therefore to identify 'bridges' of articulation between the various modes of knowledge production about the past. For example, there is very little research on the preservation of heritage by urban and rural communities. Work in progress relates to institutional frameworks (museums), or dispossession of this heritage following legal or illegal export

3 Although of primordial importance, differentiation in memory work by gender has hardly been addressed; cf. Kesselring, R. 2016.

4 Konaté, D. 2006. *Travail de mémoire et construction nationale au Mali*.

5 Nora, P. (ed). 1986. *Les lieux de mémoire*.

of works of art to world markets. The internal character of our relationship of heritage with objects, places, artistic practices, corporal practices, etc., and the evolution of this relationship over time, taking into account generation and genre, eludes us.

Finally, the connection between transformations of social memory and new technology from mobiles to the internet, TV (soap operas, theatre, video clips) and local video-based industries has not yet been investigated.⁶

The limited knowledge of social sciences regarding the work of memory, regimes of historicity, and heritage preservation does not mean that African societies are not in charge of their relationship with the past.⁷ This lack of awareness results mainly from misplaced priorities, since the results of said research are poorly circulated within these societies. It is the relevance of university-level social sciences that is at stake here and not the originality and richness of memory practices.

6 Haynes, 2016. *Nollywood: The Creation of Nigerian Film Genres*.

7 The uses of memory are intense in South Africa ranging from the Institute for Healing Memories in Cape Town, to comics and Memory Games. As with the past of slavery, the term 'memory' is substituted for that of 'history' to reclaim the past previously narrated and taught from the point of view of the oppressors. Cf. Autry, R. 2017. *Desegregating the Past. The Public Life of Memory in the United States and South Africa*.

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CHAPTER 3

THE CREATIVE CENTRES OF AFRICAN THOUGHT

Pierre Kipré

Introduction

The choice of global Africanity suggests that the concept, whether or not it is criticized, and beyond its main toponymic dimension, should be understood as encompassing all that refers to the perception and positive action of Africa and its diasporas, both internally and externally. Not long ago, in his introduction to a text on the radicalism of Africanist social sciences and the reinvention of Africa's future in the face of twenty-first century challenges, the sociologist Amadou Sarr Diop said that:

Intellectual works in the field of social sciences are not neutral regarding the profound transformations wrought within living societies and the projects that mobilize collective and individual actors. Transposed to the context of Africanism, this epistemological premise tells us about the extent of the responsibilities incumbent upon African researchers (Diop, 2015).

Since November 1990, African academics have decided to assume those responsibilities, as, for them, 'academic freedom is aimed at building a new civilization' (Mkandawire, 1990). Between the realities of the centres (institutional or otherwise) producing African thought and the absolute need to reply to the accusation of its lethargy, made by those presenting themselves to Africa as 'bestowers of lessons', what leeway is there for 'producers of ideas',

on the continent and in its diasporas, to enrich autonomous, creative African thought in the world?

An inventory of production centres

An inventory of the centres producing African thought brings to light three main characteristics: the low number and dispersion of production centres throughout the continent; the varying levels and availability of human resources; and the difficulties in coordinating and structuring the means of thought production in Africa and in the diasporas.

While the African diasporas are able to benefit from entities producing and giving shape to contemporary thought outside the continent, Africa is characterized by the dispersal of, and some structural limitation of, the institutions dedicated to promoting its contribution *in situ*.

Today, every country has at least one state university. Some have more than twenty, sometimes with a dozen or so official research centres (South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example). These institutions are young, most (at least 75%) having been established less than 50 years ago. In addition to problems regarding funding (generally less than 0.05% of states' gross national product) and general research policy, they all face problems pertaining to the internal and external sustainability of works of research, even in the social sciences.

As for centres for the production and/or promotion of the arts, the situation is more worrisome. Informality wins out over a systematically devised and applied policy. The mediocrity of artistic training in most African countries, stressed Jean-Pierre Guingané (1999), 'is extremely detrimental to the mental and psychological balance of Africans, who are often ignorant both of the cultural and aesthetic values of their traditional environment and of the aesthetic laws of so-called modern civilization. As a result, they are reduced to being no more than unenlightened consumers of a standardized industrial culture.' A scarcity of galleries, workshops and training centres is the norm across the continent. Artists' personal ingenuity must often compensate for the poverty of a rather unmotivating environment, despite good intentions, even in the public sphere.

Spaces for public debate, the age-old heritage of the 'palaver tree' used in our oral cultures, and especially a product of contemporary urban social gatherings, have also flourished in recent years in many African cities. Their names are varied: *grins* in Bamako, *agoras* in Abidjan, *ebimeeza* in Kampala, *fada* in

Niamey, and so on. In these spaces, speech is, in principle, free and all topics are broached. Ideas are rarely new, but, during improvised verbal jousts, these places are an indicator of the social and popular expression of a trending movement of political or social thought, whether or not it is relevant or innovative.

And yet the situation is not the same for all states. The variety of the levels and availability of human resources explains the many contrasts present on a regional scale throughout the continent. Certain indicators make some of the continent's major centres for the production of ideas stand out, while the nature of the migration concerned explains the different approaches taken by the diasporas.

The global ranking of universities and research centres is an initial indicator. In 2015, it identified two major hubs: Southern Africa, primarily on account of South Africa, and Northern Africa, with Egypt as its main reference point. Although active in recent years, Eastern Africa (especially Ethiopia and Kenya) and Western Africa (essentially Nigeria) remained secondary sites, and Central Africa an even more minor one. Seventy-six per cent of the continent's top 100 universities and 70% of the continent's main research centres were thus located in Southern and Northern Africa. There are four main hubs when it comes to the number of social science publications (UNESCO, 2013) and the volume of literary and artistic production: South Africa (47% of production), Nigeria (15.6%), Egypt (6.8%) and Kenya (6.5%). On the global scale, no African universities ranked above 328th place, and 70 of the leading hundred were not even in the top 2,000 (CSIC, 2015).

Such a situation is linked both to the level of access to higher education and training in social sciences and the arts and to the level of supervision of all institutions. From one state to another, differences are often pronounced, despite the progress recorded since the 1960s. The structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s have hindered that progress.

Another situation is noteworthy: that of the production of political ideas. Everywhere, the sociopolitical context, marked by crises and problems related both to governance and to the consolidation of the state, has pushed researchers and political players towards reflections that are more 'national' than 'regional' or 'continental'. Yet, at the same time, there is pressure stemming from non-African political thought and exerted through the intermediary of international bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and politically oriented foundations. The diasporas could, as in the early decades of the twentieth century, have served as a saving motivating force. They have not done so because their circumstances are not the same.

The multicultural opportunities they enjoy place the diasporas in the position of 'go-betweens' between the rest of the world and Africa. However, the profoundly different perceptions of Africa held by the diaspora of remote origins (the descendants of the victims of the slave trade) and by the diaspora formed by colonial and postcolonial migration must be taken into account. The members of the former wage their battles mainly within the transformation of the societies they have contributed to forging (the African diaspora in the Americas, for instance); the members of the latter lead struggles that are very often those of survival abroad, sometimes with references to the theory of imminent return and despite remarkable success.

An issue thus presents itself: that of the shaping and coordination of production centres through established structures, or through structures that are to be established. This is increasingly important to ensure greater visibility and momentum in the production of African thought. It is an issue present between the different regions of the continent; it is worrisome regarding the relationships between the world of researchers and artists and that of political players. It is still poorly managed when it comes to the relationships between the continent and its diasporas.

Pertaining to the connections between the different regions of Africa, there are several organizations that are continental (the Association of African Universities [AAU], the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa [CODESRIA], the Economic Commission for Africa [ECA]/United Nations, the Arab and African Research Centre [AARC], and so forth); regional (for instance, the African and Malagasy Council on Higher Education [CAMES]); or linguistic (the Agency of Francophonie Universities [AUF] and the Association of Commonwealth Universities [ACU]). They attempt to bring universities out of their isolation to pool knowledge, achievements, experience, projects and perceptions. The organization of gatherings (colloquiums, forums and the like) and even the arrangement of joint research programmes are examples of actions carried out to structure and, sometimes, coordinate university output. Despite the difficulties encountered, such initiatives are becoming more and more successful.

The relations between the academic world and the political – or even business – world are more difficult. Reciprocal distrust is long established. The freedom of thought practiced by academics is rarely deemed compatible with the sometimes hidden stakes involved in politics. Thus, as in the early decades, African governments have seldom had the habit of associating the academic world with the construction of the state. Except episodically and on a national

level, their invitations to participate are rarely collective. The business sphere remains generally skeptical as to the capacity of the academic world to adapt to its main concerns. South Africa and Nigeria are almost exceptions in these areas.

Africa's relations with its diasporas still seem informal, except, often, in the context of relations with non-African institutions (colloquiums, forums, projects, consultations with experts). They primarily consist of individual connections, often resulting from the personal history of emigrants, whether or not they are voluntary exiles. Although designated the 'sixth region of Africa' by the African Union (AU), the diaspora is not institutionally involved in the African production of innovative ideas. Personal commitment still serves as one of the ways of mobilizing an exceptional wealth of skills and experiences. Activist Afrocentrism, especially as regards the realm of former victims of the Atlantic slave trade, poorly hides African inadequacies in this area. The relations between the two diasporas, one born of the slave trade and the other a product of the migrations of the twentieth century, were still poorly documented at the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, they no longer seem to actually pave the way for resolutely shared struggles, with the odd exception.

In short, the state of affairs of the production of ideas in Africa and in the diasporas raises a dual issue concerning the form and substance of that production for the purposes of a global and autonomous Africanity of thought. Despite the limitations and inadequacies described, it is still thriving.

The matter of autonomous production and theoretical advances

The autonomous production of African thought and its theoretical advances have transpired through a long maturation of the idea that African specificity can be understood only as far as it is included in the contemporary thought that it refuses to mimic. As a current of thought that is often inwardly 'rebellious', it reveals itself outward in literature and the arts, but also in the reformulation of what Africa is and what Africa wants for humanity.

The maturation of the idea of autonomous African thought happened both on the continent itself and outside it at the turn of the twenty-first century. The contribution of the more recent diaspora (colonial and postcolonial migrants) was decisive. That of the older diaspora, the diaspora of the Americas, was more decisive in the development of Afrocentrism at the end of the twentieth century. Exchanges with the intellectuals of other continents also facilitated it.

First, the old issues of early Pan-Africanism were exhausted. Those issues were sovereignty, the development of each state and simple inter-state cooperation. They are the issues that came into play in the construction of young states at the same time as theories on African socialism and African humanism, *inter alia*, were flourishing. The disappointments involved in building the state and the new African society showed their limitations.

Second, there is the matter of the appreciation and invention of Africa's future. It gradually appeared, especially in the social sciences, that the sticking point was mainly the continuous reliance on the 'colonial library' and Western Orientalism. Putting their own spin on the ideas developed by Indian intellectuals in line with the thought of the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, African thinkers progressively adopted the subaltern studies approach and definitively rejected the theories forged from Orientalism and Western ethnology. Africa's future was no longer perceived as connected to that of a 'demoted Europe' (Mbembe, 2013).

Finally, exoticism was rejected in literature and 'primitivism' in the arts. The breaks with – or markedly abrupt transitions from – the literary and artistic trends from before the 1990s were first due to the diaspora. The idea was to set the continent on the path to affirming a new modernity. This did not prevent exchanges with others or the African reinterpretation of influences from elsewhere. Speaking of Ousmane Sow's style, Jean Cardot thus said:

Our language is sculpture. It is universal. You are not very receptive to Greek sculpture, which you find cold. You admire Rodin and especially Giacometti ... Your sculpture is not unaffected by their influence, but it includes a profoundly African dimension that resembles only you ... Your sculptures talk to each other, they look at each other ... For you, Africa is also a 'battleground' (Cardot, 2013).

It is in this context that 'rebellious' thought surged forth, marking the beginning of the twenty-first century. Since the 1990s, probably because of a democratic opening-up on the continent, many social science publications have enabled theoretical advances in African thought. These constitute new perceptions of Africa and Africanity, achieved by transcending linguistic diversity and zones of preeminent contact with the outside, for example regarding the opposition between French-speaking Africa, English-speaking Africa and Arabic-speaking Africa. Some thinkers reject 'assigned identities' and feel that they are letting 'our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies' (Appiah, 1996). While considering, like Ali Benmakhlouf, that 'the world library is open to all', many, breaking away from the old approach, raise the essential issue of Africa's future through the critique of postcolonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) and especially through

Africa's recentring of the question of modernity. Thus, for Jean-Godefroy Bidima, the problem of Africa is less one of identity or origin than one of thinking about the way in which things happen, or in other words, the way of thinking about the 'crossing' (Bidima, 2002). The appreciation of endogenous knowledge, particularly for its links to environmental issues, has also given rise to new ideas in Africa and in the diaspora. Pan-African bodies such as CODESRIA and Africa's Environment, Development and Action in the Third World (ENDA TM) office on the continent, as well as electronic exchange platforms outside Africa, are the spearheads of these theoretical advances.

The breaks in the world of African literature are also spectacular:

Negro-African literature, Neo-African literature, Negro literature, African literature: all these expressions... are frequently used with the pretension of referring to one and the same reality.... Such a large number of labels is troubling, as it seems to translate, to my mind, the embarrassment or unease felt with regard to the identity of the literature considered (Keba Tau, 2005).

It is very varied literature, which does not mean that it is without coherency, or confluences, or similarities with regard to trajectories, or at least to situations, in the history of human thought: 'The beauty of a carpet comes from the variety of its colours', as Amadou Hampâté Bâ said. The oppositions between 'Northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa' are artificial, as are those between Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone Africa. The writer from Africa, whether or not an emigrant, continues to be 'the mouth of misfortunes which have no mouth', from Ahmadou Kourouma and Assia Bedja to Tierno Monénembo, Ken Bugul, Calixthe Beyala, Driss Chraïbi, Véronique Tadjo and Kossi Efoui, to name but a few. Ken Bugul thus says: 'It is night/A black night/A terribly black night/In... a ghost country' (Ken Bugul, 2000).

However, in contrast to previous generations, many writers explicitly intend to separate themselves from the identity related nature of their words. They aspire to be recognized on their own merits, according to aesthetic schemes specific to their art. This desire exists more particularly in authors born or having settled in Europe (Alain Mabanckou, Fatou Diome, Patrice Nganang and Gaston Kelman, for example), the 'Afropolitans' (Husti-Laboye, 2010). This sometimes reveals the desire for a more individualistic identity that is more oriented towards the rest of humanity (Tahar Ben Jelloun's fight against racism) than an 'Africanity' that is difficult to define because of the ongoing upheavals in African societies. Tradition has gone out of fashion because its source has long since run dry. Speaking of Francophone African literature, the author Alain Mabanckou sheds light on this trend:

It tells us that, in spreading out across the world, Africans create other 'Africas', attempt other, perhaps salvatory, adventures, to promote the cultures of the black continent.... I belong to the generation [of authors] that break barriers and refuse the departmentalization of the imagination because they are aware that our salvation lies in writing, far from a fictitious fraternity defined by skin colour or the temperature of our countries of origin (Mabanckou, 2016).

Quand la nuit se brise (When night breaks) by Abdelmadjid Kaouah, published in 2012, also reminds us that Africa remains a land of poetry, just as it remains a land of art.

Today, the proliferation of contemporary arts in Africa and in the diasporas is evident. Painting, music, sculpture, filmmaking and photography can be modern without requiring us to leave our origins behind. The debates on some art exhibitions (*Magiciens de la terre* [Magicians of the Earth] in 1989; *Africa Remix, L'art contemporain d'un continent* [Africa Remix: Contemporary Art of a Continent] in 2005, for example) and the excitement sparked by various events (the PanAfrican Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou [FESPACO], the Carthage Film Festival, the Abidjan Market for Performing Arts, and the like) are a testament to this. And yet, the data (UIS, 2005) show that exports of African cultural goods and services represent four per cent of global volumes while imports for this sector barely stand at one per cent. It has not even been a decade since the rest of the world began to discover the vitality and modernity of Africa's contribution. In the visual arts, it breaks with 'primitivism' and, as the philosopher of African aesthetics Yacouba Konaté said, 'the art known as contemporary African art...often questions, in plastic expression, its own identity related assumptions, with its new forms of writing, of materials that transcend classical plastic disciplines.... Our artistic output is immense and rich' (Konaté, 2009).

Having broken from its long marginalization barely two decades ago, African artistic creation adapts to the contemporary market, to the impulses of modernity, but less so to contemporary trends and schools of artistic thought. El Anatsui offers us his immense metal draperies made up of bottle-tops that are folded and joined together with copper wire; Yinka Shonibare takes up classics of Western art history and Africanizes them. Whether they are from the continent or the diaspora, artists today are mainly concerned about positioning their art 'according to aesthetic projects capable of testifying effectively to the utopian elements and the possibilities embedded in African artistic creation' (Konaté, 2014). Despite international success, many even go against consumerist needs: *Sunflower* by Olu Amoda is a subtle critique of primary consumerism and Dalila Dalléas Bouzar

uses her joint French and Algerian culture to denounce all types of violence. Meanwhile, Yaw Obuobi, inspired by Kente cloth, develops his 'yarnpainting' technique to explore the culture, memory and hybridity of identity.

The actors of the art world (artists, public and private institutions, training centres) also strive to establish necessary linkages and exchanges between themselves, especially since the 1990s. In cinema, for instance, less than half a dozen festivals had been founded before 1980. Between 1990 and 2015, twenty-five others were organized, seventeen of which were launched after 2000. African films are also appreciated at major festivals (Venice, Cannes, and so forth), even though there is still much to do because of the uncertainties and inadequacies of cultural policies, which have been greatly pared down since the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s.

In summary, apart from its momentum, the most striking aspect of art is currently its complete anchoring in contemporaneity, with its own discourse, far from the clichés of 'primitivism' (visual arts) and folklore (music).

In 1986, in the novel *Les écailles du ciel* (The scales of the sky), Tierno Monénembo underlined the responsibility of the intellectual elites in Africa's multidimensional crisis. While the 'scales' (borrowing culture) hinder endogenous development, the neologism 'tauxite', which the author coined from 'bauxite', suggests a certain 'toxicity' of the political and economic theories borrowed or imposed from outside. The question of the renewal of thought was largely studied in Volume VIII of the current collection of the *General History of Africa*. What new political ideas have emerged since its publication?

Several attempts at innovation in this area have been made since the 1990s. While the decade was marked by a move towards the multiparty system and thus, in principle, a liberation of speech, the analysis of political thought did not seem to undergo remarkable changes at the same pace (or level) as in the West. Often reduced to the analysis of 'national' situations, the ideas conveyed revolved around 'democracy' and 'human rights', without offering compelling answers to the trick question: 'Is Africa made for democracy?' The philosopher Jean-Godefroy Bidima was not mistaken when he drew attention to the difficulty of envisioning democracy in Africa when the concepts of 'people', 'resistance' and 'transparency' have yet to be sufficiently clarified. After the initial moments of euphoria have passed, the democratic enterprise is vitiated by the reduction of the democratic ideal to multipartyism, freedom of expression and democratic alternation. This has paved the way for various ideas, the particularity of which has been either a retreat into nationalist notions of identity or ethnonationalism. These ideas have been unsuccessful, viewed as going against globalization and

Pan-Africanism. More consistent with the experience of state violence, the idea of human rights is increasingly taking root. Often promoted from the outside, the purpose of this idea is to see African civil society take its first steps. Fragile in the face of power and easily manipulated by the proponents of the international right to intervene, it nonetheless, and especially according to the diaspora, offers possible hope for a paradigm shift in Africa's political thought. Clarifications are a long time coming in many respects and regarding the concept itself.

One of the few remaining continental attempts to forge an innovative political theory is the idea of an 'African Renaissance'. It has been promoted since the time of postapartheid Africa. The concept was devised by Cheick Anta Diop who, in a 1948 article, described it as a 'way of being, having, living and building Africa'. Commenting on that approach, Molefi Kete Asante would later say: 'It is not Africa's purpose to become Europe. Africa must rebecome Africa.' The idea resurfaced in the mid-1990s with the South African president Thabo Mbeki. Analysts saw it as a way to legitimize his power in the wake of his predecessor, the charismatic Nelson Mandela. According to Thabo Mbeki, the aim of the African Renaissance is to build a 'new African world' of 'democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and a better life for the people, non-racism and non-sexism, equality among the nations and a just and democratic system of international governance' (Crouzel, 2000, p. 172). It is 'the adoption of modernity by Africans in cooperation with developed capitalist countries.' A political speech more than a description of a political philosophy, the thesis did nonetheless introduce, on a theoretical level, the idea of a 'rainbow' Africanity such as the one the African National Congress (ANC) dreamed of for South Africa. Criticized in many African circles, these ideas resonated widely both within and outside Africa. With the less theoretical proposals of peers Abdoulaye Wade and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, they ultimately became the basis of the Pan-African project New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Today, they no longer have the same resonance. Many people, such as Kä Mana, a theorist of reconstruction theology (Kä Mana, 1993)¹, aspire to invent a new African Renaissance.

In short, note should be taken of the inadequacy of an autonomous renewal of African political doctrines that measures up to advances in the image that Africans give of themselves today. Whether through their literature, social science theories or arts, Africa and its recent diaspora are definitely part of the

1 This author urges Africans to analyse and understand the African crisis on the basis of their history and their own attitude.

course of human history. Is this recognized by others? Does Africanity purport to be universal?

The matter of the recognition of Africanity and its universality

Addressing Ousmane Sow, Jean Cardot said: ‘When people ask you why you did not exhibit your sculptures earlier, you answer: You have to let your discourse mature. It was a kind of maturation; I was not in a rush. I knew I would need to exhibit my work, but I did not know where. It was not very important to me’ (op. cit.). The patience to ‘mature’ and encounters, even fortuitous, with others, are the two avenues for the recognition of present-day Africanity. And that recognition is now genuine, more so outside than within.

For African academics and authors, these avenues take the shape of invitations to international gatherings (colloquiums, forums and so on) and teaching assignments at often prestigious Western universities. They also involve participation in reciprocally enriching joint research projects (the ‘intersecting perspective’ approach) worldwide. Garnering more media attention, but concretizing the place of Africans and the African diaspora within the world of universal thought, the welcoming and induction of certain intellectuals into renowned institutions (major Western universities, learned societies, illustrious academies) and the conferring of prestigious awards and major literary prizes (Nobel Prize in Literature, for instance) are testaments to the universal recognition of talented Africans as agents in the advancement of human thought. Africa itself sometimes manages to encourage its talented citizens, as several awards – albeit less prominent ones – in many countries go to show.

In the art world, there are indicators of the reputation of contemporary artists. *Kunstkompass* and *Artfacts.net* have ranked artists according to different criteria since 1970 and 2001 respectively. They are two of the main references on the global art scene. In Africa itself, there is the *Artprice* ranking. While ‘the quality of contemporary artworks depends on the way they are disseminated in art-dealer and non-art-dealer networks’ (Moureau and Sagot-Duvaurox, 2006), and though the influence of the territory of residence is crucial, the fact remains that here we have reference tools for gauging the prominence of African artists. In 2010, among the top 5,000 international artists ranked by *Artfacts.net*, there were many Africans, especially from Southern Africa and Northern Africa. In 2015, the African Art Market’s African ranking showed that Southern Africa

(43%), Northern Africa (26%) and Western Africa (18%) were home to most of the most highly-rated artists. The proliferation of large, specialized museums – more museums were established between 2000 and 2014 than throughout the entirety of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially outside the continent – offers the possibility of continuous renewal on a global scale. Africa's contribution is increasing, and the actual universality of African thought is no longer a myth. It can be measured, spatially, by the presence of Africanity on every continent: 'in spreading out across the world, Africans create other "Africas"', Alain Mabankou tells us. It is expressed especially through the conscious and unconscious propagation of contemporary African influences via literature, the arts and participation in the exchange of ideas in the social sciences.

The problem that has yet to be adequately resolved is that of the anchoring of the production of African thought in the African social sphere.

Here it is first necessary to note the insufficient production rate of material (periodicals, books, documentation based on new information and communication technology) accessible to the general public in Africa and to all the African diasporas. Popular periodicals, in art, literature and the social sciences alike, are practically nonexistent. The few publications available are for a specialist audience. Thus, in the domain of thought, we may rightly speak of an 'academic ghetto'.

However, the situation has evolved, particularly in light of the opportunity presented by the rise of the middle classes in Africa and African youth's receptiveness to new ideas. The new African middle classes, 'better educated' regarding written culture and more open to new cultural needs, are new endogenous 'receivers' of contemporary African works. This constitutes an 'opportunity' for literature and contemporary art, because the new middle classes 'consume' these new cultural products. New sociopolitical needs also push them to seek more individual and collective rights; they are thus more attentive to social criticism in literature, the arts and political and economic essays. Finally, African young people, quick to adopt 'fashions', as young people everywhere do, are opening themselves up to globalization but continue to work towards ensuring that Africa goes beyond the established framework of social and political progress, as demonstrated by their activism on social media and their 'sudden outbursts of anger'. It is a world to which one can more easily commit in terms of the production of new ideas and a new aesthetic sensibility.

Just like its demography and the youthfulness of its states, the Africa of the centres of thought production is characterized by its vitality, despite its still-fragile institutions. Fully involved in this era of globalization, it is less and less

on the sidelines of the sustained enrichment of universal thought. However, for its own sake first, and for that of its diasporas, its output must leave the 'ghetto' of the social elites (academics, middle classes) to enrich an African thought that must continuously adapt to the questions of modern Africanity in a world in which works from elsewhere, backed by more powerful means, tend to reduce its scope of autonomy. Its current resilience in this area deserves to be better secured so that Africa ceases to be a mere occasional 'sounding board' for others.

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CHAPTER 4

AFRICAN CULTURES UNDER THE ORDEAL OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE

Ibrahima Thioub

Introduction

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, millions of Africans were subjected to slavery in the Americas and even in Africa itself.¹ Memorializing discourse on the Atlantic slave trade and colonial slave trade, whether European or African in nature, often overlooks the universality of slavery. Faced by the convergence of memories ‘racializing’ the Atlantic slave trade and colonial slavery, it is not inappropriate from the outset to recall that from antiquity to today, almost all human societies have deprived others of their freedom and enslaved millions of people with diverse ethnic identities under different political and socio-economic regimes. Exploiting slaves is not the exclusive preserve of trafficking communities. This is best corroborated by the fact that modern slavery, which led to the exploitation of the colonies of the New World, was born and peaked during the era of commercial and then industrial capitalism. This historical combination of capitalist system and exploitation of slave labour certainly gave the Atlantic slave trade its industrial and intercontinental dimension, connecting the three continents of America, Africa and Europe.

1 A note from this article was published in *L'Afrique des routes. Histoire de la circulation des hommes, des richesses et des idées à travers le continent africain*, exhibition catalogue *L'Afrique des Routes* (February–November 2017), Paris/Arles, Quai Branly-Jacques Chirac Museum/Actes Sud, 2017.

Initial research on slavery focused on the demographic impact. Attention then turned to the reconfiguration of the continent's spaces and political institutions along with an analysis of the state structures that responded overwhelmingly to Euro-American demand by positioning themselves as active facilitators of the gun-slave-sugar cycle. Historical research has invested considerable effort in understanding the response to the challenges posed by the Atlantic slave trade by different sectors of African society, mainly the political elite. The spread of violence and militarization of political power; the rise in predatory behaviour by the ruling elites in states that participated in human trafficking; technological regression and its economic and social consequences; the dependency of the continent; the emergence of new demographic behaviours; changes to penal systems; the deterioration of health conditions and a livelihood crisis; the dislocation of certain key political groups and the emergence of new states in line with slavery; and the subversion of ethical and moral values are all areas better explored today. Grey areas also exist in our understanding of these historical changes.

The renewal of issues and methodical approaches to the study of slavery and their impact on African societies questions Indigenous agendas absorbing these external traumas. The memories and the placing of heritage in a variety of contexts from the monumental to the musical, and the subsequent contention generated, are now at the heart of the debate about the history of different forms of slavery that had an impact on the continent.

However, these significant advances in the historiography of slavery, discussed alongside somewhat challenging memories, nod to a threshold that is barely beginning to be reached: the consideration of the cultural dimensions of the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on African societies. This field of investigation remains largely unexplored. The few works on the subject have revealed particularly promising results as to the heuristic value of the introduction of culture, restoring historical status to all the players in the trafficking scenario. This makes it possible to break with both simplistic and Manichaean approaches that separate those involved in such a complex phenomenon into victims and executioners, Blacks or Whites.

Culture is understood here in its very broadest sense, including knowledge, beliefs, creation and creativity, and their expressions in daily life from clothing to food, the spoken and written word and plastic and visual art forms. Here the subject matter involves the many different ways these elements were mobilized by different segments of African societies in response to the problems that arose with the opening up of the Atlantic.

The mobilization of cultural resources in response to the political and economic challenges caused by the Atlantic slave trade

We should first recall that African societies have not all been exposed to the Atlantic slave trade in the same way and consequently, they have not provided the same responses to the questions posed by this historical experience. The impact of slavery depended on the role of each society in the global system, the legacies that necessarily had an impact on cultural responses and accommodations. There are subsequently great variations between one region and another, as well as one society and another, and it is important, on reflection, to keep said differences in mind. Most of the examples that illustrate this reflection are drawn from the historical experience of West Africa.

The transformation of captives into 'merchandise', with monetary value, did not leave African cultures unscathed. Witchcraft crimes expanded rapidly in areas most affected by slave raids. Practical resistance was combined with the strong mobilization of the imaginary to build protective guards. Many places that witnessed a triumphant fight against raiders went on to become the home of protective spirits. Societies that suffered frequent attacks usually repeated and spread the living myths about these sites, engendering bad luck to any holder of public office who set foot there. Protective spirits came in an attractive package – as beautiful young girls – who became deadly traps for ill-intentioned strangers who ventured into the land. A large number of them were recorded in Senegal by the historian Ismaïla Ciss, in societies in Cangin, a region in the north-west of Senegal, a hotspot for raids undertaken by the States of Kajoor, Bawol and Siin to supply Senegalese trading posts with captives.

Rumours about European cannibalism spread across many regions along with the belief on the Angolan coast that red wine came from the blood of captives and that ammunition and gunpowder came from the bones of dead slaves. Slavery led to significant changes in mindsets and social ethics. A rise in kidnapping in the closest neighbourhoods of slave hunters and an increasing emphasis on market value in the creation of social prestige seriously affected parental relationships and moral values in many societies. Placing too great a value on the products of slavery altered the selection of power symbols and the objects of the slave trade became increasingly sought after.

The insecurity arising from the growth of the slave trade also reinforced the belief in predestination more or less everywhere and, ironically, it spurred

mounting recourse to soothsayers to predict an increasingly uncertain future. The business of making amulets, still strongly present today in the regulation of social relationships in many African societies, is linked, at least in part, to these times of fear.

Criminal justice, which is supposed to be an obstacle to the increasingly frequent violation of the rules of community life, was subverted. Numerous crimes and offences previously punished by reparation and compensation were now sanctioned by captivity and sale to slave traders to benefit chieftaincies and state authorities. Francis Moore, a postman with the Royal African Company stationed in Gambia, gave ample testimony of these changes². Stealing a pipe, formerly punishable by returning the stolen object, could now potentially lead to being sold to slave traders. Adultery, traditionally sanctioned by the payment of a fine to the legal spouse, now entailed the offender being packed off to Mississippi.

Whereas the ruling classes used cultural elements to control the Atlantic slave trade dynamics, the lower classes did not fail to use them as well to protect themselves against the devastating effects and violence of the slave trade by reconfiguring their occupation of their space, falling back on joking relationships and controlling the movements of the most vulnerable members of their society.

Joking relationships, a relatively common cultural phenomenon in the Sudano-Sahelian region of West Africa, mainly use the language of slavery and captivity. It is plausible, subject to further investigation on the topic, to link it to the growth of the slave trade. It is a cultural resource aimed at reducing the possible scope of captivity. Called *Sanankunya* in Mali, *kal* in Wolof (Senegal), *rakiré* amongst the Mossis from Burkina Faso, *toukpê* on the Côte d'Ivoire, *dendiraagal* amongst the Halpulaaren, *kalir* for the Sereer, this is the social practice of permitting ritualized banter between people who do not belong to the same ethnic group or who have different surnames within the same ethnic group. Groups linked by this kind of kinship are obliged to protect one another, or misfortune might befall the one violating the rule, bringing tension to a 'relative' of this type.

Apart from the fact that the most frequent form of teasing is linked to gluttony and slavery, it is interesting to note how this fictitious kinship is established between ethnic groups. In the case of Senegal, we note the exclusion of the Wolof and the Manding, the two communities most implicated in the trafficking of captives. The phenomenon exists amongst them but not with any other group.

2 Moore, F. 1738. *Travels into the inland parts of Africa, containing a description of the several nations for the space of six hundred miles up the River Gambia*. London, Edward Cave.

On the other hand, the least active groups exhibit the strongest relationship of this type: the Joola and the Sereer. While this cultural fact certainly dates back to times before slavery, it could have been recycled within the context of the Atlantic slave trade in the hope of preventing or containing violent acts.

Numerous prohibitions were instituted to protect members of society who were most exposed to the predatory activities of slave hunters. They usually focused on controlling the movements of these vulnerable people. Hence, it was formerly not recommended to leave the town during certain hours of the day. The moment when the sun was at its zenith and dusk were particularly feared times and numerous traditions forbade people, especially children and women, from leaving the village. The ban carried the threat of been struck down by spirits. It seems obvious to me that the spirits in question were nothing other than slave hunters.

Some communities that were victims of slave raids reconfigured their living spaces by abandoning villages that were too easy to find and relocating to refuges. Access to the new site was made as difficult as possible for people on horseback by creating narrow and winding trails. All homes had doors that gave direct access to the bush and secure areas. This reconfiguration of space was accompanied throughout by a culture of absolute mistrust towards non-native visitors.

The changes that followed the opening up of the Atlantic therefore had an impact on all aspects of the social, economic and cultural lives of African communities. African languages did not escape the effect of the Atlantic dynamic in that it generated significant creolization processes. Even a superficial reading of the lexical field reveals a considerable number of Portuguese borrowings in most Senegambian languages: the Portuguese word *caldero* appears in variations of the word *kawdir* amongst the Wolof who also borrowed the word *caabi* (pronounced *thiabi*) in the same tongue. *Sangria*, a trade product par excellence, has slipped into almost all languages in the region as *sangara*, meaning any alcoholic beverage. These cultural changes cannot all be attributed to trafficking or slavery. But behaviours developed that were so intolerable, including to the wrongdoers, that it was necessary to seek absolution from the sanctuaries of the local religions.

Lineage societies and the Atlantic slave trade: cultural innovation and subversive trafficking

Diverting the relationship of the sacred to legitimize reprehensible acts that endanger one's own community is the origin of key religious innovations that have been well documented in research studies. The work of Robert Baum on Joola societies demonstrates the importance of this type of historical transformation caused by the slave trade. We take some of his illuminating examples of religious and spiritual changes that resulted from the growth of the slave trade. Ancient religious cultures and practices were used to legitimize enrichment situations that corrupt the very foundations of society. The menace was so serious that it was necessary to restrict these dispersed practices and introduce sanctions in line with shared beliefs that were recognized by the community, especially in the absence of state institutions capable of containing and regulating said activities. Religious institutions proved quite effective in this regard.

It is unnecessary for the purposes of this illustration to expose the complex system of Joola religious beliefs. It is sufficient to indicate the importance of the upheavals experienced by cultural practices following Joola involvement in supplying captives for the Atlantic slave trade. Joola religious practice is characterized by the worship of protective spirits in several shrines (*ukin*, singular *boekin*) in inhabited areas and sacred woods. The shrines had different specialized functions. They were associated specifically with each branch of business activity, physical and mental health, fertility of the land, abundance of rain, fertility of women, fortune in war and the well-being of the community.

Shrines had their own 'priests' who were initiated in the specific cult of each shrine. Cultural practices included animal sacrifices and libations to lure the spirit of the shrine and its ancestors to encourage a favourable outcome to the problems voiced. Shrine spirits are meant to participate in regulating daily life by inflicting sanctions that may include the transmission of a deadly or disabling disease, depending on the seriousness of the offence committed.

The biggest cultural change associated with the introduction of slave trafficking in Joola country was the transition from family shrines to slavery-orientated shrines. The growth in slavery activities required ever more protection and the eradication of rules that were too restrictive in nature. Research by Robert Baum demonstrated that the Hupila spirit shrine was completely reworked, both in its form and in the way one could attain priesthood linked to this spirit. Previously Hupila was a simple altar with a rack, a libation bowl

and the jaw of a pig. When a person was suffering from a disease linked to Hupila, the individual had to make sacrifices to the shrine to become its priest. Sacrifices were not too demanding: two pigs, a goat, a dog and some chickens.

Gradually, there were new demands for sacrifices to this spirit. From now on the spiritual process of attaining priesthood marked by the curing of a disease entailed more challenging requests: capturing and selling a slave and more animal sacrifices, including that of a young bull. Altars dedicated to Hupila now included a wooden fetter among the instruments of worship, clearly a symbol of captivity. The name of the shrine was changed to Hupila Hudjenk (*Hudjenk* meaning fetter). During the final decades of the eighteenth century, new shrines appeared. Some were associated with key slave trading centres in the region: Dimbereng and Niomoun. Others called Hupila Hugop were located in rice granaries so the community could not control them, and they helped to shield kidnapping activities and the illegal sale of children in slave-trading areas. The novelty was that these shrines required new members to sacrifice a captive. This type of sacrifice, which was supposed to increase the spiritual power of the shrine, became necessary to protect those involved in slave-trading activities, particularly those that threatened the survival of the actual community. Association with this new *boekin* authorized the safe display of wealth acquired from slave trading activities. Social differentiation was therefore expressed via religious culture. Only those who had become rich could now take part in this ever more demanding cult. As more and more sectors of society were involved in slave trafficking, the more innovation and changes in local religious culture were taking place.

The situation was just as complicated in Aro country in the Bay of Biafra, as demonstrated by the work of Ugo Nwokeji. He shows that the society made profound changes in its religious culture and trading practices when it got involved in the Atlantic slave trade, which was particularly active in this region, without losing control of the situation. In this highly dynamic society with trade structured around diasporic networks, recourse to the Chukwu oracle authorized the sale as slaves of those who broke the established rules. Because trade did not occupy a central place in the local economy, the priests of the shrines ensured that the rules were enforced and that raiders were protected.

Ugo Nwokeji's study of Aro culture and its confrontation with slavery in the Bay of Biafra examines the sources of a remarkable specificity in relation to the conception of gender in Igbo country. It demonstrates that the Aro society, by drawing on a diasporic market culture, succeeded in imposing its logic on Atlantic dynamics by dictating its terms. A focus on culture made it clear that when trans-Saharan trade joined forces with the Atlantic slave trade, male captives were

shipped off in massive numbers across the ocean, whereas female captives and children were used for domestic slavery and the trans-Saharan slave trade.

It is apparent, therefore, that the mere mechanisms of the market or political forces – whether the centralized state was absent or not – do not explain African responses to the solicitations of the Atlantic world. African cultures influenced the methods used to set up the slave trade and were simultaneously subverted by the consequences of their developments. Commemorative and festive events are among the many examples that illustrate this dialectical relationship.

The festival, a cultural tool to validate the power derived from the slave trade

The issue of festivals with or without ritual sacrifices poses a serious methodological problem for historians. The first difficulty lies in establishing the facts from sources that need particularly close scrutiny to avoid ideological pitfalls. The second difficulty lies in interpreting these sources in order to grasp their meaning. Above all, one must avoid reductionist approaches – exclusively economic, political, or religious readings of the entire phenomenon – that cannot account for the meaning of ritual sacrifices performed in a wide variety of contexts.

The first Europeans who witnessed these events may not have paid close attention for the simple reason that in their own societies, criminals were executed in public.³ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their testimonies were a convenient way for ideologues of the slave trade and defenders of planters to sway European opinion towards the advantages of the slave trade for these miserable Africans, who, left to the devices of their bloodthirsty kings, would meet a tragic end via sacrifice in the name of beliefs condemned by an Enlightened Europe. Ideologues of colonization had a similar argument. The conquest was to put an end to the horrors of slaughter and slavery, evidence of the savage nature of African societies that Europe had taken on as its mission to civilize.

The testimony of Reginald Hugh Bacon, the leader of a punitive British expedition to Benin in 1897, in a work with a rather evocative title, *Benin: The City of Blood*, presents the capital of the state in a negative light, a country in ruins, the advanced decadence of which has turned its rulers into bloodthirsty monsters.

3 The introduction of prison as the key instrument of a modern penal system, less exhibitionist in nature, is from more recent times.

There are plenty of examples available of accounts of certain African states during the slave trade period, with descriptions of murderous rulers carrying out frenzied massacres against their own people, all captives of the king, foreigners or prisoners of war. Testimonies by European travellers, lapped up in good faith by historians, are part of this ideologically orientated mythology and are in fact more of a reflection of European imagination than the reality at ground level in Africa.

Dahomey's Customs festival sheds light on the relationship between human sacrifice and the destruction of prestige goods in relation to the Atlantic slave trade. Dahomey is a monarchy in the Gulf of Guinea that came about following the reunification by military conquest of three political entities originating from the slave trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century: the kingdoms of Allada, Savi and Abomey, all three ruled by the Yoruba State of Oyo. Agadja the Conqueror (1708-1732) was the leader who unified and transformed the state into a powerful war machine fed by arms from the slave trade that were 'products' of annual military campaigns led by an army of elites, including famous units of female amazons. The royal dynasty relied on a warrior aristocracy with an enormous quantity of slaves at their disposal.

This dynasty was at the origin of a major cultural innovation: the Customs festival instituted during the eighteenth century at the peak of the Atlantic slave trade. The festival was launched initially with the Great Customs celebrated during the funeral of the king by his successor. Subsequently, an annual festival was organized under the same name. Prepared during the interregnum period, the Great Customs included 'long and complex ceremonies, some of them bloody,' involving human sacrifices that impressed all contemporary European chroniclers. In addition to the obvious political dimension that exalted the authority of absolute power, the festival had a religious dimension via an ancestor cult celebrated by the extensive massacre of captives. It was also an opportunity for an excessive display of wealth accumulated from the slave trade and sumptuary consumption, all under the control of the royal dynasty that also ensured its redistribution.

The festival represents the exercise of a monopoly acquired by the royal power over ancestor worship, forbidden to other lineages. It is the result of a combination of methods: business deals first, by buying the skulls of the victims of raiding wars; legalities next, by introducing the death penalty as a royal prerogative; and finally, by forbidding subjects to behead the corpses of enemies killed in battle. By these means, the royal dynasty born from the slave trade, with an economy based on raid wars and the sale of captives to European companies, succeeded in exercising an exclusive monopoly over the ancestor cult. Hence,

the new power imposed its hold on the past to reinforce a hegemony weakened by constant recourse to wars of predation.

The monopoly over resources derived from trafficking and military campaigns necessarily called for a redistribution policy to validate the predation and violence which underpinned the dynastic power. The Customs festival fulfilled this function relatively well. It is also important to note that these changes thrived on a tradition that was widespread in the region as the foundation of local religious and spiritual culture. The power reclaimed the deeply rooted traditions and put them to its exclusive service, having first suitably subverted them and emptied them of their original significance.

The exuberance of the festivals and the scale of resources mobilized, including human sacrifices and the grandiose character of this now annual ritual, meant that Dahomey royalty succeeded in seizing a local resource and using it to increase its own dominance and to unify the country. The military parade showed off the power of the dynasty to the eyes of its European partners, with massive numbers of the population also involved in the festival. The composition of the sumptuary display reflects the clear link with the economic system of the slave trade, within which the annual or funerary festival was perfectly integrated. The display of a massive fortune excludes any notion of imitation by another social body or institution, let alone competition. The goods exhibited to the world came mainly from slave trading. The ruling power thus trivializes the consumption of such coveted items to highlight its omnipotence even more. Consumption here is not in response to any physiological need, it is totally symbolic in nature. To have the luxury of displaying and wasting such rare and coveted goods is what sets it apart, hence enhancing the power of the king and his dynasty.

The festival – a time of mass redistribution and destruction of prestige goods usually originating from predation activities recently introduced in the society concerned – combines the secular and religious in sacrifices with high economic value, whether animals, captives or criminals. Why would the ruling dynasty in Dahomey sacrifice war captives on such a huge scale when they could have sold them to the Atlantic slave trade for monetary benefit?

Two factors are involved in these cultural changes and innovations. First and foremost, prestige goods are an instrument of social distinction. To be effective as such, they must be inaccessible to most people and allow members of the group who use them destructively to distinguish themselves from the majority. The main purpose of destructive consumption is to showcase and legitimize the power of the owner who can dispense of high-value goods in this way. Those who are not capable of such sacrifices are of course legitimately excluded from

this game enjoyed by the big players. When consumption takes place within a religious perspective, it acquires greater efficacy because of its sacredness. Prestige goods acquired via the slave trade thus change the festive and religious cultures of the communities involved.

The study of the Atlantic slave trade from a cultural perspective sheds light on the fact that involvement in this economic dynamic initiated in the fifteenth century is not based exclusively on the existence of military or commercial institutions. The limited amount of research on cultural institutions and resources in the historiography of the slave trade has obscured a key aspect of the strategies implemented by African societies – including the most slave-orientated amongst them, with their war machinery exclusively dedicated to captive raids – to control and contain the devastating effects of slavery. The period of adjustment to the new dynamics imposed by the abolition of the slave trade in 1815 brought more problems. It makes it possible to understand the technological unravelling of African societies following the military defeat of states no longer recognized as legitimate by their own people.

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CHAPTER 5

A GLOBAL AFRICA AS SEEN THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE MEMORY OF SLAVERY

Myriam Cottias

*'To forget is to offend, and memory,
when it is shared, abolishes this offence'*

(Glissant, 2006).

*'If we were a people much given to revealing secrets, we might raise
monuments and sacrifice to the memories of our poets, but slavery cured
us of that weakness. It may be enough, however, to have it said that
we survive in exact relationship to the dedication of our poets'*

(Angelou, 1969).

Introduction

Since the late 1990s, 'forgetting' and 'silence' have been levers used to bring out and assert the 'memory of slavery' as a living memory, rooted in the past but continually meaningful in the present. Different sets of scales are needed to analyze its content and its capacity for social mobilization, as its expression is embedded in dissimilar contexts. At the national level, this memory has been established as a necessary recognition for building national cohesion, under pressure from the descendants of those affected by slavery and colonization. Everywhere, it

has brought demands for equality and questions on the concrete organization of powers. At a global level, it has exposed the dissymmetry of political and cultural relations in the world and has polarized, to a greater or lesser extent, a supranational 'Black' identity. Demands positioning themselves as transnational, based on the notion of the 'African diaspora' or, more recently, 'Global Africa' have thus been reconstructed. This article aims to show how the performativity of memory – as both legitimacy and credible authority – has developed, and what its symbolic and concrete outputs are, as well as its limits.

From silence to memory: an aporetic critique of history

Breaking the silence is one of the central arguments of the UNESCO programme 'Routes of Enslaved Peoples: Resistance, Liberty, Heritage', launched in 1994 in Ouidah, Benin, on a proposal from Haiti. Since its establishment, it has provided a sort of memory road map. It could be argued that there are many kinds of silence shrouding the history of slavery. A few examples illustrate this across the world. In Europe, the silence around the slave trade and slavery at the institutional level has been linked to the shaping of the continent as an emblematic beacon of abolitionism, with wide variations between the different European countries. In Spain, from the end of the sixteenth century, and after failing to have its illegitimacy recognized, slavery was subject to silence and oblivion, with a major tendency towards the assuaging of the phenomenon. Slavery was presented there as a dignified domestic affair, as opposed to the brutality of plantation slavery in the American and Caribbean colonies of the Spanish Empire. Portugal, since the laws of the Marquis de Pombal in the mid-eighteenth century, always affirmed the absence of slaves on its soil, whereas a century later, emancipations were still being recorded. In the United Kingdom, in 2007, at the time of the bicentenary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, the country reinvented itself as being responsible for 'abolitionism' rather than for 'enslavement'. National memory has been shaped in accordance with the image of a country that has styled itself as the champion of abolitionist morality, having shown the way to other Western powers. In France, racialized slavery and the transatlantic slave trade have not been incorporated into the narrative on the construction of the State and the Nation, whereas abolition has been hailed as one of the cornerstones of the French Republic. These different positions have masked the fact that the colonial states, at the end of the nineteenth century, were able to accept the continuation of the slavery

system, in certain African colonies, to consolidate their economic and political supremacy and maintain, depending on the period, their alliance strategies. This allowed them to avoid thinking about the ancestral legacies of slavery.

Despite pioneering works such as those, among others, of Harris Memel-Fôté for Côte d'Ivoire, in the 1980s, which invoked the need for systematic research in West Africa to identify the origins and functions of the slave population, slavery has seldom been studied there. In Senegal, domestic slavery has been veiled in silence, drowned out by the denunciation of transatlantic slavery. In Mauritania, modern slavery is still an issue and continues to establish hierarchies and social exclusion. However, some researchers from African universities, for example in Senegal, Cameroon and Kenya, now assert that the study of slavery, specifically that of domestic slavery, such as that of the participation or resistance of certain sovereigns to European demand for captives, helps us to understand the methods of developing national constructions. They want to emphasize the organization and reproduction of powers within the sovereign states of Africa. In East Africa, the memory of slavery is still alive. Descendants of slaves, for example, do not belong to the forty-two official tribes that constitute Kenya and therefore cannot acquire full citizenship. They are considered 'aliens'.

Certain valuation mechanisms used by states amount to silencing the truth. In the Arab world, classic and contemporary historiography has favoured the heroization of slaves who have occupied an honorary position in societies while simultaneously silencing the phenomenon as a whole, that is to say, the masses of anonymous slaves and the organization of the Arab Muslim slave trade. The new States of South America, such as Brazil, Peru and Argentina, which abolished slavery even before Europe did, had some difficulties, until recently, in recognizing its legacy. In Brazil, which took in the greatest number of captives, the memory of slavery is conflictual and difficult to integrate into the nation, which has long portrayed itself as 'mixed race'. To reverse this trend, Black associations have fought to obtain positive action laws to reduce the social inequalities suffered by the descendants of slaves. On a global scale, the silence around slavery has acted as a brake on policy development.

Gradual but incomplete recognition

Several elements have made it possible for the recognition of the memory of slavery, understood as the presence in today's world of the effects of past acts. The first element is the weakening of Western discourse. On the one hand, the traumatic experiences of the Second World War, combined with the

strategic role of European colonies in the global conflict, called into question Western intellectual heritage. As soon as the global conflict was over, people in the colonized areas of the Caribbean and Africa began to question the world order and modernity. An analysis of the concepts of 'freedom', 'power' and 'domination', particularly based on the history of slavery, was then formulated. Aimé Césaire who, in 1950, wrote 'Discourse on Colonialism', questioned, as did C. L. R. James and Eric Williams, the meaning of these different notions. He underscored a paradox: the enhancement of the concept of freedom, its association with modernity and its link with universalism developed at the same time as the system of slavery intensified. The hegemony of reason magnified by Western philosophy since the eighteenth century has been accompanied by the most brutal domination and negation of humanity, with the slave trade of African captives, slavery and colonization, with, among other things, the massacre of the Hereros and the Namas. On the other hand, although in 1950, the intellectual and moral solidarity of humanity and the fundamental unity of the human species were affirmed in a Declaration by the world's scientists, 'Fallacies of Racism Exposed', thirty years later, individual and collective experiences have changed little. The results of the use of the notion of 'race' – whose genealogy dates back to transatlantic slavery – remain, and the heirs of this history and the former colonized populations continue to experience racism.

The second element is a consequence of the first and concerns the methods of writing history. At the end of the 1950s, the questioning of domination gained momentum and spread worldwide. It focused as much on the Jewish question as on the need for the new nation states of Africa to build a 'unifying past opposable to colonial ideology' (Thioub, in Cottias, Cunin and de Almeida, 2010, pp. 377-386). The reference to slavery appears within the critique of colonialism. Jawaharlal Neru, in his opening speech at the Bandung Conference Political Committee, in 1955, told delegates, 'Everything else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys'. The parallel is drawn with the extermination of the Jews. At the First Congress of Black Writers and Artists, Alioune Diop said, 'we recognize that we are not the only victims of racism. Jews, during this war, were subjected to organized suffering brought to a level never imagined before. It is with emotion that we pay tribute here to the memory of all the victims of Hitlerian racism'.¹

1 Actes du premier congrès international des écrivains et artistes noirs, *Présence africaine*, 9, 10.

It is precisely from the search for elements on the specificity of this reversal of the world that the attention for the 'subject' emerged: the interest for the individual witness of history, capable of providing explanations. With the disappearance of political polarities at the end of the Cold War, the figure of the 'witness', in particular of the 'subaltern witness' but also that of the 'victim' of history emerges in the 1970s, both in the West and in the new nations emerging from decolonization. The issue became that of having the truth of the wounds inflicted by history recognized as a place of 'collective reality', which builds 'a community of tragedy' (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, pp. 146, 142) publicly and politically. A history-memory marked with the seal of universality as defined by Michelet gives way to a plurality of memories that seek recognition and a place in the history of nations and in global history.

On the African continent, since the 1960s, historians have been interested in a history that must first restore to the continent a past worthy of the present and reconcile the narrative of a heroic history (based on liberation from the colonial power) with 'the disparate memories of communities and individuals that today are the manifestation of the existence of a plural consciousness of history' (Diouf, 1999, p. 337). Yet writing history did not mean comprehensively narrating historical facts and tensions of power dynamics – especially around the issue of slavery – because history was complex everywhere. The history of slavery, called into question by its contemporary legacies – such as discrimination and racism – would gradually oppose the memory that was supposed to be able to legitimately assume the 'wounds of a group'. It is constituted as a place of truth of the community of 'descendants', for subordinate players who have been unable to write history. Memory thus claimed the place of the dominated subject both in history and in social analyses and policies, and even 'political subjectification'. This opposition had several consequences, opening up possibilities for some, radicalizing the oppositions for others.

Memory and history: a confrontation of political subjectivities

Through memory, the writing of history has been successfully questioned. Oral history surveys have been launched. A rereading of the archives has been initiated to find the 'agency', that is, 'the capacity of individuals to act independently and freely', and the subjectivity of slaves. Thanks to this, it has been possible to raise new questions about the experiences of the dominated subjects. Through the analysis of legal and infralegal documents, testimonials of the 'voices of slaves' have been found, despite the formalism of testimonies before a court of 'justice' (a concept

that is open to criticism in the context of colonial domination). Destinies have been reconstructed in a microhistory of the Atlantic. The journeys of enslaved peoples, whether transatlantic, intra-African or around the Indian Ocean and as far as Asia, have been revealed, within which both political emancipations from slavery, by states or through the Haitian Revolution, and individual emancipations, whether official or unofficial, have been pivotal. The reconstruction of these destinies brought together in the 'biographical turn' has built a new 'library of slavery situations' by showing the gap between a normative history of slavery and that of the experiences of slavery, where the 'guile' of the subject coexists with incredible violence and radical domination. Finally, a new grammar began to develop. This led to important conceptual and semantic changes, such as, for example, limiting the term 'slave' to the expression of a civil status, and preferring the terms 'enslaved' or 'enslaved people' to dissociate the civil status of the individual and the human being; resistance and revolts – whether minor or radical – abortions, poisonings or homicides bear witness to the need to pay homage to human strength.

Memory, however, has also amplified presentism and initiated a utilitarian relationship with history in the sense that the latter is understood, re-read, analysed from labels or keywords that are decontextualized, which are not taken in the context of a specific time but in an ahistorical, linear time. Attempts are being made to rewrite historical discourse from memory. For some years now, they have created the conditions for post-truth; this political culture of emotion, in the case of the history of slavery, barely reflects their complexities at the level not of systems but of the individual.

Remembrance ceremonies and repertoires of action

Do commemorations of the memory of the slave trade and slavery as well as specific legislation allow it? They are one of the responses of international, European and national institutions to demands for recognition of the crime of the slave trade and slavery. Since the 2000s, the number of commemoration dates has increased significantly. At the international level, 25 March is International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade, designated by the General Assembly of the United Nations, while 23 August is International Day for the Remembrance of the Slave Trade and its Abolition proclaimed by UNESCO (in reference to the uprising of slaves in Saint-Domingue in 1791).

At the state level, the choice of each date has been contentious, revealing a tension between institutional arrangements and associations of 'descendants of slaves'.

In France, remembrance of colonial slavery is based on six laws and regulations, establishing 10 May as 'Day for the Memories of the Slave Trade, Slavery and their Abolition', following the law of 10 May 2001, which recognizes the slave trade and slavery across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans as crimes against humanity; and 23 May has just been added as another national day paying tribute to the victims of colonial slavery. In Senegal, the Law of 27 March 2010 established 27 April each year as the date of national commemoration, as it corresponds to the date of the abolition of the slave trade in the French colonies, on 27 April 1848, at the initiative of Victor Schoelcher. The date does not meet consensus and has not given rise to a shared commemoration. In Brazil, two dates have been chosen: 13 May, which was the date of the (ineffective) abolition of slavery by Princess Isabel, and 20 November, which celebrates Black Consciousness Day, and corresponds to the anniversary of the death of Zumbi dos Palmares, leader of the largest maroon community in Brazil. The Netherlands has established the *keti-koti* (from Surinam, meaning 'broken chains'), celebrated on 1 July each year, as a commemoration of the end of slavery in Surinam (formerly part of Dutch Guiana) and the Netherlands Antilles. In Jamaica, Emancipation Day is celebrated on 1 August, marking the abolition of slavery as well as the country's independence on 6 August 1962. Mauritius celebrates the abolition of slavery on 1 February at Pointe Canon. In the United States of America and the United Kingdom, Black History Month provides the opportunity to organize cultural events without there being a national day of commemoration. All of these official events constitute political recognition, but it is difficult to measure their social effects. Rather than taking into consideration the memories of the heirs of this history, the commemoration expresses the political use that is made of the past. Rather than a global geography of the memory of slavery, which would promote the sharing of knowledge and experiences, the commemorations seem, on the contrary, to confine the history of slavery within narrow borders and in narratives that do not take into account conflictuality. The way that 'reconciliation' and 'living together' are displayed in European countries is a way of depoliticizing the issue by creating a place that is intended to be non-antagonistic.

*Art and places of remembrance of slavery:
should these occupy a global space?*

During the twentieth century, deportation from Africa to the Americas, enslavement and transatlantic trafficking of Black populations formed creative experiences within the Black diaspora. Considered through notions such as 'miscegenation', 'transculturation', 'creolization' and 'hybridity', which are

themselves based on 'encounter', 'violent opposition', cultural 'creation' and 'reinterpretation', transnational cultural genealogies have been established. Music, dance, literature and religion are all cognitive expressions of the Black Atlantic that seek to connect West and Central Africa with the Americas, ignoring nationalist borders. In this 'counter-culture of modernity', according to Paul Gilroy, memory plays an essential role: memory of transcontinental slavery, of which discussions, images and heritage regularly influence each other across continents thanks to the circulation of information via new information technologies.

Inscriptions on UNESCO's lists of intangible cultural heritage of humanity reflect this, such as, for example, Maloya from Réunion Island, Gwoka from Guadeloupe, the Manden Charter from present-day Mali and Tumba Francesa (French Drum) from Cuba. Museums and heritage sites also express it, within different scopes. The National Museum of African-American History and Culture, recently opened in Washington D.C., is focused on recognizing the importance of African Americans in the nation-building of America. It is about rewriting the history of the United States of America by valuing this essential contribution, which is rooted in slavery. The International Slavery Museum in Liverpool was the first to open in Europe. It is the only museum with such a significant project in educational and scientific mediation activities. One element, however, must be emphasized, because it is symptomatic and explains certain demands of Afro-descendants: the main memorials have been organized around the abolition of slavery, such as the Ark of Return in New York, USA; the Memorial to the Abolition of Slavery in Nantes, France; the National Slavery Monument in Oosterpark, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; the ACTe Memorial in Point-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe; and the Slave Memorial in Cape Town, South Africa, among others.

In sub-Saharan Africa, it is a different matter. Memorials have been placed in several African countries and heritage projects are underway, but they are underpinned by more encompassing notions such as that of the 'négritude' of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor, or the 'Consciencism' or 'Nkrumaism' of Kwame Nkrumah. In Ghana, the museums of Cape Coast and Elmina, former slave forts, evoke the question of the slave trade not only in relation to the European demand for captives, but also by placing it back in the history of Ghana and Africa in general. In Porto Novo, Benin, alongside the Afro-Brazilian house and following Ouidah 1992, the first international festival of Vodun arts and cultures, important projects have developed, such as the Slave Route, reconstructing the route taken by captives to their place of deportation and the Door of No Return that marked their departure. In Senegal, the House of Slaves on the Island of Gorée has been established as a place

of pilgrimage and an international symbol of consciousness of the atrocities suffered by the Africans through the European slave trade, while the Museum of Black Civilizations in Dakar conveys a more global discourse about Africa. The message sent by all these places in Africa is resolutely outward-looking, particularly towards the diasporas.

Dialogue between land and blood throughout global Africa

After having been the project of colonial authorities, whether on the side of abolitionism or enslavement, such as, for example, the American Colonization Society of 1816 which ‘repatriated’ 15,000 African-Americans to Africa and created Liberia in 1847, the question of the ‘return’ of former slaves to Africa was taken up again in the twentieth century by the Afrodescendant diaspora and by African states. Thus, for example, in 1955, Emperor Haile Selassie decided to give land at Shashamane to people of African descent from around the world, although only the Rastafarians of Jamaica responded to this call, for political and religious reasons. If the return to Africa, as an original and ancestral land from which populations deported to the Americas had been abducted, was supported by a shared imagination and hopes of freedom, egalitarianism and the absence of racism, the twentieth century reinforced these expectations through scientific techniques. Thus, genomic analyses have attempted to answer the genealogical question on the origins marked by the theme of the rupture of family and cultural ties – a major theme in literature, philosophy and artistic creation – to underline the transportation and exile far from Africa, and bridge the Glissantian ‘gulf’ of the Middle Passage between Africa and the Americas. More recently, the approach described by Alex Haley in his book *Roots*, recounting how his research based on the oral history of his family had allowed him to find the ancestral Gambian village of a grandfather who had been enslaved at the end of the eighteenth century, was contrasted with a science-based method.

Since 1992, the emerging genetic ancestry tests, stemming from the New York African Burial Ground Project, have aimed to break the silence of a history that had not recorded the identity of the enslaved deportees. A major industry has thus developed in the United States and Western Europe to enable individuals to decode their genome to discover their real ‘genetic ethnicity’ and, in this way, to reverse the trauma of unknown origins.

The notion of ‘return’ has thus taken on another dimension. On the one hand, the organization of genealogy tourism – in particular by the company African

Ancestry, based on the results of genetic testing – has led to many trips from America to supposed countries of origin. In 2010, for example, a journey was organized as part of an ancestry reconnection programme for people whose genetic origins were Cameroonian, including the film director Spike Lee, the music producer Quincy Jones and the former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. These returns to ancestral roots have also led to the enhancement of heritage sites, such as that of Bimbia, discovered in 1987 and classified as part of Cameroon's national heritage, even though its authenticity is disputed.

On the other hand, these genomic links forged across the Atlantic have led to specific political decisions aimed at strengthening spiritual and economic ties between certain African states and their diasporas. In 2010, following the earthquake in Haiti, the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, offered Haitians a 'voluntary return' to African soil.

In Sierra Leone, citizenship is granted to all those who can prove their ties to the country through DNA testing. The same is true in Ghana, where nationality can be acquired now by such genomic proof, whereas in 1961, when Kwame Nkrumah became the first President of Ghana, W. E. B. Du Bois moved there to obtain Ghanaian nationality. In September 2018, the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, launched the 'Year of Return': twelve months in 2019 during which festivals and events were held to commemorate the victims of slavery. On the margins of the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, the time of return was considered as a right earned historically, already established by the African Union, which, in 2014, recognized the African diaspora as the sixth region of Africa. Such decisions seem to thwart memorial monuments that focus on the symbol of 'no return'.

Reparations for slavery: a new way of writing history?

The tendency of states to focus on the abolition of slavery, rather than highlight the suffering of the enslaved and the wrongs inflicted upon them, is the basis of demands of African Americans and 'descendants of slaves' practically everywhere in the world. Admittedly, general emancipation changed the civil status of the enslaved and should therefore not be downplayed. However, questions on the effectiveness of their 'release from slavery', such as the persistence of economic and social inequalities and racialized and/or hierarchical social structures inherited from slavery, remain acute. Examining such questions shows the extent to which the matter of reparation (in every sense of the word) is caught between the invocation of 'justice' and the payment of monetary compensation, also in the

form of 'reimbursement'. This refreshes debates dating back to the abolition of slavery, when the slave owners received monetary equivalents for the loss of 'their' slaves, whereas the enslaved received no compensation whatsoever for their lives spent in chains. The United Kingdom gradually abolished slavery in 1833, with a period of apprenticeship of four to six years for released slaves in the English-speaking Caribbean, Mauritius and Cape Town, and some 20 million pounds was paid to the former owners. France, on the other hand, decreed a definitive and immediate abolition of slavery in 1848, with compensation of 126 million francs paid to the slave owners in all of the French colonies – Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, Senegal, Reunion Island and Nosy-Bé. Previously, the most prosperous French colony in the Atlantic, Saint-Domingue, which proclaimed its independence in 1804, had to negotiate its recognition as a sovereign State, in 1825, in exchange for compensation for the properties of French colonists (90 million gold francs paid between 1825 and 1880). In the United States, in 1865, General William Sherman enacted the rule of forty acres and a mule in the form of reparations or compensation for the enslaved, but without real implementation. The rule was definitively shelved in 1868, in particular because it was opposed by President Andrew Johnson, who advocated reconciliation with the states of the South at the expense of the political and economic situation of the emancipated slaves. The so-called reconstruction policy ended in 1877 and was gradually replaced by segregation, constitutionally recognized in 1896 by the Supreme Court judgment *Plessy v. Ferguson*.

This moral hiatus, constructed and denounced in the nineteenth century, was more or less maintained and reinforced in the twentieth century owing to theoretical developments around 'justice', and its various forms, such as distributive justice and corrective justice, and between just redistribution attached to an ideal model of a 'just society' and remediation of racialized inequalities endured by the heirs to the history of slavery. 'At the intersection of past and future, the present is seized upon as a time to correct injustices inherited from the past' (Jewsiewicki, 2004, p. 7). This explains the confrontation in the formulation of the reparations.

Regarding the question of material compensation, Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon offered a symbolic and moral solution because the historical fact cannot be corrected: 'The term reparations implies that there can be reparation. Yet it is simply irreparable. I know Westerners well enough. They will say: so, my dear, how much? There you go! Now it's over' (Césaire, 2005, p. 39). In France, the positioning of associations such as the Representative Council of Black Associations (*Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires* – CRAN) – unlike the International Movement for Reparations (*Mouvement International pour*

les Réparations – MIR) is not stable, and demands constantly hover between the financial and the symbolic. The question has also resurfaced recently in the United Kingdom, drawing from the works of C. L. R. James and Eric Williams, which implicitly raise the question of material reparations. In September 2013, under the auspices of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Caribbean states launched a campaign targeting France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Sweden and Denmark to obtain reparations (First Regional Conference on Reparations for colonization and the slave trade, 15 to 17 September 2013). They called on states to seek reparations for the damage caused by slavery and colonization while highlighting the specific case of Haiti. This demand, set out by Sir Hilary Beckles in his book *Britain's Black Debt: Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide*, was also intended to emphasize that the demand made it possible to support the political construction, and even the identity-building, of the Caribbean, and the establishment on an international scale of a group of descendants of slavery.

Recently, in the United States, the demand for reparations resurfaced dramatically during the racially-motivated clashes in Ferguson, in 2014 and 2015, and Charlottesville, in 2017; the Black Lives Matter movement that was started in 2012 was reactivated. It synthesized the necessary remedies. Justice, both in the ethical sense and in terms of judicial reform, and equal treatment, which form the principles of the demands, were put into perspective with a global demand for reparations for slavery and for public policies in favour of African Americans. The movement shifted the focus and opened up very concrete discussions, no longer focusing on financial reimbursement but on public policies. At the same time, authors such as Ta-Nehisi Coates, whose thinking is in line with that of James Baldwin, advocate the acceptance of history with all the consequences it entails: 'Reparations would mean a revolution of the American consciousness.' Memory may have reached the end of its effectiveness, especially since it does not have enough conceptual tools to open up to the future, particularly to undermine the organization of discourse and values and propose a coherence of discourse by integrating the opposition.

Thus, the mobilization of the principle of reparations could be considered as a proposal to open epistemological frontiers, to write history in another way according to modalities that would redefine the centre and the peripheries – where abolition would not be the climax of the history of slavery for countries that are former slave societies. This history must integrate, correlate and align as much the violence of slavery and domination as the resistance and revolts. The analysis of the structures must integrate the individual experiences, injuries and

sensitivities, in all their dimensions, including their African manifestations: the continuities between the past and the present are to be identified. In short, this is a new proposal to write a ‘complete’ history of citizenship, in which global Africa fully takes its place.

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CHAPTER 6

COLONIALISM

Frederick Cooper

Introduction

The very idea of ‘post-colonial Africa’ suggests that the continent’s present-day situation was determined by the fact of having been colonized. But to the Nigerian historian J. F. Ade Ajayi, the colonial period was an ‘episode’ in African history – no more important than any other (Ajayi, 1989). Recent scholarship comes down somewhere between the two positions: the period between conquest and independence was one of fundamental and durable transformation, but the dynamic was one of struggle, adaptation and reconfiguration.

At one extreme, colonizers treated Africans as objects to be used, and Africans’ ‘difference’ had to be continually emphasized to keep them in their place. At the other extreme, missionaries and social reformers sought to use political and cultural power to remake Africa in a European image. Too close to the brutal extreme, and the state risked rebellion or campaigns by humanitarian groups. Too much of a ‘civilizing mission’ and Africans might declare the mission accomplished and claim full equality.

Colonial conquest and colonial rule

What made colonial conquest possible made colonial rule difficult. European armies concentrated firepower, thanks to the machine gun, the telegraph and their ability to choose when and where to attack. But once a conquering army swept through, it went somewhere else, leaving a tiny number of white administrators to cover large areas. The District Officer or Commandant de Cercle was administrator and magistrate, tax collector and guardian of order, responsible for improving agricultural production and stopping the spread of disease.

Whatever the goals of a colonial state, governments had to turn to Indigenous hierarchies to extend its power to ground level. It needed their legitimacy and connections to collect taxes and round up labour, and it needed local knowledge. If the category of 'chief' under colonial administration included former kings, provincial leaders, heads of kinship groups, village elders, or sometimes people whom colonial rulers mistakenly thought influential, such people had to enforce colonial power – under threat of dismissal or worse – but couldn't be pushed too far, lest they become too discredited to serve the regime. Translators and local police also became figures of local importance, the often-arbitrary bottom level of the colonial hierarchy.

Colonial economies ranged from outright predation – as in the Congo of King Leopold II of Belgium (Hochschild, 1998) – to living off the fruits of African initiatives in the production of commodities, like cocoa, ground nuts and cotton, which were increasingly in demand in the world market. Some Africans, like the cocoa producers of the Gold Coast, achieved modest prosperity, even as colonial governments gave European firms privileged positions in the commercialization of African crops. In British or Portuguese southern Africa, settler or plantation production by European settlers or corporations demanded a much more intrusive, often coercive, regime of labour recruitment. Gold mines in South Africa and Rhodesia or copper mines in Northern Rhodesia depended on vast labour catchment areas around them, where the lack of infrastructure or possibilities to commercialize, crops gave Africans little cash-earning alternatives to wage labour. There was a wide grey area between 'free' and 'coerced' labour recruitment, and workers cycled in and out of exploitative conditions in the mines and impoverished family life in rural villages. Mainly in South Africa there emerged a coherent structure of racialized capitalism based on the alienation of land and a system of migration controls and labour discipline (Zeleza, 1993; Austin, 2015).

Missionaries saw the African as a soul to be saved more than a body to be exploited, but the economic and the spiritual dimensions were in fact related. Many saw the African as caught in a world of constraint – tyrannical rulers, stifling control by elders, unchanging customs – and defined their own task as forging a different sort of person, an individual conscious of his or her relationship to God, acting as a rational being in economic interactions, becoming part of a routine of daily life conditioned by European norms. Yet Africans could take elements of the package they were being offered and reshape what they needed in their own ways. Some governments also thought they could transform African society, perhaps turning subsistence cultivators into yeoman farmers or industrial wage labourers, maybe even encouraging African slaveowners to become capitalist farmers. They learned, roughly by 1914, that the more ambitious projects – for reforming Africa as a whole or exploiting it systematically – were beyond the capacities of colonial regimes.

The elites of African societies – whether called chiefs, elders, or traditional rulers – tried to use colonial power even as colonial governments tried to use them. Patriarchs could manipulate ‘tradition’ to make many societies more patriarchal than they had been. But the growth of cities, wage labour, and other changes sometimes meant that young men or women had more chance to leave when rural life became too oppressive. The very limitations of colonial transformations made colonial societies all the more uneven, their economies heavily influenced by the railways and port facilities and by the influence of import-export companies toward supplying narrow ranges of cash crops in exchange for limited ranges of European manufactured goods.

Both French and British governments in the early 1920s debated using metropolitan funds for ‘development’ programmes to get colonial economies more active, but both decided that the money was better invested at home and reform might prove dangerous. Colonial ideologies turned inward: France and Britain made a virtue of their own limited power, arguing that responsible colonial policy meant change within the structure of existing cultures rather than change in a European image. Colonial rule – which always had been ‘indirect’ in much of the continent, given that the impossibility of governing without the complicity of African authorities – became even more self-consciously linked to political structures, which while reshaped by colonial overrule, were considered ‘Indigenous’. The official effort in the 1920s at retraditionalizing Africa was if anything more urgent in order to counter arguments in the name of ‘citizenship’ made by African leaders in the aftermath of the Second World War – when many Africans defended their own empire against its rivals – and to deflect

the demands of mission-educated Africans who insisted that their Western education entitled them to representation in government councils and civil service positions.

The abuses of British and French governments were subject to criticism from within, especially from a secular republican ideology in the case of France and a Christian, missionary-led lobby in the case of Great Britain. In both cases, the non-communist left was more likely to favour reforming colonies than abandoning them, and reformers set themselves the task of bringing Africa out of backwardness as well as out of the clutches of white settlers, mining companies and commercial houses. In Portugal – ruled by a dictatorship after 1926 – metropolitan society provided no reference point for critiques of colonial rule, and a willingness to use forced labour more blatantly than did other powers was attenuated mainly by a lack of capital. The Belgian Copperbelt, the state, mining capital, and the Catholic Church helped to forge a laboratory for the use of ‘stabilized’ labour – pulled away from villages into permanent settlement in mine towns – under close supervision, leaving Africans few niches for entrepreneurship or political participation.

Decolonization and independence

The world Depression of 1929 pushed Africa more deeply into its colonial mediocrity. The crisis of the system set in during the late 1930s. If political threats earlier in the decade could be diffused to diverse locations and supposedly ‘tribal’ societies, the revival of commerce after 1935 put pressure on the narrow transportation routes and hubs of the neglected colonial infrastructure, bringing people back into miserable living conditions and rapidly rising prices for housing, food and urban services. Then came the war, putting further pressure on African workers, set against diminished supplies of the manufactured goods those workers needed to buy.

The prolonged pattern of strikes, shop boycotts, riots by urban Africans, and rural malaise profoundly shook the British Empire, and after the war French Africa as well (Cooper, 1996). Officials realized – at last – that their mediocre record of social and economic intervention in the past years left the empires with weak tools to expand needed production and even weaker means to respond to the challenges that were disrupting the key sites on which an import-export economy depended. Officials in London and Paris decided that an imperial problem needed an imperial solution, and they looked to the concept

of 'development'. For the first time, the metropolitan taxpayer would contribute to the cost of the colonies: funding would be directed not just to projects of immediate economic utility but to improving infrastructure, including services for wage workers, hopefully bringing the colonial regime both increased production and legitimacy.

Policies intended to reinvigorate and relegitimize colonial authority had the reverse effect: development initiatives unleashed numerous conflicts over resources, the openings to trade unions in British and French Africa encouraged the rapid escalation of claims, and very tentative openings toward allowing participation in government were pried wider by African political movements (Cooper, 2002). France conceded the rights of the citizen to its subjects in 1946 and soon found that citizenship became the basis for claiming social and economic as well as political rights. Although spending on infrastructure and education, particularly by France and Britain, increased sharply after the Second World War, private investment did not follow as hoped, and colonial economies remained narrowly focused on a small range of export crops or minerals. For a time, African producers of crops like cocoa or coffee could profit from relatively favourable commodity prices and African workers in mines, railways and ports could hope to earn enough wages to support a family and expect a pension. But neither the modes of production in rural Africa nor the external domination of international commerce were fundamentally restructured.

It was the most self-consciously developmentalist regimes that gave up first on retaining African colonies – Great Britain conceding self-rule to the Gold Coast in 1951 and independence in 1957, France devolving budgetary authority to elected territorial legislatures in 1956 and independence in 1960 (Cooper, 2015). Portugal, the weakest economically of European colonial powers and the least affected by democratic scruples, held on until 1974. South Africa, and for a time Rhodesia, preserved white domination by claiming to act as a national power rather than an imperial one. But what had happened during the 1940s and 1950s was not just geopolitical change. The normative basis of a world order in which the empire was an ordinary and accepted component had come apart. With former colonies – starting with India and Indonesia – taking their place alongside Latin American and Middle Eastern countries as sovereign states in the United Nations and other international institutions, colonialism was becoming indefensible. Nevertheless, the effects of the colonial idea in Africa lasted much longer than its legitimacy around the world.

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CHAPTER 7

RETHINKING THE HISTORY OF POVERTY IN AFRICA

Three Epistemological Approaches

Vincent Bonnecase

Introduction

The intense focus of both development organizations and the international press on the subject of poverty in Africa over the last fifty years contrasts with the very relative interest shown in this issue by scientific research, at least among historians. This contrast touches on a difficulty that has long been highlighted in the social sciences [Simmel 1998]: due to its emotional charge, but also its normative presuppositions and multiple institutional appropriations, poverty remains a difficult category to analyze. Added to this is a methodological problem more specific to history: since the poor leave few traces and have ‘neither the desire nor the means to tell their stories’ (Gutton, 1971, p. 1), their lives can often only be understood from the perspective of exogenous sources. It is thus difficult to distinguish between what corresponds to poverty itself and what corresponds to its social representation or political treatment.

In writing *The African Poor. A History*, John Iliffe (1987) opened up a new field of investigation, at the same time calling upon a theoretical tool set already experimented with in European world history. This foundational work has had little direct follow-up to date. If, however, we broaden our gaze to take in all the work which, without making poverty its central subject, questions the process of impoverishment in Africa over the long term, there is abundant literature to

be found. This article will go back over this literature, distinguishing three main approaches, not to place them into any kind of hierarchy but rather to examine their epistemological foundations and any developments to which they might lead.

Poverty as a social reality

A first approach consists, quite simply, of understanding poverty as a social reality to be analysed. This is the perspective of John Iliffe who, following on from Charles Booth (1970), distinguishes between ‘the poor...forced to fight constantly to meet their vital needs’ and the ‘very poor’, ‘living permanently in a state of absolute necessity’, the latter being the subject of his work (Iliffe, 1987, p. 1-2). A similar approach was followed by a historiography of famine, looking at poverty in Africa from the perspective of one of its most visible stigmas, particularly in the Sahel (Alpha Gado, 1993), Darfur (De Waal, 1989) and Southern Africa (Vaughan, 1987). The realist approach to poverty has also been fed by economic and social history, which, in parallel with the dependency theorists, has highlighted the negative impact of colonization and international exchange on the living standards of African populations (Nouschi, 1961). This has more recently been extended by studies of the structural adjustment programmes promoted by international financial institutions and their social consequences (Destremau, Deboulet and Ireton, 2004).

This approach mainly responds to two issues. The first focuses on the development of the living conditions and profile of the poorest people in African societies. This leaves us with many open-ended questions today, especially since these individuals were, for too long, perceived as weakly stratified and very few studies remain on poverty in Africa before the twentieth century (Stephens, 2012). In recent years, we have seen more development as regards the history of socially subordinate groups in colonial and post-colonial Africa, especially in relation to women and, to a lesser extent, young people. We must also continue to examine the ways in which the structure of class, gender, race and inter-generational relations has generated positions of subordination (Stoler, 2002), perceptible in terms of standards of living, but also legal status and political rights. The second issue relates to the conditions that produced the poverty. It no longer seems heuristic to try to distinguish between endogenous dynamics and external factors, as the two appear to be closely connected (Subrahmanyam, 2014). Examining this link nevertheless remains essential, taking into account both local historicities from the colonial period onwards, and an overall history of empires and capitalism.

Poverty as an institutional construction

A second focus is on understanding poverty in Africa as an institutional construction that, as a continuation of the colonial conquest, emerged after the Second World War from the perspective of the developmentalist paradigm. Such a point of view was, above all, advanced by anthropologists (Escobar, 1995) and political scientists (Rist, 1996) who focused on deconstructing what they analysed to be a new form of Western domination over the world. Fewer historians used this approach, even though the foundations for a 'history of development' (Coquery-Vidrovitch, Hemery and Piel, 1988) had been laid early on. This constructivist perspective invites us to look at development knowledge as a power device. It asks, in particular, whether 'poverty in Africa' is based on a normative projection underpinned by ethnocentric conceptions of wealth and well-being.

This approach has been criticized for conveying a monolithic conception of development and, more generally, of Western hegemony, which, in a strange reversal, it sometimes deprives of its history (Cooper, 2005). We could also criticize its propensity to look at social processes exclusively from the perspective of foreign domination, sometimes combined with a 'chromatic' view of history (Thioub, 2005, p. 282), without sufficient consideration of 'extraversion management' by African populations (Bayart, 2001). Finally, on a methodological level, we can question its empirical basis. By giving pride of place to discourses with presupposed rather than proven performative virtues, there may have been a tendency to overlook the more concrete aspects of the relationship between African societies and development institutions (Olivier de Sardan, 2001). This criticism does not, however, diminish the scientific legitimacy of questioning the intertwined relationships between knowledge and power that led to the processes of defining poverty in Africa. Such questioning has indeed been the subject of renewed interest in the twenty-first century, while the 'fight against poverty', a leitmotiv of international forums since the 1990s, has acquired an important place in the African political imagination. It is important to make this imagination part of a long history that, though much more sinuous and ambivalent than as it was once written, has nonetheless been marked by violence and unequal relations (Mbembe, 2000). Another way forward would be to compare institutional conceptions of poverty with those that the poor, defined as such by the institutions, can or could have of their own situation. Studying vernacular languages to decipher local ways of signifying indigence would be a notable way of doing this. Rather than reducing poverty to an imported concept, such questioning would imply its analysis through the lens of a local history of representations.

The government of poverty

A third approach is to ask what poverty, as a category for understanding social realities, has changed in Africa in terms of power practices, political institutions, social relations or even individual behaviours (Ogien, 1983). It is thus no longer poverty as a reality or as a representation that lies at the heart of the questioning, but its inclusion in government systems and its propensity, in itself, to 'conduct the conduct' and 'produce subjectivities' (Foucault, 2004).

Such an approach can open numerous avenues of inquiry, not only concerning the history of techniques of power, but also that of popular mobilizations. One of these, in the wake of a 'historical sociology of quantification' (Desrosières, 2008), focuses on the poverty statistics, the way they are put together and their political uses. This approach has led to work on specific regions (Bonnecase, 2011). Yet there remains much to investigate, since the history of poverty in Africa abounds in statistics, which demand to be understood, not only as descriptive tools, but also as government instruments. Macroeconomic aggregates, for example, which first portrayed the success of late colonialism in the 1950s, before imposing the collapse of African states as an obvious conclusion in the 1980s, played an important role in the evolution of national and international policies implemented on the continent. Another avenue to explore is how poverty has shaped social struggles and sparked new political aspirations in Africa. The discovery of poverty in the postwar period was not only the work of institutions but also of African political actors who, by laying claim to the same world as Europeans, demanded the same economic and social rights. It may be fruitful, using certain tools developed by *cultural studies*, to examine how such demands have been articulated over time with poverty management mechanisms or their reconstructed memory (Thompson, 1971). In light of the transformations that occurred in this area during the liberal shift of the 1990s, this questioning could lead to a better understanding of the normative expectations expressed today by the African working classes vis-à-vis the state.

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CHAPTER 8

FOOD INSECURITY IN THE SAHEL

The Limits of Food Crisis Prevention and
Management Mechanisms, the Case of Niger

Boureima Alpha Gado

Introduction

The Sahelian climate is characterized by great interannual rainfall variability, translated as the increasingly frequent recurrence of drought years. For decades, the Sahel has been facing the accelerated degradation of its productive potential and growing impoverishment of the populations most exposed to risks of disaster. Through successive droughts, sandstorms, heavy downpours, excessive firewood cutting and poor clearing practices, agricultural lands have lost their productive capacity. Fertility has declined, glacis have appeared and ravines have been formed on farms. This situation leads to poor harvests every year. Faced with the chronic deficit in food products, particularly cereals, food insecurity is becoming more and more worrying, and poverty is gaining ground every day, especially in the rural world.

In terms of agricultural production, the first postcolonial decade was characterized by a relatively satisfactory food balance. The need to set up food stock management in anticipation of famines was therefore not a priority for the public authorities. The crisis of the early 1970s was one of the most serious the Sahel had ever experienced. There was no specific mechanism for food crisis prevention and management in any of the countries of the region, only the grain offices, which were responsible for managing food aid. These offices were characterized by mismanagement and

threatened with complete closure in the late 1980s, in the context of structural adjustment policies. The final solution chosen, however, was to reduce their task to simply managing a National Buffer Stock (SNS) and creating the first generation of Early Warning Systems (SAP), disaster alert and response structures.

For the countries of the Sahel, which are constantly subject to various natural and anthropogenic shocks, the existence of a mechanism for the prevention and management of food crises is fundamental. Such a mechanism must be fine-tuned and integrated into public management systems to enable it to fully assume its basic functions: a framework for consultation, coordination and on-the-ground intervention during a food crisis.

After some semantic clarifications, this contribution analyses the case study of Niger, structured around three main lines of reflection: the mechanism and its missions; the management of National Buffer Stock (SNS); and the attempt to take charge of the situation during the Fifth Republic.

Food insecurity: a conceptual approach, some semantic clarifications

Food security, food insecurity

According to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (1996), 'Food security is the situation in which all people have, at all times, physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to enable them to meet their energy needs and food preferences to achieve an active and healthy life'. Consequently, food insecurity is the situation in which populations do not have access to safe, nutritious food in sufficient quantity to meet basic food needs. There are two types of food insecurity: chronic food insecurity and cyclical food insecurity. Chronic food insecurity is the one linked to the state of structural poverty of populations living in an unfavourable environment that does not allow them to have access to resources to meet their basic food needs. Cyclical food insecurity is the one linked to much more occasional and temporary risk factors such as drought, locust invasions, floods, epidemics, etc.

Food crisis, famine

A food crisis is characterized by a context of widespread scarcity of food resources resulting from the combined effect of several unfavourable factors. In a context of food crisis, the state of destitution of the populations does not allow them to develop survival strategies to meet basic food needs. J. Egg and D. Michels

(2004) believe that the food crisis arises when the effects of the above shocks 'go beyond preventive measures'. Famine is generally considered to be when a food crisis becomes widespread to the point of directly or indirectly causing death in a hungry population. The idea that emerges is that a famine is an extreme case of food insecurity during a given period that cannot be resolved by the response of the populations concerned. According to G. Spittler (1994), 'it is a deprivation which results from a lasting lack of energetic nourishment and which leads to disease and in extreme cases death.' When we talk about famine, we do not think of an individual phenomenon but a collective one. By definition, a famine is a mass phenomenon that affects the majority of members of a society even if all are not affected.

Farmers' concepts and perceptions

Among the Zarma-Songhay populations (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), there is one general expression to designate calamities: *bala'u*, whether it be famine, epidemic, epizootic, fire, flood, drought, war, etc. Daily hunger and chronic famine are referred to by a single term: *haray*. This term is accompanied by the qualifiers 'large' (*beeri*) or 'small' (*kayna*) depending on the duration or intensity of the crisis. *Haray kayna* (little famine) is either a difficult 'hungry gap' that turns into a localized famine, or successive years of difficult hungry gaps. The duration of a *haray beeri* (great famine) is at least two successive years of lack of grain. In western Niger, the famine of 1973-1974 – known as the *soojay meera* (year of the coup) or *daa-baare* (times have changed) – and the one in 1984-1985 called *kogondo* (great drought) or *may ga asi* (everyone is concerned) – are referred to as *haray beeri* (great famine). Conversely, the famine of 1954 (*garo jiire* or the year of cassava flour) and that of 1966 (*ban bari*, turning your back on your neighbour to eat) are considered 'little famines'.

Regarding populations, certain elements of assessment (socioeconomic indicators) allow us to identify a severe food crisis (famine): the total disappearance of grains from weekly markets; a mass exodus caused by hunger (notably entire villages departing with no intention of ever returning); excavation of anthills; widespread and unusual consumption of toxic wild plants; and deaths caused directly or indirectly by hunger.

The small famine is generally absorbed by solidarity networks and provident institutions or by large-scale expeditions in search of grain. Another concept, *haray futol* (terrible famine or wicked famine), combines ideas of intensity, generalization of the crisis (spatially), duration in time and demographic losses. The examples cited are the famines of the colonial period: 1913-1914 and 1931-1932 (the year of the

locusts, which prompted the no-return migrations of entire villages from western Niger to northern Nigeria, Sokoto State); and, to a lesser extent, that of 1984–1985.

The mechanism and its missions

After several evaluations, reforms, reorganizations and redefinitions of its mandate, the structure responsible for coordinating all responses to food crises and natural disasters in Niger is currently referred to as the *Dispositif National de Prévention et de Gestion des Catastrophes et Crises Alimentaires* (DNPGCCA), or National Disaster and Food Crisis Prevention and Management Mechanism. Simply put, the DNPGCCA is responsible for ‘the governance of hunger’. This expression refers to all the strategies and means of intervention used in the context of preventing and managing a situation of food crisis: the institutions set up, stakeholder consultation bodies, mobilization of various means of intervention, coherence of actions taken, etc. This text draws on the experience of managing recent food crises (2005, 2010, 2012).

The main aim of the National Mechanism is to coordinate and manage the actions of the various stakeholders involved in food aid for the benefit of vulnerable populations. Coordinating the mechanism is the responsibility of the Prime Minister’s office, through a National Food Crisis Prevention and Management Committee (CNPGCCA), an advisory structure tasked with alerting the government to situations of potential food and nutritional crises and defining their degree of severity and urgency. The committee is also responsible for coordinating population-focused intervention. At operational level, the mechanism comprises: a coordinating and decision-making body, the Joint Consultation Commission (CMC)¹, intervention funds and technical support structures.² It uses two kinds of tools³: means of intervention for the prevention and mitigation of minor or localized crises, and food reserves for the management of major food crises.

Niger has had a National Food Crisis Prevention and Management Mechanism (DNPGCCA) since 1998. The mandate of this body was extended to other disasters

1 Statement of Conclusions of 8 January 1999.

2 The CMC has a technical body, the Restricted Coordination Committee (CRC), mandated to carry out close management of the actions taken by preparing and implementing CMC meetings and important decisions.

3 Early Warning System (SAP) – the Mechanism’s information body, responsible for producing, collecting, processing and analysing food security information. It is also responsible for identifying risk areas and actions to be taken to prevent or mitigate food and nutrition crises. Food Crisis Unit (CCA) – the Mechanism’s executive body, responsible for evaluating the need for aid and formulating requests. It also ensures good coordination of the aid announced.

in 2012, when it became the National Disaster and Food Crisis Prevention and Management Mechanism (DNPGCCA).

One of the successes, recognized by all the mechanism's technical and financial partners (PTF), is the regular organization of surveys to measure households' vulnerability to food insecurity, organized by the DNPGCCA since 2006 through the Early Warning and Disaster Prevention System (SAP/PGC) Coordination Unit, with the support of partners (FAO, World Food Programme [WFP], etc.) to better target the most exposed areas and populations and facilitate intervention management and coordination (see Figure 1 below).

During a food crisis, all the important decisions are made at the various meetings of the CRC, the CMC's technical structure, bringing together thirty to fifty participants who must work together to implement a support plan.

Examining the elements behind the 2005 food crisis has given rise to pertinent appraisals of power relations on both an external level (between the state and donors) and an internal level (between the state and local stakeholders: technical ministries, civil society, political parties, etc.) Food crisis prevention and management bodies have now been transformed into an arena for permanent negotiation between the state and its partners. The public authorities must constantly juggle technical and political exchanges with the technical and financial partners (PTF), indispensable donors and local stakeholders, essential for the survival of the regime (Dury and Fouilleux, 2009).




FIGURE 1. Household food security survey

Managing the National Buffer Stock (SNS)

The consultative and negotiating bodies are marked by conflicts of interest, the background of which lies in the financial modalities for using the tools to be mobilized in the event of food crises. Systems such as the National Buffer Stock (SNS) used for major crises such as those of 2005, 2009 and 2010, as well as the Solidarity Fund drawn upon in the event of minor crises, are shared 'common tools', in relation to which each Partner must express a political will to achieve the mechanism's objectives. Partners must make a very large or significant contribution to be able to manage their funds relatively independently.

Graphic 1 below shows the level of financial contributions made by various partners, along with that of the State of Niger, in recent years. The sovereignty of the state is also put to the test at this level.


What about the daily management of food stocks over the past decades? In Niger, as in most parts of the Sahel, the high level of media coverage of the crises has made public opinion very attentive to the behaviour of public authorities, in particular about the management of food stocks. The same applies to all Sahelian countries:

National actors are showing their will to free themselves from constraints imposed by joint decisions and the management of certain instruments (including physical or financial buffer stocks) to develop autonomous or partially autonomous intervention policies and strategies. Burkina has now established a national buffer stock separate from the SNS (National Seed Service) and comanaged with donors. For the state, this choice is justified by the need for more flexible conditions to mobilize the stock and therefore to accelerate emergency intervention when required. According to some donors, the state is trying to free itself from common stock management rules (the 'grain for grain' concept) and, more generally, crisis intervention rules (SWAC, 2006).⁴

In the past, excessive use of Niger's buffer stock, sometimes without donor consultation, meant that it could only be rebuilt with great difficulty.

Graphic 2 gives an idea of the levels of uncontrolled use from 1994 onwards. This saw the stock decrease by more than 95%, from over 80,000 tonnes in 1991 to 5,168 tonnes in 2002. *Source:* M. Yabilan (2012), Niger Food Crisis Unit.

4 Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC). 2006. *Food sovereignty in West Africa: from principles to reality*. Paris.




GRAPHIC 1. Financial contributions by various partners

Source: © Food Crisis Unit (CCA,Niger).

Algeria	ECOWAS	New Zealand	Egypt	Norway
Saudi Arabia	SNU-CERF	UEMDA	Spain	European Union
Australia	China	USAID	Finland	European Union (ECHO)
Brazil	Korea	Germany	France	Sweden
Benin	Japan	Belgium	Great Britain	Luxembourg
Canada	Nigeria	Denmark	Netherlands	Switzerland

Table 1. Donor countries in 2012

Source: © Food Crisis Unit (CCA,Niger).



GRAPHIC 2. *Changes in national buffer stock levels since 1991*

Source: © Food Crisis Unit (CCA, Niger).

The way in which the SNS is managed has been a source of many misunderstandings and is the focal point for the relationship between the state and its partners in the context of the mechanism. In 2005, these conflicting relationships led to paralysis of the whole system.

According to the provisions of the framework agreement between the State of Niger and its partners⁵:

In years when no serious crises were experienced at national or regional level, the taking of grain from the National Buffer Stock was limited to the annual renewal of a proportion of these reserves, which was necessary to ensure that the grain remained suitable for human consumption. This operation is called 'technical rotation'.

As can be seen, in Sahelian Africa, the whole issue of food crisis management remains focused on the management of national buffer stocks through the grain offices, in spite of their major restructuring. In the case of Niger, the various reserves entrusted to the OPVN are financed by state partners. The notion of 'common goods', which characterizes this means of intervention, implies permanent consultation, with efficient joint management. It is a question of drawing upon these reserves only in the event of genuine need, duly established in consultation with the partners.

⁵ Framework agreement between the State of Niger and donors on the strengthening of the National Food Crisis Prevention and Management Mechanism (2025).

The Fifth Republic: a 'sovereignist' temptation

Regarding the reconstitution of the National Buffer Stock (SNS), in spite of great proclamations of intent in political speeches, the financial contributions made by the State of Niger failed to reflect the expression of its '*national sovereignty*'.

Since there was no guarantee that these reserves would be used judiciously, some partners within the mechanism were reluctant to make significant contributions. Others intervened in the margins of the consultation framework to manage their own reserves.⁶ This posed a problem when it came to coordinating aid in the event of very large volumes received from donors who were not members of the mechanism.

The '*sovereignist temptation*⁷' took on a very specific dimension under the Fifth Republic (2000-2009). The President of the Republic of Niger tried to reinvigorate the mechanism by reintroducing the traditional mission of the grain office⁸ Office Des Produits Vivriers Du Niger (OPVN) – buying, trading and stabilizing supply. Alongside the National Buffer Stock (SNS) and Common Donor Fund (FCD), the government of the Fifth Republic also initiated a third sovereignty-focused crisis intervention tool called the Strategic Food Reserve (RAS).

For a time, in order to assert the country's total sovereignty in this very sensitive sector, the President even envisaged abolishing the Food Crisis Unit (CCA), the strong arm of the CMC (joint State-Donor Cooperation Committee), deemed too dependent on the management methods of the major donors (European Union, WFP, France) from the point of view of the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC):

The issue was not about how relevant these decisions were but about understanding the national authorities' will to regain leadership on food policies. When questioned on the scope of the concept of food sovereignty and its relevance, national authorities mainly stress their desire to recapture the control of public policies in the area of food security, an area which they deem to be essential both from the point of view of responsibility and governance (SWAC, 2006).

Though the source of considerable disagreement in its time, this initiative was no less salutary, since it was partly thanks to the RAS (which had a capacity of 65,000 tonnes) that the country was able to overcome the 2010 food crisis.

6 The Arab countries that made a significant contribution; the USSR, China and Japan were not part of the mechanism.

7 Regarding the case of Mali, see the well-documented contribution of P. Janin (2009).

8 OPVN, the Niger Food Office.

According to well-informed sources, Niger's partners in the mechanism never believed that the country's public authorities would have such a reserve to draw upon in times of food crisis and 'budgetary shortfalls' in international financial crisis funds.

Conclusion

From independence to the present day, Niger, like other member states of CILSS (Comité Inter-État de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel, Permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel), has drawn up several food policies and strategy documents that have failed to eradicate food insecurity. On the contrary, something that was once a cyclical phenomenon has become chronic. After the controversial management of the 2005 food crisis, the relatively good coordination of aid in 2010 and 2012 has meant that Niger's mechanism to improve the resilience of its populations is now considered a reference-level operational structure in the subregion. The functioning of a structure like the mechanism raises the problem of food sovereignty, which implies a vision of '*decision-making autonomy*', notably in terms of resources and tools shared with development partners.

The criticisms and controversies that marked the management of the 2005 food crisis strongly influence the way national public opinion (in particular civil society organizations) perceives the operation of the system in Niger and its modes of intervention. In a period of major crisis, and as part of the ongoing monitoring of operations, all important decisions are taken by the mechanism's technical bodies and structures, which must work together to implement a support plan.

Although the public authorities and PTFs now have a wealth of experience in coordinating and managing food aid actions for the benefit of vulnerable populations, there are still shortcomings.

At a decentralized level, the weak capacity to deal with localized crises continues to be a problem because of local government interference.

In Niger, as is the case throughout the Sahel, the high level of media coverage of crises and disasters means that public opinion remains very attentive to the behaviour of the public authorities. Relevant authorities are expected to improve communication on the resilience of vulnerable groups faced with three major food crises in seven years (2005, 2010 and 2012).

Notwithstanding the unprecedented mobilization of state resources during

the last two food and nutrition crises to guarantee and maintain leadership in this area, the state's contribution remains limited.

In spite of the OPVN's very lengthy field experience, rightly or wrongly, some donors are mistrustful or even suspicious of its management methods.

Despite these limitations and inadequacies, Niger's experience, through the DNPGCCA, is considered one of the most operational in the subregion due notably to:

- the increasing role of civil society in the democratization of the 'governance of hunger'. Indeed, in 2005, it was powerful civil society intervention⁹ that forced the government to declare the situation of critical food crisis to the international community;
- the existence of a permanent State/PTF/NGO consultation framework through the CRC (restricted consultation framework), open to all stakeholders involved in the fields of food and nutrition insecurity;
- the pooling and harmonization of methods of collecting 'reliable' data through the joint survey bringing together the main players involved in managing the food and nutritional situation, with a view to better identifying vulnerable areas and more effectively targeting beneficiaries as well as real needs, to draw upon in the event of a crisis.

9 Civil society also forced the government to repeal legislation for raising VAT on basic necessities in a food crisis.

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CHAPTER 9

FEMINISM IN AFRICA

Fatou Sow

Sex, gender, feminism

The UNESCO *General History of Africa*, published in eight volumes between 1980 and 1998, fulfilled a legitimate ambition, on the scale of a continent long deprived of ‘exercising the right to take the historical initiative’, as Amadou Mahtar M’Bow, former Director-General of UNESCO, pointed out in the prefaces. This colossal achievement has not failed to give space to women.

From the (re)production of children to the domestic maintenance of families and communities, articles have covered their multiple roles, related to the visions of male and female roles nurtured by societies. Women have been described as daughters, wives and mothers, whose bodies have been valued all the more because they are symbols of motherhood, reproduction and continuity of lineages, both royal and ordinary. The precolonial political structures of Bantu societies in Central Africa or Akan in the West have used a ‘system of matrilineal succession of power’ (Kipré, 1985, p. 367). Even in patrilineal societies such as ‘Western Mandens, several attributes of *mansaya* (royalty) were related to the royal blood: hence the choice the nephew to ward off any mistake’ (Ly-Tall, 1985, p. 203), etc. And, in the face of the gradual Islamization of laws from the seventh century on, families, reluctant to adopt this new patriarchal legal system, continued to favour the matrilineal transmission of property, because of

the established blood relationship (Dramani-Issifou, 1990, p. 129). Recognized in their status as sovereigns, chiefs or slaves, women were also recognized as figures of the divine (Vercoutter, 1980, p. 745), priestesses, guardians of cults and responsible for the perpetuation and transmission of societal values (Hama and Ki-Zerbo, 1980, p. 66; Ki-Zerbo, 1980, p. 693).

In societies that were profoundly changing at the end of the nineteenth century, the low levels of education and training introduced by colonization and the undervaluation of their multifaceted knowledge as simple knowledge and know-how – because it was local, in the face of new practices and techniques – were obstacles to the emergence of women in the nascent formal sector. Yet it is a fact that their productive activities have contributed and continue to support the informal skilled sector or the urban, semi-urban and rural popular economy. Women's tasks in the management of agricultural, forestry, livestock and fishing resources, the processing and sale of these products, their diverse skills in crafts and many other sectors such as medicinal knowledge, have been reported as essential to the ancient economic development of the continent and widely exploited by colonial powers. Maxwell Owusu (1989, p. 343) rightly denounced the 'fourth great perversion inherited from colonial agriculture: the male bias. Traditionally, African agriculture was largely the business of women, who were often more likely than men to work the land. Colonial influence did not end the numerical preponderance of women, but it did help marginalize them.' Adu Boahen measured the impact of colonization on women's status and concluded: 'Women [have] been excluded from most of the activities introduced or intensified by colonialism, such as education, export crops in parts of Africa, many professions such as law, medicine, mining, etc. As a result of this exclusion, they were hardly granted a place in the new colonial political structure' (Boahen, 1987, pp. 857-858).

At the political level, the *General History's* articles indicate a presence of women that has undoubtedly varied, depending on their status, context and era. In the widespread patrilineal system, 'members of the clan or lineage recognize themselves as having a common ancestor and live under the authority of an elected leader or patriarch.' (Niane, 1987, p. 28) In matriarchal and/or matrilineal societies and in those with so-called dualist structures because they borrow from the two systems of kinship, women from the elites participate in the management of politics. Their female status determines their position in the structures of power, with different charges and spheres of competence (Diagne, 1967), in a political space largely controlled by men. Colonial patriarchal power, true to its own tradition of excluding women from

decision-making, has ousted them from these political spheres. This did not prevent their decisive political activism in the anti-colonial struggles and after independence, as Mazrui (1998, pp. 36-40) describes, in a very informative chapter on 'Sovereignty and Women'. Women are therefore very present in the *General History of Africa*, and rightly so.

However, questions need to be asked. How are they represented? Have readers been told of their undeniable share in the 'manufacturing' of African history? How can we read their specific contributions and their relationships to men and to global society in this context? In an introduction to Volume VIII, entitled 'Africa since 1935', Ali Mazrui regretted that their participation was not more or better elaborated, assessed and analysed to its proper extent. 'Few chapters in this volume,' he noted,

expressly relate to describing the extent to which African women have made African history. The part that women took in the struggle for independence has generally received little attention. Historians, who are otherwise aware of the role of women, prefer not to refer to the gender of the protagonists. Most of the contributors to this book relate the struggle for independence in terms of people, rather than women or men. Unfortunately, when the narrative does not mention the gender of the actors, people tend to assume they were all men. False hypothesis, of course (Mazrui, 1998, p. 36).

Ali Mazrui's criticism had the merit of pointing out a certain way of dealing with women in the GHA. Tiyaambe Zeleza made the same remark about all the general and regional histories of Africa previously undertaken. He concluded that they represented 'intrinsic androcentrism' (Imam, Mama, Sow et al, 1997, p. 94). Patricia McFadden, a Swazi sociologist, accused African history of being 'a male story' (1996, p. 2).

Women's situations and actions are more documented and analysed as partial stories, than as parts, in terms of gender, of global history. Their gender, however, determines their position, because of values, norms and rules that convey the obvious hierarchy in society and in particular inequality between men and women (Imam, Mama, Sow et al., 1997). This so-called 'neutral' approach to the statuses and roles of individuals leads to an erasure of certain actors (here actresses) and dominates widely in the GHA. It is the result of scant knowledge or ignorance, or even a lack of interest or rejection of the terms of a scientific and political debate on the categorization of the sexes, open for several decades. 'The social world constructs the body, both as a sexual reality and as a repository of gendered categories of perception and appreciation,' recalled Pierre Bourdieu (1990, p. 11). Many reflections on societies may lose some of their relevance if they do not include the gender dimension.

These early findings reveal the need to include women's participation in the 'manufacturing' of history and to identify its clearly differentiated modes. A historian of new perspectives on women's work, Louise Tilly, said, however,

this is not a call to integrate women's history into another story, which could mean simply adding materials about women and gender, without analysing their implications, but it is a call to write an analytical women's history and to link its problems to those of other histories. It is only through this confrontation that women's history will have a chance to change the general framework of history as a whole (Tilly, 1990, p. 148).

Such a perspective allows women's studies to link women's and gender history to history. It is in this context that the issue of feminism in general and feminism in Africa, in particular, are discussed.

Feminism: a system of claiming and theorizing women's struggles

Feminism has contributed to the inclusion of women in global thinking, with the development of theoretical frameworks, methodological tools and concepts useful for this exercise. It has undoubtedly 'revolutionized' the conception of the place of women in society and social relations between the sexes, hence the importance of using it, even briefly, to situate African feminism. Some reflections will be reported from multiple sources, while bearing in mind the many less documented contributions of women and their movements in the Third World, particularly in Africa.

Nicole-Claude Matthieu (1985, p. 172) 'gave...the word "feminism" the common and minimal meaning of: analysis by women (i.e. from minority experience) of the mechanisms of the oppression of women as a group or class by men as a group or class, in various societies, and a willingness to act for its abolition.' All the theorizations of feminism, as a historical tradition of struggle, have given centrality to the 'oppression' of women, even though they have interpreted various sources and forms and used differentiated languages to define it and describe its consequences (Imam, Mama, Sow et al., 1997; Sow et al., 2009). Feminism has theorized the differentiation of the sexes and their hierarchy in various forms of domination, of which male domination is an important part (Friedan, 1963; Millet, 1969). He redefined the feminine and the masculine as a given of culture and not only as determined by nature, according to 'a fundamentally biologizing conception of "femininity", in relation

to a strictly social consideration of the male category' (Matthew, 1991, p. 9). It showed evidence of unequal power relations between the sexes, built on cultural, political and religious norms and rules (De Beauvoir, 1949; Matthew, 1971). The social construction of gender roles (*sexage*, Guillaumin, 1992) organizes the sexual division of family and professional work. Domestic work, considered a 'natural' function of women, is socially assigned to them because of their biological ability to reproduce the species (Delphy, 1970), hence the submission of women to men as 'breeding machines' (Tabet, 1985). It stems from what has been called the 'domestication' of women (Rogers, 1980). The professional world maintains the same conceptions of women's work. This 'power of men', associated with patriarchy, is one of the sources of this construction of the inferiority of women (Mies, 1986). Patriarchy has been the subject of numerous theoretical and political debates, some of which have been contradictory between feminists of various tendencies and socio-cultural spheres (De Beauvoir, 1949; Delphy, 1981). It is, as Andrée Michel (2007, p. 6) asserts, 'a system that uses – openly or more subtly – all the institutional and ideological mechanisms at its fingertips (law, politics, economics, morality, science, medicine, fashion, culture, education, the media, etc.) in order to reproduce the relations of domination between men and women, just as capitalism uses them to perpetuate itself.'

Feminism has denounced sexism, meaning discrimination based on gender, that underlies oppression, invisibilization, marginalization and exclusion of women. Gender is a concept of medical origin (Dorlin, 2006) that American feminists first appropriated (Oakley, 1972; Rubin, 1975; Scott, 1988). While it is a term that is improperly used today, it is not synonymous with 'woman', as one tends to say and believe. Gender is a 'category of analysis' that allows us to understand the sexualization of representations and roles, and the construction of individual and collective identities. Joan Scott, one of the first theorists of the concept, points out that 'the definition [of gender] is based on the fundamental relationship between two propositions: Gender is a component of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of meaning power relations' (1988, p.141).

From emancipation, rethought in women's liberation, to the demand for their access to education, employment and income-generating activities, from the apprehension of civil rights to the inclusion of sexual and reproductive rights (related to physical and moral violence, rape, incest, sexual harassment, the right to abortion, control of sexuality and fertility, etc.) as a fundamental achievement of freedom and participation, from the demand for gender equality to parity in decision-making bodies – to resume widely debated issues in the contemporary world – women's

movements have waged their struggles to promote their rights and more gender justice. 'The body is political' has been an issue at the heart of the debate, as this female body has become an issue of social practices, legislation and political actions. Religion, culture, society and the state have produced norms and values, discourses, regulations and laws that contribute to the political control of the body.

Feminism, however, has constantly questioned and revisited its own theoretical presuppositions, through highly critical debates that deserve a brief mention. Judith Butler (1990, p. 136) sows 'gender disorder' when she denounces the 'regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence'. The American philosopher invites us to think about social relations, out of a prefigured and normative binary sexuation, and to 'undo gender' (Butler, 2004). She proposes the fundamental principles of what becomes *queer*: to eliminate all forms of discrimination, marginalization and sexual exclusion and to recognize the plurality of sexualities: LGBT movements (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, etc.). This divide is also generational, as it occurred between a 'historic' feminism and *queer*; it has sparked new questions and forms of militancy that have reconfigured the feminist field. Despite the ever-present theoretical tensions, it can be conceded that 'the legacy of the old is not denied, but integrated into the new modes of action of the current feminist generation' (Chaponnière, Roux and Ruault, 2017, p. 14).

At this point, how do we approach feminism in Africa? African struggles have had many female figures, some famous, others of lesser renown, whose roles must be commemorated in the GHA, because, as witnesses and protagonists, they have left a lasting mark on ancient and colonial history, as witnessed by women engaged in politics, historians and writers: Kéita (1975), Diabaté (1975), Awe (1992), Coquery-Vidrovitch (1994), Serbin (2004), Sorel and Gomis Pierron (2005), etc. But the genesis of feminism in contemporary Africa is truly inscribed in all these multifaceted theoretical and political discussions, sometimes in opposition, sometimes in convergence or in autonomy. From there, we can present and discuss the essential ideas and practices with which feminism in Africa is grappling and take stock of the constraints, breakthroughs and ambitions of the movement.

Feminism in Africa

Feminism in Africa therefore belongs to this 'global' history of women's mobilization, where it has its role, because it has introduced African perspectives of claims and action. It was neither a mere copy nor a poor imitation of Western feminism, as it is still disparaged. It was the creation, extension and renewal of

thinking linked to contexts and histories, both continent-specific and connected to a world that, from colonial times to the present day, has become increasingly globalized. It is now completely in what we call today 'glocalization', the local and global being so interconnected (Robertson, 1995).

First, feminism in Africa can be said to be part of a political movement of reflection and action that gave a greater visibility to African women's experience and a better consideration of their vision. 'African women are intellectuals and makers of theory' (McFadden, 2002). This feminism had to confront major male opposition, suspicious societal reactions, strong state and institutional resistance, including from academic circles, which could have undermined all its certainties and aspirations, but certainly weighed on its journey (Pereira, 2002). Second, as a reflection 'localized' in its spaces and temporalities, with priorities and strategies no less 'localized', it differs from a feminism that we will call 'Western' (at the risk of caricature), the theories, concepts and discourses of which are still predominant. Third, like any enterprise, feminism in Africa is complex. It carries its own convictions, doubts and contradictions. The three aspects emphasized here will be discussed through the most emblematic questions.

The first question that plagued women's organizations was the label 'female' or 'feminist'. African activists, as soon as the theoretical debates reached their level, reacted and often rejected feminism (at least the concept) for historical, intellectual and political reasons, shared with other minorities and progressive women's associations in the Americas, the Caribbean and Asia. Based on their thematic priorities and their so-called 'Southern' perspectives, they criticized discourse with Western roots that did not necessarily reflect either the historical experiences or the needs of women in certain areas designated as peripheral. The developmentalist theorizations of women's integration into development (WID/IFD,¹ 1980), then of gender and development (GAD/GED,² 1995), by Northern feminists, directed at women in the South, have raised, on both sides, consensus and fractures, questions and discussions that have in some way internationalized the feminist debate by reframing it. To challenge 'white' feminism was to denounce racism and colonial exploitation as intrinsically linked, two sides of the same coin, and to put race as an element of the debate from which it had been excluded by mainstream thought. AFARD³, when it was

1 *Women in Development*/Intégration des femmes au développement.

2 *Gender and Development*/Genre et développement.

3 Association des Femmes africaines pour la recherche et le développement/Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD).

founded in 1977, had a Pan-African plan to decolonize the social sciences, while the think tank DAWN⁴ brought together women from the South (including African women) and advanced their perspectives.

The issue of race has been and remains at the heart of the problems of various movements: Women of Color, activists of Black Feminism, Womanism, the Combahee River Collective and advocates of intersectionality throughout the Americas and the Caribbean, for the known reasons of slavery, colonization and the resulting segregationist racial policies, as well as those against apartheid in South Africa. It could have been raised more openly, in the North African and Saharan regions where, despite *métissage*, racial tensions exist. Feminism claims to be 'racialized' in Europe, among women of African descent (from the southern as well as from the northern Sahara). Aware of their position of marginality, they constructed their own feminist discourse (Afrofeminism) which takes into account the 'racial burden', hidden as in France. Maboula Soumahoro makes the argument: 'Race is a fiction that, once inscribed in the bodies, determines social, political and economic relations. Denying this constitutes violence, and this violence has lasted too long' (Soumahoro, 2017, p. 3). The 'decolonial' approach that is currently emerging in feminism in France has been engaged on the African continent for at least forty years. Under what circumstances and in what terms should we deal with race in 'Black' African regions, in the face of other crucial local sources of pressure and discrimination?

Another critical controversy of feminism in Africa has been the theoretical confrontation between matriarchy, as an institutional form of both power management and women's hegemony, and patriarchy as a 'universal' source of women's domination. The universality of patriarchy continues to be a controversial subject of African social science research, hence the complexity for feminist analyses. The Senegalese Egyptologist Cheikh Anta Diop made matriarchy the basis of social organization in Africa, since antiquity (1954, 1959). Many researchers on the continent have made it the matrix of the history and dominant position of women in ancient times; they have highlighted endogenous values and practices around matriarchy, matrilineality and matrifocality (Amadiume, 1987, 1997; Oyéwùmi, 1997; Kandji and Camara, 2000). Women have thus held pre-eminent social and political power: hence a certain rejection of the binary male/female opposition for 'complementary' or even 'harmonious' relations between the sexes (Assié Lumumba, 1996, 2000). If the history of this period testifies to dominant positions of women

4 Development Alternatives with Women of a New Era, founded in 1984.

(incarnate founding myths, queens, women of knowledge, leaders of groups), it is noted that these often belong to the elites and enjoy privileges related to their rank (McFadden). In ancient Senegal, the women of the aristocracy of the matrilineal societies of Sine, Kayoor and Baol played the same role of uterine transmission of power and, through various services, sought to elect the matrilineal relative (Diouf, 1990), without themselves acceding to the 'high political functions devolved to men' (Fall, 1993, p. 5). Feminist/female activism has not solved the theoretical question of matriarchy versus patriarchy. It mainly took the opportunity to denounce colonial rule, with its patriarchal power, as the primary source of the subordination of women, much more than the inequality of local gender relations.

The place of matriarchy in African ideologies has made motherhood central in the positioning of women in families and societies. There are the polarized theorizations between motherhood approached in terms of 'forced reproduction' by Western feminism (Matthew, 1985) and all-African institutionalized and sublimated motherhood by women and men (Amadiume, 1987; Ampofo, 2003; Nzegu, 2004). Multifaceted discourses constructed around an ideology of motherhood, motherism, femalism, have not yet responded to the problems of maternal over-fertility and over-mortality and sexual and reproductive rights in contemporary Africa.

African feminists, like other Southern women of similar contexts and conditions, have criminalized slavery, racism and apartheid, imperialism, colonization, and neocolonialism as sources of domination, discrimination and exploitation. They described their contexts compounded by the international division of labour and the deterioration of the terms of trade, the new unequal economic order and neoliberal globalization. They have been scathingly critical of the disastrous consequences of debt crises and structural adjustment policies since the 1980s on people in the Third World and, here, in Africa. Cuts in state social spending have impoverished the working class and increased women's responsibilities in the upkeep of families. Many of them have had to fill the roles of heads of households, without having the title or its privileges (Sow, 1995; Bop, 1995; Bisilliat, 1996). The resurgence of militarism of regimes (Mama, 1997) is a factor of national and regional destabilization. With the military coup as a means of access and rotation to politics in the first decade of independence, arms continue to maintain conflicts with control of often extensive territories at stake, the grabbing and plundering of natural resources, the rise of trafficking in weapons and other prohibited products. They have also produced exacerbation of cultural and religious identity differences (UNRISD, 2005). Rape and sexual

abuse have been used as weapons of war. All of these factors, their differently lived forms and expressions and interconnections, have had a significant impact on populations and have been seen as major sources of oppression, inequality and discrimination against women.

Debates around these issues during the 1970s and the international decades for women (1975, 1985, 1995) fed the platforms of the multitude of local, national, regional and Pan-African organizations that emerged at that time and structured the women's movement in Africa. The conferences of the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-1985), extended by the one in Beijing (1995), and the world summits held over the same period, on topics as varied as the environment, human rights, population or social development, were decisive moments, on one hand, of a global breakthrough in African women's activism, finally recognized and, on the other, of the anchoring of their causes in public opinion and the continent's political agendas. Their new right to speak (Sow, 2007) put them on the international women's agenda, giving form to (em-body-ing) feminism again (McFadden). After representing the women's sections of the independence political parties, many women created or joined associations that sought to distinguish themselves from these predominantly male structures far removed from their concerns. Governments, under pressure from women's movements and international organizations, established institutions and mechanisms that emitted a 'state feminism' and, alas, flattened its critical and even offensive political dimension (Mama, 1997). Yet they have signed and ratified most of the international conventions banning discrimination against women (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) and in favour of their rights included in various UN pacts, with very few reservations. African women from associative, political and academic backgrounds have found themselves at an impressive number of continental and international meetings. Their participation has led them to discuss all issues. While there has been a certain NGO-zation of the women's movement, their multifaceted actions have helped to transform the field of debate on women. Programmes to promote awareness, education, health and economic activities as well as women's citizenship rights have been set up at grassroots level for the benefit of women, rural and urban areas and young people, with the support of states and cooperation of international NGOs. Networks have been established at the local and regional level: West African Women's Association, (AFAO) 1984; Inter-African Committee to Combat Traditional Practices Harmful to Maternal and Child Health (CIAF), 1984; African Women's Development and Communication (FEMNET), 1988; Women in Law and Development in

Africa (WILDAF), 1990; Forum of African Women Higher Educationalists (FAWE), 1990; Isis-Wicce, 1993; Gender in Africa Information Network (GAIN), 1997; and others. Their advocacy has attempted to bring about real change, despite successive economic and political crises and hostile backlash reactions to their initiatives. In this regard, the Maghreb Equality Collective (1995) has pursued a remarkable collaboration to harmonize laws relating to the status of women.

'African research [has] claimed the right to speak, the right to talk about itself, to write about itself, to self-reflection, in self-reflecting terms' (Sow 2007, p. 59). In 1981, 'Women in Nigeria' organized its own national conference, the proceedings of which were published under the same title in 1985. The creation of the CODESRIA Gender Institutes in 1994, followed by the Millennium Symposiums on Gender (2002), represented an important initiative to strengthen the academic dimension of the debate at the continental level. Centres for women's and gender studies have gradually developed in universities, first English-speaking and then French-speaking, facing enormous challenges in face of academic institutions (Mama, 2011). Academic work has been undertaken on various issues, against a background of debate: for or against feminism. *Jenda, A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies* (2001), was intended to be a purely African reading of women's issues. In 2003, the journal *Feminist Africa*, initiated by the African Gender Institute at the University of Cape Town, took a resolutely feminist stance online. In addition to this academic reflection, there was the effervescence of sociological, historical, romantic, theatrical, poetic, musical, audiovisual and artistic works, which corresponded to the expression and listening needs of women of all backgrounds. The *Women Writing Africa* series (2003, 2005, 2009) highlighted how women have talked about themselves down through history and in various regions. Women have produced films and documentaries about women or related social issues. It is worth noting that the famous Women's World Congress held its eighth international meeting at Makerere University (Kampala, Uganda) in July 2002.

Nearly fifty years of national, regional and international debates on the issues facing women around the world have led, if not forced, African women to reflect on the causes and forms of their oppressions. They are linked to the effects of neocolonialism and globalization – control and plundering of resources, political control of states, money, debts, structural adjustment and austerity policies – and to African crises – poor governance and lack of democracy, political and armed conflicts, climate hazards, among others. To promote women's rights, they also had to look for African sources of sexism, the weight of patriarchy, the intersection

of gender inequalities with age, class, ethnicity, caste, race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. Educating girls – guaranteeing their right to access, improving and maintaining their education, training and employment opportunities – has helped their advancement in the public and private sectors and in jobs previously reserved for men. Ensuring their access to resources – natural (land), technological (equipment) and financial (credit) – has been the object of campaigns and projects that have brought some success, including the rise of competitive female entrepreneurship. Recognizing and accepting that ‘the body is political’, a former feminist claim, has helped to requalify women’s sexual and reproductive needs in terms of rights: better control of sexuality and fertility, advanced advocacy for the right to abortion, prevention of child marriages and forced marriages, preservation of the physical integrity of the body (abolition of female genital mutilation and other harmful practices affecting their health), protection from the unjust rites of widowhood, the fight against sexual violence, the criminalization of rape and sexual enslavement in society (family, workplaces) and in the areas of conflict, etc. Homosexuality is still penalized in most African states, with, in addition to stigma, punishment ranging from imprisonment to the death penalty. There are very few exceptions, such as Cape Verde, Central African Republic and Gabon, which do not have specific legislation. Only Mozambique decriminalized it in 2015. South Africa was the first state to make sexual orientation a constitutional right in 1992, despite the reluctance of the population expressed in frequent acts of violence against suspected gay and LGBT people. The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) of South Africa was formed in 1994.

Deconstructing African patriarchal institutions, reinforced by culture and religion and endorsed by politics, remains a real challenge, as it touches on deep identity issues that women have difficulty questioning, for fear of renouncing their identity or being accused of having lost it. Various radicalisms have developed in Africa. Jessica Horn (2011) analyses the growing collusion between politics and religion in the Christian-majority countries of sub-Saharan Africa. She sheds light on politicians’ manipulation of the discourses of conventional churches joined by Pentecostal and evangelistic churches (the appellations are legion), whose development is so impressive on the continent. Islam and its religious argument, with the current political radicalization (Perez-Gomez, 2007; Sow, 2009), remain points of acute controversy between women and feminists. Thus, we have, on one hand, the Islamic ‘feminists’ who seek to appropriate the interpretation of Qur’anic discourse and argue that its ‘sacred’ texts contain the conditions for the liberation and protection of women and, on the other, the activists of the secularization of laws (WLUMML), thanks to the principle of

secularism contained in the constitutions of a large number of African states. Mohammed El Fasi, coordinator of Volume III of the *General History of Africa*, asserted forcefully, but without any real argument, that 'Islam proclaims equality between man and women' (El Fasi, 1988). He continued: 'Customs totally foreign to orthodoxy have masked this beautiful side of the Muslim religion. But, in law, Muslim women have always enjoyed a legal status that women living under other religious systems could have envied until recently' (El Fasi, 1998, p. 62). But the first tasks of feminist and female movements in Muslim contexts, north and south of the Sahara, were focused on evading customary rights and so-called Qur'an-derived laws (WLUML, Baobab for Human Rights, etc.), by pushing for reforms and promoting the development of official family codes in countries that did not have them. These movements fought to reform the codes, from which had to be removed conservative religious and cultural provisions that brought deep inequalities (Sow, 2005; Camara, 2007). Senegal literally cleaned out religious provisions from its code between 1984 and 2014, under pressure from women, although some rules remain (unequal inheritance between the sexes, paternal authority, etc.). In 2004, Moroccan women obtained a reform of the *Moudawana*, introducing greater gender equality. One of the greatest victories of women's rights activists is certainly the adoption of the 'Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa' by the African Union Heads of State Summit in July 2003 in Maputo, Mozambique, although it is regrettable that the implementation of its provisions is very measured, and even threatened by the rise of cultural and religious conservatism.

Conclusion: Where are we today with feminism?

Being or not being a feminist is no longer a question at the forefront of debate. Despite the theoretical breakthroughs, the feminist label still shocks men, and many women do not dare to appropriate it, even if they have renewed its contents over the course of the struggles. Although remaining in the shadows, feminism and its concepts continue to fuel arguments for women's rights; it has largely been transformed cautiously into a gender approach that has allowed for a flowering of gender expertise. However, the subordination of women is no longer a subject of controversy and the faces of oppression and inequality are markers that, between the personal and the political, bring women together. Not belonging to the intellectual elite is no longer an insurmountable obstacle to making demands. The discourse of parity is also present in local elections, as in Senegal (2014).

What future for feminism in Africa, what is the legacy left to the new generations? Younger women do not necessarily wave the feminist flag and often believe that the rights won through militant struggles, although at risk, are permanent. Nevertheless, they often experience the harsh reality of gender and age discrimination and gender inequality in their professional and social lives. Like other groups of all ages and genders today, they have embraced new technologies to engage in Pan-African and global feminist cyber activism, as evidenced by the proliferation of websites and magazines emerging in Africa. We know the profound social changes induced by the advent of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the expansion of social networks (Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, etc.) on a global web. Minna Salami (2024), a Nigerian blogger, spoke about its impact on women's activism. 'Thanks to the explosion of online feminist organizations (with online petitions, social media campaigns, blogs, podcasts, online magazines, etc.) over the past ten years, the women's movement has radically changed the way politicians, intellectuals, commentators, entrepreneurs, activists and the public in many parts of the world talk about the most important issues of our time. If we can talk about an advent of women's rights, we can say that it has arrived' (2017). All areas have been targeted: from political activism to commercial and craft activities, including music and the arts, where modern careers have traditionally been male-dominated. In Senegal, young women from urban cultures belonging to the association Africulturban (2006) established the Urban Women Week festival, which organizes week-long workshops for training, exchange and expression in the arts (hip hop, rap, slam, DJing, graffiti, break dancing, etc.). Present but marginalized in the modern music sector, women gain greater autonomy through these events, in the face of a social order that is less receptive to the new demands of young people. Finally, in 2017, five young Kenyan women aged 15 to 17 were the only Africans to participate in an international technological innovation competition ('Technovation competition') for girls. Invited to develop mobile applications to solve problems in their communities, they proposed one to end female genital mutilation.

And finally, feminism for what? For Amina Mama, editor of *Feminist Africa*: 'Feminism, to put it simply, is a political and intellectual movement that challenges the subordination of women' (2004, p. 2). The African Feminist Forum, in publishing its Charter of Principles, appropriated feminism, 'without ifs or buts', on the basis of clear principles: 'By calling ourselves feminists, we are politicizing the struggle for women's rights, we are questioning the legitimacy of the [patriarchal] structures that keep women subservient, and we are developing tools for analysis and transformative measures' (2006, p. 4). We will end with the

ideas expressed by Patricia McFadden, during the run-up to the African Feminist Congress in 2004: We must build a broad Pan-African feminist movement to engage in policies that preserve our hard-won rights, consolidate our changes toward equality, and prepare us as women's and civil society movements to play a stronger and more effective role against the globalization agenda.

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CHAPTER 10

THE WOMAN'S AFRICA IN HER OWN WORDS

Esi Sutherland-Addy

Gina Mhlophe, South African freedom fighter and award-winning storyteller, has told several iterations of the Nguni myth in which in primordial times the archetypal matriarch Mazindaba insightfully identifies the fundamental element lacking in the life of her human family: stories. She embarks on a dogged quest with the assistance of animals, which takes her to the water kingdom in the depths of the sea, from where she is the first to bring stories to nourish the human soul and bring a sense of contentment and continuity to humanity.¹ This metaphorical representation of African women as the earliest keepers of the knowledge of indigenous societies is corroborated in many ways, not least of which is among scholars of history, anthropology and oral literature. Some of them have expressed regret that women were effectively silenced because their views were not solicited during field work, on the assumption that they would have nothing to say under the patriarchal hegemony of their societies (Hale, 1999; Allman and Tashjian, 2000; Sidikou, 2000). This silencing has been noted not only for the expressions of women in ethnic communities but also for the burgeoning body of written works by women who have reached a global audience but have been ignored in the discourse of literary critics (James, 1990; Adams, 2012).

¹ This story has been published in book form (see references) but is also recorded on the 2010 audio *Songs and Stories of Africa*. Released by African Cream (Randburg, South Africa).

This thought piece will briefly provide signposts along the path towards identifying where, when and how women can be described as telling and writing the story of Africa and its peoples. Our account will acknowledge the mode in which the vast majority of African women express themselves, which is in a panoply of literary genres expressed orally. However, the rapidly evolving body of written literature by women will receive concentrated attention.

In most African societies, the arts are woven into the fabric of life and are a powerful source of commentary upon life and its meaning. It is an area in which gender dynamics are obviously at play, and thus many genres can be categorized as being the preserve of a particular gender. Work and marriage songs, dirges and lullabies are often closely associated with women in the framework of their activities in the cycle of daily and ceremonial affairs. The satirical songs sung exclusively by women during the ceremonies of the arrival of the new bride to a polygamous home in the West African Sahelian (Xarxar in Wolof) exemplify the complex construction of a sociopsychological framework set in an aesthetic mode for the deflection of conflict from the real world with the hope of achieving a catharsis and the establishment of parameters for peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of the ways in which women treat memory and act as the guardians of legacy. In the performance of dirges, women in many societies reveal an intimate knowledge of family, clan and national history that can be mapped onto the life of the newly-deceased and proclaimed. Indeed, the female court historians at the Ede Palace in Yorubaland have the special role of chanting the names of all the rulers of the city during the festival in honour of the deity Sango. Perhaps it is in women's alternate and nuanced view of institutionalized roles ascribed to them that a more holistic understanding of the social history of Africa begins to emerge. This defiance may lie in the explicitness of women's songs about love and sensuality, in which they reject the image of innocence (Moroccan *La'rubiyat*). It may also emerge from the satirical wit with which women parody patriarchy, such as in Songhai-Zerma women's work songs. Perhaps most potentially disruptive is their construction of alternative realities through stories and poems that dismantle the glorious image of marriage and motherhood (Sutherland-Addy and Diaw, 2005, pp. 91-94).

The era of extended literacy² among African women is yet to be reached. There is a record of women writers. However, in the twentieth century, a growing

2 According to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (September 2010, Fact Sheet No. 3), almost 63% of the over 175 million illiterate persons in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 were women.

number of women have joined the ranks of male creative writers to develop a lively literary tradition marked by the colonial experience not only thematically but especially by the fact that writers work overwhelmingly in the languages of the colonizing power. Women have played their part in making writing an emancipatory tool. Indeed, the prolific Egyptian writer Nawal El Saadawi has been described as defining her selfhood through her writing (Sadiqui et al., 2009, p. 286).³ On the African continent, examples are too numerous to recount. However, a spectacular tribute to enscribed political insight is exemplified by The Federation of South African Women's Charter, formulated at their inaugural conference in 1954. The following are telling fragments from the elaborate document:

We the women of South Africa, wives and mothers, working women and housewives, Africans, Indians, European and Coloured, hereby declare – As women we do not form a society separate from men – The status of women is a test of civilization (Daymond et al., 2003).

Freedom was won on the battlefield and in the minds and spirits of the fighters. Thus, Muthoni Likimani, Kenyan activist and writer, recounts the active participation of arms-bearing women in the Mau Mau struggle. Speaking of her book *Passbook Number F47927*⁴ in a 1990 interview with Adeola James, she recalls that 'in all previous literature on the subject nobody ever focused on the contribution of women....Nobody said there was also a gang of women guerillas, fighting, carrying guns' (James, 1990, p. 60). The celebrated poet Noemia De Souza, on the other hand, will equally be remembered for being the powerful inspirational voice of consciousness in the long struggle against Portuguese domination in Lusophone Africa.

In the era after political independence among African states, women writers have certainly been preoccupied with the dislocations and disruption caused by the encounter between Africa and Europe, but they have also taken a close, hard look at the traditions of the continent. Their writing has sought to restore the agency of women in living and reflecting upon life in the African context. The very personhood of Flora Nwapa's eponymous heroine Efuru is denied because she cannot bear children (also see Aidoo, 1987); Nwapa's revelation of the excruciating social pressure on women is matched by Mariama Ba's

3 Nawal El Saadawi's essay Writing and Freedom is featured in the anthology *Women Writing Africa: The Northern Region*.

4 This was her own registration number with the Mau-Mau movement.

interrogation of Senegal's Islamic society as she raises the veil.⁵ Indeed, the Sudanese Leila Abulela, decades later, continues today in the engagement with Islamic society in Africa.

Male writers are not alone in expressing their disillusionment with the apparent crumbling of the post-independence dream. Ama Ata Aidoo, award-winning Ghanaian writer, has over five decades of multigeneric writing to her credit and has painted images in grim, sobering detail or in hilarious parody of wanton corruption and rising inequalities. She has also provided glimpses of the way things could be. The Cameroonian Calixthe Beyela comes across as a later fragmented and outraged voice against the devastating effect of the degenerated post-independence Africa on the women of the continent.

Both of these writers have a global reach and recall one development that must be acknowledged – the rising conversation among African women in a Pan-African world. For instance, anthologies of African women's works being published are often organized on the principle of providing a panoramic vision of Africa either with a continental focus or with a focus that embraces Africans in diaspora. For example, the *Women Writing Africa* series is mainly contained within the continent. It covers northern, southern, eastern and western Africa and represents a kaleidoscopic array of genres and thematic concerns of women from the fifteenth century BCE to the twenty-first century CE. They are of all ages, social classes, ethnic and language groups, expressing their views through a wide variety of media. Forms of oral literature from the tale to the epic poem stand side by side with letters, political journalistic pieces, court depositions and creative writing of various genres.⁶

Perhaps *Daughters of Africa*, edited by Margaret Busby, serves as an enduring monument of a Pan-Africanist vision conceptualized, executed and published by African women. The works contained in this anthology also feature Queen Hatshepsut of the fifteenth century BCE but exits the continent to embrace eighteenth-century enslaved Senegal-born Phillis Wheatley, speaking from the unlikely shores of Boston, Massachusetts, with Sojourner Truth, the nineteenth-century abolitionist, not far behind. Raising issues of identity, nationalism, suffocating traditions, affirmation of womanhood and experiences of diaspora, writer after writer, from the United States, the Caribbean and the African continent are placed side by side in chronological order, ending in the late 1980s.

5 Mariama Ba's *So Long a Letter* remains a classic of the untold story of the woman's perspective on the social realities of polygamy in a changing Islamic society.

6 This project was undertaken in a partnership between hundreds of African women researchers and the Feminist Press of the City University of New York.

Following the pioneering footsteps of Allison and Busby and Zulu Sofola, other African women have taken the ultimate step in telling one's own story by going into the business of publishing. These publishers include The Cassava Republic established by Bibi Bakare-Yusuf and FEMRITE, owned by the Association of Ugandan Women Writers. In the twenty-first century, opportunities for presenting one's works, as well as more structured publishing avenues in which the author has greater agency, have increased substantially.

At the same time, the concept of the global citizen with active ties to Africa has manifested among young women writers, many of whom are of the new African diaspora. These younger writers are taking the world by storm. Beyond winning awards, they are initiating trends, for instance the writing of science fiction/speculative literature (Nnedi Okorafor). Aminatta Forna chooses to explore the theme of armed conflict away from Africa – in Croatia. In contrast, Chimamanda Adichie, with her transnational and multilocal settings, not only defies the centre-periphery dialectic set up by the colonial experience but calls Western society out of its comfort zone with her gaze. As to whether a story by an African woman about the warped power relations in a situation of immigration would be considered a marketable product in a highly discriminatory industry such as that of global publishing, the Cameroonian Imbolo Mbue has thrown the question wide open by attracting, in 2015, a million-dollar advance – the highest advance ever paid to an African writer – from Random House for her novel *Behold the Dreamers*. However, history continues to be made in the midst of it all, as the unending cycle of life calls upon the voices of the griottes – mistresses of improvisation and keepers of legacies – to assure all, once again, of certainties in life amid change. With their fingers steadily on the pulse of society, writers like Ama Ata Aidoo and Veronique Tadjo, ever engaged with remoulding the received story, endure through the decades. And Mazindaba the Nguni matriarch whose lips were touched at the dawn of time with the gift of storytelling must be content that with granddaughters like these, her people's stories will never die.

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CHAPTER 11

CHRISTIANITY AND BLACK CHURCHES

Obstacles and Religious Challenges

Wyatt MacGaffey

The pace of change in African religious practices and in scholarly assessments of them has rendered obsolete most of the assumptions and predictions current at the end of the twentieth century. The wholesale adoption of Christianity in a variety of forms, from Catholicism to The Lord's Resistance Army, has swept aside speculation that politically independent Africans would reject Christianity as an imported religion imposed during colonial times. Secular ideologies, such as Consciencism, African Socialism and Authenticity, put forward in the name of nationalism, have all failed. The alternative of African Traditional Religion has been unmasked as not African, traditional, or even religious. Scholars have abandoned efforts to classify religious organizations and movements according to their supposed causes, motivations and degree of adherence to models of orthodoxy, and they no longer treat religion as a sphere of activity defined by belief in spiritual beings, separate from politics and history.

Predictions regarding religious trends in independent Africa were grounded on mistaken assumptions. If, as Professor Jacob Ajayi argued long ago, there was no reason to regard the eighty-year colonial period as the definitive turning point in the history of Africa, one should not assume that independence from colonial rule would occasion a massive cultural upheaval. Secondly, rationalist historians have long underestimated the intrinsic appeal of Christianity, which, during its own two-thousand-year history, has been absorbed into many different

cultural and political environments. Politically independent Africans continue to participate, as they have for millennia, in the world's political, commercial and ideological affairs, including Christianity, Islam and even Hare Krishna.

Christian schools have long provided the best educational opportunities, at the same time introducing pupils to Christian religious practice and doctrine. Education opens the way to modern employment; Christianity, like Islam, gives people a sense of participation in the world at large, familiar to more and more through television. In fifteen African countries, most of them in Central and East Africa, more than eighty per cent of the population is reported to be at least nominally Christian; in many communities Christianity is the only religious option and has become an essential feature of local identity. Local histories before, during and after the colonial period offer better explanations for the success of Christianity than the nationality or predominant religious orientation of the colonial power itself; the prevalence of Islam in any given country is the strongest limiting factor, but Islamic schools have only recently begun to teach science, English and French.

Among Christian denominations, Roman Catholicism stands out for its success. In six of the countries reported to be eighty per cent Christian, at least fifty per cent of the population are Catholics, at rates comparable to, or higher than, Catholicism in France. All of these countries were colonized by predominantly Catholic powers, but it is even more striking that they are characterized by misgovernment, inter-ethnic violence and widespread poverty. The Church, by its unitary organization, its wealth and its international prestige, is uniquely able to stand in opposition to oppressive governments and to help with its schools, hospitals and relief services, those whom the state has failed. Liturgy itself is a source of comfort and hope, its message of higher order contrasting with the disorder of everyday life. In several countries variant liturgies have been authorized, in recognition of local cultural traditions; drums and other popular musical instruments are now a commonplace in Catholic worship. Between 2005 and 2010, the Catholic population of the continent grew twenty per cent, faster than anywhere else in the world. An individual diocese, however, is unlikely to be able to support itself, but remains dependent on international missions, which are relatively wealthy. Figures for Protestants tell us little because the category itself is ill-defined, and the subordinate categories vary from one survey to the next. Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists draw their strength, as do Catholics, from their schools, hospitals and social services. The Bible, translated into all the major languages, powerfully attracts the literate.

All the established Protestant churches are challenged by the tremendous expansion of 'new' Christianities, for which no satisfactory label has been found. They are often called 'Pentecostal' because of their openness to spontaneous visitations of the Holy Spirit, but they have little in common with such long-established 'mission' Pentecostals as the Assemblies of God or the Church of Pentecost. They can be called 'charismatic', in that they are characteristically founded and led by a single influential preacher or prophet, who declares that God has singled out him or her as a spiritual messenger. Following in the same path as such prophets as Beatrix Kimpa Vita in Kongo (1704) and, in the early twentieth century, Isaiah Shembe in South Africa, Simon Kimbangu in Congo and William Wadé Harris in West Africa, they apply their understanding of the Christian message to the problems of the day in terms that make immediate sense. Their appeal includes the entertainment value of song, dance and popular music, which established churches have been obliged to imitate as best they can. The content of the message varies between churches, and even over time within a church or movement, from severe Christian morality to a promise to cast out demons, but the most common theme is that God promises prosperity to the faithful. The form of this prosperity is highly materialistic and specifically modern and universal; the churches are explicitly 'international' in name and ambition, creatively using television and social media to attract adherents. The founder or leader himself exemplifies the success of his message in his demeanour, his clothes, his cars and his entourage. The most successful churches are in fact international, having branches in several African countries and in Europe, the Americas and Asia, where their congregations include local converts as well as Africans of the modern diaspora.

The sheer scale of some of these new movements and their conspicuous presence gives their leaders considerable public weight. Standing apart from secular patronage hierarchies and for the most part transcending ethnic and other local identities, they are in a position to comment independently on the state and the political parties, which also promised the rewards of modernity but failed to deliver. Christianity in some form provides a common moral basis for social and political reform. The new movements have thus restored the essential link between religion and politics, which academic discourses once separated, and it is now possible to see the history of sub-Saharan African countries as a history of religion as much as of governments.

African Traditional Religion (ATR) did not emerge as an alternative to Christianity because it was never really a 'religion' or even a uniform system of belief and practice. It was invented in the 1950s to replace earlier views of

Africans as superstitious and fetishistic, but it perpetuated the idea that all Africans think alike. The term 'traditional' ambiguously implied both that ATR belonged to a timeless past and that it contrasted essentially with the 'modern'. Guided by a Judeo-Christian template, its proponents sifted through African cultures looking for 'religious' or at least 'spiritual' beliefs, a method described by the Kenyan poet Okot p'Bitek as intellectual smuggling. Scholars such as the Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu have pointed out that African languages do not set apart the spiritual from the material or recognize a category of the supernatural distinct from the natural. Ancestors are not worshipped, they are respected as older members of an unbroken family.

What others have called 'religion' is known to Africans as 'custom', or 'our way of life'; it is the substance of culture, identity and moral values, together with procedures for exploring the forces of nature and coping with life's problems by practical means. That these procedures may be based on mistaken ideas of cause and effect does not make them religious, and that the forces they explore are often at least partly personified does not make them spirits or deities. Since custom is the fabric of everyday life, it is not an alternative religion nor is it necessarily incompatible with either Christianity or Islam, although proponents of both religions try to draw a line between right religious conduct and 'paganism'. In the 1970s the Vatican objected to healing and exorcism performed by Emmanuel Milingo, archbishop of Lusaka in Zambia, although exorcism has always been a Catholic practice; called to Rome, he attracted large crowds there too as he had in Lusaka.

There have been attempts to formalize 'African spirituality' as a religion, with its own structure and doctrine. Afrikania, founded in Ghana in 1982 by a former Catholic priest influenced in the United States by Afrocentrism, is explicitly a church, although it draws on ancient Egypt and 'reformed and updated' African traditions for its content. Originally given some support by the revolutionary regime of J. J. Rawlings, it had limited appeal. A greater success has been that of *orisha* and *Ifa*-related practices from coastal West Africa, formerly condemned as the superstitious and potentially subversive practices of slave populations in the Americas; these are being transformed in the Americas into legitimate religions under such names as Vodoun, Candomblé and Lucumi, attracting adherents who are not necessarily of African descent. Some of them have held international conferences; like other religions, they now have histories of schismatic leaders and competing orthodoxies. There is also movement in the other direction, as American denominations seek links in Africa. In Angola, the Brazil-based Church of the Kingdom of God preaches prosperity and has built new social services and a cathedral in Luanda.

As representatives of substantial Christian communities in politically independent countries, African churchmen have not hesitated to uphold their own views of Christian orthodoxy, particularly with respect to sexuality and marriage. As Pope Francis, elected in 2013, began to express his relatively progressive views, some (but not all) African Catholic prelates indicated their disapproval. In the Anglican Communion, dissent has been established for some time, particularly with respect to the ordination of women, and more recently with respect to homosexuality and same-sex marriage. In 2005, Archbishop Akinola led the creation of the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (CANA) as a missionary jurisdiction of the Church of Nigeria. In 2009, CANA joined the Anglican Church in North America, an organization of conservative dioceses separated from the Episcopal Church of the United States. Akinola was also one of the founders of the Anglican Global South, a group of mostly ex-colonial Anglican churches including most of those in Africa. With respect to Christianity, the old colonial relationship has been turned on its head.

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NEW RELIGIONS, NEW DIASPORAS

Olusegun Morakinyo

Religion – as both an indispensable resource and a potential danger to Africa’s collective self-actualization (development) in all facets (Tshibangu, 1993) – is the *Esu*¹ of Global African aspirations in all its material and spiritual totality. Like *Esu* that is reputed for its double-edged, ambiguous, elusive, paradoxical, liminal features, which can portend both positive developments and/or serious danger, in indeterminate ever-shifting patterns and sequences, this paper evokes the immense opportunities and [in]surmountable challenges of African ‘New Religions and New Diasporas’ in relation to the psychic social-cultural-political aspiration of Global Pan-African consciousness.

The ‘New’ prefixed to both African Religions and Diasporas presupposes pre-existing ‘Old’ religion(s) and Diaspora(s), which begs the question of what are

1 *Esu* as it is known in its original Yoruba home is a figure recurrent through different manifestations in all African myths and folklore. Known as *Legba* among the Fon of the Republic of Benin, *Ekwesu* among the Igbo ethnic group of Nigeria, *Anase* in the Ashanti of Ghana, *Ogo-Yurugu* among the Dogon of Mali-Burkina Faso, *Ture* among the Azande of South Sudan and Northern Uganda, *Hlakanyana* in isiZulu, *Umvundla/Udyakalashe* in isiXhosa, *Sankambe* in Venda, *Kaggan* the mantis among the Xam/Khoisan, *John* or ‘Signifying monkey’ in African-American narratives, as *Exu* in Brazil, *Echu-Elegua* in Cuba, *Papa Legba* in Haiti and *Papa La bas* in the United States. It is therefore safe to claim the Pan-Africaness of *Esu*, in that it is recurrent in various manifestation in all African cultures both on the continent and in the diaspora. According to Toyin Falola, ‘*Esu* is complicated, ambiguous, amorphous, and plastic. *Esu* can be here and there; neither here nor there. His physical description matches his attributes: he is both short and tall – when he decides to be short and small the biggest person with the longest hands cannot hold or encircle him. He is both red and black, with a complexion that eludes fixed description since it is capable of changing. He is whimsical and non-whimsical, hot and cool, cool without being gentle, hot without being rash’ (Falola, 2013, p. 10).

the 'old religions' and what are the 'old diasporas' and in what ways are the 'new' different from the 'old'? Are religions 'new' in the sense of a complete break with the 'old' or in the variations in the mode of worship, organizational structure or a new canonical orientation, or are they new in respect of chronological periodization? What makes a diaspora new? Is it geography or demography? Specifically, in our case, what are the changes in African religions that designated them as 'new'? Are they 'new' in relation to another religion supplementing the Indigenous African religions, as historically evidenced in the case of Christianity and Islam, or are they 'new' in relation to changes within the 'old' religions of Africa – African Indigenous religion, Christianity and Islam? Also, the question of what is 'new' in the African diaspora in relation to the 'old' diaspora has been and needs to be continuously raised, given especially its implication for Global African unity. Is there one African diaspora in the sense of all Africans permanently settled for whatever reasons outside Africa constituting the African diaspora, or are there multiple African diasporas defined by geography, demography and periodization? Can there be an African diaspora within continental Africa or we can only think of ethnic diaspora or is the description of African ethnic groups living outside their historical geographical location as 'diaspora' tenuous?

These questions, which have given rise to continuing extensive scholarship,² are in the background of this text but they are not the focus, given the specific concern of how these twin phenomena – new African religions and diasporas – affect the Global African agenda. Our main objective here is the investigation of how the eruption of the new religions because of new diasporas enhances or diminishes the ideal of Global Africa of cooperation and incorporation among the people of Africa. Like Pan-Africanism, this ideal 'seeks to promote feelings of oneness among the people of the African world' (Brodber, 2003, p. 87). Other issues are whether the new African diasporas are a dispersal or an extension of Global Africa? If a dispersal, is there a need to bring them together under the umbrella of Global Africa, why and how, and if they are an expansion and extension of Global Africa, how do we maximize the benefits of the new religions they engender for the cause of Global Africa?

The discussion of new African religions is not a search for a new emergent unheard-of religion in Africa or by Africans, but concerns development and changes that have occurred and are occurring in the three existing dominant religions of Africa – Christianity, Islam and Indigenous African religions – as they are affected

2 See, for example, Turner, 1979; Isichei, 2004; Simpson, 1978; Adogame, Gerloff and Hock, 2008; Kalu and Low, 2008.

by the contemporary migration trends out of Africa, which are creating 'new' African religions all over the world and have implications for the attainment of the ideal of Global African consciousness. It is safe to state that there is no country or region in the world where a significant African population, with 'new' ways of religious worship, has not arrived in the last thirty years. However, given the intrinsic racism of modernity, the discourse of migration as a problematic side-effect of globalization to be controlled continues to be the subject of intensive scholarship,³ especially in Western societies that are hosts to the new phenomena. Relevant as these studies were to understand the impact of the new religions and diaspora on the host community, examination of the implications of these emergent African religions and diaspora – as resources to be mobilized and a problematic concern to be studied for the actualization of Global African aspiration – seems regrettably to be in its infancy. Moreover, most literature that discusses the topic of new religions and African diaspora from a supposedly African perspective has failed to align it to the cultural political aspiration of Global Africa (cf. Adogame and Spickard, 2010), a serious shortcoming of the new African Christianity in the context of the new diaspora.

One fundamental distinction between the old 'African' Christianity as constituted in the 'new' 'African' churches is an abandonment of any pretention to be 'African' as seen in their designation and general outlook. This de-Africanization by the new 'African' churches is in sharp contrast to the 'old' African church, which prioritizes its Africanness by calling itself 'African', and grew out of, was nurtured by and was the foundation of, the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Thus, while the old African church was distinguished by its Africanness, the new 'African' churches are distinguished by their 'universal' orientation and outlook and disengagement from Pan-Africanism and social concerns of racism and social justice. One further marker of the new African churches is an adjunct and necessary corollary of their Universalist outlook. What distinguishes the contemporary landscape of Christianity is the reversal of fortune between the Western European churches and the new African churches. While in the past it was European missionaries who were travelling to Africa to save the souls of Africans, what marks the new African churches is the phenomenon of reverse mission, where the new African churches are sending missionaries from Africa to the Western world to save the souls of the natives, who are deemed to have strayed from the true Christian path and are in need of salvation.

3 See, for example, the University of Vienna's Global African Diaspora Studies Research Platform. <https://gads.univie.ac.at/>.

Interestingly, it is the opposite of African Christianity's 'reverse mission' that is the norm. This is because while the new African Christianity is busy ministering to the West, the old African diaspora especially from the Americas and the Caribbean is busy 'returning to the source' of African Indigenous Religion on the continent, through the practise of 'roots tourism', which has significantly reinvigorated African Indigenous Religions, amplified by their recognition as Intangible Heritage by UNESCO (2003). While root tourism has helped in rejuvenating African Indigenous Religions, it has also led to problems of dubious reinvention of African religion for the tourist 'gaze'.

While Islam is arguably the most popular religion in Africa, it is currently having 'bad press'. What is new about Islam in Africa and Africanized Islam is the discourse of terrorism and radical Islam. Serious questions, however, need to be asked of how legitimate is the connection of Islam and terrorism, given not only the history of Islam but also the debate of the geopolitical manipulation of radical Islam? While it is not only presumptuous but also wrong and dangerous to link Islam to terrorism, it cannot be denied that what defines new African Islam is a turn towards conservative radical political Islam with its real or perceived link to Islamic fundamentalism (Abbas, 2015). Significantly, as with the new African churches that completely de-Africanized African churches in favour of Universalist orientation, the new African Islam is completely de-Africanized, preferring instead to align itself to the larger Muslim world. The implications of this change in Islam as it affects new African Muslim diasporas and Global Pan-Africanism merit further examination.

If the Middle Passage of the Atlantic and Indian oceans defines the old diaspora, what defines the new diaspora is the Mediterranean Sea. While the discourse of the new diaspora has concentrated mainly on the 'brain drain' and positive benefits of the diaspora for the community they leave from and the 'inconvenience' to their host society, the real story of the new African diaspora is the tragedy of the Mediterranean Sea where Africans youths continue to die in their struggle to reach 'fortress Europe'.⁴ While the 'fortunate' story of the 'diaspora' who survived the passage can be studied, the silenced story of those who are lost and of what is lost in the passage – that which stamped the 'diaspora' as an in-between existence of leaving but never arriving – is what calls for caution in the current positivizing of the diaspora experience by the 'silence,

4 Three days, 700 deaths on Mediterranean as migrant crisis flares. *The New York Times*, May 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/30/world/europe/migrants-deaths-mediterranean-libya-italy.html?_r=0; <http://www.voanews.com/a/iom-nearly-3000-migrants-dead-at-sea-in-2016/3430192.html>.

discovery, abolition' paradigm (Depelchin, 2005). Diaspora as aptly described is a 'dwelling in travel'; 'it is a passage, yet a passage that encompasses the possibility of never arriving. Of drifting endlessly on the betwixt and between of the world boundaries' (Carter, 2003, p. ix). The African diaspora, old and new, is thus a traumatic experience. The silenced trauma of the old diaspora is what accounts for the current capitalist economy and our position as Global African in it. Capitalist socio-economic political devastation is also the reason for the new African diaspora, understood from the perspective of the silenced who do not survive the passage of the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, despite the current positive gloss of the studies on the new African diaspora, it is a tragedy that cannot but have serious consequence for Africa now and in the future, as was the enslavement of Africans, if serious attention is not paid to it. It is in this light that the ideal and praxis of global Africa consciousness, which sustained the old diaspora is indispensable to the collective survival of the new African diaspora, given the current Western discourse of migration, identity and citizenship through the prism of racism (Koser, 2003, p. 10).

Surveying new African religions and diasporas from 1990, we can see how the three dominant religions in Africa have become new through current migration patterns creating 'new diasporas' and how these intersecting phenomena – religion and migration – do/can consolidate global African consciousness, with its attendant envisaged advantages of cooperation and incorporation among the people of Africa globally. Current developments in African Christianity, Islam and African Indigenous Religions in relation to the new African diasporas, and an evaluation of how far their emergence and activities further or hinder the spirit of Global Africa consciousness, must be examined separately. While given the hegemony of Eurocentric scholarship, I cannot escape the archival confines of the 'silence, discovery and abolition syndrome', which invariably forces a particular way of seeing and knowing African religions and African diasporas that privileges Christianity at the expense of African religions and Islam. I can nonetheless try to provincialize Christianity by giving equal attention to other religions, focusing especially on how they are challenging their marginalization by Eurocentric Christianity.

The debate of the anteriority of Christianity in Africa has been addressed in various literature and is not central to this discussion. Suffice it to say, however, that it is the position of this author that contemporary Christianity cannot be divorced from the historical injustice of racial dehumanization of Africans and the psychic despoliation of Africans. While current rejuvenation of African Indigenous Religions can be analysed from the perspective of correcting its

distortion and marginalization by Eurocentric Christian scholarship as an emancipatory praxis, and a much-needed prerequisite and crucial ingredient for 'healing' of the African collective psyche, they must be subject, however, to critical analysis, especially in the context of current pseudo-inventions as 'heritage' for roots religious tourism. However, given the current discourse of contemporary Islam and the re-emergence of radical Islam, the discussion of Islam in the African diaspora must be traced to the ambiguous history of Islam in Africa vis-à-vis African Muslims and the larger Islamic communities. As noted in Volume 7 of the GHA, while the colonial authorities were not averse to African Islam, 'what the colonial powers were particularly anxious to prevent was a Pan-Islamic movement that constituted a threat to their power' (Boahen, 1985, p. 522). Significant here is not only the oppressive sociocultural political situation of the African Muslim diaspora in the age of the 'War on Terror', but also its impact of cooperation and incorporation of African Muslims in Global Pan-Africanism. Finally, Rastafarianism as a 'new' African religion is furthering the ideal of Global African consciousness.

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BLACK IMPERIALISM

A Magic Conception of Social and
Political Facts in Contemporary Societies

Joseph Tonda

Witchcraft – long relegated to the realm of village archaisms – became, in the last decades of the twentieth century, a component of African modernity. This is evidenced in the West, for example, by the allusions to sorcery in the *politics of the belly* concept; the interference of beliefs and magical practices in economic rationality; the analysis of a national conference and/or a democratization process in such terms as a ‘family conspiracy’ or ‘exorcism’; the understanding of witchcraft as ‘a principle par excellence combining new inequalities that are reproduced on an unprecedented scale within familiar relationships of home and kinship’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2016, pp. 133–155); and the integration of witchcraft in the archaism of the colonial town. It was in the words Beast, Vampire¹, spectres, ghosts, fetishism and mysticism that Marx – and after him Derrida (1993), Deleuze and Guattari (1972), among others – saw the essence of capitalism. This is certainly not an inconsequential act. It marks the complex relationship that scientific thought has had since at least the nineteenth century with the notions, images, metaphorical figures and ideas of non-scientific thought. For example, it is with the term fetishism, but also with the metaphor of the woman conceptualized as Africa, the ‘dark continent of sexuality’, of mystery, sorcery, dreams and nightmares, spells and enchantments, dampness

¹ According to Marx, ‘Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks’, quoted by Deleuze and Guattari (1972).

and aridity, savagery and terror, that Freud, the inventor of psychoanalysis, whose field of reference was the bourgeoisie, studied subjects in capitalist society. Jean and John Comaroff, Peter Geschiere, Jean-Pierre Warnier and Jean-François Bayart (1989), Achille Mbembe, Comi Toulabor, among others, following Evans-Pritchard and Georges Balandier, have inaugurated a tradition of African studies 'from below' that take seriously the popular 'idioms' in which politics and economics are expressed. The African imagination itself, open to all the forces that can be exploited by the powerful and to all the languages capable of enriching its repertoire for interpreting the world, constantly borrows from Western languages terms from the registers of the invisible – science, the military, technology, biomedicine, telecommunications etc. – to conceptualize its relationship with a postcolonial society. Some of the best-known include vampire, from which came *vampireux*; *féticheur*, derived from fetish; and *blindage* (armor), *pine diabolique* (devil's penis), *vaccins* (vaccines), *mystique* (mystical), *spirituel* (spiritual), *sorcellerie* (sorcery), and *diable* (devil).

The idea of Black imperialism is at the heart of this article. It is a little-known, invisible form of imperialism that possesses the psychic life of colonial and postcolonial societies. As we intend to show, Black imperialism is an imperialism of dazzling images and objects. It is linked to nature, which is seen as an original colonial power acting in both the African and Euro-American worlds. The fact that the concept of imperialism is no longer part of 'mainstream opinion' accentuates its black or invisible power. Michael Parenti explains:

... the ideas and concepts about reality do not spring from our minds from a pure void. They support each other, gaining power via circulation and repetition. They keep going because they seem to blend in with prevailing opinion. They mutually reinforce themselves, becoming increasingly accepted because of repetition and diffusion. Concepts that merge with mainstream opinion have a high chance of being perceived objectively whereas other notions are generally seen as crossing the boundaries of what is acceptable and lacking in credibility. Therefore, more often than we may think, we accept or reject ideas according to their acceptability in the light of public opinion (Parenti, 2015, pp. 13–14).

One way of defining this is to start with the considerations of Raymond Williams and Frantz Fanon. The former explores advertising and the latter racism. According to Raymond Williams, capitalist societies are, when it comes to advertising, 'functionally very close to the magical systems of primitive societies, but which coexist rather strangely with extremely developed scientific

technology' (Williams, 1990, p. 73).² Frantz Fanon writes: 'A growing darkness has developed in the depths of the European unconscious, where the most immoral impulses and the most shameful desires lie dormant. And since every man strives toward whiteness and light, Europeans have sought to reject this uncivilized element that was trying to defend itself. When European civilization came into contact with the Black world, with these savage peoples, everyone agreed: these Negroes were the principle of evil' (Fanon, 2011, p. 216).

By comparing these two extracts we can see what Black imperialism is. Indeed, Black imperialism can be defined as the magic of primitive societies at work in advertising in the heart of modern societies. It is therefore the magic of this 'uncivilized' element, this 'profoundly dark crescent', this 'principle of evil' whose colonial possession is the European unconscious and which has been *recognized* in the 'Negro', turning the latter into an unknown imperialist power that is both invisible and indescribable. Black imperialism is therefore what 'triumphant rationality' had to expel from the subject, 'separate' from itself like its own 'irrational' impulses that had become menacing, shapeless and ambiguous and had to be attributed to 'another' to be dominated. Thus, the white masculine bourgeois individual projected an unbridled sensuality in turn to the lower class, coloured people, women, gypsies and Jews. Black imperialism thus had a libidinal aspect that can be found in advertising where it often appears behind the screen image of Black sexual power. As I understand it, a screen image is an image that reveals a phenomenon while hiding other aspects of its reality. This is why when it comes to advertising and its use of the screen image of Black sexual power, hidden behind this image, there is not only Black magic at work at the heart of this capitalist advertising device, but also the real subject of capitalism, which, according to Marx, is invisible, namely *value*, the 'automatic subject', that 'does not carry ... words on the surface to explain what it is.' (Marx, 1993 [1867], p. 85). For example, the screen image of Black sexual power is widely used as magical sexual power in advertising for Guinness. The intense colour of this beer is linked in the imagination with the black colour of Africans and the sexual power attributed to them. This screen image created by the phantasmal sexual power of the Black person and the imagined sexual power in this intensely coloured beer allows the real subject of capitalism, value, to replicate its system. In other words, capitalism exploits this symbolic relationship between Black sexual power and the colour of beer to sell this product. Black imperialism is

2 On the same topic of the role of advertising compared to that of 'spin doctors' in politics, Geschiere (2001, pp. 15–42).

this invisible, spectral, unconscious power that represents value and has perverse complicities with Black power³ commonly called sorcery or fetishism and the sexual spell it weaves on the unconscious.

This colonizing power, however, does not have the European unconscious as its sole possession or territory, as Fanon's studies show. Indeed, we can say that it is because of this Black power colonizing the European unconscious that Africans are perceived as 'Negroes', and that the latter represent

inferior feelings, evil tendencies, the dark side of the soul [because] in the collective unconscious of *Homo occidentalis*, the Negro, or if preferred, the colour black, symbolizes evil, sin, poverty, death, war and famine. All birds of prey are black. In Martinique, which has a collective unconscious that is European by nature, they say when a 'blue' Negro pays you a visit: 'What misfortune is he bringing?' (Fanon, 2011, p. 216).

The answer to this question is as follows: the 'blue' Negro is bringing inner misfortune to the European psyche that finds itself objectified and projected in him. The anti-Negro racism amongst the people of the Antilles is therefore the consequence of the colonization of their psyche by the magic of the 'dark crescent' in the European unconscious. As you can see, Black imperialism colonizes both the White person and the Black person. Not only the Black Antillean but also the Black African who having been 'civilized' by schooling, Christian missions, work or the authorities, treats another African as he were a 'savage', a 'primitive', a 'Negro'.

We can now summarize these considerations in the following way: Black imperialism is not the imperialism of Blacks. It is the imperialism of the dazzling unconscious *image* of Black as a paradigm for invisibility, magic, libido, force or power (sexual), with the Black and White unconscious as its possession or colonial territory. To expand its conceptualization, we can identify five dimensions to this imperialism. The first is the chromatic aspect that contrasts Black and White, darkness and light, and hence it is racial in nature; the second is represented by value, the 'automatic subject' of capitalism; the third relates to libido and sexual potency; the fourth is fetishism and sorcery, and the fifth is the dazzling dimension.

In several languages spoken in the Congo Basin, to dazzle is expressed as 'killing the eyes', to plunge into darkness, which leads to seeing the world as it is not. Dazzling is partly linked to screen images, because these reveal at the same time as they conceal. These aspects act on the unconscious, which they colonize,

3 An example of this Black power was studied by Taliani (2012, pp. 579-608).

and they are actualized in practice or discourses that transmit the power of Black imperialism. We have seen for example how it works via screen images in advertising, dazzling viewers in order to blind them. Black imperialism shows the world in a way that is different from what it is in reality, showing human beings as animals, 'things', 'naturals' coming to life in the darkness, the devil, demons, or conversely as 'gods' bringing light. This is active in all areas of life in colonial societies from the past and in postcolonial societies today. As an approach, Black imperialism deconstructs screen images.

In the scientific field, this imperialism manifests itself through screen images of metaphors drawn from popular thought or the 'magic belief' of witchcraft. So are notions like the Beast, vampires, spectres, ghosts, fetishism and mysticism, which should not be part of the corpus of social science concepts. And yet for Marx, as it would be later for Derrida (1993)⁴, for example, these words are used to reveal the essence of capitalism. As previously mentioned, this is not an inconsequential point. It reflects the complex relationships that 'magic belief' has had with scientific thinking since at least the nineteenth century until today. For their part, Africanist and African anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists, realizing the heuristic power of notions in popular thinking, have gone back to anthropological studies of lineage societies to appraise African economy and government in terms of the invisible. This is how the approach to African studies 'from below' was conceived, by taking seriously the popular 'idioms' that describe politics and business.

This scholarly reappropriation of common sense images, notions and representations is part of a long-standing movement of imaginaries forged by the longest and most universal colonization: the colonization of nature. The latter has been endowed with 'powers' and intelligence, identified with Mother (nature) and inhabited by spirits, genies, monsters and gods that are figures within the imagination or the unconscious. The colonization of nature therefore imposes itself as the original, now unconscious, matrix of all colonizations. It provides the model according to which these forms of colonization generate fantastical worlds and imaginaries through which the colonized and the colonizers explain the universe, the relationships they maintain within colonial and colonized societies, and the relationships between colonial and colonized societies. These worlds involved in colonial power relations and meanings all draw from the original matrix of the colonization of nature the terms according to which they disqualify their protagonists from the 'normal' humanity that is

4 On the same topic, Vogl (2013).

theirs, according to the logic of all ethnocentrism. This last concept signifies the incapacity of groups in colonial or postcolonial situations to free themselves from the worldviews that inhabit their psychic lives, and subsequently their social and cultural nature.

It follows that all colonization proceeds from the unconscious model of the *blind forces* of nature that bear down on humans – cyclones, ice ages, lightning, viruses, fires, etc. From this perspective, colonial violence is violence exerted by human beings following the unconscious model of the forces of nature, which do not incorporate moral notions, which are heterogeneous to ethical or philosophical concerns; this is the work of humans without humanity, minds without souls, intelligence without discernment. Because these spirits, spectres, ghosts and ancestors have no soul because souls belong to living humans. Blindness, caused by biological impulses sustained by the dazzle of material riches and ethnocentric or primary beliefs, turns the colonizer into a *natural*, whose field of consciousness is totally obsessed and possessed by these ‘forces’ that make him see the world differently than it is. Euphoric, planned, organized and systematic violence turns the colonizer into a cog in the machine, the brute force of nature acting blindly and indiscriminately, providing that the man or woman he perceives in his ethnocentric dazzlement belongs to a world he considers to be radically heterogeneous to his own.

It is thus through this ethnocentric dazzlement that colonists perceive the world differently than it is. They see the colonized as the mirror image of what they are themselves: ‘naturals’, things, tools, cogs in the machine that produced them based on the model of nature: capitalism. For their part, the colonized will see the colonizers as ghosts, gods, spirits, ancestors, in other words forces of the night, of the invisible, of death, against which they will struggle and fight, but from which they also expect the resources and modes of organization necessary for their existence: healthcare, work, food, children, recognition, development, strength, etc. They will adopt symbolic mechanisms to appropriate their strength, as shown in Jean Rouch’s film *Les Maîtres Fous* (The Mad Masters) in which, for example, we see a man in a trance who thinks he is a locomotive, which is to say a machine. Thus, a man becomes a human machine, giving his mind to the machine, which lacks one. This deep desire to be the colonizer’s machine has not disappeared in the postcolonial situation. It is at work among the formerly colonized at all levels of society. To embody the colonial machine is to embody the colonizer and to act like him against ethnic or chromatic ‘brothers’.

What these unconscious mechanisms of the colonization of nature tell us is that the recourse of scientific thought to non-scientific thought originates in an

unconscious belief that it is in non-scientific imagination that the intelligence of societies lies. Scientific imagination must therefore let itself be possessed and form a colony of (invisible) lights made up of non-scientific notions, fantasies and popular idioms to grasp the intelligence of the world. In other words, scientific imagination, because it is colonized by what it rejects, namely the irrational, unknowingly recognizes within it the power of the illumination of the real that it does not itself possess. This scientific imagination must therefore *exploit* the power that colonizes the unconscious, namely non-scientific imagination, to replicate its domination over it.

Intellectuals, the allies of the national or international bourgeoisie, need the intelligence (not just the physical strength) of the proletarians or common people to reproduce themselves as a learned, middle, dominant or ruling class. Exploitation and domination are therefore based on a *cognitive gap* among those doing the dominating or exploiting. In the Euro-American world, this cognitive gap maintains and stimulates the thirst for knowledge in scholarly circles and drives scientific curiosity: to dominate that which dominates and colonize the colonizers, namely nature and all human beings identified with it whether consciously or unconsciously.

In the case of Africa, the cognitive gap is combined with the narcissistic wound caused by two radical and opaque 'events': the slave trade and colonization. In this double gap, in which the creations of the imagination and the productions of the unconscious proliferate, we can draw the lesson that the Black dominated and dominators, affected by this double cognitive gap, keep expecting white domination to heal them of their racial insignificance, while white dominators, blinded by the dazzle of Black object fetishism, do not see the colonization of their imagination by the images and objects of the colonized.

Indeed, to the extent that the dominant power, the exploiters, dazzled by their superior status, see the African world differently from what it is, taking it for a world of beasts or human things, it is in the relationship of their intelligence with African objects that this principle appears in all its radicality. For the object is as much the material thing as it is the human being constructed by the fantasy of omnipotence in the object relationship or love relationship. It is significant in this regard that the person who experiences this relationship in the context of an omnipotent fantasy, whether magical or infantile, is precisely the person who is dependent on the 'object', notably the mother, from which Mother Nature is born. This unconscious colonization of objects, which are also images, is as we have seen a factor of Black imperialism that appears in the relationship between Western intellect and African art objects.

In this case, these objects act as would a colonialist, anxious not to 'open the eyes' of the colonized, dazzling them with his discourse (religious sermons, political propaganda, paternalistic ideology, etc.) to keep them in the *dark*. Except that here, the object shows that it is more intelligent than the missionary and colonizer of yesterday, or, for example, than today's intellectual or civil servant in charge of promoting the 'primitive arts' of the Quai Branly Museum.

Indeed, these superior intelligences, colonial or postcolonial by principle, are unaware that they are the makers of 'primitive objects' through their dazzled, intelligent gaze, possessed by the images, ideas and ideologies of the colonial past, and see only the hands of the primitives who made them. However, primitive people never made 'primitive art' or 'fetishes'. Their hands made works of art intended to make the *distinction* (Bourdieu, 1979) between dominant and dominated in society; they made objects of worship or of their power. European or American curators, modern intellectuals, do not see that they are creating primitive objects or fetishes through their 'belief' or bad faith when they refuse, for example, to see any connection between these objects and the slave trade or colonization (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2009). By doing so, they unwittingly demonstrate that these objects are indeed fetish objects, which is to say spirits in Pentecostal or African language, and from this perspective, what they imbue them with is their own spirits.

As we can see, the colonizing power of the spirits of objects first dazzles and blinds those who make them with their eyes or their intelligence, just as the superhuman intelligence of nature populated by spirits or genies plunges into darkness those humans who have never ceased to produce it with their colonized imaginations. It is according to this model that the unconscious or imagination of enslavers, racists, colonialists, capitalists, neo-colonialists and supremacists creates human objects or human beasts. Inside African societies, ethnic, religious, economic, political, cultural or class racism all operate according to this principle of the dazzling intelligence of objects inhabiting the imagination of those who believe themselves to be superior to others, especially because they are possessed by the possession of objects and money.

So, this is Black imperialism, an invisible imperialism that operates through the magic of mental, visual or material images that possess, grip, oppress and haunt the unconscious of Black and White individuals, blinded by the bedazzlement of objects, screens on machines and screen images. Freeing themselves from this imperialism is the most arduous battle that the elites of postcolonial societies must wage, provided they become aware of it.

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FROM TERROIR AND ETHNICITY TO THE IDEA OF TERRITORIAL STATE

Mamadou Fall

For too long, the definition of the state and the analysis of its trajectories has been left to lawyers and politicians. The territorial state paradigm (Tilly, 1975) has been established as a universal model binding communities to legal and political territories. However, the coincidence between a human community and a territory contained within political boundaries is an exception in world history (Aron, 2004). This evidence is admitted today,¹ although the approach is still similar to an Indigenization of the European nation in Africa. Ethnicity is seen as a shameful substitute for the nation, without territory or power, for subordinate communities.

The anthropology of ethnicity echoed Darwinism in its postulate of a world hierarchy, colonialism through the fabrication of subaltern otherness, and Orientalism glossing over the absence of a decisive step towards the modernity of industrially developed nation states. The challenge of African history is to deconstruct this triptych.

How can we identify the instances of power and define collective identities using a borrowed vocabulary? What is meant by 'kingdom'? How does it correspond to groups claiming a shared identity, spatial proximity, relationships

1 'The nation-state appears as a blip on the historical horizon, a state form that emerged recently from under imperial skies and whose hold on the world's political imagination may well prove partial or transitory' (Burbank and Cooper, 2011).

and shared material culture, the same connection to the land and a body of customs and variations sanctioned by language and culture in an area of peace, production and discussion between communities with real or imagined kinship? (Richard-Molard, 1952).

How should we gauge 'the coincidence of however heterogeneous a group achieving at least linguistic unity with a space' (Mercier, 1968, p. 421)? How should we take into account the non-coincidence between the referents of ethnicity represented by name, customs, shared ancestry and language with respect to the landscape and political order (Nicolas, 1973)?

How, over the long term, do populations work collectively with their technologies and their forms of organization in their environment (Allen, 1976)?² How is an empire established in a sparsely populated area covering the entire spectrum of ecological diversity? The complexity of these questions has focused anthropology and social history on written and oral traditions, material remains and collective imaginaries of the life of African societies. This has helped break down the barriers that political history does not reveal.

Terroir means the land of an area worked (De Certeau, 1990) by a rural village community or province, consisting of the soil and climate corresponding to that area. In French tradition (Aries and Duby, 1987, p. 57), *terroir* refers to a specific stretch of cultivated land. In a broader sense, it is the spatial expression of a rural civilization which has, sustainably, shaped the environment and the life of a population.³ It is politically consistent with the villages, districts and provinces that are places of authority in relation to a distant central government. It is a space of anthropological consistency, revealing the dynamics of sub-Saharan African societies before the opening up of the Atlantic, which remained despite wars, trade, migrations and Islamization. Thus, for centuries, grain-growing populations disrupted by nomads resettled in cradles of agriculture that seemed prepared for them (Porteres, 1962).

The *terroir* thus invented everyday life as the long duration of community trajectories, opposing an isolated and closed unity to a unity defined in relation to others with universal intelligibility. Cheikh Anta Diop (1981),⁴ Braudel

2 For this dynamic approach to space, see also Kolars and Nystuen, 1974.

3 'A delimited geographical area defined from a human community which builds along its history a set of distinctive features, knowledge, and practices based on a system of interactions between the natural environment and human factors.'

4 Cheikh Anta Diop identifies the limitations imposed by what he calls the historical and geographic conditions in the formation of the semantic field and concepts, categories in languages from one region to another. He gives the example of European languages which, from the same environment, produced the same representations, the same expressions, the same poetic images inspired by the same *terroir* (Diop, 1981, p. 234).

(1997), and Marshal Sahlins (1994)⁵ express this dynamic and pragmatic vision of human societies, before the experience of an international space.

In Africa, however, the territorial state, accompanied by imperial decrees, legal normativism and nationalist discourse, created a conceptual veil that standardized the configuration of political space. This was nevertheless quickly undermined by the long-term social dynamics around the terroirs: migration, trade, nomadism, the mobility of diasporas, Islamization, cultural mixing, border porosity and the negligence of the legitimist elites compromised by the Atlantic system. Hence the overlapping of communities in space and time, with the often-artificial character of the central authority reduced to a distant court, remembered only through (often symbolic) annual fees or a loose and sporadic messaging service. The poorly controlled peripheral space may or may not have included staging posts with an imperial presence in the form of garrisons, fortresses (Sinopoli, 1994, p. 169) or officials. But the central power remained a distant authority, lacking the necessary coercive resources and logistics (Herbst, 2000, p. 4). In Senegambia, the recurrence of titles such as Fara, Farba, Fari, Faren, Fare, Silatigi, Saltigué, Satigi, Maïssa, Massa, Damel, Dummel, Teeñ, Jarno, Maalaw, Malo, Jaagaraf, Jaraaf, Jagodin, Jawdin, Jogodo, Kamalinku, Daali, Bijjeew, Jaalaw, Jogomay, Laam, Laamido and Laaman⁶ is evidence of the local, even land-owning, nature of power.

From the sixteenth century, the issue of the coast redefined the geopolitics of western Sudan. Fragmentation and polarization became the rule. In around 1764, Doumet estimated for Cayor that 'the longest length of this coastal kingdom inland is approximately 30 leagues and its greatest width 35' (Doumet, c. 1764). This represents a fragmentation into small coastal strips overlooking the Atlantic, like a large trading post that was the only horizon of the coast's sovereigns. There was a king every twenty leagues, with two or three nations (Almada, 1964, p. 2).

In 1786, a mission sponsored by the *Compagnie du Sénégal* roaming the Cayor noted a chief in every village, with hereditary responsibilities originally granted by the sovereign: 'The master receives a ground rent from all inhabitants for his expenditure and upkeep, he is responsible for enforcing the king's orders

5 'The people's cultural assumption of external conditions that they do not create and cannot escape is the very principle of their historic action. Constructed in relation to the forces of nature – and typically also in relation to pressures of their societies' (Sahlins, 1994, p. 413).

6 There is certainly a connection between the Lamanat of the Wolofs, the Tengsoba of the Mossis and the Kunda, Kafu and Dougou of the Mandinka. From the Wolofs to the Mandinka, this taxonomy refers to the same groups that identify with power over the rural communities and their terroirs.

regarding the police, customs and justice, except for recourse to the sovereign in cases of the death sentence or slavery' (Durand, 1802). Some villages were bestowed on princes, who took the title of governor without having any more authority than the chiefs but collected royalties due to their precedence, hence the possibility of maintaining a cavalry and arming it with rifles.

There were no markers defining the political boundaries of a compartmentalized territory. On the contrary, rivers, streams, dune formations and forests were places of convergence where, for centuries, cultural mixing, economic integration and sociological fusion had been taking place, suggesting an already integrated space.

In colonial times, territory became a space built on an integrated trade network with trading posts, warehouses, maritime cargo, etc. This network offered the vision of a bridge towards the metropolitan economy. In 1932, Edmond Giscard D'Estaing highlighted how ports, roads, railways and waterways were intended to cover a measured area established as colonial territory (D'Estaing, 1932, p. 40).

The administration worked to equip it with infrastructure designed to transform traditional structures adapted to the colonial economic system by juxtaposing a local economy oriented toward the metropolis with the Indigenous country organized into *terroir*.⁷ Despite the stark reality of interference, this dual configuration inspired all colonial and postcolonial politics. In 1932, Edmond Giscard d'Estaing once again recommended:

Only to spend if these expenses are quickly profitable. The greatest service to be made to economic Africa, i.e. the one that we want to communicate with the outside world, would be to limit the few areas to be exploited; the rest of the country would continue its independent life elsewhere, develop its own cultures and trade and would climb the levels of economic progress more slowly to the extent that its purchasing power and local trading facilities would grow (D'Estaing, 1932, p. 74; Szentes, 1973, p. 9).

Leaving behind the sandy tracks to take the roads built towards the production centres and their connection via railways and loading ports, the area was evidence of the new territoriality, a privileged forum for the colonial economy.

The process of independence, beginning in 1955, opened up a default solution: adopting the national and territorial paradigm in the national construction of the state for populations still tied to the rural horizon of their *terroirs*. The only way to stimulate technical progress was through the state, its administration

7 Belin Report on Sudanese Cotton; Production, Equipment, Colonization; November 1921- 1Q/280 (77) National Archives of Senegal.

apparatus and its institutional and economic interests. However, the grafting of 'modular forms' (Anderson, 1983) of institutions and procedures never took hold, despite the 'colonistic'⁸ and all the 'white mythology' (Derrida, 1972).

The trajectory of the territorial state led to three impasses:

1. The inability to keep the promises of liberty, equality and fraternity of the 'Enlightenment philosophy' and the French Revolution within a framework of economic and financial exploitation and dependency.
2. The impossibility of grafting new structures onto pre-existing so-called traditional functions (Mamadou, 1952) (Indigenous welfare societies, cooperatives, community development, rural activities)⁹ with a socialist rhetoric and the label of 'African socialism'.
3. The impossibility of changing structures and functions with mere liberal or Marxist rhetoric without the involvement of Indigenous actors in defining the ends and organizing the means of economic and social development.

Nevertheless, since 2000, the horizon seems to be opening up through a return to reality that is unfolding, rather than through imposed discourse. Deterritorialization, integration, decentralization, and the 'border-countries' strategy¹⁰ are reinventing the African terroirs, placing them back at the centre of globalization.

8 Colonistic is a hybrid term, created at the turn of the century. It reflects the ambiguity of relations between Europe and its colonies. A mix of scientific positivism and colonial policy inspired a doctrine of institutional forms and economic options aiming to mitigate the differences and drifts of colonialism, in short to humanize the system.

9 Government of Senegal, Circular 32 of 21 May 1962.

10 The concept of 'border-country' has opened up cross-border cooperation areas for local authorities and populations in agricultural development, trade, healthcare, the environment, culture, security and peacekeeping.

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NATIONALISM/NATIONALITIES

Pierre Kipré

Introduction

The African elites of the colonial era, whether consciously or unconsciously, drew upon European ideologies to form their arguments on the 'nation' and 'nationalism'. They also fed these concepts from the ideological reservoir that was evident in the resistance to colonial conquest at the turn of the 1950s-1960s, when new African states needed to be built; these concepts were linked to the modes of construction for young states. The 'nationalities' deriving from this nation-state relationship are marked by the paradoxes of 'living together'.

Here let us recall the hypothesis of the elucidation of the role of the post-colonial state in constructing (or deconstructing) the content of these concepts. This role may differ from what the history of other continents demonstrates, even if we see in the nation a 'collective imaginary' allowing human communities to 'live together'.

Taking stock of the first decades of the post-colonial era

At the beginning of the post-colonial era, despite the effects of colonial policies and the migratory flows that disrupted population mapping and explained the progress of the Western concept of the nation-state among

some of the elite, there was no consciousness of a common identity across these young states. Therefore, whatever the institutional legacy of colonialism, many individuals, even those with the least Jacobin leanings, felt that the state had to be (or create) a 'free and sovereign nation', that is to say, a community characterized by its collective identity and complete sovereignty. This project would enable the state to break with the colonial era.

There was thus no shortage of proactive attempts to build the state at the same time as the nation, even where the colonizer had bequeathed federalism. The introduction of a universal mindset thus quickly emerged, at the same time as the idea of 'nationalities', in the 1960s-1980s. Indeed, this universal mindset institutionalized by the 'one-party' (or 'State Party') system, advocated the integration of communities to build the state and allow the nation to emerge through the bringing together of these scattered groups. All over the continent, this was based around the idea of 'development', a sufficiently vague concept to allow everyone to be brought on board through ideas of unity, modernity, progress. Exercising 'nationalism' therefore equated to promoting development through an authoritarian administration of social and identity diversity (S. Touré, K. Nkrumah, F. Houphouët-Boigny, J. Nyérére).

Barriers to this project included the chaotic conditions in which the state had to function (insecurity, coups, rebellions), along with the impoverishment of the populations, in the face of which the idea of the welfare state was found wanting. Thus, until the 1980s, the so-called 'national' integration of populations was understood as a progressive reduction of all forms of resistance (local or regional), whether expressed or not. Similarly, only the internal dimension of the concept of sovereignty as a product of the history of relations between peoples was retained – internal affirmation and a single power being exercised over the whole territory. The external dimension of this affirmation, excluding any outside interference, was rarely present. The nation that the state was supposed to promote remained, at best, a 'project', if not a 'fiction'. The only thing really being established, to a greater or lesser extent, was the institutional reference to the state's territory, to which everyone now belonged.

Nationalism was embraced by all those for whom breaking with the colonial era was not merely institutional, but aimed to bring about the emergence of a new social being who enjoyed all individual freedoms and assumed all duties towards the community. For a long time, this was a minority view. Its struggle took the form of social and political practices aimed at promoting and defending a new 'we'. It mainly took place within the territory bounded by the borders inherited from the colonial era and accepted by all states in 1963 (cf. OAU Charter),

even though evoking Pan-Africanism. This, paradoxically, helped consolidate the idea of African 'nationalities'.

In the immediate post-colonial era, 'nationalities' were thus institutional spaces, symbolized by the state, tasked with building a nation through the forced cohesion of communities within this territory.

Nationalities in crisis

The inability of this model to see the state assume its rights and duties in the socio-political and socio-economic sphere explains its structural instability. Many said that this instability was the failure of the integration of communities viewed as quasi-enclaves, thus overstating the significance of precolonial identities. In reality, from the perspective of building nationalism and nationalities, the post-colonial issues encountered were different from those of the ethnic or tribal areas of old.

The impoverishment of the populations, especially from the 1970s onwards, accentuated the competition and rivalry for access to property, land, employment and control of state power, which 'facilitated' this access. This was the pretext for the resurgence of identity claims or secession attempts, both on a local level and over portions of the national territory. These recurring events reflected the mediocrity of the state's institutions and the debatable level of its internal sovereignty. This also explains the emergence of modes of 'fabrication' and exclusion imported from abroad (Kipré, 2010). 'Foreigners', whether from another African nation or another region of the national territory, were sources of social anxiety and victims of xenophobic fever. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, caught in these traps, most African states experienced such tensions. This accentuated the crisis of the state, weakening the project for common defence and affirmation of sovereignty. Positions of dependence, structural fragility and the exclusion of citizens from the nation-building arena emptied the model of its substance very early on.

It was the crisis of the state, and not that of the ethnic group, that led to the strong emergence of a citizen-orientated and non-communitarian approach to the reconstruction of the state from the 1990s. While pursuing the dream of Pan-Africanism, the citizen-focused reconstruction of the state adopted political pluralism, making each 'national' space, and hence 'nationalities', the main focus of attention.

The challenges of this evolution, which varied from country to country, led to the assumption that each state corresponded to a specific collective identity.

Defined as an identity construction, the 'national' territory took on a material significance (natural and man-made objects), as well as a symbolic meaning (Petite, 2011). The model did not, in fact, establish any awareness of singularity, even when referring to the space instituted since independence. Although they were all going through the democratic reconstruction of public life, not all states were yet assured of having stable institutions and the promotion of citizens 'living together' had not entered into most of their practices.

Overall, the institutional concept of the state, nation or nationalities was bearing little fruit at the end of the twentieth century. As many African novelists were claiming in the 1980s and 1990s, at the cost of their freedom or their lives (Ken Saro Wiwa or the Algerian intellectuals of the 'years of lead'), Africa was 'still both a ruin and a construction site' (Cavalcanti, 2022).

The paradoxes of 'living together' today: tomorrow's surprises?

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, violence continued to disrupt the project for the emergence of the nation. Debates such as those surrounding the concept of 'Ivoirité' in Côte d'Ivoire are symptomatic of a mindset present all over the continent. They were first fuelled by issues of the state's social control, even though the overlapping of identities (Ba Konaré, 2000) was a factor in producing a collective imagination.

How was this social and political entity, the model of which represented a breaking away from old mechanisms of collective identity, to be identified? Was this not, ultimately, itself derived from the Western liberal system only appropriated by a minority? How were we to recognize and imagine being one with an entity whose social model was unfamiliar to the great majority of people? These questions formed the basis for the resilience of regional identities from another age, along with the emergence of models of religious origin, as had occurred during colonization.

Thus, since the 1990s, currents of religious fundamentalism (Muslim, Christian or animist), acting as both a spiritual escape mode and a societal project, had been attempting to fill this ideological 'void'. At the same time, however, the national struggles for liberation had made enough of a mark on certain societies to serve as a common reference and ferment of nation-building (the idea of a 'rainbow nation' in South Africa, the public discourse in Namibia or Zimbabwe), even if struggles between the old anticolonial factions had left negative traces (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola).

Two new considerations nevertheless emerged at the close of the twentieth century. The first concerned the institutional and regional integration of states, an idea that was beginning to come to the fore under the pressure of economic and security constraints. Beyond the simple idea of inter-African cooperation of the 1960s–1980s, states were experimenting with the notion of cosovereignty in certain areas (monetary union, collective security, free movement of people). The second was internal – a new perspective of the future of Africa among the youth of the continent. These young people, under the age of thirty-five, represent seventy-five per cent of the population and are now more open to the world (through the media and new information and communications technology) and thus culturally multiracial (mass schooling, intercommunity marriages, etc.). They are less affected by a hypothetical ‘ethnic culture’ without, however, having the idea of a model of national identity, even if many are attracted to the discourse of future nation-building (cf. their growing numbers in social networks on the web, civic associations and ‘democratic fever’). The violence in which they participate is not so much an ethnic violence as a symbolic ‘nationalistic’ violence.

The concepts analysed here thus seem to be already in crisis in an Africa undergoing restructuring. For example, conflicts that are interconnected blur ‘the spatial, social and political boundaries that initially distinguished them’ (Marchal, 2002). The idea of nation-state is blurred too. All these phenomena place us at the heart of the paradoxes of ongoing nation-building in Africa today.

Conclusion

The contribution of contemporary African history to the debate on nationalism and nationalities should not be ignored. It presents another logic in relation to these concepts that sees different historical realities collide, along with the challenges of building the post-colonial state. The ‘natural’ determinism induced by the idea of the nation-state is still present. However, the demographic upheavals, ongoing changes and fractures, together with the violence that accompanies them, can produce new groupings with no obvious links to those suggested by the nation-state, ‘nationality’ and ‘nationalism’. These concepts wrongly hark back to an ill-defined dimension of collective consciousness in post-colonial Africa. The presumption of homogeneity that they suggest is in fact neither natural nor acquired once and for all. The ‘collective imaginary’ and concept of the nation remains manipulable over time, or at least during its promotion. These subjective

notions (self-awareness and self-representation) imply an underestimation of the importance of territory in identity processes. They require that collective identities and mechanisms of 'co-belonging'/'co-sovereignty' be dissociated so that, in the future, citizens will be the main actors in the decline of the nation-state, source of various identity conflicts.

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Some important dates

1963: Adoption of the principle of inviolability of borders inherited from colonization by the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

1963 (1 January): Gnassingbe Eyadéma's coup d'état in Togo

1983: Creation of the *Sudanese People's Liberation Movement* by John Garang

1985 (25-30 December): War between Mali and Burkina Faso over the Agacher Strip

1989 (24 December): Beginning of Liberia's civil war

1990 (19-28 February): Conference of the Vital Forces of the Nation in Benin

1993 (24 May): Independence of Eritrea after a 32-year war against Ethiopia

1994 (26-28 April): The African National Congress (ANC) wins South Africa's first non-racial elections

1994 (especially April-June): Tutsi and moderate Hutu massacres in Rwanda

2015: General G. Diendéré's attempted coup d'état in Burkina Faso

TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND BIRTH OF THE STATE IN NIGERIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY)

Jean-Luc Martineau

Introduction

Between the start of the colonial period in 1903 with the conquest of Kano and the first real period of successful political change from 1999 to 2015, the relationship between formerly powerful rulers and Nigerian authorities played a role in the birth of the colonial and then Nigerian State. Since 1903, the extreme diversity of situations has made it impossible to consider Nigeria as a monolithic structural block. It is the failure to implement a unitary vision of the country that brought about federalism in 1944 with the Richards constitution, and even more so in 1951 and 1966. Each region requires *per se* to be considered separately from the whole entity. This overview therefore uses Yoruba as the regional example to explore the relationship between the historical holders of traditional power and holders of political power. This political power relocated to London in 1851 for the Colony of Lagos and in 1893 for the Yoruba area. Only the executors of administrative power responsible for carrying out policies determined in London stayed *in situ*. The district officer and governor general implemented the *desiderata* issued from London. For their part, the Yoruba *oba* lost their sovereignty because of this aspiration to reduce them to mere administrative cogs in the colonial machine.

From 1893 to 1999–2015, three successive phases played a part in consolidating and renewing the figure of the *oba* on the administrative-

political scene. From the conquest in the mid-1940s, the British changed the administrative map of the Western Provinces three times as the centres of power, thereby impacting royal hierarchies. They endowed the country with territorial and administrative powers that would take on a political and identity-orientated dimension. From 1945-1948 to 1966, the Yoruba *oba* invested in identity by participating in the ethnicization of politics in pan-Yoruba land. Finally in 1967-1999/2015, with the affirmation of the federal character of Nigeria, the *oba* diversified their position depending on local or regional political and identity requirements. This allowed them to perpetuate their status in the heart of the city and the federation.

1893-1945/1948, the *oba* at the heart of a win/win system

The question of Yoruba royalty has long been posed in the same terms as for African chiefdoms in general. Its 'usefulness' was gauged in the context of British 'indirect rule'. The chiefs of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française, or French West Africa) and AEF (Afrique Équatoriale Française, or French Equatorial Africa) escaped analysis, even though the 'canton chiefs' were not very different. The hatred of Sékou Touré towards them is proof of a real role in French administration. The influence of British and French university traditions in the inequality of treatment has been well documented (Dimier, 2004). Initially, the British simply wanted to improve the administration of the southwest. In the name of indirect rule, theorized a posteriori, they relied on Ibadan as the regional administrative centre (1893-1906/11). Then, from 1906/11 to 1931, the *Alaafin* of Oyo was recognized as the Head of Yorubaland, although he was only the head of the Province of Oyo and the resident settled in Oyo (Atanda, 1973). The *oba* of Abéokuta, Ijebu-Ode, Akure and Lagos were promoted at the expense of the neighbouring *oba*. By the end of the 1920s, a dose of democracy was introduced into the management of 'Indigenous' institutions. The British could no longer rely on their old, aging backers to implement this modernization. Ibadan regained its role as chief town for the colonial administration of the province. New administrative centres and new *oba* found support at conferences where they embodied, now collegially, the new guidelines (Martineau, 2004a). The connection between the citizens and the local *oba* was reinforced by the segmentation of territories, the promotion of local chiefs to the status of *oba* and an increased number of 'Native Authorities'. The very pyramidal hierarchy of the era of the

'New Oyo Empire' (1906/11-1931) was replaced by an even wider distribution of managerial responsibilities, even if the figure of Aderemi II Adesoji, *Ooni* of Ife (1930-1980), now embodied all Yoruba regional interests. This remodelling of hierarchies was not without resistance, but it was rapidly digested by the societies concerned because these new injunctions accompanied an aspiration to break with imposed affiliations that clashed with the history of pre-colonial kingdoms. However, the reinterpretation of Yoruba history was a manipulative strategy that served the new 'Native Policy'. Its longevity is mainly due to the fact that it came about on the eve of the pan-Yoruba nationalist awakening and allowed the shared objectives of Obafemi Awolowo and Aderemi II to converge in the context of the ethnicization of the Yoruba political arena that began in 1945/48.

1945/1948-1966: the *oba*, the cornerstone of a regional pan-Yoruba identity programme

The constitutional process that began in 1944 and ended in 1960 was marked by the steady decline of the British in favour of the power of the Yoruba *oba* in the new institutions – in contrast to the emirs in the North. They were subjected to the modernizing pressures of the Nationalists in the National Council of Nigeria and Camerron (NCNC) as well as in the Action Group (AG). Initially Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Yoruba nationalist party, held theoretical positions in opposition to the chiefs but these faded when he joined forces with *Ooni* Aderemi II and made the *oba* the central figure in the pan-Yoruba debate, justifying the regional path as the way forward in the march to independence. By not involving the House of Chiefs in the southwest, as it was in the North, the Richards Constitution opened the door to recrimination. The *oba* community with Aderemi II at its head, promoted since 1937 by the very high-profile Conferences of the *oba* and Yoruba chiefs, became completely marginalized. Only two *oba*, appointed by the governor, were given seats at the Legislative Council at Nigerian level! The Western House of Assembly (the chamber of deputies for the Western Provinces), the hub of the regional apparatus, also provoked criticism. It only had three members who were *oba*, the 'Big Five' no longer all having their place. The prevailing ideology of the moment, both in London and Lagos, rested on the old misconception cultivated by the Colonial Office and the university since the 1930s, according to which it was necessary to return to the equilibrium of pre-colonial institutions that were considered to be more 'democratic' by boosting the power of appointed/elected councillors to the detriment of the *oba*.

However, from that moment on, the *oba* community started to forge a key role as a reference point of regional identity without any need to talk about a 'return' (Perrot and Fauvelle-Aymar, 2008) or restoration. At the same time, its members, individually, reinforced the legitimacy of their roots in their respective communities by drawing on the emerging sense of ethno-urban belonging. The *oba* became indispensable to the Yoruba nationalist project within the federal framework being constructed *versus* the North. Opposed to the Richards constitution, Awolowo dedicated 1945 to intense editorial activity. He wrote *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (written in 1945 and published in 1947) and published numerous series of articles. This was a defining moment in the formulation of his doctrine as a future local government minister. His criticism was largely devoted to the place of the *oba* in the political system that was being developed. The absence of a House of Chiefs in the west was a major shortcoming in the new constitution. As a consequence, these articles helped to define future relations between elected officials and the *oba*. They gave everyone the opportunity to take a position on the future of Nigeria. O. Awolowo, his allies in the Nigerian Youth Movement and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa actively contributed to the ethnicization of politics. The issues were both external and internal, with the latter being more decisive: what place should the people of the southwest have in the federation? What political identity and institutions should the Yoruba have? Awolowo suggested that all chiefs running local Indigenous councils and those who participated in *oba* conferences should be brought together to continue the ceremonial and media roles of the consensual *oba* conferences. The impact of conferences on regional representation of identity had been proven. He made the *Ooni* of Ife the president of this House of Chiefs, excluding the *oba* from the House of Assembly, where debates between the fourteen representatives of the administration and the forty-four representatives of the forty-four councils of the Native Authorities would be held. The *oba* could continue to collectively embody the pan-Yoruba geopolitical space, while their individual, locally rooted notoriety and prestige remained intact.

With the establishment of the Macpherson Constitution which, this time, involved Nigerians, the status of the *oba* changed. After the November 1951 elections, pan-Yoruba ideology now had the new Western Region as its political framework. Alongside the Western House of Assembly, it was incarnated in the new Western House of Chiefs. In his papers Awolowo identified Yoruba identity with the *oba* in person and the creation of the Western House of Chiefs was its media conduit: the *oba* would speak with their unique voice that would encompass the national pan-Yoruba space and this showcase would legitimize

the region as part of an ethnicizing policy and the AG (Action Group) as its key advocate. However, a series of streamlining regional government laws that remodelled the territories and suzerainties (1952, 1955, 1957) and a new 'customary' judicial system (1957) put an end to colonial policy, marginalizing the *oba* and reinforcing the ambiguity of their status. Indeed, they coexisted with the recognition of the Western House of Chiefs in 1952, and in 1960 and 1963 with the Constitution of Nigeria. Although they had demanded it, O. Awolowo and the AG intended to keep the Western House of Chiefs in a protocol-orientated and representative role essential to the crystallization of identity while democratizing local and judicial institutions. The clash between *Alaafin* Adeyemi d'Oyo and O. Awolowo (1953-1956) was the result of this ambiguity. It consisted of a series of occasional and sometimes dramatic crises that made face-to-face debate more difficult with each passing day and also led to legislative tightening of regional political control over the *oba*.

These texts were pushed by the left wing of the AG, which was keen to accelerate democratization, but were drafted by centrists who were anxious to show consideration for the *oba*, who was indispensable to the conquest of power. In addition, O. Awolowo chose to become minister for regional government reform initiatives, one of the key functions of the regions, and presided over the transition. Numerous disputes over boundaries between communities, rival guardianship of a village, and the suzerainty of this or that *oba* increased the opportunities for conflict. They undermined the maintenance of public order and delayed the construction of a unified pan-Yoruba space that Awolowo wanted to impose. Furthermore, one of the responsibilities of local governments was to protect the past and culture of the Yoruba, which would later be reflected in posterity, including: prohibiting the removal of ancient African works of art and 'ensuring the funding of any customary role or title which, on the date of commencement of this Act, enjoys such funding or is supported by a vote of three-quarters of the members of the sectoral council'.¹ This was the first time that a legal text had been so consistent with the Yoruba cultural discourse expounded by O. Awolowo concerning the link between the protection of chiefs and African art. The task of doing an inventory of the rules of succession was given to the chieftaincy committees and this restricted the *oba* to just the issues that concerned them. Similarly, high-ranking *oba* could no longer take on at the same time the duties of justice of the peace with a seat in a local, regional

1 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Law 15/015 of 25 August 2015, defining the status of customary chiefs. *Journal Officiel, Kinshasa*, 31 August 2015.

or federal assembly. To make justice more professional, Rotimi Williams quite rightly focused on the appeal of elective functions to the *oba* elite. In matters of governance, however, real power at grassroots level remained with the chiefs because the level of influence of the *oba* stayed very high in local councils and changes in the law did not lead to a change in behaviour.

From this point on, the elected *oba* were a recognized pressure group but they no longer had political status for their community. As representatives, they symbolized the cultural values of the whole Yoruba region and their city. Awolowo also reinforced the ethno-urban roots of voters as candidates who should be 'sons of the city', but this identification with the city went through the *oba*. A key provision boosted the territorialization of the *oba* before gaining significant influence. A grid pattern of the region outlining the *oba* network as *divisions* was introduced, reinforcing a frame for the identity of populations and categorizing the *oba* under three classifications in 1959. The six divisions each had only one *oba* as the leader, except Egba division, Abeokuta and an extensive rural area. In the eyes of their people, their decline was therefore far from proven, something that Awolowo's double discourse did not deny. At the same time, the territorialization of pan-Yoruba identity was reinforced at regional level by a decree in 1959 that created a Yoruba-specific Council of Obas and Chiefs in anticipation of creating the new state that would regroup non-Yoruba zones in the Western Region.

Independence in 1960 did not change the fundamentals of the relationship between protagonists except that the *Ooni* became governor of the Western State (July 1960 to December 1962) instead of Sir John Rankin's now more honorary role. He was the last British person in the post. The job of regional *Premier* (minister) went to S. L. Akintola and 1960 to 1962 were the years when the Awoist system reached its peak of achievement: a time when the borders of the Yoruba region corresponded with the intellectual project devised in the mid-1940s, when the Action Group government succeeded in imposing hegemonic power in the West despite ethno-urban localisms that were not reducible to pan-Yorubaism, when government of the Western State completely embodied 'the desire for the Yoruba to have more weight in a federal Nigeria and to acquire more resources competing with other major ethnic groups', and when, whether directly or indirectly, influential media read, watched or listened to by the Yoruba nurtured it, and finally when a reorganized collectivity of *oba* that was self-aware and conscious of its role mingled with the idea of a Yoruba nation embodying the collective ambition of the population and its Westernized elites. This triumph of ethnicity in politics was short-lived, however, because the ethnicization of political behaviour was only superficial. The events that took

place between 1962 and 1966 demonstrated that there was still no Yoruba ethnic group at that time. Certainly, the Yoruba felt like a nation, but this feeling did not hinder intra-Yoruba rivalry. They felt they were members of a pan-Yoruba nation because it embraced diversity and for that reason alone. The *oba* had come out of their palaces but their promotion did as much to build collegial *obaship* for external use – regional and federal – as it did to nurture a feeling of ethno-urban belonging locally. The Yoruba nation identified itself within a corpus of founding myths that were both ‘national’ and local.

During this period the Western House of Chiefs retained its power. The importance of this chamber in the symbolic and identity system is attested to by the measures derogating from common law in electoral matters: *oba* close to the AG could sit without having to participate in the electoral process and then function on the basis of consensus, which was hardly democratic (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1992). In the 1960 constitution, the provisions of which were renewed in 1963, Awolowo got what he wanted for the *oba*. At federal level some *oba* sat in the Senate with the twelve members appointed to represent the West; we can add the *oba* from Lagos, an *ex officio* member and leader selected by the War Chiefs and the White Cap Chiefs for the federal territory of Lagos. The real function of the Senate was limited, as was the role of the Western House of Chiefs but it was a showcase for Yoruba specificity on a federal level even if this was not where consolidation of Yoruba *obaship* took place. Awolowo chose to focus on the regional scene. The constitution of the West left the regional executive to define by law the appointment of chiefs to the Western House of Chiefs. Two categories of members were defined. First, there were ninety-six members elected by ‘minor chiefs’ from districts in the divisions and twenty *oba* appointed by the Governor-in-Council because they had ‘undisputed power over the community’, a way of keeping seats for AG-favourable *oba*, some of whom were challenged by their chiefs. For Awolowo, it was not acceptable for an *oba* who had a place in the ‘traditional’ Yoruba edifice under development to be weakened by a vote. These provisions meant, incidentally, that the word of the *oba* did not always carry the weight it should have. When the *oba* and the community shared the same view, it was sometimes because he was in tune with his people. The ‘democratic’ legitimacy of some of the chiefs in the chamber was therefore questionable, but even more so was their independence from their benefactor Awolowo. However, this cannot be described as ‘manipulation’ because it was clearly a case of mutual benefit.

As for the role of the *oba* in the adoption of the law, this was also marked by ambiguity. The House of Chiefs shared the job of bringing laws into being with

the Chamber of Deputies. Bills had to be adopted by both chambers in the same terms except regarding finance law, but the House of Chiefs had reduced room for manoeuvre. These provisions therefore gave the chiefs real status in the legislative process but, as at local government level, the chiefs really exercised, essentially on their own, an advisory and supportive role. Negotiations took place behind the scenes and differences were hushed up in public. To conclude that it was a 'rump' house would be to ignore the importance of discreet parliamentary and extra-parliamentary exchanges. Ironically the *oba* then gained an advantage by avoiding local conflicts in which they had previously been both arbiters and actors.

Successive crises starting in 1962 and culminating in the double coup in 1966 jeopardized the most exposed AG *oba* without calling into question the pattern of their participation in the life of the Western State. S.L. Akintola's launch of the United People's Party and the Nigerian National Democratic Party during the crisis of 1962 put an end to the compatibility between territory, the party and pan-Yoruba ideology, but ethno-urban identities were remobilized. In the Western State, opponents of the Awolowo line did not recognize each other in N. Azikiwe's NCNC. On the other hand, they found a place in the UPP and then in the NNDP-NPC alliance to reformulate the sense of belonging to a pluralistic, albeit Yoruba, space. By creating the Egbe Omo Olofin organization based on the model of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, S. L. Akintola even tried to rally the *oba* to prove that one could ally with the NPC and claim Yoruba identity at the same time without following O. Awolowo. As ideological fiction, pan-Yoruba *ethnicity* was not a reality experienced by all populations, preventing the Action Group from becoming an undisputed and long-lasting political force. It remained an objective to be achieved. The failure of the 1959 federal elections and the crisis of 1962-1963, with the ideological and strategic secession of S. L. Akintola, proved this fact. When militants and the AG *oba* got control of regional power, the ideological diversity that was hidden under an ethnicizing militancy cracked. The ideological debate revealed, in a very classic manner, a liberal right embodied by S. L. Akintola. As suggested by D. Laitin (1986), following A. Gramsci and, more generally, F. G. Bailey and A. Appadurai, Yoruba cultural subsystems cannot be reduced to a uniform identity that merges ethno-urban identities into a whole to constitute the nation. The whole would necessarily remain pan-Yoruba.

1966–2015, between the military and civilians, the *oba* at the origin of a unifying localism at various levels

This period was marked by the military's seizing power, excepting the four years under the Second Republic and the fifteen years of the Third Republic following General Sani Abacha's death. However, it would be misleading to compare military regimes, during which the *Obas* were courted by generals seeking legitimacy, with civilian regimes, during which they were despised or reduced to puppets. Indeed, the many transition periods from military to civilian regimes (1977/1979–1983, 1988–1993, August 1998 to May 1999) with their dramatic reversals complicate the picture somewhat. Leaders subsequently had the opportunity to play their own role and serve the interests of their communities when political parties were muzzled or banned. Just like the academics who served military regimes by accepting jobs as 'commissioners' in the states, they claimed they were 'serving [their] people'. Thus, Yoruba political innovation that linked the *oba* to other political players is woven from a foundation of ambiguity, setbacks, random individual strategies, and successes.

The southwest is often cited to illustrate the Yoruba resistance to the founding discourses of federal identity, but it is worth returning to another aspect of resistance to encompassing identity constructions. Benedict Anderson sheds light on the rejection of federalism as well as the more recent setbacks endured by the pan-Yoruba dream. The nation as 'an imagined community' is based on the valorization of symbols – the *oba* in this instance – that contribute to its creation. However, on the scale of the entire southwest, it is impossible to find a consensus among the imagined community around these symbols. As a result, it is more difficult to identify as Yoruba within the federal framework. Over time, the use of ethnicity as a political lever throughout the Yoruba region has lost its relevance. The aspirations of subgroups to see a rise in the number of federated states since 1976 became a trap that closed on the pan-Yoruba dream. The *oba* found themselves trapped within the narrow confines of their states and moved away from the collegiality inherited from the 1930s to the 1960s. Thus, 'statism', a form of regionalism identified with the federated state, has become one of the recent forms of challenge to pan-Yorubaism. Indeed, communities need to justify their specificity to be heard by the centre. There is therefore an ethnicization of their specificities – always behind a flag-bearing *oba* – that goes against the project of building a pan-Yoruba identity. As a result, federalism in Nigeria is allied with localism. Nigerian identity is constructed by giving new legitimacy to subregional feelings of belonging and not by neutralizing them.

From 1966 on, some of the *oba*, who were pawns and actors in the civilian and military regimes, were able to retain a pivotal position in regional and federal political life and real prestige among the population, even though the very relevance of their legal status was disputed. They went through changes of regime without being swept away despite the compromises made. During the period 1962 to 1966, the misadventures of the *Ooni* of Ife illustrated his importance in the Yoruba political and identity system regardless of who was in power. The need to retain him was imposed on the very people who advocated breaking with his previous commitment. At the end of the crisis that shook the AG in 1962, Aderemi was removed from his post as governor in favour of a provisional administrator called Moses A. Majekodunni, but he soon regained his political role in reconciliation initiatives instigated by General Gowon after July 1966. However, except for some prominent figures like the *Ooni*, the *oba*, community leaders, kept their status as focal points of identity for their communities and limited their participation in civil life to the local or state level. With rare exceptions, the pan-Yoruba sphere is no longer their priority.

The fact that they were explicitly excluded from local government in 1976 and from land management by the Land Use Decree of 1978 was largely offset by the influence they retained over political and military leaders, as well as their subjects and citizens. The *oba* remain key players in lobbying for the creation of new territories and are instrumental in promoting the identity of their administrative areas through traditional culture (the Ile-Ife Museum, the Osun-Osogbo Festival and the Eyo Festival in Lagos). We may well have observed the 'return of kings' (Perrot and Fauvelle-Aymar, 2003) in French-speaking West Africa, but this is not the case for Nigeria nor for the English-speaking part of Cameroon (Warnier, 2009) subjected to the same colonial policy. In Nigeria, it is the federal character of the regime that allows them to sustain their participation in political activity and create political modernity by continuing to play the Yoruba identity card on various levels. Independence, in this respect, did not constitute a break with the Yoruba royal institution, as was the case in other areas. The *oba*, who came from ancient lineages and were strengthened by their colonial executive functions and then by their ethno-symbolic functions under the AG administration, were only briefly accused of serving the colonizers or corrupt politicians. Despite an apparently unfavourable legal framework they consolidated their prestige and a role that the press and internet media have confirmed. Their personal enrichment and the election of increasingly educated *oba* contributed, in the context of 'endless democratic transition' (Diamond, Kirk-Greene and Oyediran, 1997) and then under the

Third Republic, to the strengthening of their role in the public sphere. The creation of new Local Government Areas (LGAs) and new federal states is one of the keys to understanding this adaptation.

Admittedly, in legal terms, the dismantling of the status of administrative cogs and then of elected council members continues under both military and civilian rule (Vaughan, 1988), but the letter of the text is often contradicted by the accompanying tribute speeches or the concessions and gifts made to them. Following local government reforms in 1976 the *oba* lost all power in the new local government councils and this led Joseph Egwurube (1988) to conclude (probably too quickly) that 'traditional chiefs have been removed from the decision-making hub for local government operations and turned into observers of local government'. The Land Use Decree of 1978 certainly seals the legal exclusion of the *oba* from the management of land in urban areas, but it would rarely be possible for an elected council or military administrator to dispose of a parcel of land without the consent of an *oba*. Similarly, in a break with the 1963 constitution, the 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions, drafted by the military, tend to drastically reduce the power of the *oba* by depriving them of their last vestiges of legislative, judicial or executive power. Their retention within the constitutional framework seems incompatible with the essence of democracy. However, the 1979 text creates a Council of State at the federal level, composed of almost half of members appointed by the Councils of Chiefs of each federal state.

The years following the coup in 1983 were supposed to be a honeymoon period between the military and the *oba*, a time when the military were looking for the popular legitimacy they lacked by mobilizing that of the *oba* for their own benefit. At federal level, this led to the creation in July 1984 of the National Committee on the Review of Local Government chaired by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, *Baraden Sokoto* and future sultan (1988) before being ousted (1996) by Sani Abacha. In contrast to the Recommendations for Local Government (1976), the Dasuki commission encouraged the integration of chiefs in new local government structures with real power (Vaughan, 1988). In return, key *oba* undertook to cooperate with the military at federal and local level by regularly meeting up with military administrators of their states. This did not prevent some tension such as in 1984 when the Emir of Kano, Alh. Ado Bayero, and the *Ooni* of Ife used the occasion of a private trip to meet key Israeli government officials to discuss agricultural assistance, to the great embarrassment of the government in Lagos. The work of the Dasuki commission remained incomplete but its president, who became the Sultan of Sokoto in 1986, remained influential

in constitutional debate leading to the declaration in 1989. Meanwhile the Political Bureau launched in 1986 by Ibrahim Babangida received several dozen contributions in favour of recognizing executive power for traditional chiefs in institutions, but they did not convince either the Bureau or I. B. Babangida. In the southwest some *oba* and politicians successfully launched a pan-Yoruba cultural association in 1988, aimed at returning to democracy, thus reclaiming the ethno-regional arena. The head of this Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba or Yoruba Progressive Movement, the *Ooni* of Ife, affirmed that 'at the level of the Yoruba *oba*, the unity of all the Yoruba will be our main objective.' The Awoist dimension of this new intrusion into the cultural identity sphere led to his boycott by the *Alaafin* of Oyo and Yoruba fringes of the old NPN. This reaction reflects the proven politicization of the royal institution in keeping with not only the Egbe Omo Oduduwa but also the Conference of Yoruba leaders in 1937.

The practice of influential power by the *oba*

To protect Nigerian unity, a federal solution was imposed, which sparked a process of dividing the Yoruba space into an increasing number of federal states beginning in 1976, when four states were created by the military government. The creation of new states after the initial founding wave in 1967 is a good illustration of the symbolic, identity-oriented and political inscription of Yoruba rulers and their participation in the life of the federation. They are still at the forefront of the lobbying that would lead to the creation of states. On 3 February 1976, Murtala Mohammed's military regime created the Yoruba states of Ondo, Ogun and Oyo. The creation of these states, sometimes to put an end to violent conflict between supporters of rival *oba*, simultaneously reduced the geographical area over which each one exercised their authority and reinforced the symbolic link between the *oba* and the new territory. In these new territorial jurisdictions, the *oba* identified essential activities to diversify to meet political and identity needs, whether local or regional, thus perpetuating their importance in the city of their ancestors.

Ekiti State was born of disappointment, that Ondo State had not fulfilled its potential to develop and promote the Ekiti space and its inhabitants. The mobilization of the Ondo Provincial Movement was followed in April 1978 by an Ekiti movement that expressed the frustration of the Ekiti majority in the state (52.3 per cent). They demanded the transformation of the sixteen Ekiti LGAs into one state. The *oba* put forward an argument of discrimination based

on their number as well as a historical argument: to give a unified ethno-political framework to the sixteen ancient Ekiti kingdoms that had allied themselves in the nineteenth century to the Ekiti Parapo. The Ekiti Parapo section of Ibadan took up the torch from May 1991. Chief Oladeji Fasuan, Chairman of the Committee for the Creation of Ekiti State, organized weekly meetings of the Wednesday Group to bring together delegates from the sixteen Ekiti LGC to find a solution to the divisions. For his part, the *Ewi* of Ado-Ekiti at the head of Ekiti Oba's Council managed to get all the *oba* who had been competing to get the capital to reach an agreement. The movement was organized by combining two structures. Meetings were held in the palace of Ado-Ekiti, together with the fundraising committee (3 million Nairas in three years). The *Ewi* of Ado-Ekiti chaired delegations at Akure, Lagos and Abuja with five *oba*. According to its members, the group recycled networks and methods that had been mobilized for Ondo State. Only the unity of the applicants could ensure success. Received by Abacha at his home in Lagos, they gave him a memorandum in 1993 and in the wake of this, the dictator appointed the Mbanfo Panel. Intense lobbying by the *oba* and the intervention of Ekiti-friendly supporters in Abacha's entourage won the day. Decisions regarding obaship are always difficult to interpret, especially when they send contradictory signals. Thus, the folklorization of the *oba* and Ekiti culture was confirmed in 2007 when the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs of Ekiti became the Ministry of Local Government and Culture with a special 'department' dealing with the *oba*. However, at the same time, Ekiti State also had a more political – albeit unconstitutional – council, in the form of an Ekiti State Council of Traditional Rulers chaired by the *Ewi* of Ado-Ekiti. Informal at the start, it received federal approval thanks to a bill proposed by former military administrator A. Adebayo. Finally, a Local Government Traditional *Council* was established around eleven *oba*.

The *oba*, metonymic figures of their cities, also fought other battles that went beyond the ethno-urban characteristics they had embodied since the 1950s. Based on the model of regional or even national investment in an *Ooni* of Ife (Vaughan, *Politique Africaine*, 1988), some used their status to create new identity constructions that would promote the federal state to which they belonged. Objectives varied but there are two examples from 1999 to 2015.

The first was the *Ataoja* of Oshogbo, Iyiola Oyewale Matanmi III (1976–2010). He made a major contribution to the creation of the state of Osun and the capital for his city on 27 August 1991, following a long lobbying process validated by General I.B. Babangida. He then worked on the folklorization and internationalization of the Osun-Osogbo Festival before getting his sacred grove

labelled a UNESCO World Heritage site during the 29th session of the World Heritage Committee in Durban in 2005. Over twenty people accompanied him to hear the results, including the Governor of Osun State and the Minister of Tourism: it was the biggest delegation ever seen at a World Heritage Committee meeting. In Osogbo, therefore, the *oba* had invested himself in the field of identity alongside politicians, promoting an ethno-urban identity for regional purposes – to promote his city within the boundaries of Osun State in relation to Ile-Ife – while using this local fact to give it an international dimension. It was truly the return to democracy in 1991 and then in 1999 that allowed the *oba* Matanmi to fully play his role as leader alongside the newly-elected governors, Isiaka Adetunji Adeleke (1992-1993, SDP) and then Adebisi Akande (1999-2003, AD). Initially, the Osun-Osogbo festival was a celebration of the goddess Osun, the river goddess of fertility. The festival goes on for ten days and only has meaning for the residents of the old city centre of Osogbo. They celebrate the agreement between the founder and first ruler, Gbadewolu Laroye, and the goddess on the choice of location for the city. It is an opportunity for the ruler to recall the source of the legitimacy of his power over the site and its inhabitants. In 2004, the year the Governor first funded the broadcasting of the festival on a national TV channel (NTA) for a whole morning, he submitted the application for ‘The cultural landscape of Osun-Osogbo’ to the UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Everyone had understood how to use the site’s international recognition (Probst, 2004) in terms of heritage and cultural legacy to benefit a regional political identity project. A second example of the new civic role taken on by rulers occurred in 2002 when one of the policies carried out by the appointed governors of the state of Lagos, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu and then Raji Fashola (Action Congress, AC then Action Congress of Nigeria, ACN), combined a strengthening of the local territorial framework with a dual instrumentalization of tradition. To improve the administrative and political management of the neighbourhoods in the megalopolis, A.B.A. Tinubu created thirty-seven new Local Government Areas thereby increasing their number to fifty-seven. This decision provoked a confrontation with Abuja who did not recognize this right in federated states and made that clear by blocking the payment of the Local Government Statutory Allocation for two years (173 million Euros in 2003 and 2004). Tensions rose so high that the *Oba* of Lagos, Rilwan Babatunde Osoalale Aremu Akiolu, even accused President O. Obasanjo (Peoples Democratic Party, PDP) of wanting him and A. Tinubu (Alliance for Democracy, AD) dead. The Federal Supreme Court did not really settle the dispute in 2004 but partially validated the legislative conditions for the areas’ creation by the state parliament and declared that suspension of payment to the twenty original entities was illegal. In a

spirit of appeasement, Tinubu renamed the LGAs Local Community Development Areas to facilitate the first round of elections for the fifty-seven LGA and LCDA councils to take place on 11 October 2008. These elections were contested by Yar'Adua who rekindled the conflict in July 2009, just as the second ballot on 22 October 2011 caused a stir in Abuja. The political nature and identity-orientated character of the clash was clear in Fashola's statement in July 2009:

The state had acted in consonance with the law and if the Federal Government is bent on changing the democratic values, the people of Lagos and their government will be ready to challenge it. The people of Lagos have requested for more local development councils and that is what the state government has done (Fashola, 2009).

In response to Abuja's ultimatum – fourteen days to go back to twenty LGAs – there was an echo of the claim from the southwest region in 1953 to govern itself at its own pace without being hampered by the external shackles of a federal machine. Here the hostility of the conservative northerners in 1953 has been replaced by a PDP that was furious it had not conquered Lagos. It was this demand that was articulated via the instrumentalization of the structures of *obaship* and the folklorization of specific traditions. The arrival on the throne of *Oba* Rilwan Babatunde Osulale Aremu Akiolu in May 2003 preceded the reorganization of the chieftaincy with the recreation of a fifty-member State Council of Obas and Chiefs in January 2013. A ten-year process initiated by A. Tinubu, it marked the culmination of *oba* appointments in almost every LGA/LCDA. This Eko-Yoruba merger in the megalopolis mirrored what the Yoruba experienced in their respective city-states and at Lagos State level what had been done around the *Ooni* of Ife. The objective was to root the very heterogeneous population of Lagos in an Eko-Yoruba neo-community (Barnes, 1986). The movers and shakers who were promoted in these roles were known for their wealth in real estate, business or in the senior civil service and their close relationship with the ACN, which they funded, rather than for the commitment to tradition, *a fortiori* when these new seats of power were popping up in new urbanized areas where *obaship* was unknown. This pan-Lagosian *statism* led to a waning of the influence of the White Cap Chiefs, who were the historical figures of authority in the ancient centre of Lagos Island surrounding the royal palace of Iga Idunganran. Now, however, governors throughout the state needed intermediaries: the *Oba* of Lagos and these fifty new *oba* played this role with their electoral base.

To give a signal to Abuja that the 'Yoruba people' were behind the ACN in this war of attrition against LCDA, Governor Fashola and the *Oba* also raised collective awareness of this Eko-Yoruba neo-identity and made it visible to the outside

by promoting the Eyo Festival. Although this was a festival that was important mainly to the people of Lagos Island, they tried to give it nationwide significance. A challenge in an area in the federation that had a historical attachment to its cosmopolitanism! Originally, this festival took place to purify the city after the death of an *Oba* and to usher in a new reign. Already adapted in the past to pay tribute to the deceased benefactors of Lagos, it took place in the old ancient city centre. In order to make it a symbol for Lagosian identity, in April 2009 and November 2011 the procession left Lagos Island and its palace for the vast Tafawa Balawa Square, a venue designed for military parades. The *Eyo* mobilized all the buses in the city free of charge so that the population could celebrate the triumphs of Fashola and his motto *Eko o'ni baje* or 'Lagos will not sink'. The white figure of the *Eyo* with his baton and hat quickly made its mark in the urban setting and even replaced the statues of the White Cap Chiefs. While T.O.S. Benson, the man of the day in 2009, had defended the cosmopolitanism of Lagos all his life against the ethnicization of politics in Yorubaland, his descendants rallied to the ethnicization of politics to oppose Abuja. In 2011, it was the rapprochement of a family with a wealth of well-located land in the metropolitan area that was rewarded by the Eyo for the Olori Oloye of Lagos, Chief Yesufu Abiodun Oniru, the father of the *Oba* of Iruland, with a modern residence in the Lagos area.

Conclusion

The omnipresence of the *oba* throughout the twentieth century is partly due to their talent for intelligently managing change during their time. The increase in number of colonial administrative territories and their institutions created a plurality of neo-identitarian ethno-urban referents, which led to the construction of a modern, regional pan-Yoruba space. The triptych that comprised the city of the ancestors, the *oba* and the Native Administration and Local Government Area then became the paradigm that operated in all intra-regional fissiparity processes. Yoruba nationalists inherited a territorial framework in which the folklorization of local cultural elements with metonymic vocation and the ethnicization of politics based on the figure of the *oba*-city or, on a larger scale, on the new federated state with its regional *oba*, flourished. As a result, the kings of the Yoruba space, as elsewhere in Nigeria and Africa, including in places where they were 'rediscovered', remained key players in the management of local or regional politics throughout the twentieth century, regardless of whether political or military leaders conceded executive powers to them.

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THE FORMATION OF THE STATE AND THE CONFLICTING GENESIS OF A NATION

The Example of Kenya
Hélène Charton

Introduction

This brief presentation of Kenya's long history aims to show how access to resources, particularly land, shapes power relations. The resulting dynamics of inclusion and exclusion determine a specific relationship to space, territory and ethnicity that is easily mobilized by political tribalism. By revealing the complex links between the state, land resources, ethnic groups and territories, Kenya's long history illuminates the broader context of the genesis and formation of the state in Africa and the still fragile process of nation building and affirmation.

In Kenya, politics appears to be a family affair, a heritage inherited and passed down from father to son. Uhuru Kenyatta, the president until 2022, is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, the First President of Kenya and Father of the Nation. The elections in 2012 pitted him against Raila Odinga, the son of Odinga Oginga, vice-president of the first republic of Kenya and a historic opponent of the Kenyatta regime, which he denounced from 1966 onwards as excessively conservative and neocolonial. This political struggle was continued by his son Raila, first against Daniel Arap Moi, whom he opposed in the multiparty elections of 1992 and 1997, then within the coalition for change, from 2003 onwards, promoting constitutional reform. The post-election violence that erupted after outgoing President Mwai Kibaki's disputed victory over Raila

Odinga, claiming more than a thousand victims between December 2007 and March 2008 (ICG, 2008), revealed the enduring nature of the prevailing political practices and, in particular, the devastating effects of political tribalism elevated to a technique of government. Some authors have regarded this tragic episode as the expression of a crisis of citizenship, even of the nation (Lonsdale, 2008), the contours and borders of which continue to be the subject of divergent and conflicting interpretations and predictions by Kenya's various population groups. The roots of these tensions lie in the slow historical process of the formation of the state that dates back to the early twentieth century. The state of conquest, imposed by force outside of any social contract, has been perpetuated through the patrimonial management of state resources by a small group. The recurring violence that has punctuated Kenya's history (Maupeu, 2008) – from the first political mobilizations in the 1920s, through the Mau Mau period (1952–1960), to the 2008 crisis – is an expression of the conflicting struggles between classes, races, ethnicities, the nation and nationalism, which are central to the functioning of the state in Kenya and which John Lonsdale conceptualized through his notion of moral ethnicity (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). Differentiated access to the state's material, land and political resources structures power relations according to dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that determine a specific relationship to territory and ethnicity easily mobilized by political tribalism.

Land, resources and identities

The transfer in 1902 of the highlands on either side of the Rift Valley to white farmers profoundly changed production methods, social organization and power relations in Kenya, which became a Crown colony in 1920. The creation of twenty-four tribal reserves in 1922 contributed to casting ethnic identities in stone by administratively associating populations with territories. The central province's reserves rapidly became saturated, with the surplus population fuelling the migration of cheap labour to burgeoning cities like Nairobi, as well as nearby European farms. The geography resulting from European colonization led to marked disparities between the peripheries and the nerve centre of the colony, where unprofitable European agriculture supported by colonial legislation and geared towards export crops (coffee, pyrethrum tea, sisal), coexisted with the polyculture practiced on the reserves. This duality of production structures was reflected in social and political organization that pitted squatters and migrants

impoverished by the crisis of European monoculture against a small number of relatively prosperous African farmers. The latter, who constituted a proto-bourgeoisie educated in missionary schools, integrated into the machinery of colonial administration and equipped with land resources, founded the Kikuyu Association (KA) in 1919. Their moderate, predominantly land-focused claims (land tenure recognition) contrasted with the more radical demands of Harry Thuku's Young Kikuyu Association (YKA) that held mass meetings to denounce the humiliations of the colonial regime. Thuku was arrested on 14 March 1922; the police and colonists shot at the crowd gathered in front of the prison to demand his release, killing at least twenty-one people. The aggravation of the squatter crisis and maintaining of the status quo with regard to the position of the alienated lands and reserves endorsed by the Kenya Land Commission of 1934 fuelled the frustration and disillusionment of underprivileged members of society deprived of land, resources and protection, now united within the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA).

These land, social and political divisions were at the heart of the crisis that shook the central province from 1945 onwards, culminating in the imposition of a state of emergency on 20 October 1952 and the arrest of 150 political and trade union leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta. Far from being eradicated, Mau Mau violence intensified as the repression lost its grip on the central province. Between April 1953 and December 1956, the Special Courts of Justice conducted 1,211 trials, resulting in 2,609 death sentences. Their archives have enabled historian David Anderson to highlight the complex and multifaceted nature of this violence, the roots of which lay in the long history of communities, as highlighted by the Lari massacre of March 1953. The assassination of chief Luka and 74 members of his family by an armed Mau Mau group, and the punitive expedition in which 200 people perished, can be traced back to the history of a clan and the betrayal of its leader who, through accepting the administration's offer to relocate part of the Tigoni group to Lari, failed in his moral responsibilities (Anderson, 2005). These local issues shed light on the various dynamics at play in a civil war that pitched members of the same community against each other. The systematic colonial repression of the entire Kikuyu population (internment camps, villagization) that continued beyond the end of military operations (1956), along with measures that were, at turns, legal (the protection of witnesses in trials), economic (allocation of lands confiscated from the Mau Mau and positions reserved in the provincial administration) and finally political (loyalty certificates), accentuated and perpetuated these divisions by contributing to the legal workings of the loyalists. When the state

of emergency was lifted in 1959, after the scandal of the Hola Camp massacre, the loyalists were the main beneficiaries of the political and constitutional reforms initiated from 1957 onwards, from which Mau Mau sympathisers were systematically excluded (Branch, 2009).

Released on 14 August 1961, under pressure from African delegates who had refused to start Lancaster House negotiations for Kenya's independence for as long as he was imprisoned, Kenyatta became the symbol of the struggle against colonial oppression and was appointed Prime Minister on 1 June 1963. However, while former prisoners found their lands occupied by the loyalists, Kenya's new government chose not to re-examine the subject of transfers of white land to small African landowners. The official policy of 'forgive and forget', which closed the door to Mau Mau claims, would constitute a major political fracture line in independent Kenya.

The quest for the nation

Many works analysing the Mau Mau have stressed the limits of a nationalist reading of the movement, emphasizing the complexity and diversity of those involved (Buijtenthuijs, 1973; Kanogo, 1987; Furedi, 1989; Presley, 1992; Kershaw, 1997). Nevertheless, the event remains a major anchoring point in the national narrative fostering the construction of modern Kenya and the definition of the nation's contours (Clough, 1998; Lonsdale and Atieno Odhiambo, 2003). By shifting the analysis to the victims and the ordinary, anonymous individuals caught up in the violence, the recent works devoted to this period have contributed to the pluralization of the historical and memorial discourse of the Mau Mau (Elkins, 2005; Pommerolle, 2006; Charton, 2011).

Less than a year after the country's independence, the anniversary of the state of emergency was celebrated as Kenyatta Day. Through this metonymic process, the new President and Father of the Nation became the sole repository of the memory of the anti-colonial struggle and the suffering endured for the liberation of Kenya. This founding myth of the nation, which overlooked both the Mau Mau fighters with their claims to land and the other members of society who had led the nationalist struggle on a political and constitutional level, was used to legitimize a political regime based on exclusion, maintaining the confusion between nationalism and ethnonationalism. As in many other African countries, the early years of independence were marked by the authoritarian nature of the ruling power. Opponents, considered enemies of the

nation, were eliminated: assassinations of Pio Gama Pinto in 1965, Tom Mboya in 1969 and J. M. Kariuki in 1975; imprisonment and exile of intellectuals such as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o. In addition, the neopatrimonial management of power was characterized by the control of key posts by a handful of Kikuyus who were close to the Kenyatta clan (Martin, 1978), heirs of the loyalist order and the main beneficiaries of the land transfers that continued in the post-independence years (Médard, 1990). Paradoxically, whenever it felt threatened or undermined, the regime drew upon the official narrative of the nation to reassert its legitimacy and silence the competing memories: official memorization policy of the Mau Mau, publication of Kenyatta's memoirs *Suffering Without Bitterness, the Founding of the Kenya Nation* (1968) and the organization of unity oath campaigns, reminiscent of those of the Mau Mau themselves, to reaffirm loyalty to the Kikuyu power. The political imagination of the Kenyatta regime, based on a restrictive concept of citizenship and national borders, was perpetuated by Daniel Arap Moi, who succeeded him at the helm of the country in 1978. However, the wave of democratic challenges in the 1990s, which brought down the single-party regimes, took with it the founding myths of the old regimes, opening up both political and memorial spaces.

The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), whose candidate Mwai Kibaki won the December 2002 elections against the Kenya African National Union (KANU) candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, coming to power in 1963, had built its campaign on the promise of re-founding the nation. This memorial rhetoric incorporated a number of symbolic measures adopted by the new government. Mau Mau veterans' associations were authorized once more, with some of them successfully taking legal action against the abuses committed by the British government during the state of emergency (Charton, 2013). Kenyatta Day, renamed 'Majushaa Day' (Heroes' Day), would henceforth celebrate the reconciliation and unity of the nation, no longer embodied by one man, but by all heroes and heroines. The consecration of new places of memory such as Heroes' Acre in Uhuru Gardens, along with the erection of a statue in the centre of Nairobi in memory of Dedan Kimathi, a forgotten hero of the Mau Mau war executed in February 1957, began tracing the lines of a new geography of the nation.

Beyond the words and the invention of a new syntax for the nation, political practices have remained unchanged. The implosion of the winning coalition around the constitutional reform project resulted in the marginalization and then eviction in 2005 of the non-Kikuyu members of the NARC government. The large-scale embezzlement operation (Anglo-leasing scandal) organized by the prevailing power to finance the 2007 election campaign in favour of a small

circle close to the president ('the Mount Kenya Mafia'), showed how moral ethnicity at the service of 'politics of the belly' continued at the heart of the new government's politico-financial management, despite Kibaki's energetic speeches on good governance and national unity (Wrong, 2009). Ethnic rivalries were once again drawn upon for political purposes during the violent crisis following the disputed victory of Mwai Kibaki over his former ally Raila Odinga, tragically underlining the permanence of power practices rooted in the country's long history. The ensuing structures derive from the invisible categories of an ethno-nationalism partly inherited from colonization and institutionalized by the regimes that have succeeded each other since independence.

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SPACE, INSULARITY AND BORDERS

The Case of Madagascar
Tovonirina Daniela Rakotondrabe

Unlike the states of sub-Saharan Africa – often confronted with the thorny issue of demarcation or the questioning of borders inherited from colonialization – Madagascar's insularity is linked to its 'natural' geographical borders, the Indian Ocean to the east and the Mozambique Channel to the west. The geopolitical position of the Great Island in the southwestern Indian Ocean (Raison, 1985) and at the crossroads of Africa and Asia, together with its history, give a particular polysemy to the concept of border. Like the Mascarene Islands (Réunion and Mauritius), but unlike the Comoro Islands, Madagascar has always had distant and complex relations with the African continent (Nativel and Rajaonah, 2007, pp. 9-25): sporadic contact with the continent's eastern and southern coast even before the sixteenth century, but no relationship with the hinterland, which is still, in the collective consciousness, a *terra incognita*.

Madagascar is characterized by a double insularity, external and internal. Compared with the outside world, the Great Island has always maintained its island identity and its singularity. 'Madagascar is not Africa' as the saying goes, both in Madagascar and the Malagasy diaspora. While the reality of African influences and imprints, admittedly often diffuse, is ancient and difficult to refute, the collective memory has retained two key facts that crystallize Malagasy views on Africa. First, the island's inclusion in the Eastern slave trade in the southwestern Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century, which marked the

introduction of Makoa slaves originally from Mozambique and more generally the eastern African coast. Long-stigmatized victims of social exclusion, their servile status marginalized them somewhat from Malagasy society (Boyer-Rossol, 2015). Second, the involvement of the 'Senegalese' riflemen, in fact originally from French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, first in the colonial expeditionary force during the French conquest in 1896-1897 (Amadou Bâ, 2007), then during the 1947 uprising, where their role was closely associated with the trauma of military repression in the countryside and, more generally, their image as auxiliaries of the colonial power. These negative representations surrounding the figures of Makoa and the Senegalese amplified the feeling of repressed African identity and discourse on the uniqueness of the island.

There is no word in Malagasy to express the concept of insularity. Are the Malagasy really aware of their insularity? Is it part of a collective unconscious or a deliberate assimilation to their specific identity? Seemingly, this insularity could be more Indian Ocean than African. Since the 1990s, attempts to assert an insular identity have emerged through Madagascar's formal adherence to the idea of 'Indian Ocean Islands', encouraged by France and the European Union in a bid to boost regional integration. Today, however, a quarter of a century on, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), which brings together the main islands of the southwestern Indian Ocean,¹ can barely function, due in part to the great geographical and historical diversity of the Member States and the lack of synergy and convergence between the economies of the islands it comprises. The IOC has failed to become the driver for regional integration; Madagascar's membership in an Indian Ocean cultural area still seems to be a myth. Politically and diplomatically, its IOC membership has not generated improved regional visibility and has been ineffective in resolving recent political crises (2001-2002 and 2009-2013). The only tangible results have been seen in tourism cooperation² and, to a lesser extent, in sports, although the organization of the Indian Ocean Island Games is periodically threatened by historical disputes inherited from colonialization: between France and the Comoro Islands on the subject of Mayotte or between Madagascar and Réunion following the 1972 political crisis.³

1 The IOC includes two French territories Réunion and Mayotte, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Comoro Islands.

2 Early 2015 agreement on the 'Vanilla Islands', regarding air transport and the issuing of visas to encourage the flow of tourists between the islands.

3 Following the termination of the 1960 Franco-Malagasy cooperation agreements by Madagascar, the 1973 agreements stipulate the nationalization of the land in the Sakay region (centre-west) where 'colonists' from Réunion had settled. Descendants of the 'Creole' colonists remaining in Madagascar left to resettle on Réunion.

Regional integration seems to be happening more in southern and eastern Africa (Southern African Development Community; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) than in the Indian Ocean, despite a hypothetical linguistic border. Madagascar is historically linked to the French-speaking area, while this part of Africa belongs more to the English- and Portuguese-speaking world. In a broader geopolitical context, its full membership in the African Union⁴ forced Madagascar to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, upon resolution of the longest political crisis in its history. Seeking international recognition following the country's suspension from the bodies of the AU and the United Nations as a result of the 2009 coup, all the protagonists gave in to the edicts of the SADC,⁵ of which Madagascar is a member, with the support of the great powers of the International Contact Group on Madagascar⁶ in September 2011.

Have the absence of borders and the turbulent history of relations with the African continent contributed to the formation of an endogenous state structure and a homogeneous national consciousness? Or, conversely, did they accompany the emergence of an internal insularity on the island given its relative vastness? There is a Malagasy saying that affirms *Foin'i Zanabary ho nosy Madagasikara*: 'God the Creator made Madagascar an island'. In the collective consciousness, insularity equates to divine transcendence, implying that the island's unity is an inevitable fact. This is a 'natural'⁷ determining factor of the existence of a Malagasy nation. The island's political history was marked by two attempts at unification: first, the *Sakalava* expansion from the west in the eighteenth century, followed by the *Merina* expansion from the Central Highlands in the nineteenth century. The *Merina* expansion enabled the 'Kingdom of Madagascar' to exert a more or less effective dominance over about two-thirds of the island. On the eve of the first warning shots of French colonization in 1883-1885, the hegemonic unification started by the *Merina* kingdom had left many scars in the provinces and a strong sense of unfinished business. It was difficult to assert that the Malagasy nation had largely been formed. The 'island-continent' seemed fragmented and political unification turned out to be

4 Philibert Tsiranana, first President of the Republic, was one of the historical founders of the OAU on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa.

5 A permanent representative of SADC had lived in Antananarivo since the start of the crisis. Successive agreements resulted, in September 2011, in the signing of a roadmap that was binding for all parties.

6 The International Contact Group – Madagascar brought together the European Union, France, Germany, the United States, Russia and Japan. It subsequently became the International Support Group – Madagascar (ISG-M), supporting SADC in the 'return to constitutional order'.

7 In Malagasy, 'natural' is translated by *voajanabary*, literally 'which is the Creator's doing'.

a myth. The Antananarivo royalty collapsed and some monarchies, like those in the northwest, even joined the colonial expeditionary force to push the *Merina* garrisons back from their land, while those in the south tried in vain to lead a rapidly marginalized resistance.

The new colonial authorities did their utmost to achieve *de facto* unification of the island by connecting the territory through an authoritarian, bureaucratic and centralizing administrative apparatus (Fremigacci, 2014), based on a native auxiliary leadership. The colonial development and the resulting work for Indigenous people led to the migration of workers looking for wage employment, particularly from regions with a low colonial presence to those where the slave trade became firmly established: from the south, southeast and centre to the northwest and east-central regions. This amplified the movements of those originating from the Central Highlands towards the coasts starting from the nineteenth century. Not to mention the demographic dynamism of the Tsimihety, which led to their spread to the northwest and northeast coasts of the island in the twentieth century. The dynamics of these population movements undermined the internal borders and the (somewhat stereotypical) spatial representations of the ethnic groups and their regionalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through colonial cartography (Nativel, 2002, pp. 69 and 75). These migratory flows created internal diasporas integrated more or less into the host societies: the *Merina* and *Betsileo* diasporas, the most widespread; diasporas of natives of the southeast⁸ and south⁹; and the *Tsimihety* diaspora. The attachment of the Comoros to all 'Madagascar and dependencies' in 1912 broke down the boundaries between the two territories and generated a migratory flow from the archipelago, the source of a significant Comorian diaspora settled from north to south on the island's western edge. Cohabitation with local inhabitants was often a source of latent intercommunity tensions in a context where essential identity-based reflexes often took precedence over the feeling of national belonging.

The absence of border conflicts did not contribute, internally, to promoting a national identity-building dynamic based on a sense of unity in the face of the colonial situation. Despite some cracks, the internal borders endure in the post-colonial era. The isolation of the regions maintains, if not intensifies, the centrifugal process, making Madagascar an archipelago of enclaves and not one

8 *Antaimoro, Antaisaka, Antaifasy, Zafisoro, Antambahoaka.*

9 *Antandroy, Bara, Mahafaly, Antanosy.*

Great Island¹⁰, helped by political instability. Regional imbalances between the centre and the periphery are growing, many areas remain inaccessible and beyond the effective control of the state,¹¹ the gap between cities and the countryside is widening, all serving to maintain the 'factors of ethnicity' (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 2008, pp. 134-136) in intercommunity relations. Shortcomings, internal contradictions and the lack of political will of the post-colonial ruling class eventually eliminated the rhetoric about the effective decentralization of the administration that could have helped alter the ethnic borders and the factors of internal insularity (Rakotondrabe, 2002, pp. 411-414). The same applies to the procrastination in linguistic policy: the official Malagasy, like French, remains the language of the elite, rarely used by the underclasses, not playing its role of foundation and potential cement for national integration. It is as if, in the absence of real consensus among the political elites, insularity, instead of helping to mitigate the disparity of the historical journey and experience between the island's various regions, has accentuated them, along with the centrifugal forces that hinder the process of building national sentiment.

In Madagascar, insularity, characterized by an 'increasing politicization of ethnicity', particularly by the political elites and community leaders (Galibert, 2011, pp. 266-327) and periodically experiencing cyclical crises, has not always meant homogeneity in the nation-building process. The example of Madagascar shows that while insularity is a natural fact, national consciousness is not. The nation cannot be decreed; it is built every day through the desire of a community of citizens to live together.

10 This unequal regional development fuelled the argument of the Federalist trend, which reappeared on a cyclical basis with recurring political crises. Appearing during the decolonization process in the 1950s, federalist ideas made a strong comeback after the 1991-1992 political crisis, characterized by a growing protest against the unitary and centralized State by a number of the provincial elites.

11 Several districts in the northeast (Maroantsetra/Mananara, Sambava, Antalaha, Vohémar, Andapa), the north (Bealanana, Befandriana) and the west (Analalava, Maintirano, Morondava). Despite several military operations since the 1980s, the deep south (Bara, Antandroy, Mahafaly lands) and the extreme southeast (Anosy) are still unsafe areas with gangs of armed thieves or *dabalo*, virtually outside the rule of law. Here, representatives of the state (regional or district leaders, forces of law and order) are considered foreigners (*vazaha*) and the state's symbols (hospitals, courts, administrative offices) foreign institutions.

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Chronological landmarks

1885-1896: French military expeditions that result in the protectorate (1 October 1895) and the annexation of Madagascar (6 August 1896).

1896-1905: Gallieni implements the '*politique des races*' (policy of the races) by organizing the administration based on the supposed territorialization of the 'tribes'.

1905-1911: Gallieni's successors (Victor Augagneur then Albert Picquié) carry out the administrative networking of the territory by setting up an Indigenous leadership, the pivotal point of which is the district chief. The main responsibilities of this chief are collecting Indigenous tax and requisitioning the workforce needed for the administration and colonial undertakings.

1926: Governor-General Marcel Olivier creates the six administrative regions, the origin of the six modern-day provinces.

1947-1948: Farmers' uprising on the eastern edge of Madagascar, shaking the foundations of colonial rule and advocating a return to the 'Malagasy State', at the start of the decolonization process, alongside the Brazzaville Conference.

1960: Independence and establishment of the First Republic.

1972-1975: Student and academic uprising that overthrows the 'neo-colonial' PSD regime of Philibert Tsiranana, followed by demand for a 'decentralized' state by a faction of the armed forces seized upon by Didier Ratsiraka, establishing the 'socialist' Second Republic.

1991-1993: New challenge led by Albert Zafy's Forces Vives. Second political crisis characterized by the emergence of the federalist movement that questions the unitary state and demands the establishment of the Federated States of Madagascar based on the six provinces. Birth of the Third Republic, one slogan of which is 'effective decentralisation'.

1996-1998: Institutional crisis due to the impeachment of President Albert Zafy. Early presidential elections that mark the return to power of Didier Ratsiraka who, wanting to appropriate the federalist ideas, organizes a constitutional referendum allowing for the lawful establishment of 'autonomous provinces' (51 per cent 'yes').

2001-2002: Post-election crisis caused by the confrontation between Didier Ratsiraka and Marc Ravalomanana. Ratsiraka secretly encourages the blockade of the city of Antananarivo controlled by Marc Ravalomanana. The armed forces and the country are on the verge of collapse. After obtaining international recognition, Ravalomanana holds a constitutional referendum that organizes the country into twenty-two regions.

2009-2013: Challenge for power led by Andry Rajoelina, Mayor of Antananarivo who, through a civil-military coup, overthrows Marc Ravalomanana and brings in a High Transitional Authority. For the first time, the challenging of the state's territorial unity is no longer the driving force for political upheaval.

THE CONCEPTS OF CREOLIZATION/ HYBRIDATION/MÉTISAGE

Dominic Richard David Thomas

Africa has, and continues to occupy, an incontrovertible place as an imagined and concrete physical entity in global history. Characterized today by significant levels of internal mobility and external dispersion, the parameters of the continent and diaspora are increasingly complicated to delimit and constantly redefined by both current and longstanding systems of relation. These connect with notions such as '*mondialisation*' and 'globalization' to which extensive recourse is made today as a way of defining these interrelations, and in which one finds an: 'Imbrication de l'ici et de l'ailleurs, la présence de l'ailleurs dans l'ici et vice-versa, cette relativisation des racines et des appartenances primaires et cette manière d'embrasser, en toute connaissance de cause, l'étrange, l'étranger et le lointain.'¹

Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji has advanced the concept of 'extraversion' as a way of describing and delineating the influence of imported cultural and political concepts in shaping African societies (Hountondji, 1997). Likewise, Cameroonian novelist Patrice Nganang has asked whether 'the diasporization of African populations ultimately translate into a diasporization of African states?' (Nganang, 2011, p. 137) In all these instances, the *inside* and the

1 'Interweaving of here and elsewhere, the presence of elsewhere in here and vice versa, this relativization of roots and primary affiliations and this way of embracing, in full knowledge, the strange, the foreign, and the distant' (Mbembe, 2011, p. 229).

outside are blurred, thereby further underscoring the degree of interpenetration between Africa as *continent*, Africa as *diaspora*, and Africa as 'a floating signifier, [as] a concept with a variable geometry' (Amselle, 2001, p. 37). Defining Africa as a continent proves to be as complicated as defining Europe, especially when it comes to the boundaries of the European Union that are often mistakenly confused with *mainland* Europe rather than including spaces that are to be found in such disparate regions as South America, the Caribbean, and Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian oceans. These and related issues raise a number of questions pertaining to identity, questions that are informed by enduring and persistent geopolitical power relations.

Scholarly interventions in the field of postcolonial studies have proved valuable in elucidating the above-mentioned questions and in deconstructing official discourse and modes of representation. Likewise, numerous literary and philosophical contributions have addressed these challenges. Initially *négritude*, whose historical roots can be traced back to the encounter in Paris in the 1930s between Aimé Césaire (1913–2008), Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906–2001), and Léon-Gontran Damas (1912–1978), represented an attempt to provide positive ascriptions to blackness and Black identity and thereby counter reductive and racialized Western constructs pertaining to Africa and Africans. The *négritude* movement thus embraced concepts that would help in the process of accounting for the heterogeneous realities of the Black experience while valorizing the African heritage and points of commonality in global diasporic context and networks. Certainly, the First Congress of Black Writers and Artists (Premier Congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs) held at the Sorbonne in Paris, 19 to 22 September 1956, could be considered a crucial site for early formulations pertaining to what might be described as a global Black consciousness. Indeed, analogous processes would be recorded later in a number of diasporic settings in which evidence points to the multiple ways in which African diasporic networks are established while also revealing how 'host' societies are themselves transformed via mutually constitutive forms of relations and influences.

Édouard Glissant (1928–2011) would underscore the inadequacy of *négritude* in ascertaining historical relationality, mostly because of the central role Césaire accorded to Africa and the African diaspora at the expense of recording broader historical influences on the Caribbean region. Instead, Glissant accorded value to terms such as *antillanité* (Caribbeanness), *rhizomic identities*, and the *tout-monde* (all-world). Connections with the African continent and the history of forced transplantation through slavery remained key elements, but alternative archetypes emerged in order to stress other cultural and linguistic roots while

also insisting on the specificity of the Caribbean context as a composite identity, and as a global site of intersections between both Indigenous and external cultural influences. For Glissant, this was 'Plus qu'une théorie, une vision,'² and *créolisation* (creolization) was to be understood as a process informed by incessant mutation rather than established identities.

Later, Glissant expanded his frame of reference and inscribed his analysis in a more comprehensive and inclusive global arrangement that exceeded the conditions of *métissage* ('hybridity'), thereby offering often unexpected and unpredictable outcomes whereby 'La créolisation est la mise en contact de plusieurs cultures ou au moins de plusieurs éléments de cultures distinctes, dans un endroit du monde, avec pour résultante une donnée nouvelle, totalement imprévisible par rapport à la somme ou à la simple synthèse de ces éléments.'³ However, some Caribbean intellectuals did not adhere to these models and elected to distance themselves from them. Most notable was the influential *Eloge de la Créolité* published in 1989 by Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau and Raphaël Confiant, a manifesto that would extend the claims of '*antillanité*' and foreground the cultural and linguistic diversity of the Caribbean as a means of addressing the multiplicity of Caribbean identity and defining the 'créolisation culturelle du monde ... l'agrégat interactionnel ou transactionnel, des éléments culturels caraïbes, européens, africains, asiatiques et levantins, que le joug de l'Histoire a réunis sur le même sol.'⁴ These perpetual shifts in identity were not of course exclusive to the Caribbean and many of these issues also pertain to more recent developments in Africa and the African diaspora.

Colonial history and its various legacies shaped and continue to influence present-day realities. French government support for the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) confirms the strategic importance and relevance for France of a global community of French speakers, as do the various Franco-African summits that have taken place since 1973, and more recent agreements have outlined the principles of EU-Africa relations.⁵ These concerted efforts to achieve greater transparency, limit exploitative neocolonial practices, and also reckon with

2 'More than a theory, a vision' (Glissant, 1981, p. 495).

3 'Creolization is the contact between several cultures or at least several elements of distinct cultures in one place in the world, resulting in something new that is totally unpredictable from the sum or simple synthesis of these elements' (Glissant, 1997, p. 37).

4 'Cultural creolization of the world ... the interactive or transactional aggregate of Caribbean, European, African, Asian, and Levantine cultural elements that the yoke of history has brought together on the same soil' (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant, 1989, pp. 13-26).

5 EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's development, October 12, 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0489>

inadequate and substandard governance records are key measures in remedying economic, political and social asymmetries. To this end, two recent volumes of the journal *De(s)générations*, featuring articles and interviews with African intellectuals in multiple geographic localities for whom 'il s'agit de montrer dans mes livres que les problématiques liées à l'Afrique, l'articulation de questions à partir et à propos de l'Afrique, sont des questions à portée universelle,'⁶ are important in terms of the objectives of the new *General History of Africa* (GHA), especially when it comes to the opportunities, challenges and threats confronting Africa.⁷ As Achille Mbembe had previously argued, 'L'Europe ne constitue plus le centre de gravité du monde,'⁸ a shift substantiated by the emergence of new economic affiliates on the continent and an accurate rendering of the contours of the new postcolonial landscape in which 'L'Afrique est avant tout un projet planétaire et il n'y a guère d'histoire de l'Afrique qui ne soit en même temps une histoire du monde tout comme il n'y a guère d'histoire du monde qui ne soit en même temps une histoire d'Africains ou de leurs descendants.'⁹ With these new configurations in mind, one may well ask what Africa's place will be in the *new world order* and what impact globalization will continue to have on this continent? Cameroonian philosopher Fabien Eboussi Boulaga has, for example, called for 'dégagement' (disengagement), 'la condition préalable nécessaire à tout engagement qui ne soit pas simplement réactif.'¹⁰

These transitions are also evident in diasporic settings, in which writers have explored new realities associated with immigration and muticultural societies. Franco-Cameroonian author Léonora Miano has explained how 'Aujourd'hui, les Européens noirs refusent d'avoir à choisir entre leur part subsaharienne ou caribéenne, et leur part européenne. Ils souhaitent abriter en eux les deux, les chérir, voguer de l'une à l'autre, les mélanger sans les hiérarchiser.'¹¹ These post-national identities point to a growing awareness of the limited analytical potential of narrow definitions of 'national' identity (cf. Coquery-Vidrovitch,

6 'My books aim to show that issues related to Africa, and the articulation of questions arising from and concerning Africa, are questions of universal significance' (Diagne, 2015, p. 20).

7 Penser avec l'Afrique, *De(s)générations*, No. 22, May 2015, and Prévoir avec l'Afrique, agir avec le monde qui vient, No. 23, May 2015.

8 'Europe no longer constitutes the world's centre of gravity.' Mbembe, 2013, p. 9).

9 'Africa is above all a global project, and there is hardly any history of Africa that is not also a history of the world, just as there is hardly any history of the world that is not also a history of Africans or their descendants' (Mbembe, 2015, p. 78).

10 'The necessary prerequisite for any commitment that is not merely reactive' (Boulaga, 2004, p. 2).

11 'Today, Black Europeans refuse to have to choose between their sub-Saharan or Caribbean heritage and their European heritage. They want to embrace both, cherish them, move between them, and blend them without ranking them' (Miano, 2012, p. 84).

2009) and ethnic minority populations provide examples 'of the possibilities of new conceptualizations of minority identity' (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 50). These identity models that are structured around multiple cultural and social ties have been theorized under the aegis of Afropolitanism, described in the following terms by Taiye Selasi: 'not citizens, but Africans of the world.... Like so many African young people working and living in cities around the globe, they belong to no single geography, but feel at home in many.... [T]he Afropolitan must form an identity along at least three dimensions: national, racial, cultural – with subtle tensions in between.'¹² The decentring of Europe and displacement of economic and political power toward other centres of influence direct our attention once again to Africa and the African diaspora as privileged spaces for inquiry into twenty-first century relationality.

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12 Taiye Selasi, Bye-Bye Babar, March 3, 2005, <http://thelip.robertsharp.co.uk/?p=76>

AFRO-CARIBBEAN SEAMEN IN THE BLACK ATLANTIC WORLD 1880-1950

Alan Cobley

Introduction

Paul Gilroy defines the Black Atlantic as ‘an intercultural and transnational formation’ that developed out of the economic, social, cultural and ideological engagement of Africans with the West in the era of the Enlightenment. His figurative ‘Black Atlantic’ is evoked in the accumulated life experiences of the millions of Africans who have participated in forced or voluntary migrations throughout the Atlantic world over the past several centuries, and especially in what he calls ‘the inescapable hybridity and intermixture of ideas’ that were the products of these migrations. As Gilroy comments: ‘Black Atlantic culture is so massive and its history so little known that I have done scarcely more than put down some preliminary markers for more detailed future investigations’ (Gilroy, 1993, p. xi).

Gilroy’s concept of the ‘Black Atlantic’ has inspired numerous scholars and provided a framework for debates on connections and comparisons in the Atlantic region in a variety of disciplines, ranging from history and sociology to philosophy and literary theory. However, Gilroy, and others who have followed him, have tended to focus on elites and the transmission of ideas through a fairly narrowly defined Western intellectual formation.

In some ways the work of Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh parallels Gilroy’s work on the Black Atlantic. They see the Atlantic World as the locus

of struggle out of which emerged the modern international working class.¹ This class expressed itself across the Atlantic world, they argue, as both a uniquely rich and progressive socio-cultural phenomenon and as a powerfully subversive – sometimes even revolutionary – political movement. Their approach shifts the focus of debate on the shaping of the Atlantic World away from capital and commerce towards human agency, and away from the history of elites, towards the contribution of the ‘common folk’ (Armitage, 2001, pp. 479–486).

Both approaches conceptualize the Atlantic as a network – a connective tissue – rather than as a division. Both posit a circulation of ideas around the Atlantic World, on the backs of wind, tide and current, of trade and of conquest. Drawing on these approaches, this article proposes that the ‘Black Atlantic’ – with all its ramifications for the cultural, intellectual and political history of the West – was shaped by the critical agency of the ‘common folk’ in the Atlantic world, specifically by Afro-Caribbean seafarers.

This article further argues that their unique contribution to the conceptualization and propagation of ‘Global Africa’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arose from the deployment of ‘a uniquely creative and transformative Afro-Caribbean consciousness’ on a global stage. According to the Caribbean-born anthropologist Charles Carnegie, this consciousness reflected the centrality of migration, and the long struggle for freedom at the level of the person and the community in Caribbean societies, in shaping Caribbean identity. The result was ‘cultural predispositions toward imagining community in global terms’ – a global consciousness that was simultaneously ‘rooted in and respectful of local particularities’ (Carnegie, 2002, pp. 83–84).

Afro-Caribbean seafaring communities in the Atlantic World

Although the number of Afro-Caribbean seafarers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was relatively small, they constituted a significant segment of communities in numerous ports throughout the Atlantic World. In some instance they were the progenitors of Black communities in hitherto predominantly white societies. By the early twentieth century important Afro-Caribbean seafaring communities could be found in Halifax (Nova Scotia), St John’s (Newfoundland), Prince Edward Island, Brooklyn (New York) and Baltimore (Maryland); in Panama

1 Linebaugh, 1988, pp.193–219; Linebaugh and Rediker, 1990, pp. 221–249; Linebaugh and Rediker, 1990, pp. 225–252; Rediker, 1987). The most ambitious version of this work to date is (Rediker and Linebaugh, 2000).

(Central America); in the docklands of Liverpool (Liverpool 8 or Toxteth), Bute Town ('Tiger Bay') in Cardiff, Stepney in the East End of London; and in the hinterland of the docks in Rotterdam and Hamburg. On the African continent a small but vibrant Afro-Caribbean seafaring community could also be found in District Six in Cape Town, South Africa. Wherever they established themselves they sought to challenge and subvert hegemonic discourses in the host societies about ethnicity, identity and power.

Some sense of the mobility of Afro-Caribbean seafarers can be derived from the early career of Hugh Mulzac of Union Island (one of the Grenadines chains south of St Vincent). He first went to sea in 1905 as a deck boy aboard his father's ninety-ton schooner, *Sunbeam*. After a number of voyages engaged in the inter-island trade in the Caribbean he was promoted to Ordinary Seaman, and then – after studying navigation with his brother – to Able Seaman. Equipped with this apprenticeship, he set off for Barbados in March 1907 to find a ship heading for international waters (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 24-27). Over the next two years he traveled the world in search of work, moving from ship to ship. In quick succession he visited Wilmington (North Carolina), London, Cardiff, Malta, Romania, Constantinople, Liverpool, Colectina (Argentina), Australia, Coquimbo (Chile), Valparaíso and Hamburg. By the time he arrived back in England in January 1909, he had decided to study for his Second Mate's certificate and enrolled at the Nautical School at Swansea, thereby beginning his rise from the foc's'le to the officers' mess.

Mulzac's experience of crisscrossing the oceans aboard tramp ships was typical of Afro-Caribbean seafarers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But this wandering life did not mean that they had no support system to fall back on. As Mulzac explained: 'In my brief travels I had discovered that the West Indies had sent its sons all over the world: there were few places you could go without finding a West Indian sailor who had gone forth earlier and settled down' (Mulzac, 1972, p. 55).

In Argentina, Mulzac was given lodgings by Albert De Hall from Guadeloupe until he found another ship. In Valparaíso, he stayed in a West Indian boarding house run by a Mister Thompson. In Swansea the taxi driver who took him from the train station to take his second mate's course at the Nautical College was a former seaman from St Vincent named Billy Boyd. A few years later, when he fell on hard times after a series of voyages as a ship's cook out of Baltimore, he was helped by another Vincentian, former seaman Reg Crosby, to find temporary relief in a land-based job in Chicago as a cook at a girls' school (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 43-44, 48-49, 550).

Mulzac's experience of receiving a helping hand from fellow West Indians in foreign ports was duplicated in the lives of countless Afro-Caribbean seafarers. They were from a common background – shaped by the legacies of slavery, colonial oppression and structural poverty in post-Emancipation Caribbean societies and had embraced seafaring as a common strategy to escape the constraints of these societies and seek self-empowerment. They also frequently shared the experience of racial discrimination in foreign ports. It was not surprising that they felt themselves to be part of a special kind of brotherhood.

Seafaring communities ashore were a means by which seamen identified employment opportunities, and established supporting networks of family, friends and neighbours. In the process of nurturing these relationships ashore, seamen forged radically new affiliations and identities for themselves. In the case of Britain, for example, Afro-Caribbean seafarers who became residents in port cities found common cause with a wider Black community that included West Africans, Somalis, Lascars, Arabs and other Black Britons (Frost, 1999, pp. 187–201). In Cape Town, Black West Indians were considered part of the local 'Coloured' community by the authorities, but, as Misha Charles (2004) shows, often identified themselves strategically in the wider community as 'American Negroes'.

Afro-Caribbean seafarers frequently exhibited a high level of political consciousness ashore. As Laura Tabili suggests in her study of Black labour migrants to the UK in the first half of the twentieth century:

Scholars are increasingly rejecting the image of the migrant as an unsophisticated bumpkin borne along by forces beyond his or her understanding. Migration, they argue, was a pragmatic response to an expanding global system. Individuals migrated for a complex [set] of personal motives.... Black workers in interwar Britain were far from the naïve and easily bullied "coolies" scorned by their adversaries and pitied by their advocates. Those who came to Britain before, during and after the First World War aimed to enhance their individual welfare, to aid their kin and to claim their 'rights' as they defined them. Their migration to Britain was itself a blow against colonial discrimination and exploitation (Tabili, 1994, p. 11).

This description of what might be called the 'empowered migrant' is peculiarly apt for Afro-Caribbean seafarers, whose background, education, sense of place, and – above all – sense of self-worth, equipped them to establish themselves in communities ashore wherever they traveled in the Atlantic world.

In his study of Cardiff in 1948, Kenneth Little found that the West Africans and West Indians in the city – the 'Afro-West Indian group', as he called them – shared a broadly similar consciousness:

This group as a whole is extremely 'colour-conscious', and very zealous for the good name of their homeland and of people of African origin; a sentiment which many of them try to combine with various social pretensions. Its members frequently speak in brotherly terms of the 'coloured peoples'. But there is a tendency to restrict the term to those of Negroid affinities rather than to apply it to coloured races in general. There is a strong degree of masculinity and even austerity in the attitudes of many of the men (Little, 1948).

Afro-Caribbean seamen, in short, lived 'trans-territorial lives' (to borrow a phrase from Carnegie) that translated, once they settled ashore, into a remarkable capacity to integrate into the local community while continuing to exhibit a global consciousness.

Undoubtedly, one of the most notable features of Afro-Caribbeans abroad was their sensitivity to racial discrimination wherever they encountered it. Frequently this was the spur that drove them into political action. Hugh Mulzac, for example, was shocked to be refused admission to a church in Wilmington, North Carolina on his first visit to the United States as a seaman in 1907 (Mulzac, 1972, p. 32). Time and again, Afro-Caribbean seamen ashore could be seen demanding their rights from the authorities, whether as individuals or in combination with others with similar grievances. When these pleas failed, they often resorted to radical action. As Rediker and Linebaugh show, it was a tradition that went back over a century to Crispus Attucks and Denmark Vesey. This article now turns to consider some examples of the political mobilization of Afro-Caribbean seamen in the first half of the twentieth century.

Afro-Caribbean seamen and international organization in the inter-war years

The dramatic social, political and economic upheaval in the Atlantic World during and after the First World War led to the emergence of two powerful but ideologically opposed international organizations in which Afro-Caribbean seafarers played a key role. These were Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement and Conservation Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL); and the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU) of the Communist Third International.

Marcus Garvey had formed the UNIA in his native Jamaica in July 1914. He traveled widely prior to formulating plans for his organization and witnessed the degraded condition and spirit of Black people throughout the Atlantic

World. Accordingly, his organization advocated 'the unity and blending of all Negroes into one strong, healthy race', and preached 'race pride' above all. Its programmes aimed to promote the economic, social, cultural and spiritual uplift of Black people. After Garvey traveled to the United States to raise funds in 1916, the UNIA became established there and quickly began to spread across the country from its base in Harlem, New York. Within a couple of years, it began to spread internationally as well (Martin, 1986, chapter 1).

At its peak in 1926, the UNIA had approximately 725 branches in the United States and 271 in 41 other countries or territories. The latter included six African countries, 14 South and Central American countries, and 18 Caribbean territories, plus Wales, Canada and Australia. Garvey himself claimed a total membership of six million worldwide by 1923, though this figure is impossible to verify. There is no question, however, that Garvey's message reached and influenced millions more than those identified as card-carrying members of his organization (Martin, 1986, pp. 15-17).

Black seamen, including African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans, played a key role in disseminating Garvey's message, carrying Garvey's newspaper, the *Negro World*, with them as they traveled the world's shipping lanes (Martin, 1986, pp. 93-97). When the newspaper first reached the shores of South Africa in 1920, for example, it was Black seamen who carried it there. Within a year there were four UNIA branches in the Cape Peninsula, and four more were added in other parts of the country by 1926. Many of the early members were former Afro-Caribbean seamen resident at the Cape. The President of the Woodstock branch in Cape Town was a West Indian named M.E.A. Johnson, while the son of an Afro-Caribbean seaman from Martinique, David William Alexander, was an agent for the *Negro World* and founder and first 'Patriarch' of the Garveyite 'African Orthodox Church' in Kimberley (Hill and Pirio, 1987).

Garvey's movement also spread north along the coast to South-West Africa [Namibia]; the president of the UNIA branch formed in Lüderitz in 1921 was a West Indian named Fitzherbert Headley, a chief stevedore on the local docks, while the secretary was another West Indian, John de Clue, who ran a café in the Black location. Together they sponsored the formation of further branches at Windhoek and Swakopmund (Emmett, 1986, pp. 20-21). Such was the influence of the UNIA in Cape Town in the early 1920s, that in 1923 the Western Cape provincial branch of the ANC adopted the UNIA slogan, 'One God, One Aim, One Destiny' as its own, and also christened its headquarters 'Liberty Hall' in imitation of Garvey's headquarters in Harlem (Hill and Pirio, 1987). When the UNIA flag (red, black and green in three parallel horizontal

bars) was formally unveiled at a ceremony at the Woodstock branch of the UNIA in Cape Town in 1924, the idea of 'a flag of our own' was welcomed by the featured speaker, J.G. Gumbs, a shipwright from St Vincent who was working in Cape Town docks. A year later the ANC adopted its own version of this flag, in which the colours were adjusted to represent South Africa: it was black (for the people), green (for the land), and gold (for the country's wealth) (Martin, 1986, pp. 44-45).

Not surprisingly, the UNIA outside the United States was strongest in the Caribbean. Garvey's message of race pride and self-reliance had a special resonance among Caribbean people at a time when the colonial economy in the region was in obvious decay. Basic literacy was widespread, and Black participation in political discourse in Caribbean societies was growing everywhere. Here too, seamen played a part in disseminating Garvey's message. Despite a ban on the *Negro World* imposed by the Governor of Trinidad and Tobago in 1919, there were at least thirty branches of the UNIA in Trinidad by 1926. On one occasion in 1920, a large cache of the newspaper, plus UNIA leaflets, was found hidden in the cargo hold of a ship from New York. The effectiveness of the smuggling was such that C.L.R. James, the great West Indian radical writer, had no difficulty in buying a copy of the paper every Saturday morning in Port of Spain during the early 1920s despite the government ban (Martin, 1986, pp. 96-97).

Garvey's most ambitious project during the heyday of the UNIA was the establishment of a 'Negro-owned' steamship company by the sale of stock to thousands of small investors. The 'Black Star Line' as it was called, was inaugurated in June 1919. It was to be a symbol of Black pride and achievement, and a practical experiment in economic self-help. It was also hoped that the company's ships would provide links and encourage trade between different parts of the Black world that were relatively neglected by white shipping lines. According to Martin, practical experiences of racism at sea gave the project a special attraction to potential Black passengers and crew (Martin, 1986, p. 152).

Hugh Mulzac heard about the new steamship line from a fellow West Indian seaman, Billy Rose of St Vincent. Rose introduced him to Garvey, who promptly invited him to join the enterprise as captain of their first ship, the SS *Yarmouth*. The *Yarmouth* sailed to several ports in the Caribbean under Mulzac's command during 1920, receiving a 'heroes' welcome' wherever it made landfall, but no arrangements had been made for cargo to be collected and any passengers who were taken aboard were carried at considerable loss. As Mulzac remarked,

'It was a helluva way to run a steamship' (Mulzac, 1972, p. 71). Eventually the Black Star Line was wound up in 1923 (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 90-91).²

Despite the failure of the Black Star Line, and the subsequent collapse of the UNIA itself a few years later, for a decade Garvey's movement thrilled and galvanized Black popular opinion. The many Afro-Caribbean seafarers who played a part in spreading its message continued to exhibit the racial pride and self-reliance exemplified by Garvey in their own lives long after he had ceased to be an effective spokesperson for Global Africa.

While the UNIA was galvanizing the Black Atlantic World in the aftermath of the First World War, Governments and labour movements on both sides of the Atlantic were more focused on the earth-shattering events in Russia, where the Tsarist regime had collapsed and been swept aside by the Communist Revolution in November 1917. Fears that the Revolution might spark a chain reaction in other countries weakened by the war were hardly allayed by the formation of the Communist International (or 'Comintern') in Moscow in 1919, which made explicit the Bolsheviks' intention to foment worldwide revolution.

The Comintern's chief international labour arm was the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU) or 'Profintern'. As early as 1924, the RILU had singled out 'colonial sailors' as a group of workers meriting special efforts at organization, on the grounds that they could be effective agents for the transmission of communist ideas to the international working class outside Europe. 'Colonial sailors' could also give access to the growing communities established through the migration of members of the 'colonial proletariat' to the European metropolises (Wilson, 1974, pp.143-145, 201). This led to the establishment of seamen's clubs in several European ports during the mid-1920s.³

An RILU affiliate, the 'International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers' (ITUC-NW) was charged with responsibility for mobilizing the emerging proletariat on the African continent, as well as organizing Black workers in America and the Caribbean. It gave 'concentrated organizational attention' to Black seafarers in the late 1920s and 1930s.⁴ In 1931 the ITUC-NW sponsored the formation of the International of Seamen and Harbour Workers (ISH), with the specific aim of targeting this group.

A key role was played in the ISH by the secretary of the ITUC-NW, George Padmore, a Trinidadian, who was based in the German port city of Hamburg. His chief tool was a newspaper, modeled after Garvey's *Negro World*, entitled

2 A full account of the rise and fall of the Black Star Line is given by Tony Martin (1986, Chapter 8).

3 There were clubs, for example, in Bordeaux and Hamburg.

4 Wilson, *Russia and Black Africa*, p. 201.

the *Negro Worker*, of which he was editor (Padmore, 1931).⁵ As had been the case with the *Negro World*, the chief means of distribution of the *Negro Worker* was by Black seamen (Wilson, 1974, Chapter 9, footnote 52). Black seamen also carried correspondence for the ITUC-NW, and in other ways provided critical lines of communication.

Afro-Caribbean seamen in local and national organizations

Afro-Caribbean seamen had participated in trade union activity in Britain for a number of years by the time of the outbreak of war in 1914. For example, Hugh Mulzac joined the Amalgamated Firemen and Seamen's Union (AFSU) while in Liverpool in 1909 (Mulzac, 1972, p. 72). The Union organized a successful strike in Cardiff in 1911, in which Afro-Caribbeans took a prominent part. After the war the leadership of the AFSU, and its successor, the National Union of Seamen (NUS) adopted a racist 'British first' policy, in which white British seamen were preferred over Black British seamen (including West Indians). However, not all members and branches of the Union were uniformly racist in these years. In November 1924, for example, 'a new organization comprising white seamen, West Indians and Somali' was formed in Cardiff, 'especially to watch over and guard the interests of British seamen, who they allege are being thrown on the scrap-heap because of the avarice of certain boardinghouse masters, sea-going engineers, and the masters of vessels.... Its organizers are hopeful that it will prove to be the nucleus of a powerful white and coloured combine of seamen strong enough and capable enough to completely prevent any and every form of graft and corruption.'⁶ As late as 1929 the NUS were employing a Barbadian-born Black organizer named Chris Braithwaite who worked among seamen in Cardiff (Tabili, 1994, p. 81).

Meanwhile, the RILU's activities in the UK were coordinated through an organization called the 'National Minority Movement' (NMM) formed in 1924.

5 This book includes a sustained attack on Garveyism:

'As the Programme of the Communist International correctly states: Garveyism is a dangerous ideology which bears not a single democratic trait, and which toys with the aristocratic attributes of a non-existent "Negro kingdom"! It must be strongly resisted, for it is not a help but a hindrance to the mass Negro struggle for liberation against American imperialism' (Padmore, 1931, p. 125).

6 Bribery at the Docks? Startling Charges at Cardiff. Why British Seamen Are Unemployed, in *Western Mail* (Cardiff), Saturday November 15, 1924: The committee formed by the seamen consisted of three white seamen, three West Indians and three Somalis.

This in turn established a 'Seamen's Minority Movement' (SMM) in 1929. By the end of 1930 the latter had a committee of 'militant coloured seamen' chaired by Chris 'Jones' (Chris Braithwaite had apparently adopted this pseudonym after becoming active in the Communist movement), and with James Headley, formerly of Trinidad, as its secretary. The SMM failed to make much headway, however, despite a visit to the UK by Padmore in April 1931. In February 1932 it had only 425 paid up members, of whom only 13 were 'Negro seamen' and 10 were 'colonials'. By April 1933 it had folded. Another radical West Indian, Arnold Ward of the Negro Welfare Association (another apparent RLIU front) wrote to Padmore, grimly, 'You have to face the situation, these people don't like us and only use us for a tool' (Sherwood, 1996, pp. 151-156).

By the mid-1930s Chris Jones (formerly Braithwaite) had broken with the SMM and the Communist Party, but he continued to work closely with Padmore.⁷ In 1935 he launched another organization for Black seafarers called the Colonial Seamen's Association. In his capacity as President, he addressed the General Conference of the League of Coloured Peoples (LCP) in June 1937:

He said that the majority of the coloured people in this country were originally seamen, and that it is only through want of work that they have been obliged to remain ashore and take up such jobs as they can obtain. He gave a distressing account of the life they lead, and especially of those who have children to feed. He mentioned that the question of the employment of coloured seamen was not so acute at present on account of the boom in shipping, but maintains that this boom will not last, and expressed a fear that as they were the last to be signed on, they would also be the first to be fired. He showed the connection between the question of the employment of the fathers of the coloured children and of the children themselves.⁸

The League of Coloured Peoples was itself heavily involved in the campaign to assist Black seafarers in the wake of the promulgation of the Coloured Alien Seamen's Order during the inter-war years. From its very first issue in July 1933 the League's journal, *The Keys*, referred repeatedly to the problems faced by seamen in Cardiff and other ports. In 1935 an LCP delegation led by the President, Dr Harold Moody (of Jamaica), and including two brothers

7 A long-time party member of West Indian origin during these years, Peter Blackman, did not follow Padmore and Jones out of the Party. However, he told Marika Sherwood that in all the years he had been a party member he had never had a drink with a white party member or visited a white party member's home. In hindsight he felt that the British party, for all its mouthings about worker solidarity, was both racist and anti-semitic (Sherwood, 1996, p. 148).

8 Proceedings of the General Conference of the League of Coloured Peoples Held at The Memorial Hall, London ... June 25th, 26th and 27th, 1937, in *The Keys*, Vol. V, No. 1, July-September 1937.

from St Lucia, W. Arthur Lewis (future Nobel Prize winner in Economics) and P. Cecil Lewis, visited Cardiff to investigate conditions and to attend the inaugural meeting of a new LCP branch there. Another member of the delegation, an American student named George Brown, investigated 'the willful misapplication of the Alien Registration Act of Great Britain in the case of Coloured British subjects residing in and working out of Cardiff as seamen' (Brown, 1935). His findings were published in *The Keys*. An editorial by Arthur Lewis boasted, not entirely without cause, 'To the coloured people of Cardiff our organization stands as a champion of the oppressed.' Subsequently another Black radical from Barbados, Peter Blackman, became editor of *The Keys*: he was also a member of the Communist Party in Britain from the 1930s to the 1950s (Sherwood, 1996, p. 148).

One other organization involving Afro-Caribbean seamen in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century is worthy of note. The Sons of Africa, an association of Afro-Caribbeans, West Africans and their wives and children, was thriving in Cardiff by 1948. Kenneth Little wrote that:

Their interests are to a certain extent political but are apparently of a nationalist as well as socialist nature.... In short, the Sons of Africa claims to bring about a greater degree of collaboration – its slogan is 'unity'. Its leaders are among the most respected members of the community, and it is looked upon as a highly respectable organization by coloured and white alike. Socially, perhaps, its most important function is as a status-assuring body. Its approved criteria – sober and informed discussion, a proper funeral, a 'moral' code of behaviour – are also goals of the lower middle classes as such and are points usually approved by bourgeois society. Perhaps it is largely for this reason that from the point of view of the more politically minded Colonial Defence League, the purely social and cultural activities of the Sons of Africa are looked upon with some impatience as 'unrealistic'. They bury a man when he is dead, and do nothing for him while he is alive (Little, 1948, pp. 109-110).

This description suggests that the Sons of Africa had some affinities with the UNIA in its attitudes to race, pride and unity. It also invokes comparison with other associations that are known to have flourished in Black communities throughout the Atlantic world, such as fraternities, lodges and friendly societies. Unfortunately, work on these forms of organization in Afro-Caribbean communities at home and abroad is still in its infancy. However, they evidently provided support for Afro-Caribbean seafarers as their 'trans-territorial lives' carried them from one community to another across the Black Atlantic world.⁹

9 Among international fraternal organizations with strong West Indian memberships were the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge, the Order of Elks and Grand Order of Mechanics.

In South Africa, as in Britain, Afro-Caribbean seamen were active in a variety of organizations. As early as the 1880s they had participated in the formation of an 'African and American Working Men's Union' in Port Elizabeth. By the 1920s, in addition to the UNIA, many West Indians were active supporters of the African Political Organisation (APO), which, despite its name, was primarily an organization supporting the interests of the 'Coloured' community in the Cape. When the first ever mass Black trade union in South Africa's history was formed on the docks in Cape Town in 1919, many of the founder members were West Indians. At its peak in 1927 the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) claimed over 100,000 members. The general secretary of the ICU, Clements Kadalie (who was from Nyasaland), acknowledged the contribution of the West Indians to the movement but had reservations about their Garveyite leanings. He recalled:

On the executive committee of the Union we often had three or four of these Negroes. When the Marcus Garvey movement was at its height, these Negroes in South Africa tried their best to use the ICU as an auxiliary of the Universal Negro Improvement Association.... I became the stumbling block against their machinations, since I abhor serving two masters at the same time in my political make-up (Kadalie, 1970, pp. 220-221).

Among leading ICU members of Afro-Caribbean origin were James King, a dockworker from Cape Town, M.E.A. Johnson (who was elected Junior Vice-President in 1926), and J.G. Gumbs: all had also been members of the UNIA. Kadalie described Gumbs in particular as 'an out-and-out Marcus Garvey who had the slogan "Africa for Africans": Kadalie remembered him as having been bitterly opposed to white communist attempts to influence the Union. H.D. Tyamzashe, another former ICU colleague provided this description of Gumbs:

James Goolam Gumbs was a Native of the West Indies. By profession he was a shipwright, and earned a decent and honest living at Cape Town as such. He was one of the foundation members of the old ICU and was its first and only President. Gumbs was a black gentleman in the true sense of the word, and conducted ICU conferences with dignity, fairness, wisdom and cheerfulness. One could not curry favour with him; he was as straight as a die. Although Kadalie and some of his cronies went "all out" to have Gumbs defeated at two presidential elections, Gumbs was returned by a big majority every time.... He died at Cape Town in 1928 with the presidential colours flying over his grave (Tyamzashe, 1941).

Even Kadalie had to admit that Gumbs had been an effective Conference Chairman because of his 'good loud voice', and added that 'he was well respected by all since like myself he was free of all tribal affiliations' (Kadalie, 1970, pp. 99, 161).

Aside from overtly political organizations, Afro-Caribbeans in Cape Town were also involved in a variety of economic, social and cultural groups, such as a short-lived cooperative economic enterprise called the West Indian Building Association formed in 1901 and the American Sporting Club' formed in 1908.¹⁰ Members of the latter participated in the annual 'Coon Carnival' in the city (Charles, 2004, pp. 51-52). The Afro-Caribbean and African American community worshipped together at the Bethel AME Church on Hanover Street, while the 'West Indian and American Association' brought them together for social gatherings during the 1930s and 1940s (Charles, 2004, p. 53).

While Garvey's UNIA had been the most powerful organization involving Black seamen of Afro-Caribbean and American origin during the 1920s, in the longer run maritime trade unions proved more important for those seeking work in the United States. The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), nicknamed the 'Wobblies', founded in Chicago in 1905 as a more radical socialist alternative to the American Federation of Labor (AFL), specifically rejected the exclusion of Black workers from trade unions as anti-working class, and included an anti-racist clause in its bylaws. From 1910 the IWW began to take an active interest in organizing among Black workers. It also took a stand against 'Jim Crow' laws and lynching of Black men in the American South. In 1910-11 white American seamen were instrumental in founding the IWW of South Africa, the first union in that country's history to attempt to organize Black and white workers together. Among IWW affiliates in the United States with Black membership was the Marine Transport Industrial Union formed in 1913 (Foner, 1974, pp. 107-112).

The much larger AFL and its partner the *Congress of Industrial Organizations* (CIO) organized extensively among maritime workers during the 1920s and 1930s. On the Pacific coast the CIO's International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) specifically rejected racial discrimination in its constitution and actively organized among Black workers on the waterfront. The ILWU's chief ally was the National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards (also a CIO union). During the 1920s this union had operated a separate section for Black workers called the 'Colored Marine Employees Benevolent Association' but the ranks of the union were fully opened to Black members in 1934 following a successful strike in which both Black and White had made common cause.

10 The directors' names were given as Joseph N Boyce, Orlando Trill, Samuel Paul, James Debique, George Gumbs, George Deshon and Edwin Jeffreys. State Archives, Republic of South Africa, Cape Archive Depot, Cape Town, Cape Supreme Court, Vol. 26, Illiquid Cases, 2/1/1/440.

Meanwhile, on the Atlantic coast, a group of mainly communist seamen founded the National Maritime Union (NMU) in 1937, which was affiliated with the CIO. The NMU's constitution rejected any form of racial discrimination and established a rotation system whereby members would be hired strictly in the order in which they were placed on the Union's list of those seeking work. This was intended to counter efforts by ship-owners to pit Black and White against Black workers by discriminatory hiring practices (Foner, 1974, pp. 226-227). One of the founders of the NMU, and its first Vice-President and Secretary, was a Jamaican seaman named Ferdinand C. Smith (Horne, 2005). In an article in its journal, *The Pilot*, in August 1938, he wrote:

White and Negro Seamen! Let's not be taken in by these maneuvers of the shipowners. If we allow ourselves to be divided, the fight for better conditions will be long and hard. If we stand together, we can't be licked! (Foner, 1974, p. 227).

By 1942 the NMU had a membership of 50,000, of whom ten per cent were Black. When an attempt was made to reject Black seamen as part of the crew for a troop ship sailing from New York in January 1942, the Union wrote to President Roosevelt asking him to intervene. In response Roosevelt wrote: 'Questions of race, creed, and colour have no place in determining who are to man our ships.' Two years later, in July 1944, the NMU signed an agreement with 125 shipping companies in which they agreed to abide by the Union's anti-discrimination policy (Foner, 1974, pp. 259-260).

One of the beneficiaries of the policies of the NMU was Hugh Mulzac. After his disappointing experiences with the Black Star Line in the early 1920s, he had been reduced to casual work as a steward on a succession of American ships. Then in April 1930 he joined the non-racial 'Marine Workers Industrial Union' in Baltimore and for the first time participated in strike action. He joined the newly formed NMU in 1937. In his autobiography, Mulzac states that he had not developed a 'political philosophy' prior to the 1930s, partly because of 'my natural conservative "British" background', and partly because of his driving ambition to be master of a ship: 'I was ... driven by personal ambition and never understood my struggle in its wider social context.' However, 'the NMU changed all this' (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 111-112, 117-123, 128). According to Foner it was 'largely as a result of the NMU's efforts' that four of the 'Liberty ships' during the Second World War were given Black captains and mixed crews, including the *SS Booker T. Washington* with Hugh Mulzac as Master (Foner, 1974, p. 260). His crew included communists and ex-Wobblies, as well as NMU members (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 156-157, 194-198).¹¹

¹¹ According to Mulzac the *Booker T. Washington* was commissioned in October 1942, while Foner dates the commissioning of the four ships to 1944. It seems likely that Mulzac is the more reliable source on this issue.

After the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War and rampant fear of communism changed the political climate in the United States. The progressive left-wing leadership of the NMU was voted out of office in a conservative backlash in 1948, while the United States Congress passed a series of laws designed to root out communist influences in the trade union movement. Among the victims was the Jamaican NMU leader and former Communist party member, Ferdinand Smith. He was classed as an 'undesirable alien' and deported to Jamaica in August 1951. On the day of his departure, he told reporters:

I helped to build a union which enabled sailors to marry and have children and a home just like other workers, instead of being kicked around like bums. For this I earned the enmity of the shipowners and their agents, in and out of the government (Foner, 1974 p. 285).

Hugh Mulzac was another Afro-Caribbean victim. He could not be deported like Smith since he had become a US citizen in 1918, but he was excluded from all maritime work under the terms of the 'Port Security Act' passed in 1950. He was accused of associating with, and being sympathetic to, known subversive groups and individuals. Among the individuals named during his appeal hearing was Ferdinand Smith, while the list of 'suspect organizations' to which he belonged included the National Negro Congress, the Negro Labor Victory Committee, the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (a wartime group of which Eleanor Roosevelt was also a member), the Council on African Affairs and The Council for West Indian Federation. With reference to the latter, Mulzac explained to the hearing that he was 'a proud founding member' of this group, which was dedicated to the ending of British imperial rule in the West Indies. His appeal was to no avail, however, and confirmation of the ban effectively ended his maritime career (Mulzac, 1972, pp. 244-248).

Conclusion

As this article has shown, during the first half of the twentieth century, Afro-Caribbean seafarers had an instrumental role in the transmission of Pan-Africanist ideas, and were also prominent in the organization of the international working class in the Atlantic world. Although not discussed in this article, they were also at the heart of a wave of working-class militancy that swept the West Indies in the late colonial period. This helped sponsor the formation of a range of political associations and trade unions that propelled

the movement towards political independence in many Caribbean territories. These were important contributions to the shaping of the 'Black Atlantic,' and especially to the emerging discourse on 'Global Africa' in these years.

None of this would have been possible without the unique character of Afro-Caribbean consciousness, rooted in the long struggle for freedom in the Caribbean, and informed by 'the inescapable hybridity' of the societies in which that consciousness emerged. It was because of this unique consciousness that the local and the global came together wherever Afro-Caribbean Seafarers were found.

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CHAPTER 21

WALTER RODNEY, SYLVIA WYNTER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICANA STUDIES IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN

Aaron Kamugisha

'The road to West Indian national identity lay through Africa'

(James, 1989, p. 402).

C. L. R. James, one of the quintessential figures of the twentieth century Black world, was an insightful Pan-Africanist and Marxist theoretician of great subtlety and charisma. His immense contributions to global Black thought defy easy summation, but his history of the Haitian Revolution – *The Black Jacobins*, first published in 1938 and reissued in 1963 – is widely considered to be his finest and most enduring work, and arguably the most influential work of history by a Caribbean historian in the twentieth century (cf. Kamugisha, 2014, pp. 190-215).¹ His appendix to the second edition of that text is a discerning survey of intellectual currents underlying the social movements for Caribbean freedom from the Haitian Revolution to the early 1960s, when the Anglophone Caribbean stood at the cusp of independence, and is one of James's most poignant writings on the potential and limits of Caribbean freedom. In it, James asserts that 'West Indians first became aware of themselves as a people in the Haitian Revolution' (James, 1989, p. 391). A reflection on this statement leads one to consider the impact of the revolution on perceptions of the possibility

1 I make the argument here that given the clear influence of *The Black Jacobins* on Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery*, the latter's unquestioned status as the most *debated* work of twentieth century Caribbean history is eclipsed in influence by the former.

of Black freedom in the Atlantic world, agency against the tide of history, and the sociohistorical features that have fashioned contemporary Caribbean existence. Caribbean history is, for James, defined by two central features, 'the sugar plantation and Negro slavery', and the entire appendix is a sustained meditation on the response to those forms of modern colonial power. His study of the Haitian Revolution led James to understand enslaved Africans as living a modern existence in a colonial world, and he was among the first to firmly locate plantation slavery as a modern process, in a move that was heretical to both the complacent evolutionary anthropology of the early twentieth century and to Marxism-Leninism.² He also highlights other features of enslaved life in the Caribbean—the highly detailed, mechanized process of sugar production, the dependence of the colonial economy on transnational flows of basic goods, principally food and clothing (James, 1989, p. 392). These insights by James have been noted by scholars interested in making an argument about the profound modernity of the Caribbean and transatlantic Black experience since slavery, and indeed its primacy in debates about the modern.³ Given Haiti's seismic impact on the history of the Western hemisphere, an influence that, in James's own words, would 'make history which would alter the fate of millions of men and shift the economic currents of three continents', the Black Jacobins *create* the modern Atlantic world (James, 1989, p. 25).

'From Toussaint L'Ouverture to Fidel Castro', in its evocative tale of Caribbean history between its two most important revolutions, becomes a reflection on the knowledge of Africa and the forging of a Black identity in the Caribbean. In noting that his study of the Haitian Revolution was written with 'Africa and African emancipation...in mind', James suggests that two factors became essential in the development of a Caribbean radical intelligentsia, the first a flight from home, the second an undoing of lies that provided such an intricate scaffolding for colonial racism, which could only be accomplished through a re-evaluation of the image of Africa in the minds of people in the African diaspora. This is what influenced the work of Jean Price-Mars and George Padmore, and movements like Garveyism and Negritude. Reflecting

2 'Working and living together in gangs of hundreds on the huge sugar-factories which covered the North Plain, they were closer to a modern proletariat than any group of workers in existence at the time, and the rising was, therefore, a thoroughly prepared and organized mass movement' (James, 1989, p. 86). This line is repeated verbatim in the chapter 'San Domingo' in (James, 2004, p. 9).

3 See here Paul Gilroy (1993, p. 221). Gilroy gestures to *The Black Jacobins* and cites at length the key passage on slave life and the modern (pp. 251–252). Sidney W. Mintz has suggested that C. L. R. James was the first to illustrate the centrality of the Black experience in the formation of the Atlantic world. (cf. Mintz, 1996, pp. 289–311).

on Aimé Césaire's *Notebook of a Return to My Native Land*, James would claim that this long poem had 'united elements in modern thought which seemed destined to remain asunder', detailing them as follows:

1. He has made a union of the African sphere of existence with existence in the Western world.
2. The past of mankind and the future of mankind are historically and logically linked.
3. No longer from external stimulus but from their own self-generated and independent being and motion will Africa and Africans move towards an integrated humanity (James, 1989, pp. 401-402).

It is not difficult to discern the touch of West Indian exceptionalism in James that some found so insufferable here in his portrayals of West Indians at the heart of the International African Service Bureau in 1930s London, and his view of their decisive role in the liberation of the African continent from colonialism. It may well be here that James's most productive insight is the one contained in the epigraph to this essay, which makes West Indians of his generation historical debtors to Africans rather than creditors. To reformulate his comment, West Indian national identity becomes impossible without Africa, a legacy of which James was insightfully aware, but only partially understood.

The time separating us from James's appendix feels like a chasm, given the two generations of post-colonial developments in Africa and the Caribbean since that time. In this paper, I consider the question of the changing role that consciousness of Africa occupies among the intelligentsia of the post-independence Anglophone Caribbean. I do this through two key moments – the reception to the work of Walter Rodney, the most influential Africanist scholar from the Caribbean in this period, and through a relatively unknown, but dazzlingly important text, Sylvia Wynter's *Black Metamorphosis*, written in the 1970s, but now receiving overdue recognition and likely to guide Caribbean debates about African diasporic identity for some time to come. Through the work of Rodney and Wynter, I wish to consider one particularly fruitful moment in the invention of African diaspora studies in the Anglophone Caribbean, and what that conjuncture can reveal for us today, given the centrality of Africa in the transformed, but not vanished freedom dreams (to use Robin Kelley's term) of African Caribbean people (Kelley, 2002).

Walter Rodney in 1968 Jamaica

Black Power in the West Indies means three closely related things: (i) the break with imperialism, which is historically white racist; (ii) the assumption of power by the black masses in the islands; (iii) the cultural reconstruction of the society in the image of the blacks (Rodney, 1990, p. 28).

The words above are recognizably those of Walter Rodney, from his 1968 series of speeches, later collected under the title *The Groundings with My Brothers*. The story of Rodney's nine-month sojourn in Jamaica as a lecturer in African history at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus has become an almost talismanic landmark in the tale of the rise of the left in the post-independence Anglophone Caribbean. Rodney's appointment as the first lecturer in African history at the University of the West Indies, a post he assumed in January 1968, was curtailed by the Jamaican government's refusal to allow him back in the country in October of that year on his return from the Congress of Black Writers conference in Montreal. The massive protests that followed his banning, popularly known as the 'Rodney Riots', are often seen as the event that signalled the emergence of a new left movement throughout the Anglophone Caribbean, a fifteen-year period of heightened revolutionary consciousness and activity, which would come to an end with a succession of defeats – Rodney's murder by agents of the Forbes Burnham regime in 1980, the end of Michael Manley's democratic socialism in the same year, and the collapse of the Grenadian revolution in 1983.

Beyond Rodney's undeniable charismatic appeal, grounded in his ability to speak to different audiences throughout Jamaica and his thoroughgoing knowledge of African history, the events of October 1968 had a longer genesis. Rupert Lewis has cited the Jamaican provenance of these as the '(Claudius) Henry protest of 1960; the activities of Millard Johnson's Garveyite People's Political Party; the Coral Gardens disturbance of 1963; the anti-Chinese riots of 1965; and the national state of emergency of 1966-67', all of which made disconcertingly clear within the decade that Jamaica gained its independence that its immediate future would be neocolonial (Lewis, 1998a, pp. 7-8, 1998b). The wider international context included the assassination of Martin Luther King in the USA and the subsequent urban rebellions, the student and workers uprising of May 1968 in France, anti-Vietnam war protests throughout the USA and the Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico City in October 1968. All of these local and global events had the effect of making the University of the West Indies (UWI) Mona

Campus of the late 1960s to early 1970s a charged, unsettled and enormously productive intellectual space.⁴ The sheer unsettled nature of 1968 created a historical conjuncture in which Rodney's radicalism could be given full play, coming in a decade which was also to witness the emergence of the New World Group, the occupation of the Creative Arts Centre and the birth of *Abeng* and *Savacou*.⁵ While the record of this period is now well-known, I wish to focus on Rodney's message on the importance of African history and Black consciousness in the Caribbean in his writings in *The Groundings of My Brothers* – and to argue for its relevance in tracing the contours of a critical tradition of African diaspora consciousness in the Caribbean.

The six chapters that comprise *The Groundings with My Brothers* can be usefully seen as meditations on three themes – the Jamaican situation, Black power, and African history. Understood in this manner, its opening chapter 'Statement of the Jamaican Situation' and its last, 'The Groundings with My Brothers' can be read as analyses of Jamaica before and after Rodney's enforced exile, while 'Black Power, its relevance to the West Indies' is an elaboration on the movement sweeping the United States, first discussed in 'Black Power, a basic understanding'. The two chapters on African history follow a similar pattern, in which 'African History and Culture' presents the continent to his audience, followed by the political meaning and purpose of this knowledge in 'African History in the Service of Black Revolution'. It is these chapters on African history that will be my focus, as here Rodney's unique contribution to African consciousness in the Caribbean as both gifted orator and expert on African history is evident.

In 'African History and Culture', Rodney presents a history of the African continent from the dawn of recorded history, noting that modern humans emerged in Africa, and that through Egypt, Africa gave the world one of its oldest and most enduring civilizations in antiquity. He disputes the then still fashionable idea that ancient Egypt was a near Eastern rather than African civilization, explaining this distortion of history as a product of the colonial imagination, and another of the ideological tropes that sustain Western

4 The Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (ACLALS) was held from 3 to 9 January 1971 at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus in Jamaica. A sustained discussion of this conference does not yet exist, but for accounts by major participants, see Edward Baugh (2006, pp. 15–28); and Kamau Brathwaite (1993, pp. 321–325). For analyses of the importance of the conference, see Laurence A. Breiner, (1998), and Norval Edwards (2011, pp. 111–123).

5 The most accessible place to gain an appreciation of the ferment of that time at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus remains a series of interviews conducted by David Scott in *Small Axe*. See especially *Small Axe* 1 (1997, pp. 119–39); *Small Axe* 3 (1998, pp. 65–114); *Small Axe* 5 (1999, pp. 81–151); and *Small Axe* 10 (2001, pp. 85–177). For an examination of that turbulent decade in Jamaica, see Obika Gray (1997).

imperialism (cf. Kamugisha, 2003, pp. 31–60). The history of ancient Africa emerges here as a vital link in the decolonizing of the minds of its people, as it proves it was ‘in the mainstream of human history’ rather than a sideshow to the ‘History’ of the West (Rodney, 1990, p. 39). The tone of Rodney’s text is recuperative, but also vindicationist, as seen in the following line: ‘So long as there are people who deny our humanity as blacks then for so long must we proclaim and assert our humanity as blacks’ (Rodney, 1990, p. 39). The African American intellectual historian Wilson Moses’ description of vindicationism as a ‘project of defending Black people from the charge that they have made little or no contribution to the history of human progress. Sometimes vindicationism may imply the even more basic struggle to secure recognition of the fact that Black people are human at all’ is a particularly apt description of Rodney in this chapter, the limits of which he surpasses when he enlists African history in the political struggle for Black freedom (Moses, 1998, p. 21).

In ‘African History in the Service of Black Revolution’, Rodney commences by indicting the invidious requirements of vindicationism – that Black people should be cast in a situation of ‘proving our humanity’ – but further notes that white suzerainty over Western knowledge production means the authority which gives that work legitimacy is itself racist.⁶ Two principles should guide the study of African history. First, the quest should always be to effect a decolonization of the minds of Blacks rather than to enlist the admiration of whites, in effect a dismantling of the basis of vindicationism. Second, the acquisition of historical knowledge must be ‘secondary to the concrete tactics and strategy which are necessary for our liberation’ (Rodney, 1990, p. 51). The first principle is key to resisting the co-optation of the newly emerging African studies in the USA, and Rodney has sardonic observations to make about the paradox of corporate sponsorship of knowledge production about Black people from apartheid and imperial profits. He also dismisses the obsession with societies deemed ‘civilizations’ by the West, noting that the political state is not the only ‘meaningful form of social development’ (Rodney, 1990, p. 56). The purpose of the study of the African past is to show that ‘ordinary African life had meaning and value’, a rarely acknowledged truth that facilitates colonialism’s persistence in the contemporary moment.

6 Two versions of ‘African History in the Service of Black Revolution’ exist. The first was published in *The Groundings with My Brothers*, the second is a more direct transcription from the tapes of the Congress of Black Writers conference and was published in the journal *Small Axe* in 2001 under a slightly different title. Though the latter version is more compelling as it captures the rhetorical appeal of Rodney’s address, given the comparison I am making I will rely on the original version. (cf. Rodney, 2001, pp. 66–80; Austin, 2001, pp. 60–65).

Rodney's blueprint for the study of Africa resonates a half-century later, and one cannot help but reflect on the civilizationist Afrocentric turn in many radical circles in the Caribbean, which he would have scoffed at, recognizing well its conservatism, and the historical roots of the bourgeois love of 'civilization'. Rodney's single most influential work, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, was greatly admired in the Caribbean, and became part of a pantheon of Black radical literature read throughout the region. The reviews assembled in the African Studies Association of the West Indies Bulletin of 1973 are a good place to assess its impact in the region. These reviews provided assessments from four Caribbean scholars in different fields – Rupert Lewis (Political Science), Norman Girvan (Economics), Kenneth Hall (History) and Kamau Brathwaite (History/Literature) – and they are generally positive, with the exception being the challenging and fascinating response by Brathwaite. Brathwaite's review, titled 'Dialect or Dialectic', expresses no doubt that Rodney's book is 'really a brilliant, very important anti-colonial tract', it is 'truly revolutionary scholarship: history as teach, as thought, as verbal bomb and bullet' (Brathwaite, 1973, pp. 95, 89). Yet Brathwaite believes that Rodney is unconsciously trapped in the 'tyranny of [a] model' that proposes a 'modernist/progressive dialectic':

But when we are also told that African communal societies, by their very nature, and because of their place in the scheme, are merely stages in an exploitation/resource syndrome which will eventually lead to their transformation into more efficient (i.e. capitalist or socialist) orders, we must begin to protest; because what begins to emerge is a picture of Africa as being little more than a shattered image of Europe (Brathwaite, 1973, pp. 93-94).

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa for Brathwaite is 'pursued by its own contradiction: that Africa's weakness was that it was not efficient/capitalist enough: either in its own state, or under the Europeans' (Brathwaite, 1973, p. 95). Brathwaite ends his review with the following proposition:

With a fine committed intellect like Rodney's, we have to consider the *full* range of unfolding thought and action to properly appreciate how the dialectic's own contradictions are resolved: how the sharp-edged fragments fit. My maroon comments here concern not this brother's achievement, which quietly shines forth, but the feel and texture of this particular work: the need for some dialect to go along with the dialectic (Brathwaite, 1973, p. 99), (original emphasis).

There is much to ponder here, and despite the doubts that can be raised about Brathwaite's gloss of the nuances of Rodney's dialectic argument, the review presents something more intriguing than a spirited rejoinder to Rodney's

magnum opus. In Brathwaite, we see a shift in the *focus* of African diaspora criticism in the Caribbean away from the grander dialectical approach of a Rodney or James, with its interest in the place of Africa and the Caribbean in the world system constituted by colonialism, and more towards a concern with the renaissance of a 'little tradition' in the Caribbean, with its roots in Africa. To understand this shift fully, we may well reflect on an unpublished text that represented its author's 1970s reflections on the constitution and transformation of African culture in the Americas, Sylvia Wynter's *Black Metamorphosis*.

Sylvia Wynter's *Black Metamorphosis*

In 1971, after meeting at a conference at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, the Jamaican cultural theorist, playwright and novelist Sylvia Wynter wrote to African American historian Vincent Harding of her intention to write an essay on the African experience in the Americas for publication by the Institute of the Black World. At this time, Wynter was a lecturer in Spanish in the Department of Modern Languages at the University of the West Indies, a noted novelist and playwright, and considered a significant Caribbean cultural theorist.⁷ However, in her proposed essay for the Institute of the Black World, Wynter wanted to try her hand at something new – to move beyond her then Caribbean-centred critical essays towards a hemispheric conception of the weight placed by colonialism on Black culture. Her proposed essay would expand beyond authorial intention and become Wynter's major project of the 1970s, in its final iteration a 935-page manuscript, which never saw publication by the Institute of the Black World. The only part of this manuscript that has been published is her 1979 essay 'Sambos and Minstrels', though excerpts and allusions to many of the other texts she wrote in the 1970s can be found in the manuscript, particularly 'Jonkonnu in Jamaica' (1970), 'Novel and History' (1971), 'Ethno or Socio Poetics' (1975), 'The Politics of Black Culture' (1977) and 'In Quest of Matthew Bondman' (1981).⁸

7 Sylvia Wynter's essays, (1968, pp. 24-32; 1969, pp. 27-42) would be hailed by Kamau Brathwaite as 'one of our great critical landmarks: a major essay into literary *ideas*, and the first to be written *in* the West Indies.' See Kamau Brathwaite (1976, p. 27 original emphasis), republished in Yanique Hume and Aaron Kamugisha (2013). In addition to this and other essays, she had published 'Jonkonnu in Jamaica' (1970, pp. 34-48), a similarly path-breaking critical essay on Jamaican culture.

8 'Jonkonnu in Jamaica' (1970, pp. 34-48); 'Novel and History, Plot and Plantation'. (1971, pp. 95-102); 'Ethno or Socio Poetics' (1976, pp. 78-94); 'We Know Where We Are From: The Politics of Black Culture from Myal to Marley' (1977); 'In Quest of Matthew Bondman: Some Cultural Notes on the Jamesian Journey' (1981, pp. 54-69, republished in a slightly changed version in 1986).

Black Metamorphosis: New Natives in a New World is a remarkable manuscript, and deserves close study for a number of reasons.⁹ It is arguably the most important unpublished non-fiction work by an Anglophone Caribbean intellectual, and one major guide to the transition in Wynter's thought between her work mainly on the Caribbean and Black America in the 1960s and 1970s, and her theory of the human from the early 1980s onwards.¹⁰ Those already familiar with some of Wynter's theoretical shift from, through and with Marxism, Caribbean studies and Black Studies, and toward her theory of the human, will find in *Black Metamorphosis* a complex and provocative study, however incomplete. Not only does the manuscript clarify Wynter's reflections on the process of Indigenization and black cultural nationalism, but it is her most sustained discussion of the politics of Black culture in America. In my view it constitutes a highly significant contribution to the Black radical tradition, and one of the most compelling interpretations of the Black experience in the Western hemisphere ever written by a Caribbean intellectual.

In its initial form, the manuscript that became *Black Metamorphosis* constituted a forty-page essay titled 'Natives in a New World: The African Transformation in the Americas'. A longer version consisting of seventeen chapters and running to 251 pages in length seems to have been the version that the Institute of the Black World was familiar with through most of the 1970s. In the final 935-page manuscript, the page numbers break at page 251, and resume with page 370. The 120 missing pages correspond exactly to the number of pages in a series of descriptions of revolts by enslaved persons in Jamaica, and it appears that they were meant to be inserted at this point in the text.¹¹ A further thirteen chapters and over 550 pages follow the resumption on page 370, with the project ending at page 935.¹² In my discussion below, while my references range throughout

9 For more on *Black Metamorphosis*, see Aaron Kamugisha (2016, pp. 37-145).

10 This point is made well by Derrick White (2010, pp. 127-148).

11 These pages are divided into five chapters, with the titles 'The First Maroon War' (27 pages), 'Nanny Town' (22 pages), 'The More Honourable to Them' (25 pages), 'The Black Gendarmes' (16 pages), 'Tacky War' (30 pages). Though they are numbered Chapters 12-16 respectively, they are omitted from the order in the early table of contents, and are the only pages not numbered as part of the manuscript. They consist of historical descriptions in a manner quite divergent from the main text, and one wonders if they were originally slated to be a lengthy appendix to the earlier 250-page text. There is some justification for this, as the gap between page 250 and 370 in the final manuscript corresponds exactly to the total number of these pages.

12 Given that the long version of the manuscript in its early pages still refers to the manuscript as an essay, it seems that chapters were continually added onwards without a revision of the manuscript in its entirety, which is corroborated by the table of contents, which was never revised past chapter 17 and page 251. It is not clear when the manuscript was completed, with a number of references post-1978 suggesting that Wynter may not have concluded it until the early 1980s.

the text, I will focus on the first 250 pages of the final manuscript, as it is there that Wynter's theory of how African people make themselves Indigenous in the New World is most fully developed. While the final manuscript bore the title 'Black Metamorphosis' it is clear from the title of the earlier 40-page version that the single most important theoretical innovation in the first iterations of the longer manuscript is the question of the Black as native in the New World.¹³ My discussion will track this concern of Wynter's through three themes – the creation of African diaspora culture, the racial law of labour, and resistance.

Sylvia Wynter commences *Black Metamorphosis* with the declaration that its intention is 'to explore... the historical process, the socio-economic sea-change, the cultural metamorphosis by which the multi-tribal African became the native of that area of experience that we term the New World' (Winter, 1970–1980, p. 1). The daring and breathtaking scope of this statement announces a text devoted to wide-reaching socio-historical transformation across centuries and a cultural history of the African presence in the New World. The wonder that this might be attempted at all by Wynter can be partially explained by the historical conjuncture during which the work started – within five years of the first programmes in Black Studies at U.S. universities, in which the responsibility to disenchant the fictions of the Eurocentric academy and produce new knowledge in the pursuit of human freedom was the urgent task. Despite the forty years that have elapsed since its writing, *Black Metamorphosis* still has much to offer scholars of African diaspora studies based on two of its central themes – Wynter's theories of cultural transformation in the Americas, and her related perspective on the process of Indigenization, through which people of African descent became native to their new land; and the idea that Black experience matters – it is decisive to comprehending that the New World constitutes a distinctive 'area of experience', unparalleled in the past history of humankind, a central point to which Wynter would return in her later work.¹⁴

The dehumanizing experience of the Middle Passage and slave society had by the 1970s already been the labour of generations of scholars. In *Black Metamorphosis*, Wynter's focus was less on the identification and tracking of African culture from the continent to the New World, but more on the experience of landfall in a strange land, and the fashioning of self this engendered. Resistance to dehumanization results in a situation in which 'the black would

13 On my copy of Wynter's 40-page essay 'Natives in a New World: The African Transformation in the Americas' Wynter wrote two handwritten (potential?) subtitles, 'Return of the Native Sons' and 'Native Sons in the New World'.

14 See especially here Sylvia Wynter, '1492: A New World View', in Vera Hyatt and Rex Nettleford (1995).

rehumanize himself as the native of the Caribbean. As native he was to endure a new form of dehumanization and was to carry on a new variant of the old struggle against exploitation' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 2). The suggestion here is that the only route towards resisting chattel slavery's reduction of Blacks to the status of property, the ultimate form of human alienation, is the capturing and consolidation of an identity that makes one a legitimate member of this new landscape. The questions to be posed are far from straightforward:

In mythic fact or factual myth the Caribbean Negro is the Caribbean Native. Yet rarely had the fact been questioned – Why? Why should the black man, as much an emigrant to the New World as all the others, come to be considered indigenous to the Caribbean, to the Americas and to so consider himself, not only at the conscious but more profound at the unconscious level? (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 6).

In a discussion of the limits of the scholarship of Harold Cruse and E. Franklin Frazier, and their assumption of the non-existence of an African cultural presence in North America, Wynter states that African culture did not disappear in the New World, instead it metamorphosed (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 455). With this succinct comment, Wynter announced her position on a debate that commenced long before her time, and to which she was to make a signal contribution. In her article 'Jonkonnu in Jamaica', the published article which bears the heaviest responsibility for *Black Metamorphosis*, Wynter had already declared her interest in describing the self-fashioning of Blacks in the Caribbean as a process of 'Indigenization' rather than 'creolization', where Indigenization represented a 'secretive process by which the dominated culture survives and resists', while creolization is little more than a false assimilation (Winter, 1970, pp. 34-48).¹⁵ *Black Metamorphosis* represents a considerable extension and clarification of Wynter's argument for Indigenization, and stands as the central theory of her early 250-page version of the manuscript.¹⁶ In making her argument that Blacks consider themselves natives of the Americas on an 'unconscious level', Wynter turns to Jean-Price Mars, whom she quotes as declaring that 'our presence on a spot of that American archipelago which we have 'humanized', the breach which we made in the process of historical events to snatch our place among men' as indicative of how the process of

15 For more on this argument, see (Boyce-Davis, 2015, pp. 203-225). On *Black Metamorphosis*, Wynter would state that 'Creolization leads to the philosophy of integration. Marronage leads to the principle of separation. Indigenization must lead to the principle of liberation' (pp. 228-9).

16 For more on the development and different versions of *Black Metamorphosis*, see my introduction to this issue.

Indigenization manifests itself (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 18, 243-44).¹⁷ The sheer disruption of the Middle Passage is figured here as the event which creates a new Indigenous experience as 'the extra-African's cultural response to the dehumanizing alienation of the capitalist plantation system of the New World, was to re-root himself, making use of the old cultural patterns which had undergone a true sea-change, in order to *create* the new vocabulary of the new existence' – a process that created a new human in a new land.¹⁸ New World African culture is one 'whose crucible of conversion was exile', not just from its original home, but from 'what was defined as the human condition', resulting in a culture 'native to exile', that 'specialize(s) in nativizing exile' (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 56, 560). Wynter disputes the 'tabula rasa' myth, which suggests that Blacks arrived in the Americas devoid of a culture, or possessing one that rapidly dissipated under the calculated cruelty of the plantation experience. Rather, Blacks were the 'most creative culturally', as 'they were the only ones involved in a unique cultural process by which old roots were transplanted into new soil, in the context of a totally alienated experience' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 23). The roots and routes forged by Black culture as the underside of social life in the Americas resulted in a situation in which 'blacks made themselves the native people, through the creation of a folk culture' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 63). Black music represented an awakening of Black culture, as 'work songs, spirituals, blues, jazz, were the counter-poetics native and Indigenous to the American continent, subterraneanly subversive of its surface reality' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 218). At the turn of the century, W. E. B. Du Bois had famously written about the 'sorrow songs' that 'stirred me strangely', and stimulated his awareness of the power of Black culture – 'the Negro folk song – the rhythmic cry of the slave – stands today not simply as the sole American music, but as the most beautiful expression of human *experience* born this side of the seas... It remains as the singular spiritual heritage of the nation and the greatest gift of the Negro people' (Du Bois, 1995, pp. 264, 265, my italics). Wynter would echo Du Bois, but alert us to the global significance of this culture forged in bondage: 'The black man, converted into commodity/object, used his former culture to restructure a social fantasy system which would create him, define

17 See Sylvia Wynter (1970, p. 35; 1970-1980, p. 17).

18 Wynter's use of Indigenization has recently come under criticism by Shona Jackson and Melanie Newton, who have both shown, relying on 'Jonkonnu in Jamaica', that this essay assumes native absence to claim Black nativity to the land. It is my hope that this extended discussion of nativity in *Black Metamorphosis* will clarify further the complex meanings of the terms 'native' and 'Indigenous' in Wynter's work. See Shona Jackson (2012, pp. 43-44, 244 fn 7) and Melanie Newton (2013, pp. 117-8).

him as human. And in defining himself as such, he became the neo-native of the American continent – and the proto-native of the emerging world system' (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 243-44).

The imperatives of colonial labour meant that 'the "negro", collected at the different ports and factories for embarkation to the plantations of the New World, began his metamorphosis from a human entity to a market one' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 33). In chapter eleven, 'Negro into Native', Wynter's focus is less on the cultural manifestations of Black cultural transformation, but on the consolidation of a racial law of labour, which would produce Blacks as an internal colony within the United States.¹⁹ Emancipation would engineer a transition in which Blacks become 'native labor': 'the logic of segregation lay in its function: the transformation of the Black, who had culturally made himself the "native" of the United States, "native" in the sense of neo-autochthonous, into the internal *native labor force* of the market system now spearheaded by the United States' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 155, original emphasis). Black cultural transformation and its claiming of nativity may have been stimulated by a compulsion to fashion new selves from the wreckage of bondage, but here the positioning of Blacks as native follows the logic of the settler-native relationship of the colonial world writ large. It follows then, that 'Negro jobs inside the United States were of course the equivalent of native labor in the colonial situation' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 151, original emphasis). Blacks' diminished share of the 'social product', and not just the financial rewards of capitalism explains the obsession with the everyday humiliating rituals of segregation (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 163-4). The white colonizer emerges here as 'never native', and (using Gilberto Frerye's term) a 'horizontal settler: living in a state of psychic uprootedness', while 'settler-labor' exists as a 'settler proletariat' (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 166, 241). This leaves Blacks as 'the ultimate symbol of native labor, i.e., of the super exploited labor of the world market system' (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 208).

This attention to the world system by Wynter allows her to wed Black and Native experience in the New World together, towards a demonstration that while their dispossession is different, the struggle is the same (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 248). This struggle, which Frantz Fanon knew well, is for 'the world's natives, the wretched of the earth, to reclaim their disputed humanity', as 'It is time now for the natives to move out of the reservation, their ghettos, out of their marginality and convert the marginal into the mainstream' (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 148, 226). Native Americans ('reservation natives') and Blacks

19 On Blacks as an 'internal colony', see Ramón A. Gutiérrez (2004, pp. 282-295).

(‘domestic natives’) meet at a common site of loss in a rapidly transforming post-industrial America, with cultural resonances for the globe:

Today as all the natives of our continent move off the last reservation, or are driven off, and the reservation natives undergo their own Middle Passage into the twentieth century shanty town city, the music and the popular poetics of the domestic native exist as the first articulation of that global popular culture that is being created by all the natives, now native in exile, conscious of alienation (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 248).

The resistance culture of Blacks, its creation of global popular culture, is where we might see intimations of the human in our anti-Black world. Yet the secret of Black music lies beyond its subversive value. ‘Out of another dispossession, out of another Middle Passage of the spirit’, Wynter writes. ‘Reggae, like the blues, like jazz, articulates the revolutionary demand for happiness on the part of the wretched of the earth – the global natives of all races disrupted from their traditional cultures into twentieth century terror’ (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 205). No resistance to colonialism is possible without a reordering of aesthetics, as there is ‘no revolutionary praxis without revolutionary counter-representation’ (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 917). Wynter’s search is then, for a radical anticolonial praxis that could hasten the demise of our contemporary world order:

It is the natives, all the wretched of the earth, who, breaking out of their reservation, are now called upon to reinvent the very concept of the human, through a restructuring of the world system created by the discovery and conquest of the New World by the West (Winter, 1970-1980, pp. 249-50).

That the quest for a Black consciousness by African diasporic subjects has continued to route itself *through* Africa in the generation since *Black Metamorphosis* was completed by Wynter is clear. Midway through *Black Metamorphosis*, she makes an observation about the contemporary meaning and importance of African social relations with echoes of Rodney’s lectures on African history and culture:

To attempt to formulate the social techniques which Africans brought with them to the New World is not to fall into the trap of idealizing African cultures as a noble savage other. Rather, it is to argue that as the technological achievements of the Western culture of production have been due to a chain of innovation which other peoples now borrow as they imperatively modernize in order to survive, so the achievements of a mode of *social organization* which resolved the problem of unity in diversity and diversity in unity, was due to a chain of social innovation by non-industrial African cultures, whose models we can now borrow and adapt to the requirements of the twentieth century. Some of these social and cultural innovations

were transplanted by the Middle Passage voyagers. Hitherto, they have existed as an underlife, but in the movements of the Sixties, unrecognized, some of these innovations surfaced in movements that initiated a new phase in the social direction of the United States, shattering the axiomatic certainty that had formerly prevailed (Winter, 1970-1980, p. 505-6).

It may well be the lot of Blacks to humanize the social relations of the continents and islands of the New World, a world saturated with the violence of slavery and genocide. The conjuncture inhabited by Rodney and Wynter in their attention to the gravity of history, and commitment to global Black revolt is a telling reminder in our contemporary neoliberal order of the legitimacy of colonized people's lives, and the right of their bodies to *exist*. It remains the hallmark of the study of Black lives both within the Caribbean and globally.

The future of Africana studies in the anglophone Caribbean

My argument is that we have encountered a stasis in African diaspora studies in the Caribbean because we are not quite sure what our intellectual/political project remains in the aftermath of the end of apartheid and formal colonialism on the continent, the decline in global Black Power movements, and the proffering of cultural citizenship by postcolonial Caribbean elites, who celebrate Black culture while reproducing neocolonial domination on black bodies. To this can be added the dreary apathy and lethargy at Caribbean postcolonial development, the social crises and wreckage of our economies, and the subsequent flight to North America and Europe by a significant portion of our educated citizenry. At the University of the West Indies, the oldest and leading tertiary institution in the anglophone Caribbean, while the study of continental Africa in fields from History to Philosophy has an unquestioned place and courses on African diaspora culture in the region abound, very few attempts have been made to integrate these into a rigorously informed perspective on what an African diaspora (Africana) methodology might look like, and how, through Caribbean eyes, we might consider the Black presence in a hemispheric and global perspective, integrating the experiences of African America, Canada, South and Central America, Black Europe and continental Africa into a new arena of scholarship and activist engagement.²⁰ It may well

20 On these questions, see Carolyn Cooper (2010); and Fitzroy Baptiste (2000, pp. 1-15).

be that the rise of a new Black intellectual community in the African world's most powerful state, South Africa, may be decisive in this new articulation. The Global African perspective that this volume embraces may well call on Caribbean intellectuals to remember the daring of their predecessors' diasporic search for Caribbean meaning, in Rodney's journey through African history for Black liberation and Wynter's exploration of Black metamorphosis as an insurrectionary model by the condemned of the earth.

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IDENTITY AND 'INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE' IN THE SIXTH REGION OF AFRICA

Alan Cobley

Introduction

There are major practical difficulties in (re-)establishing meaningful collaboration among the peoples of Global Africa during the twenty-first century. Not only have they been separated by both geography and history; they must negotiate this new relationship in an era of globalization engineered by, for, and in the interests of the West. The logic of geography, common heritage and shared aspirations, for example, would seem to demand a closer relationship between the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean. Historically, Africans in the Caribbean as in other parts of Diaspora – defined by the African Union as the 'Sixth Region of Africa' – have always aspired to reconnect with the African continent. However, the consistent and often highly articulate expressions of support from Caribbean Pan-Africanists for such initiatives over the years have tended to mask an underlying sentiment in the Caribbean that has resisted a wholehearted embrace of the African heritage of Caribbean peoples. Initiatives to bring Africa and the Caribbean together in this economic and geopolitical context appear always to be working against the grain. To understand some of the reasons why this is so, it is necessary to examine historical discourses of identity in the Caribbean, and especially how popular consciousness among Caribbean people has evolved out of the tumultuous history of the region and so shaped their complex relationship with their African heritage.

Caribbean identity in historical perspective

The Caribbean islands and the territories surrounding the Caribbean basin were peopled first by Amerindians, beginning with a subgroup of the Arawak linguistic family called the Ciboney, who spread slowly through the region, moving from place to place in hollowed-out wooden canoes, searching for fresh fishing grounds. For almost four thousand years, from the first known settlement in the islands in Eastern Cuba, at least 3,500 years before the birth of Christ, this group was largely undisturbed (Watson, 1994, p. 17). After 200 CE the Ciboney were gradually displaced or absorbed by another Arawakan group, the Tainos, who pushed north to establish themselves in substantial settlements throughout the Lesser and the Greater Antilles by the seventh century CE. They supplemented fishing with slash and burn agriculture, planting crops brought with them from the American mainland such as cassava and corn. About 1000 CE, a third wave of Amerindian settlers began to appear in the Lesser Antilles. While the new arrivals were called the 'Caniba' (or 'manioc people') by the Tainos, they called themselves the Kalinago. A struggle ensued which left the Tainos in control of the larger islands to the north while the Kalinago controlled the smaller islands to the south. When the Spanish first arrived in the region in 1492 – at the beginning of another great sea-borne invasion – the first people they encountered were Tainos, who told them about the fierce people to the South. The Spanish corrupted the name 'Caniba' into 'Caribe', and henceforward Europeans referred to all the Indigenous people in the southern half of the region as 'Caribs'. Ultimately the entire region became known as 'the Caribbean' because of this mispronunciation, while the supposed savagery of the Caniba was immortalized by another new term – 'cannibal' (Allsopp, 1996).¹

The arrival of the Spanish unleashed a holocaust of violence, enforced labour, disease and starvation on the Amerindian people, which resulted in a population collapse without precedent in human history. According to a contemporary witness, Bartolomeo de Las Casas, over three million people died in Hispaniola alone in the period between 1492 and 1508; by 1509 an island-wide census found only 60,000 Amerindians who were still alive. Las Casas wrote: 'Who of those born in future centuries will believe this? I myself who am writing this and saw it and know most about it can hardly believe that such was possible' (Watts, 1990, p. 103).

1 Michel de Montaigne challenged European views about the alleged barbarity of the peoples of the Americas in 'Of Cannibals', one of his collected *Essays* published in 1580.

While the Spanish led the European invasion of the region at the end of the fifteenth century, they were soon joined by the other rising European maritime powers of the early modern era. They included the Dutch, the French and the English, all of whom had established colonies in the region by the middle of the seventeenth century. The Caribbean has been a zone of interaction and conflicts ever since, as competing empires have vied to dominate and exploit the region. As the power of the old European empires waned during the first half of the twentieth century, a new invader, in the form of the United States, staked a claim to economic and political hegemony in the Caribbean. The result of this complex and dynamic history was the creation of (at least) four linguistically and culturally distinctive zones, which may be labeled for convenience the Hispanic, the Francophone, the Anglophone and the Dutch-speaking Caribbean.

The collapse of the Indigenous population at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century created an immediate problem for the European colonizers, who needed cheap and plentiful labour to exploit their new possessions in the Caribbean. Massive profits could be made by cultivating commodities in the Tropics such as tobacco, cotton and sugar to feed the rapidly growing markets in Europe, but cheap labour was needed to work the plantations. To cut a long story short, the solution was found in the importation of enslaved labour from the coast of West Africa, and thus was born the transatlantic slave trade. Over a period of three hundred and fifty years, from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth, millions of Africans were forced into bondage in central-west Africa and sent as cargo in conditions of unimaginable squalor in the holds of European-owned slave ships to work on the plantations in the Americas. Those who survived the journey not only faced lives of unrelenting toil, but the systematic efforts of their masters and overseers to render them powerless by stripping them of every vestige of their former identities. This massive enforced immigration transformed the demography of the Caribbean region, as substantial populations of African descent were established in all of the European-controlled zones. By the time the transatlantic slave trade had ended and slavery had been abolished throughout the Caribbean in the mid-late nineteenth century, Africans and their descendants constituted the large majority of the population in many islands and territories across the region, though most remained impoverished, socially marginalized and politically powerless in the face of a hegemonic white colonial elite.

After the ending of plantation slavery, another wave of inward migration was unleashed as plantation owners turned to indentured labour from the Indian subcontinent – and, to a much lesser extent, China – to guarantee the continuation

of a plentiful, cheap and malleable labour supply. The importation of tens of thousands of Indian and Chinese 'coolie' labourers into the West Indies from the 1840s to the early 1900s added another important dimension to the demography of the region, especially in the southern territories of Trinidad and British Guiana.

The result of these major waves of migration (not to mention smaller waves such as that of the Syrian-Lebanese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), combined with generations of human interaction, has been the creation of complex multi-ethnic societies in which the colours, cultures and heritages of the constituent peoples of the Caribbean were dizzyingly mixed as the colonial era drew to a close. The 1960 Census in Jamaica, for example, identified nine ethnic categories; these were: African (76.8 percent); European (0.8 per cent); East Indian (1.7 per cent); Chinese or Japanese (0.6 percent); Syrian (0.1 per cent); Afro-Europeans (14.6 per cent); Afro-East Indians (1.7 per cent) and Others (3.1 per cent) (Nettleford, 1998, pp. 26-27).

The Caribbean and African identity

What became of African culture, identity and consciousness in this Caribbean mix? At first sight it might appear that the hegemonic power of European colonial elites over more than four centuries succeeded in shaping the emergent Caribbean identity of the late colonial and early independence era in their own image, to the exclusion of all others. The Westminster system of governance bequeathed to all the constituent territories of the former British West Indies at independence is powerful evidence of a continuing pervasive influence at the level of formal institutions, as are the legal system and educational institutions, while the languages of the four main European colonizers retain their unquestioned dominance in each of their historical zones, decades after independence.

Appearances, however, are deceiving. Even at the height of the transatlantic slave trade, the stripped and brutalized ranks of enslaved Africans who were brought to the Caribbean carried at their core African customs, beliefs and traditions – African ways of seeing and knowing – that were to prove immensely powerful weapons against the physical, psychological and epistemological onslaught of enslavement in the modernizing West. Wherever they landed, and were placed in enslaved communities, Africans set about recreating the African world they had left behind so far as was possible in their new context. This was seen in forms of expression as varied as food preparation, music, dance and religious worship, to rituals associated with birth, marriage and death; in the

practices and uses of folk medicine, and in proverbs and storytelling (Warner-Lewis, 2003, chapters 9 and 10).

Language is perhaps the most pervasive and compelling example of all; while the languages of the European colonizers became the dominant media of expression for all Caribbean people, Black and White, the grammar, syntax and phonetics took on unmistakably 'African' characteristics which melded them – at least in informal discourse on the streets and in the fields – into distinctive creoles. These were often unintelligible to those outside the local communities where they evolved and were generally dismissed by the ruling elites as poor or corrupted forms of the standard European languages. As Richard Allsopp notes of his monumental work, the *Dictionary of Caribbean English Usage*:

[T]he work has tried to sensitize the reader to the reality, nature and dimensions of the Caribbean's African background, and to invite investigative intelligence to dislodge the old programmed contempt for Black African cultures (Allsopp, 1996, p. xxxiii; Warner-Lewis, 2003, chapter 11).

This line of argument is nothing new. Allsopp's work is part of a growing list produced by Caribbean scholars over the past fifty years, including Kamau Brathwaite, Rex Nettleford, John Thornton, Sylvia Wynter, Brian Moore and many others. Maureen Warner-Lewis's work on Central-West African survivals in the Caribbean, for example, refutes what she describes as 'the theory of cultural nakedness' evident in some earlier scholarship, in which, she suggests there is 'a metonymic transference of the slave's physical nudity on the auction block with a psychic nakedness and dispossession' (Warner-Lewis, 2003, pp. xxiv-xxv). Instead she posits clearly demonstrable links and continuities between the African and African-Caribbean context, in which the Atlantic has acted as a conduit for, rather than as a barrier to, cultural influences, that gives added resonance and relevance to Paul Gilroy's aphoristic term, 'The Black Atlantic'.

Many of these scholars, following Brathwaite, would argue that the forms of African culture present in the Caribbean today are not 'pure', but exist in a creolized form because of the complex admixture of other cultures. According to Brathwaite:

The term creolization...is a specialized version of the two widely accepted terms acculturation and interculturalism; the former referring...to the process of absorption of one culture by another; the latter to a more reciprocal activity, a process of intermixture and enrichment, each to each.... From their several cultural bases, people in the West Indies tend towards certain directions, positions, assumptions and ideals. But nothing is really fixed and monolithic (Brathwaite quoted in Warner-Lewis, 1974, p. 340).

However, as Rex Nettleford pointed out in typically playful style, the mixing of 'the melody of Europe' and 'the rhythm of Africa' does not necessarily imply equality or mutual respect, much less interracial harmony, as is evident in the Jamaican case. So long as Jamaicans continue to experience the reality of vastly unequal power and privilege between White and Black, Nettleford suggests, 'Every John Crow tink him pickney white' (Nettleford, 1998, pp. 180–211).² Nettleford also takes pains to debunk the implicit assumption, arising from the traditional notion of 'African' as 'other' in Caribbean society, that creolization necessarily means that it is the people of African ancestry who have been 'Europeanized' (read, civilized) and not the Europeans (bred in the region) who have also been 'negrified' in a transculturation process (Nettleford, 1998, pp. xxxv–xxxvi).

The concept of creolization remains a dominant concept in discourses on Caribbean identity and consciousness, but the work of one Caribbean scholar, Deryck Murray, suggests that while it offers insights into the processes of cultural exchange and interaction, it fails to capture the deep-rooted influences of African epistemology on the encounter between the European enslaver and the African enslaved in the Caribbean. He argues that this pitted an evolving European worldview growing out of the Enlightenment, in which there was a clear separation between the material and the metaphysical, against an African worldview that considered them indivisible. Thus, Europeans considered Obeah, the African form of folk medicine practiced widely throughout the Caribbean, a cultural and religious practice, while Africans considered it a science. Building on this argument, Murray suggests that African resistance to slavery over a long series of slave revolts was not kindled or sustained primarily by some concept of individual 'freedom' rooted epistemologically in the West and derived from social and cultural interaction with whites, but by the application of much older and deeper African ways of knowing and understanding to the lived reality in the Caribbean. He calls this approach to the question of African knowledge 'Tukontology'. Briefly, Murray uses an example of Caribbean culture – the 'Tuk' band consisting of a bass drum, a kettle drum and a penny whistle – as a metaphor for the interplay over several centuries of African ways of knowing with the experience of living in the Caribbean. It is the interplay between these different levels of 'knowing' that shapes the African encounter with the Caribbean (Murray, 2007, pp. 811–28).

The long – and ultimately successful – struggle against enslavement by people of African descent in the Caribbean helped to revalorize African ways of being

2 This old Jamaican proverb translates roughly as 'Everyone thinks what they have is better'.

in Caribbean societies, even as their engagement with new systems of thought and new ways of constructing identity in the West began to craft a unique Caribbean civilization. If Murray is correct, epistemic differences account for the recalcitrance of African identity in the face of this onslaught, so that even today these differences have never been wholly reconciled in Caribbean societies. But however the encounter is theorized, the balance of evidence suggests that the complex multi-ethnic environment in which this struggle played out ultimately had a transformative effect on African identities in the Caribbean, just as other identities in the region were simultaneously, in some measure, 'Africanized'.

One other feature of the historical development of African identity in the Caribbean is critical in understanding the key role the region has played in the evolution of 'global Africa' since the nineteenth century. Richard Allsopp sums it up neatly, based on his exhaustive analysis of the complex African influences on the Caribbean linguistic landscape. Underlying the complexity and variation he found 'a common ancestor' – 'an African way of putting things' which suggested a powerful underlying unity: '... these pervasive parallels send a strong message of genetic relationship among the sub-Saharan African languages, a message from the Caribbean of a oneness of African cultures from the Akan to the Zulu' (Allsopp, 1996, p. xxxiv).

In her study seeking to isolate West Central African influences in the Caribbean, Warner-Lewis came to a similar conclusion: '...it must be recognized that the Central African element is only one strand in a broader pan-African complex re-engineered in the Caribbean' (Warner-Lewis, 2003, p. 344).

Ultimately, the process of 're-engineering' of African culture and identity in the Caribbean, which began during the era of enslavement and continued in the post-Emancipation period, would lay the foundation for a new relationship between Africa and its Diaspora, based on a Pan-African consciousness and identity.

Pan-Africanism and the end of colonial rule

From the late nineteenth century onwards, Caribbean intellectuals were instrumental in the development of Pan-Africanist thought, in which the Diaspora's yearning for reconnection with the 'Motherland' was parlayed into collaboration with the emerging African nationalist movements in the anti-colonial struggle. As a product of the 'modified' African identity produced in the Americas through the centuries of struggle against enslavement in the West, Pan-Africanism can be seen as the highly creative product of the early engagement

of Africans with modernity on a large scale. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of Caribbean thinkers in modern African thought remains striking, ranging from Edward Wilmot Blyden, Henry Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, CLR James and George Padmore to Arthur Lewis, Ras Makonnen, Aimé Césaire, Franz Fanon and Walter Rodney. Even more remarkable, as Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall demonstrate in their work, is the pervasiveness today of the styles, rhythms and concerns of Global Africa in global popular culture – from reggae to hip-hop and dancehall.

In the political sphere, there was a significant amount of cross-fertilization between the anti-colonial movements in Africa and the Caribbean, as they shared ideas and personnel and offered mutual encouragement towards the achievement of their ultimate goal of independence on both sides of the Atlantic. The leading figures in the 'New African Movement' in South Africa, for example, drew ideas and inspiration from the growing discourses on Black identity, pride and racial uplift emanating from Africans in the Americas. The struggle against apartheid in South Africa provided the climax to this phase of collaboration, as newly independent Black-led governments in the Caribbean mobilized in partnership with newly independent states in Africa within the Commonwealth and the United Nations to isolate the apartheid state and impose an increasingly effective range of sanctions against the regime during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It gave several African and Caribbean governments their first substantial opportunity to work together in international fora in common cause, and the struggle also had a galvanizing effect on the internal politics of those Caribbean societies where inequalities from the colonial period still remained (Rodney, 1975).

The Caribbean and the post-colonial condition

The struggle against enslavement of Africans in the plantation economy, and the negotiation of the onset of modernity during the course of that struggle, marked the first phase in the emergence of a unique African-Caribbean consciousness and identity. The rise of Pan-Africanism and the era of anti-colonial struggles in the Caribbean and Africa marked the second phase. In the post-independence era, the focus of the struggle shifted to finding the means for effective social and economic development in an indifferent or sometimes hostile global environment. Issues of identity and consciousness have been complicated further in this most recent phase by the post-colonial condition, which has seen

the nationalist project sponsored by the Black and brown Caribbean elite in the fight for independence fall into disrepute. The Jamaican writer and critic Sylvia Wynter is among those who have theorized about this problem. She argues that the failure of the anti-colonial elite to challenge the epistemic foundations of colonialism in their formulation of West Indian nationalism(s) resulted in a failure to achieve independence in all but the formal political sense. The post-colonial state in the Caribbean therefore rests, she suggests, on the same exclusionary and anti-majoritarian foundations as colonialism.³

Hilary Beckles suggests that one symptom of this post-colonial condition can be seen in the sharp downturn in the fortunes of the West Indies cricket team, once seen as the touchstone for West Indian pride and nationhood. Support for the 'national' side was bound to be ambiguous in a context in which most people in its constituent societies had ceased to think of themselves in any meaningful way as 'West Indian' – or, so far as the post-independence generation was concerned, had never thought of themselves in that way in the first place. Such was the perplexing nature of the decline of West Indian cricket during the 1990s that Beckles devoted the whole of the second volume of his two-volume history of West Indies cricket to an attempt to explain the phenomenon.

Briefly, Beckles' thesis is that the 'nationalist paradigm', within which West Indies cricket grew to maturity and achieved dominance under Clive Lloyd and Vivian Richards in the 1970s and 1980s, has been in retreat ever since in the face of 'globalizing transformations in the social order'. The 'crisis' in West Indies cricket is therefore a reflection of a wider crisis in West Indian society engendered by the post-colonial (and post-modern) forces of globalization – evidence of which is seen throughout the region in 'talk of intellectual emptiness, mass unemployment, youth lawlessness and indiscipline, and increasing criminalization of the poor' (Beckles, 1998, p. 1).

Caribbean societies have had limited success in combating the marginalization, dissension and disillusionment inherent in the post-colonial experience and the accompanying onset of a globalized economic environment. Yet there is room for hope. When the Jamaican sprinter Usain 'Lightning' Bolt left the rest of the world trailing in his wake en route to three gold medals and two world records at the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, a wave of exultation swept the Caribbean. Nothing like it had been felt since the days of West Indies cricket legend Vivian Richards – 'the Master Blaster' – in his pomp. The achievement was all the more remarkable for many outside the Caribbean in view of stories

3 For a discussion of Wynter's work see Paget Henry (2000, chapter 5).

that followed highlighting the allegedly ‘rudimentary’ training facilities available to Jamaican athletes – at least compared to their American rivals in their sleek designer ‘running suits’. Gleefully, Caribbean people repeated the claim made by Bolt’s father that his success was all down to his eating good Jamaican yam in his childhood. However, the procession of victories and medals won by other Jamaican and Caribbean athletes at Beijing merely underlined the fact that Bolt’s dominance was not a fluke. In fact, the infrastructure for success by Jamaican sprinters at the highest level of the sport had been laid over many years (Bertram, 2012; Ince, 2012).

If ever ‘Indigenous Knowledge’ could be said to have trumped the high tech, capital-intensive power of the developed world, this was the moment. It showed Caribbean people what could be achieved through identifying local strengths and building systematically upon them. Intense discussion ensued in the Caribbean about how this world-beating formula might be duplicated, not only in sports, but in other spheres of activity.

‘Indigenous Knowledge’ and identity

In a recent book Saul Dubow traced efforts aimed at what he calls the ‘South Africanization of knowledge’ in post-colonial South Africa. He argues that a shift has occurred towards ‘Africanization’ of knowledge, including the promotion by the state of research into ‘Indigenous Knowledge’, as part of the broader efforts to sponsor an ‘African Renaissance’. According to Dubow, ‘Indigenous knowledge seeks to affirm core African values in the face of globalization’ (Dubow, 2006, p. 270).

But what constitutes ‘Indigenous Knowledge’? According to various readings of the term, including that offered by the World Bank, which has been an enthusiastic supporter of the quest to capture Indigenous Knowledge as a vehicle for economic development since the mid-1990s, it can be described as knowledge held by communities, rather than individuals, and which is derived from sources that are local, traditional and culturally specific. The World Bank definition also states that Indigenous Knowledge ‘is tacit knowledge and therefore difficult to codify, it is embedded in community practices, institutions, relationships and rituals’ (World Bank, 2001). The most prominent example to date of a systematic attempt to mobilize Indigenous Knowledge is ‘The Indigenous Knowledge for Development Program’ in the Africa Region of the World Bank, which was established in 1998 with a mandate ‘to learn from the knowledge embedded in the

practices of local communities', 'to integrate indigenous practices in development programmes', and 'to empower communities through the validation and use of indigenous knowledge systems'. By this means the World Bank hoped to sponsor a wide range of practical assistance programmes at local community level, which would help to reduce poverty (Madavo, 2004).

It is one of the ironies of the post-colonial condition that an agency that played a leading role in constituting the global economy according to the priorities of the capitalist West after the Second World War, and was therefore complicit in policies which helped marginalize and disempower local communities in the developing world during those years, should now see itself as working in partnership with those same local and national communities in determining what is authentically local. Nevertheless, this attempt to leverage 'IK' has resulted in a sizeable number of successful development projects in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, in India. In her review of the first five years of the World Bank 'IK' programme, for example, Mamphela Ramphele emphasized the primary role of women as 'bearers of indigenous knowledge', and the positive benefits of mobilizing women's traditional knowledge for promoting their empowerment in traditionally patriarchal societies (Ramphele, 2004, pp. 13-17).

Other efforts to recognize and mobilize Indigenous Knowledge include the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). This agreement seeks, *inter alia*, to enlist the support of local communities and to incorporate their Indigenous Knowledge in efforts to conserve and sustain biodiversity.⁴ Meanwhile efforts to develop an international legal framework for the protection and equitable use of Indigenous Knowledge continue through the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, established under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization.⁵

Notwithstanding its recent appropriation by the World Bank, the concept of mobilizing Indigenous Knowledge for development in Africa has strong 'Africanist' roots, which predate the efforts of international development agencies by at least half a century. In South Africa, for example, the African intellectuals who constituted what Ntongela Masilela calls the 'New African Movement' in the first half of the twentieth century, sought to modernize African culture as

4 The UN Convention on Biological Diversity can be found on the Convention website: <http://www.cbd.int/>

5 On the Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Folklore Program of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), see the WIPO website: <http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/>

a vehicle for the economic, social, cultural and spiritual uplift of their people.⁶ They re-evaluated all aspects of African identity, including history, language and social organization, with a view to constituting an alternative to the dominant white colonial power structure. T. D. Mveli Skota, then Secretary-General of the African National Congress (ANC), launched a fraternal society in the late 1920s he called 'St Ntsikana's Order of True Africans'. Its constitution declared:

Come brothers and listen, let us get back to it, let us get back to our glorious own, and renew it, crystallise it, modernize it and perfect it, then jealously guard it while looking up to it as a guiding star... Then and only then will we command respect of all other nations, then and only then will Ethiopia lift up her hands unto God (Masilela, 2013).

During the 1930s a number of similar cultural associations were formed that were dedicated to the preservation and revitalization of aspects of African culture. The annual 'African Eisteddfod' organized in Johannesburg by A.B. Xuma from 1931, for example, listed first among its objects 'To preserve and develop the individuality of African Native Music, and concurrently, to encourage the finer refinements of European music' (Cobley, 1990, p. 85). African writers and artists also re-engaged and experimented with African forms and themes in these years, such as the Zulu language poet, B.W. Vilakazi, and the dramatist, H. I. E. Dhlomo. At the same time, African teachers' associations were calling for research into African history and heritage so that African children could be taught 'the true facts' (Cobley, 1990, p. 84). All these efforts led to a restoration of confidence in the validity and integrity of African culture and custom, after years of erosion at the hands of missionaries and other exponents of the superiority of Western civilization, to the extent that one African witness who gave evidence to the Native Economic Commission in 1932 could assert: 'everything in tribal custom was good, except the practice of witchcraft' (Marks, 1995, p. 111). However, the wider purpose of the 'New African Movement' was not to reject modernity, but to embrace it, through the mobilization of an avowedly modern, progressive form of African culture and identity. As J. R. Rathebe explained to the same Native Economic Commission:

I hold that not everything in European Culture is of the very best, and not everything in Native Culture is of the very best; but I hold, sir, since we are a race that is sometimes referred to as being in the transition stage, we can take the best from the European and the best from the Native, and build up a unique civilization (Cobley, 1990, p. 85).

6 Masilela, N. 2013. *An Outline of the New African Movement in South Africa*, Trenton, NJ. Africa World Press.

These ideas would inform the 'Africanist' philosophy of the Congress Youth League formed in 1943-1944 and so exerted a powerful influence on the next generation of African political leadership who were among its early members, including Tambo, Mandela and Sobukwe. A document on 'The Basic Policy of Congress Youth League' published in 1948 included, *inter alia*, this statement on cultural policy:

The Congress Youth League stands for a policy of assimilating the best elements in European and other civilizations and cultures, on the firm basis of what is good and durable in the Africans' own culture and civilization. In this way Africa will be in a position to make her own special contribution to human progress and happiness.⁷

Ultimately, the modern ideology of African nationalism in South Africa – as elsewhere in Africa – was rooted in this process of reclamation, revalorization and revitalization of African knowledge in the context of the encounter with modernity under colonial rule. A reconstituted, progressive, African identity and consciousness built on Indigenous Knowledge would prove a powerful weapon in the struggle to overthrow entrenched white colonial regimes. It was a struggle that was to be epistemological at least as much as it was political.

It would appear, from these differing perspectives, that the mobilization and valorization of 'Indigenous Knowledge' during the twentieth century had a positive, transformative effect on African identity and consciousness, and also assisted in material ways in the fight against poverty. As Global Africa seeks to position itself in the post-colonial world, against the context of, and in response to, the pressures of globalization, what role is there – if any – for 'Indigenous Knowledge'?

'Indigenous Knowledge' and the 'Sixth Region of Africa'

Since 2004, the African Union has recognized the people of the global African Diaspora as the 'sixth region' of Africa, and has begun to engage in dialogue with the constituent communities in the Diaspora, with a view to developing meaningful collaborations and exchanges.⁸ In the Caribbean, for example, the Bicentenary Global Dialogue 2007: African Diaspora and the Caribbean Regional Consultative Conference held in Barbados on 27 and 28 August 2007, with critical support from the South African Government, took as its theme, 'Fostering Sustained Global Dialogue for Africa and its Diaspora:

7 'Basic Policy of Congress Youth League' Manifesto issued by the National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League, 1948', Document 57 in T. Karis and G. M. Carter (1973, p. 326).

8 For information on the African Union and its relationship with the African diaspora see: <https://au.int/>

the Case for the Caribbean'. Speaking at the forum, the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Edwin Carrington, explained the reasons for the initiative:

This Forum...provides the opportunity for exploring new strategies for the development of Africa and its Diaspora through South-South Cooperation and collaboration in the wider global arena.... The new forms of globalization clearly require cooperation and collaboration among States at all levels. It is no coincidence therefore that both Africa and the Caribbean have recognized the need to address their challenges through regional integration and collective action. This is the only approach which seems feasible.⁹

However, while CARICOM's clear priority in engaging with the African Union in the Dialogue was the development of interregional economic and trade partnerships, Carrington could not avoid making reference to the underlying Pan-Africanist sentiment that was by far the most pervasive and more important feature of the event for many of the forum participants who had been invited from local and regional NGOs:

Undoubtedly, however, the most enduring bond between Africa, the Caribbean and other African Diasporas, is through culture; overtly manifested in language patterns, cuisine, music, art, dance, carnival and other rituals; and deeply rooted in our collective spirituality, familial and kinship patterns. It was for this vision of a united "Africa for Africans, at home and abroad" that the great Pan-Africanist, the Rt. Excellency Marcus Mosiah Garvey, advocated so passionately throughout his life.¹⁰

Influential political support for the Dialogue came from several Caribbean Heads of Government (such as Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines and the former Prime Minister of Barbados, Owen Arthur), from Caribbean intellectuals, and from radical Pan-Africanists. However, popular consciousness and understanding of these developments lagged behind the pronouncements of these political and intellectual leaders.

As noted earlier, issues of identity and consciousness in the Caribbean are complex and multifaceted. They are overlaid by the experience of multiple diasporas, each of which has left a mark in the cultural landscape, and by a history of many generations of intracommunal struggle – against slavery, against colonialism and against entrenched privilege based on race, ethnicity and class.

9 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat, 'Statement by His Excellency Edwin W. Carrington, Secretary General Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on the occasion of the Bicentenary Global Dialogue 2007: African Diaspora and the Caribbean Consultative Conference 27-29 August 2007, Bridgetown, Barbados', Press release 193/2007, 27 August 2007.

10 'Statement by His Excellency Edwin W. Carrington'.

The struggle against the post-colonial condition is merely the latest twist in this tale. The legacy of these centuries of struggle in the Caribbean is a powerful and highly distinctive body of Indigenous Knowledge among Caribbean people, as Edwin Carrington explained in his remarks on the expected outcomes of the Bridgetown Forum in 2007: 'The Caribbean Community is particularly well-placed to demonstrate to the rest of the world the potential of Diaspora dialogue, given our location as the home of, not only African, but Indian, European, Chinese and other Asian Diaspora.'¹¹

This suggests that what constitutes 'Indigenous Knowledge' among the uniquely heterogeneous people of the Caribbean includes more than the pre-existing customs and epistemes peculiar to each of the constituent elements of the population. It must be redefined to include the methods of negotiation, accommodation and collaboration that they have developed in the course of their shared tumultuous history in mostly small – at times even claustrophobic – island communities, and the unique Caribbean culture that is the result.¹² These developments and this culture have allowed the different groups in Caribbean society to continue to coexist in the face of an uncertain future, and are an important reason why the Caribbean stands out in the world today as a zone of peace.

Conclusion

Many people in the Caribbean who do not feel a direct, visceral link to 'Mother Africa' question the utility of, and necessity for, extensive links with Africa in the twenty-first century. However, as this article has shown, many continuities and commonalities can be identified between Africa and Caribbean societies, dating back to the era of African enslavement in the Americas, as well as a long history of effective collaboration during the era of the anti-colonial struggle. The process of 'Africanization' in Caribbean societies over centuries has ensured that these continuities and commonalities can be felt to some extent by all Caribbean people – and not just by those of predominantly African descent. At the same time, the 're-engineering' of African identity in the Caribbean provided a basis for a new globalized African identity, expressed politically as Pan-Africanism.

11 Ibid.

12 Rex Nettleford has argued that one of the defining characteristics and strengths of Caribbean societies is that people live, for the most part, in what he calls 'people-sized communities'. This brings familiarity with ones' neighbours, a sense of emotional engagement and immediacy, and shared experience in celebrating success or coping with failure in the community.

The mobilization and pooling of 'Indigenous Knowledge' in both regions – recognizing commonalities, but celebrating also all the distinctive features that have arisen from widely separated historical experiences and contexts of struggle – can only help strengthen effective collaboration for development between the two regions. In this way, African-Caribbean people can make a unique contribution to the struggle of the African peoples for economic, social and cultural development. Meanwhile, a re-engagement as part of Global Africa will do more for Caribbean people than establish a valuable 'South-South' partnership in the face of globalization – it will revitalize and valorize an important dimension of Caribbean identity and consciousness. As Vincentian poet Ellsworth 'Shake' Keane wrote in a poem entitled 'Private Prayer' (which was written for Walter Rodney in April 1973 on the occasion of the publication of *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*), every Caribbean person needs 'to understand the compromise I am':

'To understand
How the whole thing run
I have to ask my parents
And even my daughter and son
To understand the form
Of compromise I am
I must in my own voice ask
How the whole thing run
To ask
Why I don't dream
In the same language I live in
I must rise up
Among syllables of my parents
In the land which I am
And form
A whole daughter a whole son
Out of the compromise
Which I am
To understand history
I have to come home.'¹³

13 From a poem by Vincentian poet Ellsworth 'Shak' Keane, entitled 'Private Prayer', quoted in 'Fostering a Global Nexus Between Africa and Its Diaspora: The Role of the Caribbean' by Dr. The Honourable Ralph E. Gonsalves Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Address Delivered at the Closing Session of the 'Bicentennial Global Dialogue: Fostering Sustainable Dialogue with Africa and its Diaspora – The Case of the Caribbean', Barbados, 28 August 2007.

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CHANGING CONSCIOUSNESS OF AFRICA IN CARIBBEAN PAN-AFRICANISM

Waibinte E. Wariboko

Introduction

Lewis R. Gordon has stated that ‘There is no consciousness without intentionality, where consciousness is consciousness *of* something, but “something” cannot be apprehended without maintenance of it if but for a nanosecond’ (Gordon, 2006, p. 71). That ‘something’ in Afro-Caribbean consciousness, which gave birth to Caribbean Pan-Africanism, imagined and looked forward to a dispensation whereby Africans and African descendants would emancipate themselves from a globalized Eurocentric socioeconomic, political and cultural order that devalued Blackness. In European thought, although Africa was never culturally isolated from the main crosscurrents of world history, it was vilified as a static and dark continent between the fifteenth and mid-twentieth century. That form of representation of Africa depended on a global system of data gathering and reporting about non-European cultures, which began after the invention of printing before the nineteenth century (Ballentyne, 2002, p. 132). The first English newspapers in the second half of the seventeenth century were official organs of the British Crown; but, before the end of the first half of the eighteenth century, several newspapers had appeared in metropolitan Britain and in the British colonies of North America and the Caribbean. These newspapers, whose reporting reflected the ‘political geography’ of the Empire, promoted a race-oriented print culture in the Anglo-Atlantic world.

Aside from these newspapers, according to E. J. Alagoa, 'Over four hundred books and articles were published [on Africa] in the West by 1800 and another three hundred by 1865 on West and West Central Africa. The figures for Southern Africa were about the same up to 1865, but higher for the rest of the nineteenth century. Lower numbers of publications were made for Central Africa before 1800. The quantity of published materials for East Africa was lower than for West Africa before 1865, but levelled up from about that date' (Alagoa, 2007, pp. 124-125). These ethnographic and anthropological monographs, Alagoa also noted, had done nothing to enhance the understanding of African history, or African culture, because 'the [race oriented] paradigm of social Darwinism [had] provided the framework for most of these writings' (Alagoa, 2007, p. 125). Postcolonial theory and critique of these earlier forms of knowledge production and race representations have shown that they were socially constructed to legitimize European imperialism.

In relation to the peoples of African descent, it has been estimated conservatively that 'between 70 and 100 million people of mainly black African descent' are currently permanently residing outside of the continent as a direct consequence of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans and the voluntary migrations that occurred during and after the abolition of that trade. Approximately 20 million of these persons, it has also been said, 'live in the West Indies and on the Caribbean mainland, including 5 million in Haiti, the stronghold of African culture in the New World after Brazil' (Derrick, 1975, pp.110-111). Over the course of time, these persons have demonstrated African consciousness by celebrating their African ancestry, selectively adopting and adapting African elements into their dress patterns and hairstyles, cuisines, socio-religious rituals, and other forms of cultural observances. While giving visibility and legitimacy to their African heritage in the New World, these persons were also wittingly or unwittingly participating in the cultural struggle aimed at reshaping the power dynamics between Whiteness and Blackness globally.

E. P. Skinner has said that 'Blacks [in the New World] felt compelled to rehabilitate Africa and African peoples in their own eyes and in the eyes of the world so that by extension both they and that continent would be saved' (Skinner, 1993, p. 22). The issue of emigration to Africa from the New World and the related idea of Africa as the homeland for African descendants in the New World, which generated both emotional and epistemic debates among Pan-Africanist thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, were founded on this race-oriented thinking articulated by Skinner. The Church of England and the British Colonial Office also believed that Black West

Indians were motivated by race to return either as 'colonial intermediaries' or, as missionaries on a civilizing mission to rescue Africa and Africans from barbarism. Aside from those missions funded by Europeans, African descendants also funded missions because some of them saw the cultural regeneration of Africa as a special arena of Black activity in global geopolitics. The Basel Mission, the Baptist Mission, the National Baptist Convention of America, the Church Missionary Society's Niger Mission, and the Presbyterian Mission were among those European missions that enlisted Black West Indians in Africa. The Pongas Mission, which was called 'The Mission from the Sons and Daughters of Africa in the Diaspora to Africa', was one of those funded by African descendants in the Caribbean. All of the African descendants enlisted by these Missions had in some shape or form espoused Pan-Africanism. They were the forerunners of those pioneers known readily as the founding fathers of modern Pan-Africanism.

To discuss these Pan-African actors before and after the late nineteenth century, their sense of race representation and belonging, and their contributions to Pan-Africanism as a movement, it is worth discussing the concept of race. Discussing race as an ideology will provide an analytical framework for assessing those issues that informed, propelled, and also sustained African consciousness within and outside of Africa, especially in the Caribbean. To enrich this framework, sufficient account will however be taken of the other complex forces of culture, religion, geography, politics and economics that shaped race thinking and Pan-Africanism on both sides of the Atlantic. Shaped by these complex multilayered forces of change and their conflicting value orientations, it has not been uncommon for one set of Pan-Africanists to focus on Black aesthetics and civilizational matters as opposed to Black economic empowerment, for example. Hence, as a generally flexible definition, Pan-Africanism may be broadly seen as a set of ideas informing the variety of activities aimed at advancing the varying and sometimes conflicting interests of the peoples of Africa and African descendants across the globe.

European race constructions and Blackness

The makings of the contemporary ideas of race and race discourses are all historically traceable to the Enlightenment, 'the harbinger of intellectual modernity' in Europe (Malik, 1996, p. 45). Philosophers of the Enlightenment era, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, J. J. Rousseau, C. Linnaeus, I. Kant, and D. Hume, had

argued that all tangible and social phenomena in the universe had been ordered according to discoverable, knowable and testable general laws. E.C. Eze has argued that 'The Enlightenment's declaration of itself as the "Age of Reason" was predicated upon precisely the assumption that reason could historically only come to maturity in modern Europe, while the inhabitants of areas outside of Europe, who were considered to be of non-European racial and cultural origins, were consistently described and theorized as rationally inferior and savage' (Eze, 1997, p. 4). Following the racial delineation of humanity there appeared the tendency, particularly during the Romantic Movement, to perceive social differences as natural and to theorize them through the discourse of race. This gave rise to the related idea of racial norming: 'You are what you are in part because you originate from a certain kind of space, and that space has [certain] properties in part because it is inhabited by creatures like yourself' (Mills, 1997, p. 42). In *Essays on the Inequality of Races*, C. A. Gobineau illustrated how the interrelated concepts of race and racial norming had influenced the Romantic aristocratic reactions to Enlightenment values. For him, 'all history was the history of racial struggle'; and '[t]he basic organization and strength of all civilizations are equal to the traits and spirits of the dominant race' (Malik, 1996, p. 83). Drawing in part from earlier writings, he emphasized the notion of Aryan superiority and went on to associate skin colour with social rank and presented black people as servants of pale-skinned aristocrats. In discussing the differences between the European *self* and the African, Hume and Kant also said that 'they were substantial enough not to take seriously the status of Blacks as human beings' (Godon, 2006, p. 70).

Given this intellectual and ideological climate during the age of European expansion beyond Europe, especially into Africa, race readily became a tool for remoulding their own selfhood at the expense of the 'other' amazing diversity of human populations and cultures they were now encountering. In constructing the new European *self* all the 'others' were, in varying degrees, described as either subhuman or not human. In his *Geographical Basis of World History*, G.W.F. Hegel had argued for 'a different and inferior schedule of rights and liberties' for Africans because, among other reasons, 'The African] knows nothing of an absolute being [the Judeo-Christian God] which is other and higher than his own self.' As a result, Hegel went on, 'The Negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness, and if we wish to understand him, we must put aside all our European attitudes' (Hegel, 1997, p. 127). Africans, according to Mills, were thus categorized in the race discourses as 'humanoid entities who, because of racial phenotype/genealogy/culture, are not fully human and therefore have a different and inferior schedule of rights and liberties applying

to them' (Mills, 1997, p. 56). This thinking might have in part informed the formulation of the 'System of Negro Jurisprudence'. 'The leading idea in the Negro System of Jurisprudence', according to the 1789 submission by the Clerk of the British Committee on the Slave Trade, 'is that ... Negroes were property, and a species of property that needed a rigorous and vigilant regulation.'¹ Philosophically, since race had now become the marker of entitlement or dispossession, normative inclusion or exclusion, full or diminished selfhood, it meant that all the racially differentiated Black populations can no longer share the same present with their dominant Europeans. As a result, the latter group, as P. Gilroy puts it, could 'enlist the irresistible momentum of history on their side and treat their apparently anachronistic subordinates as if they belong to the past and had no future' (Gilroy, 2000, p. 57).

Since 'all history was the history of racial struggle', race discourses were ultimately also constructed to impress on Africans and peoples of African descent that Europeans were the real makers of history. According to Trevor-Roper, a Professor of Modern History at Oxford University in the early 1960s, 'the history of the Europeans in Africa' aside, there is only 'the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe' (Trevor-Roper, 1953, p. 871). To erase Africa from history, the Hamitic hypothesis was then developed as a sweeping explanation for any noteworthy forms of cultural achievement found in the continent. Seligman wrote in the *Races of Africa*: 'Apart from relatively Semitic influence – whether Phoenician [Carthaginian] and strictly limited, or Arabs [Mohammedan] and widely diffused – the civilizations of Africa are the civilizations of the Hamites....' (Seligman, 1979 (1930), p. 61). The following critique of the Hamitic hypothesis by R. G. Armstrong is quite telling and instructive:

The majority of the Europeans who came to Africa accepted it as axiomatic that the Negro peoples were incapable of inventing or producing anything interesting, subtle, or complex. When, therefore, interesting, subtle and complex things were found in such places as West Africa [or for that matter Uganda or Rwanda-Burundi or Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe], the problem of "science" was to discover from what place outside of Negro Africa it had come and what "white" people had brought it there (Armstrong, 1967, pp. 3-4).

In effect, because the emergent race discourse was ideologically trying to entrench white normativity globally, it also strenuously attempted to restructure global reality

1 P. Sherlock, *Jamaica's Proud Heritage*, undated monograph published by the Office of the Vice Chancellor, The University of the West Indies, Mona, and endorsed by the National Council on Education, Jamaica.

around European experiences, accomplishments, moral values, and expectations. Even before the formal partition and colonization of the African continent, race, as an ideology of domination, was being used on the American continent and its offshore islands, including the Caribbean islands, to enforce the authority of those imputed white over those imputed Black. Rex Nettleford had once observed that 'while in Malaya the Malays are the accepted indigenous sons of the soil and the foundation of the Malayan image', in Jamaica 'the blacks are not regarded as the desirable symbol for national identity' (Nettleford, 1998, p. 93). This was one of the ugliest outcomes of the representation of Blackness as an undesirable and shameful 'badge of colour'. In those societies where racial slavery was most rampant and practiced, Whiteness meant freedom and wealth while Blackness meant poverty and servitude. The slaveholders in the New World, as E. B. Rugemer puts it, saw Black slavery as 'a prop for white men's freedom' (Rugemer, 2008, p. 228). Mills has also said that 'From about the beginning of the nineteenth century or even earlier race had become for Europeans the common conceptual denominator that gradually came to signify the respective global statuses of superiority' (Mills, 1997, p. 21). This kind of thinking proclaimed and exalted Europe as the secular and spiritual arm of 'progress'; and it also made them see their own culture as representing values worthy of universal application. Hence, for four hundred years in the Americas, and in Africa after colonization, Blackness and the socio-cultural values it represented were systematically and ruthlessly subjected to denigration. In the words of W. D. Jordan: 'Englishmen found in the idea of blackness a way of expressing some of their most ingrained values'; and they felt that '[e]mbedded in the concept of blackness was its direct opposite – whiteness.' In their own eyes, therefore, 'white and black connoted purity and filthiness, virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness, beneficence and evil, God and the devil' (Jordan, 1974, p. 6). Given these European race ideas and ugly representations of Africa and Blackness, how then did African descendants in the New World, especially in the Caribbean, respond to 'rehabilitate Africa and African peoples...so that by extension both they and that continent would be saved?'

Caribbean evangelical Pan-Africanism

The rise of Caribbean evangelical Pan-Africanism, which constituted one form of response, is attributable to many interrelated factors within and outside of the Caribbean region. This region, observed S. W. Mintz, 'was westernized, modernized and developed before most of the colonial world had been colonized.' For that reason, 'the similarities of the Caribbean with other Third World countries', he contended,

'are deceptive and untrustworthy' (Miller, 2003, p. 375). R. Walters also had this to say: the Caribbean is 'an area where Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Latin American currents wash upon the shores of the United States and find a place in the African community within that country' (Walters, 1993, p. 317). In view of this profile the multiracial Caribbean populations appealed to the British imperial power and their Christian missionary organizations seeking intermediaries for their civilizing missions in Africa. Intermediaries, as H. S. Challenor stated, were often drawn from societies that had shown 'greater receptivity to westernization', or already possessed 'certain attributes of Western society, such as adherence to the Christian religion' (Challenor, 1979, p. 69). The high degree of receptivity to Westernization, as these comments from Barbara Bush also suggest, unreservedly qualified the Caribbean as a recruitment ground for the 'white man's burden' in Africa: 'After 1860, white cultural power in the West Indies and US, combined with the emergence of Social Darwinism and Scientific Racism, led to the cultivation of the belief among Diaspora blacks that they were superior and more civilized than Africans' (Bush, 1996, p. 10). The civilizing mission, also called the 'white man's burden', was founded in the Enlightenment belief of an individual's capacity to 'progress' through Christianity and education in civilized values. For James Stephen, who was the Colonial Office Permanent Undersecretary from 1836 to 1847, Christianity 'is the only religion ever known among men in strict alliance with philosophy, civilization and human advancement in all the arts and sciences' (Barron, 1977, p. 146). Due in part to such views, the Colonial Office saw and treated the Christian Missions as allies in the global effort to entrench white normativity in non-European societies including Africa and the Caribbean.

The background that encouraged the civilizing missions within the Caribbean Protestant Churches was informed by the race thinking of the imperial British government and its post-slavery programme for the regeneration of Africa. The failure of the 1841 'civilizing mission' to the River Niger, which claimed the lives of many Europeans, suggested to the Colonial Office the urgency of recruiting African descendants, particularly West Indians. In 1840, one year before that fateful expedition, Lord John Russell said as follows: 'It appears to HM Government that on one hand, men of African birth who have been trained in civilization and instructed in Christianity in Jamaica, or Barbados, would be the best teachers of the Negro Race in Africa itself' (Curtin, 1964, p. 419). The Church of Scotland Mission echoed a similar sentiment in 1846 when it said that: '[The European leaders of the Mission to Old Calabar] see plainly that the fittest men for the evangelization of Africa are the native Christians of the West Indies, headed, in the first instance at least, by the European missionaries

inured to the tropics.' Three years earlier, after the Basel Mission in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) had lost eight European missionaries, West Indians, mostly Jamaicans, had to be recruited on the same reasoning. Finally, the Colonial Office also recruited. By 1860, as Nemata A. Blyden (2000, p. 202) had pointed out, there were 164 West Indians in the colonial state of Sierra Leone working as merchants, teachers, missionaries, civil servants and newspaper editors.

By the mid-nineteenth century the Church of England in Jamaica, one of the agencies responsible for the recruitment of Black West Indians for the Church Missionary Society's Niger Mission in Southern Nigeria, had decided to join the African mission field. In 1861 the Jamaican Church of England Home and Foreign Mission Society was founded to pursue, among other aims, the propagation of the gospel 'in that portion of Western Africa bordering on the River Pongas' (Ellis, 1913, pp. 81-96). The Anglicans in Barbados had formed an association prior to this development to sponsor a West Indian Mission to West Africa. In 1855 that association started operations at the Rio Pongas; and it became known thereafter as the Rio Pongas Mission, or the 'Mission from the Sons and Daughters of Africa in the Diaspora to Africa'. This West Indian Mission, as distinct from those initiated by European and American Missions, was perceived from the outset as a mission to be manned and funded by the Anglican Communion or Churches in the English-speaking Caribbean: Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua, and Guyana. R. Rawle, who later became the principal of the Codrington College in Barbados where the missionaries for this Mission were trained, said as follows: 'Let it be well understood that it is to be a West Indian work in respect of origin, motive, and machinery; whatever help may be obtained from other quarters, the main labour and cost will rest with the colonial branch of our Church [The Church of England]' (Wariboko, 2007, p. 170).

From 1861 to 1869 the Jamaica Home and Foreign Mission Society was able to make cash donations to the Pongas Mission. After the disestablishment of the Church of England in 1870, however, the finances of that Society suffered, and contributions to the Mission stopped. Interest was later rekindled because of the prevailing sense of African consciousness, which led Enos Nuttall, the bishop of the Church of England in Jamaica, to restart the contributions. Tony Martin has said that 'Jamaica is possibly the country in the Caribbean which has the strongest mass interest in Africa. There, unlike in some other countries, it is not always possible for governments to ignore that interest. It is just too widespread' (Martin, 1985, pp. 11-12). The Church-sponsored missions gave Afro-Jamaicans an avenue of expressing their race belonging; and the Jamaican Church of England, as suggested in the following 'Call' made to the 'Young

Black Men and Women in the West Indies', had sought to exploit that prevailing sense of race belonging in October 1901 for the recruitment of candidates for the civilizing mission: 'Many of you, to whom this appeal comes, can do what others [Europeans], who have tried, cannot do; and it seems that unless there is a grand response made by those in the West Indies, this extensive region of Africa will continue dark, and indeed may grow even yet darker.'²

Black West Indians were, among other factors, predominantly motivated by race. W. A. Thompson, who had joined the CMS's Niger Mission, expressed these race sentiments in 1909: 'Perhaps there is no place where the heart throbs with greater emotion over West Africa than the West Indies, no place where there is a keener desire to help to lift our fallen brother up' (Thompson, 1909). Most of these missionaries felt that Christianity was the most potent instrument for uplifting the 'fallen brother'; that 'the slave trade was an act of Providence to enable the transfer of the torch of Christianity to Africa'; and that 'the British Empire [was] an instrument of Divine Providence [and a benign force of fate] to make possible the enlightenment [and the economic development] of benighted Africa' (Bryan, 1991, p. 252). However, some of them also believed that uplifting the 'fallen brother' was politically inseparable from the struggle to dismantle the Eurocentric global order that was privileging Europeans. Rev. D. R. Horton, a Jamaican missionary to Liberia with the National Baptist Convention of America, expressed this sentiment in October 1921: 'They [the educated and Christianized descendants of Africa] were not respected because they were the subjects of another race.' Tacitly Horton was acknowledging that Blacks were operating in a global system where race was the sole basis for determining selfhood. He further said that 'The Negro will not be free till Africa is free' (Horton, 1921). This interpretation of evangelical Pan-Africanism that portrayed Africans and African descendants in unison against European race bigotry was more forcefully and systematically articulated by those who championed modern Caribbean Pan-Africanism.

Modern Caribbean Pan-Africanism

As distinct from the earlier phase when it was 'merely an "informal organization of memories" among articulate members of the Black Diaspora' (Langley, 1978, p. 18). Pan-Africanism became a more structured movement during the closing decades of the nineteenth through to the first half of the

2 The Young Men and Women in the West Indies: A Call, *Jamaica Churchman*, No. 262, October 1901.

twentieth century. Up until the end of the latter phase, the intellectual and organizational superstructures of this evolving movement were constructed predominantly by, among others, the following Caribbean and African American thinkers and activists working in concert: Edward W. Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, and C. L. R. James. The race thinking of these Pan-Africanists, which was predicated on the assumption that race had united the descendants of Africa in the New World and those in the ancestral homeland, largely informed the political trajectories and the ideology of the Pan-African associations they cofounded. As advocates of race essentialism, they believed that shared racial essences could provide a platform for common action and unity. While there were discernible common threads in the race thinking of the Black Caribbean missionaries and the founders of modern Pan-Africanism, there were also discernible significant differences which shaped the Pan-African idea and movement as both of these evolved under their tutelage. For example, while these missionaries believed unreservedly in the British Empire as well as in the cultural invasions engendered by Christianity to transform Africa, the latter in varying degrees were very critical of Empire generally, and missionary Christianity in particular, which they relentlessly criticized as a 'handmaiden' of imperialism. 'There is no evidence that Christianity', Blyden once lamented, 'would have been less unscrupulous in their dealings with natives of Africa, than they have been with the natives of America, of Australia, [and] of New Zealand' (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 126). Du Bois similarly had once advised the uncritical adherents of the civilizing mission as follows: 'Let not the cloak of Christian missionary enterprise...hide the ruthless economic exploitation and political downfall of less developed nations' (Langley, 1978, p. 28). These comments, which were reactions to the selfish economic and political motives that informed the scramble and partition of Africa between 1884 and 1885, also showed the profound unease these modern Pan-Africanists felt about European missionaries and the colonial state as instruments for the regeneration of Africa.

Unlike Du Bois, however, Blyden's ideas on Africa's regeneration revolved around its colonization by its sons and daughters in the diaspora. In setting out these ideas, as the following passage shows, he even interpreted the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans in fatalistic terms: 'God has his designs upon that land [Africa].... The branch torn away from the parent stem in Africa, by our ancestors, was brought to America – brought by Divine permission – in order that it might be engrafted upon the tree of the Cross. It will return in part to its own soil, not by violence or deportation, but willingly, and borne on the wing of faith and charity'

(Blyden, 1994, p. 115). Other Pan-Africanists, such as Henry Turner, James Holly, and Alexander Crummell in the United States, also endorsed this notion. To sell the homecoming idea Blyden said: 'The exiled Negro ... has a home in Africa. Africa is his, if he will. He may ignore it. He may consider that he is divested of any right to it; but this will not alter his relations to that country, or impair the integrity of his title' (Mudimbe, 1988, p. 105). Emigration, he insisted, was the required answer to the threat of Black 'extinction' in the Americas: 'This much the history of the world establishes that races either fossilized, oppressed, or degraded, must emigrate before any material change takes place in their civil, intellectual, or moral status; otherwise extinction is the consequence' (Blyden, 1994, p. 47). These debates, including those about strategies for achieving African decolonization, preoccupied the mind of the global Pan-African movement throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

In 1900, twelve years before the passing of Blyden in 1912, Sylvester Williams of Trinidad formally inaugurated the first Pan-African Conference in London which was attended by about thirty delegates from across the Caribbean, Europe, Canada, Africa and the United States. Thereafter, he undertook an extensive tour of the Caribbean where branches of the Pan-African Association were established. His contributions were however curtailed because of his untimely death in 1911 in Trinidad after a stint of anticolonial activities in apartheid South Africa. With both Williams and Blyden passing, Du Bois became the face and voice of the Pan-African idea and movement until the advent of Garvey and Garveyism in 1914. Du Bois convened and led five Pan-African Congresses: Paris in 1919, London in 1921, New York in 1923 and 1927, and Manchester in 1945. Du Boisian Pan-Africanism and Garveyism, according to George Padmore, 'were diametrically opposed' because 'Dr Du Bois was not only firmly against transporting American Negroes back to Africa, but was a staunch advocate of complete self-government for Africans in Africa organized on the basis of socialism and cooperative economy which would leave no room for millionaires, black or white' (Langley, 1978, p. 69). From 1917 to 1925, exactly three years after the founding of the Universal Negro Improvement Association [U.N.I.A], Garvey successfully established branches across the Caribbean, South America, the United States, and Africa. Garveyism advocated for 'economic self-help through collective race effort'; and, on the matter of emigration and 'nationhood' in Africa Garvey said as follows: '[W]e are determined to solve our own problem, by redeeming our Motherland Africa from the hands of alien exploiters and found there a Government, a nation of our own, strong enough to lend protection to the members of our

race scattered all over the world, and to compel the respect of the nations and races of the earth' (Martin, 1986, p. 41). Garveyism, despite differences with Du Boisian Pan-Africanism, had much in common with the latter; hence the 1945 Congress held under the aegis of Du Bois was able to conclude successfully as 'a synthesis of Du Bois' intellectualism and Garvey's pragmatism', according to J. E. Harris and S. Zeghidour (1993, p. 714).

A number of factors prepared the background for the success achieved by the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, England. The rise of the Fascist movement in Europe in the 1930s, and especially the invasion and colonization of Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia) by Fascist Italy in 1935, had the effect of reviving anticolonial Pan-African activities among a small group of West Indian and African intellectuals and activists residing in Britain. In August 1935 the International African Friends of Abyssinia was formed with these officers in charge: C. L. R. James, a Trinidadian, chairman; Dr Peter Milliard, a medical doctor from British Guyana, vice chairman; second vice chairman, Albert Marryshaw, a participant of the 1921 London Pan-African Congress; Jomo Kenyatta, who later became the first prime minister of independent Kenya, honorary secretary; Amy Ashwood Garvey, ex-wife of Garvey, treasurer; and publicity secretary, Samuel Manning of Trinidad. Padmore later joined this organization when he arrived in England around the end of 1935 and became a very influential member subsequently. The central aim of this organization was 'to arouse the sympathy and support of the British public for the victims of fascist aggression and to assist by all means in their power in the maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of Abyssinia' (Langley, 1978, p. 326). To effectively propagate their message they set up the International African Service Bureau in 1937 which got amalgamated in 1944 with the Pan African Federation.

This period in the 1930s also witnessed the rise of the Negritude movement among French-speaking African and Caribbean students in Paris who had been drawn into the Pan-African movement as well as the intellectual excitement of the 'Harlem Renaissance' in the United States. Aimé Césaire, a Black West Indian from Martinique, Leon Demas from Cayenne, and Leopold Senghor, later the first prime minister of Senegal, were among the most articulate and ardent exponents of the Negritude philosophy. Negritude is cultural Pan-Africanism par excellence. Via its prism, Senghor had bemoaned the impact of Whiteness and colonialism on Blackness as follows: 'With docility we accepted the values of the West, its discursive reason and its techniques. Our ambition was to become photographic negatives of the colonizers: "black-skinned Frenchmen". It went even further, for we would have blushed, if we could have blushed, about our black

skin, our frizzled hair, our flat noses, above all for the values of our traditional civilizations....' (Meridith, 2005, p. 59). In the poetic style of these Negritude writers another West Indian, Claude McKay, had synthesized the aims of cultural and political Pan-Africanism by urging Blacks to protest against their racial dehumanization (Ralston, Albuquerque Mourão, 1985, p. 773). The Pan-African Congress of 1945 ultimately focused on African decolonization because these Pan-Africanist activities and the global outcries against the invasion of Ethiopia, including the anti-European feelings created in Africa due to the harsh economic effects of the Second World War, had effectively combined to escalate global Black Nationalism to unprecedented heights.

The 1945 Pan-African Congress made concrete achievements and became a watershed in the evolution of the movement for a number of reasons, including the following: from being a reformist and protest ideology for the peoples of African descent in the New World it was transformed into a truly nationalist ideology for African decolonization. The Congress, under the oversight of Du Bois, was organized by a Special International Conference Secretariat consisting of Milliard as chairman, R. T. Makonnen, another West Indian, as treasurer, Nkrumah and Padmore as joint secretaries, Peter Abrahams of South Africa as publicity secretary, and Kenyatta as assistant secretary. This Congress, dominated by African delegates for the first time, was attended by over 200 participants mostly from Anglophone African colonies. Some of these delegates, including Nkrumah and Kenyatta, left with a firm determination to implement the resolutions that were passed. One of these called for 'total emancipation and independence for Africans and other subject races from domination by European powers claiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them' (Kodjo and Chanaiwa, 1993, p. 745). In the wake of the anticolonial campaigns that followed, the 1960s came to be known as the decade of African independence. Spurred on by the Pan-African ideas discussed, and with the birth of so many African states during the 1960s, the way was paved for the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963. The OAU, despite its shortcomings, emerged as a byproduct of African nationalism undergirded by the concept of Pan-Africanism bequeathed to Africa by its sons and daughters in the New World diaspora. The birth of the OAU, and the death of Du Bois in September of the same year in Ghana, marked the beginning of yet another chapter in the evolution of the African-Caribbean connection.

Caribbean Pan-Africanism after 1963

Horton, one of the Jamaican missionaries to Liberia earlier mentioned, had noted in 1921 that 'The Negro will not be free till Africa is free.' This conveys in a symptomatic way the common purpose that had driven the transatlantic movement called Pan-Africanism. For all the twentieth century Pan-Africanists' African liberation from political bondage was perceived as a necessary precondition for a stronger and inclusive global Pan-African movement. But the prospects for a stronger movement, as this excerpt from Malcolm X's plea (Minister of the Nation of Islam in the United States) to the OAU in 1964 shows, seemed to be receding because African-Americans had felt that the OAU was too narrowly focused on African continental issues: 'We, in America, are your lost brothers and sisters, and I am here only to remind you that our problems are your problems. We pray our pleas will not fall upon deaf ears....' (Esedebe, 1994, p. 227). The idea that the OAU was now falling short of expectation as the highest Pan-African creation shows in part the unease within Pan-Africanism as a transatlantic movement in the aftermath of the Manchester Congress. To explain the unease, it is pertinent to pose certain questions. First: what postcolonial conditions made it difficult for the OAU to promote a stronger vision of Pan-African unity with the diaspora? Second: how did the focus of the OAU on intra-continental Pan-Africanism affect African consciousness after 1963 in the Caribbean? Third: what are some of the most recent challenges of the African-Caribbean connection as it seeks to forge a more inclusive variety of Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century? The answers given below whilst indicating change and continuity in the forces shaping Caribbean Pan-Africanism, will also, by way of conclusion, critique the race ideology that has contributed to the founding of global Pan-Africanism.

After 1963, the OAU and the newly independent states became concerned primarily about national unity and development, in part because conservative domestic forces opposed to the grand visions and goals of transcontinental Pan-Africanism were springing and gaining strength within Africa. But, aside from purely political matters, economic issues also weighed heavily on the mind of the OAU and the emergent postcolonial African rulers. In urgent need of economic aid, postcolonial African states were worried about the adverse effects their involvement in a global Black movement could have on the nascent neocolonial relationships they were forging with their erstwhile colonial masters and aid donors in metropolitan Western Europe. Hence Pan-Africanism, as originally

conceived, started to wane because these new postcolonial rulers (except for persons like Nkrumah of Ghana) felt that it was neither politically expedient nor economically affordable to address the problems of African descendants given their own internal weaknesses (Mazrui, 2005, pp. 56-77). Global Pan-Africanism based on race unity had to give way to the national self-interests as the most pragmatic basis for ordering both bilateral and multilateral relationships within the global African community as well as within the wider world of international politics and diplomacy after 1963.

On the other side of the Atlantic, transcontinental Pan-Africanism, which encouraged emigration from the diaspora to Africa, was kept alive by the Rastafarian movement in Jamaica. Founded in the 1930s, and heavily influenced by Garveyism, this movement emerged as a very powerful cultural group with a strong sense of African consciousness. The interrelated theology and ideology of this movement have always revolved around the idea 'that Black people are in reality the captive children of Israel in Babylon and that, in repeat fulfilment of history, they will one day be set free. Repatriation is that freedom' (Chevannes, 1995, p. 248). Entrenched in this Rasta worldview is the idea that Haile Salassie of Ethiopia was the Rasta king. His visit to Jamaica in 1966, merely three years after the founding of the OAU, was for thousands in this movement an opportunity to identify with one of the potent symbols of African deviance against European domination.

Just as the Rastafarians had identified with the Black nationalism of Garvey in the 1930s, they also identified with the doctrine of 'Black Power' emanating from the United States in the 1960s. At the first Black Power Conference in September 1969 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, all participants committed themselves to the promotion of Black dignity and pride. Throughout the United States and the Caribbean, Black Power adherents and their sympathizers had become very critical of the prevailing status quo because they had observed the social contradictions which correlated Blackness of skin with poverty. 'We are poor because we black' still reflects, according to M. C. Alleyne, 'the understanding of black people [in Jamaica] of the way in which, historically, their race and colour have been the object of exploitation and degradation' (Alleyne, 2002, p. 193). Expressions of race consciousness in Caribbean Pan-Africanism were also social commentaries on the poor material conditions of Black people in the multiracial Caribbean societies. However, having made a very palpable cultural impact on the consciousness of the African diaspora, the organizational force of the Rastafarian movement has not been powerful enough to influence state power in the Caribbean region. From the 1970s popular music, especially reggae that had identified with the movement

through some of the most acclaimed Rastafarian musicians like Bob Marley and Peter Tosh, also contributed heavily to the cultural consciousness of Africa among the Afro-Caribbean populations in the region.

Finally, although in varying degrees Caribbean governments did show some ambivalence to the form of cultural Pan-Africanism mentioned above, they demonstrated state Pan-Africanism in their relationship with Africa through the foreign policies they pursued after 1963. In 1988, the Jamaican government headed by Edward Seaga showed solidarity with African anticolonial Pan-Africanism by hosting the anti-apartheid campaigner Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress in South Africa. Cuban forces fought side by side with the MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) against apartheid South African forces and those of Portugal, the colonial power in Angola. In addition to demonstrating state Pan-Africanism Cuba participated in the Angolan war of liberation because 'African blood runs deep in Cuba' (Walters, 1993, pp. 296-317). Aside from these efforts, the key role of internationalizing political support for African liberation movements after 1963 was undertaken by the Caribbean Conference Committee in collaboration with the US Black Power and Pan-African Movements. This Committee was established in 1964 by a group of Caribbean activists in Montreal, Canada; and, through the annual meetings and the periodic conferences for Black writers which they organized, their understanding of the global Black struggle benefited from the theoretical knowledge as well as the practical organizational and tactical experiences of veteran Pan-Africanist thinkers like C. L. R. James, Stokely Carmichael, Amiri Baraka and Walter Rodney (Walters, 1993, pp. 296-317). Through the efforts of these activists in the latter part of the twentieth century, Caribbean Pan-Africanism continued to strengthen the transatlantic linkages between the masses of Africa and the Caribbean despite the perceived shortfalls of the OAU.

However, at the beginning of the twentieth-first century, the fragile race unity of the Pan-African movement was again put through another rigorous test at the UN-sponsored World Conference against Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa. Events leading up to that Conference offered very few hints that the debates over claims for reparations for the slave trade would set 'Africa adrift from its diaspora' (Beckles, 2013, p. 172). This was because African governments, especially Nigeria, South Africa and Senegal, had allied themselves with the United States, Britain and the European Union, to undercut the unified pro-reparation positions and arguments of the Caribbean consisting of Jamaica, Barbados, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago,

Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Guyana and Suriname. The views of Nigeria and Senegal seemed all the more ironic because the first Pan-African congress on reparations was held in Abuja, Nigeria, in 1993. This congress was followed by a meeting of African and Diaspora scholars, NGOs and youth organizations at Goree, Senegal, in June 2001, where the resolutions of the Abuja meeting were further discussed, refined and endorsed. Both meetings accepted 'The Legal Basis for the African Claims for Reparations for the Slave Trade' – a document crafted by Lord Anthony Gifford, a legal luminary – as the Pan-African position on this matter. Both meetings had also endorsed the view that the damage done to Africans and African descendants by the transatlantic slave trade cannot be simply set aside as 'a thing of the past, [because it] is painfully manifested in the damaged lives of contemporary Africans everywhere.' For these reasons, both meetings had further unanimously agreed that there is 'a unique and unprecedented moral debt owed to the African peoples that has yet to be paid – the debt of compensation to the Africans as the most humiliated and exploited people of the last four hundred years' (Beckles, 2013, p. 179). The OAU, it might be noted, appeared to have also accepted and endorsed these positions and the Pan-African meetings that had produced them.

At the World Conference, the anti-reparation alliance of African governments (as opposed to non-governmental and civil groups from Africa) the United States, the European Union and Britain had argued as follows: it was unfair to base the claims for reparations on the transatlantic slave trade because of its historical remoteness; it was morally inappropriate to hold the current Western governments accountable for that past; and it was impracticable to pursue any financial redress that would be linked directly to slavery as a crime against humanity because the trade in enslaved Africans was not illegal before its abolition. African governments, rather than pursuing the 'Claims', used the conference platform to launch the 'New African Initiative' for growth and development to be based on African self-help strategies. This unanticipated turn of events, which had undercut the Pan-African position, only succeeded in momentarily 'disheartening' the Caribbean delegation. In fact, the anti-reparation alliance actually reenergized Caribbean Pan-Africanism and its reparations agendas thereafter. For the African-Caribbean connection, Durban was a watershed moment which, according to Beckles, also taught an important lesson: 'for the future, the bridge between the continent and its diaspora over which the reparation lobby should travel is that of civil society solidarity' (Beckles, 2013, p. 188).

In continuation of the Durban dialogue, a government institution in Barbados, the Pan-African Commission, had organized the African and

African Descendants World Conference against Racism in October 2002. The aim was to reconvene the global reparations groups, especially the non-governmental organizations from civil society. In October 2004, the Global African Conference was also convened in Suriname on the African Claims for Reparations. These conferences coming after Durban, among other events, gave a preview and background to those national events that marked the bicentennial year of the abolition of the British transatlantic slave trade across the Caribbean in 2007. To mark the bicentenary, the entire region observed a moment of silence on 27 March 2007, in honour of the 'Middle Passage' victims and those who lived through the horrors of plantation slavery in the Americas. Before that, as Beckles has noted: Caribbean governments 'used the bicentennial to make public declarations – some sincere, others to placate the growing public support for the reparation movement. Most governments set out national agendas to mark the moment; some linked these formal programmes to calls for reparations; others took more serious steps and moved to establish initiatives to strengthen the movement. Collectively, the Caribbean in 2007 was informed by the politics of reparations' (Beckles, 2013, p. 223). Notwithstanding the contradictions in that politics, the national events fostered Black consciousness to a degree not seen in recent times in the Caribbean.

That politics also revealed a problem in Caribbean Pan-Africanism identified earlier in African intra-continental Pan-Africanism: the absence of a variety of the concept that would be compatible with the cultural and political expectations of the state and the masses of Afro-Caribbean society. In Jamaica, just to cite one example, while Prime Minister Bruce Golding of the Jamaica Labour Party did not declare public support for the reparation's movement, some powerful members of his own party, such as Mike Henry, did. Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller of the National Peoples Party of Jamaica made these unsavoury comments on 5 March 2015: '[S]lavery was "wicked and brutal" [but] whether Britain will be able to pay compensation I don't know. We have heard the call, but I'm not making any call on the British government' (Beckles, 2013, pp. 226-229). Both prime ministers succeeded in portraying unequivocally the ambivalence of the state towards the cultural Pan-African movement led by the Rastafarians – a group with an undying faith and avid self-interest in the reparation's movement as a fitting moral, legal and political course of action. Finally, this situation in Jamaica also led Beckles to these sobering comments: 'Jamaica, then, the largest receiving market for enslaved Africans in the British Caribbean, joined with Nigeria and Senegal, the largest suppliers, in opposing the reparations movement' (Beckles, 2013, p. 229). Such actions by the state

readily reveal the preparedness of the ruling elite on both sides of the Atlantic to use the symbols of African heritage for purposes of their own political self-interests, rather than for promoting people-oriented movements and agendas.

These apparent contradictory representations of Black consciousness could be explained in relation to the race ideology that has driven Pan-Africanism. 'Race,' as K.A. Appiah argued, 'disables us because it proposes as a basis for common action the illusion that Black people are fundamentally allied by nature and, thus, without effort; it leaves us unprepared, therefore, to handle the 'intra-racial' conflicts that arise from the very different situations of black people in different parts of the economy and the world' (Appiah, 1992, p. 176). The Caribbean, despite these perceived 'intra-racial' divides over the reparation movement, is very likely to remain as a vibrant Pan-African centre in the evolving global African community in the twenty-first century because of its own unique historical experiences and the benefits of its midway geographical position in relation to Africa, the United States and Great Britain. Increasing global connectedness via the internet, the social media, and the growing transatlantic television and cable networks, will also strengthen and sustain the Caribbean-African connection regardless of the actions of the political elite on both sides of the Atlantic during the twenty-first century.

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CHAPTER 24

NEW ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Globalization in African Words

Samir Amin

Introduction

Africa is not 'marginalized'. This word implies that the continent is positioned 'outside' the global system or that it can only be integrated at a superficial level at best. It also suggests that the African population might suffer poverty as a result. Since 1995, the extra regional trade ratio to percentage of GDP in Africa has been approximately 45% compared to 13% in Europe; 13% in North America; 24% in Latin America; and 18% in Asia. These ratios have not undergone any significant changes throughout the twentieth century. The global average in 1928 was 15% and at the tail end of the century in 1990 it was 16%.

The long history of the integration of African globalization in the global system

How do we explain the paradox that Africa appears to be even more integrated in the global system than any other region? Of course, GDP per capita in Africa only represents 21% of the global average. The high levels of trade mirror the low percentage ratios. At the same time the continent's exports only account for a small proportion of world trade. And therein lies the reason why Africa is

considered 'marginal' in the global system, that is to say only being of minimal significance ('the world can easily do without Africa'). But the assumption that the expansion of the global economy means maximizing production and trade is questionable. The logic of the system leads to choosing volume levels and conditions of production that maximize profit. So-called marginalized countries are actually cruelly over-exploited and subsequently experience poverty as a result.

Any evaluation must, therefore, focus on other matters. All developed countries have historically been self-sufficient economies in the sense that these countries have always been both inward-looking and open to the world and in most cases regarding the latter, aggressively so ('imperialist'). The resulting global system is off-kilter: self-sufficient centres are actively and simultaneously integrated within the global system (they shape the global framework) whereas marginal countries are passively integrated (they are invited to 'bend' into the system without taking on any significant role in the shaping of said system). Therefore, all the regions in the world are incorporated in the global system but this integration occurs in different ways for different countries. In addition, the level of integration in the global system has not changed dramatically throughout the twentieth century contrary to current opinion in the globalization debate. There have been highs and lows but the trending curve that mirrors any increase in the level of integration has proved to be constant and somewhat slow, with no discernible acceleration noted even during recent decades. This does not exclude the fact that globalization – an old story now – goes through several successive phases that must be identified as being qualitatively different; the focus must be in the specifics of each of these stages in relation to the changes driven by the evolution of the system's hubs.

Africa has been integrated in the global system from the get-go when it was created during the mercantilist stage of capitalism (during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). The key peripheral at the time was colonial America where an export-orientated economy had been established, dominated by European trade interests and based on the exploitation of slaves. The slave trade was the conduit for vast regions in sub-Saharan Africa to be integrated in the global system albeit in the most destructive of ways. Much of the subsequent 'backwardness' was down to this integration tactic that propelled a population crash, a decline that is only rectified now. Africa has now regained the population levels it probably had around 1500. It also led to the dismantling of large state organizations that existed before which were subsequently replaced by brutal military systems in a permanent state of hostility with each other.

The second wave of Africa's integration in the global system took place during the colonial period from 1880 to 1960. Once conquered it was necessary

to 'enhance the value of' (not develop) the continent. The combination of the requirements of said enhancement – what are the natural resources in different regions of the continent? – and inherited local social conditions from preceding African societies help us to understand the nature of each of the three colonization models implemented: the 'trading' economy that incorporates small farmers into the world market place for tropical fruit by subjecting it to the authority of a controlled oligopolistic market thereby setting in motion a drop in peasant wages to minimum levels and the destruction of the land; the 'reserves' economy in South Africa orientated towards mining activities, using cheap labour provided by enforced migration for 'reserves' that are in too short supply to permit the reappearance of a subsistence economy; the pillage-based economy demonstrated by concessionary companies in the Congo basin where the local social conditions did not permit the establishment of a 'trading economy', nor did the mineral resources justify the organization of reserves requiring the provision of a large workforce.

The outcome of this mode of insertion into global capitalism would also prove to be catastrophic. It delayed the beginning of an agricultural revolution by a century. The surplus was derived from peasant labour without any investment in modernization, without paying for labour (recreating the framework of traditional self-sufficiency), and even without guaranteeing the maintenance of the natural conditions for the recreation of wealth (pillaging agricultural soil and forested lands). At the same time this exploitation of natural resources precluded the formation of any middle classes. Neocolonialism has perpetuated these characteristics. The structure of the new system was defined by the famous Lome Agreements that linked sub-Saharan Africa to the EEC countries. These agreements perpetuated the old division of labour – relegating independent Africa to the production of raw materials – at a time when – during the Bandung period (1955 to 1975) – other Third World regions had kick-started their industrial revolutions. They cost Africa almost thirty years at a decisive moment in historic transformation.

Independence in Africa

Beginning in 1960, however, with independence achieved, the people of Africa embarked on a series of development projects, the main objectives of which were more or less identical to those undertaken in Asia and Latin America. This common denominator is easy to understand if we remember that in 1945

almost all the countries in the South continued to be deprived of any industry worthy of this term (excluding the odd mining area), the population being mainly rural and governed by archaic regimes and colonial and oligarchic land ownership. Despite their great diversity, all the national liberation movements pursued the same objectives of political independence, state modernization and industrialization of the economy.

Should we perceive this saga as a step in the expansion of global capitalism? Should we view this primitive national accumulation as activating the conditions for this next stage we are embarking on towards the opening of the world market? The appraisal outlined here is different; it places the emphasis on the paradox between the spontaneous tendencies of a capitalist economic system governed by short-term financial gain and longer-term visions that steer emerging political forces, in conflict with the rationale of globalization for that very reason. This clash is certainly not always radical in nature, capitalism can adapt, sometimes advantageously. But adapt is all it does; it does not generate the process of change.

All liberation movements in Africa have shared this modernist vision. This modernist twist on capitalism is supposed to bring the basic social relations peculiar to capitalism to the table: salaried employees, business management, urbanization, educational methods and the concept of national citizenship. And, no doubt, some other characteristics of advanced capitalism such as political democracy followed in its wake, ill-justified by the exigencies of prior initial development. All the countries in the region, be they radical or moderate, have chosen the same model of a single party system and sham elections. Nevertheless, in the absence of a middle class of entrepreneurs, the state was expected to fill this role. Since the emergence of the middle class was viewed with suspicion (due to the priority it would give to its immediate interests over the longer-term interests of the nation), the radical fringe of the national liberation movement naturally conceived of its project in terms of 'building socialism'.

If we adopt the criterion of 'nation building' the results are just as diverse. Whilst self-sufficiency had a centripetal effect that helped to forge the unity of nations elsewhere, peripheral expansion that was centrifugal in nature negated this view. In Africa where the borders of states have not respected the prior history of its peoples, the disintegration caused by capitalist peripheralization made it possible for *ethnicism* to survive, despite the efforts of the ruling classes to get rid of the latter after national liberation. When the crisis struck, brutally destroying the surplus that had enabled the financing of trans-ethnic policies, the ruling class itself broke into fragments which, having lost the legitimacy

based on expectations of 'development', are trying to create new bases for themselves, often associated with an ethnic or para-religious retreat.

What followed after the deterioration of national development projects in the 1960s and 1970s has been well documented. The starting point was a sharp reversal in the relationship of social forces in favour of capital that took place during the 1980s, operating in Africa through 'structural adjustment programmes'. Since then, GDP growth rates have slumped to about half the level they were during the 'thirty glory years' in all the regions of the world except for East Asia. The structural crisis in turn has caused a dramatic increase in developing nations' debt. This crisis is actually characterized by a growing surplus of capital that cannot find an outlet in production systems; alternative financial outlets must be created to prevent a sharp devaluation of capital; developing nations' debt is the result of the financialization of the system. The burden has reached intolerable levels. How can a poor African country allocate half its exports or more to pay interest on a debt like that when it is being asked at the same time to be 'more efficient' and to 'adjust itself to the situation'? The devastating outcomes of these policies are well-known: economic regression, social disaster, growing instability and even the occasional dislocation of whole societies (e.g. Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and the Central African Republic).

Dominant discourse claims that these tragic realities are only temporary because the deepening of global inter-connectedness in situ will favour the emergence of the countries of the South including Africa, which has been rapidly dubbed the 'continent of the future'. It is still too early to tell whether the African people are committed to this promised path of emergence. There is even some talk these days of an 'African Renaissance'. No doubt the victory of the African people in the South has generated great hope across vast regions of the continent. But there are still no visible signs of any crystallization of these hopes in alternative strategies. This would require dramatic changes at a national level, going far beyond what is generally suggested by the terms 'good governance' and 'multi-party political democracy', both at regional and global levels. Another model of globalization would therefore gradually emerge from these changes, making it possible to correct Africa's poor integration into the global system. The reality is therefore much more nuanced than the rhetoric of optimism would suggest.

The harmful effects of liberal globalization

The current system of liberal globalization is not sustainable. The extreme centralization of power for the exclusive benefit of globalized finance is reflected in the endless worsening of inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, operating on a stagnant economic basis in the historic centres and, of course, in the overexploitation of labour in the dominated peripheries and the plundering of their natural resources. This contradiction is only overcome by the endless rush forward into the financialization of economic life. You could say that such a system is illogical. Be that as it may be, we cannot ignore the fact that the financial oligarchy that draws its privileges from this system is not ready to give up its power as long as it can profit from it, even though the system is pointless for others involved.

In this context, the negative developments that have affected the societies of the world over the past few decades have been enormous. Although these social changes have been very diverse depending on the country concerned, they have all followed the same logic imposed by neoliberal globalization. And therefore, the changes that have taken place in the countries of the South, and in Africa in particular, have had an even more catastrophic impact socially, politically and economically than in dominant centres.

In Africa, the prevailing trend was the acceleration of the process of the destruction of peasant societies that had hitherto represented the majority of the population. The peasant question immediately raises the question of gender inequality: the destruction of rural societies has resulted in more female poverty and oppression. This destruction is not and cannot be offset by growth in urban jobs at a rate sufficient to alleviate the human tragedy that it has caused. Globalization as it stands has nothing to offer other than the construction of a shantytown planet. Obviously, the strain on society of desperate migrants is also the consequence of this large-scale process of impoverishment. In urban areas poverty is reflected in the steep rise in 'informal' coping strategies. The implementation of systematic exclusion policies to curb the latter permit the exploitation of a subcontracted labour force to the benefit of key transnationals.

Nevertheless, alongside these tragic developments affecting the vast majority of the people concerned – from 60% to 80% of the population – the process of liberal globalization favours the rapid rise of the new middle classes consisting of a minority involved in the production system. This minority – insignificant fifty years ago – now makes up approximately a fifth of the population in some

of the countries concerned. The only ones to benefit from the system, this sector of the population appears to have a clear conscience. But careless tributes bandied about in dominant discourse (by the World Bank and others) fail to take into account the simple fact that the price being paid is nothing less than the poverty of the majority.

This specific type of impoverishment creates a political scenario that is tricky to manage. Subjecting the tyranny of regional oligarchies to the unilateral demands of globalization has therefore become the only way to manage this ongoing crisis. Politicians who were in charge of popular national bodies during previous eras – such as the first Bandung period and the NAM (non-aligned movement) episode from 1960 to 1980 – often ended up aligning themselves with the new globalization system in the hope of subsequently staying in power and being accepted by globalization leaders. This can be seen by the backtracking of Nasser's successors in Egypt, Boumediene in Algeria, ANC developments in South Africa, the Rawlings regime in Ghana and the successor to dictator Moussa Traoré in Mali, to name but a few. But the power exerted by regional oligarchies, even when backed by the middle-class beneficiaries of the system, remains illegitimate in the eyes of the poverty-stricken masses (as evidenced by clashes in the Arab world and elsewhere). However, these movements have not gone any further than angry outbursts so far. The viscous nature of a class structure produced by the *lumpen-development* model in question certainly explains the structural weaknesses of these revolts. They easily open the door to the short-term victory of sham traditionalist alternatives based on religion or ethnicity.

The ambition of powers that seek to assert themselves on the world stage as national capitalist economies and become active players in shaping the global system is thwarted by the will of the triad powers, which deny them this right. A 'different kind of globalization' based on polycentrism is not on the agenda when it comes to what the dominant powers deem acceptable. Consequently, they are involved in ongoing wars in Africa and elsewhere, because none of the nations concerned here can tolerate indefinitely the unconditional submission that is demanded.

There can be no emergence without a state strategy based on a secure social bloc that gives it its legitimacy. This strategy has to be capable of implementing the creation of a self-sufficient national system of production in a coherent manner and of boosting efficiency through policies that ensure participation by the vast majority of the working class to boost growth. The positive changes that would create genuine emergence are at odds with unilateral submission to the current demands of globalization; the latter only result in what I call

lumpen-development, manifested by the accelerated social disintegration associated with this model of 'development' (and which therefore does not deserve the name). It is manifested by a dizzying surge of poverty-driven coping strategies (so-called informal activities). Some of these emerging countries really seem to fit the description because they are not associated with these *lumpen-development* processes; the working class is not struck down by poverty but on the contrary, there is a modest or slightly more assured upward curve in living conditions. Others such as Korea and Taiwan are obviously totally capitalist in nature. Another two have inherited the legacy of prior socialist aspirations – China and Vietnam. But there are other examples of emergence associated with the unambiguous use of the *lumpen-development* model. India is the best example of this. The country demonstrates many realities that fit the criteria for an emerging country: state policy that promotes an industrial production system, the growth of the middle class linked to this, an increase in technological capability and education, as well as an international policy capable of autonomy on the world stage. However, this also means accelerated poverty for two-thirds of society. So, we are therefore dealing with a hybrid system that combines emergence with *lumpen-development*. We can emphasize the complementary relationship between these two facets of reality. Sweeping generalizations aside, it is my belief that all the other countries considered to be emerging markets belong to the same hybrid family, be it Brazil, South Africa or elsewhere. But there are also situations – and this is the case with African countries – in which elements of emergence are poorly defined in comparison to a *lumpen-development* process that practically dominates the country's spectrum of reality.

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GLOBAL AFRICAN MODERNISMS

Heather D. Russell

'The original 'Africa' is no longer there. It too has been transformed. History is, in that sense, irreversible. We must not collude with the West which, precisely, normalizes and appropriates Africa by freezing it into some timeless zone of the primitive, unchanging past. Africa must at last be reckoned with by Caribbean people, but it cannot in any simple sense be merely recovered'

(Hall, 1990)

Introduction

Modernism has often been the vehicle through which scholars arrive at conceptual frameworks for forms of African diasporic representation. Whether we are talking about the 'changing same' quality of jazz and other Black musical forms, or the polyrhythms of samba, kumina, hip-hop, Kamau Brathwaite's poetry, or Glissantian 'transversality', there is a shared notion that runs through Black sounds, bodies in motion, theories about global southern Blackness that eschews both fixity/binaries and foregrounds contingency, fluidity, complexity, nuance, change and chance. Global African cultural identity is always already 'becoming' rather than 'being'. For Stuart Hall, this idea of 'becoming' is painfully liberating (Hall, 1990, pp. 222-237). The notion of African diasporic culture as a diluted and

perpetually unstable outcome of slavery emanating from an essential, originary and thus 'real' and recuperable Africa – is doubly problematic. First, it assumes (as in the quote above) Africa as both idea and stasis. It confirms, as Achille Mbembe in *On the Postcolony* suggestively argues, that 'Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West's desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world...and Africa, because it was and remains that fissure between what the West is, what it thinks it signifies, it's not simply *part of* imaginary significations, it is *one of* those significations' (Mbembe, 2001, p. 2). Second, it presupposes that Black cultural identity everywhere else but in Africa is trapped in a kind of perpetual longing for wholeness and being to which it can never return. In Jamaica Kincaid's construction of it in *A Small Place*, we diasporic subjects are 'orphans: no motherland, no fatherland, no gods, no mounds of earth for holy ground...and worst and most painful of all, no tongue' (Kincaid, 1988, p. 31). Of course, Kincaid is being a bit dramatic for effect. Still, this idea of peoples of African descent as having been 'stripped' of their originary African culture reifies the binary trope perpetuated in colonial discourse of core-periphery, centre-margin, authentic-bastardized, only in this case Africa and African-ness are essentialized and centered instead of Europe. Alice Walker, however, relevantly reminds us in *In Search of Our Mother's Gardens*: 'But this is not the end of the story, for all the young women – our mother and grandmothers, *ourselves* – have not perished in the wilderness' (Walker, 1983, p. 235). Indeed. To be sure, African identities, like European identities, are complicated constructions that have travelled (literally and metaphorically) globally and transnationally, and which are subjected to the same processes of modernity and flux. To view them as thus provides, to my mind, rich possibilities for collapsing such limiting, and quite frankly, dangerous binary constructions as highlighted above and thinking in terms which are excitingly contingent and theoretically generative. To do so demands perhaps a new taxonomy to conceive global African modernisms, which I want to argue here can be found, provisionally, in African-Caribbean philosophical thought.

Paget Henry in *Caliban's Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy* makes a relevant point here. Henry insists that African Caribbean philosophy like all philosophical discourse is both 'internally differentiated and intertextually embedded' (Henry, 2000, p. 3). In other words, it has been formed and shaped by larger epistemological shaping factors, in this case, of imperialism and colonialism from which it cannot be delinked; it is therefore embedded within 'a framework that always embodied unequal discursive compromise'. Questions of existence and ontology when emergent within an 'antiblack world' – or in what Abdul Jan Mohamed describes as 'the economy of Manichean allegory' in which

Black subjects must conceive themselves – ‘initiated’, according to Henry, ‘the foregrounding of colonial, racial, and national struggles and the backgrounding of classical philosophical issues such as being, truth, spirit, and the nature of the self. Binaries such as colonizer/colonized, colony/nation, or Black/White quickly eclipsed those of being/nonbeing, spirit/matter, good/evil and so forth....As a result Afro-Caribbean philosophy was relocated to an antiblack, anti-philosophical world, from which it now has to be extricated’ (Henry, 1985). This is not to say of course, and I think Henry would concur, that African Caribbean philosophy is non-existent, on the contrary; however, the terms in which it has been trapped have arguably been overdetermined by regional demands for juridical freedom, materially manifest political enfranchisement, and sociocultural visibility. At the same time, we should not, as Stuart Hall insists, ‘underestimate the importance of the art of imaginative rediscovery in which...conception[s] of...rediscovered, essential identity’ have played a vital role in articulating and agitating for rights (racial justice, feminist, anti-colonial, queer); however, we must nod accession to its utility and then continue the arduous work of ‘positioning’ African Caribbean identities within a dialectical interplay between ‘similarity and continuity’ and ‘difference and rupture’ (Hall, 1990, p. 226).

To do so we might have to begin with the plantation, nonetheless. For as Paul Gilroy insists in *The Black Atlantic*, the time has come for the primal history of modernity to be reconstructed from the slaves’ points of view’ (Gilroy, 1993, p. 55). Brathwaite’s essay ‘Caribbean Man in Space and Time’ published in *Savacou* over forty years ago, and thus arguably phallogocentric, still gives some important and relevant early context to ‘how to study the fragments/whole’ in African Caribbean history and thought (Brathwaite, 2013, p. 175). Here, Brathwaite argues that ‘plantation system studies’, which had dominated (and perhaps still do to some degree) Caribbean academic inquiry, focus on systems of exploitation of various forms which emphasize the study of, for example, Aboriginal genocide, enslavement, migration, racial/class stratification, inequality, structural underdevelopment, structural instability, persistent poverty and the like; all of which he concedes ‘one would expect given the inherited concept of exploitation and destitution’ (ibid., p. 178). And yet, such system studies (and this is relevant to Henry’s point above) are not only too discipline specific, but miss:

The subtle discontinuities which point to the originality of man as a civilization-making animal who can alter the architectural complex of an age. Such an alteration or dialectic of alteration would seem to me the cornerstone for a philosophy of history in the Third World of the Caribbean....It would alert us to the duality that is characteristic of calendars of fate associated with dead time as the spectral irony and archeology of the muse (ibid., p. 176).

Brathwaite's theoretical redress is a consideration of 'the inner plantation', which encompasses 'a model which allows for blood flow, half-look, the look both/several ways, which allows for and contains the ambiguous, and rounds the sharp edges of the dichotomy' (ibid., p. 178). Brathwaite does not entirely concede the idea of ancestry/origin, and to be fair this is an early, albeit foundational work through his generative notion of 'creolization' which has profoundly impacted Caribbean studies. I want to claim, however, that there is something potent and suggestive in Brathwaite's admonition that we consider 'the half-look, the look both ways' and in the idea of 'dead time as the spectral irony and archeology of the muse.'¹ What might 'the look both ways', framed within the context of 'live' instead of dead time, in fact look like? How might such theoretical imaginings help us to construct a taxonomy of African Caribbean philosophical thought?

African American, Black Atlantic and Postcolonial Caribbean studies have long taken as their central claim that Euro-American definitions of modernism are inadequate formulations. Paul Gilroy in *The Black Atlantic*, for example, reminds us that 'central categories of the Enlightenment project as the idea of universality, the fixity of meaning, the coherence of the subject, and of course, the foundational ethnocentrism in which these have all tended to be anchored,' all 'impact on the formation of racial discourse' and hold 'relevance in understanding the development of racial politics' (Gilroy, 1993, p. 55). In other words, modernity's privileging of the role of the intellectual must be reconfigured in contexts such as slavery which demand that we interrogate 'the meaning of being an intellectual in settings that have denied access to literacy and encouraged other forms of communication in its place' (ibid., p. 43). For Houston Baker, Jr. (1987), Black artists' formal engagement with modernism begins, not with bourgeois 'anxiety' about reproducing preexistent forms, but rather with structurally addressing the realities of Black economic disenfranchisement. As a consequence, African American modernism is implicitly vested with a politico-economic significance tangibly grounded in Black uplift. Baker yokes this materially-inflected formulation to a concomitant need to discursively master form and *de-form* 'mastery', fissuring the capitalistic imbrications of European modernity, and in turn positing a potentially liberational global African modernism (Baker, Jr., 1987, p. xvi).² Both Baker and

1 Brathwaite tells us that the idea of 'the archeology of the muse', is inspired by Wilson Harris' *History, Fable and Myth in the Caribbean and Guianas*.

2 I have changed the phrase 'deforming mastery' to 'de-forming mastery' in order to trope on the idea of fissuring master narratives.

Gilroy work to highlight the paradoxical and invisibilized narratives of Black modernity, and simultaneously, to situate them within the racially-inflected and violent discourses that were internal to the project of modernity. As Carole Boyce-Davies aptly puts it, 'Horror disrupts seamless narratives of people and place' (Boyce-Davies, 1994, p. 4). In a similar vein, Simon Gikandi argues convincingly against jettisoning modernism altogether as a viable lens through which to theorize Caribbean writing, suggesting rather that the 'colonial anxiety' that produces Caribbean modernisms simultaneously produces the subversive structures needed to challenge colonial power structures (Gikandi, 1992, pp. 11-12).³ Gikandi insists that Caribbean writers, 'haunted' by European colonization can neither 'adopt' nor 'escape' European modernism, particularly because of the *revisionary* cast of their writing. Baker, Gilroy and Gikandi invoke and then signify on modernism, insisting upon historical specificities of race/ethnicity and attenuating forms of Euro-American subjugation that in turn foster or produce what might be called a potentially emancipatory global African modernism. Pushing this notion further, I wonder, as Henry does in *Caliban's Reason*, whether 'an Africana phenomenology can be of help here' (Henry, 2000, p. 166), and more significantly, what its contours might look like?

In the foregoing, I have worked to highlight just a few of the numerous theoretical and philosophical engagements with the project of modernity, with modernism, and their dialectic relationship with Black subjectivity, race, culture, history and discourse that have preoccupied global African thinkers for decades. It seems to me, however, that such an Africana phenomenology as Henry conceives it, or, African Caribbean philosophy, or, global African modernism, must reject the notion that Africa must somehow be sloughed off or relegated to the sphere of the 'pre-modern' in order to arrive at modernity, and at the same time must challenge the idea that the African Caribbean is modern *because* of its (in comparison to Africa and Europe) imbrication in the discursive economies of the plantation system. In far too many contemporary models of Black modernity, references to Africa are defined and hence rejected as romantically nativist and implicitly naive notions of symbolic return and are positioned as diachronically opposed to the so-called African diaspora.

For Edouard Glissant, for instance, Africa is 'the inaccessible land', a land which creates an 'unceasing tug...against which we must paradoxically struggle to take root in our rightful land' (Glissant, 1989, pp. 160-61). Africa is for Gikandi

3 Simon Gikandi argues that 'the Caribbean imagination is sustained by the tug of both Europe and Africa', the former of which he aligns with an 'imposed metropolitan identity'.

a place towards which the Caribbean writer is invariably drawn but cannot look towards for a 'rescue plan' – it is 'a prelude to the adventure of Caribbean modernity' (Gikandi, 1992, p. 10). For Gilroy, even as he insists upon the opening up of modernity's meanings to Black expressivity, he locates certain forms of resistance within the sphere of the pre- or anti-modern (Gilroy, 1993, p. 56). If gestures towards Africa *are* proposed and not immediately dismissed as romantic, chimerical, or both, they are labeled as unsuitably situated within traditional Afrocentric theoretical models, and *then* they are summarily dismissed. Hence, the question we are left with, it seems to me, is whether there is a place for invoking Africa that has nothing to do with nostalgia. For *both* ideas, the modernist notion of a pre-modern 'originary' Africa and the nationalist concept of Afrocentricity are surely, albeit to varying degrees, rooted in nostalgia.

Is *the unceasing tug of Africa*, against which Glissant insists the New World African subject *must paradoxically struggle*, principally and solely about negotiating the original trauma of capture, transportation and enslavement *or*, is it possible that like the concomitant and acceded to *tug of Europe*, the tug of Africa is equally steeped in theoretical/discursive and epistemological formulations that shape and inform global African modernism and its expression? (Gikandi, 1992, p. 3). Or put another way, might we formulate our interrogation alongside Henry's so as to ask: 'Can contemporary appropriations of Oedipus, Electra, Prometheus [Greek mythos central to European philosophical thought e.g. psychoanalysis] ...adequately represent the African paths to modernity, or will we require modern appropriations of Ogun, Erzulie, Shango and other members of the African pantheon?' (Henry, 2000, p. 165). In this light, I am proposing for consideration, as I have argued in my book *Legba's Crossing: Narratology in the African Atlantic* (2009) that there is a certain efficacy in employing a specifically global African epistemological/philosophical framework through which to read the production of precisely the emancipatory or liberational poetics with which Black modernisms are concerned (Russell, 2009). To commence, we might first consider two classic tropes within global African modernisms: Wilson Harris's *limbo gateway* and Houston Baker Jr.'s *railroad crossing*.

In his germinal work *History, Fable and Myth in the Caribbean and Guianas*, Wilson Harris draws upon Brathwaite's contention that the limbo dance originated during the Middle Passage as a mechanism by which enslaved Africans moved in the face of limited space. In its 'New World' configuration, the dancer moves under a gradually lowered pole until she/he assumes a spider-like position of

maneuvering through the use of her/his limbs, under the pole.⁴ Thus for Harris, the 'spider metamorphosis' engendered by the limbo dance metaphorizes Caribbean modernity. As metaphorical gateway between Africa and the New World, the limbo dance enacts at once the disassemblage of strictly African, and an assemblage of New World African, identities. Thus, 'limbo is not the total recall of an Africa past [such would be impossible]', rather, it 'was the renaissance of a new corpus of sensibility that could translate and accommodate African and other legacies within a new architecture of culture' (Harris, 1970, p. 158). Functioning as it were as a kind of phantom limb which both separates from and links the Black subject to Africa, the 'limbo imagination' that emerges as a consequence, becomes the mechanism by which African diasporic subjects negotiate the 'violations of slavery and indenture and conquest' (ibid., p. 160). Here, Wilson's notion of 'architecture' is richly suggestive. He invokes form and function in order to get at a conception of the Caribbean as 'a gateway society' (ibid., p. 159).

A gate opens and closes, allowing for multidirectional movement. As we work to articulate a global Africana phenomenology it is useful to look even more closely at Harris's description of 'the limbo dance' as that which 'becomes the human gateway which dislocates (*and therefore frees itself from*) a uniform chain of miles across the Atlantic.' Two points. Suggestive here is the idea that African diasporic identity, as it has been conventionally understood, is conceived in Western metaphysical terms of uniformity, linearity and teleology. In other words, African (read originary, authentic, essential) identity was (albeit forcibly) transported across the Middle Passage, and as a consequence of slavery and colonization, transmogrified and transfigured, leaving scattered residuals (read African retentions), which we desire to, but can never piece back together as one-to-one, or injective functions. Secondly, dislocating itself from such desires – the desires for uniformity, for recuperation, for crafting linear and unified narratives of identity marked by singularity – is itself an act of freedom. The limbo dance, as rupture in the face of uniformity, as creativity in the face of horror, is conceived in terms of agency, a freeing from the discursive (and potentially from the material) violence of linearity (the Enlightenment, progress, modernity, development) and binaries ('the white man's burden', white supremacy, 'the civilizing mission', humanitarianism). 'This dislocation or interior space', according to Harris, 'serves therefore as a corrective to a uniform cloak or documentary stasis of imperialism.' Instead, 'the journey across the

4 Kamau Braithwaite's 'Limbo' (1973) is the poem that influences Wilson Harris's configuration of the limbo dance as a metaphor for Caribbean modernity.

Atlantic for the forebears of West Indian man involved a new kind of space – inarticulate as this new ‘spatial’ character was at the time – and not simply an unbroken schedule of miles in a log book’ (Harris, 1970, p. 159). In a similar vein, Lisa Lowe in *The Intimacies of Four Continents* argues that ‘New World’ people of the British, French, Dutch and Spanish colonized Americas ‘created the conditions for modern humanism, despite the disavowal of these conditions in the liberal political philosophy on which it is largely based’ (Lowe, 2006, p. 206). Though Lowe’s intervention is in part a critique of the European political ‘economy of affirming and forgetting’ fundamental to contemporary conceptions of mainstream modern humanism, she points from a different angle to the indebtedness of liberal modern humanism to those limbo-dancing dexterous Black subversives and their Asian and Indian co-conspirators whose challenge to notions of freedom and rights, produced ‘other versions of person and society, beginning and end, life and death’ (ibid., p. 207). Alternative versions provide an ‘inner corrective to historical documentary and protest literature which sees the West Indies as utterly deprived, or gutted by exploitation [Brathwaite’s notion of ‘the inner plantation’ and Henry’s recuperation of Afro-Caribbean philosophy],’ wherein ‘we begin to participate in the genuine possibilities of original change available to people severely disadvantaged (it is true) at a certain point in time’ (Harris, 1970, p. 159).

What I am keenly interested in, with regard to Harris’s formulation, is exploring more the juxtaposition of the linear, phallogentric limbo pole metaphorically pressing down upon the moving, resisting and multi-limbed global African body. Such dexterous subversion seems an apt metaphor to capture the resistance to linearity, the fissuring of disciplinary boundaries such as occurs in global African creative and aesthetic engagements with Literature and History, and gives us a theoretical/philosophical apparatus to consider the narratological, formal and/or aesthetic choices that global African writers often make. ‘It is against this double hegemony of a History with a capital H and a Literature consecrated by the absolute power of the written sign,’ Glissant asserts, ‘that the peoples who now inhabited the hidden side of the earth fought, at the same time they were fighting for food and freedom’ (Glissant, 1989, p. 76). ‘Limbo’, as Brathwaite has pointed out, ‘is related to Anancy of spider fables’ (Harris, 1970, p. 7). Anancy is the master linguist, using his mastery of orality, his cunning and wit, to survive, resist and subvert those who wield signifying power. Thus the ‘the limbo-anancy syndrome’ that emerges as a consequence of navigating conditions of oppression, necessarily recalls Baker’s formulation of global Black modernism as discursively engaged in mastering form and de-

forming mastery for the purposes of liberation. The successful limbo dancer, in the end, glides untouched (though not unscathed) under the encroaching pole.

In a similar vein, the *successful* blues singer and his song, 'never arrest transience,' nor fix it in 'transcendent form' (Baker Jr., 1984, p. 7). Here, we might pause for a moment to consider the rejection of the idea of 'transcendence' as a foundation of global African modernism. Glissant posits the idea of 'transversality' in contradistinction:

And so transversality, and not the universal transcendence of the sublime, has come to light...we are the roots of a cross-cultural relationship. Submarine roots: that is floating free, not fixed in one position in some primordial spot, but extending in all directions in our world through its network of branches....We thereby have the good fortune of living, this shared process of cultural mutation, this convergence that frees us from uniformity (Glissant, 1989, p. 67).

Like Harris and Glissant, Baker eschews uniformity. 'Fixity', Baker writes, 'is a function of power, those who maintain place, who decide what takes place and dictate what has taken place, are power brokers of tradition. The placeless by contrast are translators of the nontraditional...their appropriate mark is the crossing sign of the junction' (Baker Jr., 1984, p. 7). For Baker, the blues matrix, like Glissantian transversality, is the sign of Black modernity. Within this matrix, the Black blues singer is situated at the juncture of the railway and its crossing, and like the limbo dancer innovatively and deftly navigates 'injustice, despair, loss, absence, denial', through her cultural performance – in the end transliterating torment into 'conditions of possibility' (ibid.). The blues singer and their expressive power, like that of their Caribbean counterpart are starkly juxtaposed against the hard, linear, metallic rails of the railway track, tracks that bespeak a history of Jim Crow racism, exploitation of labor, and the rise of modern capitalism. Harris's invocation of the 'gateway' and Baker's employment of the 'crossing' as tropes which work to theorize global African modernity share, however, more than deep structural commonality. Both tropes share aspects, epistemologically and philosophically, of the West African 'orisa' or god Eshu-Elegba/Legba and his New World corollaries: Exù, Echu-Elegua, Papa La Bas and Papa Legba.⁵

The art historian Robert Farris Thompson in *Flash of the Spirit* tells us that Eshu-Elegba, the Yoruba orisa of language, interpretation and divine meaning 'sometimes wears the crossroads as a cap, colored black on one side, red on the

5 Some critics use Eshu-Elegba, some Esu-Elegbara. In pages that follow I invoke the term based upon the critic's usage. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. lists these figures and then collapses them into a collective called Esu or Esu-Elegbara in *The Signifying Monkey*. Eshu-Elegba's New World manifestations include: *Exù* among Candomblé worshippers in Brazil, *Elegguà* in Santería, and *Papa Legba* in Haitian Vodoun.

other, provoking in his wake foolish arguments about whether his cap is black or red, wittily insisting by implication that we view a person or a thing from all sides before we form a general judgment' (Thompson. 1983, p. 19). We might recall here Brathwaite's admonition that we work to craft a philosophy of Caribbean history that considers the 'half look, the look both/several ways.' For the Yoruba, Eshu-Elegba is the god of the *crossing*. He is the *gateway* god. As with the Greek god Hermes, from whom hermeneutics derives, Eshu-Elegba is the god who is the divine linguist, vested with the power to govern the production of meaning and interpretation.⁶ Èsù operates in the Yoruba pantheon as god of the crossroads – residing at the gateway, the interstices of truth, meaning, interpretation, and action. Henry Louis Gates in *The Signifying Monkey* maintains that Esu-Elegbara is, 'Our metaphor for the uncertainties of explication, for the open-endedness of every literary text... Esu rules the process of disclosure, a process that is never-ending, that is dominated by multiplicity. Esu is discourse upon a text; it is the process of interpretation he rules' (Gates, 1988, p. 21). Such multiplicity, as we have seen, is foundational in articulating global African modernity; and too, there is an important philosophical dimension to Èsù that should not be overlooked; a fundamental concern with *being* that is germane to Henry's admonition that we work to craft an Africana phenomenology.

In Yoruba philosophy *àṣhe*, the highest spiritual force possible – 'the power to make things happen' – is a 'privilege of righteous living, not a right' (Thompson, 1983, p. 19). It is Èsù who is granted the 'force to make all things happen and multiply (*àṣhe*)' (ibid., p. 18). As a consequence, to achieve *àṣhe* as a human being one must:

Cultivate the art of *recognizing significant communications*, knowing what is truth and what is falsehood, or else *the lessons of the crossroads* – the point where doors open or close, where people have to make decisions that may forever affect their lives – will be lost (ibid., p. 19).

Hence, without Èsù pathways to praxis and social justice are resolutely closed. As a result, Thompson tells us, 'Eshu consequently came to be regarded as the very embodiment of the crossroads... sometimes bearing the crossroads to us in verbal form, in messages that test our wisdom and compassion ("Is this true; shall I help him; what larger purpose opens up beyond this message?")' (ibid., p. 19).

As a result of his perceived affinity for duality and multiplicity, Èsù like Anancy is often considered to be quintessentially tricky. While it is true that the trickster

6 For more information on Esu-Elegbara/Eshu/Legba and their aspects see Gates (1988) and Robert Farris Thompson (1983).

figure/trope does appear to have assumed a very prominent position in recent literary analysis, Adoleye Ogundipe, in her study of Esu-Elegbara, cautions scholars to complicate their readings with regards to this trope.⁷ Ogundipe maintains that gods such as Esu are never merely 'trickster' archetypes. In fact, she argues that Esu is not a trickster per se; rather, he is a tempter, engaging in 'trickery' to prove 'philosophical and aesthetic points' (Ogundipe, 1978, p. 197). Here, Ogundipe's distinction between trickster and tempter is an important one. The tempter is concerned not with his/her *act* of trickery, or with his/her *hermeneutical prowess*, but rather with *the hermeneutical process*, and most centrally with the *lessons* to be gleaned from the crossroads, from considering *the half look, the look both ways*. In other words, the issue at hand is not how well the trickster has fooled us; it is how well the tempter has revealed the various and possible outcomes AND most importantly, how ethically and intelligently we have weighed those outcomes and chosen a just path. Èsù's purpose as divine òrìsà of the crossroads is to remind us that power is derived from a simultaneous affirmation and subversion of discursive codes. It is not so much then, that he shifts his own shape (though he does so at times); it is I would argue more salient that he shifts the *shape* of received knowledge. As a consequence, the idea within global Black modernism as qualitatively engaged in fissuring master narratives (History with a capital H; Literature; Linearity; Transcendence, Globalization) is fully embodied by Èsù who is, I would argue the progenitor of the limbo-dancing blues-singing, transversal global Black subject.

Like many other West African gods Èsù crossed the Atlantic to the New World during the horrors of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, surviving more extensively than some other deities because of his function as mediator and intermediary. Any access to the divine had first to engage the circuitry of Èsù, thus this òrìsà/lwa had to survive, otherwise captured, transported and enslaved Africans would have been totally cut off from their spiritual sign-systems and hence bereft of spiritual protection when they would have needed it most – to navigate the incumbencies of enslavement. It is no coincidence, then, that both Harris in *History, Fable and Myth* and Baker in *Blues Ideology* invoke the figure of the 'trickster' in their theses.⁸ But in *Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance*, Baker goes even further in his attempt to articulate the philosophical contours of a global Black modernist aesthetic.

7 The following is a sample of publications, in addition to those of Pelton and Gates devoted to the Trickster: Jeanne Campbell Reesman (2001); William Hynes and William Doty (1997); and Lewis Hyde (1999).

8 Houston Baker Jr. (1984, p. 200) reads the exigencies of the deconstructionist scholar attuned to 'vernacular possibilities' as akin to that of a 'liminal trickster'. Wilson Harris (1970, p. 166) reads the Caribbean modern poet/artist as necessarily risking convention and becoming a kind of discursive 'trickster of limbo' cited above.

Reading the deformity/deformation of Shakespeare's Caliban from *The Tempest* alongside the cultural FOLK soundings of Du Bois' *Souls of Black Folk*, Baker writes:

If one claims, following a post-structuralist line, that to possess the 'gift' of language is to be possessed then one immediately situates him or herself in a domain familiar to the diaspora. *Possession* operates both in the spirit work of voodoo and in the dread slave and voodoo economics perpetuated by the West (Baker Jr., 1987, p. 53).

Implicitly invoking the divine linguist, for Baker, 'possession' gifts the Black modern subject with the power to unveil the hidden discourses and unmask the lies attending, for example, Reaganomics, renamed (unwittingly and arguably, problematically), 'voodoo economics' by George H.W. Bush. We might linger for a moment here. It seems to me that there is a powerful linear narrative that moves insidiously from the discourses surrounding 'the civilizing mission' of the enslavement and colonizing projects, through the idea of 'laissez-faire economics', 'development models', 'Reaganomic trickle-down theory', to the 'postindustrial economy', the advent of globalization, the rise of neoliberalism, on through the current discourse surrounding 'humanitarianism' – a linear narrative, reminiscent of the encroaching and repressive limbo pole and the materially exploitative railway tracks, which has always resulted in the subjugation of people of colour and the working class, whose insidiousness lies in the duplicitous nature of language that attends each of these concepts. Discourse can indeed be deadly. A lesson Sixo from Toni Morrison's *Beloved* learns fully well: when 'schoolteacher beat him... to show him that definitions belong to the definers, and not the defined.' He or she, who has the power to control and define the public discourse at the suppression of intervening, challenging, subversive discourses, sets the agenda. Such agenda-setting can have and indeed has had radical devastating material consequences for the disempowered and dispossessed, and in particular for global African peoples. How then to proceed in the face of these master narratives, these dread discourses? 'A FOLK', Baker reassures us, is always out the very necessities of definition, possessed of a guiding or tutelary spirit (Baker Jr., 1987, p. 65).

According to Baker, 'the deformation of mastery refuses a master's *nonsense*. It returns – often transmuting 'standard' syllables [read master narratives] – to the common sense of the tribe' (ibid., p. 56). Such de-formation is necessarily 'fluid and multiform', and necessitates a master linguist who must work within and against a tripled domain of 'meanings, morphophonemics and metamorphoses'. In other words, the work of refusing the 'master's *nonsense*'

demands attuned and astute attention to discourse, sound, and change. Put another way, it is *connaissance*, for example, that 'Free Trade' as opposed to 'Fair Trade' is more than mere morphophonemic slippage. Unmasking such multiple and materially-inflected meanings is for Baker, 'a *sounding* on folly and excess', sound necessarily 'filtered through a persona or mask that looks like Eshu the very god of Irony' (ibid., p. 69). For Harris, 'Haitian Vodun and West Indian limbo' share an 'epic potential' that 'may supply the nerve-end of authority which is lacking...in the conventional stance of history' (Harris, 1970, p. 165). That 'nerve-end of authority' I would suggest, is captured in Eshu's signifying authority to open the 'trickster gateway' where 'there emerges the hope for a profoundly compassionate society committed to freedom' (ibid., p. 166). Both Baker and Harris, in the end, arrive at Vodou.

In her groundbreaking work, *Haiti, History, and the Gods*, Colin Dayan describes her hermeneutical journey towards centering vodou as the theoretical and philosophical project to 'read History' from the 'ground of Haiti' (Dayan, 1996, p. xvi). She begins by invoking the foundational Caribbean cultural anthropologist Sidney Mintz and his assertion that 'African slaves from a score of different societies first attempted to implant their symbolic pasts in the heart and mind of their children... "a core of belief": - one might almost say a series of philosophical postulates about reality' (ibid., p. xvii). Building on this notion of 'a core of belief', Dayan writes:

The idea of philosophy, of thought thinking itself through history, compelled me. I began to consider not only the historical function of vodou...but the project of thought, the intensity of interpretation and dramatization it allowed...This sense of invention [materiality of vodou practice] goaded by thought leads me to claim that vodou practices must be viewed as ritual reenactments of Haiti's colonial past even more than as retentions from Africa (ibid., p. xvii).

Dayan's centering of vodou thought suggestively responds to Paget Henry's implicit assertion that an articulation of 'the African paths to modernity [might] require modern appropriations of Ogun, Erzulie, Shango and other members of the African pantheon' (Henry, 2000, p. 165). Notably, Dayan insists that the vodou spirits/lwas are not 'simply African imports...nor are they pale imitations of pre-Christian and Christian images idolatrously copied without intellectual content' (Dayan, 1996, p. xviii). Stuart Hall's assertion that the relationship between the idea of culture and the notion of diaspora is helpful here, in that culture/diaspora 'cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms of origin to copy, primary source to pale reflection' since such a notion is 'founded

on the construction of an exclusionary frontier' and a 'fixed opposition between inside and outside' (Hall, 2013, p. 561). In other words, one cannot arrive at vodou philosophy *solely* by way of continental African philosophy. Vodou is not a watered-down version of West African religious/philosophical praxis. In fact, as Dayan reveals, 'the lwa most often invoked by today's vodou practitioners do not go back to Africa, rather they were responses to the institutions of slavery, to its particular brand of sensuous domination' (Dayan, 1996, p. 36). Dayan's project then is an emphasis on 'the intensely intellectual puzzlement, the process of thought working itself through terror that accounts for what I have always recognized as the materiality of vodou practice' (ibid. p. xvii). Building upon Dayan's sphere of engagement, I am not so interested in an anthropological rendering of vodou religious practice on the ground, rather, I am interested in the possibilities that open upon vodou as *thought work*.

Might vodou help us to arrive at a conceptual framework for articulating global African modernity? Vodou's philosophical principles foreground contingency, fluidity, complexity and nuance, especially in relation to ideas about knowledge, power and subjectivity. Dayan concurs, in vodou 'a person or a thing can be two or more things simultaneously. A word can be double, two-sided, and duplicitous. In this broadening and multiplying of a word's meaning...we begin to see that what becomes more and more vague also becomes more distinct: it may mean *this* but *that* too' (ibid., p. 33). Resistant to binaries that impose injustice, harm, and universal imbalance, many of vodou's lwas and the 'philosophical postulates' that surround them are inherently concerned with advocating for the dispossessed, dislocated, and disenfranchised. *Erzulie*, for instance, or *Ezili* who is loosely syncretized with Catholicism's The Virgin Mary, is the lwa of love, who is the protector of 'virgins', 'prostitutes', domestic violence survivors, and queer and non-gender conforming Haitians. *Ezili* possesses both men and women, and both sexes who are her devotees assume her feminine aspects – think about how such sexual fluidity posits a fundamental epistemological challenge to patriarchal heteronormativity and binarized gender construction. As Dayan argues, '...the customary gendered relations between men and women do not matter... Ezili demands that the word love be reinvented' (ibid., p. 63). Lwas like *Ogun* are warriors, but warriors whose fury is on behalf of righteous justice. *Papa Legba* is the god of language, meaning, and understanding, the crossroads lwa, who to my mind is the most potentially liberating because of his relationship to language, to discourse, to challenging fixed ideas. Like Èsù, he is the crossroads lwa who oversees the interpretive process. 'Papa Legba', sings the contemporary Haitian group Boukman Eksperyans, 'open the

door your children await open the door Papa Legba that I may pass.⁹ In working alongside my co-sharers in crafting a theory of global Black modernity, we can I think agree upon the following consensus: resistance to fixity and privileging fluidity are fundamental requisites of imagining freer, more inclusive and fundamentally just societies. As a consequence, what I am calling here vodou thought work, like global Black modernism has as ‘core belief’, social justice concerns. How then, might *Papa Legba* be serviceable to literary and cultural theorists, who are concerned with social justice? Who, like Baker, Harris and so many others persist in the ‘hope for a profoundly compassionate society committed to freedom?’ (Harris, 1970, p. 166).

It is not, I think, an overstatement to assert that vodou and other global African religions have been subjected to, at best, gross misunderstanding and at worst, racist derision. We might recall here Christian evangelist Pat Robertson, who in 2010 claimed that a ‘pact to the devil’ brought on the devastating earthquake in Haiti, which killed more than 250,000 people, injured more than 300,000 and displaced 1.5 million citizens. Robertson, the host of the television show the ‘700 Club’, blamed the tragedy on something that ‘happened a long time ago in Haiti, and people might not want to talk about it.’ The Haitians, he said, ‘were under the heel of the French. You know, Napoleon III and whatever... And they got together and swore a pact to the devil.’ They said, ‘We will serve you if you will get us free from the French.’ True story. And so, the devil said, ‘OK, it’s a deal... You know, the Haitians revolted and got themselves free. But ever since, they have been cursed by one thing after the other.’¹⁰ Callously implying that the earthquake was divine retribution for Haitian vodou, Robertson’s racist re-writing of the vodou ceremony which inaugurated the thirteen-year struggle for independence from France and liberation from enslavement is revelatory if unsurprising. Pushing the point further, we can easily yoke Robertson’s proclamation to the kind of linear, progressive, phallogocentric, oppressive limbo-pole colonial discourses which always already read global Africa in terms of Manichean polarities and radical alterity.

It is widely believed that the Haitian revolution (1791–1804) began with a vodou ceremony on August 1791 in *Bwa Kayiman*. According to the account, an *oungan*, a vodou priest, Boukman who had been sent to Haiti from Jamaica, led the ceremony, along with a *manbo*, Cecile Fatiman, a vodou priestess. The name Boukman is believed to be a kreyolization of Book Man, which he was named in Jamaica purportedly because he could read. It is no doubt unsurprising that there

9 See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VdI-uSdAziI>

10 CNN. <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/01/13/haiti.pat.robertson/>

has been debate among historians about if and when the ceremony occurred, and 'what happened' there. Alas, such is often the fate when the Black revolution seeks codification in official History.¹¹ As Glissant reminds us, 'History is a highly functional fantasy of the West originating at precisely the time when it along 'made' the history of the World' (Glissant, 1989, p. 64). Nevertheless, the vodou ceremony at Bwa Kayiman is an official part of Haitian national history that has been widely documented. More centrally for our purposes here however is what it symbolizes. Herein exists a vital moment in global African modernity in which there is a yoking together of *vodou*, *reading* and *insurgency*. This synergy of philosophical thought, discourse and revolution is just too potently significant to summarily dismiss.¹² Liberation from formal strictures governing official or sanctioned discourses is, to my mind, a fundamental requisite for revaluation, a material and discursive break from all forms of Euro-American philosophically grounded oppression [i.e. the discourse of white supremacy; 'master narratives'; Pat Robertson's 'pact to the devil']. Inside the 'break' is where reading, divination, and revolutionary action converge.

As I have suggested earlier, all of the key historical moments of Black subjugation and resistance throughout the global south: slavery, colonialism, cold war imperialism, neocolonialism and the rise of neoliberalism – all of these violating enterprises are always legitimized by discourses typically marked by ethnocentricity and binary oppositions that are hierarchized. In other words, it is not just that 'we are this' and 'you are that', we are civilized, you are savage, we are modern and you are backward, we are better – binary oppositions that insinuate themselves into narrowly defined, linear notions of identity, culture and progress. Just think about what kind of publicly agreed upon discourse it took to oust from Haiti in 2004 a sitting President, Haiti's first democratically elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. *Papa Legba* may be of some help here.

In my introduction to *Legba's Crossing: Narratology and the African Atlantic*, I discuss Carole Boyce-Davies and Elaine Savory Fido's reconfiguration of 'fragment' as 'quilt' to read postcolonial discursive and aesthetic form (Boyce-Davies and Fido, 1990). Their redefinition, I argue, helps to foster the re-entry of *materiality* – a move that is germane to our investigation of Africana phenomenology (ibid., p. 16–21).¹³ The re-entry of materiality (in my own terms),

11 I am thinking here, for example, of the skepticism around Hilary Beckles' historiography of the Barbadian 'Bussa' Rebellion in 1816; and the myriad (mis)representations surrounding the Nat Turner rebellion of 1831.

12 For more details on the Bwa Kayiman/Bois Caïman ceremony and debates surrounding it, see, <http://journal.thelouvertureproject.org/>

13 This section on quilting is drawn from my book, *Legba's Crossing*, titled 'Quilted Discourse'.

specifically, the financial and economic implications of the colonial project in its various manifestations throughout the global African world is crucial to theorizing global Black modernity. We might recall here, Baker's notion of the 'de-formation of mastery' as fundamental to conceptualizing FOLK work, and Dayan's insistence upon reading vodou thought work in terms of materiality. There is of course the quilt as literally 'material', but there is also the quilt as an architectonically functional object or *objet d'art*. A quilt is always already more than it appears to be. It is this art form's perceived capacity for strategic duality (we might think with *Papa Legba* here) that fostered its use during slavery as a subversive tool to resist white hegemony by embedding the 'map to freedom' within its very cloth, fibres and cross-stitches.

As with the Bwa Kayiman ceremony there have admittedly been numerous challenges launched in terms of the veracity of this so-called 'Quilt-Code'.¹⁴ I am not operating here circumscribed by a prescriptive Western metaphysical conception of empiricism. Liberating ourselves, I offer quilting as a potent signifier. In truth, one cannot make it safely to freedom without 'reading' for the map is hidden in plain view within the quilt (Tobin and Dobard, 2000).¹⁵ Liberation – thinking with 'the Book man' Boukman, relies upon the ability to *read* the very *pathway to freedom* (Douglass, 1845).¹⁶ Such liberation transcends the symbolic. Within a conceptualization of global African modernity, the subject can potentially secure tangible, physical and material freedom once fitted with interpretive 'tools' to read oneself into sovereignty. Such is the liberatory impulse of global African modernisms' formal poetics. It is here that the tools to read *the map hidden in plain view* reside. A deft reader is always culturally savvy. A deft reader might be said to enact, 'the look both ways'.

14 Claims that encoded messages in quilts were used as a tool during the Underground Railroad, have, in many scholarly quarters, been resolutely debunked. And yet, in the realm of oral history, the idea of such subversive quilting persists. As folklorist and quilt historian Laurel Horton remarks, 'It's not a matter of one group having the truth and the other not. It's a matter of two different sets of beliefs. It's made me realize that belief doesn't have a lot to do with factual representation. People feel in their gut that it's true so no one can convince them in their head that it's otherwise'. As with Horton, I am not, at this point, concerned with the History whose domain is 'the head'. I leave questions related to the veracity and authenticity of the Quilt-Code to the purview of Underground Railroad and Quilt historians. But, if we dispense with History for the moment, with the disciplinary proscriptions that necessitate a fixed dichotomous relationship between fact, (head) and myth (gut), what results is a radically altered epistemological model that makes room for an efficacious and persistent alternative history that is discursively revisionary and engenders an expansive conceptualization of what constitutes Truth.

15 Jacqueline Tobin's and Raymond Dobard's work (2000) has been the subject of hot contestation. Outside of the central question of veracity, as a discursive model, I find their study quite useful. I am troping here then on Tobin's and Dobard's title.

16 I borrow the concept from Frederick Douglass's classic fugitive slave narrative (1845), in which he describes his acquisition of literacy as 'the pathway to freedom'.

For instance, *re-reading* Haiti and Robertson's discourse within the alembic of the quilt we might in fact find devil-work in other places. It is by now more widely known, thanks to the work of Professor Hilary Beckles and others, that the most significant and destructive 'pact' that was made by Haiti during the nineteenth-century was with France in 1825 (Beckles, 2010). In his groundbreaking article, *The Hate and the Quake: A Long History of Stolen Wealth*, published shortly after the 2010 earthquake, he writes:

Buried beneath the rubble of imperial propaganda, out of both Western Europe and the United States, is the evidence which shows that Haiti's independence was defeated by an aggressive North-Atlantic alliance that could not imagine their world inhabited by a free regime of Africans as representatives of the newly emerging democracy (Beckles, 2010).

The early nation-formation beginnings of Haiti were radically thwarted, made practically impossible by the economic stranglehold imposed by France and her allies (Britain; the US) between 1804 and 1825. President Boyer of Haiti was backed against the proverbial wall, unable to trade, subjected to US trade embargos, and the threat of recolonization. Denied sovereignty by the sovereign powers, the government of Haiti signed 'a pact' and agreed to pay France reparations and compensation for its loss of economic profit in light of the Haitian revolution. Haiti was forced to pay 150 million francs (later reduced to 90 million). The last installment to France was made in 1922. In today's terms the value of this amount is estimated by financial actuaries as US\$21 billion. Two years after the 2001 UN Conference on Race in Durban, South Africa, where a strong representation was made to the French government to repay the 150 million francs in today's terms, Haiti became the world's first former colony to demand reparations (in the form of debt restitution) from a former colonial power. The petition, brought by President Aristide, was angrily rejected. It is widely believed that France joined with 'Washington in brazenly fomenting a *coup d'état* against Aristide, who was ousted on Feb. 29, 2004' (Ives, 2013). Again, discourse can indeed be deadly. As Dayan reminds us, in vodou, 'a word can be double, two-sided, and duplicitous'. Re-reading Pat Robertson in this context we might then ask: Which devil? Which pact?

Jacqueline Tobin and Raymond Dobard's description of African American quilt-making is discursively instructive in thinking more closely about the 'philosophical postulates' which frame global African thought and help us (in the vein of *Papa Legba*) to stand at the crossroads of reading, divination and revolution. In their chapter titled, 'The Fabric of Heritage: Africa and African

American Quilting,' Tobin and Dobard suggest that the quilt, which they describe as a 'cultural hybrid', encodes multiple meanings and thus operates as a 'fabric griot' (Tobin and Dobard, 2000, p. 36). Through quilting together 'geometric patterns, abstract improvised designs, strip-piecing, bold, singing colors and distinctive stitches', the quiltmaker functions like the African griot, as the purveyor of history, the repository of culture and as the mechanism through which the stories of the community are passed down (ibid.). Akin to the shape-shifting Iwa *Papa Legba* 'although the African American quilt appears to be an everyday bedcover, it is more' (ibid.). In tracing surviving Africanisms in African American quilts, the authors discuss the use of 'abstract arrangement', that sometimes 'seemed to glorify confusion'. What they discovered, and in turn proposed was the idea that the use of 'fragmented patterns and the use of so many different fabric textures' were derived from the African belief that '*evil travels in straight lines*' (ibid., pp. 48-49). As a consequence, quiltmakers would engage in what Robert Farris Thompson calls 'randomizing the flow of paths' in order to thwart the movement of evil (quoted in Tobin and Dobard, 49).

The insistence on fluidity, polyphony, multi-directionality, the limbo imagination, the railway crossing, the gateway, vodou emerges from a radically different epistemological viewpoint when we conceive the specifically West African tenet, which is *literally threatened by linearity, chronology, and teleology*. 'Evil travels in straight lines'. And at the same time, it is precisely the fabric, the network of meanings, associations, juxtapositions and 'randomiz[ed] flow' that guarantees safe passage from enslavement to freedom. The reader engaged in the process of deciphering the story the fabric reveals is indeed engaged in a radically reconstitutive act of liberation: reading to be free, transacting literacy and liberation. In this way, readers become designated agents in the production of meaning both in terms of the body of the text and in terms of engaging the revolutionary praxis attending such pedagogic practice.¹⁷ Such proficiency tropes on Vèvè Clark's definition of 'diaspora literacy', which she describes as 'the ability to read and comprehend the discourses of Africa, Afro-America and the Caribbean from an informed, Indigenous perspective' (Clark, 2009, p. 11). In Clark's formulation, the allusive quality of African diasporic texts is not primarily concerned with veiled references to history, or signposting the past; rather, allusion is 'a pedagogical tool', which produces active writerly engagement.

Building upon Clark's formulation, I propose that the pedagogic imperatives replete within global African modernism simultaneously necessitate and potentially produce:

17 Roland Barthes' notion of the writerly text is useful here, within which the reader produces textual meaning.

a literacy of resistance which includes: recognizing and recouping (frequently suppressed) histories of black resistance to white hegemony, reader-resistance to the linear, cause-and-effect simplifications replete within “official” versions of History and self-conscious resistance to the propensity to impose generic expectations that are valued and normalized within western epistemological and hermeneutical traditions. The reader who wields such literacy is fitted with the tools to navigate the text’s allusive quality. For as Clark reminds us, while allusion is a silent interlocutor...it is also a trickster creating confusion on the one hand and associations on the other (ibid., p. 17).

Thus, Papa Legba emerges anthropomorphically, in this instance as the sign of discursive writerly engagement.

By way of conclusion and thinking with both Dayan and Henry, I am purposive in my invocation of Papa Legba in his vodou aspect. I invoke Papa Legba in the first hermeneutical instance here, and in *Legba’s Crossing*, because of his Black revolutionary Haitian heritage. It is in homage to 1804, to Haiti’s revolutionary spirit, determined resistance to European domination and will to imagine and forge an independent Black nation with universal citizenship as the central tenet of its constitution – that I invoke Legba in his vodou context. Like Hermes from whom the theory of hermeneutics derives, I invoke Legba as metaphorizing the difficult work of reading, interpretation and praxis that is necessary to address the historical and contemporary disenfranchisement of Black people. Such a praxis demands as we have seen that we disrupt, interrupt and erupt, binary oppositions; and, that we give the lie to the linear, chronological, prescriptive discourse of progress. Such praxis involves what Edouard Glissant describes as the necessary act of foregrounding and articulating ‘the submarine roots’ of global African experience, ‘submarine roots: floating free, not fixed in one position in some primordial spot, but extending in all directions...freed from uniformity’ – excavating and bringing into public discourse the submarine roots that challenge and subvert what Glissant describes as ‘one of the most devastating consequences of colonization – ‘the idea of a single History’ (Glissant, 1989, p. 93). Thus, we must again reiterate, resistance to fixity and privileging fluidity are fundamental requisites of imagining freer, more inclusive and fundamentally just societies. It is in this domain of *freedom* that Legba, the god of the crossing sign, presides.

Global African modernisms in all of their incarnations refuse the idea of a single concept of History; they disrupt any linear imposition, simplification of history, or even narrative voice, perspective. Legba as lwa and metaphor embodies, we can agree, a studied resistance to the domination of the single perspective,

the single story, the single image, the single History – randomizing the flow of paths, as it were, of knowledge, meaning, interpretation and understanding. But like all his devotees, we readers have to come to the crossroads of discourse seeking to understand ‘the significant communications’ he seeks to impart. This is work. It is hard work. An Africana phenomenology in the end perhaps opens onto the revolutionary potential of reading.

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CHAPTER 26

IDENTITY

Developing One's Own Image and Naming Oneself

Helen Lauer

Introduction

Suppose someone you know is not sure of her identity as a person. Providing her with insights would not involve presenting her with theories about *what* is meant by the concept of 'person' (Ayer, 1963; Chisholm, 2012; Strawson, 1962; Frankfurt, 1969; Dennett, 1976; Williams, 1970). What she needs is insights about *who* it is that gets treated as a person, and why. This might seem counterintuitive; learning the necessary and sufficient conditions that determine the difference between persons and everything else should help to understand what it means to be a person, and to be recognized as one. But it doesn't. In the first place, personhood is one of those essentially questionable concepts that attract different associations and connotations from culture to culture (Hallen, 2015; Graness, 2015; Wiredu [ed], 2004). And even if one were equipped with the most versatile criterion that could be used anywhere, it might not get applied universally. The intellectual powerhouse Immanuel Kant proposed his own very basic and convincing principle for illuminating the essential personhood within every human being; yet he wantonly failed to use it consistently (Allais, 2016; Mills, 2003 [1998], pp. 70-73).

Misplacing concreteness in identity politics

Other people's recognition of one's own identity as a person appears to matter greatly; but it not obvious why it should. Clearly, whether one garners some respect, whose respect one garners, matters to very different degrees for different people – and undoubtedly for the same individual in different contexts. Another seemingly fundamental variant in human experience concerns mutual recognition and knowing with whom one can identify. This would seem to boil down to sharing beliefs and values, a life-world, a worldview. But what does this sharing amount to? And what determines when and where it will occur? The question is important for scholars and historians who purport to explain extreme brutality, dehumanizing behaviour, or utter annihilation such as episodes of genocide, as a failure of the perpetrator to identify with the victim, a failure to recognize the victim as a person. What accounts for such a failure? Misrecognition and extreme disregard are attributed sometimes to the differences in the social identities of the individuals involved, or to the perpetrator's having a certain type of identity.

This raises as a matter of urgency the problem of how to tell when our beliefs and values become *dissimilar* enough to say that there is attributable between us not one identity but two. Charles Mills (1998) has laboured to show there is no fact of the matter when two individuals are said to share the same group identity. It is not clear what it means for two individuals to occupy different ontologies. Samantha Vice (2016, p. 118) has observed that the identities 'Black' and 'White' get treated as 'entirely separate existential and experiential categories,' and completely incommensurable.

We must assume most people living adjacent to one another ordinarily do share identities or life-worlds to some extent, even when their beliefs and experiences are diametrically opposed to each other. Because to expose the divergence of two living perspectives, there must be some common landscape or backdrop against which all the opposing views and projects are set, in order for us to see their glaring contrasts (Davidson, 1980). So, for instance – relying upon caricatures to spell out a point – consider the antagonism of worldviews in South Africa before 1994. It seems it would have been obvious to assign mutually exclusive mental universes to the presiding president at that time F. W. de Klerk, and the succeeding president Nelson Mandela, who was then being shunted in and out of solitary confinement cells – on the grounds that their beliefs and values were so totally polarized throughout their lifetimes. But

attributing to these two South Africans strictly isolated, mutually exclusive life-worlds or identities would be mistaken. It is not as if during his twenty-seven years of maximum-security imprisonment Mandela never shared with his oppressors any factual beliefs at all about the apartheid system that he fought to undermine. Mandela knew far more intimately about the life-threatening effects of apartheid law than those who enforced it. The worldviews of the African National Congress (ANC) militant and of the last apartheid chief executive did intersect – indeed they collided – in the most penetrating and horrifically graphic ways. Perceived at a distance, a crucial moment in world history was Mandela's insisting that he would die before he would acquiesce to the injustice of the very same system over which P. W. Botha and later de Klerk held executive authority. Mandela was not condemning some other parallel government system in an incommensurable worldview, in which even the names 'President Botha' and 'President de Klerk' could have no conceivable significance or meaning remotely like the one understood in the world of his oppressors. In stark contrast, when it came to the crunch, Pieter Willem Botha finally resigned from office; and after him Fredrick Willem de Klerk did nothing to defend the system which since 1989 had vested in him so much prestige and power. On the contrary, de Klerk has even been credited with dismantling those same institutions without a blink when it appeared most prudent to him and his kind to do so. Unless we recognize that it was *the same set of material conditions and legal statutes* about which the convictions, feelings, intentions, character traits and actions of these three personalities crossed each other so diametrically, we will not capture the extent of contrast between them as moral agents and as historical figures.

The tyranny of expertise

This is not to suggest there are no significant polarities between life worlds, some of which are so radical that subscribers to the privileged group identity regularly fail to recognize important ways that personhood is understood by the formally subordinated group identity. This myopia is a form of epistemic annihilation, in virtue of which the victims need to demand repossession of their personhood in order to survive.

And so it has remained an existential mandate of all leaders in the decolonization struggle as W. E. B. Du Bois (1903), Amílcar Cabral (1969), Frantz Fanon (1965),

Marcus Garvey; and more recently Paul Gilroy (1997), Charles Wade Mills (2003 [1998], 2011), Olúfẹ̀mì Táíwò (2004), Tsenay Serequeberhan (2009), and

Cornel West 2014), which is a striving ‘toward ownership of one’s self-image.’¹ One failure of the establishment in scholarly disciplines is the inability to enable this self-repossession. This inability need not have malicious or vicious intentions; it may come down to a failure of hapless privilege (Sullivan, 2006). The failure to recognize subjective agency beyond the identities privileged by an established social architecture is one of several manifestations of the tyranny of expertise, a tyranny to be subdued and transformed, in the collective fight to institutionalize social justice.

For an instance of this corrosive myopia, consider the role that land plays in the identities and life-worlds of people throughout the world whose cultural heritages have survived the onslaught of capitalism (Nyerere, 1998). In many agrarian economies of West and East Africa, for instance, it is a commonplace that belonging to the land of one’s birth, rather than owning that land, is a spiritual, economic, cultural and political entitlement, and central to one’s sense of personhood. In such contexts, the foreign neoliberal proposal to correct a global economic injustice (dubbed Africa’s ‘resource curse’) by negotiating a redistribution of profits in terms of a fair-trade policy constitutes a category mistake. For instance, Leif Wenar (2016) urges assessing the exchange value of land, or timber, or gold, or minerals as a potential liquidity that will profit the people living locally by involving them in commercial interchanges with total strangers. But this would be to perpetuate an aberration of history, a cultural abomination, a defiance of the natural order of things. In Ghana, as in the former Tibet, you cannot rightfully sell land or its precious deposits and sacred natural aspects any more than you can sell your mother or your neighbour. Of course, in congress with foreigners precisely this sort of barbarism has been going on for centuries in accordance with the logic of foreign capital. But it is no less an abomination.

Experts disregard the various ways there are to understand and evaluate phenomena reflecting different concepts of ownership, property value and legitimacy of authority over the disbursal and control of natural goods — be these access to grazing pasture and farmland, rights to mine precious minerals and metals, fishing territory, hunting groves and forest resources. In agrarian and nomadic economies, such properties are so intrinsic to an individual’s integrity and security, and so central to a community’s perpetuation over generations, that the value of natural resources of a region is too precious to quantify in terms of market exchange. Such fallacies are initially the commission of strangers who have been garlanded with the authority of expertise, whose function in part is to

1 Kofi Anyidoho, Africa’s Euro-colonial legacy and the challenge of self-naming, Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences Ephraim Amu Memorial Lecture, GAAS Auditorium, Accra, 28 January 2016.

maintain the architecture of privilege. The fallacies are sustained because those best placed to provide corrective contributions to the discourse are systematically disqualified as inadequately trained, biased, overly invested, linguistically gauche, lacking in the reliably accredited affiliations, or 'insufficiently committed to truth oriented inquiry' (Navin, 2013, p. 243) because they are positioned to provide contrary results, critical queries, or rival hypotheses, and have nothing to lose by way of entitlements and prestige.

Scholarly stereotyping appears implausible only if we overlook the multiple roles that declarative utterances play in the rational collaboration at the heart of knowledge production. To appreciate the resilience of disinformation as a feature of rational coordination in the scholarly and research enterprise, consider a distinction between *factive* and *objectual* senses of knowledge advanced by Brigid Brogaard (2017). An assertion or endorsement (of a theory, or a fact, or a procedure) whose warrant or credence value rests not on its truth functional content but on its stochastic frequency of occurrence throughout a professional network or community may be regarded as reflecting *objectual* expertise.² For instance, because an affirmation P is *widely held* throughout a prestigious group, an individual whose choice of assertion is based upon the intention to convey affiliation with that group is professionally motivated to assert P. Speech acts that convey information in this *objectual* sense are parochial and insular in their impact. The rules of *objectual* discourse do not prohibit sanctimony, defamation and calumny as discursive strategies to deflect challengers and abort critical inquiry. In contrast, *factive* discourse conveys evidence-based knowledge and invites critical, unrestricted probing as an ineliminable element in the acquisition of expertise understood in the traditional and everyday sense of know-how and propositional knowledge.³

The politics of misrecognition

The ignorance of experts is important to correct; for it is hard to overestimate the degree of damage that misrecognition of expert strangers is able to do. But correlatively, it is equally important to appreciate what the recognition of strangers is unable to do. It is easy to exaggerate the power of the stranger's

2 Someone who can recite from memory every facet of the table setting at the Lord's Supper depicted by Leonardo da Vinci, or who wins first prize for detailing the exploits of Harry Potter, demonstrates having extensive knowledge of that subject in the *objectual* sense.

3 I mean to attribute 'factive' expertise in the untutored sense that Timothy Williamson (2000) recommends understanding ordinary knowledge attributions. Then an 'objectual' expert contrasts with the 'factive' sort as a fake duck contrasts with a duck.

gaze. Mbembe (2002) describes the treatment of history as sorcery, and the misrecognition of oneself that emerges in the post-trauma of apartheid, colonization and slavery. As Charles Mills (2011) points out, being a person is a morally objective fact, whether it is recognized socially or not.

In contrast, Axel Honneth (1992) and Derrick Darby (2009) both place a very high premium on social recognition. Darby, for instance, equates being a person with being recognized. Honneth posits a primordial human need for recognition as the root cause of all struggles against social, economic and political injustice. He claims that to maintain self-respect throughout life, we must constantly seek facsimiles of that primal acceptance upon which our survival and security depended in our infancy. He cites as primary evidence the direct injury that we all feel from degrading treatment or from public humiliation, from belittling verbal abuse or from outright physical assault. Indeed, we all know firsthand that self-esteem can be damaged by receiving poor treatment. So Honneth argues that the contra-positive equivalent must also be true. That is, since the absence of respect from others can trigger the experience of injury to our self-esteem and personal integrity, then it must also be the case that sustained self-esteem and personal integrity depend upon our sensing that other people recognize us as worthy of their respect. Thus, he regards the primal need for recognition as essential in all fights for social justice.

Honneth's psychoanalytic template applies to a narrow range of the privileged in society. But he overlooks the fact that individuals can harbour self-esteem and personal integrity even though from birth their subordinate status does not entitle them to expect that significant others will recognize or treat them as due certain deferential regard or as worthy of respect. Women occupy this status in most societies. And both men and women in South Africa, who forged a new definition of citizenship through the second half of the twentieth century, did so despite the annihilating, profoundly abusive conditions that prevailed throughout their lives and which had been legalized long before their birth.

Significant in this regard is the title chosen for the chronicle of an articulate ANC activist, Naboth Mokgatle (1971): *The Autobiography of an Unknown South African*.⁴ Contrary to Honneth's theory, Mokgatle's self-respect and esteem that

4 Mokgatle (1971, pp. 216-224) vividly describes his regimen for cultivating Black Consciousness which inspired his powerful contribution to the success of the anti-apartheid struggle. He writes that he intentionally provoked abuse, contriving to routinely expose himself to the worst excesses of physical brutality and psychological humiliation by breaking pass laws conspicuously so that he would be caught by authorities and dealt with in the degrading way apportioned to his identity under apartheid law. He says this discipline taught him to lose his fear of police and prison.

fuelled his fight for justice was strengthened precisely as he focused his awareness on the abuse, insults and injuries perpetrated by significant authorities who actively deprived him of respectful recognition and intentionally disqualified his moral worth. Nor was this a one-off peculiarity unique to the psychology of one South African. The ANC ideology deliberately schooled activists in the anti-apartheid struggle to divorce themselves from interaction with liberal whites eager to offer them recognition and political reverence, precisely because such recognition and approval was seen as a weakening influence that threatened to undermine the uncompromising autonomy of the Black Consciousness Movement, an autonomous identity which was necessary to genuinely overturn (rather than to subtly perpetuate by colluding with) the white supremacist status quo.⁵

African historiography in a new key

In closing, consider how African historiography might contribute to discovering solutions to particular problems encountered in self-discovery and self-actualization both locally and globally (Serequeberhan, 2004). To outgrow the Eurocentric myopic failures of recognition still reflected in African history as written by Africans (Miller, 1987, p. 145) would be to produce scholarship that empowers its subjects' personal discovery and self-definition. Two practical directions in the expansion of methodology recommend themselves.

The first is a gradual convergence of African historiography with the recent European and North American autobiographical historians' reaction against elitist social perspectives. Some contemporary autobiographers have conveyed correctives and modified the official historical canons of the eras in which they have lived, through their personal memoirs and essays, 'using the story of their own intellectual and academic itineraries as the source of historiography' (Aurell, 2015, p. 246). A culturo-racial feature shared by these academic elites is a privileged self-confidence in presuming – and being publicly recognized as entitled – to speak for their era. Their personal experiences thus count as significant and part of the unassailable given data. Their interpretations and assessments of events in their daily lives emerge as authoritative and representative because they assume a social identity as being the sort of intellectual who is answerable to no one (Mbembe, 2002, p. 240). This approach to scholarship and theorizing

5 This was spelled out to me in conversation by one of the founders of the Black Consciousness Movement, the ANC activist and colleague of the late Steven Biko, Dr. Mamphela Ramphele, New York City, August 1984.

contrasts starkly with one whose outlook does not presuppose a robust sense of agency nor of entitlement. Because she is rational, the non-elite historian's self-image tallies with how she is perceived publicly (Mills, 1998, p. 13). Along with other non-elites, she regards history as handing her a set of immutable life conditions together with choices restricted to either compliance or defiance.

In line with this new autobiographical methodology, a recent reframing of African historiography (Greene, 2002, p. 132) features the description and analysis of the collective memories and the individual perspectives of subjective agents as persons, rather than aggregating, depersonalizing and transforming them into components of socio-economic forces reacting to world systemic processes initiated elsewhere (Amenumey, 2004, p. 337). Researchers in this new key are recognizing the importance of capturing the 'real history' of individuals whose lives transpire 'in the margins of society.'⁶ This calls for skills and capacities not required by the conventional investigator of official colonial records, tradesmen's logs, diaries of foreign travellers and adventurers, reports of missionaries and bureaucrats. Instead, contemporary African historiographers are turning to non-discursive sources and data.

As discussed, and documented by Bellagamba, Greene and Klein (2013, p. 11), in post-abolition societies there is neither the vocabulary nor the moral license to mention the legacy of foreign enslavement at any level of public discourse. In northern Ghana, for instance, it is taboo to mention the names of relatives in previous generations who were enslaved; and it is a serious moral offense to call someone else a descendant of slaves.⁷ In denying the name of one's father, one denies any claim to a heritage and accompanying heroic mission and life purpose. The silence and severance of shame has been held responsible for individuals disowning their subjective agency, and foregoing their complete personhood (Mbembe, 2002, p. 242) with all its obligations and entitlements to authorize and participate in democratic self-governance (Taiwo, 2010).

To chronicle the abominations and victories of a collective memory in denial 'requires a new kind of literacy' (Anyidoho, 2013, p. xvii). Centuries of African history have been camouflaged by moral innuendo, mythic allegory and proverb, protected from the foreign predatory gaze. Communication of historical knowledge is performed variously through elegy and eulogy, encoded drumming (Nketia, 2012), dance-drama (Yartey, 2013) formal oratory, religious

6 Jaume Aurell (2015, p. 235) quotes Carolyn Steedman (1986, p. 144).

7 Kofi Anyidoho, moderator of panel discussion, "Finding Justice: myth and narrative, particularity and ambiguity" by Anne Hewitt, International Society of African Philosophy and Studies Sixteenth Annual Conference, University of Ghana, Legon, 19 March 2010.

recitative, travelling concert-party skits (Collins, 2012); slapstick comedy, political parodies and lampoons (Shipley, 2012), musical drama and pantomime (Ben-Abdullah, 2012).

A recently expanding repertoire of investigative techniques is unveiling the histories of conflict in non-confrontational cultures, where explicit description of humiliating abuse and cruelty violates norms of delicacy, gentility and indirection (Bellagamba et al, 2013). In unwritten knowledge traditions, historical epics are recounted by specialists in ceremonial oratory and other performance arts (Anyidoho, 2013; Bauman, 1977; Finnegan, 1992) integral to perennial state functions, enstoolments and deposals, commissions, inaugurations, weddings, funerals, outdoorings, coming of age ceremonies, harvest durbars, religious festivals, spiritual rites and healing ceremonies (Okpewho, 1990).

But history is recounted not only on formal occasions by specialists. Landmark events are retold by non-elites through chant, unison singing, call and response, while farming, cooking, building, trading, fishing, playing, children's storytelling – through improvisational songs and proverbs, rhymes, riddles, jokes, poetry. Helen Yitah (2012) analyses normative discourse in Kasena communities of northern Ghana, where public opinion on political and social topics is conveyed by women at their work and leisure. Group and solo performances conveying value judgments and cautionary tales often include references to significant community members' accomplishments and misdoings in the distant and recent past, in order to problem-solve, reconcile, exhort and commend.

In postcolonial settings, to witness ceremonial performances or impromptu aural documentations of a legacy as interpreted by its heirs is an entitlement that may require induction through years of apprenticeship (Tengan, 2006). The deserving researcher may require attributes that go beyond multidisciplinary expertise in musicology, psycholinguistics, cosmology, spirituality, physics, art, anatomy, medicine, choreography and dramatic form.

The shift from elitist to agent-centred, interventionist historiography requires skills and attributes not everyone can claim. One needs not only to recognize accurately, but to be recognizable within the subject's culture as trustworthy, respectable, literate (Amenga-Etego, 2007). In short, one must be fluent not only in the local languages but also conversant with the codes of respectful conduct and indirection; the researcher must know the nuanced protocols that signal trustworthiness and credibility to the subjective agent's ancestors. This need not require that one is recognized already as extended family by birth or by marriage (Okpewho, 2004). Nor does this necessarily entail a new segregationist element into historiography; but it does suggest a new kind of exclusionary criterion,

one which turns the tables on privileges tacitly accorded to and assumed by whiteness worldwide (Sullivan, 2006; Yancy, 2004).

Non-elitist historiography certainly remains a disciplined exercise in stringent impartiality and scrupulous rigour, cross-checking sources and revising interpretations; but it is more than that. To write history as an illocutionary act that empowers the protagonists by enriching their identities requires engaging in acts of mutual recognition and reciprocity. One must exemplify personhood on the subject's terms. As Gayatri Spivak⁸ so illuminatingly conjures the teaching of reading and writing in the humanities generally, to write history is to answer a calling; it is to dance rather than to gaze immobile; it is to assume responsibility in a relationship of mutual interest and respectful regard, with all the nuances required in seeking some version of intimacy. These include maintaining as well as transgressing distance through active listening, while being vulnerable, open to revelation, and self-disclosure. This element of reciprocity presupposes recognizing the subjectivity of the agent as one recognizes one's own; such recognition has been regarded as an essential aspect of the intentional stance constitutive of personhood (Dennett, 1976). If this view of personhood is correct, then perhaps at this moment in the historical transformation of African identities, successful participatory historiographers are those who are as keen to see their own identities transformed by their work as they are to have it contribute to the transformation of others.

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SECTION II

AFRICA IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD

INTRODUCTION

Tayeb Chenntouf

In 1946, W. E. B. Du Bois, historian and African American sociologist, undertook an in-depth study of the position of Africa in world history. Upon the book's introduction, he stressed that '... the history of the world cannot be understood without the history of Africa and...the history of Africa cannot be written without referring to the history of the world.'

The recommendation has never been more relevant than at the beginning of the twenty-first century. A whole series of contemporary changes have intensified transitions of all kinds between Africa and the world. They compel a necessarily global history but, at the same time, a history close to local African realities and everyday issues that affect the greatest number of its people. The following chapters, and the authors who wrote them, all share this approach.

In this perspective of concrete analysis of a concrete situation, this section of the *General History of Africa* examines i) the sustainability of the Global Africa project; ii) the challenges created by globalization and the new global geopolitics; and iii) the projects needed to cope with these challenges and to enable Africa to become a real player in international relations.

The permanence of Global Africa

Africa is the only continent to affirm its desire to achieve unity among all its constituent countries. We can only be impressed by the sustainability of the idea of Global Africa. It took root at the turn of the twentieth century with the holding of the London Congress in 1900, which was met with some relative successes. The challenges are nevertheless numerous and severe. They impose today a complete revamp of the project, which would lead to a second Pan-Africanism.

The first laudable mention of the Pan-African movement, and it is not negligible, is that it remained viable both in Africa and with the diaspora throughout the twentieth century. It represented a tremendous movement of people, ideas and struggles between the constituents of Global Africa. Amzat Boukari Yabara looks at the Pan-African movement, its continuity as well as disjunctions. Tukulufu Zuberi carries the analysis forward with a special focus on human rights, the struggles for liberation from colonial rule and independence, as well as the civil rights movements in the United States of America. The total liberation of the continent from colonial domination was finally achieved with the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Vladimir Shubin, directly involved in many of these events in the southern part of Africa, presents the diplomatic and military facets of African militants' armed struggles.

The Italian Ethiopian War (1935-1941) mobilized African Americans and the Caribbean. The year 1957 marked a turning point for the movement. At the All-African Peoples Conference held in Ghana in 1958, Kwame Nkrumah reaffirmed the need for African unity. 'Africa must unite,' he proclaimed, calling for the unification process to start as soon as possible. His wish was granted in 1963 with the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), transformed a few years later into the African Union. The fundamental texts of the two organizations laid down the ultimate goal of achieving unity of the continent.

However, there was no shortage of difficulties, and the process is far from being complete. The creation of Sierra Leone in 1787 and the independence of Liberia in 1847 aimed for the resettlement of African descendants as emancipated and free. The experience was not a total success, and serious consequences still prevail today.

At the Durban conference in South Africa (2 to 9 September 2001), some African countries, headed by Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and several African American NGOs, demanded apologies from countries that had practised slavery. They also demanded its recognition as a crime against humanity as well

as reparations. Finally, the issue of reparations divided the diaspora and the African states that renounced them because of strong pressure. In the end, the OAU and AU effort obtained meagre results.

All this requires a new call within the framework of a renewed Pan-Africanism, witnessed especially at the level of civil society and academic research. Valter Silvério discusses the case of Brazil, where emerging strong grassroots social movements reclaim their African identity. Pan-African congresses in Tanzania 1974, Uganda 1994, South Africa 2014, Accra 2015 as well as Pan-African festivals brought Africans and the diaspora together on a regular basis. They always revolve around history and African contributions in all domains. For example, the second Festival of Algiers in 2009 and the third FESMAN of Dakar in 2010 had African renaissance as a theme. In addition, two conferences of intellectuals from Africa and the diaspora were held in Dakar (2004) and in Salvador da Bahia (2002). These contemporary approaches to Global Africanity are analysed in Amzat Boukari Yabara's second chapter, while Giulia Bonacci explores the relationships between Africa and its diaspora. For the record, we must mention the success, especially in the United States, of afro hairstyles, dashiki outfits, African cooking and music. We must also add the craze for genealogical research. Africa holds, in one way or another, a central place in aesthetics and political and religious thinking.

Regarding the diaspora, the African Union took the initiative in 2002 to elevate the diaspora to the status of the sixth region of Africa. Their members were urged to contribute to higher education and research in Africa by being more mobile. They were also encouraged to create job-yielding small and medium enterprises (SMEs) requiring investment models. In Brazil, a 2003 law made the teaching of African and African Brazilian history compulsory. A document from the Ministry of National Education about school textbooks mentions that ancient Egyptians were Black and that Africans were the first to use and develop writing. The Senegalese thinker, Cheikh Anta Diop, is also included in Brazil's school textbooks.

Finally, in the academic field, two or three generations of intellectuals have been promoting the special characteristics of African ideas and visions of the world. These are evident in the arts, theatre, fashion and music. A few feminists, like Léonora Miano or Chimamanda Ngozi Adiche, also nourish a current that has the same inspiration.

African identity in the contemporary world

Despite this vitality, global African identity comes across as ambivalent in the contemporary world. This is so in political discourse and in the media. In July 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France at the time, delivered a speech at the University of Dakar. It painted a broad panorama of Africa past and present for the 'young people of Africa'. His speech sparked strong protests in France, Africa and the Caribbean. One sentence particularly caught the attention of critics. According to Sarkozy: 'Africa, still at the threshold, has not yet entered History', an assertion that sends the continent back to its infancy and darkness. Tayeb Chenntouf, in his chapter, takes on that remark, outlines its assumptions and refutes its presuppositions. Besides Sarkozy's mid-nineteenth century views, the image of Africa conveyed by the mainstream media is hardly more positive. Willy Jackson and Issiaka Mandé show bluntly that Africa receives the attention of the international press and television only when dramatic events arise. Africa, it seems, is only about nature reserves, wildlife, conflicts and poverty. This issue will well and truly be included in the agenda.

In the social sciences and humanities, in contrast, a revival is taking shape. In the face of Islamist movements in northern Africa in the 1990s, analysts, surprised by the fast turn of events, armed themselves with the methodological and technical resources of nineteenth century orientalism. But, very quickly, faced with the failure to understand this new political Islam, new approaches are being tested, exploring new epistemologies and opening up new theoretical fields of inquiry and concepts. Bahija Chadili outlines the contours of Neo-Orientalism in North Africa, and Gosnell L. Yorke explores the domain of Africanism. The break with the old African identity is more honest. It is achieved by a new Indigenous African identity that seeks to think of Africa and its problems through the perspective of Africans so as to better draw plans for the continent's future. Many intellectuals are part of this perspective and are leading many civil society activities, but without always having the strong backing that would make them successful.

In education, the dynamics are even stronger. Until now, Global African identity has been virtually non-existent in this field. Learning programmes are based on spiral pedagogy, but the first cycle, that of the nation, is predominant since political independence. Everywhere from north to south and from east to west, the teaching of history is called upon to strengthen the national consciousness and boost nation-building. The opening to other continents, and especially the history of civilizations, is very weak, marginal, and even non-existent. African students

know little about Chinese, Indian or Mexican civilizations. The different facets of the history curriculum in African and diaspora schools are explored in three chapters. Valter Silvério and Nilma Line Gomes examine the 'place' of Africa in Brazilian school systems. Tayeb Chenntouf brings to light the disproportionate place and weight of Europe in history textbooks in Algeria. Lastly, Yamina Bentabet carries out a comparative analysis of the place of Global Africanity in Senegalese and Algerian school curricula. The teaching of African history is a constant and sustained demand in diaspora contexts. It has been very successful in Brazil, for example, where the 9 January 2003 law mandates the teaching of African history and Afro-Brazilian culture in all public education institutions. This is how the theses of Senegalese scholar, Cheikh Anta Diop, came to be included in syllabuses and textbooks.

The challenges of the new world

Overall, Pan-Africanism remains very active, enlists many people, and constantly feeds the idea of unity. It does so in a more challenging situation than in the twentieth century. Economic and financial globalization, the new world geopolitics, crises and local wars are seriously threatening the realization of the Pan-African dream. Post-independence Africa witnessed multiple social and political experiments. In his chapter, Alexander Balezin presents a history of 'Marxist-Leninist' states in tropical Africa during the latter part of the twentieth century. Jean Michel Mabeko-Tali describes the Marxist 'experiment' in Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. Lastly, Issiaka Mandé and Willy Jackson discuss the virtually unanimous adoption of the 'one-party' system as well as the 'epidemic' of military coups in the context of the Cold War, resulting from the meddling of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of new African states. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Africa is becoming marginalized in the context of globalization. Its structural integration into the global Atlantic economy dates back to the fifteenth century with slavery, and continued with colonization. Unlike other parts of the world, its position further deteriorated instead of improving.

Globalization, as shown by Moussa Willy Bantenga in his chapter, is a term that appeared between the 1980s and 1990s. It has emerged today in the social sciences, the media and political discourse. It was preceded and reinforced by the communications and transport revolutions. Indeed, a silent revolution took place at the end of the twentieth century with the drop in the cost of air

travel, which made it easier to move from one country to another, and from one continent to another. The number of tourists rose considerably. They were mainly from Europe, the United States, Japan, and now from China, travelling to the countries of the South. In Africa, no country escapes the arrival of tourists attracted by the sea, sun and nature.

As for the Internet, it continues to gain ground but remains limited in some areas, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. It allows instant and inexpensive exchanges of information and entertainment, which tend towards standardization around the world.

Economic and financial globalization is preceded by the adoption of the Washington Consensus, which is a set of ten nationally and internationally applicable measures for free-market economic and financial globalization. It is based on the idea that deregulation and price autonomy are beneficial and promote free trade and the relative freedom of movement of capital. The world economy is thus transformed with the tremendous intensification of world trade. It has three new features. First, the different countries around the world are now interconnected by large-scale exchanges. Only the movement of people is subject to restrictions. Second, this new world economy is also dominated by multinationals that, in search of maximum profitability, seek relocations. Lastly, capital and banks have become autonomous and operate through the stock market in a closed circuit. Africa, obviously, is not benefiting from the upheavals that have affected world trade. Globalization even results in resetting African economies to their primary status because of the high demand for raw materials and agricultural goods. It is virtually absent from lead markets, such as manufactured goods and services, and remains outside the new world organization of production.

The new global geopolitical configuration does not work in favour of Africa either. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had a very rapid impact on the African continent. The end of the Cold War was clearly the end of an era. The West lost interest in Africa and saw no more reason to support the various countries just because they opposed the Soviet Union. Willy Jackson presents an outline of the emerging geopolitical map, featuring the gestation of a multipolar world.

Africa found itself marginalized in the eyes of the great powers and African countries lost importance. The most tangible consequence of this change is that the subsidies that Africa derived from the East-West confrontation disappeared; today, governments' public assistance to development is on the decline. Li Anshan discusses the history of China–Africa relations; Joseph Gahama focuses on those of Europe and Africa; and Fumilayo E. Showers describes the itineraries as well as the perils of African immigrants who are citizens of the United States. The collapse of

the Apartheid system in South Africa in the early 1990s generated great hopes on the continent. However, the reality that set in was very different. As shown in the chapter by Patrick Harries on the imprint and legacy of more than four decades of minority domination constrain social interactions in South Africa today.

At the end of the Warsaw Pact, which had brought together the USSR and Eastern European countries, a new strategic doctrine was being developed at the global level. The enemy to fight was no longer the USSR and communism but the countries of the South. NATO's objectives were redefined. The UN Security Council has, in some cases, recommended and supported military interventions in Africa and elsewhere. The right of humanitarian intervention was used to exert diplomatic pressure, followed by military pressure on states. Strongly criticized, it was replaced by the right to protect civilians, as in Libya. NATO troops, led by France and the United Kingdom, dropped bombs on the country for several months resulting in a change of regime. UN troops, mainly French, intervened militarily after the Ivorian presidential election to oust President Laurent Gbagbo. French UN troops also settled permanently in Mali and in the Sahel to fight against terrorism.

In addition, the International Criminal Court, headquartered in The Hague (Netherlands), prosecuted African politicians for crimes against humanity. Several of them, including President Omar El Bashir, were charged.

NGOs, independent or not in relation to their states, frequently denounce any violation of human rights and freedoms. They do not hesitate to intervene on the ground, as happened in Chad, where a French NGO sought to send young children, so-called orphans of Darfur, to France when their parents were still present in Chad.

Overall, globalization and the new global geopolitics leave little room for Africa. Its role is completely marginal: it submits to transformations rather than influencing them. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear the continent's dependence has probably never been greater. Jean-Pierre Dozon reflects on the place and the role of Global Africa in the globalized world, while Thaddeuz Metz considers the positive part Africa can play, through her humanistic values, in re-humanizing the world.

The role of culture and intellectuals

Faced with this situation, the question of 'What to do?' continues to haunt reflection both in Africa and in the diaspora. It is a fact that possible alternatives are unclear. It is essential to outline the necessary policies in the short, medium and long

term. Burkina Faso's historian, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, in a book of interviews, strongly emphasized the role of culture in the immediate future in order for Africa to become an active player in the new world. Concretely, this means developing an indigenous vision of globalization and developing a new project for the long term. Both of these goals are a challenge to researchers and intellectuals, prompting them to get to work. The first urgency is to undertake analyses of globalization. What does globalization mean for Africa? What changes does it imply? What model of development does it impose and under what conditions? The answers to these questions provide a complete and relevant vision to avoid a 'subservient globalization'.

The social sciences and researchers were unprepared when anticipating the events and transformations that the world has experienced since the end of the twentieth century. Several researchers admit to having had at least three decisive surprises: the drop in the price of oil, Islamism and terrorism, and migratory movements across the Sahara and the Mediterranean. As for globalization, the lack of anticipation is due to the organization of institutional research and analysis itself. African universities have remained almost completely excluded from the intense debates that have taken place in recent years on the transformations of capitalism and societies stemming from the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century. In African countries, national leaders remain the be-all and end-all of any analysis. The regional and – even more so – the international environment comes into play only in the form of obstacles that must be removed. As far as I know, until the 2000s, no African university or research centre had any geopolitical, military or diplomatic strategy. However, awareness is forming today. The social sciences must and can analyse global changes because they have serious consequences for Africa.

They can also play an important role in developing a new project for Africa. The 1980-1990 decade represented a major turning point with the end of Apartheid, and with governments under increasing pressure to reform. However, it also opened up a series of crisis, whose origins are both endogenous and exogenous. It continues today, and may even worsen in the near future. The emerging question is that of building a new historical vision comprising three essential components: i) a political project; ii) the social endeavours likely to support it; and iii) the possible alliances at regional and institutional levels.

Today, African countries face three problems that they must solve under penalty of disqualification. The first is citizenship, the second concerns linguistic and cultural diversity, the last concerns economic even development.

All these challenges must be addressed, first and foremost, by researchers and intellectuals. Their relative lack of presence in national and global debates is often described as deplorable and sometimes even condemned.

The intellectuals, in all their different spheres of activity, must redefine their place and their role in the new world order, as suggested by Luís Kandjimbo in his chapter. They are socially responsible, whether they like it or not, and it is up to them, in their field, to identify the priorities that are needed in research and culture. The crisis in the lack of social sciences knowledge is now recognized by all specialists. It is indeed a gigantic programme, one of rethinking the world and the crises of our time.

Two issues are particularly urgent in Africa: i) criticism of the religious and political tradition; and ii) the historicization of African societies in all its intellectual and cultural implications. The historian's mind has evolved minimally, and anti-historicism is today more acute than it has ever been. Historicization would advance the solution of pressing problems. African thought has not quite severed the Gordian knots that command access to progress and modernity. As shown by Pierre Kipré's chapter, the generation of ideas and the diffusion and spread of African thought face many challenges.

The chapters in this section, and the authors who wrote them, have addressed all these questions from complementary points of view. They depict a Global Africa that has the ambition to become a player in the new world. The new world stage now sees Africa assert itself on the intellectual and artistic scene thanks to its philosophical thought, its literature, its paintings, its sculptures and its cinema. Its contribution is not reduced to its traditions and its ancestral values (solidarity, hospitality, temporal perspective), as some provincial African minds like to think. The recognition of its contemporary achievements would result in the world rediscovering a part of its history, just as Africa would discover its part in world history. The wish formulated in 1946 by W. E. B. Du Bois would finally be realized.

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CHAPTER 1

CHANGES AND CONTINUITY OF PAN-AFRICANISM

Amzat Boukari-Yabara

The resilience of Pan-Africanism

This chapter outlines the changes and continuity of Pan-Africanism since the 1990s, for which one must first review the relatively long existence of this fight towards freedom and solidarity. This movement was born among Africans who were enslaved and shipped to the West Indies and the Americas from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, prior to becoming a political ideology in the twentieth century (Esedebe, 1994). The military, intellectual or political anti-slavery struggles were led across the Atlantic by Gaspar Yanga, Zumbi de Palmares, Reine Nanny of the Maroons, Olaudah Equiano, Harriet Tubman, Toussaint Louverture and Mary Prince, forming the foundation of Pan-Africanism as a process of rehabilitating the humanity of Africans who had been degraded by the capitalist and racist Transatlantic Slave Trade.

The concept of Pan-Africanism made contemporary history with the independence of the Black Republic of Haiti on 1 January 1804 following a war of liberation against France, the colonial power. The creation of a state outside of Africa and ruled by Africans freed from slavery led to consequences in the United States. In response, several thousand freed Africans were repatriated to the American colony of Liberia, which was created in 1816, next to the colony of Sierra Leone, itself founded in 1791 with the same purpose of repatriating

Africans who were considered undesirable since the Somerset ruling¹. The two colonies became territories instilling West African nationalism. Under the impetus of Edward Wilmot Blyden, Haiti responded to racist attacks by developing a 'pan-negro solidarity' embodied by Anténor Firmin who published *De l'égalité des races humaines* (The Equality of Human Races) in 1885 in answer to Gobineau's theses².

In February of the same year, the Berlin Conference formalized the colonial partition of Africa between the different Western powers. Slavery was followed by colonization, which saw Africans being dispossessed by deceit, or by forceful economic and political control of their affairs. The only monarch to resist, Ménélik II, the head of Ethiopia and who was victorious over Italy at the battle of Adwa on 1 March 1896, granted an audience to the Haitian activist Bénito Sylvain. Sylvain requested a rapprochement of the Ethiopian authorities with Haiti and Liberia to form an alliance, defending the interests of all African peoples of the world.

It was in this context of transatlantic and intercontinental enlistments and movements that, in 1900, Caribbean, Afro-American and African activists and intellectuals gathered around the young Trinidadian lawyer, Henry Sylvester-Williams, to organize the Pan-African Conference in London. Their agenda was to organize the fight against racism and colonialism, and to ensure just representation and a fair and equitable defence of the interests of the peoples of African origin in international economic and political relations.

In the inter-war period, the Pan-African movement took several directions. The African American intellectual, W.E.B. Du Bois, organized a series of Pan-African congresses (in 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1927) in the Western capitals, laying out the African people's real political and socio-economic demands. His rival, the Jamaican leader Marcus Garvey, transformed the Universal Negro Improvement Association – African Communities League (UNIA-ACL) into an economic empire and a mass political movement driven by the project of the repatriation of Blacks in Africa ('Back to Africa'). Both Du Bois and Garvey distilled a set of social, intellectual and popular movements, such as the Harlem Renaissance, *Négritude* and Rastafari.

1 The 1772 Somerset ruling refers to the case brought to an English court by an enslaved African. Lord Mansfield ruled that he could not be forcibly removed from England and sent to Jamaica for sale.

2 Arthur de Gobineau, a French diplomat, wrote *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* [An essay of the inequality of human races], which argues that human races have different intellectual abilities and that white races are superior.

In 1935, a new generation of militants, mostly Caribbean and based in England, mobilized in response to Mussolini's aggression towards Ethiopia. One of the militants, George Padmore, having broken with the Comintern³, organized the Pan-African Congress in October 1945 in Manchester. This was the first congress held in the presence of a majority of African delegates, and it endorsed the political and economic independence of Africa within the context of an emerging, new international order. A major player in the Manchester Congress, Kwame Nkrumah, waged a long political struggle that ended with the independence of Ghana on 6 March 1957. Announcing that independence would be incomplete without the total liberation and unity of the African continent, Nkrumah worked with the African-American and Caribbean diaspora, who were fighting against segregation in the United States, to bring together the bequeathed legacies of Du Bois and Garvey. Thus, bringing back Pan-Africanism on the African continent, while enriching it with the principles of solidarity and non-alignment defined in April 1955 at the Bandung conference.

Nkrumah attempted, in vain, to rally a majority of African states seeking independence of the necessity to form a continental government that would guarantee common monetary, military and diplomatic sovereignty. In this regard, Nkrumah supported Sékou Touré's Guinea, which broke with France, and hosted the Conference of the Independent African States (April 1958) and the Conference of African Peoples (December 1958). Political figures (Frantz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba, Felix Moumié, Che Guevara, Malcolm X) and cultural figures (Louis Armstrong, Nina Simone, Maya Angelou, Maryse Condé, Shirley Graham, Du Bois) travelled through Ghana during that time. In July 1960, Accra also hosted the Conference of African Women and the Diaspora, which gave visibility to the thousands of women struggling for African liberation and unity.

The ideological split of the Cold War (Washington versus Moscow), the multiple colonial legacies (London, Paris, Brussels...), the different modalities of accession to independence (armed struggle in Algeria, Southern Africa and Portuguese colonies), the rivalries of leadership and the international crisis of Congo divided the African countries into a Casablanca group (a radically committed minority revolutionary unity) and a Monrovia group (a moderate majority, in favour of minimal cooperation). While both groups officially

3 Communist International, an organization that existed between 1919 and 1943, advocating world communism.

condemned colonialism and the South African Apartheid regime, Nkrumah's vision of the United States of Africa was rejected in favour of the creation, in Addis Ababa, of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963.

African unity in the aftermath of independence aimed to meet three challenges: i) to totally liberate the continent from colonialism; ii) to reduce political fragmentation of the continent (or Balkanization), which gave birth to states that did not seem viable; and iii) to respond to poverty, resulting from a process of underdevelopment caused by internal and external factors marked by historical changes of trafficking and colonization in African societies (Rodney, 1972). However, by validating the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization and non-interference in internal affairs, the OAU reduced Pan-Africanism to a structure of institutional cooperation in charge of finalizing the liberation of the continent. This aim materialized in the early 1990s with the end of Apartheid; however, it remained incomplete on many points.

New issues of governance, security and development in an economic context of neoliberal globalization led the African Union (AU) to replace the OAU in 2002, without addressing the deep substantive issues that remained. Meanwhile, militant groups continued to incarnate Pan-Africanism from below, with social and community grassroots struggles. Impregnated with the pioneering spirit of Pan-Africanism, these groups challenged the minimizing institutional policies, revealing the facets of a Pan-African movement, which has taken many forms in the last three decades.

From the OAU to the AU, an economic and institutional redeployment

The end of the Cold War gave rise to weak political transitions to democracy in the countries of Africa, accompanied by a sharp turn towards a neoliberal economy. Thus, from June 1991, the OAU announced, via the Abuja Treaty, the creation of the African Economic Community (AEC). The aim of the AEC was (and still is) to coordinate the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within a continental development project. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of the East (EAC) and the South (SADC), ensured their respective integration of regional policies in markets and services, whereas the long crisis, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since the mid-1990s, prevented Central Africa from fully playing its part in continental integration. The problems associated with the movement or residence of peoples

from one country to another, as well as insufficient military coordination in the face of new transnational security threats and weak intra-regional trade, has revived the debate on the effectiveness of integration policies and the reform of Pan-African institutions.

It was in this context that, on 9 September 1999, during an extraordinary meeting of the OAU in Sirte, the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, called for the creation of a new continental organization, the African Union (AU), which became operational at the Durban Summit in July 2002. The construction of a 'peaceful Africa, integrated and prosperous, managed by its people' was the general objective upheld by the AU, which adapted its economic policy on the merger of several plans initiated in the 1990s, and brought together in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In line with the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, as a prelude to the various national plans included in the concept of an 'emergence', or of the latest continental agenda 'Africa 2063' of the AU, NEPAD favoured the pre-eminence of neoliberalism over the economic and social rights of peoples.

No doubt, the aim of the Draft Statutes of the AU is to introduce people into its operations through several bodies, but the Pan-African Parliament, based in South Africa, was formed of national parliaments, which were often not very representative, while the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) allowed States to co-opt pro-government NGOs. In the context of the failure of national jurisdictions to protect populations from abuse, as well as the distrust of the AU's bodies with regard to the International Criminal Court (ICC), accused of targeting Africans, the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice was still not clear. Dependent on foreign financing and without an autonomous military force to intervene in the many conflicts that ravaged the continent since the year 2000, the AU retained the structural weaknesses of the OAU.

However, the debate organized at the July 2007 Accra Summit on a 'Continental Union Government' had revived the relevant vision of Nkrumah's United States of Africa. Libya had vainly proposed to equip Africa with its own monetary system and infrastructure (satellites, highways, airlines) in order to speed up the unification process. However, the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, following an intervention of the allied powers of NATO (Campbell, 2013), deprived the AU of its main political instigator and financial contributor, while reactivating the anti-imperialist dimension of Pan-African activism.

If Europe and the United States remained historical poles of the Pan-African resistance, new players emerged. Driven by President Lula's Brazilian African policy and President Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian vision for Venezuela, South-

South cooperation led to Africa-South America summits (in 2006, 2009 and 2013). The ebb of history and the new economic migrations have meant that China, India, Japan and Türkiye have been exerting influence and an interested African vocation through trade forums. The Emirati and Asian powers are also strengthening their presence in Africa in land grabs, the control of the mining sector, and the discriminatory use of labour. In a context where the average and great powers display their 'Pan-African' project, seen as the twenty-first century continent, Pan-Africanism became a tool of social challenge, cultural claim and political alternatives.

The redefinition of the players of Pan-Africanism

In April 1994, while the Tutsi genocide was tearing Rwanda apart and South Africa was reconciling itself by electing Nelson Mandela, activists gathered in Kampala, Uganda, for the Eighth Pan-African Congress to lay out the new objectives of twenty-first century Pan-Africanism: food and physical safety, enlistment and advancement of young people and women, the integration of peoples, the contribution of Africa to globalization, and the exit from economic dependence (Abdul-Raheem, 1996). The Conferences of Intellectuals of Africa and the Diaspora of Dakar (2004) and Salvador de Bahia (2006) were a reminder that Pan-Africanism was often upheld by women and men of culture before politicians. The recognition of Swahili as one of the official languages of the AU in 2004 and the enlistment of the diaspora to the rank of 'Sixth Region' in 2013 were in response to old militant demands.

Pan-Africanism also focuses on issues of military, monetary and political sovereignty. The years between the end of the Burkina Faso revolution of Thomas Sankara in 1987 and the overthrow of Blaise Compaoré by a popular uprising in 2014 witnessed a renewal of generations and ideological context. Despite the two mandates of the first Black U.S. president Barack Obama, which did not bring the expected results in terms of protection and social progress to African American minorities, the United States did invest in African civil societies via digital tools, while playing a decisive and destructive role in the Libyan war. By resuming the struggle for civil rights, controversially at times, the 'Black Lives Matter' movement has echoed the voices of the youth, who have denounced impunity, negrophobia and police violence since 2015. Present in all Pan-African enlistments of the last century, and increasingly numerous and organized, the associations of the African diaspora students called for new educational facilities

and better access to a historiography of Pan-Africanism, whose sources were, all too often, only available in the English language. Consequently, site forums and the blogosphere became novel virtual communities, new areas of exploration and redeployment of Pan-Africanism. The lack of Pan-Africanism teaching in African and Western universities is compensated by self-teaching in these areas. On this point, while the project of a Pan-African University (PAU) struggled to gain momentum on the continent, a few countries in the diaspora, such as Brazil and Jamaica, started reshaping the curricula by teaching the general history of Africa. Pan-Africanism, as defined in academic circles, became challenged by the social practices of militant groups who, in the process of re-appropriation of their history, sought to gain autonomy of power (*empowerment*). In Europe, especially in France, Pan-Africanism is sometimes attacked on the grounds that it seeks 'communitarian' revenge on slavery and colonial history. However, on the one hand, it is a tool to problematize the current consequences of these two historical periods on Black populations, and, on the other hand, it is a response to identity and nationalist movements that thrive on ignorance and negrophobia.

This memorial work has also reintegrated the emancipatory circumstances at the origin of Pan-Africanism. Thus, the African and Caribbean diasporas have relied on the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in France (1998) and the bicentennial of the abolition of the British slave trade (2007) to demand legislative progress, as well as a reparations policy in connection with the debates opened in 2001 at the Durban Conference against racism. While France and Senegal voted laws in 2001 and 2010 recognizing trafficking and slavery as crimes against humanity, the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) decided to go all the way, following a judicial process, by forming a commission in 2014, led by the historian Sir Hilary Beckles, to defend their request for reparations from Western powers. In line with the launch in 1994 of the UNESCO 'The Slave Route' programme, several countries also exploited the Pan-Africanism apparatuses to develop 'memorial tourism'.

The cities of Algiers (in 2009) and Dakar (in 2010) tried to reconnect with the spirit of the 1966 FESMAN⁴ and 1969 FESPAN⁵ festivals, when many Pan-African cultural and artistic events emerged on the continent and in the diaspora. Just as African music can be heard all over the world, with hip-hop, rap and reggae cultures continuing to promote both protest and

4 The first World Festival of Black Arts was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966.

5 The first pan-African cultural festival was held in Algiers, Algeria, in 1969.

festive narratives, African film festivals (FESPACO⁶, Carthage Film Festival⁷) continue to offer an institutional showcase for audiovisual creation, while Nollywood is increasingly professional and moving beyond Nigeria's borders. Artistic and intellectual collaborations between Africa, the Caribbean and Black America are also gaining visibility and recognition. A cultural power, such as Afro-futurism, is adapting science fiction and cyberculture to the historical and cultural sources of the Black universe. Architects, designers, visual artists, musicians, photographers and artisans are demonstrating a Pan-Africanism rooted in popular knowledge and practices. For example, initiatives are being held around African gastronomy, adapting it to new forms of fast food. All these elements are coming together to enrich a Pan-African culture, thereby facilitating the identification of a 'global African family'.

Women at the heart of Pan-Africanism

A revision of the historiography of the African continent is prompting a closer examination of women's involvement in Pan-Africanism (Serbin, 2004). Women's stories (see HerStory⁸) highlight concepts linking gender, race and class, provoking intense debate between progressive and conservative lines of Pan-Africanism. The great female figures of anti-colonial or diasporic Africa (Nzinga, Yaa Asantewaa, La Mûlatresse Solitude), the revolts of women against the colonial order, and transnational female solidarities structure a chronology that reached a turning point with the creation of the Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO) in Dar-es-Salaam in 1962. In international meetings, Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti (Nigeria), Aoua Keita (Mali), Pauline Clark (Ghana) or Jeanne Martin Cissé (Guinea) made their voices heard, and several women gained ministerial or diplomatic positions.

Enrolled in the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies and in Southern Africa, like the São-Tomean writer Alda do Espírito Santo, or Winnie Mandela in South Africa, African women in the 1990s were at the forefront of popular fronts, becoming an enlisting force feared by authoritarian regimes and demanding a political transition. In Brazil, as well as Venezuela, Colombia,

6 The Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, currently in its 29th edition (in 2025).

7 Journées Cinématographiques de Carthage takes place in Carthage, Tunis, and showcases Arab and African cinema.

8 A platform amplifying the voices and stories of women with African descent: <https://www.herstoryglobal.com>.

Ecuador and Central America, Black women constituted the backbone of social movements who, by fighting for greater economic and social equality, promoted the political recognition of the African contingent of these countries. Groups such as the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) relayed the struggles led by Amy Ashwood Garvey and the Women of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). Indeed, women tried to apprise public policy on issues specific to Black women.

In the United States, where civil rights activists Ella Baker and Fannie Lou Hamer trained many groups in political struggle and social issues (early pregnancy, single parenthood, etc), Shirley Chisholm became, in 1972, the first African American personality to run for president. Globally, several women have gained high-ranking positions, such as the Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was the first woman elected as head of an African country in 2006, or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the first woman to chair the Commission of the African Union in 2012. Other women embody important causes, such as Kenyan activist Wangari Maathai, who organized the Green Belt Movement to replant trees and fight for environmental preservation and sustainable development. As the first African woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004, Maathai then went on to chair the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) from 2005 to 2008, while raising awareness of environmental issues in Pan-African and international bodies until her death in 2011.

New generations of women are rediscovering the path of the Afro-American activist Assata Shakur, a political refugee in Cuba, or Angela Davis, an icon of the Black Power movement in the United States. The engaged literary writings of Léonora Miano (Cameroon) or Chimananda Ngozi Adichie (Nigeria) address societal and personal issues, such as exile, love or gender violence, in the context of pan-African fictions inspired by reality. Alongside key African voices, such as Angélique Kidjo (Benin), and following in the footsteps of Miriam Makeba (South Africa) and Nina Simone, American singers, such as Alicia Keys and Lauryn Hill, embody new committed female role models. The return of Afro and nappy hairstyles has led many Black women to assume their identities and impose aesthetic canons that reconfigure pan-African fashion. More and more activists, intellectuals and entrepreneurial African women are entering the field of politics and civil society on themes that, although transnational in nature, join the causes carried by Pan-African pioneers of the time, such as Catherine McKenzie, Adelaide Casely-Hayford or Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti. The dynamism of women brings Pan-Africanism to a new age that coincides with the quest for freedom and the political maturity of new generations.

Is Pan-Africanism reaching maturity?

Since the eighteenth century to the present day, the protracted construction of Pan-Africanism is one of globalization in the making, which beats to the rhythm of the communication chosen by its social players to create, share, discuss and enlist between Africa and its diaspora. The twenty-first century, which has opened up to the digital and technological revolution and, together with the capacity of social networks, has enabled millions of people to appropriate references to Pan-Africanism without necessarily having to grasp the concept, with all its socio-cultural, political and historical dimensions. The AU did not take into account the OAU's shortcomings in its treatment of the diaspora, without whose representation or electoral constituency it would remain limited in its rights and duties.

While Pan-Africanism thus appears as a consensual objective within the framework of institutional practices, it has become a subject of action and debate for militant groups engaged in political and social transformations. Drawing inspiration from historical attempts at inter-territoriality (African Democratic Rally), federalism (Pan-African Federation) and internationalism (All African People's Revolutionary Party), new organizations (Front pour une révolution anti-impérialiste populaire et panafricaine [FRAPP]⁹ and the Pan-African League [UMOJA]) tried to replace Pan-Africanism at the heart of political debates. These groups, present in the diaspora as well as on the African continent, stood out and enriched themselves with local issues, globally echoed by social networks. Far from being homogeneous, African diasporas appear cleaved between the individuals born in the country of origin, whether African or Caribbean, and those born in the diaspora. With each personal journey, the issue of the return to Africa is viewed differently. It depicts the tragic reality of African youth who, by leaving Africa, risk their lives in search of a better future.

The multiple regionalized historical, geographical and social perspectives draw a plurality of Pan-Africanisms. While Morocco's return to the African Union confirms the continental and economic dimensions of this institution, some Pan-African currents still reject the inclusion of North African countries for the sake of Black unity. Xenophobia within the continental borders, as well as phobia of the diaspora, can lead Africa's residents to express distrust or indifference to those who return, thus igniting intense debate on who should

9 Front for a Popular and Pan-African Anti-Imperialist Revolution.

uphold the Pan-African leadership as well as the order of priorities. In this context, Africa's present history consolidates Pan-Africanism as a polycentric and versatile movement, as well as the articulation of individual and collective methods, skills and experiences related to emancipation struggles and aspirations for equality and global justice.

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CHAPTER 2

THE PAN-AFRICAN MOVEMENT FOR TRANSNATIONAL LIBERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Tukufu Zuberi

Introduction

The African diaspora is defined by the massive migrations to Asia, Europe and the Americas as a result of the Arab and European trade in enslaved Africans from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century. The enslaved Africans came from a variety of nations, spoke several different languages, and provided the world with a variety of important historical and cultural contributions, despite the legacy of enslavement and continued second-class citizenship. Pan-Africanism is a movement born out of the marginalization of Africans and the African diaspora. In this essay, I argue that Pan-Africanism and Pan-Africanist thought connects Africans and African descendants in the modern world, and I will focus on the efforts that involve transnational organizations. I begin by defining Pan Africanism, followed by discussions of examples of this transnational movement over time, from the Pan African congresses to the formation of the African Union. I conclude with a brief comment on the shifting politics in Africa and the African diaspora, ranging from the election of U.S. President Barack Obama to the CARICOM¹ Reparations Commission (CRC).

Pan-Africanism is a socially constructed concept that provides a philosophical and ideological framework to help define the struggle of the peoples and land

1 The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was created in July 1973 and comprises a group of 15 member states and 6 associate members.

of Africa, and offers solutions to change the reality resulting from the massive racial colonization and enslavement of Africans in Asia, Europe and the Americas, past and present (Thompson, 1969, pp. 36-39; Zuberi, 2015; ch. 1-2; Boyce-Davies, 2007, ch. 6). Pan-Africanism is an intellectual movement with a number of political, cultural, economic and organizational manifestations. As St. Clair Drake observes: 'traditional Pan-Africanists see their struggles as not only involving black people everywhere but also as being organically related to Third World struggles generally and to the worldwide struggle of proletariat and peasantry regardless of race.' (Drake, 1982, p. 344). From this observation, at least two perspectives regarding Africa and African descendants are clear. The fight for Pan-Africanism is either related to other struggles against injustice and domination, or the struggles of Africans and African descendants are seen as subsumed under these other struggles. The first trend was exemplified by George Padmore who chose his battleground around African nationalism. He was born in Trinidad and authored the classic *Pan Africanism or Communism?* He co-organized the Fifth Pan-African Congress and was an adviser to President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The second trend was exemplified by Franz Fanon who was immersed in the fight for Algerian independence. He was born in Martinique and wrote *The Wretched of the Earth*. Both trends are subsumed under Pan-Africanism because both conclude that the history of Africans and their descendants around the world is pivotal to the future of humanity.

In both trends of Pan-Africanism, racial consciousness is seen as a necessary component in the destruction of Eurocentric oppressive social systems (Fanon, 1963; Padmore, 1956). Within the Pan-Africanist movement, Africans joined with the African diaspora in the Americas, the Caribbean and Europe where they attempted to develop common policies and a united front. However, according to scholars such as W.E.B. Du Bois and George Padmore, and activists such as Amy Jacques Garvey and Kwame Nkrumah, the origins of Pan-Africanism are firmly based in the experience of Africa's American diaspora (Du Bois, 1947, p. 7; Nkrumah, 1963, ch. 15).

The Pan-African congresses

Several historical processes, including those of the Sudanic empires in West Africa and the Zulu empire in the South, may serve as the intellectual basis of Pan-African thought. However, it was not until the dawn of the twentieth century that Pan-Africanism was born with the first Pan-African conference organized by Henry

Sylvester-Williams, a Caribbean lawyer living in London in 1900. Members of the African diaspora from England and the Caribbean attended this first conference, as well as a small contingent from the United States. Moreover, the Pan-African ideal of uniting people of African descent was not restricted by geographical or national boundaries. The Pan-African movement sought to engage in what Marcus Garvey would call the 'redemption of Africa'. The redemption of the African continent and peoples was now seen in an international context. Despite cultural, linguistic and racial differences, the Pan-African movement would argue for a common struggle for freedom and justice for Africans and the African diaspora.

In February 1919, under the leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois, the first Pan-African Congress was held in Paris, France, at the Grand Hotel on Boulevard des Capucines. Presided over by Blaise Diagne of Senegal and Du Bois, 57 delegates attended the congress from different parts of the world. Several nations sent official representatives, for example, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee represented France, Belgium sent a member of its Peace Delegation, Portugal was represented by former minister of foreign affairs, Colonel Friere de Andrade, and the United States sent William E. Walling and Charles Edward Russell. The resolutions adopted at the gathering made demands on behalf of the people of African ancestry and called for another congress. The congress members also called for the internationalization of the former German colonies in Africa. Towards the end of the congress, Du Bois, as the principal organizer, promised to convene another congress two years later. The congress submitted a petition, which Du Bois delivered, to both the League of Nations and the Peace Conference that was simultaneously meeting in Paris.

The Second Congress was assembled and held in London, Brussels and Paris in August and September 1921. This congress was much larger than its predecessor, with 41 delegates from Africa, 25 from the United States, 24 from Europe, and 7 delegates from the West Indies. The purpose of this congress was much like the first; however, more radical resolutions were adopted. Resolutions criticized the colonial system and racism; they asked that the sovereignty of Abyssinia, Haiti and Liberia be respected, and they challenged the world to recognize the absolute equality of all men and women irrespective of race.

The next two congresses were relatively uneventful. The 1923 congress was a small and disorganized gathering, held in London and Lisbon. Four years later, in 1927, a distinguished group of African American women organized another Pan-African congress in New York, with over 200 delegates representing 22 American states and 10 other countries. Once again, only a few individuals from the African continent were present at the meeting. It is important to

recognize that African American women were the conveners of the 1927 congress, highlighting that women have been leading activists and intellectuals in the movement from its beginnings to the present day (Blaine et al., 2016).

Universal Negro Improvement Association

Marcus Garvey and his organization, the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), represented the largest mass movement of the African diaspora in history. The UNIA professed a Pan-African idea that all Black people are the same, and that the only solution to the racism and second-class citizenship that Black people experienced in Africa, Europe and the Americas was for them to return 'Back to Africa'.

The UNIA was one of the most important advocates of African independence in the post-First World War period. The objective of the UNIA was to build the necessary organizations to meet the needs of African people, not only in Africa but also around the world. These organizations would meet the political, economic and social needs of people who were confronting racial oppression everywhere globally. The UNIA was founded in 1914 in Jamaica with the motto 'One God! One Aim! One Destiny!' In 1916, Garvey visited the United States to meet with Booker T. Washington to discuss his ideas and the institutions he was working to establish in the United States. By the time of his arrival, Booker T. Washington had died. Undeterred, Garvey and his colleagues took advantage of their time in the United States and travelled around the country, establishing branches of the UNIA. The UNIA eventually established over 800 branches in the United States, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and Africa by the early 1920s. However, five years before the end of the Second World War, Garvey died in obscurity, with his organization only a shadow of what it had promised in the early 1900s.

Amy Jacques Garvey, the widow of Marcus Garvey and a strong critic of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, expressed her deep concern about the direction of Pan-Africanism following the end of the war. She took action and rallied interest in the 5th Pan-African Congress. She continued the work of the UNIA and, on 4 April 1944, she contacted Du Bois about, what she called, the 'African Freedom Charter', a way of amplifying the promises of the Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 and later ratified by the Allied nations fighting fascism. Amy Jacques Garvey challenged Du Bois to discuss freedom and independence on the African continent. In response, Du Bois contacted Paul Robeson and others about convening another Pan-African Congress (Herbert, 1997, pp. 375-384).

The 1935-1945 years

The majority of delegates at the first four Pan-African congresses were intellectuals from Europe and America. Even Professor Du Bois recognized this dynamic: 'So far, the Pan-African idea was still American rather than African.' This was to change with the Second World War. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia had a profound influence on the development of Pan-Africanism and the ideal of African independence. On 13 October 1935, the Italian fascist troops marched into Ethiopia. By 1936, the Emperor Haile Selassie was in exile in Britain, and the Italian occupation of Ethiopia ignited Africans and people of African descent to action. In addition, the Spanish Civil War mobilized the radical forces into action (Boyce-Davies, 2007, ch. 6; Robinson, 2008, ch. 10). Every element of the Pan-African movement joined the battle cry for the return of Ethiopia to Ethiopians. The UNIA and the Pan-African Congress movements agreed on this critical issue.

The African diaspora joined the international efforts to fight the fascist forces in Spain, Europe and Africa. The ideological basis of Pan-Africanism offered a space for activist intellectuals and the large numbers of colonially and racially marginalized Africans and the African diaspora to fight with the Allies as a way to resist oppression and exploitation worldwide. The invasion of Ethiopia catalysed and united Africans in the diaspora. Members of every branch of the movement stood together to support the return of Ethiopia to independence. These same individuals would breathe fresh and new life into the Pan-African movement. As the Second World War came to an end, this new vigour among Africans and the African diaspora resulted in the 5th Pan-African Congress in 1945 (Du Bois 1947, p. 242; Levering Lewis, 2000; Morrow 2010; Thompson, 1969).

This international context of struggle led to Pan-African participation in the Second World War. The fact that millions of Africans and members of the African diaspora fought to save democracy in the Second World War changed the political landscape. The returning soldiers would protest their colonial status on the African continent and would demand civil and human rights in the Americas and Europe. The reinvigorated calls for a say in the politics of the African colonies, as well as civil and human rights in Europe and the Americas, added fuel to the fire of social change. After the Second World War, the potential for change in Africa seemed inevitable to many activists, and the civil rights struggles in Europe and the Americas took on an added urgency.

The 5th Pan-African Congress convened around 200 delegates, representing Africa and African descendants the world over. At the congress, Padmore introduced Du Bois as the 'father of Pan-Africanism'. With deference paid to his earlier efforts as a founding member of the movement, Du Bois was confirmed as the presiding international chairman during the conference. Together with Peter Milliard, president of the Negro Association of Manchester and the chairman of the British section of the movement, they jointly chaired the meeting. Amy Jacques Garvey represented the UNIA, and people from all walks of life from Europe and the Americas attended the meeting, as well as observers from the non-African world. Several trade unions and cultural and political organizations were also represented. Indeed, the African contingent was significantly represented, and Africans would take the message back to every corner of the continent, igniting the fire of independence. South Africa's Peter Abrahams would later observe: 'This Congress, therefore, was the most representative yet assembled by African and peoples of African descent to plan and work for the liquidation of Imperialism' (Abrahams, 2001; Levering Lewis, 2000, p. 513).

Cultural congresses and festivals

The 1945 5th Pan-African Congress fanned the flames of African independence and the fight for civil and human rights among members of the African diaspora. Transnational congresses and festivals continued to be used as intellectual and cultural battlefields in Africa and the world. A few examples highlight these struggles. In 1956, *Présence Africaine* (a pan-African quarterly journal founded in 1947) organized the 1st International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists at the Sorbonne in Paris (also known as the Congress of Black Writers and Artists) (*Présence Africaine*, 1956, pp. 1-243), which was largely attended by intellectuals, activists and artists. *Présence Africaine* convened a second congress in Rome in 1959 (*Présence Africaine*, 1960).

In 1966, the Senegalese Government organized the first World Festival of Black Arts as a celebration of African and African diaspora artists. Additional festivals were organized in Lagos in 1977 and Dakar in 2010. A meeting was held in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in 2016 to discuss the possibility of holding the festival outside of Africa, in the nation with the largest African diaspora – Brazil.

In 1977, members of the African diaspora in Latin America organized the First Congress of Black Culture in the Americas in Cali, Colombia, around their collective experiences under the theme 'Decolonization of Black Culture in the

Americas'. A second and larger Congress of Black Culture in the Americas was convened at the University of Panama in 1980, which was also attended by Africans and members of the African diaspora. The idea of the congress as a platform for transnational communication and political organizations persisted. However, the centre of activities shifted to the African continent after the 5th Congress in 1945.

Africa takes centre stage

The Cold War followed the end of the Second World War, which would later define the global political, economic and military context for decades, while surveillance was carried out on those seen as a threat to the development of capitalism and US strategic interests. The Cold War was an intense time in Africa and led to the surveillance of Africans and members of the African diaspora who fought for Pan-Africanism. Given the marginalized position of African descendants in the world's democracies at this time, many Pan-Africanists, such as Claudia Jones, W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson, were opposed to the Cold War and called for peace (Du Bois, 1945, 1952). Indeed, the peace movement was anti-Cold War and argued that the world needed peace and justice more than blind adherence to capitalism and US strategic interests.

In Africa, the Cold War was fought from a position of classical European colonialism against African independence. From the time of his return to Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was determined to make Ghana's capital, Accra, the centre of African independence and liberation. Accra would serve as a base from which nationalist leaders could work towards independence and Pan-Africanism more generally (Gaines, 2012, p. 2; Thompson, 1969, p. 64; Zuberi, 2015, ch. 2). The 5th Pan-African Congress ended with the idea of holding another Congress soon thereafter. The idea of a Sixth Pan-African Congress was reconfigured when delegates from all over the continent met in December 1958 in Accra. The All-African People's Congress brought together over 200 still-unknown political leaders of the African independence movement, as well as known figures such as Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Patrice Lumumba (Republic of the Congo), Holden Roberto (Angola) and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia). Many of the politicians, union leaders, women and youth organization leaders in attendance gained prominence in their respective fights for African independence that would follow. Pan-Africanism moved from the realm of ideas, espoused by Du Bois and his fellow intellectual activists, into the

practical politics of building African independence (Prashad, 2007; Thompson, 1969). Two additional All-African People's congresses took place in Tunis in 1960, and a third conference in Cairo in 1961.

Continental Pan-African organization crystalized in the form of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa by 32 African governments. The OAU was limited in its political and economic scope and was eventually disbanded and transformed into the African Union (AU) on 9 July 2002. Between the time of the founding of the OAU and its transition to the AU, several regional organizations came into existence. They include the Organization of Central African States in 1966, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1980, and the East African Community (EAC) in 2000. More and more, even the most conservative forces on the African continent could no longer ignore the imperative of cooperation and unity as a tool and a weapon of African development. While these newly formed efforts point to continued relevance of Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century, these organizations lacked a clear strategy connecting the efforts and activities of Africans in the diaspora. This disconnect motivated the AU to declare the African diaspora as the sixth region of Africa. The other five regions consist of the geographic areas: North, South, East, West, and Central Africa.

It did not take long before the nascent African republics faltered as the Cold War and underdevelopment turned the dream of African independence into a nightmare. When the Cold War was finally over, Africans continued to face the ethnic and racial problems caused by colonial rule. Today, Africa finds itself in a world of superpowers and a new form of globalization (Zuberi, 2015).

The Pan-African limits of national independence

African independence was the most important Pan-African event to happen in the last decade of the twentieth century, during which time the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended, and a new world order emerged in Africa and the world. During this time, the diaspora populations of India, China and Europe were having significant political, economic and cultural impacts on their 'original homeland'. The more recent African diaspora has sent hundreds of millions of dollars in remittances to their families back home to the benefit of Africa. However, the potential realized by these contributions, monetary and otherwise, has yet to be articulated by a modern movement in the twenty-first century.

Pan-Africanism in the twenty-first century and Global Africa

In 2001, at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban, South Africa, a few African governments, as well as representatives of African descendants in Latin America, Europe and the United States, missed an opportunity for collaboration. Nevertheless, the ideal of Pan-Africanism was very much alive. In fact, the AU and governments in the Americas held meetings with the African diaspora to explore ways of increasing economic links with Africa. Beginning with the First Meeting of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora, which was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2004, the AU followed up with meetings of intellectuals of the African diaspora in the United States and Brazil. Latin American nations had also organized Pan-African meetings between representatives from the world of business and academia to discuss future African cooperation. In 2013, the Colombian Government convened the Third World Summit of Mayors and Presidents: Africans and African descendants in Cali. Later that year, in Costa do Sauipe, Salvador, Brazil, a similar conference was held: the African Fair for International Business, Culture and Sports. Both these transnational meetings were convened in collaboration with African nations to pursue ways to advance a mutually beneficial economic relationship. While these conferences may be considered Pan-African in scope, neither of the conferences was Pan-African in design.

With the election of Barack Hussein Obama II as the 44th President of the United States, only 42 years after African Americans obtained the right to a full vote because of the delayed implementation of the 15th Amendment² to the United States Constitution, the political possibilities of Pan-Africanism changed forever. President Obama raised the question of what Africans and the African diaspora can bring to global society, and, following his presidency, the era of ignoring the African diaspora in modern African politics was over. The issue was no longer simply one of civil and human rights for the marginalized African diaspora populations. Indeed, the ideals of Pan-Africanism needed to be reimagined in terms of power shifts in the new global context, in a world that had shrunk as a result of the revolution in communications. There may in fact be a time in the future when the role of the African diaspora is deemed as important as it was in the beginning of the twentieth century.

2 The 15th Amendment, enacted in 1870, granted African American men the right to vote, prohibiting the federal and state governments from denying the right to vote based on "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

The CARICOM Reparations Commission is another example of how political power among the African diaspora can be used to raise questions that have largely been ignored by the world but yet have had a profound impact on the lives of Africans, the African diaspora and displaced native populations. In 2013, several Caribbean nations presented a unified call for reparations. They justified this call on the basis of past and present misdeeds by several governments in Europe and the Americas. The expansion of Europeans across the globe and the white supremacy that ensued resulted in racial discrimination in the democracies of Europe, North America and South America. Indeed, racial marginalization in many societies in the first part of the twenty-first century serves as the moral, ethical and legal case for reparations by governments of the former colonial powers.

The independence and human rights movements have helped to re-evaluate the space that Africans and the African diaspora inhabit in the world, past and present. This dialogue needs to happen if we are serious about changing the place of Africans and their descendants in the world. They need a renaissance to confront twenty-first-century realities, and this renaissance needs a framework for understanding and designing the struggle ahead. The issue is not whether the African diaspora will play a role in the world's future; the conclusion is that the African diaspora is central to the future of the Americas, Europe and Asia. Pan-Africanist thought has developed thanks to contributions from various African descendants and Africans who are fighting to expand the idea of citizenship and humanity in the modern world. What is good for Pan-Africanism is good for the world.

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CHAPTER 3

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS CLAIMING AN AFRICAN IDENTITY

Valter Roberto Silvério

“What it *was* to be Black and what it *is* to be Black”

In a February 2016 interview with *El País*, one of Spain’s main newspapers, Emanuel Araújo¹ used this phrase to express the changes taking place in the reconstruction of the history of Brazil’s Afro-descendants. Araújo founded the Afro-Brazil Museum (*Museu Afro Brasil*) in São Paulo in 2004. He explained that the museum’s mission is to ‘rescue the history and memory of those who have been forgotten by, or are remembered very little in, the official history’. This justification, expressed by the creator, is central to understanding the transnational dimension of the struggle of the Afro-descendants who are dispersed throughout the world. At the same time, it forces us to revisit the controversy surrounding African culture, African heritage and the African diaspora in the present day, particularly with regard to those corresponding to the ‘Black’ social construct, and the experience associated with them. The temporal dimension of Araújo’s discourse implies unveiling a past and rewriting the present with a view to the future. The notion of rescuing this past through

¹ This plastic artist of African descent donated his personal collection of over 2,000 pieces to the museum to promote and give visibility to the collective Afro-Brazilian memory, preserved through various artistic techniques. Throughout the twentieth century, this memory has been claimed as the basis of Brazilianness but, at the same time, is disassociated from its producers.

the history and memory of those forgotten and/or little remembered has an explicit goal: to demonstrate to future generations that Africans and their descendants in the diaspora have a history.

In practice, the Afro-Brazil Museum reflects a transnational agenda in which interactive museums, digital technologies, events, workshops, courses, specific programmes and lines of research in different parts of the world have begun to question not only the 'forgetfulness' but also, above all, the distortions and incompleteness of the European 'scientific' legacy. There is a desire to go back over the various ways in which the history and memory of those corresponding to the social constructs of Black, 'negro', *noire*, maroon, *quilombola*², and so on, have been rescued and rewritten, filling in the gaps that created this quasi-collective 'ignorance' of the past and present contributions of the African continent. In the specific case of museums, the art of Africa and/or the diaspora, as a place of memory and exchange, resumes a central position in the debate on modernity.

I say 'resumes' because, at the turn of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, this was already a source of inspiration for European artists, provoking a debate among Western intellectuals and art critics surrounding its status. In 2006, the Picasso and Africa exhibition, held in Johannesburg (10 February-25 March) and Cape Town (25 March-13 April), attracted the attention of newspapers and magazines, such as *The Guardian*³ and *The Economist*⁴. It was intended to demonstrate to new generations of Africans, on and outside the continent, the influence of African art on one of the main proponents of cubism.

Picasso said that the 'virus' of African art stayed with him throughout his life. He caught it in June 1907, when stumbling upon the African and Oceanic collection at the Ethnographic Museum of the Trocadéro in Paris. The fateful encounter was a revelation: 'The masks were not simply sculptures like any other. Not at all. They were magical objects.' That day, he later said, he understood what painting really meant. 'It is not an aesthetic process; it's a form of magic that interposes itself between us and the hostile universe, a means of seizing power by imposing a form on our terrors as well as on our desires (Huffington, 1998, p. 90).⁵

2 Afro-Brazilian residents of *quilombos*, settlements and places of refuge where enslaved people escaped to.

3 See Meldrum, A. 2006. Stealing beauty. *The Guardian*, 15 March. <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/mar/15/art> (Accessed 9 August 2025).

4 See Africa's magic that transformed modern art: an exhibition in South Africa reveals the depth of African influence on Picasso. *The Economist*, Johannesburg, 9 February 2006. <https://www.economist.com/culture/2006/02/09/africas-magic-that-transformed-modern-art> (Accessed 9 August 2025).

5 Cited in Pennisi, Nadeed (n.d). *Picasso and Africa: How African Art Influenced Pablo Picasso and His Work*.

The exhibition showed how Picasso absorbed Africa's abstract, expressive representations of faces and bodies, and made them his own. He started fragmenting and faceting the human figure, which eventually gave birth to cubism. He was later inspired by African power masks from Congo (wood carvings used by diviners to help them communicate with the spirits), which used everyday materials, such as nails and mirrors.

The place of African art in the constitution of the genuine revolution in expressive abstract language, represented by cubism, provokes unease and incredulity. This is due to its stark contrast with the idea of peoples with no history constructed by the 'Enlightenment in Europe' and which is so present in the Western social imagination. African art, and its place as a form of expression, remains a contemporary field of aesthetic and scientific inquiry. It has deservedly received much attention from scholars but, contradictorily, the findings on its importance for Western modern art have had little media coverage.

The issue of 'forgetfulness' when it comes to the African and Afro-descendant contribution is not restricted to the field of the arts. It extends, for example, to the narratives of social science on the revindication, construction and affirmation of a diasporic African identity since the mid-nineteenth century, and which is absent from the mainstream literature of these sciences (Elias and Feagin, 2016). A process of rediscovery is therefore necessary through our understanding of the links between past and present in relation to the social and historical constitution of the experience of those corresponding to the Black social construct in the New World.

What became known in the mid-1960s as the African diaspora⁶ is part of a long historical process of building an African identity outside the continent. One of its most dramatic chapters occurred with the advent of colonialism and, later, in relation to the divisions brought about by the erosion of the European empires and the formation of new national states. Reflections across a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have tried to describe, analyse and summarize this process through categories and concepts mostly forged under the dominant perspective, and in a selective manner.

The first aim of this chapter is to identify the foundations and prerequisites of some of the social movements of the diaspora, past and present, which claim

6 Diaspora refers simultaneously to a process, a condition, a space and a discourse: the continuous processes by which a diaspora is made, unmade and remade; the changing conditions in which it lives and expresses itself; the places where it is moulded and imagined; and the contentious ways in which it is studied and discussed. Diaspora is a state of being and a process of becoming, a condition and consciousness located in the shifting interstices of 'here' and 'there', a voyage of negotiation between multiple spatial and social identities (Cline Horowitz, 2005).

an African identity based on description, analysis and summaries of events or facts that have been forgotten, little remembered, or inadequately situated.

This issue, with its emerging contemporary literature, has proved very complex, and it has been the source of many differences of opinion. Nevertheless, interest in Africa, 'racial' consciousness and African consciousness (or consciousness of African origins) are interwoven in the reported experiences of Afro-descendants in the diaspora. For the purposes of this chapter, we will consider a selection of recorded experiences since the turn of the nineteenth century. From this period onwards, interests and forms of consciousness began to emerge out of the constraints experienced, both individually and collectively, by Black people and Black populations in various countries. All these examples, in different timeframes and forms, gave rise to a culture of resistance and opposition.

What I have observed in the literature on the subject is that, when it comes to political arrangements on both a macro and micro level, Africa, Africans on the continent itself, and Afro-descendants in the diaspora have always been considered, whether directly or indirectly, in an exclusionary manner. From an international point of view, the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the League of Nations (1919) were fundamental conjunctural milestones for this exclusion of Africa and Africans in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Aside from the great European wars, in which soldiers from the colonies served with the hope of being liberated⁷, the national independence movements that led to the post-colonial republics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (even when considering their variety and diversity in terms of social processes) commonly resulted in the exclusion of those corresponding to the 'Black' social construct from the sphere of citizenship rights.

This situation changed significantly during the post-war period with the creation of the United Nations (UN), which replaced the League of Nations, as part of a global framework in which racism emerged as the main, or at least one of the main, global issues. A central concern of the emerging United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), since its foundation on 16 November 1945, was *how* to find solutions and successful experiences in relation to ethnic and racial problems.

7 In his BBC documentary, 'The World's War: Forgotten Soldiers of Empire', David Olusoga challenges our perceptions of the First World War with the stories of the millions of Indian, African and Asian troops and ancillaries who fought and died alongside white European troops on the Western Front and elsewhere. David Olusoga is a British Nigerian historian, broadcaster and filmmaker. Born in Lagos, Nigeria, David studied history and journalism before joining the BBC.

Racism gained visibility through the outcomes of the war, in particular, as consequences of fascism and Nazism within Europe itself. It is worth noting that the questions surrounding the continuity of colonialism in Africa and Asia were the result of the struggle by the colonized peoples themselves.

Brazil was one of the countries chosen as an example of harmonious race relations in the early 1950s. The results of the UNESCO survey are well known, and the claims made by Black organizations throughout the twentieth century demonstrate that the Brazilian 'racial democracy' propaganda can, at best, be interpreted as a successful myth. There are other versions not emphasized by the official histories that take into account the experience of the various peoples and countries in South and Central America (Latin America), where the so-called *mestizo* (blended, syncretic, creole, hybrid, etc.) societies are to be found. These show how the elites developed and operationalized a discursive ideological logic of proximity and similarity, in contrast to societies operating ideologies that emphasize distance and cultural differences, as is the case of the United States.

Another version usually omitted is described in detail in a book by Abdias do Nascimento (2002) entitled *O Brasil na mira do Pan-Africanismo* (Brazil in the sights of Pan-Africanism), in which the author describes the history of rejection of the Black population in the country and the trajectory of what he calls the 'genocide' of Black Brazilians. The Brazilian racial situation was also denounced in an open letter dated 1966 addressed to the First World Festival of Negro Arts, now known as FESMAN, held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966.⁸

Between 1950 and 1970, the issues of colonialism, racism and citizenship rights dominated the world stage. This widespread questioning of the direction in which world society was heading resulted in an agenda that included both the construction of a history of Africa, emanating from Africans themselves, and a set of organized actions to uncover the history of social oppression of Afro-descendants in various countries.

The 1960s marked the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement as a series of specific collective movements, laying claim to an identity and structured around subjective issues. As I understand it, the Civil Rights Movement was fundamentally an initiative carried out by Black Americans against their racial segregation. The history of this racial explosion goes back to the American Civil War and the contradictory (to say the least) issue of the rights that were constitutionally guaranteed to all American citizens but not respected in the

8 The letter can be found in full in the book's appendix, (pp. 321-332 of the second edition (2002)).

day-to-day functioning of public and private institutions in relation to Black people (see Morris, 1984).

Black organizations in the United States formed the hard core of public manifestations of the so-called new social movements, thus presenting a difficult environment for literature, since their origins lay within the Black population. They were organizational forms covering a wide range of deprivations across a broad spectrum of experiences suffered by Black populations. They provided emotional and material support for spiritual and physical survival in societies that rejected these individuals, considering them to be inferior. Such organizations have existed since the nineteenth century in almost all the societies of the American continent, and they have responded to cyclical changes at a macro and micro level, in accordance with the scarce resources available within societies that were racially structured in dominance (Hall, 1980). This was true, for example, of the *Frente Negra Brasileira* (Brazilian Black Front) in the 1930s, as well as the *Teatro Experimental do Negro* (Black Experimental Theatre) in 1940s and 1950s Brazil.

The new factor at play during this period was the political expression manifested by people asserting their rights in the face of oppressive systems of varying scales and intensities, both nationally and internationally, based on 'race', or more precisely, the racialization produced by scientific practice (epistemic construction). This was reflected in the development of public policies, in education for example, along with the everyday experience of construction and reconstruction of the 'other' as not fully human.

The emergence and, in a certain sense, the confluence of a number of anti-racist demonstrations had a relatively concealed history. The cumulative experiences of the struggles against slavery and colonialism served as a kind of memory/cultural and political bridge in the struggle for basic human rights denied to Africans and, by extension, their descendants. In certain contexts, these were simultaneous and coordinated with dimensions of the workers' struggle for labour rights. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the labour divide and the attempts to intentionally overlook, deny or subsume the 'racial' divide, in the key to racialization, only gained visibility in the post-Second World War period through the masterful work of Frantz Fanon (1968, pp. 197-207), especially in his essay 'On National Culture'. This text explores how the impact of the awakening of national consciousness (in the colonies) and the notion of being racialized (in countries such as the United States) within the arts led to the observation that artistic production by colonized and subalternized peoples had abandoned any kind of formalism.

Frantz Fanon examines cultural production in the pre-revolutionary period in Algeria, comparing and contrasting it with that of the post-Second World War expansion and dynamism of the Black civil rights struggle in the United States. He notes that the removal of prohibitions, caused by the colonial/racial situation, led to an awakening of consciousness, and he makes reference to its immediate and visible manifestation in the context of artistic production.

By calling our attention to the 'specialists' concern', Fanon reminds us of the reactions after the Second World War when new styles such as *be-bop* were taking a definitive shape as an innovation within traditional jazz. He argues that such a reaction should be examined in the context of attempts to set colonized peoples and their creations within the expectations of the colonizer/dominator. In this specific case, the desire was to maintain the image of:

[D]espairing, broken-down nostalgia of an old Negro who is trapped between five glasses of whisky, the curse of his race, and the racial hatred of the white men. As soon as the Negro comes to an understanding of himself, and understands the rest of the world differently, when he gives birth to hope and forces back the racist universe, it is clear that his trumpet sounds more clearly and his voice less hoarsely. The new fashions in jazz are not simply born of economic competition. We must without any doubt see in them one of the consequences of the defeat, slow but sure, of the southern world of the United States. And it is not utopian to suppose that in fifty years' time the type of jazz howl hiccapped by a poor misfortunate Negro will be upheld only by the whites who believe in it as an expression of nigger-hood, and who are faithful to this arrested image of a type of relationship (Fanon, 1968, pp. 273-274).

Fanon's diagnosis first establishes a connection between the liberation struggles in Africa and the fight for access to Black rights in the United States and then draws a parallel between colonial domination and racial domination as a product of racialization. It finally opens the way for the analysis of racist culture as a product of European modernity. This can be contrasted with the creation of an anti-racist, Black humanist counterculture.

The foundations for this creation lie in the emergence of movements striving for change based on the requirement to overcome the 'colour line' and the recognition of the specific contribution of Afro-descendants to the construction of countries of which they were part, along with modernity itself.

If we re-read Pan-Africanism, the Negritude Movement, the Civil Rights Movement and the liberation struggles in Africa as forms of collective political action, expressing a legacy of cultural policy past, we can consider them as part of the recorded memory of the struggles for physical and subjective survival fought

by those corresponding to the Black social construct, as well as milestones in the construction of the African diaspora.

The denial of, or lack of deference and reference to, the role of activists and Black intellectuals in building the Civil Rights Movement, along with its impact on the debate around the importance of democracy, is itself a symptom of the exclusionary Western social mindset in relation to those corresponding to the Black social construct. There is a need to supplement the collective memory of our racialized social experience. This has been marked by different forms of oppression that intersect with those caused by the division of labour⁹ but, at the same time, are different. Hence the importance of re-examining the processes and movements that influenced the Negritude Movement and Civil Rights Movement, along with the contemporary dynamics, processes and organizations revolutionizing the interpretation of the foundations and social contexts of exclusion.

Pan-Africanism between codex, internationalism and transnationalism

Africanism is a system of thought, built on a strong belief in the existence of a specific African way of life and way of being, feeling and thinking in the global world. Its origins have been reframed through social movements and doctrines, such as Pan-Africanism, Negritude, Cultural Nationalism, Afrocentrism, African Path, and so on. It has, either directly or indirectly, constructed epistemic and ideological perspectives that focus not only on the definition and meaning of Africa and Africanness but also on the imaginative possibilities available to reposition Africa's contribution to the world in global and transnational terms.

Certain articles published in the late 1990s and the beginning of the first decade of the twenty-first century strike a kind of balance in the relationship between Africa as a place (or the interest in Africa from activists, academics, artists and intellectuals) within the nation (Segato, 1998); the debate around Black transnationalism and national identity policy (Stephens, 1998), and the

9 To Young (2003), exploitation, marginalization, and powerlessness all refer to relations of power and oppression that occur by virtue of the social division of labour: who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines one institutional position relative to others. These three categories refer to structural and institutional relations that delimit people's material lives, including, but not restricted to, the resources they have access to and the concrete opportunities they have or do not have to develop their capacities.

vision of Black historians and intellectuals, beginning in 1883 and continuing throughout the twentieth century (Kelley, 1999; Edwards, 2001). Although they are written from different disciplinary and theoretical perspectives and with different purposes, they share a common drive to recover a sense of place and/or interest in Africa, along with the synthetic systematization of a series of practices and political actions among Afro-descendants, going beyond national borders. In other words, for these authors, rescuing these practices, actions and movements allows for a rewriting of Black politics in the twentieth century, both from the point of view of the constraints suffered within countries and from the organizational strategies produced to overcome them. This is also a starting point for the innovative construction of an African transnational identity.

From a different perspective, which can nevertheless be seen as comparable for the purposes of this chapter, Mansbridge and Morris (2001) seek to outline the development of, what they call, an oppositional culture and oppositional consciousness. Both dynamics derive from, or are part of, a long process that requires positive meanings to be constructed in relation to origins in terms of African descent, and a sense of belonging for populations that suffered negative stereotyping in the countries in which they settled. Hence, the need for an ongoing intrasubjective and intersubjective struggle structured around the reconstruction and reconstitution of meanings, for example, Africa as a place, and 'racial consciousness' and African consciousness in the formation of our experience.

Organizations and forms of action, both individual and collective, emanating from those corresponding to the Black social construct, followed similar patterns in different national experiences of racial discrimination and racism. Forms of resistance developed in the face of the barriers interposed: a drive to secure physical and cultural survival through revolts and rebellions, the socialization of information through the Black press, religious practices, and so on. Hence, the importance of the memory of transnational content as part of the very process of construction and development of an oppositional culture and oppositional consciousness. As Kelly reminds us:

The particular Pan-African framework through which we viewed the black world was all too familiar before I set foot in a college classroom. Growing up in Harlem during the mid- to late 1960s, even as kids, the international dimensions of our lives were so profound that they were practically taken for granted. We were part of an African diaspora before we were Americans; we were told by resident radicals that we had more in common with the Chinese than with the white folks downtown or along Riverside Drive. We were surrounded by Jamaicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Barbadians, Haitians, *ad infinitum*, and they defended their home connections with a vengeance.

We even drank a short-lived soda pop called Afro-Cola and were surrounded by people walking the streets in dashikis, Nehru suits, and Chinese peasant outfits. So, the idea of a bounded national history set in isolation from the world contradicted my own lived experience, let alone what we as young, aspiring 'Afrikans' learned in college. Nevertheless, when I embarked on this preliminary and very incomplete project of exploring transnational perspectives coming out of African American history, I was surprised by the extent to which black scholars – including fairly conservative ones – in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century paid attention to international contexts. In the pages of forgotten survey texts and back issues of the *Journal of Negro History*, one finds historians with varying degrees of formal training doing what many of our colleagues are now advocating. Of course, there were precedents: for over two centuries, black writers and activists defined themselves as part of a larger international black community – an 'African diaspora' (Kelly, 1999).

Reactions to Gilroy's work (1993), both positive and negative, suggest that there is a specific Afro-descendant experience that can be traced back to the process of enslavement and its development in the West, defined in contemporary literature as the African diaspora for the portion of the globe situated in the Black Atlantic. Thus, the African diaspora, as a concept and as a practice, presupposes a return to issues that have been inadequately addressed in mainstream literature. These include the place of Africa in the Western imagination, the Black construct and the deletion of African ethnic groups, Pan-Africanism, the Civil Rights Movement and the new identity agenda, along with the importance of Black artists and intellectuals in the late nineteenth century (Edward Wilmot Blyden, Frederick Douglass, Édouard Glissant, Martin Delany and Pauline Hopkins) and early decades of the twentieth century (W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté), among others, striving towards an understanding of modernity.

The 'new' identity agenda, in relation to those corresponding to the Black social construct, was 'new' for a scientific and academic mindset that could be classed as non-Black due to its 'lack of interest' in Africa, a progressive arena in relation to the formal subsumption of race under class. This hegemonic notion of Africa as a place with an absence of history¹⁰, along with the social class divide, made the social sciences colour-blind, despite the existing evidence, for example, in Du Bois' *The Philadelphia Negro: a Social Study* (1967 [1899]), which according to Morris (2014) can be considered one of the pioneering studies that paved the way for modern American sociology.

10 For a contemporary discussion of the importance of the negative impact of the Hegelian dialectic on Africa and Afro-descendants, see Fanon (1967, 2008).

Du Bois, who attended the first Pan-African Conference in London in 1900 along with Henry Sylvester Williams, its organizer, provide us, on the one hand, with a new kind of reflection on the experience of those corresponding to the Black social construct and, on the other hand, with the beginnings of a new kind of political action. Du Bois identifies the essential need to position the history of the African continent to allow for and support the experiences of its original population, giving it the same value as that of the Europeans and recognizing its contribution to modernity from a Pan-African perspective.

Appiah and Gates Jr (2003), for example, in the preface to their *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience*, attribute the first attempt by Du Bois to develop an encyclopedia, in the context of the time, with the aim of providing new generations with a compendium of 'scientific' knowledge on the history, cultures and social institutions of people of African descent, that is, those corresponding to the Black social construct in the Old and New World.

Henry Sylvester Williams focuses on the relationship between Afro-descendants and Africans on the continent and its need to acquire a new meaning, along with Pan-African political organization, to alter the oppressive framework experienced by those corresponding to the Black social construct in different parts of the world. He sees theoretical reflection on Africa's place in the modern world as going hand in hand with the political organization of Africans and their descendants against organized forms of rejection of the African corpus.

According to Martin (1996), the official conference document, 'To the Nations of the World', of which Williams was one of the signatories, contained the following prophetic and often quoted passage: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line, the question as to how far differences of race will hereafter be made the basis of denying to over half the world the right of sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modern civilization.'

Du Bois explains how Pan-Africanism originated as an internationalist discourse with the general purpose of coordinating the interests of Afro-descendants scattered throughout the world. In *The World and Africa*, for example, he writes:

[W]hen Europe's formal empires were on the verge of collapse and a vibrant anticolonial movement was beginning to gather strength, I believe that the trade in human beings between Africa and America, which flourished between the Renaissance and the American Civil War, is the prime and effective cause of the contradictions in European civilization and the illogic in modern thought and the collapse of human culture (Du Bois, 1968, pp. 305-306).

Du Bois tells us that Black slavery was the first step in world trade, followed by the modern theory of colonial expansion. In his view, the relations between colonialism and the colour line must be understood from a global perspective. This was conveyed in an essay entitled 'The Color Line Belts the World', published in *Collier's Weekly* in October 1906, in which Du Bois emphasizes that:

The Negro problem in America is but a local phase of a world problem. With the outbreak of World War I, the implications of colonialism and the global color line became all the more apparent to Du Bois, as the white working class in Europe and the United States embraced nationalism, militarism, and imperialism. White workers were practically invited to share in this new exploitation and particularly were flattered by popular appeals to their inherent superiority to "Dagoes", "Chinks", "Japs", and "Niggers" (Lewis, 1995, pp. 48-52).¹¹

In other words, the structural dimension of the colour line intertwines dialectically with the economic, cultural and legal-political dimension of countries, on the one hand, and the temporal differences in the manifestation of collective actions, and challenging the internal stability of these states, on the other. This can be explained by the different configurations assumed by nationalism and/or national ideologies, which emphasized a common ethno-racial heritage.

As a transnationally envisaged community, the common elements that characterize the experience of Afro-descendants in different parts of the globe are enslavement, territorial control through the use of force by external nations, absence of common sharing of citizenship rights in various national experiences, legal-spatial segregation and/or segregation forged by colour-blind public policies, and the constructs presenting Africans and their descendants as peoples without history, and so on.

Responses to the barriers erected to prevent the integration of those corresponding to the Black social construct during the processes of independence and, later, the formation of Republics, can be summarized into two basic directions. Firstly, the struggle for the integration of previously enslaved people and, secondly, the creation of alternative forms of social, political and economic organization, such as Pan-Africanism and Black nationalism, among others.

In the period between the two European wars, involving a significant part of the world's population, five Pan-African congresses were held¹². The emerging differentiations in relation to the colonial situation (under European administrative

11 See also <http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b207-i148>. (Accessed 9 August 2025).

12 Paris in 1919, London/Brussels/Paris in 1921, London/Lisbon in 1923, New York in 1927, and in Manchester in 1945.

control), socially hierarchical populations on an intra-national state level (ex-colonies) and dependent territories with limited autonomy characterized very different perspectives and readings of the direction of the movement's political actions, even on an ideological level. According to Tony Martin:

Garvey's African nationalism was the dominant organizational expression of Pan-Africanism in the inter-war years, but it was not the only expression. Caribbean Africans both at home and abroad continued to be prominent in all variants of Pan-Africanism. The leadership of George Padmore and C. L. R. James, in what may be described as the communist variant of Pan-Africanism, has already been noted. In the Pan-African Congresses of African American scholar W. E. B. Du Bois, Pan-Africanism found its liberal integrationist expression. Du Bois convened congresses in 1919, 1921, 1923 and 1927. The first three convened in a variety of European capitals (Paris, London, Brussels and Lisbon). The fourth, largely the work of African American women, convened in New York. Caribbean delegates were sometimes the majority element at Du Bois' congresses. E. F. Fredericks of Guyana served on the executive committee of Du Bois' first congress in Paris in 1919. The ascendancy of working-class African nationalism in the Garvey Movement and in trade unions into the 1930s, meanwhile, did not in any way eclipse similar sentiments among the African middle and upper classes. Nationalistic elements everywhere made common cause with Garveyism; and independent expressions of African nationalism continued to arise among those not openly associated with the UNIA (Martin, 1996, pp. 273-274).

The tensions and ideological differences between advocates of integrationist perspectives and more radical practices, in addition to the racist frameworks in countries (barriers to the Black vote, absence of educational projects, barriers to formal employment and substandard housing in areas lacking urban infrastructure, etc.), are all components around which the various readings of the paths forged, and to be forged, by Africans and their descendants in the diaspora have been structured.

When the contribution of the past is looked at in perspective, fundamental resonances are found in the present day. Although the Black social movements are subject to national logics, which are generally destructive when it comes to their orientation and objectives, associative actions have expanded and become extremely complex. Nevertheless, critical references and readings of past processes and organizations cut across and inform the new generations. Henry Sylvester Williams, Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Martin Delany, Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, Eric Williams, George Padmore and Aimé Césaire, among others, are references gaining increasing visibility, and they tell us a story that has still not been duly analysed in the diaspora's scientific productions or elementary education textbooks.

Now that there is extensive documentation to be consulted and worked upon, the close relations between Pan-Africanism, the Negritude Movement, the Civil Rights Movement and the liberation struggles on the African continent are beginning to come together from the point of view of forming an oppositional culture and oppositional consciousness emanating from those corresponding to the Black social construct. The reconstruction of a common history, in diasporic terms, should also take into account the so-called radical alternatives represented by movements such as the Black Panther Party, The Republic of New Africa, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, Teatro Experimental do Negro and Quilombismo as movements, places and spaces where Afro-descendant roots intersect, both in the diaspora and in society, for which networks are a fact of life.

The emergence of Pan-Africanism is a milestone in this process and is based on transnational dynamics that, since the mid-eighteenth century, have fed into the construction of an oppositional culture and a global anti-racist oppositional consciousness. The new forms of organization from a network perspective, such as *Géledes* (Brazil) and other similar organizations with eminently political objectives, belong to the Central American Black Organization (ONECA)¹³ and include *Mundo Afro* (Uruguay), *Partido de Acción Ciudadana* (Costa Rica), *Proceso de Comunidades Negras* (PCN/Colombia), *Organización de Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario* (ODECO/Honduras), and the *Organization of Africans in the Americas* (OAA) and *AFROAMERICA XXI* (USA), and are structured around the knowledge transmission strategies represented, for example, by museums. These include the use of digital technology, as well as the convening of meetings with specific objectives to explore the new directions, outlines and complexities of the African codex in its global diasporic versions.

13 *Organización Negra Centroamericana* (ONECA) was founded in Dangriga, Belize, in August 1995. It is a network of Afro-descendant organizations from Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Belize, Honduras, Guatemala and the Central American diaspora living in the United States of America.

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CHAPTER 4

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF AFRICANNESS

Amzat Boukari-Yabara

Introduction

The Africanness concept is one of the most debated in African intellectual history, from the precolonial period to modern day. If figures like Edward Blyden and Pixley Ka Issaka Seme have, respectively, put forward theses on 'African personality' and 'African renaissance' at the time of colonization, debates on the meaning of 'African' continued throughout the twentieth century, with views based on race, culture, geography, as well as debates on social and national type. The issue of the very existence of truly African cultures or civilizations was resolved with the dawn of self-determination through the works of historians such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Joseph Ki-Zerbo or Basil Davidson. However, debates on *The Invention of Africa* (Mudimbe, 1988) were re-opened because of the failure of rallying projects by the new states that were born out of these self-determined freedoms, and further by the entry of Africa into the new era of globalization. In an increasingly interconnected world, the evolution of the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous influences of African cultures requires us to rethink 'Africanness', which is no longer a static and essentialist concept but one that is dynamic and a carrier of change.

Africanness stands at the crossroads of Pan-Africanism and *Négritude*, the two strands of thought which probably produced the most successful critical and

constructive analysis. Africanness makes up a pluralist cross-disciplinary field, echoing neither cultures nor identities and linked exclusively to continental or diasporic Africa. But nor does it solely pertain to the Black colour of skin. In recent years, concepts have been revamped or created in order to think through the complexity of Africanness. Theories on Afrocentricity, Afropolitanism, Afrofuturism or Afro-feminism are some examples of this. How do these different theoretic fields structure a globalized Africanness in a polycentric world? How do these fields maintain distinctive localized African features within globalization while still connecting Africa to the great debates of the modern world? Which networks and dialogues are helping to propel Africanness in all its diversity into the twenty-first century replete with radical changes?

Reaching the end of a bridled Africa

From the 1950s through to the beginning of the 1990s, the progressive successes in self-determination at the end of colonialism brought about the construction of new states across the entire continent, thereby creating a 'new African', as described by Kwame Nkrumah. Acting as a political subject within the framework of international relations. African nationalist movements, which were opposed to colonialism, thus became blueprints for a new African conscience. Associating the memory of colonization resistance fighters to history in the making, embodied by the founding fathers who proclaimed legal independence, the historiographical narrative rallied a new African intelligentsia, as examined by Toyin Falola. However, nationalist euphoria progressively disappeared in the face of the incapacity of new regimes to raise better standards of living and improve social and economic conditions for their peoples. Many factors lead to territorial conflicts, such as the misuse of economic resources, the emergence of clans, or even problems related to refugees, the displaced, and cross-border groups.

Within this framework of evolving Africanness, heightened expressions of populism or nationalism were intensified, much in the same way as authenticity. By identifying persons deemed 'more African' than others, or more 'native' than others, and by formulating any privileges or handicaps based on these notions, the politics of African identity yielded clans and ethnic groups in countries where nationalities were intertwined with cross-border affiliations among ethnic groups. Africa is a mosaic continent of more than a 1.5 billion inhabitants, comprising more than 50 countries and island territories, with each country often made up of dozens of social and cultural groups. They have evolved in different geographical,

historical, demographic, economic and political worlds, underscoring the fact that Africa is defined more by its diversity than its uniformity. However, nationalist projects did not wish to take this factor into account. By proclaiming, in particular, the inviolability of borders inherited from colonization, the nation-state projects laid down roots of a vision of a homogenous Africa, particularly in the sub-Saharan region and areas of 'Black Africa', often wrongly presented as a 'country'.

The stereotype of Africanness, summed up through a continental, geographic prism or by skin colour, has been deconstructed by diasporic views, which take into account migratory, minority or identity contexts, as well as ideological positions tied to social struggles. Thus, the association that several critical theorists make with communism recalls that the relationship between race and class has been, throughout the twentieth century, a common thread of the 'Black question' (James, 2012). However, if material, economic and social conditions seem to have replaced the ontological dimension of *Négritude*, then chromatic approaches are reinvested into new areas. Thus, resistance and struggles against negrophobia led a segment of Afro-diasporic populations to claim their Africanness as a type of paradoxical opposite of assigned identity. In the United States, the official adoption of the 'African American' moniker in 1977 appears to mark the end of the long period of Black separatism, with its integration into the 'American dream', while serving to remind the Black populations of their African roots which have, paradoxically, receded ever further.

At the same time, the new migrations of Africans and Haitians in the post-colonial era have redefined American Africanness as more complex than ever. This historical transition between the 'African American' descended from captives sold into slavery and the 'American African' derived from post-colonial migrations was embodied by the figure of Barack Obama. He was born of a Black Kenyan father and a White American mother. If the idea of the transition to a post-racial society was raised the day after the election of the first Black President of the United States, racial violence seen in the media under his two mandates painted a different picture of the Black question.

While the experience of Black communities in the United States would not be representative of the experience of other Black peoples of Africa and the diaspora, the debate is very much alive in the hearts of second and third generation Black Europeans who claim dual African and European identities based on a growing visibility within their host society, which remains blind to such ethnic issues. Africanness finds itself caught up in the construction of identities with hyphens: Afro-American, Afro-European. It would no longer be a case of belonging to a 'Black world', which would thus define the position

of each of these social groups, but rather their integration into 'Americanness', 'Europeanness' or 'Asianness' in which their Africanness would constitute an anchor or a reference point.

Africanness, written within a context of racial minorities in Europe or America, is increasingly rethought by Pan-African and Afrocentred militant groups as a way of questioning the political authority of Western states that, under the umbrella of neutrality, defend the power and culture of the majority group it represents. The protracted debates around multiculturalism and communitarianism thus tend to demote conflicts to cultural clashes rather than to react to the absence of institutions and venues open for direct dialogue. From the United Kingdom, the 'cultural studies' of Stuart Hall (a cultural theorist) and the theory of a 'Black Atlantic' developed by Paul Gilroy have brought new thought perspectives into the relationship of Black identity to European traditions and institutions.

In other realms, notably South America and the West Indies, institutionalization of the term 'Afro-descendant' has pushed societies, labelled under the banner of Creolism or colonialism, to dig further into their Africanness. The writings of Anténor Firmin, around *The Equality of the Human Races* (1885), or the commitment of Marcus Garvey to an 'Africa for Africans' continue to make sense, but Pan-Africanism has long shown that Africanism does not require an obsession about origins or a demand for the return of the diaspora. For the latter, it is really a case of making political sense of its presence beyond the geographical boundaries of Africa, including a question mark on statutory issues (right of exile, dual nationality, naturalization etc.). Reference to Africanness is no longer restricted to a people or a territory, but to a 'common' exile shared by those with a similar history.

Creativity surrounding Africanness

In the reflections raised by Maya Angelou or Maryse Condé, diasporic views are embodied equally by the renewal of feminine literature (Chimananda Ngozi Adichie, Léonora Miano, Taye Selasi), which questions the dominating perceptions, exchanges and manner in which the Black body is a bearer of stigma. Hence, how the structure of encounters around the image of the body in the West contrasts with how the media or police treat this body, bearer of a dual historical experience of slavery and discrimination through its Africanness. The pride in wearing frizzy hair (the nappy movement) is also part of the affirmation of Africanness, a carrier of socio-political stakes in Afro-feminists' trends, but

it also has an economic aspect with the development of 'ethnic' businesses. African hair and beauty salons today make great meeting places everywhere in the diaspora, where artisanship (combs, products, Black dolls) is alive and well.

In parallel, the works of Black American feminists around intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991) as a combination of race, class and gender oppression targeting women as a social group, has also led African researchers and militants to theorize on their own feminine status in societies where matriarchal and matrilineal references do not always protect against gender discrimination. With a view to uniting women's struggles, Africanness has therefore been closely examined from different divergent identity categories, which need to be debated in order to identify common denominators. Identity therefore becomes the key to activism, for it allows the identification of a group, subject or object to a specific policy. Here, the contribution derived out of Africanness is fed into the cross-sectional and intersectional identity theories for the production of new ways of thinking. How does one produce quality relationships through already merged identities, and which are rendered problematic by the norms to be deconstructed? How can the complex facets of identity serve the symbolic infrastructures?

Studies on the Black body are reigniting phenomenological thinking on Africanness explored by the analyses of W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon by inviting the visual arts to have a say. The modern arts, notably dance (kuduro, kizomba, coupé-décalé, among others), theatre and fashion, also demonstrate strong sources of inspiration within contemporary Africanness. Afro-American or African musicians, notably Nigerians (Davido, Wizkid, Nneka, P-Square, Yemi Alade), have been inspired by the Afrobeat rhythms of Fela Kuti, or by the highlife of E.T. Mensah, to produce new sounds. At the same time, the music is both modern and traditional, celebratory and upbeat, going beyond the limits of Africanness musicology. Serving as cultural markers of globalization through their mastery of online platforms, these artists have been replacing Africanness in its idealistic successes and capitalist ethics by means of hybrid musical forms, with original clips attracting millions of hits.

The urban cultures, from where these music styles emerge, play the role that *Négritude* literature could have played in upending the stigma. Hip-hop promotes a post-modern Africanness in the sense that this music, borrowed from Afro-Americans, was re-appropriated in an African context by rap artists (Awadi, Elom 20ce, etc.) who carved out common historical references around a pantheon of celebrated Pan-African figures (Thomas Sankara, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba or Malcolm X), embodying a positive and self-assured vision of the Black condition. Nevertheless, African music genres are not

exempt from marketing considerations and productions staged to meet sometimes stereotypical demands from a Western public that dominates the cultural consumption market. Popular song repertoires in African languages, sometimes tagged 'world music', thus comprise a paradoxical niche of African authenticity as a counterpoint to urban music, which would represent a hybrid Africanness. On this point, Africanness can be seen within the framework of African cultural industries. What are the policies promoting African cultures? How can these industries keep their conceptual independence, their plasticity, in the face of the big players? This includes international radio stations (RFI, BBC), founded, in part, on the recording of African cultural assets, and which position themselves as powerful broadcasters that can make or break careers.

The example of art sectors, such as Nollywood (the Nigerian film industry), casts a light on the vision of the African cultural industry, which has come a long way but is now about to enter a new era. Independent radio and new media are also helping to link together Africanness in a common space (communion), which allows network architecture (communication) to create new perspectives, close to a 'Tout-Monde', as imagined by Édouard Glissant. Thus, how can we communicate and relate to one another through relationships? Here, negative African public opinion is, perhaps, still not taken seriously enough despite new means of communication. Mass media channels are evolving but in an unequal fashion, with the emergence of new literary worlds on the one hand, and the accrual of abandoned spaces on the other hand.

The first World Festival of Black Arts held in Dakar in 1966 was dedicated to the Senghorian vision of *Négritude*, with very specific discourses on the professional stakes of the art world, which would be taken up later in the second edition of the festival held in Lagos in 1977. Moreover, the Pan-African Festival of Algiers, which was held in 1969, was an opportunity to discuss areas of converging interest between African and Arab cultures in a more militant, political setting. The second Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 2009 and the third World Festival of Black Arts (FESMAN) of Dakar in 2010 have been placed under the spotlight of African renaissance, with programmes reaching across all aspects of cultural and scientific creation. The two conferences of Intellectuals from Africa and the Diaspora in Dakar (2004) and Salvador de Bahia (2006) also fit this discursive storyline of global Africanness, brought about by men and women of culture with ideas on progress, brotherhood and unity. These very institutional approaches to the debate on Africanness should, nonetheless, be approached cautiously owing to their compatibility with the neo-liberal model of commodification of culture, leaving little room for socio-political demands.

Africanness, stakes and plural debates

As a result of social history and intellectual training, the African political elites were unable to propose, in the aftermath of independence, an alternative cultural project to the one instilled through Western cultural values. In Marxist theory, in which a group cannot maintain its cultural and scientific production without having minimum economic and political control, African intellectuals were unable to benefit from long-term critical support and to oversee state mechanisms to form an economically strong social group, one that was sufficiently politically organized to institute a cultural revolution. Thus, this culture has remained an extraverted object of seduction, power and social promotion, in which Africanness, embodied by works such as those of Cheikh Anta Diop on Black Egyptian civilization, has not been allowed to create a structured institutional, educational system. Indeed, the choice to maintain the colonial language as the official language of education and administration also appears as a transmission of cultural dependence in an Africa strongly coveted for its cultural market potential. Africa, where languages evolve and regenerate from both a social and lexical point of view, and the official preservation of French, English, Portuguese, Spanish and Arabic linguistic influences by African states, challenges the partisans of African political and cultural sovereignty.

The debates around oral traditions as a means of conservation and transmission of African literature continues, while literary productions in European languages still succeed in retranscribing African realities and experiences. *Négritude* knew how to rally racial and linguistic unity around the fact of being Black and, at the same time, expressed in French, it sought to overcome this contradiction with a new process. In reality, writers, musicians, architects, stylists or dramatists, emanating from the African continent, probably know, for the most part, that they might as well get along with the canonical rules in their respective arts – rules established in the Western world – rather than dissociating themselves, and adapting them to different African contexts when they get the opportunity. In fact, African creations reflect the context of announcements and the material conditions of production or broadcasting on the continent. But a growing number of African creations are breaking free from the ties that demand they restrict themselves to Africans or subjects related to Africa.

What appears to be playing out in thoughts on Africanness is the freedom to create: an aesthetic emancipation, freed from political censorship where the artist is targeted as a subversive intellectual critic. The challenge of this dual

skill in Western cultural domains and in endogenous knowledge is still to be met within a subversive context of which *Négritude* was an example. In this dual intellectual ability, which would be a joint celebration of Africanness, is there an 'African' literature, an 'African' philosophy, an 'African' art, an 'African' cinema, an 'African' science?

Sustained by a whole generation of intellectuals (Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Paulin Hountondji, Fabien Eboussi-Boulaga, among others), these debates are not over and cannot be entirely summed up here, even though they manifest the demand to be distinguished as African in the fields of literature, arts, human and social sciences, which goes beyond the sole need for identity. Africanness would therefore be less of a subconscious reflex for identity than a conscious reflection, a journey of discovery to better understand itself. In the field of research, there is thus a sense of urgency to determine institutions, rules and values through which Africans can reflect about the world, and to think for themselves, unaided, to replace the founding myths with the creation of mobilizing principles. It is undoubtedly up to academic institutions to reflect on an Africanness that is both systemic and structural, rigid and supple, capable of reinforcing methodologies that enable Africans to think about Africa and the world autonomously through the lens of Africa, to acquire tools that all Africans can share.

The issue of Africanness is also an issue of defining the speaker. Who can speak on behalf of Africa? How can we represent Africa? What image, from an African viewpoint, do we want to portray of the continent in an era dominated by media wars? These three questions force African intellectuals to face up to their social responsibilities. The progressive side of African intellectual elites has always sought to come up with a rallying project. Thus, Afropolitanism emerged in this period of transition, between the decline of the old Pan-Africanist defender of freedoms and the rise of globalization seeking neo-liberal openings into the African continent. Presented by Achille Mbembe as a way of being part of this world, to break off from an Afro-pessimism based as much on complacency of a bygone past as on a fatalistic future, Afropolitanism reflects Africa's participation in a cosmopolitanism, comprising exchanges and movements and allowing the continent to reach out by itself and for itself. If the border is seen as a link, rather than an obstacle, then these movements will not be new but free flowing with new information and communication technologies. At the same time, they are complicated by the use of these very technologies to control migration, thus creating blurred spaces and new, uncharted areas to invest in.

In this Africa, taken over and taking part in this world, the megalopolises (Lagos, Johannesburg, Nairobi, Cairo) serve as connector hubs of a globalized Africa, but whose links and anchors are not always defined. The growing urbanization of Africa has an effect on the prejudiced views of Africa as 'traditional'. Africa's relationship to biodiversity is also worth noting, in the same manner as the continuity between nature and culture, which fuels the status quo of affinities or taboos. If climate-associated ecological issues are driving an Africanness that is stereotyped in the sanctification of rural and agricultural life, then African cities are undoubtedly the places where Africanness of the twenty-first century is being constructed. The colossal architectural challenges will have to take into account social and societal demands, demographic needs, and idealisms revitalized around the powers of authority and freedom.

Rethinking timelines: the elasticity of Africanness

Africanness has been carried by an anticolonial vision, which seems to have been exceeded by new forms of domination. If some breaks in identity stem from a colonial era, which crystalized social groups on the basis of ethnicity, new African populisms, founded on Manichean rhetoric, similarly reinforce defiance towards any form of Africanness that may promote an excess of Westernization or universalism. To think of the Westernization of Africa as the counterpoint of an Africanization of the West would undoubtedly be exaggerated in light of asymmetric relationships between Africa and the rest of the world. Thus, Ali Mazrui's (1986) thesis around the 'triple heritage' of African culture, notably the European and Arab impact on African cultures, continues to be a sensitive and controversial subject, despite forms of manifest resistance.

In certain decolonization-prone places, the concepts of *métissage* (multiraciality) (in La Réunion) or secularism (in Mayotte) have been overemphasized to marginalize the Africanness of societies within the framework of domination politics, which is also found in some Caribbean realms. In more isolated places, disconnected from continental reach, cultures appear more hybrid and geopolitically controlled through their inability to travel. Thus, Africanness is an identity under control. The question of Indian Ocean cultures also arises around the coherence of an East-African insular coast, where populations of Arab or Indian origin also subscribe to Africanization processes, just as Africanness has embraced Islamization processes along the Sahelo-Saharan strip. Indeed, the move away from Christian-centric and Islamic-centric Africanness continues to spark lively ideological debates.

Nonetheless, the quest for identity has not lost all its meaning. On the economic front, the thesis of Africanness, partly built by colonial anthropology, was used in existentialist narratives to equate the African character of a society to its degree of traditionalism or immaturity. Responding to the outdated theories of modernization, which justified the lack of African economic progress through cultural factors rather than through material or political obstacles, the developmentalist narrative is equally reversed in the Afrocentric paradigm to insinuate that the development of Africa is impossible without a return to African cultural origins. The Manichean vision of Africanness, founded on the purity of origins in the face of an African identity that has become degraded or diluted through contact with non-African influences, has created a stereotypical approach to Afrocentrist trends, which has since subscribed to more critical and ontological approaches, forming a true alternative epistemological field (Asante, 1998).

Radical, critical Black thinking has also generated a utopian narrative seen in today's expanding cultural universe in Afrofuturism, that is, a departure from Africanness and its speculative and metaphysical iteration ('Black to the Future'). It is possible to imbue the concept of Africanness, endowed with a traditional vision of Africa, with a modern, post-modern and revolutionary vision. With Afrofuturism, the deconstruction of 'race', as a biological and chromatic principle, has produced numerous fantasies, drawing on a spectrum of new feelings and senses. The comic strips, the cinema (*Twaaga* by Cédric Ido, or *Black Panther* by Ryan Coogler) and African cartoons have produced, in turn, superheroes who transported Africanness into a fantastic world, sometimes inspired by historic myths (*Anansi*, *Pokou*), and open to transgression or social satire. Pioneering links to Black feminism (Octavia Butler) also introduced gender issues in the guise of complex personalities. Afrofuturism also entered into new scientific fields, which had, thus far, been neglected in the definition of Africanness. Chemistry, physics, genetics, mathematics or astronomy are hence called upon to become new realms to propel Africanness, including fractal logic, unique to the organization methods of several African societies.

Beyond its association with colour, how can Africa continue to produce conditions that allow the many generations of Black people living abroad to identify with it? Can Africanness derive empathy from the events that have hit the African continent from each and every one? After how many generations does one cease to be a 'stranger' in the Western world when one is assigned the identity of Africanness owing to the colour of one's skin? The quests for integration and assimilation not only question the biological relationship to multiraciality but also the degrading and dangerous practice of skin whitening.

Detachment, withdrawal and breaks from the individual or collective past have created a longing for Africa, of which *Négritude* poems are an example. More than ever, the great outpourings of Africanness are being heard: the question of Africanness is being resolved through narratives and reinventions, which take into account practical and social realities and experiences. The teaching of Swahili, the wearing of Afro hairstyles and colourful Dashiki garments, the adoption of African ancestral names, the naming of places after African revolutionaries, the trade in cards, posters or clothing with a visual African identity, are just some of the elements that have contributed to a growing Afrocentric culture among the diaspora, which is supported thanks to social networks.

In perpetual motion, African and Afro-American religions continue to create a transnational identity, sometimes made up of messianisms, or groups of migrants that constitute nations (Peul, Soninké, Yoruba, Somali) with their own transnational, virtual spaces. They allow the diaspora to relive the past and experience their Africanness with heightened emotions, while heritage tourism around historical slavery and trafficking (Cape Coast, Gorée Island, Ouidah, Zanzibar) rehabilitates memorial sites seen as the *ground zero* of Pan-Africanism. These sites give a tangible form to a dramatic Africanness, which harkens back to traumatic lineages, which are felt and carved out in genealogy. Recourse to DNA testing among Afro-descendants also marks a will to retrace their origins that are more embedded in the genealogy of precolonial nations (Yoruba, Woloff, Fon, Ashanti) than postcolonial nationalities (Nigerian, Senegalese, Beninois, Ghanaian).

While the challenges of globalization no longer place Africanness under the banner of authenticity or 'discovery', as may have been the case during the Harlem Renaissance or *Négritude*, the fact remains that, in some cases, the erasure of generic identities leads to a search for ever more precise and unique particularisms. African identities are contracting and expanding, depending on the interrelationships they create. Social networks today allow Africanness to be created by association, by sharing content and forming virtual communities, thus allowing Afro-descendants to find themselves on the frontline of initiative projects, rallying around solidarity causes, or sharing the same socializing experiences. Numerous blogs, forums and websites bring the existence or exchange of cultural, social or political Africanness to life in an interactive, or even rebellious, way. These networks bring about a second youth and greater democratization and exposure to a Pan-African civil society, which was built throughout the twentieth century through conferences and congresses, thus laying down the objectives of emancipation.

Africanness as an emancipatory principle

Pan-Africanism is a movement that has combined skills, not standardized them; it has rallied altruistic transnational racial solidarity with the goal of emancipating people from slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This militant and political practice of Pan-Africanism, which seemed out of step with the times, is more than ever having its comeback. It also marks the emergence of an African youth in tune with its times, a contemporary of itself through new 'African writings of the self' (Mbembe, 2000), which is not emulating anything in particular but creating its own utopia, its 'Afrotopia' (Sarr, 2016). In intellectual circles, new perspectives on Africanness have also derived from debates, which have triggered subaltern studies launched by Indian historians (Diouf, 1999), global history (Subrahmanyam, 2014) and decolonial theories by South American thinkers (Mignolo, 2011). While 'whiteness studies' are equally underway, the quest for an epistemological pluralism for the benefit of a new Africanness is driven by the will to decolonize historiographies and bibliographies, and to debunk the statutes representing knowledge or powers deemed out of kilter with new social needs.

Through the looking glass, Africanness scrutinizes the scale of racial hierarchies, asymmetrically socialized by dominating economic processes and power relations: slavery, capitalism, colonialism, imperialism. For each type of domination, identity and, therefore, political reactions ensued to remove targeted African groups from a strongly held vision of history, replacing it with a pan-Black, then a Pan-African, survival, resistance and rebirth project. What does it mean 'to be African' in this century? One that is supposed to end with a vast demographic revolution. What rupture is necessary from previous centuries, which denied African identity its full and entire humanity? Demographic forecasts indicate that a country like Nigeria will be the world's third most populated by 2050. The African continent is witnessing an unprecedented demographic surge, which has alarmed some Western observers and left others indifferent, particularly African governments ill-disposed to adapt health and education policies so as to take advantage of the 'demographic dividend'.

The future of humanity requires us to rethink Africanness as a giant leap for humanity. From now until the end of the twenty-first century, the average human will look more than ever like a Black, African person. To define Africanness is to define Africa as a former pioneer, which is gradually becoming a human majority; or rather, assess what the world owes to Africa in terms of reparations.

From the Bois-Caïman (Bwa-Kayiman) meeting at Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) in 1791 to the rallying call two centuries later of the Ubuntu that led to reconciliation in South Africa, this duty to define Africanness has relied on a number of African spiritualities. This call seeks to conceive Africanness in relation to freedom and otherness. Finally, in increasingly young African societies, but still traditionally founded on a respect for elders, attempts are being made to accommodate this social urgency. It will undoubtedly be a matter of rebuilding political power over time, based on new emancipation narratives, so that Africanness can be fully realized.

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CHAPTER 5

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE DIASPORAS

Giulia Bonacci

Introduction

The term ‘African diaspora’ was introduced into scientific debate in 1965 on the occasion of the International Congress of African Historians in Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania. For the first time, the programme included a round table entitled ‘The African abroad or the African Diaspora’ (Harris, 1993, p. 4). By focusing on diaspora issues of realm and feelings of self-belonging, felt at the core of enquiry by Black Africans throughout the world, debates were ignited about the nature and form of the diaspora. Since that time, references to cultural identity have multiplied exponentially, prompting a deep rethink of our view of societies linked to transatlantic slavery and their connection to the African continent.

Other diasporas have served as conceptual models for the African version, especially the Jewish diaspora, based on which the specific nature of the African diaspora has often been compared (Cohen, 1997). As a result of studies on the African diaspora, which rapidly pluralized into African diasporas, the concepts of movements, idealism and realism have provided a new lens with which to view diasporas in terms of their social and political construction (Edwards, 2001; Butler, 2001). The works of Paul Gilroy are emblematic of this move towards the Atlantic realm, which associates the issues centred on global racialization to nationalist ideas and to transnationalism realism (Gilroy, 1993). Furthermore, the

dominance of the Atlantic model has significantly limited the way we perceive Africa's presence at a global level (Zezeza, 2005). That is why recent works distinguishing between the new African diasporas spawned of colonization and marketplace, and often dangerous migratory journeys, all contribute towards this complex picture of 'Global Africa', characterized by the relationships between its different realms and its relationship to Continental Africa (Zezeza, 2009). This chapter seeks to cast aside the notion of a scattered diaspora to examine the interface between Africa and the diaspora, and to probe their relationship. I therefore recommend a concise reading of multiple encounters, interactions and influences between Africa and the diasporas, as well as an analysis of the role of African states in the institutionalization process of the diasporas, to finally enquire into the ambiguities marking these relationships.

In terms of methodology and references, this perspective firmly positions African studies alongside those on African diasporas so as to draw from their cultural backdrop, their movements and idealisms, as well as the social and political realisms that connect Africa and the diasporas.

Africa and the diasporas

In the Americas, Africa has always had a central place in Black popular culture, as well as religious and political realms, around which new American societies were formed. We need to move away from the study of Africanism in the Black cultures of the Americas with its indelible trace on anthropological enterprises so as to reinterpret the diasporas in light of their relationships with Africa. It is within these interrelationships that the historical relationship between Africa and the diaspora comes to the surface.

Africa, a land of return

Since the end of the eighteenth century, descendants of Africans born in the Americas have settled in Africa and have contributed to the development of cosmopolitan societies situated mainly on the West African coasts. The founding of Sierra Leone (1787) and the independence of Liberia (1847), driven by Great Britain and the United States, respectively, aimed to re-establish free and enfranchised Black populations living on their territory. Thousands of 'poor blacks', having loyally fought for Great Britain, including Jamaican Maroons and survivors of slave ships, shaped the Creole society in Sierra Leone. In Liberia, tens of thousands of labourers arrived from

the southern United States as well as a handful of intellectuals, where they replicated the practices of extraction and exploitation of the resources with which they were so familiar. After the revolts of the Malé people in Brazil in the 1830s, 'Brazilians' arrived on the Slave Coast and, for the most part, they became attached to the merchant networks of the era (Prah, 2009). At the end of the nineteenth century, the liberated slaves and the 'Bombay Africans', who were educated in India and settled in Mombasa, established the community of Freretown, which still has a particular status in Kenya (Harris, 1987). Ethiopia facilitated the recruitment of Black professionals and their settlement in the country in the 1920s, a dynamic that was stopped short by the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1941) but vigorously taken up again in the 1940s. Starting from the 1960s, Rastafarians from Jamaica and elsewhere in the world continued to arrive, forming what is today a cosmopolitan community in Shashemene, a city to the south of Addis Ababa (Bonacci, 2010). Ghana played an important role in these return dynamics. From the time of its independence in 1957, President Kwame Nkrumah recruited and facilitated the arrival in Ghana of Black professionals and personalities, such as George Padmore, W. E. B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, Maya Angelou, Malcolm X, among others (Gaines, 2006). In Tanzania, the Black Panthers, who were persecuted in the United States, found refuge in the country, with some of them deciding to settle permanently (Bedasse, 2017). Other countries welcomed Black congregations, professionals and activists, as did South Africa since 1994, and Benin. Conversely, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, no agreement or international financing endorsed these returns. African diasporas have a strong presence in Africa. They started families, built schools and contributed to social and economic life and, in return, these new African diasporas wove multiple ties back to their territories of origin or attachment (Okpewho and Nzegwu, 2009).

Africa at the heart of political struggles

With a common historical background of slavery and colonialism, and their associated racist practices, Africans and the descendants of Africans developed common causes and shared ideological tools in order to politically mobilize their quest for freedom and rights, which was at the core of their action throughout the twentieth century. The Pan-African movement is an example of this quest. Born in the diasporas and reappropriated by Africa, itself on the threshold of independence, the Pan-African movement represented 'the most ambitious and far-reaching ideology that Africa has produced for itself since the nineteenth century' (M'Bokolo, 2006). The history of Pan-Africanism intersects, to a large extent, with the relationship between Africa and the diasporas, to which we can

add some timely, cultural elements. As early as 1918, Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), from Jamaica, founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in New York. This important Black organization saw its publications banned in British and French colonial Africa for having contributed to inspiring rising nationalism (McDuffie, 2016; West, 2002).

The Italo-Ethiopian War represented a major political event, which mobilized people around the world (Harris, 1994; Scott, 1993). Colonial Black subjects in the Caribbean and Africa, as well as marginalized U.S. citizens, fervently rallied together to defend Ethiopia, the only sovereign country in Africa. Subsequent decolonization struggles on the continent fanned the flames of the fight for civil rights and the pride of Black Americans. Anti-fascism, followed by anti-imperialism and self-determination, contributed widely to the structuring of relationships between Africa and the diasporas throughout the twentieth century (Adi, 2013; Robinson, 1983). Cuba's involvement in Africa, which saw Cubans taking part in decolonization wars, remains not only a unique example of military cooperation but also of civil, medical and educational collaboration. The battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 1988, which opposed the Angolan People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), supported by Cuba, against the Angolan forces of UNITA, supported by South Africa, marked an essential milestone towards Angolan independence and the fall of the Apartheid regime in South Africa (Campbell, 1990). Numerous personalities, artists and activists from the continent and from the diaspora kept up mobilization efforts against the segregationist South African Government, which was fiercely opposed locally and internationally. In addition, a number of events, such as the Pan-African Congress¹ and Pan-African festivals², served as cultural and ideological meeting places for combatants, intellectuals, artists and activists originating from the continent and the diasporas.

The boxing bout between the Afro-Americans George Foreman and Muhammad Ali, held in 1974 in Kinshasa in Zaïre (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo) of the then president, Mobutu Sese Seko, left behind an important cultural footprint, perpetuated by songs, films and testimonies (Malaquais, 2009). In the same vein, the invitation extended to the Jamaican

1 The Pan-African conferences and congresses were held in London in 1900, Paris in 1919, London in 1921, London and Lisbon in 1923, New York in 1927, Manchester in 1945, Dar-es-Salam in 1974, Kampala in 1994, Johannesburg in 2014, and Accra in 2015.

2 Among the many Pan-African festivals, important festivals include FESMAN in Dakar in 1966, PANAF in Algiers in 1969, FESTAC in Lagos in 1977, PANAF in Algiers in 2009, and FESMAN in Dakar in 2010.

reggae singer and Rastafarian, Bob Marley, to attend Zimbabwe's independence celebrations in April 1980 was another powerful symbol. The presence of the first musical star from the Third World, who financed his own two concerts, strengthened the cause of solidarity between Africa and the diasporas in the face of the decline of British colonial presence in Africa (Steffens, 2017).

Africa and its diasporas beyond politics

Beyond political mobilization, the relationship between Africa and its diasporas has been rooted equally in intellectual, religious, musical and literary fields. The importance of the challenge represented by the history of Africa, both modern and ancient, cannot be underestimated. Intellectuals from Africa and its diaspora have played a central role in amassing knowledge about their origins. They were the first to underline the influence of knowledge on the make-up of Africa and Africans, which helped structure the centres of learning and university environments (West, 2018; Gebrekidan, 2015). American pioneers, such as E. W. Blyden, W. E. B. Du Bois, J. H. Clarke, among others, not only brought African studies to the United States, they also played a part in educating an African elite that was committed to the struggle for decolonization. Hence, we can think of Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, founder of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in 1912, or Kwame Nkrumah, founder of the Convention People's Party (CPP) in Ghana in 1949, whose American training was a determining factor in their political trajectory and for the future of their respective countries. Subsequently, the works of personalities such as Cheikh Anta Diop, in turn, profoundly influenced American intellectuals and the development of Black studies in the United States.³

In the religious sphere, the influence of Black American missionaries in the development of certain independent Black African churches at the end of the nineteenth century is now acknowledged, in particular, for the 'Ethiopian' churches in Southern Africa (Chirenje, 1987; Vinson, 2012). The complex networks of the spiritual worlds of Vodun, Yoruba, Kongo or Akan in the Americas and in Africa intertwined around the questions of purity and ritual legitimacy, and of the re-Africanization of cults and spiritual lineages (Argyriadis and Capone, 2011; Guedj, 2011). Since the 1980s, American and, notably, Brazilian evangelist churches have quickly embedded themselves in Africa. Moreover,

3 UNESCO's *General History of Africa* project has a direct part to play in these scientific relations between Africa and its diaspora.

since Samuel Ajayi Crowther became the first African bishop in the Anglican Church in 1864, African pastors and priests have permeated Western religious hierarchies. New religious movements, such as the Rastafarian movement, born in Jamaica in the 1930s, in turn, influenced the spiritual experiences of African youth thanks in part to the success of reggae music, which promoted the social and anticolonial identity of Rastafarians.

In fact, the field of music is a marvellous illustration of these cultural comings and goings traversing the Atlantic. The rhythms, the instruments and the myriad sounds coming out of Africa have influenced the birth of many musical traditions in the Americas, which later transformed the musical styles played on the continent. The impact of Cuban music in Africa, thanks to the spread of records and the development of radio programmes, as well as the emergence of Afro-Cuban music, is testament to this constant dialogue between artists, musicians and the public. The hymns and chants which have rhymed along the Afro-American struggles are reflected in the burst of a committed popular music celebrating African independence (Independence Cha Cha of Joseph Kabasele and African jazz), transforming urban practices (highlife with E. T. Mensah and Afrobeat with Fela Kuti), and heralding the golden age of Ethiopian music (with Tilahun Gessesse and Mahmoud Ahmed). Since the 1980s, the birth of African reggae, rap and hip-hop has opened up a new chapter in musical journeys (Aterianus-Owanga, 2017).

In the literary field, Africa has often served as a mythical or metaphorical backdrop for Afro-American authors. In the nineteenth century, the poetry of Paul Laurence Dunbar or the 'Ethiopian' stories of George Schuyler was reserved entirely for the continent in their literary idealism and, since the 1940s, authors have visited or settled in Africa. The international congresses of Black Writers and Artists held in 1956 in Paris and in 1959 in Rome contributed to their visibility. The novels of the Guyanese David Talbot or the Guadeloupian Maryse Condé, and the testimonies of Americans Richard Wright or Maya Angelou, as well as the poetic dialogues between Aimé Césaire of Martinique and the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor are similar tangible footprints of the relationship between Africa and the diasporas. In the other direction, African writers have also woven transatlantic ties, like the Ivorian Bernard Dadié in the 1950s, the Nigerian Wole Soyinka since the 1960s or, more recently, the Ethiopian Dinaw Mengestu, the Nigerian Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, the Cameroonian Léonora Miano or the Ghanaian Yaa Gyasi. Their novels stage this vision of Africa with extended frontiers, where individual and collective journeys breathe life into the story of peoples' scattered lives as well as the

solidarities whose divisions they try to mend. With diasporic settlements in Africa and scattered families torn apart, with head-on political struggles and shared critical and literary thoughts, with churches and rhythms in common, it is a particular social depth that emerges from these historical and contemporary relationships between Africa and the diasporas. It is also the cultural and relational context of Pan-Africanism that is taking shape.

The African states and institutionalization of the diasporas

The great political evolution of the twentieth century could also be illustrated by the emergence of African nation states. They played a central role in the process of institutionalizing the diasporas, an important phase and not without challenges in the rekindling of relations between Africa and the diasporas. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 in Addis Ababa, became the African Union (AU) in 2002. With a reputation tarnished by the weak political interplay on the continent, the founding of the AU would represent an additional step in the institutionalization of the historical Pan-African movement. This new administration would have to energize it with a new continental dynamic. What is known as the 'diaspora initiative' of the African Union is the fruit of many concurrent factors. First, an amendment to the AU's constitutional act indicated that one of its aims was 'to invite and encourage the participation of the entire African diaspora as an important cog in our continent's construction of the AU.'⁴ Then, in 2006, the AU adopted the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance, which would replace the Cultural Charter for Africa ratified in 1976. In the 2006 charter, a clause was dedicated to the African diaspora, which encouraged solidarity between Africa and its diasporas in multiple political and social areas, and it invited the diasporas to contribute towards the development of Africa.⁵ This clause was founded on the definition of the African diaspora drafted by the AU the previous year. In fact, in April 2005, a meeting of experts in Addis Ababa honed the final definition of the African diaspora required by the AU's Executive Council.

4 Art. 3 (q) Protocol on Amendments of the Constitutive Act of the AU, July 2003.

5 VIII, Art. 32 and Art. 33, Charter for African Cultural Renaissance, January 2006.

The African diaspora is made up of persons of African descent living outside of the African continent, but who wish to contribute to the development and construction of the African Union, whatever their citizenship or nationality.⁶

The purpose of this definition was to facilitate the integration of the diaspora into AU affairs, and to allow the inclusion of the diaspora as the AU's 'Sixth Region'. In fact, in 1976, the OAU had set out its five continental zones of activity: North, West, Central, East, and Southern Africa. The aim of this sixth region, officially ratified by the AU on 25 May 2012, was too well and truly institutionalize the diaspora, extend a continental Pan-Africanism steered by the AU, and to create ideas and practical networks so as to constitute a new political body (Edozie, 2012). Hence, in 2005, the AU created institutions capable of making a contribution to the relationship between Africa, the diasporas and civil society: the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and the Citizens & Diaspora Directorate (CIDO). Finally, a whole series of meetings contributed to substantiating the 'diaspora initiative', to which numerous civil society associations signed up, emanating from the old as well as more recent diasporas.⁷

The chief difficulties linked to diaspora institutionalization were identified by representatives of the African states: how should the diaspora be represented within the bodies of the AU? What will be its relationship with the AU Executive Council? How to ensure moral and political legitimacy of the representatives of the diaspora community? Could the sixth region be anything other than a mobilization tool?⁸ On the occasion of the Global African Diaspora Summit, which took place in 2012 in South Africa, five projects were adopted that clearly placed the diaspora as an economic opportunity: i) the production of a database of African professional skills in the diaspora; ii) the setting up of a body of volunteers from the African diaspora; iii) an African diaspora investment fund; iv) a market development programme for the diaspora; and v) an African institution for the remittance of migrant funds. However, the divergence between the political objectives and their implementation slowed down the launch of such a global dialogue. For example, whereas the diasporas are mentioned in the AU's incorporation act, Article 29 states that only African states may become

6 Report of the AU meeting between member state experts on the definition of the diaspora, April 2005.

7 We can think of the meetings of the intellectuals of Africa and the diaspora in Dakar in 2004 and in Bahia in 2006. In 2005, a conference between South Africa, the AU and the states of the Caribbean was held in Jamaica. In 2007 and 2011, consultation conferences were held in Brazil, London, New York, Paris, Barbados and the AU, followed by ministerial conferences.

8 Report on the African Union Diaspora Ministerial Conference, November 2007.

members, an article quoted in the decision to deny Haiti membership of the AU in May 2016, even though the first Black Republic had attained full associate membership status the previous year. The historic impact of Haiti on the creation of a Pan-African consciousness at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not enough to guarantee its formal position in the Pan-African institution.

Global Africa was taking shape and defining the diasporas, first and foremost, as an economic asset for Africa, but it had probably reached a dead end. The question of citizenship is indicative of that. The creation of an African citizenship remains the prerogative of ideological talk and, in reality, seems a far-fetched concern of present-day leaders. Only West Africa, by issuing a unique passport in 2000 within the ECOWAS framework, comes close to the idea of a shared regional citizenship. At the time of writing, around 30 countries on the continent have adopted dual citizenship, a framework that would represent an important motivation in facilitating the involvement of the diasporas in Africa.⁹ However, only two countries have created an intermediary statute for their diaspora, Ghana and Ethiopia (Manby, 2016, p. 101). Ghana has authorized dual nationality since 2002, but holders of another nationality may not be elected as president or to its parliament, or hold certain administrative posts. Ghana was also the first African state to grant rights of return (*right of abode*) to diaspora members. A by-product of the mobilization of a few thousand Afro-Americans and Caribbeans, who have lived in the country since its independence, this status applies more often to the Ghanaian diaspora than to 'returnees' of old diasporas. By December 2016, only 34 Afro-Caribbeans had finally received their Ghanaian nationality.

Ethiopia does not allow dual nationality, but since 2002, a status of 'foreigner with Ethiopian origin' can be secured by Ethiopian diaspora members who are able to justify their Ethiopian roots, or for spouses of Ethiopian nationals. The holder obtains the same rights (work, residency, investment) as other Ethiopians, except for the right to vote, to be elected, or to work in the country's security and defence services or foreign affairs. However, several hundred 'returnees' from early diasporas and Rastafarians of twenty or so nationalities have been living in the country for more than fifty years without status and papers for themselves or their families (Bonacci, 2010). Consequently, the Ethiopian Government announced in July 2017 that their situation would be brought into line. Since 2017, Rastafarians have been issued with identity cards and granted

9 The African Union ECOSOC – Global Diaspora Stakeholders Convention, November 2015, p. 123.

residency status, but they are not considered as Ethiopian citizens. The AU's African diasporas institutionalization plan has stumbled over manifold political obstacles, as well as the differences in status of these diasporas, which often remain subject to power disputes in the countries of origin. The underlying economic goal of this institutionalization appears not to address the breadth of the historical relationship nor the cultural and symbolic issues at the heart of the relationship between Africa and the diasporas, especially the earliest ones.

Ambivalent relationships between Africa and the diasporas

Relationships between Africa and the diasporas have also been determined by a whole series of interlinked and sometimes disjointed depictions as a by-product of slavery and colonization. For the Black intellectuals of the nineteenth century, in their quest for a nation in their image, immigration towards Africa was envisaged as a firm option, justified by what E. W. Blyden called 'the prophetic destiny of Black people' (Blyden, 1862). Because Blyden had survived slavery and had picked up survival skills along the way, it was imagined that immigration to Africa would serve the divine will of regeneration or of redemption of an African continent disfigured by colonialism. Within this ideological framework, Martin Delany, an American abolitionist, came up with a slogan reappropriated by Marcus Garvey in the 1920s and later by African independence leaders: 'Africa for the African race, and black people for its leadership'. By 'Black people', Delany meant the 'descendants of Africans who claim an identity with the race' thereby underlining the leadership role that Afro-Americans would have to play in the development of the 'African civilization' (Delany, 1861, p. 82). This redemptive ideology was similar to the civilizing mission developed by European empires in order to justify their colonization of Africa (Adeleke, 1998). This 'imperialist' vision would reveal the profound duality of Black nationalists. Traces of this can still be found today, notably in the slogan of Rastafarians, 'Africa awaits its creator', which serves to point out the role they could play in this African rebirth. This ideological duality, understandable in the light of the dominant discourse on the development of Africa since the nineteenth century, represents a hindrance on the constructive dialogue between Africa and its diasporas and by the value judgements it conveys.

The question of 'race' remains central to the building of diasporic communities, but it has been lived out differently on the continent (Pierre, 2012). In particular, European influence on these interlinked relationships need

not be underestimated. For example, the American consul, Robert P. Skinner, who arrived in Ethiopia in 1903, insisted on a racial definition of Ethiopia as a 'Caucasian Kush' and Ethiopians themselves as 'Caucasian Semites'. He claimed to have it from a reliable source that the Emperor Menelik II, victor of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, deemed himself to be a Caucasian (Jonas, 2011, p. 283). If the reticence of Ethiopian royalty to be identified with Black Americans, descendants of enslaved people, called 'niggers' at the time, can be understood, it is highly unlikely that Menelik II would have used a vocabulary with its origins in nineteenth-century European scientific racism in order to define himself. The racial antagonism between Ethiopians and Afro-Americans sought by Skinner was to restrict and undermine these nascent relationships as much as to differentiate an American policy towards its Black population and towards the single sovereign African state.

Kwame Nkrumah, influenced by his experience in the United States, was initially a critic of the interracial cooperation advocated by his elder, James Emman Kwegyir Aggrey. However, in an illustration of the shift from Black nationalism to African nationalism during the course of the twentieth century, Nkrumah understood that to use racial primacy as a springboard for political action might not suffice in uniting the peoples of this vast continent. Black certainly, but with multiple internal divides, such as classes, castes, languages, regions, ethnicities, and so on (Nkrumah, 1960). But Afro-Americans and Caribbeans, living in or visiting Africa, are always upset when they get referred to as *oburo* in Ghana or *faranj* in Ethiopia, terms which typically identify the 'white man' but which in fact mean 'foreigner'. These terms are therefore not racial labels but rather an acknowledgement of the foreignness of these 'returnees', who are often seen through the eyes of local people in the same way as privileged foreigners, i.e. as White people (Holsey, 2008, p. 220). However, the almost universal definition of an enslaved person is 'foreigner', that is, a foreigner to the African territory, lineage and affiliations.

Afro-American Saidiya Hartman traced the slave routes to Ghana, having been driven by the anger of loss and wounded by the difficulty of finding a common link between her and this Africa, which failed to welcome back those it previously let go (Hartman, 2007). The sometimes contentious role played by Africans and their societies in their treatment of humans across the Atlantic lies at the heart of these disjointed and interlinked relationships, which still stirs up resentment, anger, and the feeling of permanent loss.

The weight of the history of slavery in contemporary relationships between Africa and the diasporas cannot be ignored. The movement for reparations for

slavery and colonization – claimed in the name of the genocide of Indigenous Caribbean populations – had initially benefitted from the common cause linking intellectuals and African and diasporic heads of state. In 1999, on the initiative of M. K. O. Abiola of Nigeria, the OAU established a group of eminent thinkers to reflect on the question of reparations, which included several African personalities but only one person from the diaspora, the Jamaican attorney and diplomat Dudley Thompson (Howard-Hassmann, 2004). The following year, in 2000, the Abuja Summit on Reparations represented an important step in the pooling of data on the legacies of slavery and colonization, as well as their legitimate ideas and claims. But Abiola, elected president of Nigeria in 1993, was overthrown by Sani Abacha and died in prison in 1998. With the tragic disappearance of the first moral and financial support for reparations, regional initiatives, notably from the United States and the Caribbean, took over in the 1990s. For the representatives of these regional initiatives, the global anti-racism conference, the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, organized by the United Nations and held in Durban in 2001, represented a pivotal moment to present their grievances to the world.

Carried by their enthusiasm and commitment, and backed by African civil society organizations, the Caribbean delegations felt hurt and deceived by the refusal of African states to consider the legitimacy of their claims. Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Wade of Senegal undermined the legitimacy of the reparations issue, with the Caribbean Group viewing it as an informal alliance with the West and their surrender to its economic power. In fact, these African states were promoting the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), adopted in July 2001 and backed by international funders, which did not allow a pursuit of the issue of reparations. The Caribbean Group left Durban with the feeling of having been betrayed by their African peers (Beckles, 2013). The move toward reparations continued following the Durban fiasco, realigning itself around diasporic communities and their relationship with former slave-trading and colonialist countries. This dialogue around reparations between Africa and the diasporas, made impossible by the weight of history, responsibilities, political and economic demands, would have to be re-opened. This is because a process of reparations, limited to the relationship between the Caribbean and Europe, can never repair the relationship between Africa and its diasporas, even though this is where the potential of 'Global Africa' resides.

Relationships between Africa and the diasporas have settled in for the long run, touching on every dimension of social and political life, and representing an area of research that is in full swing. The AU's initiative to institutionalize the African

diasporas is still suffering from a lack of commitment and political coherence, as is the exploitation of diasporas to nourish national and financial goals at the expense of cultural and symbolic dialogue. Relationships between Africa and the diasporas, marked by the ambiguities inherited from slavery and colonization, necessitate consideration and resources, which only a deep commitment can change. These relationships should be at the heart of the twenty-first century states and peoples' politics and practices to enable the emergence of a Global Africa, which has been expected and claimed for several decades.

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CHAPTER 6

ENTERING INTO HISTORY

Tayeb Chenntouf

Introduction

On 26 July 2007, Nicholas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, gave a lecture at the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, Senegal. Speaking directly to the ‘youth of Africa’, he depicted a wide panorama of a past and current Africa. In his representation of world history, only Europe, followed by the West, would have entered the history books. Immediately afterwards, the speech aroused many critics in France but especially in Africa and the Antilles. His reasons why Africa would not have entered history drew particular attention. Referring to this speech – close to two decades later – it is only interesting insofar as it participates in the debate on this particular belief system about world history, which still weighs heavily with regard to research and education. Max Weber very explicitly raised the question of how these changes, which led to modernism, began in the West and only in the West (Weber, 1964, p. 11). For Norbert Elias: ‘the notion of civilisation expresses awareness of oneself and the West’s feelings of superiority. It signifies what Western society is proudest of, that is, its levels of technology, its morals, and the development of its scientific knowledge’ (Elias, 1973, 1995).

Moreover, the other continents, including Africa, would also have remained outside of history. But was it so? A substantial revision of social sciences

(in terms of approaches to global history and knowledge) in the wake of decolonization and globalization casts doubts on this assumption. In fact, many modernisms existed before Western modernism. Africa itself, from the outset, had origins that lay further afield than the West. In any case, contemporary upheavals are truly representative of the birth of multiple modernisms and the de-Westernization of the world.

Modernisms prior to modernism

Western modernism was a latecomer in history and only represents the last of the modernisms. Historical modernisms have appeared in Africa as well as in the Chinese, Indian and Muslim worlds. Deemed to be the cradle of humanity, Africa was able to develop sciences and technologies at an early stage. In the political sphere, many empires emerged in the modern era.

Geographic localization and the fact-finding process of Africa, where it all started, are still under discussion, but it is acknowledged that the ancestors of modern humans first appeared about 200,000 years ago. The modern human branched out to the rest of the world from Africa. For Yves Coppens (2004, pp. 29–39), the emergence of the human being is clearly an African phenomenon, with the primordial separation of humans from large apes. The inception of culture and awareness is also African, with the development of grey matter.

Africa subsequently witnessed the birth of iron and copper metallurgy from antiquity. Iron was used for making a variety of agricultural tools and weapons. It was also used to make jewellery and to produce coins. The Iron Age gave rise to an agricultural revolution thanks to the tools that were developed in Africa, which would be used in the future across the world. In the context of the Atlantic Slave Trade, local techniques crossed over to the Americas. Slave traders were often the exclusive cultivators of rice, cotton and indigo. They also mastered weaving and the seasonal movement of livestock. Their influence even extended to architecture and language (Maiga, 2008).

In the political domain, rich and powerful empires would follow from the seventh to the seventeenth century. The kingdom of Ghana (300–1240) was incredibly powerful before being weakened by the Almoravid attacks from the eleventh century onwards, followed by its decline. Sonni Ali Ber (r. 1464–1492) retook Timbuktu in 1468 and founded the Songhai Empire, which grew during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Saadi victory on 15 April 1591 signalled the end of the empire.

On other continents, Asia, China and India were among the world's oldest civilizations. China went through a Neolithic period and the Iron Age only after Mesopotamia and Anatolia. Chinese historians deem China to have gone through several modernizations, which cannot be fully covered in this chapter. Throughout antiquity, Chinese thinkers and scientists contributed significantly to advances in the fields of astronomy, physics and medicine.

Under the Han (206 BCE-220 CE), the Tang (618-907 CE) and the Song (960-1279 CE) dynasties, China experienced long periods of peace, during which time it ranked among the world's most important powers by population but also by its innovations, particularly under the Tang and Song dynasties. Another concrete example is China's construction of the 'Great Fleet' in 1405, which was assembled to undertake one of the greatest maritime explorations in history, one which would take Admiral Zheng He as far as Java, Ceylon and the African coasts during the course of seven expeditions.

One of the most remarkable aspects of Chinese civilization has been the invention of techniques that only appeared or spread to other areas of the world several centuries later. Indeed, China has been a true scientific and technological hotbed of innovation for centuries. Notwithstanding the great inventions of ancient China (compass, printing, paper, gunpowder), China's major inventions also included porcelain, silk, steel, stern rudders, callipers, the wheelbarrow, the abacus, horse harnesses, stirrups, clockmaking, ironmongery, noodles, paper money and matches.

In India, a neighbouring country, the Indus Valley civilization developed three millennia before the birth of Christ. It was during this period that the canonic Hindu texts (the four Vedas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanisads) were composed in Vedic Sanskrit. In the fourth and fifth centuries, Northern India united under the Gupta Dynasty, an era considered the golden age of the Hindu civilization.

From the seventh century onwards, after rapid territorial expansion, the new Muslim religion gave birth to a stellar Muslim civilization, whose many achievements are briefly described here. From the seventh to the twelfth century, a considerable effort was undertaken to translate Greek and Indian texts. A veritable scientific tradition was established in Cairo and Andalusia, not to mention Baghdad and Damascus. It was fuelled by the thirst for scientific knowledge and conceptual thinking, notably enhanced by mathematical development in terms of research as well as more concrete applications. Mathematics was structured by scientists in the fields of arithmetic, algebra and geometry. New knowledge was elaborated in medicine, botany, zoology, agriculture, physics, optical chemistry, geography and astronomy. In Cordoba (Andalusia), the library of Caliph al Hakam II (961-976)

contained 400,000 volumes. By way of comparison, the collection of Charles V (1364–1380), King of France, who was known for his patronage of culture, did not exceed 200 volumes.

In the north of Africa, hotbeds of civilizations thrived, starting out from cities like Kairouan and Tunis (Tunisia), Fez and Marrakesh (Morocco), and Tlemcen and Béjaïa (Algeria). In Béjaïa, the celebrated Italian mathematician, Fibonacci, who was visiting the town, perfected his mathematical formulae by using calculations carried out by beekeepers and rabbit breeders. The Catalan philosopher Raymond Lulle (d. 1315) came to debate his philosophical ideas with the local *cognoscenti*. Finally, the historian and sociologist Ibn Khladoun (1332–1406) briefly became the prime minister of Béjaïa.

Non-European origins of Western modernism

The European continent was undoubtedly the latecomer by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The English Abelard of Bath (philosopher and early interpreter of Arabic scientific knowledge) took issue at the beginning of the twelfth century with the ‘inconsistency’ of doctrines taught in Gaul, and he underlined the efforts taken by Arabs to formulate rational knowledge. He denounced ‘this generation which has the innate vice to believe that it doesn’t need to take on board anything discovered by the moderns’ (de Gandillac, 1992).

Much later, in 1753, members of a Welsh agricultural society expressed the wish that their country might one day ‘flourish as much as China’ (Pomeranz, 2010, p. 21). However, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Europe entered an era of self-supporting changes, which made other areas of the world look static. It started with light, and then in 1750, the Industrial Revolution took hold in England. Why in Europe, and why only in Europe? Still today, the origin of European modernism is the subject of many hypotheses. They arouse fierce academic debate, while the significance of the crossover of scientific knowledge from China and the Muslim world (Al-Andalus) is being increasingly revised. Three major debates punctuate the discussions on the origins of European and Western modernism. They continue to abound and produce a huge amount of literature.

The first debate was sparked by the Senegalese thinker Cheikh Anta Diop (1923–1986). From his first work, Diop developed his theory of a ‘Black Egypt’ and the ‘pre-eminence of black civilizations’ (Diop, 1954, p. 9). His argument is not limited to colour or physical anthropology; rather, he assembles cultural, religious, political themes, and even molecular biology. According to Diop, the

Egyptian civilization would have been a Black civilization based on its people, language, spiritual culture, sociology and material culture. He encountered plenty of scepticism and difficulties in obtaining his doctorate. In the 1970s, Diop took part, alongside Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow and Joseph Ki-Zerbo, in the International Scientific Committee which oversaw, within the UNESCO framework, the drafting of a *General History of Africa*. Diop's work was truly groundbreaking as it placed Africa on the frontline of the origins of civilization and the 'pre-eminence of black civilizations'.

The second debate was inaugurated by Martin Augustin Bernal's work *Black Athena* (Bernal, 1987), a professor at Cornell University in New York. In his work, which would be picked up by others, he re-examined the influence of Egyptian culture on the origin of culture and ancient languages. Bernal considered that a turning point in Western Greek perception occurred in the eighteenth century. Henceforth, academic studies denied any African or Phoenician influence on Greek civilization. Consequently, ancient Greece was detached from ancient Egypt, and the concept of the 'Greek miracle' made way for an exclusively European, White civilization. Bernal's ideas soon unleashed a series of controversies. They gained significant traction in the United States where the work drew the attention of African Americans. In France, its translation encountered few reactions, including among scholars in the field. Critics of *Black Athena* blame it for being written by a historian who was neither versed in Ancient Greece nor the Near East. The controversy is still ongoing today.

The third and final debate began in France in 2008 with the appearance of Sylvain Gouguenheim's work *Aristote au Mont Saint Michel : Les racines grecques de l'Europe chrétienne* (Aristotle at Mont-Saint-Michel: The Greek roots of Christian Europe), in which he defended the idea that Greek heritage was brought over directly to Europe and bypassed the intermediary of Arabs/Muslims. He underlined the direct, early discovery of Greek soap by Christian monasteries, and he challenged the idea that the spread of mathematics, physics, medicine and astronomy was owed to Muslim Spain (Al-Andalus). The work aroused lively reactions from scholars, who accumulated evidence of weaknesses in his thesis. The non-European contributions to Western modernism are now, in reality, more fully acknowledged and valued.

In 1954, Joseph Needham and his collaborators published *Science and Civilisation in China* in seven volumes.¹ This work provided irrefutable evidence that, up to the fifteenth century, the Chinese were well ahead of the rest of the

1 Partly translated into French under the title, *La science chinoise et l'Occident*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1969.

world. Europe would have to wait until the scientific revolution at the end of the Renaissance period before it could take the lead.

Lord Francis Bacon's writings² on three inventions (printing, gunpowder and the magnetic compass) had a groundbreaking impact. At least another 100 or so other inventions were added: the mechanical clockwork, cast iron smelting, callipers, horse harnesses, gimbal-mounting, Pascal's triangle, and segmentally arched bridges, canal locks, stern bearings and multi-sail navigation, quantitative map drawing.³

Pierre Germa, author of a lexicon of inventions, considers that paper, printing, the compass and gunpowder to be great Chinese inventions, which 'contributed to building the West' (Germa, 1979, p. 262).

The crossover of instruments and techniques to Europe possibly involved two routes. The routes that carved their way through India and the Muslim world were likely the most durable and broadest routes. Some inventions were carried over by Europeans themselves, though this was less common. By way of example, Guillaume de Rubrouk, ambassador of France to Mongolia in 1254-1255 and a personal friend of Roger Bacon, is often quoted as a possible broker of gunpowder. Conversely, the compass would have been shipped back by the Templar, Pierre de Montaigne, following his voyage to the Mongols in Persia.

The adoption of heritage emanating from the Muslim civilization in Spain during the Middle Ages is also well known. The ideas and concepts in the works of Ibn Rushd (Averroës), a twelfth-century philosopher, theologian, jurist and doctor, who was born in Córdoba and died in Marrakesh (Morocco), have had an enduring impact. For instance, it allowed Europe to rethink its relationship to Christianity at the end of the Middle Ages.

Juan Vernet, a professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Barcelona and an Arabist of world renown, had dedicated himself to the history of sciences in Spain. In a work translated into French from Spanish, entitled, *Ce que la culture doit aux Arabes d'Espagne* (What culture owes to the Arabs of Spain)⁴, he drew up an exhaustive census of the heritage of antiquity, the movement of translations, and the development of sciences from the tenth century onwards.

Muslim Spain re-worked the knowledge of antiquity and enriched it with decisive new contributions. The Arabic language made its way into Europe thanks to Latin and Roman translations. Published scientific texts and statistics

2 *Novum Organum* (part of the *Instauratio Magna*) was published in 1620.

3 For more details, refer to Needham, J. 1977. *La Science chinoise et l'Occident*, a chapter dedicated to *La science et l'influence de la Chine dans le monde*, pp. 56-105.

4 *La Cultura hispanoárabe en Oriente y Occidente*, 1978. Published in France under the title *Ce que la culture doit aux Arabes d'Espagne*. Paris, Sinbad, 1985.

demonstrate what Europe owes to Al-Andalus. Juan Vernet is one of those rare authors who safeguarded the often past and forgotten fields of art and literature. Crossovers, once integrated by the cognoscenti and writers, such as Copernic, Chancel or Boccace, are revised with the hindsight of a universal culture.

The works of Ibn Rushd (Averroès) played a direct role in the emergence of the Renaissance. In his musings, he emphasized the need to practice philosophy created by God. To that end, he practised and recommended secular sciences, notably logic, physics and medicine (Averroès, 1905). Accused of heresy towards the end of his life, he did not have a following in the Muslim world until the nineteenth century. However, his ideas quickly gained ground in Medieval Europe and in the Renaissance period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He influenced Latin and Jewish philosophers, such as Siger of Brabant, Boetius of Dacia, Isaac Albalag and Moses of Narbonne.

The ideas of Averroès were so embedded in Europe that a new school of thought emerged, which, in the nineteenth century, Ernest Renan called 'Latin Averroism'. By the fourteenth century, Averroism had spread to Italy, where Jean de Jandrin, a collaborator of Marsilius of Padua, attempted to reconcile Averroism and Augustinism. During the Renaissance, the philosophy of Averroès was widely studied in Padua. By the end of the fifteenth century, the city had become the meeting place for free thinkers like Etienne Bolet, Bunel and Du Perron. From Padua, anti-Christian sentiment spread into France (Dolet), Spain (Michael Servetus and Francesco Vicomercato) and throughout Europe.

For Alain de Libera, a scholar of Averroès, through his citations on Aristotle, considered Averroès to be one of the 'spiritual fathers' of Western thought (de Libera, 1991). The researcher Majid Fakhry describes Averroès as one of the founding fathers of secularism in Europe.

Contemporary modernisms

The challenge of distinguishing between scientific and technological knowledge transfers from China and the Muslim world, as well as their appropriation by Europe, facilitated the launch of the last line of modernisms in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. From that moment, modernism became Western, and the West became modernism. It is the sole region of the world to have entered the history books, while all the others remained outside of history.

Western modernism reached its zenith in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the reversal point of which came at the end of the last century. For the first time in centuries, Western modernism was being challenged by other modernisms. Indeed, the process of de-Westernization in the world is clearly emerging. In this systemic contemporary transformation, Africa is repositioning itself, as it has much to contribute to the world. The euphoria that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union was relatively short lived. In fact, new players have appeared and are now competing against the established powers. Some countries moved ahead in terms of their economic growth, including several countries in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s that were called 'Newly Industrialized Countries' (NICs).

In 2001, the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) appeared for the first time, to which an S was added for South Africa in 2011. Inspired by the spirit of Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement, the five countries represent a little over 40 per cent of the world's population and occupy 25 per cent of the world's surface. By 2030, they will possess 40 per cent of the world's wealth. BRICS countries want to become economic powerhouses, but they also seek to influence the global economy. Beyond their economic prowess, they seek to wield political and geo-political influence. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, they united to demand a more equitable world order, which the richest countries were not prepared to accept. They also fought against the one-sided moral order that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and which resulted in a Western-dominated world under American leadership.

For their part, China and India consider their formidable economic growth not as something new, but rather as a return to the prosperous times of the eighteenth century when they dominated the world's cultural and commercial exchanges. The world map has in fact been totally upended, with the shift in the world's centre of gravity now being economical, geopolitical and cultural. In reality, the world is de-Westernizing much quicker than expected. The many new modernisms are seriously challenging the position of the United States and Europe.

In 2008, Fareed Zakaria, essayist and editor-in-chief of *Newsweek International*, predicted the advent of a post-American world (Zakaria, 2008).⁵ He went on to give a very realistic and precise analysis, i.e. that it is not about the decline of America but rather the rise of other powers. Despite what it may have looked like,

5 Translation into French under the title, *L'empire américain l'heure du partage*. 2009. Paris, Éditions Saint Simon. For a wider analysis than the American case, see Niall Ferguson (2011), *Civilizations. The West and the Rest*. New York, The Penguin Press.

the great transformation ushered in a new era. For Zakaria, there have been three deep transformations since the fifteenth century. The first was the rise of Western influence, which began in the fifteenth century and gathered momentum in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The second transformation occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century, which saw the progressive rise of the United States. The third transformation is the current one, which began at the end of the twentieth century. The United States, nonetheless, maintains a strategic superior position compared to other nations, but it can no longer rule the world on its own and, even less, impose its will on the rest of the world. It is true, as Jack Goody recounts, that a large part of the world is loath to admit that a sole superpower uses its immense military and economic superiority to dictate, affirm or impose its will in other areas of the world (Goody, 2006).

Europe, for its part, is facing scepticism and fear of a dreaded possible downgrade. It raises alarmist questions of a continent threatened by 'its exit from history' and from the 'Great Swiss' syndrome (Védrine, 2016, p. 96). It also advocates for a Westernist approach, which increasingly permeates political narratives, main media outlets, and even prolific literature. For these biased authors, there are the good (the United States and their allies) and the bad (everyone else). It is as if there is a Western camp, the custodian of positive values, and the rest of the world, open to barbarism (Bulard and Dion, 2009, p. 8). In fact, the Western world has lost its monopoly over power. Henceforth, it is no longer possible for Western powers to impose their will on the world. It is not the end of history but rather the end of one world and the beginning of another entirely polycentric new world.

Africa and the diasporas can contribute much to the resolution of the problems born from the turbulence that has come with these changes in the world. It has the resources available to become an important player in international relationships. For this reason, priority must be given to culture, notwithstanding economic issues. The most recent assessments are seeing the Afro-pessimism of the 1970s and 1980s transform into an Afro-optimism, which itself must be balanced. It is true that African mining and agricultural resources, as well as its youth, are grounds for optimism. In addition, some states can already be considered as emerging countries.

The initiative Africa 2025, led by Alioune Sall of the African Futures Institute⁶, developed four potential scenarios for Africa. In the first scenario (lions in a cage), the continent remains unchanged and in the hands of elites

6 <https://www.africanfuturesinstitute.com>

who do not believe in its development. It is an Africa where, if the elite becomes embedded in globalization, half the population will continue to live in poverty and face rampant urbanization. In this situation, latent or open conflicts and crises will multiply. In the second scenario (starving lions), states will collapse due to the monopolization of profit, which will turn violent and destabilize the state. There will be pockets of poverty among the populations, dominated by warlords. Somalia is an example of this. In the third scenario (lions leaving their dens), some states will manage to integrate globalization. The elite will agree to a broad political consensus to allow for rapid, durable and fair economic growth. Finally, in the fourth and final scenario (lions marking their territory), Africa will pioneer a new model of development that is respectful of nature and ancestral tradition. It will be in a position to ensure its independence and the production of goods and services needed by its peoples.

The relevance of these scenarios currently exists on a daily basis. They are at the heart of the reflections and debate currently taking place across the continent and the diasporas. For example, Joseph Ki-Zerbo published a remarkable, lengthy interview in 2004, aptly entitled *À quand l'Afrique?* (When Africa?) (Ki-Zerbo, 2003). He remarked how the role of Africa in the world had not changed in 16 centuries, and that no human group had been more interiorized over this period than Africans.

In the current global situation, the priority for Africa is to construct its own identity, without which its presence in the world would be impossible. From this perspective, tackling unequal cultural exchange is also a priority, even more so than unequal economic exchange (Ki-Zerbo, 2003, p. 8). For Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Africa has to conquer its own identity to become a world player. It will then contribute to current debates and to the resolution of conflicts. Its contribution is not constrained, as is frequently believed, to its traditions and ancestral values, i.e. its conception of time, hospitality and solidarity (see Thiong'o, 2011, 2017).

Africa is already imposing itself on the continent and among the diasporas in terms of its intellectual and artistic scenes, and by its philosophical undercurrents, its literature, paintings and sculptures, and its contemporary cinema. The world is slowly rediscovering the African side of its history. As the African American W. E. B. Du Bois had wished for Africa in 1946, a continent that has suffered most in modern times, to contribute its share in constructing a new humanism, one that – this time – is truly universal.

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CHAPTER 7

AFRICA IN THE MEDIA

Willy Jackson and Issiaka Mandé

Introduction

It is no secret that media portrayals of Africa are deeply flawed. The roots of the issue lie in how the continent has historically been viewed and represented. Specifically, perceptions of Africa have been shaped by a Eurocentric vision of the world, largely expressed through cartography as well as a relationship of subjugation and dependency based on colonial ideals. Since the end of the Second World War, a Western-centric vision has prevailed thanks to the overwhelming strength of the international media – that vector of soft power. In Michel Foucault's *Les mots et les choses* (The Order of Things, 1966), his critique of ethnology includes an examination of the paradox faced by Europeans who, in the face of the irreducibility of otherness, can only approach the Other from a theoretical perspective, as an object of knowledge. To do otherwise would be an abdication of Cartesianism and undermine European cultural and intellectual supremacy. For his part, Max Weber highlights how the West exerts its privilege over other peoples through both its monopoly of reason (its rationality) and modernity (Weber, 1964). According to this binary interpretation, Africa, which stands opposed to the West, the Arab world and China, is characterized by 'tradition' and 'chaos'. The continent is portrayed as a child that requires assistance to reach adulthood, which takes the form of 'emergence' and development. In

other words, Western representations generally depict Africa as unchanging and playing a distinct role. Initially described as a 'terra incognita', and later as the 'mysterious' continent, Africa has consistently been seen as a distant land that arouses curiosity because of its 'difference'.

An appetite for exploration and so-called discoveries first drew European travellers to African shores in the fifteenth century, who benefited from the support of royal courts. These travellers were astonished by the Black skin of the continent's inhabitants, and wondered if the latter were truly human beings.¹ Upon their return home, they had to prove to their fellow Europeans that they had actually set foot on this continent inhabited by Black peoples (described as 'savages' or 'barbarians'), who displayed not only physical nudity (lack of clothing) but also spiritual nudity (paganism, fetishism, witchcraft, magic, lack of rites, sexual anarchy, lack of organization, lies, etc.) as well as cultural nudity (ignorance of the arts, lack of literature, writing, monuments).

As far back as Origen (a Christian scholar from Alexandria [185-253 CE]), Christian metaphors have used the colour black to represent sin and the devil. The curse of Ham, associated with Africans, is just one in a series of allegories that led bishops attending the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) to support the petition entitled, *Postulatum pro nigris Africae centralis*. It called on the Pope to pursue the evangelization of Africans as an expression of mercy and a way of removing the curse hanging over them. This petition can also be seen as a precursor to the Berlin Conference and the affirmation of the right to colonize Africa in the name of a mission to civilize the population, to be undertaken by the 'superior races'. Likewise, in European art, both Africa and Africans have traditionally been assigned a lesser status.

Figurative Africa and fantasy Africa

European art depicts Africans as full of inner tension, simultaneously timid and intimidated, placed off to the side or in the background, young (in contrast to both the state of full maturity and the ancient character of Asia), full of strength and intuition, in communion with nature and with the cosmos. Indeed, in *L'autre face du royaume*, Valentin-Yves Mudimbe notes how:

1 Montesquieu uses biting irony and antiphrasis to fiercely attack his contemporaries in the chapter, 'Of the Slavery of the Negroes', in Book 15 of *The Spirit of Laws* (2011).

There is no need for an in-depth analysis to uncover “images” that immobilize Africans. Simply think of those that depict the African as a maniacal dancer, moving like a demon; as a poor, pitiful, miserable figure; as being at home in a world full of monsters, nudity, sexual symbols; as an exotic pretext for illustrating travel stories; as a servant or a follower, if not a slave whose dark skin typically allows whiteness to burst forth, bright and beautiful in relation to its surroundings (Mudimbe, 1973, p. 28).

Ethnology, like the other human and social sciences, has embraced these representations (Medeiros, 1985). Beginning in the thirteenth century, Europeans made great strides in maritime navigation, as they sought to break the Arab and Muslim monopoly over the gold trade. Their voyages led them not only to explore the coast of Africa but also to offer up rather vague depictions of the lands and peoples of the continent’s interior. One striking feature of this emerging new cartography (world maps, nautical charts, atlases) is that the iconography was largely borrowed from the Arabs. These documents did not merely offer a geographical representation of the world; they also provided a pretext for approaching the Other from a Eurocentric perspective (Fall, 1982). This is how the Portuguese, and later Europe as a whole, came to adopt a political outlook based on trade networks, and to foster the emergence of a world-system based on a relationship of domination. By directly exploiting the resources and human capital found in the territories they had recently discovered, Europeans transformed luxury goods into necessities (Wallerstein, 1989). The use of violence and competition for so-called unoccupied and ungoverned lands introduced a new stage of domination. To justify their imperialist ambitions, European politicians turned to philosophers and ethnologists for help. The rationalization of wholesale slaughter, pillaging and colonization inspired the idea of the savage, whose inferiority legitimized a hierarchy of worth. A firm conviction soon prevailed: European civilization was superior to all other social systems. Widely circulated in the popular press, this idea was embraced by numerous opinion leaders who thereby helped forge essential stereotypes and representations of Africa (Gallouët, 2009).

Ideology served to keep these stereotypes and representations up to date, ensuring a steady supply of clichés, biases and preconceived ideas regarding Africa. Likewise, the media adopted a discourse that generated content based on a binary opposition. On the one hand, the West was portrayed as the epitome of ‘modernity’, in line with Max Weber’s vision. On the other hand, Africa was seen as being mired in ‘tradition’, that is, backwardness, whereas all other societies were engaged in change. But how is this outlook reflected in modern media?

The construction of modern media discourse: a question of agenda

The historiographical debates surrounding the New World International Information and Communication Order (NWICO)² highlighted attempts to eliminate Western bias in media coverage, the flow of culture and information, and the management of information resources worldwide. Indeed, the various fleeting images of Africa that appear in the media demonstrate how the continent was treated differently. According to Serge Théophile Balima, a journalist and diplomat from Burkina Faso, the situation can be explained in terms of ‘the remnants of a colonial outlook, a geography of violence and humanitarian abuse, the institutional complicity of the African media, themselves a source of clichés and stereotypes associated with “Afro-pessimism”’ (Balima, 2004). A vision of a ‘continent in agony’ seems to dominate depictions of Africa. This state of affairs can be better understood in terms of two theoretical concepts:

- **Agenda setting**, whereby the media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion, by drawing attention to certain events and simultaneously ignoring others.
- **Agenda building**, whereby news is more of a social construction than a collection of basic facts processed solely by the media. Rooted in constructivism, this second theory poses a challenge to the idea of agenda setting.

This idea of ‘agenda’ was first put forward by American researchers Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972), who argue that it serves to amplify specific situations.

The theory of ‘agenda setting’ therefore rests on the idea that the media shapes public opinion by establishing a hierarchy of events. In other words, news production is the result of editorial choices made by media managers. And yet, by all accounts, the media is tasked with producing textual and audiovisual content in response to a pre-existing public opinion. For instance, Jean Charron wonders whether the general way in which news is packaged might not be shaped by external factors that strongly influence the agenda. Given that there is a market for news, it makes sense to account for the constraints imposed by that market to understand how media companies and journalists position themselves. This raises questions related to press freedom and, especially,

2 NWICO was a political initiative promoted by the Non-Aligned Movement and developing nations in the late 1970s. It aimed to create a more equitable and democratic international communication system, and to address the imbalance of information flows primarily dominated by Western countries.

whether journalists are really allowed to reach their own conclusions. Suffice to say, the agenda-setting model appears poorly adapted to understanding how the international media reports on African realities. Indeed, as Charron notes, 'studies of media operations and journalistic practices reveal that a news item cannot be conceptualized as a ready-made material, produced at the initiative of the source, and on which the journalist only intervenes through selection' (Charron, 1995). This passage represents a clear appeal to the idea of agenda building, which portrays the news as the result of a negotiation involving the media, the public, political actors and/or events.

It follows that African news presented in the media is not merely biased but also ideologized. This is all even more true given that the international media rarely probe their sources in Africa. However, the issue tends to be dismissed as an attempt to muzzle or censor the Western media. As a result, the discussions surrounding the NWICO, which took place in the late 1970s, failed to produce any tangible results.

Media coverage of Africa

Challenging the flawed vision of Africa presented in the media also means challenging the international media's business model, whose profitability depends on a biased approach to covering the news (Ojo, 2002). According to Tokunbo Ojo, the issue of bias in media coverage serves as a key starting point for reflecting on the flow of news, in a context where the distribution of communication infrastructure overwhelmingly favours developed countries. Charles Moumouni (2003) notes that events involving Africa only tend to be considered news when they meet at least one of the following criteria:

1. They occur in a geographic and temporal context aligned with the structure of media operations.
2. They play out on a sufficiently large scale.
3. They are easily interpreted or largely free of ambiguity.
4. They have a strong cultural affinity with, or significance to, the audience.
5. They are consistent with the pre-existing view of Africa.
6. They are, in some way, rare and unexpected.
7. They involve an important country.
8. They involve important people (i.e. the country's elite).
9. They relate to personal stories.
10. Their impact is as negative as possible.

In Western countries, news about Africa makes headlines when it matches the agenda the media has already established for the continent. Furthermore, this agenda makes room only for catastrophic events.³ However, there has been some change since the 1990s, especially with regard to the diversity of news networks. The range of voices covering African news has grown increasingly wide, with the emergence of new media organizations based in the Arabian Peninsula, Asia, and even Africa itself. Following the example of major Western nations, many countries see their media sector and their openness to the free flow of information as a reflection of their strength (Mattelart, 2014).

The Qatar-based Al Jazeera network, established in 1996, provides a particularly good example of this phenomenon. In fact, it has come to epitomize these media counter-flows. To quote Tristan Mattelart, Al Jazeera ‘challenges the Western monopoly on international television news’, and provides an ‘alternative to the dominant Western news agenda’. It has even attracted competition from new Arab-language news networks that have been established in Western countries. Al Jazeera enjoys easier access to participants in several armed conflicts on the African continent because its coverage avoids the well-worn ‘Islam versus Christianity’ narrative.

As Western countries and China compete for influence in Africa, what little coverage the Chinese media does provide is positive in nature. According to Ronan Morin-Allory (2011) the diplomatic discourse emphasizes ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’. On the whole, the media laments the lack of democracy and good governance in Africa. They focus on instances of disregard for human life and negligent leadership, as well as on the slow pace of democratization, fraudulent elections and the ensuing violence. They lay bare the squandering of public resources by private interests, as well as collusion with companies that exploit the country’s resources. The media also praise the creativity, restlessness and resistance displayed by civil society in response to flawed states. This latter approach offers up a form of Afro-optimism in the face of Afro-pessimism, reflecting a certain shift in the media’s rhetorical construction (‘invention’) of Africa. There is praise for the continent’s economic attractiveness, its progress, its modernity. The Africa of despair has given way to the Africa of the great Chinese projects. Instead of famine, there are images of pineapples and luxury cars, reflecting the continent’s integration into the global economy thanks to

3 According to Roger Tatarian, former vice-president of United Press International (UPI), the imbalance in news flow between North America and developing countries, and African countries in particular, is determined by media networks whose structure reflects the global distribution of economic and political power. See Mary Ann Fitzgerald (1987, p. 24).

international financial institutions. But what the media fails to mention is that the 'good governance' they trumpet mainly serves the interests of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Or that the free movement of goods and services primarily benefits Western companies, whose competitiveness is bolstered by access to free trade zones where taxes and customs duties are waived. In short, this new brand of pro-development rhetoric ensures the spread of economic neo-liberalism (Morin-Allory, 2011).

In the foreign media (Western, Chinese, Arab, etc.), Africa is (re)presented as a monolithic whole, as a homogeneous society (as if it were a single country). A racialized perspective leads some media – and even some academic researchers – to speak both literally and figuratively in terms of 'the Dark Continent' (as if all its inhabitants are Black), rather than portraying Africa as the diverse and varied geographic unit that it is. Ultimately, media coverage of the continent is rooted in the intricacies of colonial history. Quite often, foreign coverage of events in African countries is dominated by media from former colonial powers. As a result, the vision of Africa presented in the news reflects the persistence of a colonial or neocolonial outlook.

The violent images used in media depictions of the continent emphasize its underdevelopment. In this way, Africa is portrayed as being in a perpetual state of insecurity and chaos, a place where illnesses and viruses, like AIDS, are rampant. The continent is therefore primarily understood through widespread instances of violence, along with the ensuing humanitarian disasters. On the one hand, the media portrays this violence as a return to the barbarity or anarchy that supposedly characterized Africa before European colonization, whereas the colonial period is depicted as a time of prosperity. On the other hand, these instances of violence are interpreted as evidence that African countries are incapable of managing their own affairs. The bewildering spectacle of exotic-looking African 'migrants' being rescued at sea, their eyes full of distress, dismay, sadness and anguish, but also determination to reach the European El Dorado, come what may, only serves to reinforce this mindset. Generally, this all leads to an affirmation of Western superiority, exhibited through generosity, daring, courage, and a humanitarian impulse to rescue those (the Other) who are in need (destitute). Meanwhile, Africans remain in the role of 'grown children' who rely on the West to get them out of trouble. The media therefore depicts an Africa characterized by indescribable misery, while highlighting the stark contrast between its immense resources and its impoverished population. Western television stations have broadcast unbearable images of Ethiopian and Somali children suffering the effects of famine caused by war or drought.

Journalists seem to have no ethical qualms about repeatedly displaying such images for the viewing pleasure of a worldwide television audience. Equally compelling are the images of Western doctors and nurses (cast as heroes), who tend to the masses succumbing to Ebola in Guinea and Liberia. Or those of the Western humanitarians providing assistance to refugees fleeing war-torn countries. However, the media almost never mentions that competition for the continent's vast resources, coveted by wealthy nations, is behind such armed conflicts (the latter being spurred by competition between profit-driven companies). Or that the weapons with which African belligerents commit their violent acts are sold by self-interested companies based in the West and other parts of the world. These wars are often presented as being inter-ethnic or religious in nature. For instance, the war in Côte d'Ivoire has routinely been explained in terms of a conflict between the Muslim North and the Christian South, or as a clash between 'foreigners from Burkina Faso and Mali' and the 'native population'. A similar discourse surrounds the wars in Sudan and Uganda. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed conflict is often cast as a confrontation between the eastern and western parts of the country, or between Tutsis and other groups. But beyond presenting a sorry spectacle, these wars also serve to showcase Africa's 'difference', its 'otherness', in contrast to the 'peace' and prosperity enjoyed in the West. The images show men being massacred, women being raped, towns and villages being plundered. They focus on the displaced multitudes: distressed and starving adults, lost and frightened children sleeping under tents provided by the United Nations. This media coverage depicts exotic figures from another era, while suggesting that the backwardness of Africa's population is what justified slavery and colonization.

The contrast between the continent's fabulous resources and the misery of its people gives rise to explanations that call out the recklessness of African leaders and elites, as well as the endemic corruption they foster. Such reasoning highlights Africa's 'difference' (or unique character): a hotbed of evil impulses and rampant mismanagement. Africans are portrayed as vile characters, lacking any individuality, but they are also cast as victims, who require 'help' of the sort provided in most of the films where the continent serves as a backdrop for war, adventure or romance. Images of Africa are therefore, generally, apocalyptic and presented with an air of resignation.

A quantitative analysis can serve to nuance the situation. Whereas the content of English-language print media appears to closely follow the trends described, regardless of the period, an analysis of 2,215 articles published in three French-language dailies (*Le Devoir* [Quebec], *Le Monde* [France] and

Le Soir [Belgium]) by Tristan Sicard, paints a somewhat different picture. According to the author of the study, these newspapers do not cover Africa less than other continents. However, from a more qualitative perspective, the study finds that the coverage of Africa is frequently skewed toward negative events (Sicard, 2007). As Cyril Lemieux notes, negative representations of Africa and stereotypes about the continent reflect the fact that:

Once they become convinced that ‘people aren’t interested’, journalists become entirely focused on making things interesting! As a result, they resort to stereotypes and overdramatization, while favouring certain types of news items because of how they resonate with the audience’s fantasies and assumptions. However, they sometimes encounter more complex information, which cannot be handled in a superficial manner, and which needs to be presented with much greater nuance. They may not see the task as impossible, but things certainly become much more difficult. It strikes me not only that this issue of simplification is directly tied to the level of public interest, but also to the fact that even when journalists manage to capture the public’s attention, they cannot hold it for very long (Lemieux, 2004).

In the media, there still exists a pretext for presenting Africa from a familiar perspective, rooted in bias and in an ideology of domination (or of ‘will to power’) that once justified enslavement and colonization by the ‘superior races’. This helps to better understand why Mudimbe began to challenge these biases in the 1970s, especially in *L’Autre face du royaume* (Mudimbe, 1973) and *L’Odeur du Père* (Mudimbe, 1982). Using the example of ethnology and relying on *The Order of Things* by Foucault, Mudimbe (1982) shows how the West can only approach the Other, whose existence it recognizes as irreducible, from a theoretical perspective, that is to say, an object of scientific study – a laboratory specimen. Its study was entrusted to ethnology, that offspring of imperialism, to show that nothing can escape observation by a Cartesian mind.

The representations of Africa and Africans in the media have a certain permanency. In *Reason in History*, Hegel (1995) describes Africa as ‘a dormant continent’.⁴ Since the sixteenth century, a vast body of literature and art produced in Europe has portrayed Africa and its Black population through the lens of chaos, anarchy, disorder, ‘madness’, disease and violence. This is true not only

4 According to Hegel, ‘Africa proper’ (i.e. sub-Saharan Africa) is the part of the continent that provides its unique character: ‘This continent is not interesting from the point of view of its own history, but because we see man in a state of barbarism and savagery which is preventing him from being an integral part of civilization. Africa, as far back as history goes, has remained closed and without links with the rest of the world. It is the country of gold, which is closed in on itself, the country of infancy, beyond the daylight of conscious history, wrapped in the blackness of night.’ Hegel goes on to argue that Africa’s isolation is a result not merely of its tropical nature but, more fundamentally, of its geography, as cited in Bayart (2009).

of academic writing (anthropology, psychiatry) but also fiction and cinema. Of course, equating Africa with natural disasters, conflict, disease and treacherous crossings to Europe reduces the continent to a negative trope. Consequently, Africans are denied the faculty of reason, which is deemed the privilege and monopoly of Whites. This explains some of the logical contradictions that persist in how the media discuss Africa or the Black population, despite the use of an updated vocabulary. Africa remains primitive, degenerate, mysterious, slumbering; talents lie solely in the fields of dance, music and athletics. Media analysis provides not so much a portrait of Africa or its population, but rather one of the inability or unwillingness to acknowledge the African Other; a failure to see the Other as having anything meaningful to express beyond a heightened appreciation of difference, and a refusal to consider that it might be more fruitful to initiate a dialogue.

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CHAPTER 8

NORTH AFRICA

From Classical Orientalism to Neo-Orientalism

Bahija Chadili

Introduction

Neo-Orientalism must be viewed in the context of the successive social and political transformations that occurred since the end of the twentieth century, namely, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the start of a unilateral world order, the Gulf War, the global financial crisis, as well as the social movements that emerged in North Africa and later spread to sub-Saharan Africa, with the rise of Islamic movements.

These transformations have spawned numerous publications that have attempted to explain the processes behind these changes through the study of social structures and the culture of Muslim peoples. In fact, these accounts are not so different from the literature accompanying the heyday of colonialism in the nineteenth century. For this reason, it has been called 'new Orientalism' or 'neo-Orientalism', thus attracting the interest of various Arab and African researchers who have tried to deconstruct it.

This study aims to revisit Orientalist ideas and theories, and the relationship between culture and the history of colonialism. North Africa's place in Orientalist thought will be examined through the concept of Orientalism: how the latter has changed, and its impact on culture and the cognitive foundations of the new Orientalism and its ramifications by comparing the discourse of classical

Orientalism with that of neo-Orientalism, with specific reference to North Africa. Most research covering North Africa and the Middle East does not include sub-Saharan Africa despite considerable similarities and close correlations.

Orientalists' interest in North Africa is studied through certain concepts and through the process of change in the phenomenon of Orientalism as it relates to this area. For this purpose, certain models of classical Orientalism have been chosen to compare with new models of Orientalist discourse and the reactions of North Africa's intellectual elite.

North Africa and the concept of Orientalism: definition and analysis

Orientalist writing has dealt with a number of geographical areas beyond the Orient, not least Africa. This has led to what is known as 'Oriental and African studies' (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2012). Consequently, there is a problem in distinguishing between the different fields of Oriental research, as North Africa has typically been linked to Arabic and Islamic studies, which is the subject area covering the Middle East today, whereas East Africa falls under 'African studies' (El Qadéry, 2010). Thus, it is difficult to study the culture and history of North Africa without taking into account its African and Oriental background.

Orientalism first gained momentum from the nineteenth century onwards, although Westerners already had some knowledge and a certain perception of Africa well before this period. A number of maps, in particular Angelino Dulcert's 1339 map, was discovered depicting the route to the Mali Empire across North Africa, Morocco's Atlas Mountains and the desert (Hamy, 1887). Similarly, Abraham Cresques's Catalan Atlas (1375), produced at the request of Charles V, King of France, names 'Ciutat de Melli' in North Africa (Cresques, 1375). The image of the king of Mali on early maps was described thus: 'golden crown on his head, ball of gold in one hand', which was the first impression of Africa to leave its mark on the European mind and spark the imagination of most Europeans prior to the sixteenth century.

This is followed by the description by Mármol (1520-1600), who mentions in his introduction that he would not have written his book without the encouragement of Charles V: '...hitherto, no man has written the history of this part of the world, despite the fact that it is in our interest to have a full understanding of it, whether for peace because of trade, or for war, to wage it with advantage.' (del Mármol y Carvajal, 1667, pp. 8-9). In this respect, Mármol's

book could be regarded as the starting point for Oriental studies relating to North Africa. Thus, Orientalist research into North Africa has passed through three stages:

- The inaugural stage began with the great discoveries and was accompanied by information-gathering and the production of maps. Thus, the European Renaissance was not only a cultural movement, it also saw the advent of capitalism and colonialism.
- The second stage, from the eighteenth century, saw Orientalism gain momentum, especially with European expansion. It received institutional support from the state as being essential to European colonialism (Rabault-F Feuerhahn and Trautmann-Waller, 2008).
- The third stage saw the emergence of neo-Orientalism, beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of the new world order.

The development of Orientalism and its significance for North Africa

An international federation of Orientalists was established at the start of the nineteenth century in Europe, which was marked by the first session of the International Congress of Orientalists held in Paris in 1873.¹ Successive sessions were organized across the globe, particularly in Europe and Asia. Algeria hosted the fourteenth session in 1905, the only country in Africa to host the congress (Rabault-F Feuerhahn, 2010).

It took a whole century before the International Congress of Orientalists decided to drop the term 'Orientalism'. At its twenty-ninth session in Paris in 1973 (Ries, 1974), the International Congress of Orientalists disbanded, with the International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa taking its place. This session saw a number of ideological clashes. Orientalism was now replaced by 'Asian social sciences', covering civilizations extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Pacific (Ries, 1974).

This thirtieth session of Orientalists, and the first session of the Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, took place in August 1976. In this new iteration, it became clear that the 3,000 participants were divided

1 Full text of the report on the first session of the International Congress of Orientalists, Paris, 1873 (see <https://archive.org/details/internationalcon02inte/page/n5/mode/2up> (Accessed 24 August 2025)).

(Ries, 1977). Thus, the question arose as to whether, under these circumstances, classical Orientalism still had any role to play. Was it actually the end of an era, or just a question of terminology? As recounted by Ries:

[C]lassical Orientalism was still important. At the [1973] session in Paris, the advocates of the new orientation in research had an opportunity to clarify the main thrust of their ideas and express their desire to involve all the sciences for each cultural unit. The human sciences are only just beginning to process their sources. They will undoubtedly need to draw on the findings accumulated by classical Orientalism for over a century (Ries, 1975).

Moreover, different sections of the Congress sessions stated that North Africa did indeed have an important role. The meeting that took place in Florence in 1878 focused on Egyptology and African languages (*Egittologia e lingue africane*). In Berlin (1881), one section of the congress was devoted to Arabic studies, another to Africa and Egypt. In Stockholm (1889), a special section was organized for Africa, and in London (1892) attention was again focused on Egypt (Vollers, 1892). At the Algiers session in 1905, Africa played an even larger part, with prominence given to 'African archaeology, Muslim art, Muslim languages, Egypt and African languages'.²

Thus, the continent of Africa was very much present in Orientalist thinking during the heyday of colonialism. Indeed, North Africa was one of the territories explored and exploited by Europeans for their own purposes, which made it a useful field of study in various respects. With the new world order, North Africa became both a focus of attention and competition for various political and economic powers, particularly for the United States and France. This was when neo-Orientalism really took off. The historical expansion of classical Orientalism gave rise to neo-Orientalism, the latter forming part of a trajectory that began with the collapse of the ideological confrontation between liberalism and communism. Its disappearance provided a clear opening for the emergence of neo-Orientalism in the intellectual sphere and in the media, leading to a search for and formulation of an alternative to the traditional balance between East and West. It is therefore easy to recognize the attractions of the new Orientalism, which began to closely examine the areas of tension associated with Islamic identity.

2 Proceedings of the International Congress of Orientalists, Algiers, 1905, Section II (Semitic languages); Section IV (Egypt, African languages); Section VII (African archaeology and Muslim art). 1907. Paris, Ernest Leroux. <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65817789/f15.image> (Accessed 24 August 2025). [In French.]

Neo-Orientalist discourse: analysis and theory

Despite being the subject of much criticism, Orientalism still retains its original nature and enjoys much institutional and intellectual support, which allows it to continue to exist. There has been a number of attempts to reconstruct it as an academic field, thus ensuring that it continues to be effective in achieving its goals.³

As already shown, Orientalism developed in the West. Its methods and objectives would vary depending on the goal. Let us take the example of historical Orientalism, which appeared at a time when historical research was dominant in Europe. Historical Orientalism gathered as much information as possible on non-European cultures for the purpose of using it to facilitate control over colonized peoples. Later, Orientalism became interested in languages, since knowledge of a culture also entailed mastery of the language.

However, although Orientalism was a field that allowed the spread and application of modern science in the East, the region was considered to be lacking in values and history in terms of anthropology and ethnology. North Africa was particularly affected. It was represented as having 'barbarian' and intolerant peoples. This played a large part in the emergence of cultural clashes based on identity (Bergounioux, 2001). Similarly, sundry strands of 'Islamity' meant that Islam was subject to various types of rejection, calling into question the foundations of society. Most ethnological and anthropological research into Muslim societies lacked precision, as it often described only part of the people being studied, such as the Amazigh tribes in Morocco (Périer, 1873), the Kabyles in Algeria,⁴ and many other communities. Although Orientalism obviously underwent a change, it was unable to free itself from the mindset of Orientalist anthropology, which considered the European model to be superior and the most advanced.

In addition, there was the development of a European anthropology, which from the 1990s onwards contributed to excluding from debate those countries on the south shore of the Mediterranean. In this way, the Mediterranean had lost its advantage as a cultural bridge; instead, it was seen as a border between an economically and politically expanding Europe and an Arab world

3 Transactions of the Fifth International Congress of Orientalists, Vol. 1 (African Section: essays and lectures). 1881. Berlin, A. Asher & Co. See <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6580318b/f111.item> (Accessed 24 August 2025). [In German.]

4 Les tribus privilégiées en Algérie dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle. 1966. *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 44-58. https://www.persee.fr/doc/ahess_0395-2649_1966_num_21_1_421348 (Accessed 24 August 2025). [In French.]

increasingly influenced by political Islam (Dionigi and Tozy, 2005). Thus, from 11 September 2001, the media coverage of Islam and Muslim countries turned into an image-manipulation industry; the focus shifted from investigating the causes of events to manipulating them for consumption by viewers, listeners and readers (Gannoushi, 2011).

According to Olivier Moos (2009), the term 'neo-Orientalism' connotes a new Orientalist ethos, a means of restructuring the field of Islam based on a revival of classical Orientalism to promote the values of democracy and modernity. This is pursued not by academic specialists but by individuals from a variety of fields and disciplines, such as lead writers, experts, activists and journalists, who meet a number of requisite common criteria and take a familiar, specific approach. However, neo-Orientalism is not a school or intellectual movement but a concentration on a method that is riddled with flaws (Moos, 2011).

With the emergence of social movements in North Africa in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and the growth of political Islam in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, social and anthropological Orientalism turned into political Orientalism. Political Islam and the future of Islam began to be approached in an alarming way. It was at this time that the new Orientalists made their appearance.

If we look at the most recent works of the British-American historian and Orientalist Bernard Lewis, we cannot fail to note the impact of his many years in the field of classical Orientalism. It seems surprising to find that Lewis takes his inspiration from Mármol (del Mármol y Carvajal, 1667, p. 9) when considering the Muslim world, and he reiterates his description of North Africa's 'barbarian' peoples who invaded Europe (Lewis, 2002). Thus, the transition from classical Orientalism to neo-Orientalism is clearly apparent in Lewis' study. It is also obvious that he exemplifies the heritage of classical Orientalism. Further books by Lewis, in the mould of *What Went Wrong?* (Lewis, 2002, p. 4), have contributed towards the lamentable image of the East and Muslims, inciting feelings of hatred for the 'Other' in the West. The politicization of history took a surprising turn with the appearance of other publications, such as Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* and the arguments developed by Bat Ye'or in her book *Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide* (2001)⁵, which is an affirmation or belief in the 'clash of civilizations'.

5 This book focuses on the concept of 'dhimmitude', a term derived from the Arabic word *dhimma*, denoting Christian and Jewish communities' relations of subordination to the Islamic authority. Its neo-Orientalist narrative is supported by a mixture of denial and historical negationism.

In her other book, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (2005), Bat Ye'or criticized the European Union's foreign policy as anti-Western due to its silence over immigrants from North Africa, who seemingly represented a 'threat' to Europe, as if the southern shore of the Mediterranean could swallow up its northern neighbour and take on its identity.

Thus, despite its sundry contradictions and lack of scientific validity, neo-Orientalism did have an impact on people's actual lives. The style used, the careful selection of phrases, and its habit of magnifying and dramatizing a situation, exaggerating the Islamist threat, have considerably affected policy-making. This can be seen in recent policy initiatives to reduce the number of immigrants into Europe, or by unacceptably preventing them from entering the United States. In addition, there is the enormous role played by the mass media in influencing the general public and determining political choices during electoral processes.

North Africa's intellectuals: critique of Orientalism

North African thought has created serious academic models for the critique of Orientalism. While the Middle East produced Edward Said, who was able to deconstruct Orientalist discourse, North Africa's intellectuals have also had something to say. One could mention the writings of Hicham Djaït (1985), Anouar Abdel-Malek (1963), Mohammed Abed Al-Jabiri, Mohammed Arkoun, Abdallah Laroui, and many others in North Africa, together with Bogumil Jewsiewicki and Valentin-Yves Mudimbe (1993) for sub-Saharan Africa. This work warrants closer attention, as it forms part of a broad approach addressing a number of issues of current concern.

The critique of Orientalism, for North African intellectuals, is contingent on the critique of reason. This means mastering the academic methods that give Orientalism its power. In addition, the mechanisms of Orientalism have to be taken apart to expose their limitations and in order to provide answers to contemporary issues and challenges. Here, methodology is very important, albeit complex, as it involves developing an understanding of the world under study, in interaction with that world, while keeping abreast of academic developments in order to tackle the domination of Orientalism (Arkoun, 1988). As shown by the postcolonial studies debate, the influence of classical Orientalism still endures. This is why literary criticism and methodological deconstruction are indisputably important, as the aim is to establish a complete cultural project, affording space for ideas to produce an alternative culture. To this end, a method

is required that can free itself entirely from the prejudices of the prevailing Orientalism by fully assimilating current developments. Thus, North African intellectuals' positions on Orientalism have varied according to the approach taken and their reading of Orientalist narratives.

The study of North African discourse in relation to present-day Orientalism reveals a sort of fear and anxiety among North African intellectuals. The resurgence of Orientalism itself, in its new form and in the current circumstances, demonstrates the strength of the Other (the West) and the decline of North Africa's intellectual elite in terms of its historical mission. This suggests that it is necessary to take up new academic methods to respond to the Other in order to avoid ethnic contradictions.

Conclusion

Regardless of the content of Orientalist texts – narratives produced by the West about the Other – both classical Orientalism and neo-Orientalism are being condemned by the social, economic and political reality that has bred them. Throughout history, Orientalism has always offered an image of the Other, including North Africa, by embodying sentiments of superiority. However, the real danger is that this image is also being offered to Indigenous populations, and even being absorbed by them, which is not without influence on their relations with the West.

This raises the crucial question of the ability of Africans and Arabs to fully grasp their situation based on the picture painted of them by the West. Generally speaking, Orientalist writing would seem more likely to misinform readers than enlighten them, as its purpose is to maintain the balance of power. Thus, closer attention should be paid to a critique of Orientalism in order to achieve two overarching objectives:

- Firstly, the deconstruction of Orientalist discourse. This will provide a better understanding of its mechanisms and help establish an academic dialogue.
- Secondly, the need to avoid overrating Orientalist discourse, particularly as it is, at times, considered as reflecting a precise state of affairs when in fact it depicts hyperbole and a context that is far from reality. For this reason, the deconstruction of the Orientalist discourse must go hand in hand with its mental repositioning in order to reveal the paradoxes of European ethnocentrism.

The critique of Orientalism has to be an important first step in addressing issues of daily life so as to move beyond sweeping statements and to build a clear picture with regard to religion, democracy, extremism, modernity, and so forth.

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CHAPTER 9

AFRICANISM

Gosnell L. Yorke

Introduction

For most scholars in cultural studies and other allied academic disciplines, the term ‘Orientalism’ will conjure up the name of Edward Said (1978) and his compelling postcolonial account of how Britain, France and, later, the United States succeeded in the ‘otherization’ and construction of the Orient. They achieved this in ways that, ultimately and unconsciously, aided them in their protracted imperial project, as well as their colonial control of that part of the world. As an oppressed and largely marginalized continent, trying to resist the overwhelmingly negative forces of globalization, Africa could also not escape the process of ‘otherization’ inflicted upon it by their sustained imperial gaze (Kebede, 2011, pp. 102-111; Osha, 2011, p. 183; Zein-Elabdin, 2011, pp. 216-217).

This ‘Afro-othering’, on the one hand, has tended to manifest itself in a deliberate, self-serving and distorted ‘3D’ image of the continent as one of ‘diseases, disasters and death’ requiring the constant and, sometimes, uninvited and external intervention of others. On the other hand, it provides a justification for the negative depiction of African identity, be it via Western-driven social, scientific or humanistic research and literature about the continent, the eventual enslavement of many of the continent’s inhabitants, or the wanton economic exploitation of their vast and diverse natural resources. For some scholars in

global Africa, the adverse effects of this 'Afro-othering' and Africa's history can be creatively captured in three alliterative collocations, namely: i) Christianity, commerce and civilization; (Yorke, 2012); ii) missionaries, merchants and mercenaries (Asante, 2007); and iii) God, gold and glory (Mazrui, 1990).

Africanism defined

Africanism, unlike Orientalism, is not yet a well-established lexical term in the contemporary discourse. It appears neither in the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa* (1981) nor in the *Cambridge History of Africa* (1982). In addition, the term does not appear as an entry in any of the major works in English devoted exclusively to Africa and/or its diaspora. Such major works include the following: i) *The Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara* (Middleton, 1997); ii) *Africana: The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience: Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (Appiah and Gates, Jr., 1999); iii) *Encyclopedia of African History* (Shillingford, 2005); iv) *Encyclopedia of the African Diaspora* (Davies, 2008); v) *New Encyclopedia of Africa* (Middleton, 2008); and vi) *Africa: New World Encyclopedia*. Instead, what we find in these major works devoted to Africa and/or its diaspora is the more hyphenated but historically important term: Pan-Africanism.

When broadly defined, Africanism points to that characteristic of Africa and Africans in terms of their rich and robust religio-cultural traditions and belief systems, their customary practices and their linguistic conventions. The term also seeks to embrace the continent's immutable ideals and its steadfast commitment to its own renaissance and advancement. That is, unlike Orientalism, Africanism – as it is currently understood – conveys a more positive tone, tenor and thrust insofar as Global Africa is concerned, encompassing both the continent and its diaspora. In other words, Africanism captures the determined resilience of Africans, both at home and abroad, and their ability to retain the diversity of their cultural expressions. This is in spite of the unrelenting forces of globalization, rapid technological innovations, and the negative and demeaning imaginary that seeks to undermine the identity, contemporary importance and relevance of Africa and Africans on the world stage.

Such Afro-resilience and consciousness can readily be discerned, not only within the continent itself, whether it is delineated in terms of Islamic Africa, Indigenous Africa or Euro-Christian Africa, according to Ali Mazrui (Yorke, 2009; Martin, 2008), but also within the context of a displaced, dispersed and,

in some ways, dispossessed multi-lingual African diaspora, as it now exists in the Americas and elsewhere in the world (Warner-Lewis, 2003). Furthermore, today, it is a robust diaspora, not only in its historic and contemporary manifestations but also because it is truly global in both scale and scope. For this very reason, in its attempt to capture this Afro-demographic reach, UNESCO is justified in its use of the term 'Global Africa'.

This resilience and consciousness, particularly as it relates to the historic African diaspora within the context of 'Africanism', are to be especially appreciated against the backdrop of the horrendous centuries-long Islamic- and Arabic-driven East African slave trade (Harris, 1971), followed by the equally horrendous European-driven West, Central and Southern African slave trade (Williams, 1944). In terms of the latter, it is not uncommon to hear scholars in Global Africa refer to it today as a 'crime against humanity', an 'Afro-holocaust', or a *maafa* (Kiswahili: 'great disaster') (Harris, 2008).

This chapter will attempt to identify some evidence of Africanism or Afro-consciousness found throughout the African diaspora. For the most part, this will encompass the Anglophone, Francophone, Hispanophone, Lusophone and Dutch-speaking diaspora. In addition, the concept of Africanism as a reality and phenomenon will be explored within this dominant post-independence, post-Cold War and post-Apartheid environment in which we live. Perhaps this will legitimize the call for a much more functional reconfiguration and operationalization of Global Africa, which would help advance its renaissance and its overall socio-economic, political, psychological and religio-cultural forms of development.

To achieve this, we will use the mathematical metaphor of the triangle, which is commonly used to describe the geographical reach and layout of the centuries-long European-driven African slave trade, which played no small part in spawning the historic African diaspora. In terms of the European-driven African slave trade, this places the Europe-Africa side of the triangle (side one) as representing the enslavement of Africans by Europeans in an unequal exchange for certain European goods and services. The Africa-Americas side (two) of the triangle represents the European-driven transatlantic shipment of enslaved Africans to the Americas where, against their will, they were reduced to chattel or unpaid 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'. The triangle is completed by side three of the Americas-Europe nexus, with the return to Europe of raw materials, such as cotton, rice, sugar and tobacco. These goods were produced by enslaved peoples and processed mainly for European consumption. This cycle would go on to facilitate and advance Europe's economic development at the expense of Africa and Africans (Rodney, 1972; Beckles and Shepherd, 1993).

This 'triangulation' of the discourse, as it relates to Global Africa, against the backdrop of Africanism also echoes the language used in the social sciences as it relates to some methodological approaches to data gathering and analysis. In this context, such language suggests, however, the need to create and consolidate a more sustainable infrastructure in Global Africa today. This would enable a more robust, positive and productive interaction to take place between mainland Africa and its historic diaspora (side one of the triangle), as well as between mainland Africa and its extra-continental contemporary diaspora (side two), and between the two African diasporas (side three).

In conclusion, the Africanism-driven triangulation of the Global African discourse has been rendered even more necessary and compelling by the resurgence of consciousness for Pan-Africanism, as exemplified in recent developments. For example, in 2002, the African Union (AU) was created as the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), itself organized in May 1963. In 2003, the AU amended its Constitutive Act so as to encompass the African diaspora (in its extra-continental, contemporary and historic manifestations) as its 'Sixth Region' (Yorke, 2013a). Furthermore, during its 69th session of the General Assembly in November 2014, the United Nations voted to designate an International Decade for People of African Descent (from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2024).

Africanism within the historic African diaspora

The historic African diaspora, as mentioned earlier, principally refers to that aspect of Africa's history that witnessed the centuries-long violation of Africans, depriving them of their dignity and humanity, and the prolonged period of enslavement for the economic benefit of others, mostly Europeans. Although truly global in its reach (Harris, 1993), this chapter will focus attention on the European-driven slave trade, encompassing the Danish, Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish multi-lingual elements of the African diaspora (Hall and Higman, 1992; Beckles and Shepherd, 1993; Aub-Buscher and Noakes, 2003; Munanga and Gomes, 2006).

Through these languages, we are able to discern, within the historic African diaspora, the phenomenon of a robust and resilient Africanism at work. Indeed, the various cultural features of the continent, although subjected to the prolonged influence of Europe and even some Indigenous forces throughout the Americas (as in the case of Garifuna in parts of the Caribbean, such as in Dominica and

Belize), continue to manifest themselves in one form or another. Such Afro-consciousness can readily be discerned, for example, in the realms of religion, language, the arts, and even in the general 'Weltanschauung' or worldview and lifeways that characterize African descendant peoples in the diaspora as a whole (Yorke, 2000; Warner-Lewis, 2003).

Africanism and religion

It is worth noting that John Mbiti's (1969) characterization of Africans on the continent, as being irredeemably religious, is echoed by diasporic scholars such as D. H. Davis in his description of Africans in the historic diaspora as being incurably religious (Davis, 1990). Such a religious orientation does not manifest itself simply in terms of Africans seemingly converting in large numbers to the various 'foreign imports' of Christianity and Islam; instead, it refers to their creative dialectical, even inevitably syncretistic, interplay between these two 'foreign imports' and their various vibrant traditions or primal African religious expressions. That is, the ongoing interaction of what can best be described as the creative Africanization of Christianity and Islam in Africa and, by extension, within the historic diaspora at large. This appears to contradict what some might assume to be the total de-Africanization of the African religious consciousness in Africa or throughout its diaspora.

It is in this context that we should analyse and appreciate contemporary, robust religious expressions, such as Winti in Dutch-speaking Suriname, Rastafarianism in English-speaking Jamaica, Voodoo in French-speaking Haiti, Candomble in Portuguese-speaking Brazil, and Santeria in Spanish-speaking Cuba (Barnet, 1995; Chevannes, 1995; Erskine, 2013; Taylor and Case, 2013).

Africanism and language

For the most part, the policy of divide and rule (*divide et impera*) characterized much of the European-driven slave trade in the Americas. In order to execute such a policy, attempts were sometimes made to de-tribalize the consciousness of the enslaved Africans by separating one ethnic group from another. This 'de-tribalizing and divide and rule' policy is in stark contrast to what was generally attempted in Africa, where the opposite strategy was used but with the same objective. That is, the various ethnic groups in Africa were largely left intact so

as to make them easier to manipulate and exploit. This enabled the oppressors to manipulate the ethnic groups by occasionally favouring one group over another. This policy was particularly effective, not only in countries like Rwanda, where the Belgians tended to favour the Tutsis over the Hutus and the Batwa, but also, and most egregiously perhaps, in the Republic of South Africa where we witnessed the now discredited Bantustan system as an integral part of the pernicious system of Apartheid that systematically violated human rights.

In terms of the African diaspora, from a linguistic point of view, it was not uncommon to find different ethnic groups working side by side on the same sugar, cotton or tobacco plantations from different African language groups. Unlike in Africa, such an arrangement served to discourage horizontal communication among the enslaved Africans. Instead, they were forced to communicate through the language of their captors, whether they were Dutch, English, French, Portuguese or Spanish (Orlando and Cypess, 2014).

However, there are documented cases where the early arrivals banded together within their African language and cultural communities (Warner-Lewis, 2003, pp. 57-68). Perhaps this was to facilitate their acculturation into the 'New World' for a smoother, faster and more successful adaptation to life on the plantations in the Americas. The enslaved Africans came from West, Central and Southern Africa, representing a sizeable swathe of the continent and representing approximately 2,000 of the 7,400 languages spoken around the world (Grimes, 2016). The enslaved Africans thus spoke a multitude of languages among themselves including, in some cases, possibly an already African-influenced English, French, Portuguese or Arabic language. Moreover, not all of these many African languages belonged to the same language family, such as Bantu, a relatively large language family of the Niger-Congo group and spoken in much of Eastern and Southern Africa, stretching as far west as Cameroon.

This *de facto* (if not *de jure*) linguistic arrangement saw Africans of different African language groups dispersed throughout the various cotton, rice, sugar and tobacco plantations, perhaps at times with the intention to prevent insurrections, which was not always successful. At other times, slave masters were driven by greed and their interest to disperse the enslaved workers to various plantations throughout the Americas, including the Caribbean. No doubt this forced migration led to, what linguists usually refer to as the pidginization of the 'imposed' European languages. That is, the enslaved Africans found themselves using a more simplified or 'stripped down' form of the European languages, but doing so under the strong influence of their own African native languages. Over time, this pidginization process resulted in the 'creolization' of European

languages such that they became the 'mother-tongues' or the first language of the second generation of enslaved Africans in the diaspora and beyond (Devonish, 1986; Yorke, 2004, pp. 153-166).

In terms of religion, not surprisingly perhaps, and as previously discussed, we already see the resistant and resilient nature of cultures generally, whether African or any other culture. Indeed, the total de-religionization of Africans in the diaspora does not occur given the constant presence and influence of African primal religions operating as a substrate of African Christianity and Islam. In the same way, neither do we witness the complete de-lingualization of Africans in the diaspora. Instead, the phenomenon of Africanism also manifests itself within the realm of language. Moreover, even though the creolized European languages serve as lexifier languages, in that most of the vocabulary comes from the languages of the colonizers, it is clear that African linguistic influences, which are morphological, phonological, idiomatic, syntactical and even lexical in nature, still continue to impact how creolized European languages are spoken (Wardhaugh, 1992; Warner-Lewis, 2003, p. 339). This seems especially true among the non-elite speakers of the creolized European languages spoken in the diaspora.

It should also be pointed out that, in recent years, the elites themselves have begun to increasingly use these creolized forms of the European languages in their own communication. This can best be interpreted as an act of postcolonial Afro-defiance and self-determination, sometimes expressed in an otherwise hostile socio-economic, psychological and political environment where systemic forms of racism continue to evolve and show itself (Yorke, 2012; Watson, 2014).

This self-affirming Afro-linguistic phenomenon occasionally expresses itself in academia, politics, the media, and in the translation of Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish versions of the Bible into the various creoles now spoken in the African diaspora. In the translation of the Bible, or portions of it, in the Caribbean, where as many as one-third of the total number of Creole languages in the world are spoken, we can readily cite the following examples: the complete Dutch-based Sranan Tonga New Testament in Suriname; the Portuguese and/or Spanish-based complete Bible in Papiamentu, used in the Dutch-speaking Netherlands Antilles; the English-based New Testament in Jamaican Creole; the complete French-based Bible in Haitian Creole; as well as the New Testament and the Psalms in French-based Patwa in Dominica and Saint Lucia (Yorke, 2004, 2013b). In North and South Carolina in the United States, one can also mention the New Testament and other Bible-based products in Gullah.

Africanism and aesthetics

Within the aesthetic facet of Africanism, we can find expressive art forms, such as music and dance. Moreover, it is not difficult to see and feel the evident African influence at play throughout the diaspora. In terms of music, the catchy power and rhythm of 'Afro-beat' can easily be discerned in art forms such as the Anglo-Caribbean calypso and its *soca* successor (originating in Trinidad and Tobago), as well as African-American pop, soul and jazz, Brazilian salsa, and in the deeply rhythmic and engaging Jamaican reggae. In fact, reggae has since evolved into such a *bona fide* global art form that it now has a profound impact on both Africans in Africa and non-Africans around the world. Thanks to the late Robert (Bob) Nesta Marley – one of its most influential Jamaican 'musical missionaries' – we are now witnessing the influence of reggae music in the Middle East, such as in Israel, in North America, Australia, Asia (e.g. Japan and Indonesia) and throughout Europe. In Germany, reggae enthusiasts now pride themselves as being 'Germaicans' (Cooper, 2012).

Reggae has become such an influential and global musical genre that it has also precipitated, what can best be referred to as a form of 'reversed Africanism' with respect to Global Africa. One example can be found on Rodrigues island, the smaller and more Afro-demographic of the two islands comprising the Republic of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, where *sega* is the dominant local music derived from the popular influence of reggae, and from which a new and creative musical art form has since emerged called 'seggae', a creative blend of both *sega* and reggae. This is a clear example of the African diaspora creating a discernible aesthetic influence on the continent itself, rather than the other way round.

In the realm of music, one should not overlook the natural sense of rhythm and typical 'song and dance' approach to celebrating life in general characterized by Global Africa, encompassing both Africans on the continent and the diaspora at large. In some cases, we also find the adoption and creative adaptation of local items used to replicate the musical instruments and sounds of the continent, whether it is the all-pervasive drum, the African flute, or other wind or stringed musical instruments (Warner-Lewis, 2003, pp. 227–263).

Other manifestations of Africanism

As much as the three broad categories discussed might be considered representative of the inherent presence of Africa in the diaspora, one can, and perhaps should, also mention the following facets, namely: i) the importance of the African medico-herbal tradition and Indigenous knowledge systems that are still rooted in some parts of the historic African diaspora; ii) the persistent belief, in certain diasporic communities, in the mystical qualities, characters and powers of all-pervading spirits to either help or harm, protect or punish (Yorke, 2000); iii) some culinary practices that help keep alive the taste of Africa within the diaspora (Loichot, 2013); iv) a strong story-telling or narrative tradition involving talking animals, such as the story of Anansi, the trickster spider, as a way to embody and instil the ethics and morals of Afro-society; and v) a more protological 'backward-looking' cosmology and worldview, which tend to focus on the past, as opposed to the more eschatological or 'forward-looking' last-day orientation of the Christianized West. This represents a cosmological perspective which suggests that, for Africans, upon death, one returns to the land and realm of one's ancestors, inhabiting both the immediate and the distant past, rather than waiting and yearning for some yet-to-be-realized paradise in the future in the glorious beyond (Yorke, 2000; Phiri and Werner, 2013).

An Africanism-driven triangulation of Global Africa

As a continent, Africa now comprises 54 countries: from Algeria in the north to Zimbabwe in the south. Nowadays, it has become fashionable to speak about the various contemporary 'mini-diasporas' corresponding to each African country. This encompasses a diaspora that is either politically and/or economically motivated to migrate, or that has opted to migrate outside of the continent, or those who have opted to migrate to another African country. In addition, and perhaps as a form of unintended Africanism, the same phenomenon can be found in the historic diaspora, for example, in the multi-lingual Caribbean where there exists various mini-diasporas, such as the Antiguan, Barbadian, Cuban, Dominican, Haitian, Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Saint Kittitian diasporas.

One must concede that this somewhat provincial and parochial tendency is entirely explicable and, perhaps, even acceptable. It is clearly motivated by an unshakable sense of post-independence nationalism and patriotism, and an occasional counter-productive sense of sovereignty. In the case of Africa,

there seems to be an over-attachment to the 'Balkanization' of the continent, which originated from the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 when Africa was arbitrarily carved out by the colonial powers with the creation of borders between the various nation-states.

In light of the phenomenon of Africanism, and for the ultimate good of Global Africa, despite the challenges, concerted attempts should be made to think and act in ways that are consistent with the existence of the two African mega-diasporas: the historic diaspora and the contemporary extra-continental diaspora. Global Africa, if it is to make and maintain meaningful progress towards its renaissance and development, must shed its deleterious image as an aid-dependent continent, which has a psychological and economically disempowering impact on its peoples. Moreover, Africa can ill afford not to engage in more effective strategies and initiatives to help itself. Indeed, Global Africa can take full advantage of its two mega- and ever-growing diasporas. Both continental Africa and its two multi-lingually configured mega-diasporas, constituting Global Africa, can mutually benefit, economically and in other ways, from this triangular arrangement (Yorke, 2013a).

In short, Global Africa should challenge itself to create and consolidate its structure of relationships so as to effectively and efficiently draw upon the resources available to it as a whole. Global Africa is, metaphorically speaking, 'in the same boat' as the enslaved Africans of the past, whose descendants constitute the diaspora of today. Global Africa can no longer allow its sense of powerlessness to be felt on the world stage, induced, for the most part, by its unhealthy economic dependency on others. It is not in its best interest – economic or otherwise – to have others 'kill us with kindness' (Schuller, 2012).

Africa can take much comfort in the fact that the AU has embraced its two mega-diasporas as its 'Sixth Region' by amending its Constitutive Act in 2003, just one year after the AU succeeded the OAU. Moreover, the decision by the UN General Assembly, at its 69th session in November 2014, to designate 2015-2024 as the International Decade for People of African Descent further helps to create the enabling environment within which the greater triangulation of Global Africa can now be operationalized.

Conclusion

In light of the phenomenon of Africanism, the following five actionable recommendations are proposed:

- i. Strengthen the links between Africa and both of its extra-continental and historic diaspora by granting dual citizenship to the former (taking the example of the Republic of Zambia) and by removing the unnecessary visa restrictions for the latter (taking the example of the Republic of Ghana). Instead, African countries should extend the right of return and/or remain for members of the two mega-diasporas so as to contribute towards the continent's economic development.
- ii. Reinforce the ties between Africa and its two mega-diasporas by establishing a remittance or similar AU-monitored fund to which the African diaspora is encouraged to contribute in order to lessen Africa's foreign financial dependency. Instead, it would facilitate the AU's humanitarian role in dispensing aid and assistance to Africa but also to the diaspora, for example, during natural disasters or demographic disruptions involving refugees, migrants and other displaced persons (Keita, 2011, p. 135).
- iii. Strengthen the ties between the two mega-diasporas by creating, for example, various inter-diasporic professional bodies, and inviting the relevant professionals in Africa to be part of these bodies, thus making available intellectual and other resources to such bodies.
- iv. Encourage the creation of MoUs between the various African universities and their diasporic counterparts, as well as within the continent, so as to encourage faculty and student exchange programmes throughout Global Africa. This would ultimately establish departments, institutes and schools of European and Asian studies across the continent in various African universities. This would provide the opportunity for African descendant peoples in Africa to theorize on behalf of Global Africa for Africa's benefit. Indeed, understanding what it means to be European and Asian in the contemporary global economic order will allow Africa to replicate the plethora of education institutes found in the Global North and Global East.
- v. Introduce at least one compulsory African language, such as Kiswahili (currently, the only African language among the five official languages of the AU, alongside Arabic, English, French and Portuguese) into secondary and tertiary level curricula throughout the historic diaspora. This would help create a greater pro-Africa consciousness among the youth, as representatives of the future of Global Africa.

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WHY RESEARCH ON THE GLOBAL BLACK MIDDLE CLASS IS ESSENTIAL

Kris Marsh

Overview

The growth of a Black middle class has been regarded as an important benchmark for the social and economic standing of the Black population globally. The social mobility of this group is often seen as evidence that discrimination and prejudice have eroded. However, social science literature provides evidence that the middle-class status achieved by Black populations is precarious. As a collective and global group, the Black middle class continues to face historical and persistent marginalization, discrimination and segregation. For these reasons, scholars struggle to determine which section of the Black population can truly be considered middle class. Black middle-class scholarship examines a broad range of subjects, from marriage and choosing a partner, to wealth accumulation, consumption patterns, participation in the arts, community mobilization, political activism, social movements, to health and well-being.

This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one takes a step back from the above-mentioned scholarship to focus more on historical points in time and the related policies implemented for social mobility and the growth of the Black middle class, both in the United States and in South Africa. Part two attempts to define and study the global Black middle class. Such a definition challenges scholars to rethink and critically assess the systemic and global

nature of racialized, class-based stratification processes. Part three concludes with a discussion of and suggestions for important future research on the global Black middle class.

Historical points in time and related policy for the growth of a Black middle class

There have been various policies implemented across the world with the goals of social mobility and potentially shaping a robust global Black middle class. This chapter briefly highlights the historical points of the civil rights movements in the United States where the Black population constitutes a sizable minority in relation to the White majority, as well as the end of Apartheid in South Africa where Black South Africans comprise a dominant majority in relation to the White minority. Highlighting these two points in time provides a theoretical context for understanding the connections between the United States and South Africa, while also opening up our understanding for the need to critically explore the similarities and differences with and among the global Black middle class.

Prior to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, a small group of Black elites emerged in the country. These elites have been called the 'Black bourgeoisie' (Frazier, 1957) and 'old Black middle class' (Landry, 1987). In some cases, 'talented tenth' (Du Bois, 1996 [1899]) was a term used to describe a group of Black intellectual leaders, which made up about ten per cent of the Black population in the United States. During this time, when such terms were coined and used to describe the Black middle class, the Black population was excluded from working with or for Whites, and they relied on the limited resources of other Black patrons, subsequently experiencing limited social mobility.

The post-civil rights era gave rise to a 'new' Black middle class. Researchers have identified two main reasons for the growth of the Black middle class: i) demographic and economic changes; and ii) the Civil Rights Movement (Landry, 1987). The literature generally attributes the growth of the Black middle class to increased economic prosperity following the Second World War due to improved job opportunities for Black communities. These opportunities were direct relics of the fight for racial integration won by the civil rights movements. This desegregation was especially present in the public sector, and it led to increased economic growth for Black people in the United States. For example, beginning in the 1960s and through the 1970s,

government employment grew rapidly but, at the same time, unionized factory jobs subsequently declined (which disproportionately hurt Black workers). The Black-White wage differential was lower in the public sector than in the private sector, and Black workers received greater financial benefits from working for the government than they generally received in the private sector.

Nearly thirty years later, in the early 1990s, with the end of Apartheid and the birth of democracy in South Africa, the nation saw a rise in the middle-class Black population. Opportunities for social mobility expanded tremendously with the end of Apartheid. On winning power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC), guided by the National Democratic Revolution theory and as part of an agenda for racial and economic equality, set out to develop a Black middle class. The ANC pursued this goal by promoting economic growth and the redistribution of wealth by transforming social institutions and economies through 'Equality Employment' and 'Black Economic Empowerment' (Southall, 2016). These developments (similar to affirmative action programmes in the United States) enabled Black South Africans to move into the public sector. While some gravitated toward government employment, others obtained degrees and found work in the private sector. The South African Black middle class seems to have achieved social mobility but not social integration, as prejudice, discrimination and segregation were still part of their lives.

Today, South Africa suffers from many of the same problems seen in the United States, but the Black middle class is making inroads towards parity with the White middle class, albeit social mobility is extremely modest, while a section of the Black population remains impoverished and are increasingly falling behind. In both countries, the disparities between the Black and White middle class remains a lingering historical relic and an intergenerational problem. While much is known about both the US and South African middle-class groups, few scholars explore the similarities and differences between the Black middle class in a global context, and how history and national context shapes both objective and subjective measures of class.

Defining the global Black middle class

Defining 'middle class', irrespective of race, has proven difficult. Defining the Black middle class is especially challenging because it has long been acknowledged that oppressive, discriminatory and racist systems have existed against Black populations globally. Traditionally, social scientists have relied upon education,

occupation and income as objective indicators of socio-economic well-being and class status for White populations. Similarly, social scientists have used these same indicators to define the Black middle class. To extend research beyond utilizing these more traditional measures of socio-economic status, more recently, Black middle class scholarship has considered other dimensions, such as neighbourhood location (Haynes, 2008; Pattillo, 1999, 2013; Lacy, 2007), home ownership and wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995, 2006; Shapiro, 2004), social class identification (Hunt and Ray, 2012), and social comparison processes (Landry and Marsh, 2011).

When looking more closely at the traditional measures of class, there are noticeable race variations that exist, leading to substantive limitations to such measures. Studies that have focused on education have typically specified, at least, a bachelor's degree. In terms of income, researchers have relied upon an income range as well as median household income to determine middle-class status (Haynes, 2008; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro, 2004). Middle-class occupations have been assessed on the basis of blue-collar versus white-collar professions, as well as the use of an 'occupational prestige index', which is based upon people's rankings of the importance of various occupations (Landry, 1987; Wilson, 1978). Home ownership is often used as a measure of wealth because most Americans have held the vast majority of their wealth in the form of home equity. Yet, home ownership, like education, income and occupation, is an imperfect measure because large residential inequities exist among the Black and White middle class. For example, the Black middle class tend to live in less socio-economically desirable neighbourhoods, which are in spatial proximity to disadvantaged Black communities (Pattillo, 2013).

The main challenge associated with using objective indicators of socio-economic and class status to define the Black middle class arises when scholars seek to make cross-racial, cross-national and global comparisons. This becomes problematic because of the large racial disparities in income, education, occupation and wealth that exist between Black and White populations, as well as national and contextual differences. The United States and South Africa provide a vivid example of these differences (see Table 1 for a detailed account of these variables). A very interesting and compelling piece of the larger sociological puzzle is how to compare the Black middle class in the United States to the Black middle class in South Africa and to the Black middle class globally. For example, the class measures used in the United States are potentially irrelevant in South Africa, especially among Black populations.

Homeownership is often used as a measure of wealth, yet racial disparities exist. But this is not the case for Africans in general, especially South Africans.

Table 1. *Comparing U.S. and South African class structures across four socio-economic indicators*

Class	U.S.		Black population in U.S.		South Africa		Black population in South Africa	
	No. of individuals	%	No. of individuals	%	No. of individuals	%	No. of individuals	%
Income (over 18)								
Less than \$10,000	8,274,388	7.2	1,988,803	14.6	27,173,346	86.9	22,407,130	92.6
10,000-19,999	12,402,538	10.9	2,129,248	15.6	1,887,090	6.0	972,891	4.0
20,000 - 39,999	23,863,669	20.9	3,395,063	24.9	1,360,082	4.4	559,905	2.3
40,000 - 74,999	31,747,732	27.8	3,464,565	25.4	560,260	1.8	172,797	0.7
75,000 - 149,999	28,163,051	24.7	2,191,678	16.1	171,583	0.5	38,906	0.2
150,000 or more	9,784,618	8.6	450,598	3.3	103,035	0.3	33,667	0.1
Total	114,235,996	100.0	13,619,955	100.0	31,255,396	100.0	24,185,296	100.0
Education (over 25)								
Less than high school	29,898,483	15.0	4,355,718	19.1	22,706,512	88.3	17,709,267	91.9
High School diploma	57,903,353	29.0	7,368,575	32.4	1,070,453	4.2	679,307	3.5
Some post-secondary*	56,197,824	28.1	7,006,464	30.8	753,051	2.9	372,721	1.9
BA degree or higher	55,726,999	27.9	4,027,512	17.7	1,184,310	4.6	506,532	2.6
Total	199,726,659	100.0	22,758,269	100.0	25,714,326	100.0	19,267,827	100.0
Occupation								
Professional	13,675,610	37.7	1,496,808	33.3	3,638,605	25	1,737,477	17
Non-Professional	22,625,466	62.3	3,001,141	66.7	10,830,734	75	8,554,737	83
Total	36,301,076	100.0	4,497,949	100.0	14,469,339	100	10,292,214	100
Homeownership								
Owned	76,089,650	66.6	6,239,661	45.8	7,672,339	53.1	5,801,886	51.1
Rent/Occupied	38,146,346	33.4	7,380,294	54.2	6,292,614	43.5	5,146,489	45.3
Other	NA		NA		485,208	3.4	412,195	3.6
Total	114,235,996	100.0	13,619,955	100.0	14,450,161	100.0	11,360,570	100.0

Source: US (2006–2010 ACS) and South Africa (Census 2011; Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 2011). (© Krish Marsh).

* Some post-secondary education includes associate degrees.

For example, the U.S. Census reported that in 2015 roughly two-thirds of households in the United States owned their homes. Among homeownership rates (by race and ethnicity of the householder), in the fourth-quarter of 2015, 72.2% of the White population were homeowners compared to 41.9% of the Black population. In South Africa, Black homeownership rates are higher than for the United States, but the notion of the home as an asset is a more convoluted comparison.

Keeping with the homeownership example, in the United States, the Black middle class, who own or are purchasing their homes and live in racially integrated neighbourhoods, tend to live near less affluent White communities (Alba, Logan and Stults, 2000). For some middle-class South Africans, while they may be homeowners, they are more likely to own homes in extremely poor and all Black townships, or own a home in the township and live elsewhere, making this objective measure of homeownership less relevant and/or more complicated in a South African context compared to the United States.

Another challenge associated with using objective indicators of socio-economic status to define the Black middle class arises when scholars seek to make middle class cross-racial comparisons. This becomes problematic owing to the large racial disparities in income, education, occupation and wealth that exist between Black and White populations (Carter, 2005; Collins, 1997; Darity and Meyers, 1998; Darity and Mason, 2004; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995, 2006). Therefore, some scholars have moved away from such objective measures and have instead focused more on subjective characteristics, such as lifestyles and values, which have significant meaning among the Black middle class (Frazier, 1957; Pattillo, 1999). For example, irrespective of these racial disparities, Black individuals are increasingly likely to self-identify as middle class, with education and income mainly influencing their identification (Hunt and Ray, 2012). Such findings help improve our understanding of the relative impact of race and class on shaping Black identities globally. Regardless of the measurement used, much of the research in the social sciences asserts that the middle-class position achieved by the Black population is precarious. These large and persistent inequities, between the Black and White middle classes, as well as scholarly disagreement over the definition of class, lead some to question the very existence and/or assume the fragility of a Black middle class in the United States, South Africa and globally.

Racism and micro-aggressions may diminish the benefits typically associated with middle-class status (Hudson et al., 2012), especially for Black people, given the fragility of the Black middle class, the psychological and economical 'Black

tax', which family members feel compelled to pay to support their families on a daily basis, and the continued exposure to discrimination.

For a clear example, below are findings from health research on the Black middle class. Generally, scholars assume that being middle class and having access and exposure to more socio-economic resources serve as protective measures that improve the health of the Black population, as explained in the literature for the United States and implied for South Africa. However, there is a preponderance of literature to suggest that being Black and middle class does not confer better health outcomes for Black people (Cole, 2003; Hudson et al., 2012; Jackson and Williams, 2006; Pearson, 2008; Thomas, 2015; Williams and Mohammed, 2009). Although there is evidence to support that the Black middle class has worse outcomes than the White middle class in the US context, further research is needed to understand the health and well-being of the global Black middle class.

Future research on the global Black middle class

Based on the issues discussed, with regard to the Black population in general and the Black middle class in particular, researchers should compare and analyse the historical context and the current socio-economic similarities and differences of the Black middle class within a global framework. Scholars should explore the ways in which middle class status is subjectively conceptualized among the global Black population. Social scientists should investigate residential choices and compare the levels of residential racial segregation of the global Black middle class. Academics should also examine the neighbourhood preferences and decision-making processes of the global Black middle class to explore how they view a neighbourhood's racial and/or class composition when deciding on housing, as well as how their own racial identity shapes their residential choices.

The potential significance of such scholarship is immense. The first contribution would be multiple publications on the global Black middle class, which would be more inclusive of the context of today's African diaspora. Some relevant and interrelated research questions include: What is the impact on the transfer of wealth and resources, especially as it relates to racial inequality in wealth and resources among the global Black middle class? To what extent does the global middle class rely on Western images or notions of Black and/or White middle class lifestyles to shape the definition of middle class? What factors led the global Black middle class to live in segregated or integrated

neighbourhoods? What are the mental and physical stressors related to movement into the global Black middle class? Does middle-class status have the same payoff in terms of improved health for the global Black population as it does for members of the dominant middle class? The potential outcomes of these research questions and publications would lead to a body of additional and ongoing international collaborations. These collaborations could serve as a foundation for a broader research agenda and, potentially, an international research centre focused on the global Black middle class.

The second contribution would be the potential to support an exchange programme between global Black undergraduate and graduate students. Given the globalization of knowledge, an exchange course could deepen students' understanding of global social processes and enlighten them on the Black middle class, as seen within a different context. This would ultimately transform their understanding of the global Black middle class.

The last contribution would be the ability for scholarship on the global Black middle class to inform policy, especially policies to generate wealth and wealth management, for previously excluded racial, ethnic and/or social groups around the globe.

An established body of scholarship on the Black middle class in the United States and South Africa is present in the literature, and scholarship is emerging on the Black middle class across the continent of Africa. The latest evidence of this is the edited volume, *The Rise of Africa's Middle Class*, published in 2016 by Henning Melber. Some of the relevant chapters in the anthology include: 'Kenya – an unconscious middle class? Between regional-ethnic political mobilisation and middle-class lifestyles' by Dieter Neubert (pp. 110–128); 'Middle class activism in Nigeria: from nationalist struggle to social media campaign' by Nkwachukwu Orji (pp. 129–146); and 'Emerging middle-class political subjectivities in post-war Angola' by Jon Schubert (pp. 147–158). The next step is a body of scholarship that is dedicated solely to the global Black middle class.

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ISLAM IN AFRICA

Souleymane Bachir Diagne

Introduction

In 1960, Léopold Sédar Senghor wrote an article entitled, ‘For a cooperation between Islam and Christianity’¹ (Senghor, 1964). This vision stood out. Indeed, in the same year, the world witnessed the independence of a majority of African countries. The political priorities were labelled as ‘nationalism’, ‘socialism’, ‘Pan-Africanism’, ‘non-alignment’, ‘development’, and so on, rather than the role religions could play – positively or negatively – in the construction of the young African nations. It must be specified that the political priorities in question were those of secular elites and intellectuals who come from a tradition that Ousmane Kane called ‘non-Europhone’, that is, they considered that the future lay in the re-Islamization of society and the state.

Senghor considered that African countries should adopt a form of secularism that best corresponded to their different religious variants, while firmly establishing the principle of the separation of religion and state. He called for the neutrality of the state and its distance from all denominations, which would guarantee its secularism. It was thus desirable that Islam and Christianity, in a sense of understanding and convergence, should contribute the power of education towards the work of national construction and development.

1 Text paraphrased in L.S. Senghor, 1964.

Here, we have two remarks. The first is that Senghor only mentioned these two Abrahamic religions because he saw the rapid decline of local religions as already happening and inevitable. The second remark is that for him, on the one hand, 'cooperation' in the process of education and national construction could only exist within an open-minded form of Christianity, reconciled with the evolutionary paradigm as envisioned by the philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. On the other hand, he saw an Islam that had renewed its own principle of evolution, of openness to changing times, of pluralism, an Islam that had integrated a modernist philosophy and a Sufism of action. According to Senghor, such integration was conceived by the philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, who – in pursuing the beliefs of pioneers such as Jamal ad-Dīn al Afghānī – was for him, 'the Muslim Teilhard de Chardin'.

The Muslim tradition in Africa was, therefore, in the mind of the Senegalese philosopher, a translation of this Sufi-tolerant Islam and, at the same time, a calling for a modernist philosophy. In recalling, in broad strokes, the Islamization of the continent, the first question we need to ask is: How was this tradition formed? We will then examine the meaning behind the ideas of a modern 'reconstruction' of 'religious Islamic philosophy', to paraphrase the title of the major work by Muhammad Iqbal. We will conclude by asking the question: What will the face of Islam look like tomorrow as a result?

The making of a tradition

Islam in Africa is the story of an initial meeting under the sign of human and Abrahamic brotherhood when, around the year 615 CE, the pre-eminent Muslim people were exiled from Mecca, before the Hijra, to escape persecution and to find refuge and hospitality with the Negus of Abyssinia. Thus, after the period of 645 CE (and the founding of the Fustat citadel, which eventually became Cairo in 969 CE), in the first decade of the eighth century, Islam was implanted in North Africa (before extending to the Iberian Peninsula) where it witnessed a history of slow penetration across the continent, from north to south, from the desert shores to the west and to the centre of the continent. This penetration also came from the Indian Ocean in Eastern Africa. This history is thus a tradition of learning and teaching, an intellectual and spiritual history that shaped the Muslim religion in Africa, which, for the most part, but not always, was the face of pacifism, pluralism and tolerance.

For a brief history in the Islamization of the continent south of the Sahara, let us first consider West Africa. The region has certainly experienced wars waged in the name of religion, especially during the nineteenth century, led in 1804 by Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817) in the region of present-day Nigeria and Cameroon. This was followed by the war in the mid-nineteenth century (from 1852 to 1864) in present-day Mali, led by Sheikh al-Hajj Umar Tall (1797-1864). These *jihads* thus prolonged the movements led by Muslim leaders during the previous century against traditional rulers. They also prolonged the bloody violence experienced by the populations as a result of the involvement of Muslim leaders in the slave trade that was established by European states. Thus, in 1776, the revolution in the Fouta (a region of the valley of Senegal) replaced the traditional Denianke Dynasty by a regime of *almamiyya* (an imamat), which originally took an anti-slavery stance, and whose historical importance is particularly noteworthy. Nevertheless, generally-speaking, the history of the Islamization of West Africa was less owed to states and empires than of educated merchants. After all, it was the trade routes that carried the message of religion to every part of the continent, even further south. Some ethnic groups, who traditionally were traders, particularly stood out in the history of the expansion of Islam in the region.

In East Africa, Islam was first a 'religion of ports' (Fischer, 1970, p. 381) facing the Indian Ocean and mainly in interaction with populations from the south of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. It was not until the nineteenth century that it penetrated inland. In this region, such as West Africa, the pace and acceleration of Islamization was also, paradoxically, a consequence of European colonization. The destruction of traditional kingdoms and the establishment of an infrastructure of colonial administration also facilitated a faster penetration of Islam into areas that would otherwise not have been well integrated nor considered open areas for Muslims. The primary actors of Islamization, who were the leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, essentially used all their powers to attract populations and to thwart assimilation by Europeans through the strength of resistance as a result of a self-assured Muslim identity.

Islamization was also, and perhaps above all, the development of a spiritual and intellectual tradition. Against the colonial discourse that fabricated a divide between two worlds separated by the desert (a north emerging from the 'Orientalist' science, and a south enlightened by ethnology, the science of 'oral societies'), we must recall that the Sahara has always been an expanse for voyages and exchanges, criss-crossed by trans-Saharan routes. How many goods and enslaved peoples have these routes seen? These routes also witnessed the transit of books, manuscripts, paper, ideas, pilgrims going to Mecca, and

numerous scholars and researchers from the major intellectual centres of the Muslim world, especially from Egypt.

The famous phrase *translatio studiorum* (literally, the transfer of knowledge), which was used in the European Middle Ages when referring to the transmission of sciences from the Greek world to Latin Christianity in the West, is not a simple unilinear path that led from Athens to Rome and Rome to the Western empire. The *translatio studiorum* was also the path that crossed from Athens to Baghdad, to Cordoba, Fez, and to Timbuktu. The history of philosophy in Africa would thus be incomplete and distorted if it did not take into account the tradition of studying Aristotle's logic or a reflection of the elements of Neoplatonic philosophy in the metaphysics of mysticism found in West Africa and in intellectual centres like Timbuktu, or in East Africa in the Swahili world. The study of the tradition of scholarship in sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing key developments, as witnessed, in particular, by the manuscripts of Timbuktu. The writings of the non-Europhone African intellectuals – as Ousmane Kane called them – i.e. those writing in Arabic or in *ajami* and not in European languages, are the subject of promising research (Kane, 2016; Ngom, 2016). In general, it is important to take full measure of the significance of the Islamization of the continent as a factor of development in the same way that it does not divide but unites the Sahara of its intellectual tradition, which awaits (re)discovery.

This intellectual and spiritual tradition was the fruit of the work of *ulama* (Muslim scholars) who sought to win hearts and minds in moving towards Islam through education rather than coercion. The *ulama* thus cultivated a pacifist philosophy in the belief that the fury of the *jihad* will always achieve infinitely less than the patience of the educators. Thus, to take the example of West Africa, it is important to underline the key role played by the Jakhanke², an ethnic group that specialized in training scholarly missionaries who, for centuries, created Islamic educational centres in the region.

The pacifist tradition thus established in West Africa rightly bears the name of the founding ancestor recognized by the Jakhanke, Al Hajj Salim Suware, who lived in the thirteenth century. It is by reaffirming this tradition that the Jakhanke responded to the test of colonization itself, denouncing the *ulama*, some of whom launched *jihads* against European presence. Like the leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, they were convinced that the real fight was that of education against depersonalization. This philosophy has given Islam, in Africa, its key features.

2 The Jakhanke are the subject of an important study in the work of Lamin Sanneh, *Beyond Jihad. The Pacifist Tradition in West African Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2016.

Reconstructing religious thought in Islam

Published in 1930, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is the title of a major book by the Indian philosopher, poet and statesman Mohammed Iqbal, who Senghor considered as the 'Muslim Teilhard de Chardin', as previously mentioned. No doubt Senghor had discovered the ideas of Mohammed Iqbal when the French translation (in 1955) of his main work was followed by some of his poetic collections. Here, Iqbal described the power of his philosophy to revitalize Muslim ideals, which he felt had become stagnant. For Iqbal, the task of the Muslim intellectuals of his generation, but especially those who had yet to come, was to rediscover the spirit of Islam as a movement; an active, living, creative response to the ongoing challenges. He was against the idea of preserving the past, even though for some, ever-changing time is seen as the enemy, and the past must be preserved in its original, pure form. But Mohammed Iqbal did not see the concept of time as a loss but as an unravelling and an evolution of meaning. This is how he interpreted the prophetic saying, 'Do not denigrate time because time is God'. Iqbal invites us to understand time as a 'creative evolution, as a vital impulse'.

Indeed, 'creative evolution' and 'vital impulse' are known key concepts of Henri Bergson's philosophy (1859-1941). For Iqbal, the notions of the French philosopher are important (as it is for Senghor) because they correspond to the true evolutionary and open cosmology of the Qur'an, with which Muslims today must learn how to reconnect, in opposition to an intellectual history that, in the past, had led them to adopt a closed cosmology. In this cosmology, innovation became blameworthy because any novelty is, by definition, a loss. Only fidelity of thought can be considered worthy, a static imitation reconstituted as a 'model of the ancients'.

It is from this paradigm that Bergson's vital philosophy allows one to emerge. Life itself is a continuous innovation (God being engaged in a new creation daily, according to a Qur'anic quote often made by Iqbal), and the human mission must be constantly tasked with the very movement of life. This is what Islam means by its endorsement of modernism, which has nothing to do with adaptation techniques or engineering with alien external factors called 'modernism'. The concept of 'reconstruction' of the ideas advanced by Islam is not to be understood as an 'adaptation' or imitation (in its desire to repeat itself, of an outside model or coming from within), but as the revitalization of a principle of movement, to emerge from the freeze that occurred in the thirteenth century.

This is the broad, cosmic definition that goes beyond the mere legal significance of *ijtihad*, understood as the effort involved in interpreting/adapting to the movement of life. For this reason, it can be said that the *mujtahid* (the one who produces the effort of interpretation) is none other than the *mujadid* (the one who renews, who achieves rebirth), adding that it is not about individuals or 'heroes'; rather, it is about socio-political and cultural movements.

It is not surprising then that Iqbal's ideas on the 'reconstruction of the religious notions of Islam' also had a great influence on many Muslim intellectuals on the African continent, but also on those like Senghor. The adherence to an evolutionary paradigm also demonstrates the degree of Bergson's early influence, whose works were translated in Egypt and read in the Arab-Islamic world in Africa and elsewhere. It should be noted that the Tunisian, Mohammed Talbi, who passed away in 2017, said he was inspired by the notions of the French philosopher in his reflection on the conditions of a modern and open Islam in the world. This was also the case of the Muslim politician and intellectual Mamadou Dia (1910-2009), a long-time political companion of L.S. Senghor until the breakup of their alliance in 1963.

This intellectual openness was manifested in the political reflection contained in the important work published in 1928 by the Egyptian Ali Abd al-Raziq under the title *Islam and the Foundations of Power*, following the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Reacting to the end of this political institution that had, until then, been the symbol of continuity between the first Muslim community of the seventh century and contemporary Muslim societies, the Egyptian thinker stated in his book that this form of state was adequate within the political and human framework of its time, but that, post-1924, the challenges faced by the Islamic world demanded new answers. These would include the creation of political institutions by the different Muslim societies, which would enable them to develop into dynamic, modern republics. It should also be noted that Iqbal declared, around the same period, that the Caliphate was no longer a vital model and that the Islamic community must now think of itself as 'a living family of republics'.

At the centre of Abd al-Raziq's thoughts, he questioned the accepted idea that there is, in essence, no separation between religion and politics in Islam. In reality, his book explains that this separation is, in fact, *ab initio*. Opposed to this understanding of the meaning behind the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate lies the explanation provided by the Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. The goal of this organization was to re-establish an Islam in which, according to the words of its founder, lies a

‘government’ that does not distinguish between religion and politics. This concept can be labelled as ‘Islamism’ in the sense that it defines religion as an ideology that seeks to establish ‘Islamic law’ as a principle of organization of society and state. In Islamism, the idea is that institutions governed in Muslim societies by human laws, within the framework of the nation-state, are a form of associationism (Westerlund and Rosander, 1997, p. 309).

Islamism first developed in different forms in North Africa and then in sub-Saharan Africa from the 1950s onwards. However, it was especially in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s that this development resulted in the proliferation of Islamist organizations opposed to, what they regarded as, the political, economic and cultural influence of the West, as well as authoritarian state apparatuses they regarded as objective allies of this same West. They also opposed the Sufi brotherhoods that gave their face to Islam in Africa, which they considered as blameworthy innovations worthy of eradication while restoring religion to its primitive purity, as lived and practised by ‘pious ancestors’ (the *Salāf*). The situation in Africa today could thus be seen as a confrontation between Sufis and Islamists.³

Between pluralism and Islamism: what will be the face of Islam in tomorrow’s Africa?

We must be wary of two simplistic affirmations: first, the division of Muslims between the ‘good’ non-violent Sufis and the violent-prone Salafists; second, the idea that African Islam, especially its sub-Saharan component, is the very incarnation of this tolerant Sufi Islam, steeped in a syncretism that would be threatened by a purist and closed Middle Eastern version of Islam that comes from the outside.

If we begin with the affirmation of African Islam as Sufi *par excellence* and embedded in syncretism, we must realize that it is no different from what we see in other parts of the Islamic world. Sufism is everywhere in the Muslim world, existing in different forms of popular belief, where it is entrenched in many societies. In addition, to identify Salafism with violence does not do justice to the philosophy – overall pacifist – of Salafism, which rests on the will to faithfully follow the tradition established by the first generation of Muslims, devoid of any innovations; it must be clear, this does not preclude the concept of being

3 ‘Confrontations (*encounters*) between Sufis and Islamists’, as seen under the title of the volume edited by David Westerlund and Eva Evers Rosander (1997).

‘modernist’ in its own way. As claimed by the theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who refused the idea that legal decisions should depend on reasoning by analogy or a consensus established at a given moment in a Salafist manner, like Wahhabism, which draws inspiration from pious ancestors as a means of renewal.

On the other hand, it is not always true that Sufism forbids armed struggle. When France set out to conquer Algeria in 1830, the emir, Abd el Kader, a leader in the Qadiriyya way, took up arms, calling the war of resistance against the invader as ‘holy’. It is important to recall that Usman dan Fodio was also a Qadiri leader and founder of the Sokoto Caliphate who waged a ‘holy war’ in the early nineteenth century, which was followed later, in the middle of the nineteenth century, by El Hadj Umar Tall al Fūtī, calif of the Tijaniyya brotherhood for West Africa.

Hence, it must be clarified that there is indeed a polarity with, on the one hand, what one could characterize as ‘Sufi modernist’ with its metaphysical philosophy, and, on the other hand, militant and exclusivist Islamism. The question is not, in fact, whether it is this or that philosophy; it is a question of exclusivism: the absolute rejection of pluralism. For if it is not necessary to identify Salafism with militarized violence. It must be said that the exclusivism that characterizes it is an affirmation, in the practice of excommunication of all those who do not share the same views, of a first symbolic violence that can easily lead to armed violence.

In contrast, the metaphysics of Sufism is pluralistic. It is attentive to the unity of God’s desire, founded on all the ways in which it is translated. It naturally welcomes the plurality of expressions of faith, including even ‘Godlessness’. In these opposing forces, today’s Islam in Africa is a challenge. This is why we see, what we could call, ‘Sufism policies’ to describe the effort to promote the role and influence of the *zawiya* (brotherhoods) in many countries with a strong Muslim demography. This is the case, for example, in Morocco, where periodic events, such as the Festival of World Sacred Music in Fez, are also a means of demonstrating against Islamism, with the weight of an Islam of enlightened, tolerant and pluralistic spirituality. This is also the case in a country like Senegal.

To apply such a policy of promoting Sufi Islam is to realize that Sufism, as the very nature of an African Islam, will continue in its ‘essence’. The story of the rapid development of Wahhabism in Africa or a radical Salafist movement like Yan Izala⁴ in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon or even Benin⁵ in areas that were

4 The hausa acronym for the Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Restoration of the Sunnah.

5 For a study of this development in different African countries, where the Muslim population is important, from Mauritania to Somalia, from Benin to South Africa, etc., see Benjamin Soares and René Otayek (2007).

traditionally lands of brotherhood Islam, shows that Sufism does not provide immunity against militant Islamism.

It is, of course, African youth who are faced with the tragedy of job shortages and who are tempted by emigration or fanatical radicalization. It is these young people who will shape Islam in Africa. The foreseeable future will depend on the resilience of the modernist philosophy and open pluralistic Sufism. Since the latter essentially identifies with organizations of brotherhood, this future will depend, in part, on the credibility of the leaders of these brotherhoods. It will be determined by the confidence that young people will have in the example set by their leaders, who often seem to forget, in political compromises, the educational mission that Senghor sought for them. Because, in the end, education is the field where the future of Africa will be played.

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CHAPTER 12

EUROPE IN ALGERIAN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Tayeb Chenntouf

Introduction

The weight of history in international relations has increased considerably over recent years. In matters of public debate, statements tend to focus particularly on issues of recall and the potential conflicts that arise therein. In the academic field, there is a focus on educational curricula, textbooks and the training of teachers. This chapter aims to identify the messages that are communicated by schools by analysing the textbooks used in Algeria since independence in 1962. The representations conveyed to pupils are examined in detail. This is less a matter of identifying conventional clichés and stereotypes than of plotting the ambivalent image of Europe as conveyed through these textbooks. However, the chapter begins with a brief review of the role of the textbook in teaching history.

The role of the history textbook

In the current transitional phase, the place occupied by the textbook is extremely complex, not least because several generations of textbooks are in use. In addition, their use in the classroom and/or at home is not fully understood. Yet they play an important role in learning about history, notwithstanding the

existence of numerous competing sources which, outside school, disseminate information and representations of European history.

The first generation of textbooks emerged in the wake of Algerian independence in 1962. The Ordinance of 16th April 1976 fundamentally reformed the education system, which had been inherited from the colonial era with the establishment of basic schools that were to be attended by children up to the age of 16. Curricula, textbooks and the teaching profession very rapidly assumed an Algerian perspective.

The teaching of history occupies an important place at every level of schooling. The same Ordinance confers a number of objectives on teaching history, together with other social sciences. Schools are required to communicate the fundamentals of social sciences, specifically historical, political, moral and religious knowledge, in order to allow pupils to fully understand the appointed purpose of the Algerian nation and the revolution, together with laws governing social development, but also to acquire the behaviours and values of Islam and moral socialism (Official Journal of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, 25th May 1976, Article 25).

History was taught from the 5th year of basic schooling onwards, up to the end of secondary studies and the *Baccalauréat*. Included in both literary and scientific studies, it formed part of the examination for the basic school certificate (coefficient 3) and for the Baccalaureate, with a coefficient of 4 for literary studies and 2 for scientific studies. Textbooks were of poor material quality (in terms of paper and printing), and included few illustrations, maps, coloured diagrams or statistics. Their content was rigidly structured, leaving little scope for initiative on the part of teachers and pupils. These were not works of consultation and reference, which would enable the mutual structuring of historical knowledge. Additionally, for many pupils, textbooks represented the only means of access to a written culture.

These textbooks, and the teaching of history itself, were the subject of extensive criticisms in the decade from 1980 to 1990. The 'urban riots' of October 1988 and the emergence of Islamism, in which young people assumed an important role in the years from 1990 to 1992, were partially or wholly attributable to the education system. The teaching of history was therefore particularly challenged.

Under the reforms introduced from 2003 to 2004 onwards, history was classified as a structurally-defining discipline, in the same way as Arabic language or Islamic studies. The place of honour assigned to these three disciplines in school curricula was intended to promote the inculcation of 'national values' and 'the structural definition of an Algerian character' in the minds of pupils.

History was introduced from the third year of primary schooling onwards, rather than the fifth year. The time dedicated to history in primary schools was tripled from 20 to 60 hours a year. New textbooks were introduced progressively from the start of the autumn term of the 2003–2004 academic year. The changes introduced were less concerned with content than with the didactic approach to history. Target-based pedagogy was abandoned in favour of pedagogy for the development of skills. Lessons were now delivered in the context of teaching units. Maps and statistics were more numerous. The same applied to illustrations, the quality of which was improved. The introduction of these new and enriched textbooks is an effective indicator of the new policies pursued. The authors of the textbooks explained to both teachers and pupils how to use them in the classroom and at home. The accent was placed on the active construction of historical knowledge, based on the acquisition of the requisite skills.

Europe in textbooks

In textbooks, Europe is not considered an entity per se. It does not constitute a geographical, cultural, political or economic space. The terms ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ only occur in lessons devoted to the Renaissance, the political revolutions of the eighteenth century, the industrial revolutions, and the imperialist regimes of the nineteenth century. However, European countries feature strongly in terms of their internal history, their relations with the rest of the world, and their activities outside Europe. The ‘prescribed curriculum’ assigns particular importance to the latter of these. The history of France also features prominently.

Compulsory schooling starts at the age of six. Pupils receive their first introduction to the subject of history between the ages of eight and ten, in years 5 and 6 of primary schooling. Curricula and textbooks are entirely devoted to contemporary Algerian history, which addresses colonial occupation, anti-colonial political struggles and the war of independence.

The year 5 textbook, following an introduction to the concepts of duration, events and documentation, deals with the entire Algerian Revolution, from 1954 to 1962. It describes the origins of the Revolution, the National Liberation Front, the National Liberation Army, repression by the military and police forces, and popular involvement in the struggle. The final lesson is conceived as a conclusion, describing the development of socialism (first generation textbook) or the construction of a modern state (second generation textbook).

The textbook ends with a portrait gallery of heroes of the revolution. The year 5 textbook ends with an evaluation of the 'price of independence and freedom', setting out statistics on the human and material cost of the revolution:

- 1,500,000 martyrs
- 300,000 orphans
- 400,000 arrests
- 300,000 refugees in Morocco and Tunisia
- 600,000 persons displaced to camps
- 8,000 villages destroyed

The year 6 textbook goes back to the colonial era, examining the state of Algeria before French colonization, the origins and methods of colonial conquest, resistance to military occupation, colonial policy and its consequences, the insurrections of the nineteenth century, the events of 8 May 1945, and the Algerian Revolution, which began on 1 November 1954. This textbook is also illustrated with numerous portraits of heroes in the anti-colonial struggle.

In middle school education, which now lasts for just three years rather than four, textbooks address prehistory, antiquity, the Middle Ages and the modern era. This is the level where Europe is least represented. In the first year, part of the textbook is devoted to ancient civilizations, including the civilizations of Greece and Rome. Two lessons analyse the colonization of North Africa by Rome, and the policy of assimilation which it pursued. The final lesson of the year addresses the Vandal invasions and the emergence of independent local kingdoms. In the second year, the involvement of Europe is limited to highlighting the role of North Africa in the expansion of Islam from the seventh and eighth centuries onwards. The textbook includes the conquests of Spain and Sicily. It places the Crusades in the context of all the attacks committed against the Muslim world. The lesson devoted to this subject is followed by the lesson on the Mongol invasions. The Crusades are presented as a series of Christian forays against the Muslim world between 1026 and 1291, including confrontations in Sicily and Andalusia. Their consequences in Europe include the advancement of warfare, the reinforcement of royal power, the expansion of trade, and agricultural progress.

In the third year, the Europe of the late Middle Ages (from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century) makes an appearance through geographical discoveries and the advent of the Renaissance. Factors cited in the latter, in addition to cultural and intellectual progress, include the Crusades and the influences of the Arab-Muslim civilization. The same textbook addresses the French military

occupation of Algeria (1830) and the resulting resistance movements in the nineteenth century.

The third-year textbook combines Arab-Islamic influences, geographical discoveries and the growth of maritime trade as a means of explaining the conditions of the Renaissance. The same number of pages are devoted to all these aspects. The influences of Arab-Muslim civilization originated in the eleventh century from the Sicilian School, North Africa (Béjaïa) and from Andalusia in all fields of Arabic science, which gave rise to a movement of religious reformation, followed by the cultural Renaissance in Europe. Two colour illustrations feature on the opposing page, with the map of the world plotted by Al Idrissi and Muslim scholars who had studied astronomy.

In secondary education, the history of Europe assumes a more substantial role, although its relative proportion in the new textbooks has been reduced. In the first year of secondary education, Europe is included in the study of the external relations of the Muslim world and their consequences. Three chapters are then devoted to the internal history of European countries, including issues relating to the Renaissance, key political revolutions of the eighteenth century (in England, France and the Americas), industrial revolutions, national movements, and imperial European regimes. In the lesson that describes the external relations of Algeria, its relations with Europe and the United States are considered alongside relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Near East.

Following the enumeration of the causes of the French Revolution, and how it unfolded, the textbook describes its six main consequences:

- The end of royal power and the birth of the French Republic, based upon the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, and a constitutionality based on the concept of the people as a source of power.
- The popular nature of the revolution, involving the use of violence as a means to constrain the bourgeoisie, to enact measures in favour of the people and combat European powers.
- The separation of the state from religion, and the downgrading of the role of the Church.
- The administrative, centralized unification of France and the emergence of an elected authority.
- Economic and social reforms.
- The spread of the revolution abroad through the 'Napoleonic Wars'.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (adopted in France in 1789) is reproduced in full on the following page of the textbook. According

to the textbook, the concept of the Industrial Revolution encompasses 'a series of changes which occurred in Europe from the mid-18th century onwards, and throughout the 19th century. These involved changes to the methods and means of production, and ultimately to the structures of the economy, society, national territory and political organization in Europe and throughout the world. The industrial revolution originated in England'.

The imperialist movement is presented as 'the manifestation of a policy adopted by European nations vis-à-vis other countries for the occupation of their lands, the subjugation of their people, and the exploitation of their wealth and human resources, in pursuit of their own interests. This gave rise to competition between European countries in the 19th century'. The textbook reproduces a table of European emigration between 1847 and 1932, broken down according to geographic origin: the British Isles (18,000), Italy (10,092,000), Austria-Hungary (5,196,000), Germany (4,889,000) and Russia (2,253,000). The lesson is illustrated by a photograph of Black Africans captured in chains in the bush (three adults and two children). The second-year secondary textbook contains the biggest proportion of material on European history. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) ranks among the major world-changing events of the nineteenth century. The whole second unit is devoted to relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. There is a lesson each on the French protectorate in Tunisia (1881), the British protectorate in Egypt (1881), the Franco-Spanish protectorate in Morocco (1912), and the Italian occupation of Libya (1911).

The Italian colonization of Libya (1911-1912) features in the second year of secondary education and discusses the question of the role of the Orient in the Arab world. The Italian defeat at Adwa in Ethiopia in 1896 preceded the Italian Turkish War in 1911-1912, followed by the emergence of the colonial ambitions of Benito Mussolini after he seized power in 1922. Military colonization operations themselves receive less consideration than the international context (the interventions of France and Great Britain), and the resistance movements, led by Idriss al-Senussi and Omar al-Mukhtar, are described in considerable detail.

The development of the French colonial occupation of Algeria under the Third Republic constitutes the third teaching unit, including a presentation of the colonial administration and its economic and financial organization, and the social and cultural development of Algeria. The textbook considers the *Code de l'Indigénat* (or 'Native Regulations') as a symbol of the colonial situation, which was a series of legal rules enacted by the colonial administration. Published in 1881, it listed 41 penalties, and it was applied until 1927. In every sector, it transferred judicial powers exclusively to the central administrative

authority and removed the guarantees that protected the individual against the government, which exercised sole authority.

- Full powers were vested in the Governor Generals of Algeria, in their capacity as the protector of general security, to impose penalties without the referral of cases to the courts.
- Collective liability was assigned to tribal populations for crimes committed within their territory.
- The government was entitled to arrest and imprison any person for damage to property, with no referral to a court of law.
- Algerians were compelled to carry a travel permit if they wished to make a journey.
- Any attack on France or European property, or any unauthorized opening of a school or a place of worship, was classified as a crime. Penalties varied according to the severity of the offence: a 15 francs fine or 5 days' imprisonment for the least severe.

The textbook devotes a number of lessons to relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe under the general title 'The Question of the Orient'. The first of these lessons covers the period from 1453 to 1870, tracing the empire from its origins and following its stages of development from 1453 to 1535, and thereafter from 1535 to 1830, and from 1830 to 1870. The second lesson focuses on the period from 1875 to 1878, which deals with the entire Balkan crisis. The following two lessons analyse the French protectorate in Tunisia (1881) and the British protectorate in Egypt (1882-1892). No fewer than 34 pages are devoted to the Ottoman Empire. Confrontations with Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are mentioned, but the accent is placed on Greek independence, followed by the colonization of Algeria and Libya and the protectorates in Tunisia and Egypt. The internal and external causes of the weakening of the empire are presented in a balanced manner.

The fourth teaching unit addresses resistance movements and anti-colonial insurrections in Algeria, followed by political and cultural mobilization and emigration. The development of the United States (covering the period 1865-1914) and Japan (1868-1914) are included in the same teaching unit.

The sixth teaching unit deals with the First World War and its consequences, as well as the Peace Conferences in France (1919-1920) and the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920. Consideration is also given to European interventions in the Fertile Crescent, British policy in Palestine in 1920, and political struggles in Algeria between the wars.

The seventh teaching unit analyses fascism in Italy, the economic crisis of 1929, Germany in the inter-war years, and Nazism. The textbook applies three principles that define the ideology and philosophy of the fascist state: i) a strong state, which marshals the entire population; ii) institutions that control and organize a nation; and iii) the promotion of fascism as a source of positive national values, morals, opinions and attitudes. The fascist state rests on a foundation of moral discipline as a means of moulding a strong and vigorous nation, consistently effective and committed to labour, struggle and sacrifice.

Nazism was based upon the purity of the German race, the commitment of the German people to their nation, its history and civilization, as well as German pride in its customs, traditions and heritage, and the unity of the German people behind the Führer. Nazism was intended to secure reparations for the negative terms of the Treaty of Versailles, and to achieve German dominance of Europe and the world through a strong, expansive and populous nation, with a mission to control and dominate the world.

The eighth teaching unit is entirely devoted to the development of international relations up to 1939. The textbook for the third year of secondary education forms part of the second generation of textbooks. Again, it addresses relations between Europe and the rest of the world in the interwar period, and devotes three chapters to the Second World War and its consequences, together with three chapters on the development of international relations between 1945 and 1990, including the origins and the end of the Cold War. The final lesson analyses the organization of the new world order, with a single superpower in the 1990s.

Two Europes

In practice, the representation of Europe is not unambiguous. It cannot always be identified by methods used to compare textbooks. In Algerian textbooks – compared with the history of other regions of the world – the history of Europe predominates. What emerges is a two-fold history and, ultimately, a two-fold Europe. Moreover, contrary to appearances, textbooks adopt a European representation of the history of Europe and of the world.

Analyses of textbooks are highly diverse and follow three main principles. The first of these analyses focuses on historical content, which may give rise to a two-fold critique. Firstly, factual assurance is required so as to eliminate historical errors and to ensure that the dates included are relevant. Moreover,

it is required that the content includes the latest results of university research. The discrepancy between the content in Algerian textbooks and the results of research on European history is substantial. This is due to the age of textbooks, as well as numerous reissues, which have not been updated. Failure to incorporate research results is also due to the training received by textbook authors.

The second set of approaches involves the identification of the values, outcomes and ideologies communicated by textbooks. These are the most long-standing approaches, and they remain the most up to date for critiquing any form of dominant ideology and/or subversive political bias. In terms of international comparison, these approaches identify clichés, stereotypes and prejudices relating to other countries and societies. Comparative international analysis, as we know it, started at the end of the First World War and the rise of nationalist movements in Europe. This intensified in the 1980s following the worldwide resurgence of nationalism and the advent of globalization. Such an analysis endeavours to eliminate sources of tension between countries, foster mutual understanding, and create a situation of world peace. The Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany, sponsors a number of bilateral cooperation initiatives between historians and teachers in the two countries for the purpose of comparisons and recommendations on curricula, textbooks, and the coverage of certain subjects and questions.

UNESCO has been working in this field since its establishment in 1945. It recommends the application of eight criteria:

1. Information provided by textbooks must be accurate and comprehensive.
2. Illustrations, maps and diagrams must be up to date and accurate.
3. The achievements of other peoples must be acknowledged.
4. Political conflicts must be presented objectively and honestly.
5. Wording liable to incite prejudice, misunderstanding or conflict should be avoided.
6. Ideals of liberty, dignity and fraternity should be advocated.
7. Standards of equality should be applied.
8. Emphasis should be placed on the need for international cooperation, the formation of common human ideals, the promotion of peace, and respect for the rule of law.

For the most part, these potential criticisms do not apply to Algerian textbooks. In practice, these texts reflect a strong presence of Europe, or European countries, compared to other regions and continents of the world. The representation of European history is extremely complex. At the very least, this representation is ambivalent, with textbooks conveying the image of two Europes.

Aside from Algeria, which evidently is the main focus in textbooks, Europe ranks as the leading region covered in history lessons, even ahead of North Africa and the Orient. The Orient first appears in the first year of middle school with the early history of the Far East. This is followed by the relationship between North Africa and ancient Egypt and Syria. In the second year of middle school, textbooks address the Arabic-Muslim states and the birth of Islam, the Hijra of the prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, and political development and civilization, comprising four lessons in total. The third year of middle school tackles the emergence of the Muslim Orient at the end of the Abbasid era (750 CE to 1258 CE), followed by the Ottoman Empire from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century.

African countries enter history at the time of the rise of Islam in the Middle Ages, and thereafter during the era of colonization and decolonization. The history of the American continent is summarized by the American Revolution of the eighteenth century, relations between Algeria and the United States in the modern era (addressed in the first year of secondary education), and the development of the United States from 1865 to 1914 (covered in the second year). In terms of Asian history, only Japan is covered (from 1868 to 1914) and the interwar years, as well as China (from 1850 to 1939). India is completely absent, as is the remainder of the continent.

The history of civilizations is also limited. In the first year of middle school, the ancient civilizations of Mediterranean and Libyco-Punic are considered. In the third year of secondary education, one lesson focuses on twentieth century civilization and, in this context, Arab-Islamic civilization. Ancient Oriental and Chinese civilizations are only briefly touched upon. African and South American civilizations are not mentioned.

In practice, textbooks lean towards Europe and a European history of the world. The actual history of Europe is two-fold: it includes the history of European 'Enlightenment' and the history of Europe's conflictual relations with the rest of the world.

The third-year middle-school textbook addresses Europe in the late Middle Ages, with three lessons on the Renaissance, the influences of Arab-Muslim civilization, and factors involved in the Renaissance, including the Crusades. In the third year of secondary education, pupils discover the major revolutions of Europe between 1453 and 1914, including one lesson on the Renaissance, a second on the political revolutions of the eighteenth century (in England, France and the United States), and a final lesson devoted to industrial revolutions, national movements, European imperialism and the resulting resistance

movements, which are an omnipresent feature throughout the pupils' schooling. The War of Independence in Algeria (1954-1962) appears in the textbook as early as primary school. Year 6 includes a review of French military conquests, colonial policy and methods of colonization, followed by the insurrections of the nineteenth century, political struggles and the War of Independence.

The third-year middle school textbook analyses the Roman colonization of North Africa and the Roman policy of assimilation, followed by the Vandal invasions. The third-year middle-school textbook returns to the French occupation of Algeria (one lesson) and resistance movements.

The curriculum for the second year of secondary education includes no fewer than nine lessons on the Orient (1453-1870) and the protectorates in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya. The development of French colonization in Algeria under the Third Republic is addressed in four lessons. This is followed by the resulting responses to colonization and uprisings, comprising four lessons. Finally, relations between Europe and the Middle East after 1918 are addressed. In the third year of secondary education, decolonization throughout the world is presented in five lessons. This is followed by Palestine (one lesson), Indochina from 1946 to 1954 (one lesson), the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 (one lesson), liberation movements in North Africa (one lesson) and Algeria from 1945 to 1962 (one lesson). The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) is addressed for the third time in the curriculum in a programme of five lessons.

One may wonder whether educational reforms will substantially change the teaching of history. School curricula and textbooks will undoubtedly continue to play a significant role. Global history constitutes a potentially rich resource for the introduction of revisions. This would respect the history of Europe but also the history of other continents and civilizations.

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AFRICA'S PLACE IN SCHOOL CURRICULA IN BRAZIL

Valter Roberto Silvério and Nilma Lino Gomes

Introduction

The demands of the Black movement in Brazil began to be partially institutionalized in the country's political agenda through Law No. 7716, which became effective on 5 January 1989.¹ On 9 January 2003, at the beginning of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first term in office, Law No. 10.639 was passed, which amended the *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases (LDB)* – the law on the guidelines and bases for national education. The law introduced the obligation to teach Afro-Brazilian and African history and culture as part of the country's elementary education. Two other important laws were No. 12.288 of 20 July 2010² and No. 12.711 of 29 August 2012.³

On the whole, the new legal framework has partially responded to the demands of a series of social struggles developed by the Black population since

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- 1 Law No. 7.716/1989 defines crimes resulting from racial prejudice. It establishes the penalty of imprisonment for those who commit acts of discrimination or prejudice on the grounds of race, colour, ethnicity, religion or national origin. The law became known as *Caó*, in honour of its author, Deputy Carlos Alberto Caó de Oliveira.
 - 2 Law No. 12.288/2010 establishes the Racial Equality Statute, in which Article 1 states that it is 'intended to guarantee the black population effective equal opportunities, defence of individual, collective and diffuse ethnic rights and the fight against discrimination and other forms of ethnic intolerance.'
 - 3 Law No. 12.711/2012, in Article 3, guarantees that 50 per cent of enrolments for every course and cohort, in each institution, will be filled by students who have declared themselves Black, mixed race or Indigenous where the institution is located.

the establishment of the Brazilian Republic in 1889. Relevant milestones of this period, as set out in the literature on the subject, include the emergence of the Black press in the first two decades of the twentieth century: the Frente Negra Brasileira (Brazilian Black Front) of the 1930s, the Teatro Experimental do Negro (Black Experimental Theatre) in the 1940s, and the resurgence of the Movimento Negro Organizado (Organized Black Movement) in 1978. It is important to note that the activities carried out during this period sought to secure subsidies to guide public authority actions. These included conferences, congresses and the creation of associations with different objectives but, generally, they were concerned with the full integration of the Black population in society at large.

What ties all these organizational initiatives is the central demand for more education for this demographic. Actions were indeed instigated to this end using the meagre resources available to the Black community. However, the demand for more education accompanied important social changes. For example, up until the Second World War, integrationist tendencies could be observed among leaders within the Black community, which distanced them from their African origins. During the post-war period, the independence of several states on the African continent, the American Black movement and its civil rights demands, and – in the case of Brazil – the conclusion of the national segment of the UNESCO project related to São Paulo, were all indicative of a climate of social change that impacted the Black population of African origin. This conditioned their possibilities of social ascension in a context of profound social transformations, characterized by the situation of São Paulo as an emerging urban industrial society.

Overview: challenges to Black culture

With regard to São Paulo, Silva (2013) draws our attention to the existence of relations between the Black Cultural Association (Associação Cultural do Negro – ACN) and representatives of the *Négritude* movement in France. The authors also argue that there was a sparse but important flow of ideas between African, African-American and Afro-Brazilian intellectuals between the 1920s and 1960s, which could offer some relevant leads in this debate:

The circulation of ideas on Africa or of African intellectuals and activists in São Paulo still lacks structured research. Memoirs, such as those of the activist José Correia Leite (Leite and Cuti, 1992), or interviews such as that of Oswaldo de Camargo (2007) show that, between 1920 and 1960, black associations in São Paulo had some

degree of contact with translated works, writers, journalists and debates that referred to themes such as pan-Africanism, back to Africa movements, anti-colonial and national liberation struggles, the violence of apartheid, etc. (Silva, 2013a, p. 371).

For the purposes of this chapter, it is most important to note that, by the end of the Second World War, Brazilian Black associations started to move from integration-focused claims, without any explicit mention of a relationship with Africa (inspired by the idea of racial democracy), towards a conscious recognition of African origins, as expressed by Camargo (1961) and quoted by Silva:

Oh Africa! Oh Africa!

My scream is the rattle of a convulsing river... / Of the Nile, ah, my scream is of the Nile... / And what hurts me is the fruit of roots, / oh, raw roots! / of the rough forests of the African land / My cry is a spike that crushes me, / there is a dagger vibrating in me, tearing through me / my poor heart hesitates / between raising or silencing this distressed voice: / Oh Africa! Oh Africa! [...] / My God, why do I exist without message / [...] Lord! Jesus! Christ! / Why am I screaming? (Silva, 2013, p. 276).

Or in the poem 'Banzo (*Ao meu irmão Patrice Lumumba*)' by Eduardo Oliveira (1963) quoted by Silva:

I know, I know that I'm a piece of Africa / hanging on the night of my people / My body bears the mark of lashes / through which the wagons of progress / sought out the furrows of the future / [...] I saw a thousand civilizations / erected by my powerful arms, / a thousand whips unfurling / a desert of pain and disbelief in my soul / announcing the tragedies of Lumumba / [...] I feel the same anguish, the same banzo that filled the sad seas of other centuries / this is why I still listen to the sound of jongo / that made the thousand mocambos dance... / and that still strikes through these plagues today. [...] I know, I know that I'm a piece of Africa / hanging in the night of my people (Silva, 2013, p. 277).

The 1960s would nevertheless witness another major new current, which affected the position of representatives of Black activism within the transnational sphere, namely, the denunciation of Brazilian racism through the allegations of Abdias do Nascimento (2002) in his book *O Brasil na mira do Pan-Africanismo* (Brazil from the perspective of Pan-Africanism). Here, Nascimento describes the history of the rejection of the country's Black population and the path of, what he calls, the 'genocide' of Black Brazilians. This denunciation of the Brazilian racial situation was made in an open letter, dated 1966, to the First World Festival of Black Arts held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966.⁴

4 The full letter appears in the book's appendix between pages 321 and 332 of the second edition (2002).

This contrasted with the prevailing narrative informing intellectuals around the world that Brazil was a racial paradise, a thesis that had been challenged by the results of UNESCO research in São Paulo (Bastide and Fernandes, 1955, 1958, 1971). From the perspective of Black activism, this data was not a sign of bias about being prejudiced but rather the consequence of racial discrimination and racism concealed behind positive representations of miscegenation. There was thus a hidden reproduction of social inequalities rooted in the racialization of the experience of Afro-descendants, which went far beyond any corporeal marks. Hence, the importance of Silva's perspective (2013a; 2013b). Silva presents an analysis of Fanon's reception, at that time, from a hitherto under-explored point of view: that of Black activism.

The author suggests that Fanon's reception in Brazil could be better understood if we focused on this Afro-transatlantic flow of ideas. As is well known, Frantz Fanon actively participated in international debates on the liberation of colonized countries, circulating between the main arenas of anti-colonial political expression (Geismar, 1972; Gordon, 2015; Macey, 2000). The Associação Cultural do Negro (Black Cultural Association), based in São Paulo, was present in one of these spaces, namely, the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists held in Rome in 1959, as demonstrated by Silva (Leite and Cuti, 1992; Silva, 2013a, pp. 517–518) taking up the memoirs of the activist José Correia Leite:

Geraldo Campos de Oliveira [...] attended the Second Congress of Black Writers, held in Rome. [...] There was already a Brazilian representative there, the painter Tibério, who lived in Paris (Silva, 2013a, pp. 517).

According to Faustino (2015), the painter mentioned in José Correia Leite's testimonial 'may possibly be Wilson Tibério (1923–2005), a plastic artist from Rio Grande do Sul who lived in Paris for a long time'. Describing the participants of the First International Congress of Black Writers and Artists held in Paris in 1956, Raissa Brescia dos Reis confirms that: '24 countries from the Americas participated, including Brazil, whose delegate was identified only by the name Tibério' (Reis, 2012, pp. 142–143).

The laws and constitution of a normative field, as previously mentioned, thus go beyond the limits of the sphere of education to become part of the overall agenda for the political struggle of the Brazilian Black population. From the mid-twentieth century, through numerous forms of organization, this population called for the recognition of the contribution of African cultures in forming Brazilian society. The cycle that ended with the presidential sanction

of Law No. 10.639/2003 brought out the contradictions hidden behind the supposed racial democracy and, at the same time, confirmed the Brazilian Black movement as an important political force in the transnational agenda encapsulated by the African diaspora in the Atlantic community. Kabengele Munanga (2000, 2002), for example, brought together 100 years of bibliographic output on Brazil's Black population (between 1900 and 2000) in two volumes, covering approximately 1,300 pages. He makes the following observation:

Studies of the black population really became more diverse in the 1950s. There was a move from seeing this population in a purely historiographical sense – through trafficking, slavery and abolition – or a purely biological sense – in terms of physical differences and as producers of a differentiated culture – to regarding this as a social issue subject to sociological analysis within the anti-racist discourse of the time (Munanga, 2000, p. 9).

The new contours observed by Munanga (2000) since the emergence of what Brazilian literature refers to as 'new social movements' during the opening up of democratic processes, i.e. with the Black population mobilized to join associations, paved the way for new forms of organization, along with the resumption of previous ones. The dissemination of the social and political agenda centred, for example, on the constitution and expansion of human rights, which began to significantly shape the demands of Brazilian civil society groups from the 1980s. In analysing certain developments of the actions and social struggles of the Brazilian Black movement, I argue that these went beyond national borders, becoming part of the rubric of a movement clamouring to participate in a transnational Black African agenda.

Reference to the transnational agenda during this new period was mainly, but not exclusively, related to the so-called re-Africanization process of Bahia. At the time, this process was attributed to the Afro-Bahian carnival blocks, such as *Ilê Aiyê* (1974) and *Olodum* (1979)⁵. More recently, it has also been

5 The 1970s were a time of great cultural, political and behavioural transformations in various parts of the world. The Black population of Salvador, influenced by the Black Power movement, reinvented new ways of affirming their identity. Although persecuted by the religious intolerance of the authorities, the *candomblé terreiros* were important arenas in this process, with strong, characteristic traces also found in the Afro carnival blocks. Salvador's Black population already participated in great numbers in samba schools, *afoxés* (Afro-Brazilian street processions) and the Indian blocks. 1974 saw the creation of the first African carnival block founded in Bahia, *Ilê Aiyê*, created in Curuzu, Liberdade. For the first time, a carnival guild was clearly expressing its protest against racial discrimination in the lyrics of its songs and, at the same time, strongly valuing African aesthetics, culture and history. Other Afro blocks also emerged in the same decade, including *Mutuê* (1975), *Olodum* and *Malê Debalê* (1979), all formed by residents of poor neighbourhoods.

linked to the participation of entities from the Black movement in the process of preparing the Brazilian delegation to the Durban Conference⁶ (resulting in the official recognition by the Brazilian Government of the existence of racism in the country). Another important factor was the approval by the National Education Council (Resolution 001/2004) of the National Guidelines for Race Relations Education and the Teaching of Afro-Brazilian and African History and Culture as a result of the presidential sanction of Law No. 10.639/2003, which amended Law No. 9394/1996: *Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (LDBN)* – the law on the guidelines and bases for national education – which set out mandatory provisions in the aforementioned guidelines.

The constitution of a legal framework establishing the obligatory incorporation of Afro-Brazilian and African history and culture into the school curriculum, from primary school level, is at the centre of the political disputes igniting the debate around Africa's place in the nation. Past and present tensions are being unravelled with regard to how Africans and their descendants should be considered in the history of the country and, consequently, in school curricula. Indeed, certain issues appeared in the course of the twentieth century to indicate the inconsistencies, or lack of correspondence, between theory and social practices, between nation-state and society, and the represented framework and the real-life experience of socially racialized peoples and groups. As regards Africans and Afro-descendants specifically, the predominant national ideologies throughout most of the twentieth century led to their experience being mostly imagined within different nations, especially in the New World. Segato (1998), for example, argues that there is a distinction between form (the way in which Africa is conceived) and the content and diffusion of cultural practices and beliefs associated with the presence of African cultures in the world. Segato defines key questions that must be asked to conduct a thorough investigation of their location and reception (in nations): Where can Africa be found in the nation? What is its place in the formation of the nation itself? How has the African element been processed in the construction of each society in time? How do African traditions find their way into history?

Rather than answering the above questions, we can, in the case of Brazil, identify some of the contemporary paths currently pursued by the Black movement seeking to reunite the Brazilian Black community with its ancestral origins. The course of this reunion is long and tortuous, and it is marked by

6 The Durban Conference: the Third World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in 2001 in Durban, South Africa.

countless attempts at erasing origin and therefore memory in the name of abstract modernity. Nevertheless, the world of cultural practices (the symbolic dimension) has fed information into the social universe (the agency dimension), leading to the real or imaginary reconstruction of several different Africas. The results of this long process of struggle have gained new contours since the 1987 Constituent Assembly of Brazil, synthesizing the demands of the Black movement as articulated over the course of the century. In a context of several different forces coming together, requiring numerous negotiations, these were eventually translated into legal form, thus paving the way for a new post-constitution political context from 1988.

The new context

It is possible to identify two distinct categories of legal claims made by the organized Black movement in Brazil since its 1987 Constituent Assembly, namely:

- (i) those related to the general problems that mainly affect the black population, such as police violence, the issue of prisons, the right to healthcare (particularly for women), access to education, access to work (labour rights for rural labourers and domestic and day workers), access to land, and (ii) those that are more strictly related to race and have what the activists themselves would see as coercive, promotional and educational aims (Santos, 2015).

Since then, these two types of claims, and ethno-racial issues in Brazil in general, have been channelled along three distinct but not always separable 'pathways', both in the 1988 Constitution and in the various initiatives, proposals and social struggles. These can be labelled coercive, promotional and educational.

The coercive route suggests that everyone is equal before the law. Therefore, any discrimination against human rights should be punished as a crime and not subject to bail, and it is up to the judiciary to judge and prosecute on these grounds. The promotional dimension, when identifying any kind of prejudice or privilege due to birth, race, ethnicity, colour, sex, religion, etc., tasks the public powers with the obligation of promoting social, economic and educational equality through specific programmes. The educational pathway establishes education as a universal right. The state's duty to provide it becomes inseparable from the principles of accessibility and equality between men and women and, hence, the need to expand strategic public policy to fight all forms of racism and discrimination. In other words, given our social background, in which differences (racial, ethnic and gender) have historically been the basis of hierarchies, with

private (individual) interests subordinated to public (collective) interests, a new educational direction is needed to empower women and Black students. The school curriculum thus becomes a central element in this argument, since the very representations contained within it can reproduce versions of dominant and subordinate groups in history.

Working with Silva (1999, 2010), we can explore the way in which theory is a representation, an image and a sign of the reality that, chronologically and ontologically, precedes it. We invariably assume the existence of something called a 'curriculum' that is out there waiting to be discovered, described and explained. From this point of view, the curriculum is an object that precedes theory, which only comes onto the scene to discover, describe and explain it. In other words, understanding the way in which the negativity of the Black symbol associated with Africa has been built up in the school curriculum requires, in practical terms, a critical appraisal of what is hidden behind a curriculum or, more precisely, of the status of truth that it has acquired. In general terms, the notion that we will discover the truth by following the school curriculum and, consequently, that there is a correspondence between curriculum and reality, should be profoundly questioned in relation to Africa and Africans, simply because they have been conceived as devoid of history.

The curriculum from a Black Brazilian decolonial perspective

The amendment of the *Lei de Diretrizes e Bases*, Law No. 9394/1996, by Articles 26A and 79B of law No. 10.639/2003 and No. 12.645/2008, introducing the obligatory teaching of Afro-Brazilian, African and Indigenous history, not only meant that this theme could be institutionalized in Brazilian education but also that it could lead to a series of actions to produce educational material, train teachers and conduct diagnostic evaluations. Perhaps one of the most important elements in this process was the inflection all these changes allowed in the Brazilian curriculum. More than an alternative curriculum, this accumulation of educational production, whether through the official channels or created by male and female activists from the Black movement, inside or outside of educational institutions, can be understood as a Black Brazilian decolonial perspective of the curriculum.

Maldonado Torres (2007, p. 131) explains how colonialism remained present throughout the process of building a modern democratic society, and

how coloniality – its derivative – still persists in educational texts, as well as in the criteria for good academic work, culture, common sense, people's self-image, subject aspirations, and many other aspects of our modern experience. The role of the Black population in Brazilian society could be considered the key element in questioning schools and curricula on how issues of colonialism and race were (and still are) treated. Part of the political process developed by the Black movement to denounce racism was the revelation that Brazilian educational institutions and their curricula referred to a Eurocentric framework of knowledge, considered a colonial framework.

Maldonado Torres (2007) emphasizes that we are still living and breathing coloniality in our modern day-to-day lives. From a Black Brazilian decolonial perspective, we could see racism in the Americas and, more specifically, ambiguous Brazilian racism as its beating heart. Political will or emancipatory positioning alone is not enough to decolonize school curricula and implement a Black Brazilian decolonial perspective. Decolonization means breaking with the past in epistemological, political and social terms, not only in the production of teaching materials but also in the various drives and actions mentioned in this chapter as well as changes in national, regional and local educational legislation. Above all, the Black population must be represented in arenas of power and decision-making, academic structures, the management of education and curricula, justice, health and employment. In other words, the decolonization of school curricula from a Black Brazilian perspective must embrace the field of social and power structures through the real-life presence of individuals in spaces where the Black population had previously been under-represented, invisible or subalternized. Moreover, decolonization will not take place solely by convincing society and the world of the need for education and that racism needs to be overcome. Real-life individuals thus lie behind every action initiated as part of the Brazilian political and historical process of fighting racism. These Black men and women have dedicated (and are often still dedicating) part of their lives and their time to epistemological and political activism to reveal latent racism.

The actions of these individuals throughout the history of Brazilian education came to a head in the first decade of the twenty-first century following the 2001 Durban Conference in South Africa, with Brazil recognizing the existence of racism and racial inequalities before an international audience and becoming a signatory to the Durban Action Plan⁷. Since then, the Brazilian State has

7 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA), a UN blueprint for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.

committed to implementing ‘affirmative actions’ in an institutionalized way in a wide range of sectors that include education. This political inflection has led to the aforementioned laws No. 10.639/2003, No. 11.645/2008, No. 12.288/2010, No. 12.711/2012 and No. 12.990/2014. Much more than just legislation committed to guaranteeing political and educational rights for Black Brazilians, these are affirmative action policies aimed to correct the historical inequalities impacting the Black population. They pave the way for the construction of a series of reparation policies that are still being discussed in Brazil.

Brazil is currently making progress in systematizing this Black Brazilian decolonial perspective of the curriculum and increasing its visibility. We can see how this perspective has been consolidated, building on the foundations of the classic book *Pensamento Negro Em Educação No Brasil. Expressões Do Movimento Negro* (Black Thought in Education in Brazil. Expressions of the Black Movement) by educators Petronilha Beatriz Gonçalves e Silva and Lúcia Maria de Assunção Barbosa following the *Pensamento Negro em Educação* (Black Thought in Education) seminar held in 1996 at São Carlos Federal University. Important milestones include a revisiting of works by Black thinkers, such as Lélia González, Beatriz Nascimento, Luiza Bairos, Guerreiro Ramos, Abdias do Nascimento and Milton Santos, as well as Portuguese translations of Franz Fanon, readings of Latin American decolonial and African postcolonial authors, and Black Brazilian works circulated during the Congressos Brasileiros de Pesquisadores/as Negros/as (Brazilian Congresses of Black Researchers) and presented at the Associação Brasileira de Pesquisadores/as Negros/as (Brazilian Association of Black Researchers). It is also important to include the Racial Relations and Education Working Group coordinated by ANPEd⁸ (the National Association of Research and Graduate Studies in Education) as one more arena in which this Black perspective of knowledge and the curriculum is being researched and produced.

With regard to the racial theme and its theoretical and practical consolidation, Brazilian education in the twenty-first century went through a period of decolonial epistemological emergency in times of democratic challenges such as the impeachment of Brazil’s legitimately elected president, Dilma Rousseff, on August 31, 2016. This prevented the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Brazilian Workers’ Party) from continuing in federal government and stifled some of the more progressive parties in power, which were committed to implementing racial issues and promoting racial equality through state policies. A new era of

8 Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Educação.

tension in the struggle between social emancipation and conservative regulation has thus taken hold in Brazil. Certainly, this tension affects the progress of the anti-racist struggle in the country.

Before we begin associating such an emergency solely with the presence of Black thinkers and theoreticians who now occupy positions in Brazilian higher and postgraduate education and research institutions, it is important to point out that, without disregarding its role, this new context also coincides with the presence of a new force on the political scene: Black academic youth. As a result of racial quota policies – one of the modes of affirmative action in Brazil – these young people are beginning to graduate from universities and, little by little, enter the postgraduate and research arenas. They are arriving in this position with a much more affirmative stance on identity, which is shaking up the White Brazilian academic world. They assert this identity through their hair and hairstyles, clothes, peripheral culture, music, corporeality, colours, subjects of interest and modes of analysis. They are introducing new, robust research themes, and they have no qualms about tackling the racial issue with research in several different fields.

This Black academic youth has been brought together in academic collectives, instigated by Black teachers (along with some White allies) in charge of organizing 'Núcleos de Estudos Afro-Brasileiros' (NEABs, Afro-Brazilian Study Nuclei) in higher education institutions. Together with other young people, they are participating in initiatives such as school occupations to denounce the recent conservative actions of the National Congress as well as the draft constitutional amendment for a 20-year freeze on public resources allocated to healthcare and education. This bill contradicts what had already been agreed in the National Education Plan between the government and civil society following a comprehensive national debate. Its approval will doubtless be a setback for social struggles and the fight against racism.

This Black Brazilian decolonial perspective of the curriculum should be seen in the wider context of the decolonial movement that exists in other Latin American countries. It nevertheless maintains the specificities of Brazilian political, social and cultural history, and the history of the fight against racism in Brazil. Workers in the field of education, along with social movements, young people, *quilombolas*, traditional and *terreiro* communities and people, and the Black academic community have embraced education and the curriculum from a Black Brazilian decolonial perspective as an arena for fighting oppression. It is these individuals who are responsible for all the emancipatory changes in the field of curriculum and who are experiencing the tension between emancipation

and regulation in achievements linked to overcoming racism in Brazil.

This process has been marked by radical actions and projects that go far beyond the place of Africa in the school curriculum. They refer to the way in which Africa has been perceived and interpreted in the context of the African diaspora by Black Brazilian men and women, and how this interpretation has led to another kind of epistemological production in Brazil, which is understood as part of the process of decolonial struggle in the Americas within the fields of politics, economics, social studies, culture and knowledge.

Government actions for the implementation of directives

In 2007, when a drop was observed in the level of institutionalization of the 'National Curricular Guidelines to the Education of Ethnic-Racial Relations and to the Teaching of Afro-Brazilian History and Culture', which was approved in 2004 by the Ministry of Education (MEC), a workshop was organized to assess the origin of the obstacles. The workshop was convened on 6 and 7 November 2017 by the MEC through its Secretariat for Continuing Education, Literacy and Diversity and Inclusion (SECADI) in partnership with the UNESCO Office Brasilia. Among the main results, following the submission of a document on the status of the implementation of guidelines for Education for Ethnic-Racial Relations (ERER), is the development of the Brazil-Africa: Crossed Histories Programme. The programme developed along two main axes: education for ethnic-racial relations and intercultural dialogue for ethnic-racial relations.

For this chapter, it is enough to detach the actions of the educational axis from ethnic and racial relations given their meaningful connections with the programme developed for the African continent entitled *Uso Pedagógico da História Geral da África* (Pedagogical Use of the General History of Africa), whose goal is to contribute to the renewal of history education in African countries by developing three core components for primary and secondary education (kindergarten to high school). They are: i) the production of a historical atlas, an educational DVD, training tools and educational manuals for history teachers; ii) strengthening initial and in-service teacher training for a new approach to history education; and iii) promoting the use of the volumes of the *General History of Africa* (GHA) and harmonizing the teaching of the GHA in higher education institutions across the continent.

A Scientific Committee was created in February 2009 for the project. Composed of ten members and representative of the five regions of the African

continent, they take intellectual and scientific responsibility for the project. The Association of African Historians (AHA), a strategic project partner, is also represented on the committee. In the case of Brazil, some of the axes and actions planned have already been put in place by the Brazil-Africa: Crossed Histories Programme. They are outlined below.

Axis: Support for the implementation of Law No. 10.639/2003

Carrying out diagnoses on the implementation of Law No. 10.639/2003, based on consultation with social actors (academia, organized civil society, government and international organizations). The first diagnosis took place in 2007, from a partnership between the UNESCO Office Brasilia and the Secretariat for Continuing Education, Literacy and Diversity and Inclusion of the Ministry of Education (SECADI/MEC). This resulted in the preparation of a document highlighting the weakness of the institutionalization of the law and the absence of educational materials on the history and culture of Africa and Afro-Brazilians, and it sought to help finance the training of teachers and their educational activities. The diagnosis was coordinated by the authors of this chapter.

The second action, carried out in 2010, arose from the partnership with the Federal University of São Carlos and Educational Action, resulting in an action plan for civil society. This supported the realization of research on pedagogical practices of work with ethnic-racial relations, with the mapping and analysis of educational initiatives of ethnico-racial relations set up by public schools as well as the collection of information on the process of institutionalization of Law No. 10.639/2003. The research was carried out with the cooperation of UNESCO Office Brasilia and SECADI/MEC, under the coordination of the Federal University of Minas Gerais.

Axis: Production and dissemination of information on the history of Africa and Afro-Brazilians

A Portuguese edition of the UNESCO *General History of Africa* was published in 2010 in partnership with SECADI/MEC and the Federal University of São Carlos, comprising eight volumes.⁹

Pedagogical materials were elaborated thanks to a partnership with SECADI/MEC and the Federal University of São Carlos (Silvério, 2013a, 2013b.; Brasil, 2014, 2024a, 2024b) with the aim of adapting and expanding access to the UNESCO *General History of Africa* collection for teachers and students in elementary education, as well as highlighting Africa's influence on the history of Brazil.

Advice on the development of public policies

A National Plan for the Implementation of the Law on Ethnic-Racial Relations Education was drawn up. The prepared document, submitted to the Minister of Education, was used to draft an Official Plan by the Special Secretariat of Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR). The document, produced through a partnership between the UNESCO Brasilia Office and SECADI/MEC, involved representatives from civil society, the government, academia and international organizations, among others.

9 See UNESCO Brazil-Africa: Crossed Histories Programme: <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/brazil-africa-crossed-histories-programme?hub=66903>; UNESCO Digital Library (UNESDOC). História geral da África, 8 volumes: <https://ipeafro.org.br/gratuito-historia-geral-da-africa-em-8-volumes-7357-paginas-em-pdf/>

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GLOBAL AFRICANITY AND EDUCATION

Yamina Bentabet

Introduction

The central idea of this chapter is to understand how school education impacts the dissemination of ‘Global Africanity’, namely, a set of cultural values and models as referenced by African populations and diasporas. School is the ideal environment for organized and streamlined educative learning and the best place to consider the mechanisms that could lead to this type of learning practice. Indeed, education through the school system introduces the rules of behaviour and the transmission of knowledge, techniques and sciences. Hence, school provides the functions of socialization, the conservation and reproduction of culture and, at the same time, it tends towards progress and innovation. Consequently, it is involved in the social and cultural dynamic of the development of societies. The school’s functions of cultural practice and socialization may also contribute to the entrenchment of Global Africanity.

Global Africanity is a concept that can be used in the modern world in reference to a set of values, cultural models, and the practices of African populations and diasporas. It presents a uniform character that, in the first instance, can be perceived as referring to the values of humanism and universality that originate from an African cultural heritage and modern culture, which have combined during the history of African countries.

The different civilizations arising from African cultural heritage are characterized by their contributions to the transmission of human values, namely from the Pharaonic civilizations, the Amazigh culture, the Arab-Islamic civilization, the Judeo-Christian civilization, and the cultural movement of *Négritude*, which is a literary and political movement that advocates for anti-colonialism. Léopold Sédar Senghor, the founding president of Senegal, thus defined Négritude as ‘all the economic, political, intellectual, moral, artistic and social values of the peoples of Africa and the black minorities of America, Asia and Oceania.’ As for modern culture, it is primarily based on scientific rationality.

It therefore follows that Global Africinity refers to a common identity and the same geographical origin as sometimes experienced ancestrally by the populations of Africa and the diasporas. It results in behavioural models that are based on the preferred values of humanism and spirituality, the basic personality, but also from the technical and scientific ideals, progress and development of modern culture. They are essentially transmitted through education systems, as the socialization of young people in school – according to the norms established by the education system – is the basis for this unity of consciousness. Moreover, based on Emile Durkheim’s expression, it is ‘a collective consciousness’ and the entrenchment of Global Africinity. This African cultural and political project conceived Pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism, the end of Apartheid, and the African Union, among others.

To illustrate this point, this study aims to research a few decisive elements in the dissemination of Global Africinity in Algeria, Senegal and South Africa through national education strategies. In order to achieve this, we have used existing scientific works and documentation on school curricula and textbooks, mainly in the fields of civics and history. The development of teaching and effective mentoring can also contribute effectively to the transmission of the values of Global Africinity.

Overview of educational strategies in Algeria

In the aftermath of Algerian independence, the education system was characterized by an increase in school enrolments but also problems with school infrastructures and management. In addition, the government was committed to democratizing education and establishing a new cultural order, defined schematically by the extension of Arabization, while recovering its cultural attributes and the wider dissemination of scientific education.

Various education strategies and reforms were also implemented, such as increasing the budget allocated to education, increasing the number of young people attending school¹ at all levels of education, revising the curricula to reflect components of Algerian identity (Islam, Arabism and Amazighity)², and developing scientific knowledge. Thus, the former President of the Republic, Houari Boumediene, proclaimed: 'But all the efforts that pave the way for us to regain our personality must not, in any way, mean we retreat back into ourselves. To be ourselves, that is Algerians and socialists, is to root ourselves in our history, but it is also to engage ourselves in the principal schools of modern thought that are expressed by scientific humanism.'

Several reforms were carried out, including the establishment of basic schooling, which introduced compulsory and free schooling for all children at primary and secondary education levels.³ In higher education, the 1971 Reform, in addition to an increased emphasis on the study of scientific subjects, established the sociological analysis of the charters of the Algerian Revolution in all higher education institutes. Lastly, the National Education Orientation Act (Loi d'Orientation de l'Éducation Nationale)⁴ for primary and secondary education was formulated in 2008, which states that school life consists of preparing students for socialization, and sets out appropriate education programmes. This act seems to take into account the many changes in the modern world, such as globalization and its consequences, by further incorporating the study of foreign languages into the school curriculum.

The greatest purpose of Algerian schools, as relayed in the civics textbooks, is to assimilate pride of the Algerian identity, strengthen national unity, and promote patriotism and nationalism in children's hearts. The Algerian school is duty bound to glorify the role of Islam as a religion, culture and civilization. Its spiritual and moral content, and its contribution in terms of civilization and humanity, make it possible to achieve social integration and good relationships, and to promote solidarity, respect for the family, tolerance, dignity and peace. Furthermore, through their curricula, civics textbooks disseminate the values of democracy, knowledge of human rights, and encourage the entrenchment of citizenship by concentrating on the values of the nation and the Republic.

1 The number of school children in Algeria was 1,556,055 in 1962, and 8,618,155 in 2015. *Source:* Ministry of National Education.

2 As contained in the Preamble to the Algerian Constitution.

3 Law of April 1976.

4 Law of 23 January 2008, the National Education Orientation Act.

This aspect of education therefore appears as a school of citizenship, democracy, social integration and peace.

The programme contained in the history textbook for year 5 of primary education describes the history of Algeria during the different phases of colonization, the national liberation movement, the war of independence, and independence. Topics referring to African values⁵ are also mentioned, such as the fight against racism and the resolution of international problems by peaceful means and non-interference in the affairs of states. Finally, it is worth noting that Algeria is a principal member in the Maghreb Union, The Arab League, and the African Union. Consequently, it seems that the aim of these educational programmes is the transmission of a progressive and national education in line with the cultural values and planned development of Algeria and Africa.

The Senegalese school and Global Africanity

In Senegal, following its independence and the development of teaching principles, the National Commission for Education and Training Reform (Commission nationale de réforme de l'éducation et de la formation) recommended the transmission of an education programme based on explaining the objectives of school learning. This led to the distribution of new history curricula, which tend to communicate specific knowledge as well as the knowledge to be acquired at all education levels, logically and objectively⁶. The dissemination of knowledge about the history of Senegal and Africa thus contributes to raising awareness around a common identity and the values of their civilization among the students.

The objectives of primary school textbook programmes in Francophone African countries

In particular, these aim to ensure the harmonious integration of schoolchildren within their family environment and to acquire a patriotic spirit and respect for the values of good citizenship, solidarity and openness. Similarly, the programmes

5 Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Algeria. History book of year 5 of primary education, pp. 83-87.

6 Cf. Commission nationale de réforme de l'éducation et de la formation : rapport général. Ministry of Education of Senegal. General Inspectorate of Education. National Commission of History and Geography, September 2004. [In French.]

in these textbooks are designed to instil an awareness of African citizenship. They also provide knowledge of democracy and human rights, in particular, the protection and promotion of women's rights. However, it should be noted that Francophone African countries have a large shortage of school textbooks due to insufficient funds and disproportionate school attendance.

The shortcomings of the education system in Africa

Many of the field studies conducted in Africa have revealed shortcomings in the teaching systems, which may adversely affect the transmission of knowledge. This may be due to a number of factors, such as a lack of qualified teachers, overcrowded classrooms, the unavailability of textbooks, or unsuitable infrastructures.

Thus, in her survey on primary schools in Senegal, Fatou Niang (2014) demonstrates how teacher recruitment policies, the use of special classes, the construction and maintenance of school infrastructures, and the development of private provisions have increased school attendance rates but also created differences in quality education for certain populations, as well as disparities between schools and classes.

Similarly, Jean-Paul Larousse and Alain Mingat, in their book *The Primary School in Africa* (2000), observed major differences in school conditions in Togo in terms of class sizes, teacher training, the availability of teaching aids, the lack of textbooks, and disparities in teaching quality and student learning.

The education system in South Africa

The education system in South Africa suffers from the negative effects of a historical past marked by colonization and Apartheid, the legacy of which is still present today, along with the more recent effects of fiscal austerity. In order to understand the education system in South Africa it is important to first present a brief review of the historical conditions of colonization and Apartheid. The structures of the school system are briefly described below, along with the changes brought about post-Apartheid and the persistence of certain problems.

South Africa was colonized with the arrival of Europeans, mainly Dutch and British, during the seventeenth century. In 1948, this colonization imposed the separatist regime of Apartheid, which was based on 'race' separation and the superiority of White Europeans. This regime would cause many educational,

economic and social inequalities, which were based on racial discrimination. In 1991, the last remaining separatist law was abolished following the struggle against Apartheid led, in particular, by Nelson Mandela. The school structures and school system in South Africa were then reorganized around three major divisions: General Education and Training (preschool and primary level), Further Education and Training (secondary level), and Tertiary and Higher Education (higher level). It is mandatory for children to attend school for the entire 10-year General Education period.

Post-1994, the government drafted several laws and reforms in order to restructure the country and its education system. Curriculum 2005⁷ was one of these many reforms. Curriculum 2005 was based on a new learner-based education system, whose purpose was both educational and social. By broadening the entitlement to education, it aimed to establish a democratic system and abolish racism and segregation.

The teaching languages used differed depending on the regions. With eleven national languages, it was difficult to establish a single programme. However, over the ten years of compulsory education, the Curriculum offered a programme based on learning languages, a set of science subjects, including social sciences, which covered history and geography, and civic education. This programme taught components of cultural heritage as well as the rational and scientific side of modern culture.

Under the supervision of Professor J.-L. Gurtner, the failings and improvements observed in the study of the South African school system highlight the persistence of significant inequalities between the 'quality' schools and the disadvantaged schools, as well as other types of shortcomings that are a consequence of the Apartheid policy. In addition to these factors, there are economic difficulties, such as expensive school fees, which has led to dissatisfaction among students, particularly in universities, as well as social tensions during the academic year.

Despite these weaknesses, measures have been taken by the government to improve the education system, such as the 'Girls Education Movement', which advocates for social values, including equal opportunities to access education for all children, and an improvement in the quality of education in South Africa.

7 Curriculum 2005 subsequently underwent revisions, leading to the development of the National Curriculum Statements and, later, the Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statements (CAPS).

Conclusion

Although the democratization of education has been achieved in a number of African countries, enabling the dissemination of knowledge focused on their history and civilization to help internalize the values of Global Africanity, the quality of teaching still needs to be improved. Indeed, a school's success depends on it, in particular, the teachers' level of competence and knowledge, and the right cultural conditions and resources for quality, educational activities. That said, the school, as a legitimate cultural institution, remains the means by which cultural and social values of African identity is transmitted, based on anti-colonialism, values of spirituality and humanity, knowledge management, and science and technology for the development of the continent.

A review of education strategies adopted in Algeria and Senegal, in the wake of their independence, demonstrates that they have contributed to a number of socio-cultural and socio-economic changes observed in these societies, such as equal opportunities in accessing schooling, the enhanced status of women, and even unlocking the potential in the human resources needed for the management and development of any society.

South Africa, despite the changes brought about by the abolition of Apartheid and the restructuring of its education system, still has challenges to overcome, which are made worse by the introduction of market forces, resulting in the globalization of the school system. Generally, and for greater effectiveness in internalizing Global Africanity, it is important to strengthen education, improve teacher training, and ensure the right conditions for educational action in terms of teaching and logistics, requirements which are themselves related to the application of appropriate development strategies.

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‘MARXIST-LENINIST’ STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Alexander Balezin

Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia belonged for a short time to the category of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ states in Africa. They were the special pride of Soviet ideologists after their disappointment in the results of ‘African Socialism’ in certain other African countries in the 1960s.

In the late 1950s, an entire team of Soviet scholars had developed a concept for a ‘non-capitalist way of development’ for Asian and African countries. This form of development was the focus of research at the Institute of African Studies (IAS) of the Russian Academy of Sciences established in 1959. Its first director, Ivan Potekhin, used to say that the IAS would be the lever that would turn Africa towards non-capitalist development.

Initially, the policies of Tanzania, Guinea, Mali and other young African states were highly appreciated in the Soviet Union. But gradually, even those countries that did not abandon the ‘progressive’ course caused great dissatisfaction among Soviet ideologists. The kind of socialism those countries developed was criticized in Moscow, mainly because it was not based on Marxist-Leninist principles, including a one-party state and the nationalization of land, major industries and banks; the necessities for building up a ‘proper’ socialist society.

Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia were other examples. Their ruling parties declared them to be Marxist-Leninist states, which was welcomed enthusiastically by official Soviet propaganda. But the publication in 2014 of the *USSR Foreign*

Policy in the Years of the Cold War and New Thinking, a monograph by Andrey Urnov, reveals that even there the situation was more complicated.

Urnov, a chief researcher at the IAS when he wrote the monograph, had previously headed the African section and then served as Deputy Head of the International Department of the Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990 and was named Moscow's first Ambassador to Namibia. He took an active part in the formation of the Soviet Union's African policies and had many personal contacts among the leaders of 'Marxist-Leninist' states. Hence, the importance of his publication and its use here as a primary source.

After the revolution in Portugal in April 1974, both Portuguese colonies on the African continent achieved their independence: Angola on 11 November 1975 and Mozambique on 25 June 1975. Angola's ruling party, named after independence as the MPLA-PT (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Party of Labour), declared in 1977 that building up socialism was its main task. The same was declared in Mozambique by FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front).

Important common elements in the history of the two former Portuguese colonies on their way to socialism were civil wars and their involvement in South Africa's affairs. Both belonged to the so-called Frontline States. The military camps of the South African and Namibian partisans, the militant forces of, respectively, the ANC and SWAPO liberation parties, were located in Angola. From the very beginning, the USSR actively supported the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. This support was multilateral: financial, military and, last but not least, ideological. Consequently, once they had achieved independence, both countries declared their adherence to the ideas of socialism in Marxist-Leninist form.

In Mozambique, the crucial turn to socialist ideas occurred when Samora Machel became the leader of the FRELIMO party following the assassination of its first leader Eduardo Mondlane in 1969. Under Machel's leadership, the idea was to build up the socialist society, abandon capitalism, and become part and parcel of the party ideology. By 1974, as the revolution in Portugal was unfolding, FRELIMO forces controlled about one-fourth of the territory of Mozambique. Andrey Urnov, who visited Mozambique on the eve of independence, described the peaceful atmosphere in the country at that time in his 2012 book.

After the proclamation of independence both in Mozambique and Angola, basic industrial enterprises, banks, farms and so on were soon nationalized. In Angola, the rate of nationalized industries, including the very important diamond

corporation Diamang, reached 80 per cent within one year; in Mozambique, there was also an overwhelming majority of nationalizations taking place as well.

The Soviet Union provided the Machel regime with different kinds of support. In March 1977, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Mozambique was signed. Some enterprises were built with the help of the USSR, such as a joint fishing company. Andrey Urnov, who was a member of the Soviet delegation that signed the treaty, reported that about 70 per cent of Soviet credits went to military expenses. He also mentioned the appointment of the first Soviet ambassador to Mozambique, Pyotr Yevsyukov, a high-ranked official in the African section of the CPSU Central Committee, responsible for the links with FRELIMO.

The 3rd Congress of FRELIMO in February 1977 positioned the party as the vanguard party of workers and farm labourers, guided by the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. In 1980, an agreement of cooperation between the CPSU and FRELIMO was signed. Machel wanted his party to be recognized as a full member of the international communist movement and his country to be a member of the CMEA, the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, comprising the Eastern Bloc and other socialist states. But according to Urnov, the CPSU leadership's viewpoint was that FRELIMO could not be considered a communist party nor Mozambique a socialist state. Machel stated that Urnov was insulted by such an attitude.

Many of the nationalized factories of Mozambique were closed because of the massive exodus of the White population, mostly Portuguese. All the land in the country was nationalized and agricultural cooperatives were created. This was extremely important as 80 per cent of the population were engaged in agriculture. But the programme was a failure for many reasons. One was the mass deportation to the cooperatives of people from urban areas who had neither the will nor the skills for agricultural work.

One very particular political mistake of the communist regime in Mozambique was its attitude towards traditional rulers and witch doctors, who were declared enemies of progress and socialism. But people greatly respected them and this policy sparked protests.

In 1976, a partisan war against the government of Mozambique was launched by RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique), which was supported by Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) and South Africa. This movement demanded a multi-party system and an end to the country's socialist orientation, which was a direct rejection of the essentials of the Marxist-Leninist regime in Mozambique. South Africa went as far as to organize terrorist actions against

the ANC and the Communist Party activists who took refuge in Mozambique. On 17 August 1982, a prominent activist of the Communist Party of South Africa, Ruth First, was killed in Maputo, Mozambique's capital.

These circumstances forced Mozambique's leader, Samora Machel, to sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in 1984. This treaty called for an end both to ANC's activities in Mozambique and to South African support of the RENAMO movement. However, South Africa did not fulfill the clauses of this treaty and continued to support RENAMO. The Soviet leadership pushed the Machel regime to become more decisive in its fight against RENAMO. During Machel's visit to Moscow in March-April 1986, President Mikhail Gorbachev promised to maintain his government's support, as stated by Urnov, 'according to the possibilities of the Soviet Union'.

On 19 October 1986, Machel died in a suspicious aircraft accident. He was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano, who became the new president of Mozambique. Chissano paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in August 1987. Officially, this visit was defined as an important contribution to the strengthening of ties between the two countries and the two parties. The deep economic crisis, exacerbated by the civil war, compelled the Mozambican Government to start cooperating with the International Monetary Fund. In 1987, a new economic programme was published that included the privatization of a substantial part of the state's economic sector.

In July 1989, the fifth FRELIMO congress took place. It declared the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology of the party. The era of Marxism-Leninism in Mozambique was over. This development spurred Mozambique's process of reconciliation. In 1990, negotiations began between FRELIMO and RENAMO to end the civil war and to begin national reconciliation and, on 4 October 1992, the peace treaty was signed.

In Angola, the first liberation movement, the UPA (Union of Populations of Angola), was formed in 1954. This organization was renamed FNLA (National Front of the Liberation of Angola) in 1962, and it had its ethnic base in the Bakongo people. Its leader, Holden Roberto, belonged to the traditional aristocracy, and its aim was the reestablishment of the old Congo Kingdom. In April 1962, in Zaire, a 'Provisional Revolutionary Government of Angola' was created with Roberto as prime minister and Jonas Savimbi as foreign minister. This government was recognized in August 1963 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the only representative of the Angolan people. Later, in 1964, Savimbi created his own movement, the UNITA.

The democratic People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA was created in 1956 and was mainly comprised of the Ambundu people.

In 1962, it was headed by Agostinho Neto. The first MPLA delegation visited the Soviet Union in 1960. However, in 1964, as Urnov recounts, just in time for Neto's visit to Moscow, the Soviet leadership took the secret decision to recognize the preliminary government in exile. According to Urnov, this decision was later overturned due to the intervention of Portugal's Communist Party leader, Alvaro Cunhal. Neto visited the Soviet Union again in 1966 and 1967, and the question of who to help in Angola was settled: Moscow would provide MPLA with financial and military assistance.

However, in December 1972, Neto agreed to create the 'Supreme Revolutionary Council' of the MPLA-FNLA, with him second in command under Holden Roberto. This event – together with the revolt of a breakaway MPLA group under Daniel Chipenda, who was considered by some officials in Moscow to be more effective than Neto – led to a reduction of Moscow assistance to Neto. According to Urnov, on the eve of the Portuguese revolution, Soviet support of Neto was far from total.

In January 1975, at the Alvaro conference, an agreement to establish a coalition government with MPLA, FNLA and UNITA was signed by Neto, Roberto and Savimbi, and its inauguration followed on 31 December 1975. But, shortly thereafter, the FNLA and UNITA, supported by the Western powers, launched military action against the MPLA. On the eve of the independence of Angola, set for 11 November 1975, the FNLA and UNITA attempted to seize the country's capital, Luanda, but they failed because of the Cuban troops supporting MPLA. On 11 November, Angola's independence was proclaimed. The People's Republic of Angola was created, with Neto as president and the MPLA forming the one-party government.

The Soviet Union renewed and increased its assistance to the MPLA in late 1974. As Urnov tells us, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took a special decision to support the MPLA politically and financially, but would not have any military involvement in the Angolan War. Moreover, he states that the decision to send Cuban troops to Angola was made by Cuban leader Fidel Castro without any consultation with Moscow. In any case, the evolving situation meant that Moscow acknowledged the Neto Government and supported it financially and militarily.

After the MPLA came to power, other movements in Angola faced a disastrous civil war with international participation. Even in these circumstances, the MPLA Congress held in December 1977 proclaimed the creation of the 'MPLA - the Party of Labour', founded on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. There were serious doubts in Moscow about this decision, writes Urnov, but 'we didn't argue with friends.' Following the death of President Neto in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos became the leader of the party and the new president of Angola.

In May 1983, during the new president's visit to Moscow, another cooperation agreement between the CPSU and the MPLA was signed. Moscow provided Angola with not only military hardware but also substantial economic assistance. Indeed, party links were maintained after Gorbachev came to power. Dos Santos visited Moscow several times and Soviet delegations also visited Angola. Urnov wrote that the Soviet-Cuban disagreements regarding 'perestroika' did not have much influence on the relations between Moscow and Luanda. In Urnov's conversation with Dos Santos in 1988, the latter showed extensive understanding of Gorbachev's policy.

From 1976, the main enemy of the Marxist regime in Angola was UNITA, which was supported by the USA and South Africa. One reason for the prolonged conflict was the issue of control over the diamond fields on the conquered territory and the illegal diamond trade; legal diamond production had decreased by three-quarters by 1986. This long civil war only weakened the regime of José Eduardo dos Santos.

An important phase in this struggle in 1987 and 1988 involved military operations by government troops, supported by Cuban forces, against the UNITA forces, which were, in turn, supported by South African forces. When the government troops reached the border of Namibia, South Africa agreed to talks. The result was the signing of the Tripartite Accord on 22 December 1988 that saw the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the future independence of Namibia. In 1991, the Government of Angola and UNITA signed a ceasefire treaty, the Bicesse Accords. It called for the creation of a unified army and the organization of the first multiparty elections under United Nations supervision.

The parliamentary and presidential elections took place in September 1992, which demonstrated the MPLA's overwhelming influence in Angola. During the following MPLA congress, the words 'Party of Labour' were removed from its name and, more importantly, the clauses that referred to Marxism-Leninism as its ideological base disappeared from the party's programme.

Conversely, Ethiopia was never colonized. All the attempts to conquer it in the nineteenth century had failed, but following the 1935-1936 Second Italo-Ethiopian War, Italy succeeded in taking over the country and held it until 1941. Ethiopia was finally liberated when British and Ethiopian forces invaded in January 1941 and, months later, they recaptured Addis Ababa. Emperor Haile Selassie I, who had returned from exile to lead the Ethiopian resistance, was hailed as a hero and he was restored to his throne. He would be the last ruler of the country's ancient Solomonic Dynasty as his regime was overthrown by the revolution of 1974.

Ethiopia's move to Marxism-Leninism was largely orchestrated by Mengistu Haile Mariam. An officer, he was one of the leaders of the revolution and a member of the Provisional Military Administrative Council that ran the country after the fall of the emperor, and he became head of the new government's radical wing. He disapproved of the American influence on the army and espoused the ideas of socialism.

The military government's radical wing wanted the revolution to go further than it had under its first head, General Aman Mikael Andom. In November 1974, the radicals took power after killing the general and sixty other prominent officers. Mengistu officially became number two in the country's leadership, although in reality he was its leader. One of his first initiatives was the national campaign of 'development through cooperation'. As a result, more than 69,000 teachers, students and older schoolchildren were sent to rural areas for one and a half years. The goal of the campaign was to eradicate illiteracy, provide medical assistance, build bridges and roads, and, last but not least, explain the revolution to the masses. The campaign had another important goal, which was to remove revolutionary-minded youth from urban areas, particularly from the capital. These young people opposed Ethiopia's military leadership and had organized their own party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party, having as ideals Mao, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

The idea of Ethiopian socialism was first formulated in a declaration issued on 20 December 1974 that was not strictly Marxist-Leninist. The class structure of society was not mentioned in the programme; instead, it mentioned the need to create a party based on 'scientific socialist ideas'. In April 1976, the *Programme of the National-Democratic Revolution* was published. It declared the need to establish a working class party and to build up socialism in the country. All industrial enterprises, banks and land were nationalized.

In September 1984, the founding Congress of the Labour Party of Ethiopia took place. It is worth mentioning that initially the party was to be called the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia. This was the official name for the party's organizing commission created in 1979 and in the preliminary documents drafted with the help of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The new name of the party was intended to emphasize its commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideas. This, therefore, came as a surprise to the parties in the CPSU, as Urnov – who was one of them – wrote in his 2014 book.

In 1987, a new constitution was adopted, and the People's Democratic Republic was declared, with Mengistu Haile Mariam as its president. Mengistu

gradually created a totalitarian state. His reign was marked by the inability to resolve Eritrea's secession bid.

The majority of Ethiopians also became increasingly disappointed by the revolution. Given these circumstances, in his speech at the Central Committee plenary meeting in March 1990, Mengistu declared that the choice of the socialist path to development 'had not given the expected results'. He proposed a turn to a market economy and the liberalization of Ethiopian society, together with the reorganization of the party and a move to a multiparty system. All the slogans and posters about Marxism-Leninism disappeared.

However, despite all the steps taken, it was too late. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front, together with the Tigray People's Liberation Front, put an end to Mengistu's regime in 1991. After a series of successful combat operations, the Eritrean soldiers succeeded in taking Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, and Mengistu escaped to Zimbabwe.

Andrey Urnov, who personally represented the Soviet government in a special delegation to Ethiopia in December 1987, explained in his 2012 book that the collapse of the Mengistu regime was due in part to the Soviet Union's refusal to support it and to Gorbachev's general abandonment of the idea of socialist orientation in the Third World.

Generally speaking, the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Black Africa were closely connected to the Soviet Union and relied on its economic and military support and ideological influence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these Marxist-Leninist regimes also collapsed. Nevertheless, even in the twenty-first century, some scholars in Russia continue to believe in a socialist future for Africa. The second director (1964-1976) of the IAS at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vassili Solodovnikov, the man behind the research on socialist orientation, was still insisting in 2002: 'I am sure the theory of socialist orientation devised by Soviet scholars...will be relevant.'

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Chronology

- April 1974 – Revolution in Portugal.
- 25 June 1975 – Independence of Mozambique.
- 11 November 1975 – Independence of Angola.
- 19 October 1986 – Death of Samora Machel in a plane crash.
- July 1989 – Fifth Congress of FRELIMO. End of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Mozambique.
- 1956 – Foundation of MPLA in Angola.
- 1966 – Foundation of UNITA.
- 1987-1988 – Successful MPLA military operations against UNITA.
- 22 December 1988 – Accord between MPLA and South Africa.
- 1991 – Angola turns away from Marxism.
- 12 September 1974 – End of Haile Selassie's rule in Ethiopia.
- November 1974 – Radical officers take power in Ethiopia.
- 20 December 1974 – First declaration on socialism in Ethiopia.
- April 1976 – 'Programme of the national-democratic revolution' published.
- September 1984 – Founding of the Congress of the Labour Party of Ethiopia.
- 1987 – New constitution is adopted and People's Democratic Republic declared.
- March 1990 – Ethiopia turns away from Marxism-Leninism.

THE MARXIST EXPERIENCE

The Case of the Congo and Angola

Jean-Michel Mabeko-Tali

Introduction

Despite apparent similarities in terms of postcolonial political experiences, a general appraisal of the state of Angola and the Congo would not reflect the internal complexity of both countries, either in terms of their colonial trajectories or on a human and societal level. This complexity increases in Angola's case due to two long-term factors: a specific, longer-term colonization process, followed by decolonization that ended with a lengthy and complex armed anti-colonial conflict, which doubled in size from its origins due to discord between three armed anti-colonial movements. The MPLA (The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) would emerge as the victor, unilaterally proclaiming Angola's independence on 11 November 1975. This act would shape the intrinsic nature of postcolonial Angola under the MPLA. Not without a societal connection to the colonisers, postcolonial Angola had inherited a multi-ethnic society just like other former Portuguese colonies. This would have specific socio-identity and cultural implications (Barbeitos, 2011), in addition to spawning historical and ethno-identity orientated resistance. These are all factors at variance with the perception (often biased in social discourse but not unfounded in absolute terms) of postcolonial social dynamics (Mabeko-Tali, 2005). Furthermore, in the case of the Congo, if the state is in essence a demiurge derived from the colonial

state, this is no less true in Angola where most of the bureaucratic and legal references remained unchanged. It was colonial administrators who rallied to the new regime and immediately took control of the administrative machinery of the new state. However, historical, societal and political factors stemming from the anti-colonial armed struggle would change part of this legacy, following political and societal dynamics dictated mainly by the long postcolonial civil war. The liberation struggle certainly blurred the impact of the colonial legacy to a certain extent but did not eradicate it. The old elite opposed any common nationalist project, as reflected in the civil war, which began amid the anti-colonial struggle. These oppositions, in themselves, reflected the failure of the colonial model of the state, particularly in its functional instrumentalization of reinvented identities (cf. Amselle and Mbokolo, 1982). The postcolonial state of Angola is thus a cocktail of diverse historical legacies, with its colonial dimension (the bureaucratic-legal traditions and its administrative skills and human resources) prevailing. While the 'socialist' option represented by the MPLA seemed to be founded on modernist discourse and the theory of power, it was nevertheless a reflection of this legacy, dominated by a coastal Creole elite.

For its part, the Congolese nation-state was born amid turbulence of a different kind. Here, recurring political change was brought about by political and military violence¹ and a political culture in which rival elites opportunistically fueled and encouraged socio-identitarian divisions that could be summed up by the 'north-south' dichotomy (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1997). The state structure of the immediate postcolonial Congo was in fact the result of a transition that took place between 1946 and 1956 in the wake of the Framework Law (1955). The colonial power had entrusted urban African intellectuals with both the subordinate political positions and the roles within the machinery of this 'truncated state' that would run the Congo (Bazenguissa-Ganga, 1997). But more than in Angola, the postcolonial Congolese state would be heavily influenced by African traditions in its expression of state power: a *praxis* of power that was certainly reminiscent of traditional chiefdom but which also reflected the cultural impact of colonialism (cf. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1985). Modernist ideology channelled by the 'socialist' option in the Congo from 1963 to the end of the 1980s was supposed to break free from all these traditionalist memories – considered in revolutionary discourse to be retrograde or even 'reactionary' in nature. In practice, however, the intra-elite struggles for state power worsened, which meant that this modernist ideal did not get a foothold. The weight of the clash of identities cultivated under colonization,

1 Regarding this bloodthirsty process, see Obenga (1998).

or even before colonization, was more expressive than in Angola, affecting the functioning of the state, transformed here into a vector of exclusion. So much so that a former Congolese prime minister (and future head of state), Pascal Lissouba, derived a so-called 'tribal-class' theory from it, which, according to him, characterized the *praxis* and nature of the state power in the Congo. According to his theory, every regime, particularly its president, would represent a dominant 'tribal-class', the other 'tribes' would be the dominated classes (Lissouba, 1975). This was a distortion of the theoretical Marxist class struggle that reflected the extent of tensions around identity, mirroring the power struggle of the ruling elites and within the nation-state. The nature of supreme power would become all the more crucial. Regardless of the efforts made to achieve consensual governance, which takes into account all the identity components of the nation-state, it was the possession of the presidential seat that mattered above all else.

In both cases, the function of the head of state was locked in 'power myths' (cf. Ela, 1990, p. 30). These myths were based on a 'socialist', 'Marxist-Leninist' political alternative that locked that nation-state into a logic of exclusion where political identity took precedence over civic identity.

The identity origins of the Congolese and Angolan states: divisions and violence

To understand the nature and identity of the state institution in both cases, we must go back to the very foundations of the birth of the nation-state project that gave rise to the institutions and regimes that succeeded it.

The case of Angola

In the Angolan case, there was first an original fracture that was political, identity-based and sociological, which preceded and followed the birth of the postcolonial state. Initially, there was a multi-speed colonial occupation, which resulted in pockets of regional particularism that were conducive to the emergence of regional micro-nationalisms, particularly where – as in the Kongo (north) and Ovimbundu (centre-south) regions – former kingdoms had left deep marks on identity. Well before the nineteenth century, this was followed by the establishment and intensification of a colonization based on settlement, with its socio-somatic consequences that sowed the seeds of division in the Angolan nationalist process from the outset. The 'racial' issue, the establishment of an

'assimilationist' colonial ideology, albeit insignificant in practical and numerical terms (Bender, 1978, pp. 220-222; Messiant, 2006), as well as on a societal and identity restructuring level, would actually be some of the many reasons for the rifts that Angolan nationalism as a whole would experience (Candido, 2013). This is comparable to the religious allegiances of the African colonial elite and future nationalist leaders. The societies on the coast, close to the old urban hubs of Luanda and Benguela, would be the Creole soil from which the MPLA² would emerge in 1960. The expropriation of African land to benefit the settlers, in this case in the northern regions, especially after the Second World War, would force many African families out of the colonized territories towards the Belgian Congo. These exiles expressed aspirations for independence, initially ethno-nationalist, followed by a primarily pan-African vision of Angola's future (Mabeko-Tali, 2005). As a result, as early as the 1950s, various ethno-nationalist Kongo political groups emerged, including the FNLA in 1962. The south-central regions of the country (Ovimbundu) gave rise to a nationalist elite that was certainly partly assimilated and marked by evangelical and Baptist religious education, but which would eventually consider itself more rooted in its African identity than the Creoles and assimilated groups along the coast. UNITA (National Union for the Total Independance of Angola), created in 1966, represented this particular 'branch' of Angolan nationalism (Marcum, 1969). The struggle for anti-colonial liberation took place within the context of total division that, at first sight, shaped the exclusivist nature of the postcolonial Angolan state. The 'socialist' Soviet-style 'Marxist-Leninist' option and its ideological implications further reinforced these divisions and the intolerant nature of the structures and *praxis* of this state, with a vision of an almost sacred power enjoyed by the head of state. The post-colonial Angolan state was therefore born on the basis of Soviet-style political exclusivism under the MPLA, a one-party state, in contrast to the Congo of the early years of independence.

The case of Congo-Brazzaville

Following the popular uprising of 1963, the Parti Unique (Single Party) was established in the Congo in an ideologically confused, ambiguous and less rigid 'Soviet' style than in Angola years later (Bertrand, 1975). It would lead to the same process of primacy, that is, the party over the state, or simply a party-state system in which a biased relationship would exist that favours the

2 For more on the historical controversy surrounding the founding of the MPLA, see Pacheco, 1997; Mabeko-Tali, 2001; Rocha, 2003; Bittencourt, 1999, among others.

citizen, who can decide whether or not to adhere to the structures of the party-state. Being a party-state activist became a secure source of income. This was a practice found in all postcolonial African dictatorships, whether 'socialist' or not, as well as in 'rationally distributed societies' (Konrád and Szelényi, 1979) in the ancient 'people's democracies' of Eastern Europe and other communist countries. However, unlike these experiences, there was no welfare state or a real 'redistributive' state structure either in Angola or the Congo. On the contrary, these states quickly became instruments of political and economic domination by an elite that either promoted ethnicity (particularly in the Congo under the Congolese Labor Party [PCT] and, to a lesser extent, in Angola³), or the domination of a Creole identity (the case of Angola under the MPLA). The evident nuances as to the nature of the planned socialism in both countries, as elsewhere on the continent, with all their 'sublimations of reality', would generally be based on exclusion (Benoît, 1972, p. 192). Moreover, the quasi-monarchical sacralization of presidential power, and therefore the nature of state power, embodied the subsequent drift of nation-state governance towards patrimonialization and, as a corollary, the establishment of corruption, which would lead to the abandonment of the citizen vis-à-vis the state institution. Citizens were often confronted with individuals seeking to personally profit from the slightest public service under their control. These phenomena reflected the socio-economic impoverishment of ordinary citizens and, above all, their dereliction vis-à-vis the state.

Angolan and Congolese states and the citizen: widespread failures and neglect

This widespread abandonment of citizens simply reflected the failure of the state institution itself, which was more than evident in the Congo in the 1990s and 2000s, with the cycle of civil wars from 1993 to 2002 its most tragic manifestation. This led to the creation of militia groups (Yengo, 2006), which reflected the weakening of republican symbolism and state authority in the national army and the police force.

3 The case of Angola is different in that the elite dominating the power of the state comes from both the Mbundu elite and Creole societies in coastal regions as well as a politico-military and bureaucratic elite originally from the islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and even from Goa and Macao, former Portuguese enclaves in the Indian peninsula and along the Chinese coast.

In Angola, the long postcolonial civil war had helped build a powerful central state authority, which was forcefully challenged over 27 years by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebellion. By controlling vast areas of the territory over a long period of time, Savimbi constructed a kind of parallel state, with Jamba as its capital on the fringes of the south-western region of the country, where Western political figures would come and go throughout the civil war. This parallel state only lacked *de jure* international recognition. The personality cult of the rebel chief would only be matched by that of José Eduardo dos Santos, the Angolan head of state. These two parallel systems of violence involved the controlled exploitation of natural resources, especially diamond mining – the country's second largest export. The economic turning point of the war came with the complicity forged between senior government officials and the rebels. This downward spiral would only increase the impression of a clash between two systems of plunder: on the one hand, the rebels, considered as criminals, and on the other, corrupt individuals who were unconcerned about the well-being of citizens (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000). The unabashed nepotism practised by the leaders of both countries further diminished their image as heads of state and, by extension, the role and nature of the state itself, reducing it to a mafia-like organization serving a small elite and headed by a quasi-monarch with almost divine power.

Conclusion

The examples of Angola and Congo-Brazzaville examined here reignite the debate on the role of the state, its nature, and its relationship with its citizens. This relationship was characterized by various forms of exclusion, often perpetrated or facilitated by the state apparatus in a combination of modernism and ancestral traditions of power, as elsewhere in Africa (Mbembe, 2000, p. 69). Added to this, was the sacralization of the power of the head of state, coupled, particularly in the Congo, with unapologetic ethnic domination, which made any political change volatile and almost always violent. In both cases, the socialist option did not establish any form of welfare or redistributive state or serve as a guardian of social justice. Membership of the party-state was essentially a position of privilege, to the detriment of civic identity.

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POLITICAL COUPS AND ONE-PARTY REGIMES

Willy Jackson and Issiaka Mandé

Introduction

Political life in Africa in the 1960s and 1980s was marked by two major phenomena: coups d'état and single-party rule. Beyond their specific characteristics, these experiences reflect not only the overall political crisis in postcolonial African societies but also the ineptitude of states that were, for the most part, born out of the decolonization process. While politics is inherently conflictual (Freund, 1965, 1983) because it pits individuals with divergent interests against each other in a given society, it also aims to contribute to the appeasement and resolution of the conflicts that inevitably arise from the need to live together by seeking consensus, if not majority rule. If we rule out political regulation through violence, what remains is democracy, through which living together is supposed to be achieved through encounter and respect for one's own freedoms. What is the relationship between democracy, coups and one-party regimes in Africa? This fundamental question has led to a great deal of reflection on the nature of political systems in Africa (Chevrier, 1975; Coulon, 1972; Gonidec, 1978, 2016; Lavroff, 1976; Médard, 1990). The author Paul Brooker argues that coups d'états and single-party states are the preserve of undemocratic regimes (Brooker, 1995, 2014).

Before the advent of coups d'état and single-party rule, democratic forms may have existed in Indigenous societies, including under colonization.¹ This

1 Regarding the precolonial period, see Terray (1988, pp. 720-731).

is evidenced by the organization, during this period, of pluralistic political competition as a means of gaining and acceding to power. With independence occurring in the early 1960s, 'like a swarm of locusts...fell on Africa following the sunshine of politics' (Kourouma, 1968, 1985), most African countries abandoned this legacy by establishing authoritarian regimes. How can this democratic reversal be justified? Is Africa resisting Western democracy? Is the attempt to 're-create' politics using coups and one-party regimes an answer to the need to establish a common social bond in a phase of disintegration? How can the contradiction between the dominant political model, i.e. the nation-state, and the human complexity of African societies be resolved?

In the first part of this article, we shall demonstrate that coups and one-party regimes are manifestations of the general political crisis in Africa. This crisis stems from the disconnect between Western concepts, such as the state and the nation, and the African context, as well as from the derisory responses of those responsible for nation building. We will then attempt to lay the foundations for a new social bond that is structured around the notion of a political community so as to bring about genuine democratic renewal.

The political crisis and the failure of the nation-state model of nation-building

Most African countries, during independence, were faced with building a nation when most of their societies were fragmented into a myriad of ethnic groups that sometimes extended into other states. Hence, the recourse to the nation-state model, in which all nationals must feel recognized in order to forge their identity. This model is based on two ideological assumptions: on the one hand, identification between social heterogeneity and archaism, and on the other, the capacity of the nation-state to resolve the problem of integration and modernity.

In Western evolutionary thought, the development of humanity has taken place in successive stages, from a primeval state to civilization. Each phase of history corresponds to a form of social and political organization (Morgan, 1975), the culmination of which is the state: 'The emergence of the state brought about the typological division between savages and civilized people' (Clastres, 1974, p. 170). According to Hegel, 'the state is rational in and for itself' (Hegel, 1975, p. 258) and, 'the rational destination of man is, in fact, to live in a state, and if this state does not yet exist, it is required of reason to create it' (*ibid.*, p. 127). Hegel excludes Africa from his vision, considering it an ahistorical continent:

Africa...as far as History goes back, has remained — for all purposes of connection with the rest of the World — shut up; it is the gold-land compressed within itself — the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of night (Hegel, 1965, p. 247).²

Conveying the prejudices, stereotypes and clichés of the time, these theories helped legitimize the slave trade and then colonization. They permeated colonial ethnology (Kuper and Smith, 1969) in which pluralistic African societies became the object of a ‘civilizing mission’, gradually leading towards Western modernity. The mandate system of the League of Nations stemmed from this rationale. In 1945, the principle – revolutionary for its time – of the right of peoples to self-determination (Article 1, paragraph 2) was enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations*. Unfortunately, this right was drowned out by colonialist philosophy, including for non-self-governing territories or those under international trusteeship (Chapters XI and XII).

Shaped by Western thinking, most African leaders in the 1960s adopted this political project of the nation-state. Hence, the recurrence of the theme of national unity, both as a founding myth and a driving force for socio-political integration. The aim was to purge society of its factors of disintegration: ethnic and tribal sentiments and particularisms. The institution of the single-party system was presented as a necessity for the construction of the nation-state (Carter, 1962; Dieng, 2012; Keita, 2012; Okohui, 1984; Tempel, 1990). It should be noted that two key arguments were put forward in the late 1950s and 1960s to justify the introduction of single-party regimes: the imperative of national unity across class and ethnic lines, and the requirements of development (Ki-Zerbo et al., 1998). The single-party system became the instrument of social innovation irrespective of whether the regime was capitalist or socialist. Hence, the excessive presidentialization of power (Asso, 1976), the unification of trade unions by the single-party state (Fall, 2006), and the aggregation of women and youth organizations around the party. This desire for uniformity was based on the denial of existing antagonistic social classes or class struggle. For politicians at that time, traditional African unity was innate, intrinsic, and rendered the Marxist analysis of social antagonism inoperative: ‘as long as social classes are not yet in evidence, the party can only be the party for all the people’ (Gonidec, 1978, p. 316).

However, this model proved to be a failure. Wherever the single-party state was established, far from easing social tension (especially ethnic) (Sylla, 1977),

2 For a critique of Hegelian ideas, see Dieng (2006) and Quillet (1976).

the country would rapidly display signs of dictatorship, leading to violent kinds of transformation. In January 1963, the assassination of then President Sylvanus Olympio in Togo precipitated the era of military coups (Benchenane, 1983; Pabanel, 1984; Siaka, 2013; Wiking, 1983). There were 23 coups in the late 1980s (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dahomey (Benin), Upper-Volta (Burkina Faso), Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, etc.). Some of these countries experienced multiple military incursions into political life. Armed forces seized power with the goal of ending corruption and nepotism, restoring morality in public life and democracy, and sharing the national resources confiscated by the ruling elites. However, the new self-proclaimed leaders repeated the very flaws they denounced (Benchenane, 1984; Decalo, 1976, 1990; Martin, 1990; Rouquié, 1979). As stated by Joseph Ki-Zerbo, 'In the 1960s, most of Africa turned towards authoritarianism. One-party regimes, military coups and presidential autocracies were on the rise for much of this first decade of African independence' (1998, p. 552). Even without contesting the incompatibility between the single-party system and democracy (Gonidec, 1978, p. 202), it must be said that the erosion of fundamental freedoms and basic rights, as well as arbitrary arrests of political opponents, media crackdowns, censorship etc., were commonplace, whether in a military or civil dictatorship.

The political crisis was fueled by coups d'état and single-party rule, which betrayed the promise of peaceful nation-building enshrined in the political agenda of the ruling elites at the dawn of independence. Attempts to transpose the nation-state model onto African societies failed. The question of nation building in pluralistic societies and the dialectic of freedom and democracy in social structures with multiple identities remains unresolved to this day. The question remains: What kind of political community could help foster a new political bond that would enable people to live and evolve together?

The political community: a global response to the problem of nation building?

Given the failure of traditional approaches, it is imperative to imagine and construct an emancipatory political relationship that respects the human and social diversity of African societies.

The formation of nation-states began in the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The relationship between the political structure and the human component is a prerequisite for national cohesion, with each peoples, within

the nation, destined to live in their own state. The system expanded territorially with colonization as well as during the era of decolonization. The future ruling elites saw this system as a means of resolving the heterogeneity of their young nations through 'the similarity... between the State and the nation' (Gonidec, 1978, p. 33). However, even in Europe, this model is challenged from below by identity claims and political demands of subnational communities (Corsicans, Basques, Catalans, etc.) and from above by the supranational model (the European Union). African societies are pluralistic in nature. They must still build political cohesion to create something 'in common'. The political issue is one of freedom and diversity. However, African political leaders, obsessed with forging a nation-state model, by force, if necessary, have sought to eradicate the particularities of communities. This is an illusory approach, as 'the state structure, by forcing unity where there is a mixture of diversities, is particularly ill-suited to peace between people... It is time to look at the implications of the fact that most state authorities are not comprised of homogeneous populations and to try another approach that considers a political community to be a multination' (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2013; Pierré-Caps, 1995), and to do so beyond the always possible excesses of communitarianism (Haacher and Libois, 1997). The concept of multinationalism is well suited to this point. It should be enshrined in law by including it in the constitution, which would go beyond prohibiting discrimination based on social origin, colour, language, race, gender, religion and political opinion, or affirming the sovereign, indivisible, democratic, secular and social nature of the state. This plurinational recognition has been achieved, for example, by Bolivia³. In this way, the demands of communities can be satisfied, including those that remain silent but still wish for their identity to be recognized within the nation.

Most African powers have suggested decentralization as the solution (Demante and Tyminsky, 2008). However, this does not necessarily produce the desired calming effects. The reform of territorial institutions and the transfer of powers to local authorities remain largely incomplete, but even full decentralization would not be enough. Admittedly, backed by vigorous land-use planning policies involving local authorities, reform can help reduce structural inequalities between regions. But there remains the inalienable need to acknowledge the identity of particular communities.

Should these communities be considered national minorities within the state and, as such, be granted the internationally recognized rights enjoyed by communities in this category? (Rouland, Pierré-Caps and Poumarède, 1996;

3 Constitution of 2009, Article 1.

United Nations, 2010). Admittedly, some groups are relatively small in relation to the total population and other ethnic groups. But international law struggles to define which human communities constitute 'minorities'. Objective criteria (ethnicity, language, religion, etc.) and subjective factors (sense of belonging to a minority) have been put forward. Minority rights are a human rights achievement, but one that remains incomplete. For example, recognizing national minorities presupposes the homogeneity of the rest of the population, or at least the existence of a dominant group that forms the basis of the nation-state. This has led to the need to protect non-dominant groups by granting them certain rights, such as affirmative action policies to correct inequalities (ethnic recovery in Côte d'Ivoire, and regional balance in Cameroon). However, these measures were poorly accepted and only contributed to pitting populations against each other, as the elevated status of minorities breaks down the principle of equality between the various components of the national community.

A new social bond, which is the foundation of a balanced relationship among peoples living together, necessarily involves the exercise of citizenship.⁴ This is distinct from nationality, which is the legal bond that ties an individual to a state. Citizenship is the expression of the right of all to participate in political action. Imbued with universalism, it cannot be conceived outside the framework of human rights and democracy, which must be at the heart of the political renewal of African societies. It cannot be reduced to cyclical mechanisms of political representation: the holding of elections is not necessarily a sign of a healthy democracy. Rigged elections, elections under international control, contested elections, and dynastic devolution of power are all ills that undermine the alternation of power in African political culture. Democracy presupposes the involvement of citizens in the affairs that concern them in order to shape their present and their future. This may be the political moment when citizens seize the 'insurgent democracy' to oppose a political system that has been distorted and suppresses freedom (Abensour, 2010). Using the right to insurrection (enshrined in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1793⁵), the people of Tunisia succeeded in overthrowing a seemingly unshakeable dictatorship during the Arab Spring in 2011. In Burkina Faso, pressure from the street played a role in Blaise Compaoré's fall from power in 2014. When politics no longer helps resolve conflict, popular anger can shake things up during a period known as 'riot time' (Bertho, 2009).

4 Some scientific work and articles tackle this regrettable confusion: Manby (2009) and Labelle (2011).

5 Article 35: When the government violates the people's rights, insurrection is, for the people and for each portion of the people, the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties.

The transformation of African societies into political associations holds the potential for overcoming and resolving social conflicts. This does not mean that dysfunctional phenomena that undermine democracy, such as coups d'état and single-party rule, are excluded from the political horizon once regimes inspired by this philosophy are established, not least because 'a promise of pacification does not mean that society is pacified' (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2013, p. 97). The momentum that drives people to unite politically is not the negation of conflict; it is their transformation into a political problem. This may mean that politics then replaces war, or at least regulates war in such a way as to limit its destructive effects. This is a promise, not a certainty of the regulation of violence.

The challenge of establishing a new political foundation in Africa requires us to embark on a project of cosmopolitanism and global democracy as a common political horizon for all human beings, that is, the possibility of a democratic link between all peoples and democratic governance in the service of the interests of all (Archibugi, 2001; Baduel, 2007; Chemillier-Gendreau, 2007; Labelle, 2011; Schnapper, 1994; Tassin, 2003). This creates the need to politically control violence at the global level. However, the concept of state sovereignty restricts major transformations in global society today, whether at the level of the United Nations (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2013, pp. 151 et seq.) or the African Union (Mandé and Jackson, 2015).

Coups d'état and single-party rule are indicative of the global crisis of politics and democracy in Africa. They reveal the extreme difficulty of structuring African societies through the prism of the nation-state. This reflection prompts us to rethink the theoretical framework that governs diverse human societies by attempting to imagine a new political bond that can create national cohesion. Pluralist African communities aspire to act and live together while respecting each other's diversity in a shared political space. Let us encourage this entry into a political community so as to form a multinational entity that will build bridges among all the peoples of the world through cosmopolitanism, the common horizon of all human beings.

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EXTERNAL FACTORS

The Role of Moscow and its Allies in the Decolonization
of Namibia and the End of Apartheid in South Africa

Vladimir Shubin

Introduction

Despite the fact that Russia never had colonies in Africa, its history of contacts with the continent is rich and long. Relations became especially intense in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s when the Soviet Union provided multiple forms of support to the armed liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

The year 1960 entered the history books as 'Africa Year' when 17 countries became independent. In December of that year, at the initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. However, in the southern part of the African continent, the struggle for independence took many more years.

There is a tendency to look at the armed conflicts in Southern Africa primarily through the distorted prism of superpowers' rivalry and 'proxy wars' during the Cold War¹. Naturally, external factors played their role, but most of the conflicts at that time in Africa and other regions were caused by local dynamics. In particular, the developments in Southern Africa were driven, on

1 The 'Cold War' was not part of the Soviet political vocabulary. Moscow regarded its actions rather as a part of the world's 'anti-imperialist struggle', which was waged by the 'socialist community', the 'working class of the capitalist countries' and 'the national liberation movement'.

the one hand, by peoples' determination to abolish colonialism and Apartheid, and, on the other, by the efforts of the 'Unholy Alliance' of Pretoria, Salisbury (present-day Harare, Zimbabwe) and Lisbon, and their Western allies, to suppress such efforts. Moscow began offering its political and practical support, including military assistance, to the liberation movements at their request. In fact, supporting 'the struggle of people for national liberation and social progress' was confirmed as one of the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the USSR Constitution.²

The African National Congress (ANC), a leading liberation organization in South Africa, named four key elements in their fight against the Apartheid regime: armed struggle, underground structures, mass political movement and international solidarity. It would not be wrong to say that the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia waged its battle along these same lines, which makes it expedient to structure this chapter accordingly. However, to begin with, we must consider when contacts between the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia were established and in what way.

The ANC was the first national organization in the region to establish regular relations with Moscow when Oliver Tambo, then Deputy President, visited the Soviet Union in April 1963.³ Earlier, he had tried his best to receive meaningful support from the West, but in vain. The capacity of the independent African countries was also limited. Having travelled with Tambo in 1962, in a group representing several countries, Nelson Mandela wrote to his colleagues: 'Money collecting is a job which requires a lot of time. You must be prepared to wait. A visit to socialist countries has become imperative' (Strydom, 1965, p. 108).

However, Tambo's trip to the USSR was preceded by visits of the representatives of the South African Communist Party (SACP), including its General Secretary (and prominent ANC leader) Moses Kotane, and Dr Yusuf Dadoo, who was also a leader of the South African Indian Congress and the Congress Alliance.⁴ The visits resulted notably in the allocation of funds for the SACP, which were used, at least partially, by the ANC as well. Following Dadoo's first visit, the SACP had been allocated US\$30,000 from

2 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 28. Available at <http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons01.html#chap04>.

3 Perhaps, the word 're-established' would be more correct. The ANC President Josiah Gumede visited the USSR 36 years earlier, but that trip did not constitute the beginning of a permanent relationship.

4 The Congress Alliance consisted of the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Coloured People's Congress, the Congress of [White] Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

the so-called International Trade Union Fund by the end of 1960.⁵ Allocations grew in 1961 (US\$50,000)⁶ and 1962 (US\$112,445).⁷ In fact, Yusuf Dadoo underlined that the SACP was assisting the ANC Emergency Committee in this respect, but after Tambo's visit, US\$300,000 was provided to it directly in 1963.⁸ The regular financial assistance to the ANC, along with, but separate from the SACP, continued until the end of the USSR, although its amount differed from year to year.

The situation in the liberation movement in Namibia (or South West Africa, as it was then called) was initially rather complicated. Two organizations emerged there in 1959, SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization, known until 1960 as Ovamboland People's Organization) and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU). Moreover, initially, SWANU was more known on the international arena, and together with the ANC and the Panaficanist Congress (PAC), it became a member of the (short-lived) South African United Front formed in June 1960.

However, SWAPO took steps to establish contacts with Moscow in 1961 via its representative in Cairo⁹, and in December 1963, Moscow received its request for material support, including arms and ammunition.¹⁰ As to financial allocations to SWAPO, the archive documents, accessible to date, do not indicate any regular funding in that period, although it looks like it was provided in small amounts from time to time. However, soon after SWAPO President Sam Nujoma's visit to the USSR in 1969 (to the best of my memory), US\$15,000 were allocated to SWAPO.

5 *Source:* Russian State Archive of Modern History (hereafter RSAMH). Head of the CPSU CC International Department, B. N. Ponomarev's report on expenditure of the International Trade Union Fund for Assistance to Left Workers' Organizations attached to the Romanian Council of Trade Unions, 2 November 1960.

6 *Source:* RSAMH, collection 89, inventory 38, file 4, pp. 3-5, Head of the CPSU CC International Department, B.N. Ponomarev's report on application of the International Trade Union Fund for Assistance to Left Workers' Organizations, 1 November 1961.

7 *Source:* RSAMH, collection 89, inventory 38, file 5, pp. 5-6, Head of the CPSU CC International Department B.N. Ponomarev's report on application of the International Trade Union Fund for Assistance to Left Workers' Organizations, 3 January 1963.

8 *Source:* RSAMH, collection 89, inventory 38, file 6, pp.11-12. Head of the CPSU CC International Department, B.N. Ponomarev's report on application of the International Trade Union Fund for Assistance to Left Workers' Organizations, 28 December 1963.

9 *Source:* State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter SARF), collection 9540, inventory 1, file 102, p. 52.

10 *Source:* SARF, collection 9540 gs, inventory 2c, file 47, p. 61.

International solidarity

It would be logical to begin the discussion with the main avenues of the liberation struggle from the 'pillar' of international solidarity. The policy of the USSR and its allies towards Apartheid in South Africa and the illegal occupation of Namibia was clear and consistent. Political support was provided at various levels. At the governmental level, they supported all the relevant resolutions of the UN and other international organizations and they boycotted the Pretoria regime in various spheres. The issues were also regularly raised in bilateral contacts with other countries. A specific feature of those countries was the existence (whether *de jure* or *de facto*) of one-party systems. As a result, the bilateral contacts of the liberation movements of the ANC and SWAPO, with their ruling parties, were extremely important in providing assistance. However, the second level of the NGOs (in the Soviet Union they were called 'social' organizations) should not be underestimated. For example, trade unions, women and youth organizations maintained contacts with the relevant branches of the liberation movements and rendered both political and practical assistance to them on a bilateral basis as well as through their parent bodies, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. In fact, almost all socialist countries had Solidarity Committees connected with the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) with headquarters in Cairo.

It was the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (SAASC) that initially served as a conduit for almost all African liberation movements to the Soviet authorities. However, the ANC was an exception. From the outset, the SAASC established direct contacts with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); the SAASC was an official host for Oliver Tambo during his first trip to the USSR.

Moscow, through its NGOs, actively participated in holding international conferences in support of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, and it often rendered assistance by providing financial means, especially air tickets and transit facilities for delegates. One example is the Emergency Solidarity Conference with the Militant People of South Africa convened by AAPSO and the World Peace Council in Addis Ababa on 30 and 31 October 1976 soon after the Soweto uprising. In addition, air tickets were provided by Moscow for representatives of the liberation movements to visit different countries of the world.

The USSR's mighty information machinery (called propaganda in those days) also worked in favour of the liberation movements. It included Radio

Moscow, which had an African section and was broadcast in English, Zulu, Shona and Ndebele. Novosti Press Agency also had an African section, and it published its magazine in several African countries.

The military field

Most vital for the liberation movements in Southern Africa was Soviet assistance in the military field: supplies of arms and other hardware as well as training both in the USSR and in Africa, especially in Angola. It should be underlined in this respect that the decision to 'use violence' was not imposed on the liberation movements from Moscow or anywhere else. As for South Africa, the issue of using violence was raised in Moscow for the first time when Kotane and Dadoo came to Moscow in October 1961. Specifically, they mentioned training cadres in preparation for sabotage.¹¹ The Soviets' reply to the discussions and in an official message, approved by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, stated: 'It is necessary not to counterpoise one form of struggle to the others but to combine all these forms skilfully. The armed struggle is a struggle of the...masses.'¹² Moscow respected and backed up the decision to use 'violence' but emphasized the priority of political work.

Initially, the Soviets suggested organizing the training of military instructors, 'using for this in particular the facilities of some friendly African countries, for example Guinea and Ghana'¹³, where Soviet military were present. However, in April 1963, at the meeting with Boris Ponomarev, the CPSU International Secretary, Oliver Tambo announced that only a limited number of fighters could be trained in South Africa or in independent African countries, and he requested a large-scale training of soldiers in the USSR.

Thus, the first groups of personnel of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC's armed wing, included men such as Chris Hani, future Chief of Staff of prominent commander Archibald Sibeko (Zola Zembe), and Lambert Moloi, future Lieutenant General of the new South African National Defence Force, who went to study for ten months 'in the environs of Moscow', in the highly

11 They did not mention in Moscow that the first operations of Umkhonto we Sizwe (the paramilitary wing of the ANC) would start on 16 December 1961, two months later, most probably such a decision was taken after Kotane's departure from South Africa.

12 *Source:* RSAMH, decisions taken by the instruction of the Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee without recording in the minutes, N 478, 28 November 1961.

13 *Ibid.*

specialized establishment known among freedom fighters as the Northern Training Centre. Archibald Sibeko wrote in his memoirs:

We were taught military strategy and tactics, topography, drilling, use of firearms and guerrilla warfare. We also covered politics, with heavy emphasis on skills needed [for] the construction and use of explosives, vehicle maintenance, feeding a mobile army and first aid in the field: everything necessary for survival under guerrilla conditions (Sibeko [Zola Zembe] and Leeson, 1996).

Much bigger groups began arriving in November 1963 in Odesa, where a military college was designated for the ANC cadres.¹⁴ Among those who studied there were Joe Modise (his *nom de guerre* was Thabo More), future Defence Minister in democratic South Africa, and Ronnie Kasrils, its future deputy and then Minister of Intelligence Services.

Soon, another specialized institution, the 165th Training Centre, was established in Perevalnoe, near Simferopol in the Crimea, to train fighters from the liberation movements in Africa and other regions, while higher-level commanders were trained at the Vystrel Higher Officers Courses in Solnechnogorsk, not far from Moscow. Later, in the second half of the 1980s, in anticipation of radical changes in Southern Africa, the training of officers for regular army, navy and air forces began in a number of Soviet cities, from Minsk in Belarus to Frunze in Central Asia.

Assistance from the USSR gave the ANC the possibility of preserving the core of its armed wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe) when, as its document stated: 'In July 1969 our headquarters received a notice requiring that the ANC vacate its military cadres from the Kongwa Camp [in Tanzania] within a period of 14 days.... In other words this meant the liquidation of Umkhonto we Sizwe.'¹⁵ Later, at the ANC Consultative Conference in Kabwe (Zambia) in 1985, Oliver Tambo elaborated: 'In 1969 as a result of complications that our movement faced in this region, we had to evacuate [most of] our army to the Soviet Union at very short notice.'¹⁶ Thus, Moscow came to the rescue when not a single African country was ready to replace Tanzania as a base for the MK fighters.

Responding to the requests of the ANC and SWAPO leadership, the supply of small arms and explosives began, which was followed by machine guns, anti-

14 All in all, 328 Umkhonto fighters were trained in Odesa in two groups.

15 Source: *Mayibuye Collection of Historical Papers*, ANC Lusaka Collection. The report of the Secretariat covering the last two years (1971), p. 5.

16 Ibid. African National Congress National Consultative Conference. President's Statement, p.19.

tank, recoilless and anti-aircraft guns (and even tanks in the case of SWAPO). With the consent of independent African states, initially Tanzania and later Angola, Soviet supplies were sent to their defence forces earmarked for ANC or SWAPO. From 1963 to 1990, the total value of Soviet military supplies to the ANC was about 36 million rubles, but it would be misleading to convert this sum into any foreign currency because the cost of hardware was very low in the USSR. The list of equipment speaks for itself: several thousand AK-47s of various modifications, 3,362 Simonov self-loading carbines (SKS), 6,000 pistols, 275 grenade-launchers, 90 Grad-P missile launchers, over 40 Strela 2M anti-aircraft missile launchers, 20 Malyutka anti-tank rocket launchers, over 60 mortars, etc.¹⁷ The supplies to SWAPO began later, but its volume was even greater because the numerical strength of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) was superior to that of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

The underground structures of academic and political training

Moscow's supplies to the ANC and SWAPO in exile were not limited to military hardware, they included food, clothes, cars, trucks, stationery, sportswear, building materials and other goods. The USSR provided annual 'quotas' for the recuperation and medical treatment of leaders and activists of the liberation organizations. The USSR received wounded fighters in military hospitals, dispatched medicine and equipment, trained their members as medical doctors and nurses, and, in a number of cases, sent medical teams to their camps in independent African countries. Hundreds of freedom fighters went to the USSR for academic and political training.

The ANC leadership made several attempts to send MK cadres (often trained in the Soviet Union) back home, but all attempts failed, including Operation J, which attempted to land a group of MK fighters on the coast of Transkei, South Africa. Moscow initially hesitated, considering the difficulty of the mission, but after repeated requests it agreed to support the plan,¹⁸ which

17 *Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Moscow, 8 August 1992.

18 The decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee P 58/52 of 18 October 1967, item 1, referred to in: RSAMH, Minutes of the Secretariat, N 103, item 24g, 20 July 1970; the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee P 183/13 of 20 October 1970 and the order of the USSR Council of Ministers 2217s of 20 October 1970, referred to in: RSAMH, Minutes of the Secretariat, N 103, item 24g, 20 July 1970 as proof of fulfilment of the last-mentioned.

included training personnel to find sites for landing, giving financial assistance to acquire a vessel¹⁹, supplying hardware, and training the landing party.

The April 1974 Portuguese Revolution, followed by the Soweto uprising in June 1976, radically changed the situation and prompted hundreds and then thousands of young South Africans and Namibians to leave their countries to join liberation movements, many of whom underwent military training in the USSR. Just one example, 'from the horse's mouth', comes from General Siphwe Nyanda, the first African Chief of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and later the Minister of Communications. He came to the USSR in 1985, in a group of four MK commanders, which included Charles Nqakula (who became Minister of Defence and a member of parliament) and Nosiviwe Maphisa-Nqakula (who also later served as Minister of Defence). He recalled:

In the USSR, we were staying in an apartment on Gorki Street, Moscow, where the lectures were conducted. For practical exercises, we went to a place outside Moscow. We studied MCW (Military Combat Work) as part of an abridged Brigade Commanders' course. The course covered the following subjects, among others: communications, underground work, surveillance, secret writing, secret meetings, photography, military work, ambush, attack, artillery effectiveness, small arms. All were useful.²⁰

A new element in bilateral cooperation with the ANC appeared when, during his visit to Moscow in October 1978, Tambo asked for Soviet assistance with the training of MK cadres in Angola.²¹ The first group of Soviet officers, initially small, was headed by Navy Captain Vyacheslav Shiryayev who, under his *nom de guerre* 'Comrade Ivan', became a well-known figure in ANC circles (Shiryayev, 2005, pp. 88-92). By the late 1980s, the group's size reached about 30 persons; all together more than 200 Soviet advisors, specialists and interpreters served in Angola with their ANC comrades.²² Among them were infantry officers, engineers and various experts on hand-to-hand fighting, automobiles, communications and communications equipment repair, medicine, etc.

Even earlier, in 1977, a similar but bigger group of Soviet military instructors, headed by 'Comrade Yuri' (Colonel Zaputryayev), began training Namibians in Lubango, South Angola.

19 GBP 75,000 were allocated for the purchase of the ship. SACP to CPSU, 6 September 1970 (Maloka, 2002, p. 29).

20 Siphwe Nyanda to Vladimir Shubin, 10 December 2002.

21 According to an ANC document, the initiative to involve the Soviets came originally from Jorge Risquet who, at that stage, headed the Cuban contingent in Angola (Brief Report of the Revolutionary Council. April 1979, pp. 5-6).

22 Source: Segodnya, Moscow, No. 5, 1993.

Among the courses that the ANC and SWAPO cadres undertook (either in the USSR or with Soviet military in Angola), one was especially important: military combat work (MCW), mentioned earlier. Despite its title, it was much more than just 'military' or 'combat' work; it was devoted to building an armed underground capability. Ronnie Kasrils once wrote to the author from his hideout in South Africa when he was wanted by Pretoria's security as 'armed and dangerous': 'The three little words have been our safeguard.'²³

In September 1987, Oliver Tambo asked Soviet representatives to assist in creating the network of the ANC underground machinery inside South Africa, which later became known as Operation Vula. Both Mac Maharaj (a future Minister of Transport) and Sphiwe Nyanda, who were to head the structure, underwent brief training in Moscow; assistance was also needed just to support their 'legends'. Nyanda later wrote:

'The Moscow visit of [July] 1988 was the final leg of my preparation to infiltrate South Africa. It afforded me the opportunity to brush up on my disguises and gain more confidence in these. More identities were added to existing ones, enabling me to shed some of them... From an operational point of view, the Moscow leg was probably the most important for my cover story. Without exception, those who were not privy to the information believed I was in the Soviet Union for [military] studies. The enemy therefore never expected me to be right on its doorstep!'²⁴

Of Moscow's allies, two countries should be singled out as the most active in supporting the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia: Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Cuban contribution to the defeat of the SADF²⁵ intervention in Angola in 1975 to 1976 is well known. Under the MPLA Government, Angola became a reliable rear base for the ANC and SWAPO. The Cubans contributed significantly to the establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe camps in Angola, assisting in training and providing logistical support (Gleijeses, 2005, pp. 87-89).²⁶ The GDR's assistance to the liberation movements was consistent and efficient. It drastically differed from the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that cooperated with the Pretoria

23 Ronnie Kasrils to Vladimir Shubin, 10 March 1991.

24 Sphiwe Nyanda to Vladimir Shubin, 10 December 2002. For more on the Soviet role, see Shubin (2009). *ANC: A View from Moscow*. Johannesburg, Jacana Media. One episode is worth mentioning here: on 11 and 12 July 1989, at a time when Pretoria and Western propaganda were claiming that the USSR had 'dropped' the ANC, Moscow was still the safest place for Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders to meet Mac Maharaj, the head of their underground machinery.

25 South African Defence Force. It became the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1994.

26 Read more on Cuba's relations with the ANC in Blanch, H. L. 2008. *Cuba: The little giant against apartheid. The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 3: International Solidarity*. Pretoria, UNISA Publishers, chp. 14.

regime. A special feature of the cooperation was military and security training. Teterow, a small town in Mecklenburg in northern Germany where a secret training camp was established, became a household name among fighters of Umkhonto we Sizwe.²⁷

The mass political movement

As for the mass political movement in South Africa, Moscow's role had to be limited, for obvious reasons. However, apart from the involvement of the cadres trained in MCW, political training in the Institute of Social Science, Youth and Trade Union schools was also invaluable. Even more so because, as a rule, the trainees underwent courses in 'resisting subversive actions of imperialist forces'. Thus, one of the South African incumbent ministers told the author that the knowledge acquired in that course in Moscow helped him when he was arrested and interrogated: 'South African security has never found out that I was in Moscow.'

However, with the growth of the legal opposition in South Africa, Soviet NGOs and academic bodies, in consultation with the ANC, as of 1985, began to establish contact with legal democratic forces in South Africa, including visits from prominent opponents of the Pretoria Government, such as Archbishop Tutu, and Alex Boraine Frederick van Zyl Slabbert from the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA).

These contacts began in the first years of *perestroika*, initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, whose meeting with Oliver Tambo in the Kremlin on 4 November 1986 was the peak in Moscow's relations with the ANC. The Soviet leader informed Tambo about the attempts of P.W. Botha to contact Moscow 'through a third, even a fourth, party'. He assured Tambo that any step in this direction would be taken in consultation with Congress²⁸; later, however, it was found that he had not kept his word.

The common position of the two parties was expressed in the official press release. Three major conditions were put forward to ensure the political settlement in Southern Africa: an end to Pretoria's acts of aggression against independent African states, the granting of independence to Namibia in accordance with UN resolutions,

27 For more on the GDR's assistance to the ANC and SWAPO, see Schleicher, H.-G. and Schleicher, I. 2008. *Special Flights to Southern Africa*. Harare, SAPES Books; Schleicher H.-G. 2008. The German Democratic Republic and the South African liberation struggle. *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 3: International Solidarity*. Pretoria, UNISA Publishers, chp. 13.

28 The author's notes on the discussion of O. Tambo with M. Gorbachev, Moscow, 4 November 1986.

and the removal of the Apartheid regime in South Africa as 'the primary cause of the conflict situation in the region.'²⁹ All these goals were later achieved.

One of the results of Tambo's visit to Moscow was the opening of the official ANC mission in the USSR in 1987. It was opened at the same time as the SWAPO mission and it enjoyed all diplomatic privileges³⁰, even though it was accredited to a non-governmental organization, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

Conclusion

The rise of the liberation struggle in South Africa and the growing recognition of the role of the ANC as its leader created an atmosphere where negotiations on the eradication of Apartheid by peaceful means were becoming possible. The approach to the political settlement was discussed in detail at the confidential tripartite consultations in Moscow in September 1987. The delegations of the USSR, the ANC and Cuba confirmed a common position on all the issues. The conditions conducive to the political settlement were facilitated by the enduring support given to the ANC by the USSR and its allies, as well as a general relaxation of international tensions in the late 1980s.

However, the idea shared by many academics that the negotiated settlement in South Africa and the end of Pretoria's rule in Namibia were the results of the political changes in Eastern Europe – symbolized by the 'fall of the wall' (in Berlin) in November 1989 – is incorrect. The proponents of this view forget that the New York Agreements on the 'Angola-Namibian settlement' were signed a year earlier, in December 1988, and the group of the ANC's top leaders, including Walter Sisulu, were unconditionally released from prison in October 1989.³¹ Moreover 'talks about talks', the first informal contacts between the government-connected personalities and the ANC, can be traced to the visit that Prof. H. W. Van der Merwe, a South African peace-broker, made to Lusaka in 1984.

Conversely, the negative change in Gorbachev's attitude towards the ANC, manifested by several delays to Mandela's visit to Moscow³² and contacts with

29 Source: *Pravda*, 5 November 1986.

30 Source: MCHP, ANC Lusaka Collection. Rules governing the privileges and immunities granted to the Mission of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

31 I believe that this event, and not the famous speech of President De Klerk in Parliament, was a real watershed; the ANC leaders immediately took part in mass political meetings, even though the ANC was officially still banned.

32 It finally took place in 1999.

Pretoria behind the back of the ANC in the last year of his rule, were detrimental to the eradication of Apartheid by political means. Fortunately, however, by that time, the ANC was deeply rooted inside the country and began gaining broad support internationally.

Moscow played an important role in achieving the political settlement in Namibia, which was envisaged by the UN Plan endorsed by the Security Council in 1978. But its implementation was delayed by Washington and Pretoria for a decade. George Schultz, the U.S. Secretary of State in Reagan's administration, later confessed: 'We were not ready to see a new nation [Namibia] created only to become enrolled in a Soviet camp' (Crocker, 1993, p. 12). Of course, Moscow had no plans to 'enroll' Namibia into 'a Soviet camp', but Schultz's words confirmed that Washington was eager to prolong the sufferings of the Namibian people under Pretoria's rule rather than to allow it to make its own choice.

Unfortunately, the beginning of implementation of the UN Plan was marred by differences between the Soviets and SWAPO. Soviet diplomats, as well as representatives of other permanent members of the Security Council (China, the UK and France), agreed to the American proposal to cut down the number of UN troops to be deployed in Namibia in the pre-election period for financial reasons. This decision, which caused political complications for the USSR, was taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, who practically acted single-handedly.

Subsequent events showed that the reduced strength of the UN units did not harm its functioning, especially as the number of UN police officers had been increased. However, the delay caused by the lengthy discussions on the issue prevented their deployment on time.

Summing up, we can say that Moscow's assistance to the liberation movement was of special importance because it was provided in the field, and at a time when others could not or would not help. It also undoubtedly encouraged non-racism in the ranks of the ANC through fraternal relations, which had developed between the 'White' Soviets and the 'Black' members of the liberation movements.

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CHAPTER 19

GLOBALIZATION

Moussa Willy Bantenga

Introduction

‘Mondialisation’ in French and ‘globalization’ in English is a favourite theme of debate among the ranks of intellectuals, the media, researchers, decision-makers, and international institutions. A vast subject area, globalization has been the subject of countless publications. The process leans towards the idea of a global or planetary ‘village’; it conveys an image of instant and permanent connections with the world, from the closest to the most distant and remote areas (Thwaites, 2008, p. 1). Positions are often split: globalization is a solution for some and a problem for others. The former promised the creation of wealth, which would have a knock-on effect for the entire world; the latter mobilized people to lead resistance movements. It was at the beginning of the 1990s that the word was unveiled to the world against the backdrop of capitalism’s triumph over communism. The supporters of free market economies took advantage of the situation to spread and apply their theories. The digital revolution, emerging in parallel with the push for economic globalization, sped up the whole process. Furthermore, globalization took on other aspects, such as culture, governance, the environment, and know-how. As a result, the issue of globalization became more complex.

Ever since, it has been examined across three periods of time: the past, the present and future. Historians have been taking an active role in this debate

despite their tendency to study events in hindsight. As such, they are experiencing a world that is moving forward at a rapid pace and they find themselves in a privileged situation in their dual role as scientists and citizens. How are we to understand globalization within the spheres of thought and action?

Understanding globalization: history, domains and issues

After three decades of growth, from the end of the Second World War, the West experienced a long, protracted crisis that resulted in higher petrol prices and a slowdown of the economy. The capitalist advocates were in need of a new impetus. The concept that was maturing in research centres and financial firms, and experimented with on a small scale, was unleashed. One needs to bear in mind that the context was marked by a number of major events. Firstly, in the 1980s, two champions of ultra-liberalist economics came to power: Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) in the United States, both stamped their doctrine on world affairs. In 1982, the 'Washington Consensus' endorsed liberalization, deregulation and privatization as a privileged model of economic governance. By the end of the 1980s and into the next decade, we witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Communist Bloc. The result was the triumph of capitalism. In this new order of the capitalist world, it was now time to make it irreversible: there would be no going back.

The experts focused on the economy and finance on the one hand, and information and communication technology (ICT) on the other, but the elements that went on to define globalization are manifold and have evolved over time. Today, for example, globalization has a knock-on-effect on tourism or migration.

Historians have contributed widely to the debate, either directly by formulating their assessment of globalization, or indirectly by spurring other experts to integrate the dynamic of the human spirit into their approaches. Moreover, Antony Gerald Hopkins and François Chaubet cite that the origins of the first world dynamic, called 'archaic globalization', dates back to the Bronze Age, from 4000 BCE to the beginning of the seventeenth century (Hopkins, 2002, p. 3; Chaubert, 2013, p. 9).¹ In referring to navigation and the economies of Greece and Rome, Jean-Pierre Allegret and Pascal Le Merrer retrace their analysis to

1 These two authors evoke the 'protomondialisation' until the end of the seventeenth century characterized by a growing grip of European states on the world.

antiquity (Allegret and Pascal, 2015, pp. 26-27), while Régis Bénichi became interested in the world's spice market (Bénichi, 2003, p. 17). As for Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, they fashioned the concept of a 'world economy' to define the European economy and the expansion of capitalism since the fourteenth century (Braudel, 1979; Wallerstein, 1979). Joseph Ki-Zerbo later pointed out that Europeans used the concept to initiate the Atlantic Slave Trade and, later, the colonization of Africa (Ki-Zerbo, 2003, pp. 21-22). Numerous experts, amongst whom Sebastian Santander, Régis Bénichi and François Chaubert, deemed the nineteenth century to be a significant turning point in the historical analysis of globalization. They retrace the intensification of exchanges and even faster growth in the export of capital in the wake of economic, financial and scientific revolutions (Santander, 2000, pp. 29-63). According to Makhtar Diouf, when the current 'new globalization' started taking shape, African historians – through their learned society, the Association of African Historians (AHA) – organized their third conference from 10 to 14 September 2001 in Bamako, Mali, around the theme 'African Historians and Globalization' (Diouf, 2002, p. 109). They were in tune with the spirit of the age and wanted to express their thoughts on this fundamental question.

By learning from the experts who have studied globalization in its historical setting, we find that the current phenomenon is only a phase in human history, or the offshoot of a lengthy process, which in itself raises many questions. Indeed, looking at the expansion of humans on the planet, we could return to the beginnings of humanity where we would find that this great adventure began in Africa. This interprets the liberal economy as being supported by both the process and its other components, notably, ICTs, culture, governance, the environment, knowledge etc., which have a cumulative effect. It is one of the reasons that prompts us to single out the study of economics and finance; the other explanation hinges on controversy and impassioned debate.

One of the great novelties of the late twentieth century was the spread of Internet, which led to the digital revolution. Through ICTs, people were able to enter a cyberworld symbolized by the Internet, multimedia and digital television. By promoting the dissemination of knowledge, exchanges and knowledge-sharing, ICTs became a powerful springboard for growth. Moreover, an entire economy rapidly mushroomed around ICTs, giving birth to a vast range of new products like computers, electronic components, remote controls and smartphones, thus saving time, lowering costs, and clearly improving technical performances in numerous other sectors (Singh, 1994; Thwaites, 2008, pp. 203-204). This technology was the driving force behind innumerable

emerging activities: communications service providers, money transfer services, e-administration, e-education, e-commerce, 'start-ups'² etc.

Global governance was another important aspect as we witnessed an increased awareness of living in a unique world (Chaubert, 2013, p. 4). The pluralist democracy model spread to the majority of countries and those lagging behind were encouraged, or more or less coerced, to comply. Good governance was promoted, as well as values such as transparency and accountability.

Global problems demand global solutions

Regarding the environment, humanity has already proved its power over nature. The Anthropocene defines the world's most recent time period as being human influenced. Unrestricted human activities are destroying the environment. They are responsible for climate change, the destruction of forests and fauna, and pollution. Noticeable consequences are recurrent droughts, flooding and extreme weather events, the melting of glaciers, and the rise of sea levels. This global problem therefore requires a global response and perspective. Key summits on safeguarding the future of the planet began in 1992 with the Rio Summit, which was dedicated to sustainable development. The 21st Conference of Paris (COP21) on climate change, which took place in Paris in 2016, aimed to contain global warming below a threshold limit of 2°C in relation to pre-industrial temperature levels.

Another interesting point regarding globalization is higher education. The Bologna Process, through which European ministers sought to establish common standards for higher education, was begun in 1999, and it eventually reached a large number of countries around the world. This model was underpinned by four pillars: i) a greater opening up to private establishments; ii) the *Licence-Master-Doctorat* (bachelor's-master's-doctorate) degree system; iii) greater use of ICTs; and iv) increased mobility for students and teachers.

However, globalization also created opposing forces, both in developed and developing countries. Experts underlined how the digital divide imposed limitations and how developing countries have insufficient access to ICTs and the Internet. Debates on cultural identities led to the fear that English would outperform other languages, and that globalization could become 'globish', a term referring to a simplified version of English invented for the use of non-native speakers, synonymous with cultural impoverishment.

2 These are small businesses using ICTs to maximize their performance.

When all is said and done, globalization is structured by an intermediate network of associations, movements, connections, speed of production, human mobility, and a greater flow of goods, capital, ideas and information. In this movement, networks were created and intertwined, which were implemented by researchers, experts, entrepreneurs and citizens to empower themselves. Indeed, the large-scale policies promoting world governance are dictated by commodification.

Economic and financial globalization: liberalization and controversy

Academic research has revealed key elements of globalization: economic and financial integration, deregulation, freeing of markets, disintermediation, multinationalization of companies, foreign direct investment (FDI), outsourcing, intensification and networking (Diouf, 2002, p. 19; Xavier and Rosalto, 2002, p. 5). Liberal globalization is propelled by three levers: money, performance and competitiveness. Businesses invent development strategies on a continuous basis to optimize the value chain. A striking example is that of aircraft manufacturers. In 1992, it took 45 days for the American plane manufacturer Boeing to build a B737 plane; in 2005, assembly took just five days. This was because the firm was able to rely on the support of subcontractors based in Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom, who were able to supply and deliver preassembled modules on time (Reich, 1993, p. 103; Allegret and Pascal, 2015, p. 166).

The very optimistic proponents of liberal globalization enumerated the following promises: every country should give the best of itself; the living standards of everyone in the world should improve; competitiveness would be an excellent thing for good economic organization; competition should prompt entrepreneurs to reduce their margins so as to innovate and eliminate sources of inefficiency; the enrichment of those who stand to gain from globalization would always trickle down to the bottom of society (Giraud, 2012, p. 42; Allegret and Pascal, 2015, p. 348). In addition, globalization would add up to an opportunity for developing countries, that is, external markets would be more open to them, foreign investors would flock to create businesses, which in turn would help reduce unemployment, and tourism would take off. Conversely, people from these countries would emigrate to developed countries to look for

work (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 32).³ It is also appropriate to recall that actors in the free market are guided, above all, by their own interests.

This process of globalization was driven by state clusters, or 'clubs', and especially by certain international institutions. Within this framework, the Group of Eight (G8) – comprised primarily of rich capitalist countries and joined by Russia in 1998 – takes first place.⁴ Due to its substantial power, the world's markets were an easy target.

In parallel to the G8, the World Economic Forum was formed, where heads of state would continue to meet in Davos, Switzerland, joined, in particular, by the leaders of large multinationals and think tanks⁵, as well as top officials in the economic and financial fields whose job it is to consolidate the global market (Diouf, 2002, pp. 126-128).

Nevertheless, the supremacy of the giants has been increasingly contested. The creation of the Group of Twenty (G20) in 1999 recognized the emergence of other countries with whom the G8 wished to create a dialogue.⁶ These were emerging countries, of which five (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) formed BRICS.

As far as international institutions are concerned, four are of particular interest: The World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Bretton Woods institutions, namely, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Spearheading liberal globalization, these institutions prescribed the operating rules for global economics and finance (Allegret and Pascal, 2015, p. 286; Diouf, 2002, pp. 139-145; Rainelli, 2003, p. 61).

But the reality on the ground contradicted the promises made by the disciples of liberalism on many points. Very early on, worries surfaced. In developed countries, the issue of unemployment, which had become endemic, translated into offshoring, computerization and automation, among other things. Indeed, to maximize profit, numerous Western European and North American company bosses shifted their textile and electronic components businesses offshore to more attractive countries with lower productions costs, such as China. One of the consequences was the loss of employment in these areas. For example, in the United States, as steel production

3 It should be noted that Joseph Stiglitz served at the White House from 1993 to 1997, and at the World Bank as Senior Vice President and Chief Economist. He was a Nobel Prize winner in 2001.

4 These states are the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada and Russia.

5 Testbeds for new ideas.

6 The G20 is made up of G8 members plus South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Australia, and the European Union.

increased between 1982 and 2012, from 75 million tonnes to 120 million tonnes, the number of steel workers fell from 289,000 to 74,000 (Rifkin, 2014, p. 187).

Another problem generated by liberal globalization is the recurrence of crises. It is true that the phenomenon is intimately linked to capitalism. But we should also remember that liberal globalization itself engenders crises and sources of instability. The 2008 financial crisis is a classic example. It began in the United States under the guise of the subprimes crisis, characterized by a slump in the property market that had serious repercussions on bank loans. In Europe, the shock took the form of sovereign debt and a deep recession (Stiglitz, 2010, pp. 39-210; Allegret and Pascal, 2015, pp. 214-232). The crisis extended across the world, and Africans endured it through the drop in prices for prime materials, leading to economic slowdown and inflation.

From the outset, the evolution of liberal globalization faced criticism. It even provided the baton with which to beat itself. Because of its shortcomings and the damage it had caused, the opponents of liberalized globalization gained legitimacy for their actions and their rationale, in thinking about a more prosperous and just world.

In addition to unemployment and dysfunction, as discussed above, grievances against liberal globalization focused on the accentuation of injustices and inequalities, the degradation of the environment and resources, the imposition of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), exploitation, plundering, and land appropriation. Its adversaries argued that unrestricted competition has a negative impact on the most vulnerable populations and increases poverty, drastically weakening the power of states, labour unions and small producers, and subjecting the world to the power of multinationals and the insatiable financial appetites of corporate shareholders and bosses. It is undeniable that the powerful countries, which exalt liberalism, know how to bend its rules for the benefit of its own producers, such is the case of the United States that subsidises its cotton producers, for example. Indeed, one of Africa's most pertinent defences is to contend that the opening of borders to capital, ideas and goods impacts negatively on humanity as a whole. The institutions at the forefront of liberal globalization are accused of trampling on the good governance they seek to impose on developing countries. They are said to lack responsibility, transparency, democracy, and especially effective organization, and of serving the interests of the financial elites, while being influenced by the most powerful countries (Allegret and Pascal, 2015, pp. 336-340). Ultimately, the major powers are suspected of scheming to cleverly maintain their dominant positions. The main question that everyone continues to ask is: What is the alternative to liberal globalization? Every movement seeks to win over public opinion to its cause.

The most seen and heard among them are the anti-globalization activists. They are equally present in developed and developing countries, and are made up of ecologists, NGOs, consumer protection groups, feminists, trade unionists, and agricultural organizations. They demand a globalization solidarity, a different type of globalization based on universal access to fundamental rights, protection of the environment, food sovereignty, and the protection of developing countries and vulnerable communities. One of their shows of force took place in 1999 in Seattle in the United States where thousands of militants blocked access to the convention centre in order to prevent the WTO conference from taking place.

The second movement, of lesser scope, is composed of supporters of de-globalization. Unlike the anti-globalization activists, who seek a globalization stripped of its abuses and excesses, they reject globalization outright in favour of economic nationalism. They are found, paradoxically, just as much among conservatives as among socialist-communists in the great capitalist countries. They denounce offshoring, the loss of popular sovereignty, the chaos of the financial world, and the ever-increasing pressure for productivity (Lordon, 2011, pp. 1, 8-9).

Within these movements is a call for at least some regulation and control, and a decisive role for the state in reducing the power of the groups, clubs and institutions that drive liberal globalization. Where does Africa stand in this game?

Africa's challenges in globalization

Globalization from Africa's viewpoint has to be understood by associating it with sustainable human development. This means development that responds to the needs of the present but without compromising the capacity of future generations to respond to their own needs. The situation, as presented, opens up discussions about training, health, gender, the environment, and a reduction or even the elimination of poverty and hunger.⁷

Africa has numerous pressing issues, and it is not just a question of blaming liberal globalization for them all. However, the continent's integration into globalization continues to face internal obstacles, such as inadequate infrastructure and crises, as well as external obstacles, such as deteriorating terms of trade. Furthermore, with the exception of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the integration of states and peoples, in relation to the challenges they face, is lagging behind.

⁷ This topic has been presented in the form of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) from 2005 to 2015, which have since become Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

However, these problems were often made worse as the first waves of liberal globalization swept across Africa. The economic crisis experienced by African countries forced them to turn to the Bretton Woods institutions. The austerity measures recommended by these institutions put an end to the welfare state. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which consisted of liberalization, privatization and cuts to social spending, were certainly intended to restore macroeconomic balance, and they granted new loans to the countries that requested them. But the social impact was negative and resulted in mass youth unemployment, redundancies, a drop in civil service recruitment, inflation, and so on. On a psychological level, recourse to the Bretton Woods institutions was perceived in some scientific, intellectual and civil society circles as an injunction from the continent's traditional partners concerned about African debt repayment. Moreover, the conditions imposed/recommended were perceived as a loss in state sovereignty. But, like a reed, Africa bends but never breaks. On the political front, the resilience demonstrated by the continent enabled it to impose a pluralist democracy on their leaders during the 1990s in what is known as the 'Time of the People'.

Looking ahead, Africans are entering the debate by appropriating the term 'emerging'. Internationally, the term appeared in the 1980s to refer to developing countries that offered opportunities for investors: these were middle-income countries that had sustained growth and begun to catch up with developed countries through institutional transformations and economic openness. Their weight in global wealth creation was growing. As a result, they constituted a new centre of economic and political power and became involved in development cooperation with other developing countries (UNDP, 2013, p. v). BRICS countries and those like Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia spring to mind when we talk about emerging countries, economies or markets. To avoid confusion, these countries are now classified as emerging powers. The term 'emerging' has been adopted in Africa, particularly by political authorities. The challenge for these leaders is to have a vision for better anchoring Africa in tomorrow's world.

Globalization is an interesting framework to establish comparisons. By focusing attention on the significant evolution of newly industrialized Asian countries (South Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore), Africans have realized that these countries understand how to attract foreign capital, promote go-getting entrepreneurs, and accumulate vital resources. Thanks to the entrepreneurial culture that is taking shape across the continent, Africans today have high hopes of sustaining the take-off of their economies.

Globalization is an opportunity for Africans to take charge and for states to diversify their partnerships. The workings of capitalism are well known. As a

result, African countries have been developing strategies, even more so since the 1990s, to break free from the orbit of their former colonial powers and secure independent leadership. This has amplified their sense of responsibility. One of the major challenges is to ensure quality growth, meaning the diversification, intensification and transformation of raw materials at the national level to create more added value.

Other African countries and emerging powers are the preferred targets. On the first point, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa are demonstrating their ability to trade and invest in Africa. This includes a wide range of sectors, such as manufacturing, telecommunications and infrastructure. On the second point, emerging powers are rushing to the continent, and it is important to capitalize on and maximize investments for the benefit of inclusive development. Investors are betting on certain statistics, such as favourable gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Between 1980 and the early 1990s, the rate rose from 2.5% to an average of 4% between 1996 and 2017 (African Development Bank et al., 2013, pp. 22, 41; 2017, pp. 5, 26).

The most emblematic of the emerging powers is China. How can the success of China and other Asian countries in the global economy inspire Africans? This vast Asian country has achieved the remarkable feat of embracing globalization and becoming one of the world's major investors. China was once the world's workshop, but it has managed to rise to the ranks of countries mastering cutting-edge technology and artificial intelligence. Its economic prowess has also led it to Africa. Relations with China took a decisive turn in the 2000s when China dealt a blow to Western powers, which were far more interested in Central and Eastern Europe, newly freed from Soviet control.

In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was launched. The Beijing Declaration that ensued described a cooperation founded on long-term stability, equality and reciprocal benefits. Since then, China/Africa conferences have been held regularly. What emerges from these forums is the cancellation of part of Africa's debt, the granting of preferential loans to Africa, the encouragement of imports of African products into China, the encouragement of Chinese investment in Africa, support for the training of Africans, the provision of experts to Africa, and the construction of infrastructure in Africa. Since then, both parties have been working to formalize these declarations. To ensure the long-term success of its efforts, China joined the WTO in 2001. As a result, the value of transactions jumped from an estimated US\$10 billion in 2000 to US\$220 billion in 2014. By 2014, it had reached US\$220 billion (Philling, 2017, p. 84). True, Africa's opening up to China has attracted

criticism: issues cited include competition with domestic retailers, technology transfer, the problem of recruiting national labour, the exploitation of Africa's natural resources, the opacity of Chinese operations, malfeasance, human rights abuses, corruption, and the practice of copying and counterfeiting. However, Africa's new stance is forcing former colonial powers and traditional partners to shift their policies away from rent-based economies. As a result, cutting-edge and crucial sectors, such as solar energy, is attracting greater investment.

Conclusion

Globalization has been debated in scientific circles over the last thirty years and historians have contributed by providing historical depth. This chapter has attempted to highlight the different facets of conquering globalization: ICTs, culture, pluralistic democracies, environmental issues, knowledge systems, and so on. However, economic and financial globalization, or liberal globalization, occupies a central place in the process. International institutions and groups of major countries are supposed to guarantee this new world order. The proponents of liberal globalization, theorists and decision-makers alike, promised global prosperity. But they were driven more by their own interests. Time is an essential factor. For greater competitiveness and performance, speed is vital in the production and circulation of goods, ideas and innovations. Globalization requires constant adaptation. But reality has shaken certainties. Indeed, because of its harmful effects, liberal globalization has brought protest and opposition movements to the fore. Anti-globalization activists envisioned a fair and equitable world, while supporters of de-globalization defended the idea of protecting the national economy. Africa, a fragile continent, has suffered the excesses of liberal globalization. However, African states have attempted to negotiate this shift by attracting partners, such as China, and by looking to the future. Bolstered by sustained economic growth, they have ambitions to join the ranks of emerging countries.

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NEW WORLD GEOPOLITICS

Willy Jackson

Introduction

The historical and political shockwaves that were felt around the world due to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which ultimately ended the Cold War¹ and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, represented a real paradigm shift in conventional international relations. This event marked a reversal in the previous international order and heralded a new era in world geopolitics (Badie and Smouts, 1999; Dallenne and Buchy, 2016; Géré, 2012). Indeed, in the preceding years, geopolitics had been structured around the antagonism between the capitalist and communist blocs, as promoted by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Overarmed, ideologically opposed and based on contradictory economic systems, these two great powers fought for world hegemony. This bipolar period is globally characterized by the withdrawal and the confinement of each bloc in its geographical sphere of influence. Equipped with the deterrent of the atomic bomb, they neutralized each other due to the fear of direct military confrontation. They were therefore condemned to peaceful competition (space exploration and economic conquest through regional integration) (Krasnov, 1975, p. 6). Both parties' desire to avoid a head-

1 Defined as a 'high intensity power relationship between two States or two alliances which is not resolved by direct confrontation' (Géré, 2002, p. 19).

on conflict led to their disputes being exported to peripheral areas. This goes some way to explaining the disastrous crises and ideological wars that happened in some developing countries (Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, etc.). The many foreign military interventions in the doomed former Zaire (present-day, Democratic Republic of the Congo), which in the Western geopolitical chessboard was the containment point for the spread of communism in sub-Saharan Africa,² followed the same logic.

This period ended with the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Then began a period of globalization that was predicted to bring happiness to all humans: the promise of a 'New World Order'³ and the proclamation of the end of history through the victory of liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992). Hence, the optimistic prediction of a world without enemies and the resurgence of a utopia of universal harmony and perpetual peace (Crucé, 2004 [1623]; Castel de Saint-Pierre, 2013 [1713]; Gentz, 1997 [1800]; Kant, 1979 [1795]). Has this hope for a better world materialized in practice? Has full globalization through the disappearance of one of the antagonistic parties of the Cold War period helped to make people's lives easier in our global society?

In the first section, we will show that the end of the bipolar system was accompanied by an unprecedented worsening of geopolitical tensions, which permanently established widespread disorder in global society. In the second section, we will explore how this explosion of danger is due to the absence of a collective political project, a cornerstone for regulating violence between human beings. The idea of the universal political community, as a response to modern geopolitical crises, will be addressed in the third section.

New geopolitics and globalized world disorder

The objective here is to explore the nature of modern disorders, not least because post-Cold War global society presents a worrying map of new conflicts, violent situations and unprecedented insecurity that are evidence of the dangers and chaos of today's world (Bauer and Raufer, 2009; Berthelet, 2014; Dessertine, 2010; Lăidi, 1993; Mova Sakanyi, 2009; Pascallon, 2016; Raufer, 2008, pp. 25–28; Sur, 2010). This state of affairs reveals threats that are, admittedly, always rooted in the history of humanity but, through globalization,

2 'La fiction zaïroise' (Zaire fiction) a series of articles published in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 1977, and specifically by Claude Julien, *Les trois grands mérites de l'intervention française*, p. 10.

3 Speech by President George H.W. Bush on 11 September 1990 to the United States Congress.

are growing on a hitherto unparalleled scale. While it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive catalogue, the most iconic and significant forms of disorder can be identified: armed conflicts and global insecurity, economic and social disorder, environmental risk, and geostrategic conflicts.

Armed conflicts and global insecurity

World disorder is particularly evident in terms of armed conflicts and the constant proliferation of wars (Boniface, 2016, p. 16; Cattaruzza and Boissière, 2014; Fabry, 2017). The world's militarization, the explosion in arms budgets⁴, the sophistication of military mass destruction technologies⁵ and the political decision to use them, as well as the arms trade among the great powers, all contribute to this increase in these hotspots of tension and military confrontation around the world. The race by certain countries, such as Iran and North Korea, to have nuclear weapons is also a contributing factor, despite the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for this type of weapon in 1968. To this, is added the end of public authority's monopoly of defence and security functions, which is now shared with private entities. These private entities, which are havens for mercenaries, are increasingly intervening in wars and uncontrolled police operations (Haupais, 2009, p. 87 et seq.; Renou, et al., 2006). Terrorism, including by states, also continues to prosper despite the vigorous responses in recent years following the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2013, pp. 50 et seq.). In this regard, the threat of conflict is permanent, unclear and dispersed, not least because the enemy can no longer be identified. It is everywhere and nowhere: 'Terrorism, like other threats, is now de-territorialized, itinerant and globalized (Berthelet, 2014, p. 193; Delmas-Marty, 2010, pp. 181 et seq.).

Globalization has also generated global crime on its fringes. In a world in limbo, with the loss of control over its territory and the loss of its sovereign powers (Bauman, 2002, pp. 81-90; Badie and Smouts, 1996; Habermas, 2000), new transnational forms of crime have appeared, contributing to the emergence of human societies in a veritable 'security Wild West' (Berthelet, 2014, p. 183), with the emergence of all types of trafficking, including humans, cybercrime,

4 According to Géré: 'In 2010, in billions of US dollars, the following was spent: United States (722.1); China (76.4); United Kingdom (56.5); Japan (52.8); Saudi Arabia (45.2); France (42.6); Russia (41.4); Germany (41.2); India (38.4); Brazil (34.7); South Korea (25.5); Italy (20.5); Israel (15.6)' (Géré, 2012, p. 19).

5 Drones, a mega-bomb, called 'the mother of all bombs', released by the United States on 13 April 2017 in Afghanistan.

smuggling of prohibited goods, maritime piracy, paedophilia, organized crime and more (Bauer, 2010; Bauer and Raufer, 2009; Berthelet, 2014; Carillo, 2010a, 2010b; Raufer, 2008). In territories where the state no longer exercises power, grey areas have increased; actual enclaves where the underworld reigns. Globalization has revealed the state's inability to curb the explosion of violence and stem the growing anarchy (Chemillier-Gendreau and Jackson, 2009, pp. 23-44; Gayraud and Thual, 2012; Jowitt, 1993; Kaplan, 2002).

Social and economic disorders and environmental risks

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world hoped to reap the 'dividends of peace', with the idea that the sums of money previously used in the arms race would now be allocated to human development projects. However, the military spending of states only experienced a relative decrease and over a short period (Quinet, 1997, pp. 101-120). In this context, the global economic situation continued to deteriorate, contributing to the increase in inequalities between nations and populations. Financial and predatory capitalism is very much part of this problem. Its logic of maximizing profits, well beyond any morality, has made it the source of many illicit and organized criminal activities: misappropriation of funds, money laundering, tax evasion, hidden commissions on public procurement, etc. This is in addition to repeated economic and financial crises of dubious origin: organized bankruptcies, fiscal and social dumping, hostile business relocations, collection of public subsidies without return investment, and so on. Economic and financial crime reached its peak in the era of globalization (Gayraud, 2011a, 2011b, 2014, 2016; Juvin, 2012; Raufer, 2011; Strange, 1996).

Financial and criminal capitalism also fuels many varied social crises of human misfortune that are a real violation of economic, social and cultural rights, as set out in 1966 by the United Nations in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is not surprising that these events, which caused human misery, increased substantially due to the brutal structural adjustment programmes imposed on states in the late 1980s. The main reasons for the destabilization of internal societies, as well as international society as a whole, include recurrent food shortages, accompanied by the ruthless response to food riots, as seen in 2008 in many sub-Saharan African countries⁶, but also elsewhere

6 The food crisis was once again raging in many African countries in 2017: Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, etc. It was fueled by the monopolization of the best land by powerful financial interests, states and large international financial groups allied with corrupt local authorities and contributing to the destruction of rural communities.

in the world (Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, Bangladesh, etc.). This litany of ills continues with unchecked urbanization, infectious diseases, pandemics, illiteracy and mass unemployment. Furthermore, the migration crisis precipitates the collapse of societies' structures, weakened by the ravages of an uncontrolled and unequal globalization because, 'in a world of winners and losers, the losers do not disappear as if by magic, they try their luck elsewhere' (ILO, 2000).⁷

In environmental terms, it is accepted that humanity is confronted with many risks, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and volcanic eruptions, which highlight the vulnerability of populations in the face of natural disasters. Similarly, predatory activities (deforestation, industrialization) cause harmful effects, climate change and atmospheric pollution. Global climate conferences continue to reflect the growing need for joint action and a sustainable ecological transition towards the use of renewable energies over nuclear and fossil fuels, particularly oil, where the uncertainty of supply has also led to conflicts.⁸ Faced with the explosion of competition to harness the world's riches, including water resources, it is therefore urgent to act.

Geostrategic conflicts

Located in geographical areas of varying sizes, some countries are hotbeds of insecurity, violence and threats to world peace. Regional tensions fall into this category (Dumas and Crettien, 2014). In the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is far from being settled, despite the ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the wall constructed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory.⁹ The two-state solution recommended by the United Nations has not been applied, which has plunged this region into a permanent state of conflict. Elsewhere in this part of the world, following the crushing of the 'Arab Spring' by the authorities, Syria was in chaos from 2011, as befell its neighbour, Iraq, since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Several other countries (Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya) also experienced situations of endemic violence and chaos as well as pressure from radical Islamic movements (ISIS), local dictatorships and foreign interventions. In the Maghreb, the conflict in

7 On this subject, see Jackson (2000, pp. 52-63).

8 On all these aspects, see Furfari (2012), Favennec (2007), Favennec and Mathieu (2014), de Lestrangé, Paillard and Zelenko (2005), and Kaméni (2011, pp. 109-137).

9 Source: ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, *Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders*, Advisory opinion of 9 July 2004. On this point, see Jackson (2004, p. 14).

Western Sahara is still unresolved, while sub-Saharan Africa has many tense areas (Sahel, Horn of Africa, Lake Chad, Gulf of Guinea, Great Lakes), and several of its countries are in turmoil (Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo). All these deteriorating situations have led to military interventions by the United Nations and foreign powers, notably France. The Islamist threat is also active, with the presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram. The collapse of state structures, democratic deficits and ethnic conflicts, which occasionally descend into genocide (Rwanda), mean that many of these countries are considered 'failed states'. Elsewhere, particularly in the Balkans, pockets of tension persist, fueled by nationalism (Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo), which also extends to Russia's backyard (Chechnya, Caucasus) and Kurdistan.

But geostrategic conflicts also arise from states' territorial encroachment (Russia's annexation of Crimea) and military alliances (NATO's expansion to countries on Russia's borders). This type of bellicose behaviour includes disputes over maritime areas, such as in the South China Sea, where various players (China, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc.) are fighting for sovereignty over certain islands, notably Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands.

What is Africa's place in this new configuration of world geopolitics? With globalization having reshuffled the cards of geopolitics: What influence does Africa have, and does it represent an interest in the challenges that are emerging? A coveted continent during the Age of Discovery, it experienced the slave trade, colonization and independence without truly breaking free from its former masters, and thus remaining under the yoke of neo-colonialism (M'Bokolo, 1980). Its successive globalizations have therefore contributed to its dependency. Devalued and marginalized in the 1990s, Africa has become an object of desire and 're-coveted' since the 2000s. An Afro-pessimist vision (Dumont, 2012; Michailof, 2015; Smith, 2003) has been replaced by an Afro-optimist perception of the continent (Nonjon and Pautet, 2014; Rahmouni-Benchida, 2015; Severino, 2010), which has aroused the enthusiasm of foreign powers (Pautet, 2011). Its immense resources and potential are obvious advantages: 30 million km² (22.5% of its land surface), 2 billion individuals by 2050, nearly one-third of the world's mineral reserves, including 81% of manganese, 68% of chrome, 55% of platinum, 44% of vanadium, 40% of gold, 13% of oil reserves, and an economic growth rate of over 5%. The continent's geopolitics is also marked by the repositioning and deployment of a wide range of actors, both former colonial powers and emerging new partners (China, India, Brazil, Russia) are competing for strategic, economic and commercial

gains (Hugon, 2010, pp. 99-118). The proliferation of bilateral forums attests to this renewed interest: summits between China and Africa; Japan and Africa; the United States and Africa; France and Africa; India and Africa, etc. The traditional bilateral ties of subjugation (*Françafrique*) are increasingly being overlaid by asymmetrical relationships within the framework of the European Union, notably with the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).

The increase in terrorism on the African continent and its inclusion in transnational organized crime networks (d'Auzon, 2014; Daniel, 2014; Hanne and Larabi, 2015; Laurent, 2013) have also served as a pretext for military deployment by foreign powers: the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the presence of numerous French military bases. All in all, Africa presents a world of contrasts, with assets to be exploited and weaknesses to be overcome (Hugon, 2016). In seeking to end the rivalries of the great powers and emerge from the curse of its natural resources, Africa must channel its riches for the benefit of its peoples, instead of the local oligarchs who are allied with foreign interests.

The Cold War succeeded in limiting the risks and conflicts in certain geographical and political spaces. However, this is no longer the case today, where there is a veritable global society marked by a diverse mix of individuals, peoples, economies and culture, and so on. The end of bipolarization has been reflected by an unprecedented networking of human beings and their activities, but with increased geopolitical risks. This current situation results from the absence of a common political project on a global level.

The absence of a universal political community, an element that contributes to the worsening of geopolitical tensions across the world

The disorder and chaos in the world, some salient aspects of which have been highlighted, stem from the difficulty for global society to conceive and structure itself as a political community. The prospects for change, in this sense, require an understanding of the principles and rules that govern its organization and functioning, and which constitute obstacles to the prevention and resolution of geopolitical crises.

Today's global society is emerging from a slow but inexorable transformation, which embodies the concept of sovereignty as an operating standard for the political societies formed as states. These political societies emerged from

a historical moment in Europe in the fifteenth century, when princes freed themselves from the dual authority of the emperor and the Pope according to the adage: 'Every prince is the emperor of his kingdom' (Kantorowicz, 1989; Krynen, 1993). Sovereignty therefore increased and would eventually be inscribed in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 (Article 2, Paragraph 1) as a universal standard. This legal fiction, because of the formal equality attributed to all States (Article 2, Paragraph 1), is defined by lawyers as the competence of competences, those exercised exclusively by the state over its territory and its population. However, this model of unconditional power is today outdated. The absolutism which characterizes it is undermined by multiple intrusions by powerful actors (transnational companies, international institutions, organized crime). As an emancipatory principle, which has enabled many states to enter the international arena through the application of peoples' right to self-determination (Article 1, Paragraph 2), it has also encouraged certain states, under the guise of the rule of non-intervention in their internal affairs (Article 2, paragraph 7), to commit numerous reprehensible acts without the possibility of intervention by other states. The right or duty to intervene – a legal concept that remains unidentified and is in its infancy – has not fundamentally changed this situation, which is overshadowed by the widespread use of violence and repression that fuel many contemporary geopolitical crises.

Indeed, neither the proliferation of humanitarianism, which acts as an after-sales service for human rights violations, nor even the instrumentalization of the supposedly innovative concept regarding the responsibility to protect, will improve this state of affairs, as seen in the case of Libya.¹⁰

The absence of a common law regulating all forms of violence also contributes to the growing disorder in global society. The question of global law is that of a system by which it is possible to prevent violence between states and other entities that make up human society. However, in the international arena, sovereignty precludes the existence of any rules that are binding on all states. International relations are governed by treaties concluded between states. These are affected by the relative effect,¹¹ which excludes any widespread application of a standard to a state that is not a party to a treaty. This predominance of a contractual law has indeed enabled states to get out of certain conventions where the objective is to

10 On 17 March 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 1973 which provides for the protection of civilians protesting against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The hijacking of the United Nations mandate by the international coalition formed on this occasion, in fact, led to the overthrow of the Libyan regime and the assassination of its leader by the rebels.

11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34.

organize global society. The United States and China are absent from multiple conventions, and France is not party to those on the imprescriptibility of war crimes. But those states that dare embark on the path to nuclear weapons are subject to sanctions in the name of the recognized monopoly of certain powers in this domain. This contravenes the equality between states, as proclaimed by the Charter, a principle that is already undermined by the Charter itself, as evidenced by the category of permanent members with veto power in the UN Security Council (Article 23). The same breach of the principle of equality can be seen in the IMF and the World Bank, where voting rights are allocated to states according to their financial contributions. The contractual form therefore allows for many abuses, which give rise to conflictual situations. As for transnational relations, i.e. those that bind formal and informal private actors, they are able to escape state control and develop in lawless areas. Private contracts predominate, which encourage all forms of organized crime trafficking. Similarly, arbitration, a form of transactional justice, allows for many abuses in international investment and trade. International justice is not immune to these dysfunctions.

A universal political order must be able to rely on international justice, which is called upon to rule on accountability and compensation for damages. However, international justice is essentially transactional because a state cannot be brought before an international court without its consent.¹² The example of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the main judicial body of the United Nations, illustrates this point: four permanent members of the UN Security Council reject its jurisdiction outright (China, Russia), or have rejected it after a conviction (United States, France). The United States refused to execute the Court's judgement ordering them to pay reparations to Nicaragua for its liability arising from the assistance given to the Contra guerrillas working against the country from Honduras.¹³ International society is therefore at an impasse due to the impossibility of accessing a general and universal right. As for international criminal justice, the universal nature of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) jurisdiction is jeopardized by the fact that some of the world's biggest states (United States, China, Russia) are not party to the Rome Statute that created it. Furthermore, a strong suspicion of partiality weighs on it, not least because the accusation of crimes against humanity has mostly been made against African leaders, giving the impression of only pursuing the weakest.

12 With the notable exception of the European Court of Human Rights and the dispute settlement body of the WTO.

13 See ICJ, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, Decree of 27 June 1986, *ICJ Reports*, 1986, p. 14 *et seq.*

Political disorder, meanwhile, must be linked to the failure of the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. Given the impossibility of defining what constitutes a 'people', this principle was only effective in triggering decolonization within colonial borders, which were in themselves a source of territorial disputes that clogged the courts of international tribunals and led to armed conflicts between states. This principle therefore became ineffective once this historical period came to an end. Hence, the wars that inflamed the former Yugoslavia as well as the chaos that presided over the break-up of the USSR, which saw the Baltic states gain sovereignty, but has so far eluded the Chechens. In addition, the Palestinians, Sahrawis and Kurds have also been deprived of the exercise of this right to self-determination.

Its non-application therefore contributes to the creation of a category of stateless people who are the source of many regional and international conflicts. In addition to not recognizing peoples, the system, as it is designed, denies several other categories (stateless persons, refugees, illegal immigrants), who are abandoned to arbitrary national laws that cannot be tempered by any universal normative injunction supported by a global community.

The failure of the collective security mechanism, set up by the United Nations, also fuels modern geopolitical crises. In 1945, the previous sovereign right to wage war was challenged; the Charter forbids the use of force (Article 2, Paragraph 4). The United Nations system is based on precise rules: justification of war in case of legitimate self-defence against an aggressor (Article 51) pending UN intervention and war initiated by the United Nations itself, in application of its collective security mission. The following prescriptions complete this structure: i) the provision of troops to the Organization by its members, prepared to act in its name (Article 43); ii) the creation of an integrated command through the Military Staff Committee 'responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council' (Article 47, Paragraph 3); and iii) the option for disarmament (Article 26). These relevant provisions of the Charter have never worked. Consequently, unilateral military interventions, without a political solution, have increased. They are dressed up as humanitarian rescue operations but, in reality, they are imperial wars with dubious objectives (Iraq, Libya, Syria). Moreover, the collective security mechanism itself is insufficient because it is limited to the hypothesis of conventional wars and military confrontation between states, far from the current pattern of asymmetrical wars.

In economic and social terms, the decline in the state's regulatory power must be acknowledged, and this is not without consequences for the disastrous

situations reported. Under the pressure of liberal ideology, the Charter has lost its political decision-making ability. The fierce competition that results from powerful lobbies and the greed they demonstrate contribute to the involvement of global society in trade and social wars, as well as generating situations of human distress and a source of tension. When politics abdicates its responsibility to resolve conflicts, then popular anger pushes global societies over the edge into 'times of riot' (Bertho, 2009).

Contemporary geopolitical threats arise in the context of a fragmented global society, marked by a cause-and-effect relationship between the system that governs it and the realities it produces. We must therefore guide humanity toward a political project that will create a universal way of living together. The new global geopolitics cannot be content with merely acknowledging the dangers of the world. We need a reinvented geopolitics of peace. It must lay the foundations for a peaceful global society based on shared values.

The universal political community, a response to modern geopolitical crises

With globalization accelerating sharply in the twentieth century, the dangers have become planetary and spread to all human societies. However, we lack a universal instrument to create a united front. This is precisely the challenge: to go beyond our singularity as individuals or as groups in order to create a link to a higher community that transcends our affiliations and our differences. This existential question was also asked by Henry Kissinger: 'The mystery to be overcome is one all people share – how divergent historic experiences and values can be shaped into a common order' (Kissinger, 2016, p. 17). At the heart of this issue lies the question of 'Otherness'; our relationship with others, recognizing them for who they are, what makes them who they are, and accepting our differences. Linked to the question of identity, this issue is central to the future of the global political community. Many of today's geopolitical crises are caused by identity politics, and cultural, religious and ideological conflicts. Samuel Huntington predicted that post-Cold War conflicts would be conflicts of civilization (Huntington, 2000). Consequently, we have seen the reappearance of old stereotypes and divisions of an irreconcilable perception of different worlds: ethnic group against ethnic group; barbaric East against civilized West, radical Islam against Christianity; a rich, sated, dominating North against a poor, hungry, dominated South. Such hateful confrontations would contribute

to making human beings 'savage' and 'uncivilised' (Berthelet, 2014, p. 216 et seq.; Rufin, 1991). The confrontation line of contemporary conflicts mirrors the perceptions of those involved, whether local or global. This is what makes them geopolitical (Giblin, 2016). These excesses can only be resolved through a universal and cosmopolitan mindset.

According to Pascal Boniface, the opportunity for a new world order was within reach but was missed because of the strategic choice made by the United States at the end of the Cold War to pursue a unipolar world in which it would dominate (Boniface, 2016, pp. 25–38). Today, we have emerged from this 'furtive American hegemony' (Sur, 2014, p. 17), with the US having experienced the relative nature of power (Hassner, 2007; Badie, 2013). Thus, we are heading towards 'an apolar and anomic world' (Sur, 2014, p. 14), where states have lost all control over international affairs to the benefit of private stakeholders. New geopolitics is therefore now arranged around a multi-polar world with the creation of large regional spaces of emerging nations (BRICS)¹⁴ and free-trade megazones¹⁵ formed or being formed and bypassing the World Trade Organization (WTO). Competitive and contested by most civil societies and public opinion, they are also challenged by certain participating states (the United States and France). But the addition of regional poles, however homogeneous and powerful they may be, does not constitute a universal political community.

Thinking about and organizing the global political community means clearing the way for universalist thinking (Assiter, 2003; Balibar, 2016; Martin, 2015; Tassin, 2003), currently in a sorry state: 'A utopia is dying. That of universal rights. The prospect of a world where all human beings would be free and equal, without distinction' (Fourest, 2009, p. 7). What is lacking in the human community is a political representation of global society. It is important to tackle the construction of this political link for action and a universal life together; it is the price we must pay to reduce the world's geopolitical risks and conflicts. This political idea of a 'common good' must be the expression of a democratic and non-hegemonic bond: 'Only a multilateral universalism, in which consideration of diversity integrates all points of view, would fulfill the conditions for a new

14 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.

15 They include: CETA (Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement) between Canada and the European Union; TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) nicknamed TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement) planned between the United States and the European Union; RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) between China and India and 14 other Asian countries; TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) between the United States and 11 other countries; ZLEC (African Free Trade Zone) that brings together the 54 African Union states.

approach' (Affergan, 1993, p. 15). Consequently, the universal can only be thought of as an empty space, which is not 'pre-occupied' by a singularity that has monopolized the universal's representation (Laclau, 2015). To this end, we must denounce the misuse of the expression 'international community', which is nothing more than a veiled translation of the interests of a particular group.

Once the philosophical foundations of the global political community have been laid, the battle must still be fought for the sake of common law because no political society can function without legal regulation. Law and politics are indivisible. Moreover, sovereignty is an obstacle to the development of common law. We cannot achieve universality through the use of treaties, as they only contribute to diversifying and differentiating commitments. We must therefore break free from the stranglehold of contractual relations and prioritize non-contractual norms: customs, *jus cogens* or general imperative law¹⁶ and unilateral acts by international organizations, particularly those by the UN General Assembly, which are to date not binding, unlike those of the Security Council.

Many conflicts go unaddressed due to flaws in the current global political and institutional order in the modern world. The UN is not a democratic institution and permanent members with the right to veto have been known to use this power to block decisions that would have helped to ease conflict situations. Two sets of beneficial measures should be taken: on the one hand, reactivating that part of the UN model that has never worked, that is, collective security; and on the other hand, making the Security Council more democratic by eliminating permanent member status with the right of veto, which the five major victors of the Second World War have abused, an issue that has remained taboo until now. The derisory and inadequate nature of the UN reform proposals mainly consists of enlarging the Security Council to other members, while leaving the imperialist nature of this organization intact.

In terms of economic relations, crushing liberalism has established itself as the only viable model by weakening any ideological alternative. The world is globalized because commercial exchange mechanisms have been imposed on all sectors of economic and social activity, resulting in the above-mentioned malfunctions and endangering world peace: 'Living in peace and security demands, first, the satisfaction of basic needs and second, harmony with the varioust actors of international society' (Jeanclos, 2011, p. 9). The question therefore remains of how to move beyond this system and reinvent another

16 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Notion that means a set of norms with a superior value. Treaties and other contradictory norms are null and void.

historical perspective (Wallerstein, 1999). However, the tyranny of this single model is questionable in light of international law, which recognizes the right of each state to freely choose its political and economic system.¹⁷ But it is, undoubtedly, essential to begin pursuing universal public interests by defending access to global public goods (water, air, medicines, technologies, etc.), and which are not subjected to market relations.

Conclusion

The global society that emerged after the Cold War is a source of various internal and external threats and violence. The many geopolitical conflicts were made worse by the absence of a universal community, which could have defused these situations through unified political decision-making. The time has come to give substance and consistency to such a project. Indeed, our collective survival depends on it.

In a world where the democratic ideal is no longer a universalism, in which two competing universalisms, i.e. the market and religion (Bessis, 2014) are in conflict, the outlook outlined in this analysis is one of cosmopolitanism. Despite our differences, humanity has a common purpose, whose conflicts can be resolved through a dialectical relationship of freedom and democracy (Kaplan, 2010).

17 Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly of 24 October 1970.

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CHAPTER 21

TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Willy Jackson

Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the international situation has been marked by an upheaval in the political architecture that emerged at the end of the Second World War. The latter ended in 1945 with the creation of the United Nations under the impetus of a diverse coalition of states formed to defeat Nazism. This paradoxical alliance included, on the one hand, the Western powers of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, to which must be added the then nationalist China led by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, and, on the other hand, the Soviet Union. Based on ideologically antagonistic systems and in military competition with each other, these two blocs found themselves united around a common interest: the defeat of Hitler and the Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan). But this historic consensus was not to survive the end of this world conflict. Very early on, the divisions – those which had led to the Yalta agreement that divided the world into capitalist and communist spheres of influence centred on the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively – resurfaced. International relations then took place against the backdrop of the Cold War¹, a bipolar period that saw the dominance of the two superpowers asserting themselves on the

¹ Defined as an 'intense power struggle between two States or two alliances which will not resolve by direct confrontation' (Géré, 2002, p. 19).

world stage. This configuration persisted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; a major historical and geopolitical upheaval that established the United States as the sole superpower. With the disappearance of the USSR, as a global competitor for world hegemony, the world became unipolar. The twenty-first century, as predicted by American ultranationalists and neoconservatives, would be the century of the United States, propelled to the status of 'New Empire' (Kaplan and Fukuyama, 2006; Fukuyama, 1992). But the country found itself overwhelmed by the many international challenges that arose in the wake of the new world order (Maynes, 2000; Nye Jr, 2002; Sapir, 2008; Schlesinger Jr, 2000). American hegemony was, in reality, a fleeting moment (Golub, 2004, pp. 9-33; Golub, 2007; Golub, 2008, pp. 141-150; Sur, 2014).

Thus, in this post-American world (Fareed, 2011), we witnessed new players emerging on the international scene seeking power and competing with each other. The world became multipolar, with the proliferation of formal and informal centres of power and spheres of influence (Haas, 2008; Hiro, 2009; Kampf, 2009; Kennedy, 1988; Krauthammer, 2002, pp. 5-17; Wallerstein, 1991; Walton, 2007). Multipolarity, a poorly thought-out concept (Douguine, 2017), nonetheless typical of post-Cold War geopolitics, defines a situation where power is no longer concentrated in the hands of a sole player or international organization, but disseminated across several poles. In the radical sense, a multipolar world is one in which the world has turned its back on the unilateralist and hegemonistic project of the United States (Amin, 2000, 2005, p. 8) and, generally, on the Atlanticist West (Douguine, 2012). A doctrine aimed at rebalancing international relationships, multipolarity is in essence conflictive and revolutionary because it aims to eliminate totalitarianism and replace it with true socialism. 'Only a worldwide crusade against the United States, the West, globalization and their politico-ideological expression, and against liberalism, may constitute an adequate response' (Douguine, 2012, p. 55) or even, 'The hegemony of the United States and its NATO allies is the chief enemy of social progress, of democracy, and of peace' (Amin, 2000, p. 49).

In the first part of this chapter, we will outline a map of global society, which has become multipolar due to its fragmentation into competing poles of power. In the second part, we will examine whether multipolarity is an obstacle to the emergence of a common world, which must set the political horizon for all human beings.

The fragmentation of global society into competing poles of power

At the start of the 1990s, the picture of a bipolar world, such as had emerged from the matrix of the Second World War and prevalent at the time of the Cold War, disintegrated with the break-up of the Soviet Union, progressively allowing for an international situation marked by the emergence of a multipolar world. This evolution is itself part of the logic of globalization, a long-standing phenomenon that accelerated rapidly in the twentieth century, transforming international society into a dual society where inter-state relations coexist with transnational relations that develop outside the state sphere. The international society that has become global therefore presents a particularly strong heterogeneity in terms of its components and the flows that run through it, a trend emphasized in the current phase of multipolar relations. This new world is built around states, and coalitions of states, around political, economic and military entities, international institutions and private actors.

States in a multipolar world

States, although weakened due to multiple attacks on their sovereignty, still constitute today the essential ingredient of a global society that has become multipolar. The state, this select model of politics, which first took shape in the fifteenth century in the West when Italian principalities emancipated themselves from the power of the emperor and the Pope (Kantorowicz, 1989; Krynen, 1993), and branched out through the universalization of the model under the thrust of capitalism and the emancipation movement of colonized peoples. Legal recognition of the universal nature of the state came in 1945 with the creation of the United Nations, an association of states with a global mission, which nonetheless refrains from defining what a state is, a word that is not even mentioned in the organization's name. The gradual entry of all states into the organization thus made it possible to achieve a formal and organic universalism, driven by the conversion of the Soviets to the virtues of the state (Tunkin, 1965), and the rallying call of the new states emerging from decolonization and moving towards the concept of sovereignty (McWhinney, 1986). This principle of sovereignty had been debated and adopted by the great powers, which were not ready, at the time of the creation of the United Nations, to relinquish one iota of the power it conferred. Hence, the category of 'permanent members' of the UN Security Council with the right of veto, which contradicts the rule of sovereign equality (United Nations Charter, Article 2,

paragraph 1) attributed to all states. Some saw in it the opportunity to maintain their power, while others perceived it as a protective and liberating process which allowed them to gain power. The 'state' is appealing because of the symbolic significance of the attribute of sovereignty (exclusivity and full powers) that is inherent to it and which it alone possesses. In fact, the new phase of international relations, ushered in by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, resulted in a massive return of states (Sapir, 2008), of subnational tiers, identity claims, territorial disputes, and tense borders (Foucher, 2012), as witnessed by new and numerous examples of emerging states that appeared on the international scene in the wake of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and some African states (Sudan, Ethiopia, etc.). The state grid covering the planet is now complete. The world has become multipolar due to the persistence of the state form and the proliferation of state subjects, even if some of them now exist only in the caricatured form of weakened, altered and alienated sovereignties (Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.). The figure of the sovereign state is in crisis, not only in these areas of proven chaos but also elsewhere, particularly in the West, even if the expression of this crisis varies greatly from one experience to another. Despite these attacks on sovereignty, the trend towards a greater number of states is at work in global society through people's emancipation movements, drawing on the right to self-determination (United Nations Charter, Article 1, Paragraph 2). The persistent demands of certain peoples (Chechens, Palestinians, Sahrawis, Kurds, etc.), which have not yet been met, are likely to lead to the formation of new state entities to be added to those already in existence. The right to emancipation is intertwined with the desire for statehood. The multipolar world is a world of conflicting state sovereignties, as the interests of each are divergent and contradictory.

Aspiration for power is first and foremost lived out at national level. In striving for power, some states do better than others, and have succeeded in positioning themselves favourably on the international scene. This category includes the five major victors of the World War (Chemillier-Gendreau, 1997); now challenged by the strategies of conquest and the power of newcomers, such as Brazil, India and Japan. North Korea and Iran are also prime players in the nuclear arms race, a monopoly retained thus far by the five great powers of the UN Security Council, and a few other known or covert countries.

Coalitions of states around political, economic and military blocs

The realization by certain states of weakness and powerlessness in a ruthless world, which has become increasingly competitive, has led them to

form coalitions among themselves. This trend towards grouping is certainly not new, but since the geopolitical upheaval of the 1990s, it has taken on an unprecedented scale, affecting both continents and regional sub-groups, and contributing to the 'multipolarization' of global society. The ambitions of these groups are political, economic and military.

At the continental level, it is necessary, for example, to point out that fear of the foreseeable downgrading of Europe is raising alarmist questions on the existential future of this continent threatened with an 'exit from history' (Chevènement, 2013) and the 'Great Switzerland' syndrome as formulated by French diplomat Hubert Védrine:

Europeanists dream of a moral power, a sort of global Red Cross, spreading human rightism throughout the world.... The peoples themselves, I fear, only want to become a "Great Switzerland"... a high standard of living, few obligations and plenty of rights, a compassionate attitude but distanced from the world's miseries. It's worrying, because in the tough forthcoming multipolar war, if Europe doesn't become a power, it is condemned to being a protectorate (Védrine, 2016).²

Reduced to the status of a subordinate ally of the United States, without a clear political vision and without an independent defence strategy, economically exhausted, burdened by its struggling southern neighbours and strangled by an unprecedented migration crisis, Europe, it is believed, will owe its survival solely to the formulation and implementation of an alternative project for continental union.

What will the geographic outline of this new dream Europe look like? Will it stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, as General de Gaulle wished? How do you undo the Gordian knot of Turkey's integration within it? A Europe of 'concentric circles', 'à la carte', 'of variable geometry', 'at multiple speeds', the semantic grammar of European construction is full of terms that reveal the difficulties of 'thinking Europe' (Morin, 1987) and the possible change in direction of this continent based on a differentiated method of integration. But, even weakened, Europe continues to play a leading role in world affairs, notably through the European Union: the world's leading trading power and a major player in the resolution of international conflicts.

Africa also dreams of power in the new multipolar configuration of international relations. Considered to have got off to a bad start at the dawn of its independence (Dumont, 2012 [1962]), it has attempted to reposition itself in the global game by asserting its assets: its immense natural and energy resources, a young and dynamic population, and a high rate of economic growth, among

2 Quoted in Dallenne, Buchy and Degans (2014); see also Jacques Lesourne (2014) and Sylvie Goulard (2016).

other assets. It should not be surprising that the Afro-pessimism (Michaïlof, 2015; Smith, 2003) of yesterday has given way to today's Afro-optimistic outlook of a continent propelled by foreign powers to the status of a new El Dorado to be conquered (Nonjon and Pautet, 2014; Pautet, 2011; Rahmouni-Benchida, 2015; Severino and Ray, 2010). Its strategy for rebirth and power includes, on the external front, the conquest of two permanent member seats on the United Nations Security Council, with the right of veto, an illusory position that does not challenge the imperial nature of this organization but ignores the power ambitions of African countries seeking continental leadership. Internally, this power strategy revolves around a project of continental unification to gain influence in world affairs. After the failure of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in this area, hopes now rest on the African Union (AU), which replaced it in 2002. However, the original flaw in the integration method remains, which is causing political union to drift away from regional economic unions. The proliferation of the latter³ in effect thwarts any possibility of a continental political union (Mandé and Jackson, 2015, pp. 61-77).

Africa is also lacking a sovereign development strategy. Its attempts to break away from the international system of dependency have so far been unsuccessful, as evidenced by the continued dependence of some of its French-speaking countries on the CFA franc currency. Africa is economically and politically crippled by the persistence of political regimes that are undemocratic and repressive, by the security challenges arising from the intrusion of global terrorism into the public sphere, by the breakdown of many of its states, which are considered as 'failed' states, by the difficulties of nation-building, and the exacerbation of ethnic divisions and tensions leading, as in the case of Rwanda, to genocide. Africa has both strengths and weaknesses. The path to its affirmation in the world as a centre of power lies in its radical break with the structures of domination and the implementation of a rationalized project of continental unification. It is time to return to the original Pan-Africanism.

Elsewhere in the world's other continents and regions, economic zones are proliferating and bearing witness to the undergoing changes in the world's traditional balance of powers (Santander, 2016), and to the wishful jockeying for position of

3 To illustrate this point, note the many regional economic organizations: IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) created in 1986; AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) in 1989; SADC (Southern African Development Community) in 1992; COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) in 1993; CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community; UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) in 1994; and CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) in 1998.

states on the new international chessboard. The end of the Cold War brought to life a greater need for regional cooperation between neighbouring states in light of the absence of an identifiable world leadership (Gill, 2011) and the crisis in multilateral organizations.⁴ A multipolar world is thus emerging around free trade megablocks created to circumvent the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁵ This shift has ushered in an era of the 'decentralization of global power' and the 'progressive multipolarization of world affairs, and crisis of global governance' (Santander, 2016, p. 14). Henceforth, we are heading towards a 'regional globalization' through the formation of '*great spaces*' united around countries and peoples belonging to the same civilizational arena (Douguine, 2012, p. 187). In this race for power, opened up by the new sequence of multipolar international relations, we should note the case of the so-called emerging nations grouped around associations that contest the dominant world order. This is the case with the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) (Santander, 2009, 2012). These emerging nations, to which Turkey can be added, are not only challenging the former masters of world power in their own backyard, but they are also competing among themselves, most notably in Africa (Santander, 2014). For some, like China and India, it is in fact a return to power; a reference to their glorious past (Golub, 2006, 2004b, 2015; Kissinger et al., 2011). The emergence of competing nations has led to a shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy:

'This transformation, the most significant since the industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century, is disrupting the hierarchies born of Western economic and territorial expansion and marks a return, under new historical conditions, to the polycentric international configuration that prevailed before 1820' (Dallenne, Buchy and Degans, 2014, foreword).

4 De la Vega, X. 2008. La crise des organisations internationales : FMI, Banque mondiale, OMC. *Sciences Humaines*, No. 197.

5 These organizations include: CETA (Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement/Accord économique et commercial global) between Canada and the European Union; TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) called TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement) between the United States and the European Union; RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) between China, India and 14 other Asian countries; TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) between the United States and 11 other countries; AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area), which groups the 54 states of the African Union. We can also cite the creation in 1989 of APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation); in 1991 of MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), and the AFTA (Asean Free Trade Agreement) trade agreement concluded in 1991 within the framework of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations created in 1967); and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) created in 1992. Also, CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States); SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), created in 2001 and which today groups Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan; the Eurasian Economic Union created in 2014, replacing the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), today including the members Belarus, Russian, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kirghizistan; the 'New Silk Road' and the 'Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century' formed around China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative.

International organizations

International organizations are also positioning themselves within a system of reconfiguration and redistribution of world power; however, in unequal situations. Financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) appear increasingly to be centres of concentrated world power; yesterday, with the imposition of structural adjustment plans and neo-liberal development models for under-developed countries, and today, with the handling of the world's debt crisis. In the military domain, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact has benefited NATO, which has seen the majority of the member countries of this old military alliance join NATO. This organization keeps expanding its spheres of action, thus asserting itself as the armed wing of the interventionist and often destabilizing policies of the United States and its allies. This expansionism is contributing to undermining and eroding the UN's power, competing against the great powers' unilateralism, notably the US.⁶ As a result, the organization is overwhelmed and distracted from its peacekeeping mission, which it has never really been able to fulfill (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2013).

Private actors

The break-up and fragmentation of power has thrust private players onto the stage. This shift in global power benefits transnational corporations (Google, Apple), mega information-gathering agencies and streaming media outlets (Reuters, CNN, Al Jazeera), which have no qualms about manipulating public opinion and feeding it fake news. Other private actors include international criminal networks, global terrorism (ISIS, Boko Haram, AQIM, etc.) and cybercrime (ransomware viruses). Finally, among the new beneficiaries of fragmented global power are numerous informal groups and forums, such as the G20, G8, G7, and the Davos Forum.

Since the 1990s, a new multipolar world order has superseded the bipolar world inherited at the end of the Second World War. This has led to a redistribution of power among actors vying for global or regional leadership. These competitive positioning strategies are giving rise to an asymmetrical multipolarity that benefits the strongest and leaves the weakest behind. Does this not jeopardize the existential human project of a common world?

6 US President Donald Trump, speech on 19 September 2017 at the Tribune of the 72nd UN General Assembly.

Multipolarity, a hindrance to the emergence of one world?

The multipolar social project, conceived as the only democratic alternative to the post-Cold War unipolar order dominated by an Atlanticist vision of the world, would contribute to the appeasement of international conflicts (Amin, 2000, 2005). Implemented as *a regional universalism* within the limits of a *large defined space*, it thus excludes the idea of a universal universalism encompassing all of humanity (Douguine, 2012, p. 190). Multipolarity is therefore a self-centred conception of different worlds, systems and actors that oppose and compete with each other. Multipolarity is thus an inward-looking conception of the world, of different players and systems, who oppose and compete against each other (Association des auditeurs et cadres des Hautes études de l'Armement, 2010; Myard, 2010; Roubinski, 1998). This multipolar world triggers rivalries. Overcoming this conflictuality is only possible through a vision and perspective of the universal, a common world. This is a necessity because the scale of global problems calls for universal solutions within the framework of democratic governance.

Today's global society has indeed entered a profound crisis. Extremely serious factors are colliding: latent wars (but more often than not real ones with catastrophic effects), the militarization of economies, monetary turmoil, the stranglehold of mafias on economies, trafficking in human organs, environmental and health disasters, widespread corruption, and so on. These are all transnational problems that require common awareness and solutions at the level of humanity. However, those proposed within the framework of a multipolar world, with rival systems fighting each other, do not meet this challenge. We must move away from both the hegemonic universalism of the unipolar world and the radical relativism of the multipolar solution, and lay the foundations for a universal political community, a common world (Kissinger, 2016; Tassin, 2003). The world is lacking a universalism that takes into account the diversity of human societies. It is this form of universalism, the breeding ground for universal coexistence, which must be promoted (Assiter, 2003; Balibar, 2016; Fourest, 2009; Martin, 2015). To the detriment of a targeted vision of multipolarity that tends to accentuate identity tensions: 'There will be no universal standard, neither material nor spiritual. Each civilization will finally have the right to proclaim freely what constitutes for it the measure of things. Here, it will be man, there, religion, elsewhere, ethics, somewhere else materialism' (Douguine, 2012, p. 191). Such thinking ignores the existing reality, that is, the already observable existence of a global society through the interconnection of all people, and the imperative that arises from this concrete

situation to define a collective project for our common survival in the face of the dangers facing humankind.

It has become necessary today to go beyond the phase launched by the United Nations in 1945. The idea of a universal political community was not on the agenda at the time, as this organization had been invested with the symbolic and concrete responsibility of representing the universal. However, the reference point for this universalism has been occupied and confiscated by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and their allies. The pluralism of human societies must fit in with the need for universalism in the universal political community. A common world cannot be built without peaceful dialogue between civilizations (Michael, 2009, pp. 47-67).

The universal political community, as an expression of a common world, is distinct from communitarianism. It is the political link that creates universal action and coexistence. This political idea of a 'common good' that needs to be invented at the global level requires us to move beyond sovereignty, in the sense of the unconditional and exclusive exercise of powers over one's territory by the state. Nowhere today is sovereignty what it once was, not least because the logic of the absolute that characterized it has been undermined by numerous attacks on state power in the context of globalization. A conservative concept, sovereignty leads states to withdraw into themselves and thus block the necessary transition towards a global political community.

Democracy, understood as the recognition of others as they know themselves, must be the political horizon that moves us towards a common world. However, global society is suffering from a breakdown in democracy. Democracy has not been achieved within the United Nations and it is absent from global governance, as evidenced by the confiscation of power by the major powers at the UN (Security Council) and in international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank).

If democracy is the recognition of the other as they know themselves, it therefore presupposes, at the global level, the recognition of the plurality of subjects and actors. To date, only sovereign states and international organizations are recognized subjects of international law, as they alone are vested with international legal personality. Many other entities with an indeterminate status remain on the margins of the system but continue to play an important role in global society: peoples, non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, individuals. These are powerful actors ignored by international law, but which contribute to the awareness of the existence of humanity. These ignored actors are an integral part of global society as a whole. The common world cannot therefore function by excluding some of its components.

But a common world must also be developed on the bedrock of a global common law since no political society can function without legal regulation. Humanity needs common regulations of universal scope in the face of the dangers it faces. This perspective leads to laying the foundations of a global law, a cosmopolitan law of general application. But states will be able to retain a margin of national discretion. They will have to bring their legislation into line with universally defined general principles. An attempt is thus made to reconcile the diversity of legal systems with the possibility of a common law. As such, the diverse legal systems would be reconciled with the possibility of a common law (Delmas-Marty, 2004). Compatibility does not mean uniformity.

The problem of international justiciability remains to be addressed. A universal political order must be able to rely on an international justice system that rules on the attribution of responsibility and the reparation of damages. However, international justice suffers from two weaknesses: on the one hand, the impossibility of bringing states before a court without their consent, with the notable exceptions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO); on the other hand, the closure of international courts to non-sovereign actors. This leads to situations of impunity and denial of justice, especially with the recent decline in universal jurisdiction⁷, which allows for the prosecution of anyone suspected of a crime regardless of their nationality and the place where the crimes were committed. International justice is therefore in crisis. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, only hears disputes between states, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) is boycotted by some of the most powerful countries (China, the United States and Russia).

The universal political community must also be founded on substantial common values. Universal began with two concepts. On the one hand, it began in the negative, with the concept of crimes against humanity, which led to the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo criminal tribunals in 1945 to try war crimes committed during the Second World War. This was followed, after a long eclipse, by the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994), the International Criminal Court (1998), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002). On the other hand, in a positive sense, it began with the concept of

7 Set out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict.

the common heritage of humanity, whose current ineffectiveness in terms of implementation makes it necessary to renew the issue of the common good by declaring certain resources and goods universal: water, medicines, technologies, and so on. Human rights, the right of peoples to self-determination, and many other achievements of human history are concepts that must also be defended and integrated into the fundamental values of humanity, just as universal standards must be established in the areas of social and environmental law.

Conclusion

A major break occurred in international relations in 1989. The global power structure inherited from the Cold War collapsed, giving way to an uncertain period in which the United States emerged as the sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet empire. This unipolar world was succeeded by a multipolar world made up of new players vying for global or regional power. However, multipolarity has exacerbated tensions and competition between these new poles of de-territorialized global power. The prospect of a common world, structured and built around a global political community, has thus been compromised. Hence, the need for a critical assessment of the concept of multipolarity. From the perspective of our common humanity, we must build a world of multiple interdependencies based on the reconciliation of universalism and relativism.

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CHAPTER 22

AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH EMERGING COUNTRIES: CHINA

LI Anshan

Introduction

Africa continues to develop partnerships with all countries, no matter whether West or East, North or South, capitalist or socialist, as the previous chapters have shown. Owing to disappointment with the West and the changes in international politics, a recent call has seen Africa 'looking East' (ACET, 2009) and its tendency to promote relations with emerging countries, which presents an alternative development model and a different type of development cooperation. This chapter examines Africa's relations with emerging countries with a focus on China.

BRICS and emerging countries

What do we mean by emerging countries? These countries still exist, yet they are being referred to today as investment markets. Since the term has become popular, we will use it at face value. BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), an acronym coined by Jim O'Neill in 2001, was joined by South Africa in 2010, becoming BRICS. Today, it is more balanced because it includes a representative from Africa, a continent with enormous human and natural resources and a rich cultural tradition. As a regional actor, South Africa can intensify its links with

emerging countries and thus advance its national interests while promoting regional integration and continental agendas with foreign resources. In addition, by joining the group concerned with global issues, South Africa can play a greater role in international politics. This inclusion has also extended the geographic and intercontinental reach of the BRICS, which accounts for 40% of the world's population, 25% of the planet's land, and around 20% of global GDP. Thus, we can say that BRICS represents emerging countries, which demonstrates this recent shift in the global economic situation.

Different names

Acronyms have long been convenient ways to describe entities or changing situations. In addition to BRICS, several terms or acronyms have been used to describe the countries that have performed well in the global economy. In 2005, the new acronym VISTA appeared, denoting Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina as emerging countries. Then, Next Eleven (N-11) was created (in addition to BRICS) by Goldman Sachs to describe 11 big developing countries with fast economic development, including Nigeria and Egypt. In 2007, two names were created, the Group of Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) and the B(R)ICSAM constellation (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico).

Other names have also appeared. In 2009, the firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) declared an Emerging Seven (E7) that included China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. It predicted that the economic aggregate of E7 would reach 70% of the G7 in 2020 and surpass the present G7 in all fields in 2032. *The Economist* coined another acronym, CIVETS, to include several emerging countries. This was followed by the Emerging 11, announced at the Boao Forum for Asia in 2010 that included 11 emerging countries of the G20. In 2011, Jim O'Neill suggested that the growing economies include BRICS and Next1. He then created MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) to indicate the best countries for foreign investment. There are additional labels to describe the emerging countries, such as Asian Drivers of Global Change, Anchor Countries, Future 7, Emerging Market Economies (EMEs)¹, among others.

1 According to M. Ayhan Kose and Eswar S. Trasad (2010), there are 23 emerging market economies.

Similar characteristics

The new acronyms, names and titles signify how emerging countries are a real phenomenon, one that clearly poses a challenge to the present international system. These countries have similar characteristics. They are developing countries, not developed countries in the traditional sense, with a steady economic development over a period of time and a ratio of growth that is above average. They show resilience in periods of difficulty and possess more dynamic and vigorous force than many other countries. With a relatively large population and a huge consumer market for economic growth, they have an economic aggregate with a high impact on the world economy. Lastly, they tend to have a large youth labour force and are thus a driving force for sustainable and vigorous development. With a stable politico-social situation, they have laid down the foundations for a healthy development of the economy.

Africa and emerging countries

Since independence, African countries have developed relations with developing countries in various ways, including through the Asian-African Conference, the 77 Group, the Non-Alignment Movement, the Third World framework, and others. In the new century, bilateral economic ties have greatly increased. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2011), the centre of world economic development gradually switched to the South as a result of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Indeed, the appearance of emerging countries is a challenge to the international system. Africa has forged its relationship with new economies both in breadth and depth. Africa's trade with new partners reached US\$673.4 billion in 2011, and its development potential has attracted investment, especially from the emerging countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa increased, while the investment from emerging countries grew immensely. The investment projects numbered 99 in 2003 and reached 538 in 2011, far surpassing the 319 projects from the developed countries (UNECA, 2011). In 2012, FDI to Africa increased 5% while global FDI decreased 18% (UNCTAD, 2013). Africa has kept a close relationship with the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Malaysia was rated the top Asian investor in Africa in 2011, and trade between Africa and Singapore reached US\$11.8 billion in 2012. In 2013, the Africa-South East Asia Chamber of Commerce was set up in Singapore with 13 companies from Southeast Asia.

BRICS has expanded its relations with Africa. In 2013, the BRICS Summit was held in Durban with the theme 'BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization'. Currently, African economic growth depends greatly on its export of bulk commodities such as oil, gas and minerals. Africa has enormous natural resources while emerging countries need resources to fuel their economic growth. As South African Ambassador Dr Bheki Langa noted: 'In terms of economic linkages, BRIC-Africa trade has increased nearly eightfold between 2000 and 2008, and the BRIC's share of African trade increased from 4.6% to almost 20% in 2008. Today, China, India and Brazil rank as Africa's 2nd, 6th and 10th largest trading partners respectively' (Lin, 2011, p. 18). In 2012, African exports to BRICS reached US\$144 billion, almost the total of its export to the EU and the US (US\$144.8 billion). According to Standard Bank, the trade volume between Africa and BRICS increased 4%, reaching about US\$376 billion in 2014 (Freemantle, 2015). Indeed, strategic engagement has been ongoing between Africa and BRICS over the past decade (Shaw, 2015, pp. 255-268). Moreover, the South countries have similar aid policies, which differ from those of the West that places conditionality first, creating many problems for developing countries.² Aparajita Biswas pointed out the same principle with respect to India and China in terms of international aid to Africa (Biswas, 2012).

Both Brazil and India have historical links to Africa. There are three mechanisms linking Africa and Brazil, namely, the IBSA (the India, Brazil and South Africa Forum), the Africa-South America Summit, and the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP). When Lula became President in 2003, Brazil substantially boosted its relations with Africa. The Africa-South America Summit was set up in 2006, with a summit held every three years. As a result, Brazil and African countries' regional organizations developed partnerships or held dialogues (Zhou, 2014, pp. 125-139). Lula visited 29 African countries during his tenure, and Brazil cancelled several African countries' debt. At the time of writing, Brazil had more than 150 projects of technological cooperation covering more than 40 countries in Africa. Agriculture is an important field of cooperation, and Brazil had more than 50 agricultural agreements with 18 African countries. In 2012, the African Union (AU), FAO and the Lula Institute decided to cooperate on solving the African food issue (Xu, 2014, pp. 6-14). Medical research and energy/power were two other fields for bilateral cooperation. In 2013, among Brazilian international companies, 30.16% conducted business in Africa (World Bank, 2012; Alves, 2013).

2 The U.S. Congress Millennium Challenge Corporation set up a conditionality that included 17 requirements for the recipient countries. If a country could meet the 17 requirements, it would no longer need aid.

At the time of writing, they were about 2.76 million Indians in Africa.³ After its independence, India strongly supported the struggle against racial discrimination policy in Southern Africa. In the twenty-first century, India strengthened its relations with Africa in various ways, including the Pan-African e-Network project, which seeks to improve African regional integration through ICT infrastructure; donations to NEPAD; the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9); and the Focus Africa programme. The IBSA was set up in 2003 to promote India-Brazil-South Africa relations. In 2003–2008, India was sixth in the world in international investment in Africa. In 2009, overseas Indians' investment reached US\$105 billion and Indian investment in Africa was 33% of its total foreign investment. In South-South green field investment in 2012, India invested US\$52 billion (OECD et al., 2013, p. 47). Africa-India trade surpassed that with the US and France, reaching US\$74 billion (Freemantle, 2015). India-Africa cooperation covers different fields. Since it was founded in 2008, the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) has been held three times (the last summit was held in 2015 in New Delhi). With 54 African states present, the 2015 summit started a new phase of India-Africa cooperation (Michael, 2014, pp. 341–57).

Africa-China relations

From the eighteenth century, Chinese labourers worked in European colonies in Africa, and Chinese migrants settled in Mauritius, Madagascar, South Africa and other countries (Li, 2012a). About 64,000 Chinese indentured labourers worked in gold mines in South Africa between 1904 and 1910. They worked, suffered and protested with Africans (Richardson, 1982). The Chinese expressed sympathy for Egypt and Morocco in their time of turmoil. During the Italo-Ethiopian War, China voiced its strong support for the Ethiopian people (Xu, 1993, pp. 66–70).

During the 1950s–1960s, Africa and China supported each other politically. The independent struggle against colonialism in Africa helped China in its fight against imperialism, and the struggle diverted imperialists' attention, as pointed out by Mao Zedong (Mao, 1994, pp. 370, 467). With the support of developing countries, China reclaimed its legal seat at the United Nations in 1971. Among

3 Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs. *Population of Overseas Indians*. <https://www.mea.gov.in/population-of-overseas-indians.htm>.

the 76 countries voting for China, 26 were African countries. Chairman Mao stated vividly that, 'it was African black friends who carried us back in' (Fu and Li, 1995, p. 9). After the 1989 incident, China faced a boycott from the West, and African leaders began visiting China: 'It was exactly to show that Africa was a real friend of China, even though China was going through its toughest situation' (Qian, 2003, pp. 255-257). From 1990, the West tried to interfere with China's internal affairs at the UN under the pretext of human rights. African countries supported China, which caused the interference to fail. Africa has consistently supported China on such issues as Taiwan, Tibet, the Olympic Games and others.

China has also assisted African independence, the anti-Apartheid struggle and African countries' national economy. During his visit to Africa in 1963-1964, Zhou Enlai stated the 'Eight Principles of Economic Cooperation', which emphasized mutual assistance, non-conditionality, respect for sovereignty and self-reliance efforts.⁴ From 1956 to 1996, China undertook nearly 800 projects throughout Africa, involving various fields (Huang, 2000, p. 45; People's Republic of China, 2011). TAZARA (the Tanzania-Zambia railway) became a modern legend in Africa-China relations. In order to break through the Apartheid regimes' blockade, Tanzania and Zambia asked for international support to build a railway. Although the West declined the request, China undertook the task in 1970. Exemplifying friendly cooperation and technical assistance, the monumental project was finished jointly in 1976 at the sacrifice of 65 Chinese lives (Yu, 1975; Monson, 2009).

Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Africa in 1982 and raised four principles of China-Africa economic cooperation: equal bilateralism, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and common development. In the 1980s, 51 African heads of state visited China; a great increase compared to 33 such visits in the 1970s. From 1990 to April 1998, 53 African heads of state, 15 African prime ministers and many African senior officials visited China (Chen, 2009, p. 132). The year 1995 witnessed a rapid development of Africa-China relations. Chinese leaders visited 23 African countries, publicizing the new measures for

4 Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries was first put forward in a press conference in Accra in January 1964. They were: 1) Aid should not be considered as unilateral grants, but mutual help; 2) Neither conditions nor privileges should be attached to the aid; 3) To reduce the burden of the recipient countries, no-interest or low-interest loans can prolong the time limit if necessary; 4) The purpose of aid is to help recipient countries develop independently; 5) To increase the income of recipient countries, the programmes should produce quicker results with less investment; 6) China would provide the best equipment and materials to the recipient countries, and promise to change them if the quality is not as good as the agreement states; 7) To guarantee that the recipient countries master the relevant technology when technical assistance is provided; 8) Chinese experts should receive the same treatment as the local experts in the country and not have any privileges.

preferential loans and other forms of foreign assistance. After an oil project was carried out in Sudan, African oil subsequently became the top import to China, and trade between Africa and China increased by 48.3% (People's Republic of China, 1996, pp. 554-555).

Equality is a principle in Western ideology as well as an important idea in human history, and the concept appears in the constitution of almost every country. Yet, in international politics, the principle of might-is-right or 'power matters' continues to hold sway. History has witnessed many unequal cases created by colonialism and maintained by the current international order. Moreover, inequality does not only exist in the economic field. The West can use its power to interfere with other countries under the pretext of democracy or human rights. Examples include Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

By calling Africans 'friends' or 'brothers', Chinese leaders conferred their sense of equality and mutual respect to Africa on various occasions. Mao Zedong elaborated on China and Africa's equal position in the international arena and highlighted their similarities in history (Mao, 1994).⁵ Deng Xiaoping told President Mugabe (of Zimbabwe), President Museveni (of Uganda) and other African leaders that Africa should not copy China's model but draw lessons from China's development, especially its negative experiences (Deng, 1993, pp. 289-290). Jiang Zemin spoke to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1996, stating the five principles of China-Africa relations for the twenty-first century, setting out the guiding principles for cooperation in the new era.⁶ Hu Jintao visited Africa several times and praised the China-Africa friendship as a model of South-South cooperation. Xi Jinping chose Africa as his first state visit after he became president, and he connected the 'Chinese Dream' with the 'African Dream'. It is common practice since 1991 for the Chinese Foreign Minister to visit African countries at the beginning of the year.

Forum on China-Africa: an African initiative

At the turn of the century, facing common challenges and protecting legitimate interests were common issues for Africa and China. Some African nations suggested an adjustment of Africa-China relations, reflecting the new situation, and the creation of a similar mechanism for large-scale high level contacts, similar

5 Mao, Z. 1994. pp. 403-413, 416-420, 463-467, 490-492, 497-502, 526-528, 587-588, 600-601.

6 The five principles include sincere friendship; equality and mutual respect; common development and mutual benefit; consultation and cooperation in international affairs; and looking into the future to create a more splendid world. *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, 14 May 1996.

to the USA-Africa Business Forum, the British Commonwealth Conference, the Franco-African Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Euro-African Summit. This would strengthen mutual communication on issues of mutual concern, such as peace and development (Yao, 2007). The most significant driving force behind the birth of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) came from Africans themselves.

From 1996 to 1998, several African diplomats at the 'Understanding China' seminar proposed a Africa-China forum. Benin Minister Albert Tevoedjre proposed in 1997 the establishment of a Africa-China cooperative system, known as TICAD,⁷ as suggested by Ahmed Haggag, Assistant General-Secretary of the OAU during his visit to China in January 1999.⁸ However, China was not yet confident to undertake this initiative owing to its lack of experience in multilateral cooperation. Later, in 1999, Lila Ratsifandrihamanana, Madagascar's Foreign Minister, visited China. Talking to her counterpart, she mentioned the many forums for cooperation between Africa and developed countries and suggested setting up a multilateral forum based on the strong bilateral relations between China and African countries (Tang, 2009, p. 433). This ultimately became the goal. In October 1999, President Jiang Zemin wrote to African leaders to propose the convening of FOCAC.

Nine forums have since been held since FOCAC was created in 2000, including four summits (in 2006, 2015, 2018 and 2024). Unlike other forums, which either emphasize dialogue or are laid out by one player, FOCAC is a combination of dialogue and action, with action plans designed by both sides and carried out through cooperation, which are assessed accordingly. As strategic partners, Africa and China cooperate in various fields (Li, Sheldon and April, 2012b). Politically, there are frequent top-level visits from both sides and regular exchanges of ideas on the world's situation. They also cooperate on various issues and support each other in the international arena. For example, China supports the AU, NEPAD and African integration. The cooperation extends as far as the issue of peace and security, and China has actively participated in peace-keeping missions in Africa. There are also mutual exchanges of experience of governance and political issues.

Economically, with China as Africa's largest trade partner since 2009, China-Africa trade volume reached US\$211 billion in 2014. Chinese companies have invested in finance, telecommunications, energy, manufacture, agriculture, and

7 Email from Ambassador Xu Jinghu (former Director of the African section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Li Anshan, 21 January 2012.

8 Emails from Ambassador Liu Guijin to Li Anshan, 20 and 21 January 2012.

infrastructures such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway, the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway, and various projects of agricultural cooperation in many countries, including with Chinese experts helping to promote local food production, demonstration centres of agricultural technology, and training of African technicians. The China-Africa Development Fund and the Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) will undoubtedly speed up bilateral cooperation in African industrialization.

China-Africa cooperation has also expanded into many social fields. Chinese medical teams have treated 240 million people in 47 African countries since 1963 (Li, 2011). In the fight against Ebola, China sent the largest medical team and provided the most medical facilities to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea of all countries. More African students enjoyed Chinese scholarships, with more than 5,000 African students benefiting annually in the period 2013-2015. With the establishment of the African Talents Project in 2013, 30,000 Africans received training in various fields. Cultural activities are booming and there are ongoing bilateral exchanges among young people, women, think tanks, journalists, local cities and so on (Li, 2015, pp. 446-475).

The African Union has become more involved in Africa-China relations. China has sent its delegation to the AU Summit, and its ambassador to the AU is now in position. Alpha Oumar Konare, Jean Ping and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma all visited China as AU Commission Chairs to discuss strategic cooperation. Eight AU-China Strategic Dialogues have been held since its launch in 2000. In May 2015, Chair Dlamini-Zuma and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming co-chaired the Sixth Dialogue, exchanging ideas on Africa-China relations and cooperation, the African situation and international politics. The first AU-China Diplomatic Policy Consultation was held in 2011. The Eighth FOCAC Senior Officials' Meeting accepted the AU as a member of FOCAC in 2011. According to China's second Africa Policy paper: 'China values and supports the AU's leadership in building a united and strong Africa and promoting African integration, its centrality in safeguarding peace and security in Africa, as well as a bigger role for the organization in regional and international affairs. It appreciates and supports the AU's adoption and implementation of Agenda 2063 and its first ten-year plan.'

Regarding China's role in African development, there has been both criticism and praise.⁹ The African economy has developed rather smoothly with an average 4-5% annual growth in the past twenty years. Did China-Africa

9 For criticism, see Lamido Salusi (2013).

relations contribute to the development? It is argued that China and Africa's growth trajectories joined together as a new relationship: 'A shift in Africa's economic relations is occurring – away from traditional economies, toward the East and China' (Davies, 2011, p. 204). Refuting the view of China's 'neo-colonialism', an African scholar stated: 'China's model of development gives African countries an alternative model of development that is both workable and without strings attached. All these reasons make African countries warm up to China as opposed to the USA and Western Europe' (Mihanfo, 2012, p. 142; Wade, 2008). Following the assessment of the World Bank and the IMF, a report of the US Council on Foreign Relations acknowledged that 'Chinese investment in Africa has helped spur consistently high economic growth' (Alessi and Xu, 2015).

Nevertheless, Africa-China relations obviously have their problems too. What is Africans' opinion of China? In a Pew 'Opinion of China' survey in 2015, African respondents showed a favourable view.¹⁰ It is argued that the China-Africa honeymoon is over and a difficult time is due, with increasing problems regarding bilateral relations on the horizon (Olander, 2014). My view is different: the more problems, the better. Why? No problems equals no contact. Deeper and broader relations will invariably lead to more complications. But Africa and China can discuss their problems equally and with mutual respect to find solutions. After each problem is solved, the relationship will only become stronger.

10 Favourable opinion: Ghana (80%), Ethiopia and Burkina Faso (75%), Tanzania (74%), Senegal, Nigeria and Kenya (70%), South Africa (52%). Opinion of China, <http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/>.

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AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Fumilayo E. Showers

Introduction

In discussions of immigration in the United States of America (USA), there exists a little known, or perhaps conveniently ignored fact: in the past four decades, more Africans have voluntarily come to the USA than were forcibly taken across the Atlantic during more than three centuries of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Halter and Johnson, 2014). From 1980 to 2009, the African-born population in the USA grew from just under 200,000 to almost 1.5 million (McCabe, 2011). Other studies trace a dramatic increase from 1960 to 2009 when, respectively, the African immigrant population grew from 35,355 (0.4%) to almost 1.5 million (almost 4%) of the total immigrant population. These numbers show that most of the increase has occurred during the past two decades (Balogun, 2011; Halter and Johnson, 2014; McCabe, 2011). Scholars have noted that Africans form the fastest growing immigrant group in the United States (Terrazas, 2009; Anderson, 2017). Of the approximately 1.9 million foreign-born Africans in the USA, as of 2010, roughly 1.4 million are Black Africans.¹ The increasing presence of African immigrants, coupled with a slight drop in the inflow of Caribbean immigrants, led some demographers

¹ According to the American Community Survey 2010, 73.4% of Africans were Black, 20% were White, and 2% were Asian.

to predict that by 2020 continental Africans would surpass the Caribbean Black population as the largest group of Black immigrants to the United States (Capps, McCabe and Fix, 2011). The exponential increase in the numbers of recent African immigrants in the United States deserves greater scholarly interest in this burgeoning immigrant group, which has been termed the 'new African diaspora' (Gordon, 1998; Konadu-Agyemang, Takyi and Arthur, 2006; Koser, 2003).

A great deal of scholarly work has focused on providing demographic information about this immigrant group (Capps, McCabe and Fix, 2011; McCabe, 2011) through mapping out their settlement and residential patterns (Massey and Denton, 1993; Logan and Deane, 2003) and their labour market trajectories and experiences (Arthur 2009; Chacko, 2016; Stoller, 2002). Efforts have also been made to identify common patterns and trends in their experiences while examining the diversity among various arrival cohorts and regional/national/ethnic groups within this new migration. The increased presence of a majority Black, contemporary African immigrant population led to research tracing their distinctiveness from their historical migration from the African continent (African American) to the contemporary migration of Afro-Caribbeans to the United States (Arthur, 2000; 2009; Gordon, 1998; Shaw-Taylor and Tuchs, 2007). This scholarship has looked at the issue of racial identity among African immigrants, while trying to understand the changing contours of race and ethnicity in the United States as well as their diversity among Black populations. A strand of scholarship on race relations has explored racial identities among the new waves of immigrants from Africa, with an emphasis on how they craft and manage racial and ethnic identities amidst racial hierarchies in the United States. This scholarship has charted their experiences of racism as well as their efforts to survive and thrive amid the multi-tiered racial and economic landscape of the United States (Habecker, 2012; Halter and Johnson, 2014; Showers, 2015).

While facing difficulties and obstacles, African immigrants have also been recognized as a group with a number of distinguished achievements. A few studies have highlighted African immigrants as the most educated immigrant group in the United States (Halter and Johnson, 2014; Imoagene, 2017; Kusow, 2007; Robinson, 2010; Slater, 2000). Research has cited the high human capital that was brought from their home countries, the overwhelming positive selectivity, and a cultural ethos that values education among some members of this immigrant group (Imoagene, 2017; Halter and Johnson 2014). This

distinguished record in education also extends to the second generation², with some scholars noting that the children of African and Caribbean immigrants make up a disproportionate number of the increasing enrollment of Black students in elite educational institutions (Massey et al., 2007; Bennett and Lutz, 2009; Robinson, 2010). Some analysts suggest that the children of African immigrants have been beneficiaries of an infrastructure that was set up to redress the generational and cumulative effect of racism targeting African Americans in the USA. The second generation of African immigrants have been beneficiaries of affirmative action programmes, which have helped them in their path to success in the United States (Imoagene, 2017).

Another noteworthy fact is that African immigrants, both men and women, report significantly high labour-force participation rates, outperforming those of native-born men and women and other immigrant groups. However, it has also been noted that despite their high human capital, income levels do not match their levels of education. There are also reports that highly educated African immigrants fare worse in terms of job outcomes than their Latin American and Asian immigrant counterparts (Fix and Batalova, 2008; Halter, 2007). While a general picture can be painted of African immigrants, there are marked differences within and between regions. For instance, analysis of statistical data on East Africans suggests that 'immigrants from the southeastern sub-regions consistently score higher on all indicators of socioeconomic status than those from the northeast' (Kusow, 2007, p. 301). There also appears to be racial disparity in earnings among Black and White African immigrants. Even though there is a dearth of scholarship on Southern and Central Africans in the United States, analysis of statistical data from the U.S. Census suggests that White South Africans and Zimbabweans are faring better across socio-economic indicators than their Black counterparts (Marrow, 2007).

In considering contemporary (post-1965) African immigrants in the USA, this chapter provides a demographic overview of this population group. The socio-economic, cultural, political and global forces that have combined to shape the migratory experiences of African immigrants are also investigated.³ While it is important to account for the structural and macro-level forces, it is also helpful

2 This chapter uses the term 'second generation' to reference the USA born children of African immigrants. It uses the term 'African immigrant' to refer to the African-born, first-generation immigrants to the USA.

3 The term 'African immigrants' is one fraught with contradiction. Africa is, of course, a continent, not a country. There are 54 countries in Africa, with a multiplicity of languages and diverse cultural, religious and ethnic identities, as well as convoluted and complicated histories. Referring to these diverse groups only as 'African' instead of using specific regional, national or ethnic terms risks homogenizing the complex and complicated identities that characterize individuals within this group.

to consider insights from individual narratives and stories gleaned from the experiences of the regional groups of African immigrants in the United States.⁴

This chapter focuses on the experiences of a specific continental group within the broader landscape of immigration in a country that characterizes itself as a 'nation of immigrants'. Relying on empirical data and examples drawn from the experiences of Black African immigrants, and employing the analytical insights provided through the neoclassical theory of migration scholarship,⁵ I trace the structural forces that 'pushed' Africans out of the continent of Africa. I will also simultaneously chart the forces in the United States and within the context of globalization that brought them to American shores. Employing the frameworks developed by American sociologist Alejandro Portes (1990), this chapter considers the 'context of exit' found within the 'sending' countries in Africa and focuses on the 'context of reception' in the United States, which facilitates successful migration and integration into US society.

Specifically, in the introductory section, I explore one aspect of the context of reception: US immigration policies, which dictate who can leave their country of origin and under what conditions they are allowed to enter the country. A discussion of US immigration policy, as it pertains to new African immigration, is essential in placing contemporary African immigration within a larger historical and structural context. Indeed, US immigration policies have been important to shape and manage the racial, ethnic and social landscape of the country. The second section of this chapter will focus on how Africans have integrated into US society amid the existing racial configurations that, in general terms, place Black or African-descendant people at the bottom

4 In the summer months, May–August from 2010 to 2012, and again in 2015, the author conducted ethnographic field work among a group of West African immigrants in metropolitan Washington D.C. This ethnography entailed conducting participant observation at work sites, religious organizations and institutions as well as ethnic businesses owned and operated by West African immigrants from five nations: Nigeria; Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cameroon. This multi-year study also involved in-depth qualitative interviews with about 70 immigrants representing the five afore-mentioned nations. The interviews and ethnographic data, coupled with a rigorous analysis of data on other West African and other regional groups of Africans, form the empirical base from which the arguments/statements in this paper originate.

5 Immigration has been widely understood as a search for a better life, where migrants are treated as rational or opportunistic economic actors who weigh the costs of migration against the expected benefits of higher wages, better quality of life, etc. These assumptions were posited by the neoclassical economic theory which offered the 'push-pull' models of explaining migrant behaviour. This theory perceives the cause of migration to be inherent in factors such as demographic growth, lack of economic resources, political instability, wars and famines etc., which compel or 'push' people out. On the other hand, the assumption is that potential migrants are 'pulled' by factors such as demand for labour, good economic opportunities, political freedoms and so forth. For critiques of this theory, see Todaro and Smith (2006) for more information on this theory, Castle and Miller (2003), and Massey et al. (1993).

of racial and social hierarchies. It has been noted that newly-arrived Black immigrants quickly realize that ethnic, national and regional identities become less important in how they are accepted, and that race becomes the primary identifying marker (Johnson, 2008). A final section will be devoted to labour force participation and labour market experiences. This section will provide a qualitative look at African immigrants at work, highlighting their successes and difficulties amidst the proletarianization of the local Black population in the United States. This section will provide a view of ethnic niches of employment⁶ activated by the various groups of African immigrants, and it will also shed light on their strategies for upward mobility, how they garner educational credentials and gain a foothold in US society, the benefits of which they then extend to the second generation.

African immigrants in the United States: 'contexts of exit and reception'

Alejandro Portes argues that immigrants' decision-making processes are shaped not only at the level of the individual but also by the particular 'contexts of exit' from their home countries and 'reception' in the host nation. In addition to the conditions in their home countries, he writes: 'For immigrants, the most relevant contexts of reception are defined by the policies of the receiving government, the conditions of the host labour market, and the characteristics of their own ethnic communities' (Portes, 1990, p. 85). These contexts of exit and reception of African immigrants in the United States (i.e. those particular national, historical, socio-economic and political variables) shape migration and, eventually, their location in the United States.

'Contexts of exit': economics, politics and society in Africa

An analysis of the contributory factors arising from the sending countries is useful to understand why Africans decide to leave their countries of origin in the first place. A cursory look at the leading sending nations of Africans to the USA⁷

6 An ethnic occupational niche describes the concentration and specialization of an ethnic group in a particular occupation (Portes, 1995; Waldinger, 1991).

7 According to the USA-based Pew Research Center, the leading countries of birth for Africans in 2015 were ranked as follows: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Somalia, Morocco, Liberia, Cameroon. For a full listing of the sending countries and numbers, see <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/14/african-immigrant-population-in-u-s-steadily-climbs>

suggests some of the problems of the post-colonial African state. While gifted with vast mineral, natural and human resources, most of the countries from where contemporary African immigrants originate have endured the violence of colonization and neocolonial formations, economic mismanagement and crises. Authoritarian political regimes and military dictatorships characterized by corruption, nepotism and human rights abuses have made life on the continent especially difficult. The prevalence of regional conflict and conditions of war in parts of the continent have also played an important role (Arthur, 2000, 2009; Chacko, 2009, 2015; Halter, 2007; Kusow, 2007; Takougang, 2003).

In addition to wars, corruption and some general failures of the political systems in these nations, the problem of crippling debt and the policies of structural adjustment enacted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are common themes that are shared by most of these nations. The social impact of IMF-imposed loans are contributory factors in the migration of people from Africa. Faced with economic hardships, engendered by the austerity measures imposed by the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), Africans moved from rural areas to urban areas within their countries and sometimes across borders to look for work or better economic conditions (Arthur, 2000, 2009; Donkor, 2005; Hoogvelt, 2001). Some scholars have pointed to the gendered aspects of the SAPs, noting that women and children have been disproportionately affected (Hoogvelt, 2001; Wong, 2006). The resulting pauperization prompted the emigration of increasing numbers of women and children.

These factors, alongside the search for self-advancement and upward mobility, as well as the quest to fulfill personal and professional goals to find better jobs and security (personal and economic) for themselves and their children, continues to drive the emigration from Africa (Arthur, 2000, 2009; Donkor, 2005; Gordon, 1998; Stoller, 2002; Wong, 2006).

'Contexts of reception': US immigration policies

During the course of the twentieth century, the flow of African immigration shifted course, from a pattern of migration to Western European nations due to long-standing ties to former colonial powers, to the United States (Lobo, 2006). As immigration policy in Europe became more restrictive, partly to discourage migration from former colonies, policies in the United States, conversely, became less restrictive vis-à-vis African immigration. The immigration of African-born people to the USA has increased exponentially since 1965. However, compared

to other foreign-born groups, their percentage of the country's total foreign-born population remains small (Capps et al., 2011; McCabe, 2011).

The year 1965 was a watershed year in the history of immigration in the United States. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act, removed barriers of immigration for Latin American, Asian, Caribbean and African countries. Prior to 1965, immigration policy was enshrined in the 1924 Immigration Act, which had set in place national quota restrictions. It was widely noted that these quotas institutionalized a preference system for White immigrants from Western and Northern Europe, and significantly restricted the immigration of non-White groups (Kibria et al., 2014; Waters and Ueda, 2007). The 1965 Act thus introduced far-reaching changes to the US immigration policy, which fundamentally changed the racial composition of the post-1960s immigration population. Another major impact of the 1965 Act, which also relates to African-born immigrants, is that it changed the criteria for admission of immigrants, from one based on the national origins quota system (favouring Northern and Western Europeans), to an emphasis on family reunification and the recruitment of immigrants on the basis of their skills and human capital (Foner, 2001; Waters and Ueda, 2007).

Another fundamental change in US immigration policy was the 1980 Refugee Act, which increased the number of refugees entering the United States. Consequently, the subsequent migration streams of Africans to the USA reflected both the numerous conflicts on the continent and this new focus of immigration policy. The 1990 Immigration Act further modified and expanded the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, increasing the number of immigrants from Africa by offering diversity visas (DV). Visas are distributed annually via a lottery system. The DV lottery, as it became popularly known, sought to correct some of the inequalities built into the prior immigration regime and to diversify the immigrant population by allotting immigrant visas to countries with low rates of immigration. This particular immigration act is perhaps the most significant factor in explaining the most recent (post-1980) wave of African immigration. In addition to specific legislation, Africans have benefited from employment preferences in immigration law that have provided a pathway for settlement and citizenship. Furthermore, some have entered the USA on short-term visitor, student or temporary employment visas.

This brief history of immigration policy, specifically the immigration acts and policies that pertain to this group of immigrants, is useful in laying out the ways in which immigration policies and provisions affect the entry and course of immigration in the USA. This discussion further highlights the fact that, contrary

to popular colour blind discourses of US immigration or the characterization of the USA as a nation of immigrants, raw calculations have revealed that the racial make-up and the socio-economic and national interests of the country have dictated the policies guiding immigration to the United States. The entry and settlement of recent Black African immigrants must be understood within this context of US immigration policies. These policies are also useful to define different groups of immigrants (skilled workers, diversity visa winners, refugees or asylum seekers, visa over-stayers or 'illegal' immigrants, temporary immigrants, such as students, or workers on temporary visas etc.). These different typologies confer to the individuals various levels of legality/illegality and thus dictate the terms of their integration into American society. How one enters the country is not only a matter of individual preference or opportunity, it may also determine the trajectory of one's life. For example, the DV lottery and refugee categories provide employment benefits and a pathway to citizenship, while entering the country as a visitor or on a temporary student visa explicitly bans the grantee from gainful employment and, in effect, legally places them outside the bounds of total inclusion in the labour force, the nation and polity.

Integration into society: race and race relations

Sociological studies of immigrant integration in North American society have centred around the concept of assimilation.⁸ Sociologist Jemima Pierre, providing a historical analysis of assimilation of previous waves of European immigrants into North American society, stated that the ability of distinct ethnicities of Europeans (Poles, Italians and Irish etc.) to become fully integrated into society was directly related to their ability to become incorporated into a larger 'White' classification. Becoming 'White' entailed a subsuming of European 'ethnic' identity for the privilege of a racial one, as upward mobility for these earlier waves of European ethnicities occurred at the same time as their acceptance into the mould of White Americans already in the United States.

Subsequent immigrant scholarship has focused on the need for non-White groups to emulate the cultural practices of successfully incorporated European ethnics, which means acceptance into the mainstream (meaning

8 Assimilation is a concept used in immigration scholarship to understand the experiences of 'minority groups' as they seek to integrate or 'fit in' to the mainstream 'majority population'. It involves the process of 'acculturation' where immigrants learn the language, charter myths, customs and traditions of their host society. It is thought to be a generational process, with the assumption that full integration takes place over generations, and full assimilation is achieved when signs of the immigrant culture have been erased.

White America). However, for Black immigrants, assimilation has not been as straightforward as posited for previous waves of European immigrants. Due to their phenotype, assimilation into a 'White' America seems unlikely. Also complicating the issue further is the presence in American society of a native-born Black population: African Americans who historically have occupied the lowest rungs of US racial classification systems. Some scholars of immigration argue that in order to gain upward mobility, and in an attempt to circumvent the realities of racism in American society, Black immigrants may eschew a racial identity that is linked to downward mobility and an association with African Americans; instead, these immigrants may express, to a greater degree, their ethnic and national identities over race (Foner, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Vickerman, 2001; Waters, 2001). Upward mobility and assimilation into the socio-economic mainstream therefore involve Black immigrant groups actively distancing themselves from African Americans and expressing their ethnic particularity (Vickerman 2007; Habecker 2012). Given that African immigrants have voluntarily arrived in the USA in sizeable numbers relatively recently, this existing literature on Black immigrants was drawn primarily from the experiences of working-class Caribbean immigrants. Furthermore, this literature has been criticized for ignoring the fact that Black immigrants can secure upward mobility while still embracing a Black identity. It has also been criticized for presenting Black identity, as reflected by African Americans, as inherently problematic and downwardly mobile. Some critics have also argued that some of the articulations of differential patterns of assimilation strengthen the 'culture of poverty' thesis as well as other pathological presentations of African Americans (Neckerman et al., 1999).

Given the increasing diversity of the Black immigrant population in the USA, the question remains: How would recent African immigrants and their children seek to assimilate themselves into American society? Do they assimilate into mainstream (meaning White America), or do they identify with African American society? Or do they seek to maintain their ethnic particularity? The story of African immigrants and race is unfolding, and answers to these questions remain speculative. However, immigration historians take a longer view of race relations and the African immigrant experience to address the specific relationships between recent African immigrants and African Americans. As the most recent African immigrants arrived after the 1960s, that is, after the triumphs of the civil rights era that greatly improved the condition for racial minorities in the USA, they enter into a society – for the most part – free from the blatant oppression of

slavery or the overt racism of the Jim Crow⁹ era. In fact, recent African immigrants have been the beneficiaries of gains made in the post-civil rights movement. This fact has been a source of contention for these new immigrants, who – it has been noted – enter with an ignorance, or perhaps willful denial, of this history. Moreover, African Americans view African and other Black immigrants as being intentionally silent on the issue of race and contemporary forms of racism.

Scholarly work and anecdotal evidence also note relationships of ambivalence and sometimes open acrimony between foreign-born Black immigrants and native-born African Americans. These misunderstandings are fueled by stereotypes, prejudices and misunderstandings on both sides (Halter and Johnson, 2014). Some scholarship suggests that some of the acrimonious relationships are sparked by a White America that is invested in making racial distinctions between foreign-born Black people of Caribbean descent and, more recently, African immigrants, presenting them as ‘model minorities’ in relation to African Americans. Kenyan writer Mukoma Wa Ngugi picked up on this theme of differential treatment of Black and White immigrants. He noted a difference between racism towards African Americans, often expressed in overt and openly hostile ways, and racism towards African immigrants, which he argued is expressed more in paternalism or condescension. He wrote: ‘Racism wears a smile when meeting an African; it glares with hostility when meeting an African American’ (Ngugi, 2011). Several studies of workplaces report employer preferences for Black immigrants as opposed to African Americans, which sets the stage for resentments within workplaces (Waters, 2001).

As the Black population in the USA continues to diversify, there is a growing need for studies that show what assimilation means for Black immigrants from Africa. Continued investigation into their pathways and trajectories in the USA might point to differences in experiences and assimilation patterns among Black immigrant groups. There is also an increasing need to understand how professional contexts shape racial, gendered and classed identities of African immigrants in the country.

9 Jim Crow laws were state and local laws enforcing racial segregation in the Southern United States. Enacted after the Reconstruction period, these laws were in force until 1965. They mandated *de jure* racial segregation in all public facilities in the states of the former Confederate States of America, starting in 1890 with a ‘separate but equal’ status for African Americans. Facilities for African Americans were consistently inferior and underfunded compared to those available to European Americans; sometimes they did not exist at all. This body of law institutionalized several economic, educational and social disadvantages. *De jure* segregation mainly applied to the Southern states, whereas Northern segregation was generally *de facto*: patterns of housing segregation enforced by private covenants, bank lending practices, and job discrimination, including discriminatory labour union practices.

Work and labour force participation: strategies for success and advancement

As discussed, African immigrants have high levels of educational attainment and labour force participation. Drawing on ethnographic data, this section highlights how African immigrants formed niches of employment within specific labour market segments and encountered difficulties and constraints. At the same time, they found ways to attain a middle-class lifestyle while adapting their cultural ethos and sensitivities to their new landscapes. In using micro-level examples to elucidate macro-level processes, it also tells us a story about how immigrants employ social networks and social capital to succeed in North American society. While discussing labour market experiences writ large, this section will provide detailed insights into two categories of employment that have seen a concentration of groups of Africans in the USA: nursing and health care, and work as cab drivers or 'cabbies'.

Studies show that African immigrants from all regional groups are represented in the professional classes in America. Historians Marilyn Halter and Violet Johnson, in their comprehensive study of West African immigrants in the USA, note the presence of this regional group among the professional strata in the labour market, stating: 'Indeed by the dawn of the twenty-first century, West Africans were prominently dispersed in professional occupations and throughout business districts from Madison Avenue to the Loop in Chicago to Peachtree Street in Atlanta' (Halter and Johnson, 2014, pp. 79-80). This representation is not limited to West Africans, as immigrants from other African regions are also found in highly skilled occupations (Marrow, 2007). However, the presence of African immigrants in professional and highly skilled occupations is only one part of the story. Information from existing studies reveal a bifurcated labour market outcome, with groups in high-level positions but also large numbers concentrated at the bottom of the labour hierarchies. In studies looking at low-level service occupations, African immigrants were clustered around nursing home and elderly care, meat-packing, construction industries, manufacturing and other precarious occupations. They are also located in taxi driving, petty trading, hair braiding and other activities in the informal sector (Arthur, 2000, 2009; Chacko, 2016; Halter and Johnson, 2014; Stoller, 2002). Indeed, even for those individuals who occupy high-level positions in prestigious occupations, their journeys into those positions seldom take a straight and uncomplicated path. Their final destinations at the top involve taking circuitous routes, often encountering obstacles, false starts and setbacks (Halter and Johnson, 2014).

Central to the experiences of this group of immigrants is the mismatch between the skills earned from their home countries and the jobs they hold in the United States. A common experience is for individuals to enter into completely new fields and areas of employment, taking what historians Halter and Johnson term 'occupational detours', as they are unable to continue their career paths in the USA due to structural obstacles. Oftentimes, these occupational detours involve substantial 'deskilling' as immigrants take on low-level menial tasks for which they are overqualified. To illustrate this point, consider the case of Amos Bello,¹⁰ an immigrant from the West African nation of Cameroon, who was an aeronautical engineer in his home country. He was active in politics in his home country and escaped persecution as a member of an ethnic minority. Due to the persecution, and the threat that it posed to him to return to Cameroon, he sought political asylum in the United States. Amos described the difficulty of immigrants who leave situations of war and political turmoil and who seek refuge in the USA. He went through years of inhabiting a liminal space while he waited for his asylum case to be adjudicated. Due to his immigration status, and the fact that his previous educational credentials were not recognized, Amos entered into years of work in the secondary labour market in low-level informal and service sector employment. He then became a home health provider, working in the homes of care recipients. Amos' story is an example of the difficulties encountered by this group. Despite their education and professional skills in their home countries, these immigrants face obstacles to professional mobility due to processes of deskilling, and they often have to start their lives anew while navigating the US immigration regime. Analysis of the 'brain drain' in Africa has established the existence of an exodus of the professional classes and academics from the continent. Moreover, in this context, the concept of 'brain waste' also applies to a sizeable proportion of groups of African immigrants in the USA who report to work for which they are vastly overqualified.

In addition to 'occupational detours', African immigrants often start at the bottom of professional hierarchies in specific industries and then go through exorbitant retraining processes to obtain the requisite educational qualifications in their field or to accumulate specific licenses to make inroads into the professional strata of certain occupations (Showers, 2015). Consider the case of Kate Ansah, a registered nurse from Ghana, West Africa. Kate, in her late forties, migrated to the USA with her husband, who was a medical doctor in South Africa. As Kate

10 Pseudonyms are used throughout this chapter to maintain the confidentiality of the research participants.

explained, they had moved from their native Ghana to South Africa, but found it difficult dealing with immigration issues in the country where they were required to renew their work permits every year. They entered the Diversity Visa lottery and won, thus starting their journey to the USA. The fact they entered the country as legal permanent residents played a tremendous part in their ability to gain employment, especially for Kate, who works as a registered nurse. Kate's experience shows that immigration policy, specifically the visa categorizations through which African immigrants enter the USA, had a powerful effect in determining their access to the labour market and the opportunities available to them. Nevertheless, despite the fact that she migrated legally and had 'papers' (i.e. authorization to work in the country), Kate initially encountered difficulties in securing a job in the nursing field. She described the difficult, expensive and cumbersome process of transferring her nursing credentials from Ghana and having to take the licensing exams. In addition to transferring her credentials, Kate also faced many obstacles in securing employment as a registered nurse, even after she had received the requisite qualifications and licenses to work. She entered the labour market as a nanny and, eventually, was able to work as a nurse, starting in the labour-intensive and less appealing specialities that see a concentration of immigrant women of colour. In addition to presenting the importance of having a legal status, Kate's story is instructive in highlighting nursing as an 'immigrant niche' occupation.

'Nursing the nation': African 'immigrant niche' occupations

The increasing recruitment of immigrants into the health care field in general, and nursing in particular, can be attributed to what has been termed a 'crisis of care' in America. This purported crisis is believed to be a consequence of the ageing of the American population. Accompanying this demographic trend is the related problem of who will provide care for the growing number of elderly as well as the sick and disabled populations in need of long-term care. There appears to be a growing demand for skilled, professional and paraprofessional health care workers in institutional and home settings. The demand for labour in health care institutions is also driven by medical advancements and innovations allowing more individuals to live longer, even with chronic health problems (Ong and Azores, 1994). Tied to this growth in health care occupations is the accompanying increase in the number of foreign-born health care workers, as the supply of native-born health care workers has failed to meet the growing demand. Immigrants from various regional groups are linked to this occupational sector, although there are clear concentrations of particular

racial/ethnic groups (Choy, 2003; George, 2005; Guevarra, 2010; Ong and Azores, 1994; Rodriguez, 2010). African immigrants have increasingly been incorporated into this growing labour market at various levels in the industry. Data from the 2009 American Community Survey showed that, compared to female immigrants overall, African-born women were more likely to report work as registered nurses, as other non-physician health care practitioners, and in health care support occupations. African men were also more heavily concentrated in health-care related jobs, a trend that began at the close of the 1990s (McCabe, 2012).

While nursing is entered into by all regional groups of Africans, the popularity of nursing as an occupation is particularly widespread among the networks occupied by English-speaking West African immigrants. This was aptly captured by a young Sierra Leonean nurse, who stated in an interview (with the author): 'nursing was the talk around town' (interview with Michelle Johnson Cole, 11 June 2010, Maryland, USA). So why did nursing become so popular among this regional group of African immigrants? The answer lies in the structural demand, as previously discussed in this chapter. Faced with domestic shortages, this particular occupational group is open to recruiting workers from abroad. Indeed, a large sociological body of work has been devoted to understanding the practices of international recruitment of nurses into the US labour market (Choy, 2003; George, 2005; Guevarra, 2010; Ong and Azores, 1994; Rodriguez, 2010). Unlike other fields, which had subtle and sometimes overt barriers to entry, nursing and other health care jobs were readily available and could easily absorb Africans, and it was an option that was prevalent among communities of West African immigrants. Another Sierra Leonean nurse articulated the idea of nursing as a desirable field that was open to people from all over the world:

'In nursing, whether you are green, whether you are Black, whether you are short, whether you are fat, whether you are young, whether you are old.... there are nurses who are seventy years old still working. Other professions, no. [This is not a possibility in other professions]. They need your skills, they need you, and so they hire you' (Interview with Yenoh Kamara, 29 July 2010, Virginia, USA).

Nursing jobs were also coveted and sought after because – with domestic staff shortages – this was one occupational group that allowed for the readjustment of status to permanent residency and, eventually, to citizenship for immigrants who had entered the country on a temporary basis or had violated the terms of their visas. The ability to gain coveted 'green cards' through entry into nursing made this occupation particularly attractive for certain immigrants already

present in the USA and who wanted to transform temporary sojourns into permanent ones or to come out of the shadows of illegality. Halter and Johnson found this explanatory motive in their study of West African immigrants. They wrote: ‘...propelled by immigration status considerations, they [West African immigrants] made conscious and deliberate choices to abandon homeland occupations’ (Halter and Johnson, 2014, p. 89).

A final factor that served as motivation to enter this occupational field was the promise of financial security. Unlike other service sector jobs, nursing jobs provided high wages (especially if one is prepared to work excessive hours and long shifts) and the opportunity to build secure middle-class lifestyles. The promise of high remuneration and more comfortable work environments, as well as gaining a higher professional stature, attracted immigrants who were already nurses in their home countries. However, many more, who were not previously nurses, entered the profession after migration because of the promises of financial and material success. In response to an interview question about the best aspects of the job, a Nigerian nurse stated quite simply, ‘the money’. A few seconds after she gave that response, she seemed to reflect on the question and then said, almost as an afterthought, ‘I love helping people’ (interview with Toyin Obasanjo, 9 June 2010, Maryland, USA). Her initial response to the question, and the fact that her response was made during a frank, unguarded moment, shows that for some of the nurses, nursing was seen as a lucrative line of work with promises of material success.

The financial rewards in nursing were strong enough that they sparked a transformative process, wherein middle-class immigrants, who had previously shunned the occupation back home, viewed it as a gendered vocation for lower-class women and entered into it in droves upon migration. Once in the USA, they realized that the occupation was organized differently from their home countries, with professional status and prestige attached to it. Elite women aligned this occupational detour to a value that matched their cultural ethos: the quest for higher education and professionalization.¹¹ The promise of financial reward and professional advancement were also sufficiently strong that they provided an incentive for West African men to enter the profession after migration, eschewing gendered and classed pre-migration perceptions that nursing was a ‘female occupation’ only suitable for women of the lower

11 See Showers (2015b) for a detailed account of how West African women view the nursing field, as well as the subjective identities that two divergent groups of West African nurses developed upon entering the occupation in the United States.

classes. West African men, like their female counterparts, saw nursing as an opportunity for upward mobility and integration in the USA.

The increasing presence of men in female dominated occupations, including care work¹², has become the subject of a small but growing body of research (Cottingham, 2013; Dill et al.; 2016; Price Glynn and Rakovski, 2012; Harvey Wingfield, 2009; Lupton, 2000; Scrinzi, 2010; Williams, 1992). This literature established that migration destabilizes the notion of gender, as the threat to the migrants' sense of masculinity is linked not only to downgrading social mobility but also to their employment in feminized jobs (Scrinzi 2010, p. 45). West African men in the nursing industry in the USA made sense of their continued occupation in a feminized profession by stressing the financial rewards of the work and the opportunities for upward mobility, and affirming their bread-winning role, or applying discourses of survival or need. As men who needed to work to survive and provide for their families, both in the USA and back home, they argued that they had to do whatever was necessary to fulfil the roles associated with their status. They also tried to reassert their masculinity by seeking inroads into the highly regarded and more 'masculine' specializations within their field and seeking opportunities to become 'health care entrepreneurs'. Using these afore-mentioned strategies, West African male nurses, and other health care workers, transformed 'women's work' into work that was compatible with their masculine roles of provider and breadwinner. The case of Marcus Fon, an immigrant from Cameroon, exemplifies the strategies used by some men to gain upward mobility in what was paradoxically considered a 'female job'. Marcus, who was a teacher in Cameroon, had initially tried to work as a teacher upon migration to the USA and was met with obstacles, which he attributed to the prevalence of racism in the school systems. He then decided to train as a nurse, not eyeing a lifetime of providing bedside care but because he wanted to use his nursing training and his knowledge of the workings of the health care delivery system into opportunities for entrepreneurship. Speaking about his motivation to open a home care business, where he could hire other mostly West African caregivers, he stated: 'I wanted to go into home care because I had seen people in the [Cameroonian] community who had done it and they were successful. They could provide for their families both here and back home. So, I saw that it was productive economically to go into it' (interview with Marcus Fon, 29 May 2012, Maryland, USA). Marcus' case also reiterates the

12 Care work is a term used to refer to paid work that involves attending to the care needs of people (e.g. bathing, dressing, meal preparation and skilled nursing care).

importance of West African ethnic networks, not only in providing immigrants with material support but also in shaping their desires around health care. For this group, occupations in health care, at least the skilled sectors, were imagined as something to which newly-arrived immigrants could aspire, even if they entered at the lowest tiers to gain a foothold in the industry.

*Taking a taxi to the American Dream:
experiences in a niche market*

While groups of mostly English-speaking African men had found success within a traditionally feminized profession, other groups looked to a quintessentially masculine endeavour to find a foothold into the North American economy, from which they hoped to build a strong foundation for the upward mobility of the second generation. Immigrants in many cities, including African immigrants, formed ethnic niches in taxi driving. Statistical data from the 2000 U.S. Census showed that while African-born immigrants did not constitute the majority of taxi drivers overall, they were an increasing presence by the close of the twentieth century. Indeed, immigrants make up over 50 per cent of taxi drivers in major cities in the country (Chacko, 2016; Halter and Johnson, 2014). Taxi driving has attracted increasing numbers of mostly male immigrants because it is a profession that has relatively few barriers to entry (most cities require only a valid driver's license and the ability to speak English). Although taxi driving can be insecure, exploitative and dangerous, and is faced with restricted opportunities in the labour market, the fact of high unemployment and insufficient human capital means that immigrants and refugees often turn to it as an entry point into the American labour market or as a viable occupation with a path to entrepreneurship and upward mobility (Chacko, 2003, 2009, 2016). Africa, broadly defined, has been identified as one of the three major regions – including South Asia and the Caribbean – from where immigrant taxi drivers originate.

Although employed in a wide range of occupations, East African immigrants, especially Ethiopians, developed, over time, an ethnic occupational niche in activities such as taxi driving and working as parking garage attendants. This niche market is most visible in the nation's capital, Washington DC, where Ethiopians outnumber all other African national groups. The Washington metropolitan area also reportedly has the largest number of persons of Ethiopian ancestry of any city outside Africa. Anthropologist Elizabeth Chacko provided rich ethnographic detail and analytical insight into the lives and experiences of cab drivers in this area. Chacko's findings show that East African men have become taxi drivers in

the USA for reasons similar to those of their West African counterparts in the health care professions. Faced with restricted mobility and obstacles, and sensing the low barriers to entry, they formed networks and entrepreneurial initiatives in this field. Facing similar issues of downgrading of educational credentials and 'deskilling', they turned to an occupation that would allow them a good living, a coveted middle-class lifestyle, and the flexibility to engage in further study in pursuit of other white collar occupations. In this account of the formation of a labour market niche, in which Ethiopians worked as both owners of cab companies and cab drivers, Chacko identified a similar transformation and readjustment of pre-migration cultural values and expectations that have been established in the studies highlighted on West African migrants. She wrote: 'Although merchants and tradesmen had a low social status in Pre-Deng Ethiopia, a significant proportion of Ethiopians evidently overcame the alleged cultural stigma of being engaged in business and embarked in careers as self-employed entrepreneurs' (Chacko, 2016, p. 205). Once again, this proves that the process of migration involved significant reassessment, re-evaluation and adaptations of prior held values, systems and beliefs.

Although African immigrants have diverse work experiences within various occupational fields, this chapter has highlighted two areas that have seen concentrations of specific regional groups of African immigrants. Using case studies from ethnographic research and micro-level data, this chapter has described the lived experiences of this group of immigrants to the USA. These lived experiences illustrate important processes at the global and national levels that have influenced African immigrants entering the country.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that upon entry into the United States and its labour force, African immigrants enter a society that is much improved in terms of race relations, but not totally free from the cancer of racism. The historical legacy of slavery, Jim Crow segregation and de facto racism form the background against which they enter and shape their relationships with White Americans, African Americans and other racial groups. African immigrants, especially Black African immigrants, also encounter contemporary structural impediments to upward mobility. These obstacles include the fact that educational credentials garnered from home countries do not apply and are often rendered useless in the US labour market. Furthermore, the terms of

their entry, such as specific visa specifications (for students, visitors and other temporary visa statuses), ban employment, effectively and successfully barring their entry into the mainstream sectors of the economy. Also salient is the effect of racism and racial discrimination that prevents entry into highly regarded occupations and professions, as well as specialties within occupations. Despite these disadvantages, this group of immigrants has achieved success in certain highly regarded professional occupations as well as through other indices, such as educational attainment, income level, home ownership rates and entry into the middle class. In their journey to success, they have had to seek out novel and ingenious ways to gain upward mobility. Deploying the social capital embedded within their ethnic networks, African immigrants have been able to succeed, as well as find new pathways into the American dream. Some of the strategies for upward mobility include working hard, investing in education, and engaging in entrepreneurship. A major strategy also involves entering fields and occupations where there is a structural demand for their labour, and where their racial/ethnic, immigrant and nation status do not stand in the way. Accepting severe cuts in their professional identities and social status, they realize that their sacrifices and losses will provide them with the financial foothold they need and thus serve as the starting point and springboard for the second generation.

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CHAPTER 24

AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH EUROPE

Joseph Gahama

Introduction

Certain ideas no longer hold water. Prior to the era of colonial conquest, Africa was not an isolated continent, contrary to what some have long claimed. Far from it. It maintained all kinds of relations with the rest of the world since ancient times, especially with Europe. Colonization intensified these relations – in many cases, unfortunately, in the form of exploitation. Relations between Africa and Europe continued in the post-independence era. This chapter intends to examine this aspect. First, we will consider economic, cultural and military links in the context of bilateral assistance conferred in favour of African countries by their former colonial rulers, as well as the EU-African ‘partnership’ established through the conventions and accords of Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou. This chapter also examines the role played by Africa as a supplier of raw materials to Europe, a continent which is currently losing ground in the face of competition from ‘emerging’ countries. Finally, the strategies adopted by African nations to take charge of their own destiny will be analysed.

Bilateral assistance

In the aftermath of independence, an Afro-pessimistic current circulated in certain European circles, which believed that Africa was made up of a multitude of politically artificial states that were 'rarely economically viable' (Servoise, 1961, p. 124). In 1962, prominent French agronomist René Dumont declared that Africa had made a poor start, while Albert Meister, in 1966, questioned whether Africa was capable of making any start at all. The opinion at that time was that Africa should continue to function as an 'extension', in which Europe could not be a disinterested party, and that the two continents were, in fact, a couple, for better or worse (Servoise, 1961, p. 125). It was therefore necessary to devise ways the Western world could continue to forge relations with African peoples, particularly in the field of economic and technical cooperation.

European countries, particularly France and the United Kingdom, thus maintained close ties with their former colonies through bilateral assistance arrangements. Eager to avoid severing links with newly-independent African countries, General de Gaulle established a Ministry of Cooperation as early as 1959, which sent volunteers, doing their military service, to Africa as aid workers. The studies and reports produced by these agents led to the establishment of a documentation centre containing interesting archives, both public and confidential.

The neocolonialistic nature of this assistance was frequently criticized in the context of what François-Xavier Verschave described as 'Françafrique' (a term which describes France's relations with its former African colonies), as being:

[A] nebulous assembly of economic, political and military stakeholders in France and Africa, organized in networks and lobbies and engaged in the polarized appropriation of two benefits: raw materials and public funding for development. The rationale of this system prohibits any initiative outside the circle of initiates. This self-destructive system fuels a cycle of criminality. It is naturally hostile to democracy (Verschave, 1998, p. 21).

Prior to its abolition in 1992, there was a long-standing African unit at the Élysée Palace which reported, not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but directly to the president. Its function was to oppose African leaders who were hostile to French policy on the African continent and, if necessary, to organize *coups d'état* for the installation of dictators, i.e. puppets (*hommes de paille*), whose time in power was proportional to their loyal services in favour of France.

French military bases on the African continent and defence agreements represented a further key pillar for the maintenance of French political influence

and the protection of its economic interests, whether in terms of access to natural and strategic resources (oil, uranium, etc.) or the provision of outlets for multinational corporations such as Total, Areva, Bouygues, Bolloré, etc.

In an attempt to maintain its status as a world power, and at the same time limit the influence of the USA and the UK, France was reliant upon the 'Francophonie' (French-speaking) community which, territorially, was comprised primarily of African countries. The regular organization of summit meetings of heads of state provided an opportunity to discuss the French language in response to the omnipresence of English, but also for the discussion of key issues of the day. The speech given in La Baule in June 1990 by President Mitterrand, demanding the democratization of Africa under threat of cutting aid to recalcitrant leaders, had an impact that is still felt today.

Conversely to France, the United Kingdom, once its former colonies had become independent, conducted a policy described as 'minimum engagement', which was manifested dramatically in the 'dismantling' of the sterling currency area, which had functioned in the manner of a mechanism for the regulation of economic exchanges since the end of the Second World War (Lee, 1970, p. 102). This by no means implied that the UK severed all links with its former colonies. It continued to maintain economic, commercial and military relations with these countries on the understanding that this was both desirable and beneficial to both parties. Certain countries, such as Kenya, took the opportunity to open up relations with new partners, such as the USA, to the extent that the latter ultimately established Kenyan air and naval bases (Fenwick, 2009, pp. 16-18).

African countries have not always approved of the foreign policies pursued by the UK. Some, including Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania, went so far as to condemn the UK's failure to intervene in response to the illegal declaration of independence of Southern Rhodesia in 1965.

Through the agency of numerous British NGOs, particularly the Department for International Development (DFID), the UK is currently a major contributor to development aid in a number of African countries, particularly its former colonies, in the fields of combating poverty, fostering democracy and effective governance, and the promotion of peace and security (Williams, 2004; Chafer & Cuming, 2013, p. 169).

Portugal, the third largest colonial power on the African continent, also maintained links with its former colonies, but it was unique in that the countries secured their independence after prolonged wars of liberation, followed by exceptionally bloody fratricidal conflicts between rival movements bent on seizing power. Over 69 per cent of development aid from Portugal goes to its

former colonies (Torres, 1997, p. 9), specifically in education, health care and military cooperation. Following the discovery and extraction of substantial natural resources in Angola, Portuguese banks and businesses invested substantially in the Angolan oil industry, the transport sector and others. In return, Angola became the fourth largest consumer of Portuguese products, specifically in the wake of a major influx of Portuguese immigrants, rising from 21,000 in 2003 to 91,900 in 2010 (Seabra and Gorjoa, 2011, p. 6).

With the injection of US\$62.7 million into agriculture and fishing between 1985 and 1994, Portugal became the second largest foreign investor in Mozambique (Oppenheimer, 1977, p. 471). In 1996, following the model adopted by the Francophonie community and the Commonwealth, Portuguese-speaking countries established the CPLP or Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) which, thanks to the population of Brazil, encompasses approximately 279 million inhabitants. These nations advocate what some have called 'lusotropicalism', meaning their common language and culture have succeeded in achieving a strong inter-penetration of different cultures, thus forging sustainable and stimulating links (Oppenheimer, 1977, p. 473).

Some specialists in Italian colonialism argue that its particularity lies in the fact that it was carried out by a fascist regime in desert territories in Libya, Eritrea and Somalia (Reviglio della Veneria, 2014, p. 14). Whereas these last two countries have become enclaves of authoritarianism and self-destruction, Muammar Gaddafi concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation with Silvio Berlusconi in 2008. This followed some thirty years of problematic relations, mainly due to the embargo imposed on Libya, which did not prevent the Italian oil and gas multinational Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) from continuing to conduct business in Libya, nor prevent Libyan investors from increasing their holdings in Fiat (Ronzatti, 2009, p. 126). This treaty was based on two key principles. First, it was intended to draw a line under the past: Italy agreed to pay US\$20 million of compensation to Libya. Second, a partnership was established between both parties, and cooperation was envisaged in the fields of energy, sciences, industry, defence, combating terrorism and the control of illegal immigration (Ronzatti, 2009, p. 129). As a result, the influx of migrants arriving by sea from Libya was considerably reduced, and economic links were reinforced.

To varying degrees, other Western European countries, including Germany, have maintained commercial relations with Africa, which has supplied the German automotive industry with oil, uranium, copper, manganese, etc. (Gloannec, 1983, p. 13). Public development aid has been delivered through the agency of private law organizations, such as the GTZ, or Gesellschaft für technische

Zusammenarbeit (Association of Technical Cooperation), which is highly active in professional training and rural development (Gloannec, 1983, p. 21). The Goethe and Frobenius institutes are present throughout Africa, fostering international cooperation in general, and promoting German language and culture in particular.

Long confined to the religious sphere, in the form of Lutheran missionaries who were sent to convert Black Africans, relations between Scandinavian countries and Africa since the 1980s have focused on development, through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), which finance projects related to the environment, gender, good governance and humanitarian assistance.

After its creation in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) cooperated with the Third World in general, and Africa, specifically, was one of its priorities. It positioned itself remarkably during the Cold War as a formidable rival to the United States and the West. It lent particular support to liberation movements on the continent and offered numerous scholarships to young Africans. After disengaging somewhat, following the collapse of the USSR and the reorientation of its foreign policy, Russia later resumed exports of military equipment, and endeavoured, as best as it could, to recover money it had lent to Marxist-Leninist African regimes. It has since adopted a more prudent approach than before in the pursuit of solutions to crises and conflicts in Africa (Birgeson, 1996, pp. 155-156).

Evidently, most major European countries have maintained and continue to maintain bilateral relations with Africa. To harmonize their aid, they prefer to channel it through the European Union.

The EU–Africa ‘partnership’

The Yaoundé Convention between the European Economic Community (EEC)¹ and 18 Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM)² was signed in Cameroon in 1963, renewed in 1969 and expired in 1975. Through the agency of the European Development Fund (EDF), the convention provided

1 At the time, this Community was comprised of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

2 These African countries were Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, the Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Chad and Togo. These were all Francophone countries, with the exception of Somalia.

trade advantages and financial aid to former African countries totalling 730 million units of account, spread over a period of six years. It emphasized the development of roads, education and health care infrastructure.

Following the United Kingdom's accession to the EEC in 1973, four 'Lomé Conventions' established relations with 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Based upon the principles of the equal treatment of partners, respect for national sovereignty, the pursuit of mutual interests, and interdependence, these conventions established the STABEX system for the offsetting of export losses associated with fluctuations in the price of primary products. They also recommended independent development, self-sufficiency and the security of food supplies (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Cameroon, 2013, p. 2). Cooperation under the Lomé Convention IV (1995-2000) was not concerned solely with the economic development of Africa but also involved a firm commitment to protect human rights, democracy and effective governance, the enhancement of social status, and the protection of the environment.

Despite EEC aid granted in favour of African peoples, it was observed in 2000, with some bitterness, that:

[T]he development of the economic situation has been accompanied by the disintegration of social fabric and the multiplication of conflicts and humanitarian disasters, which have undermined development policies and led financial supporters to focus on emergency aid and crisis management (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Cameroon, 2013, p. 3).³

The Cotonou Agreement concluded in 2000 for a term of 20 years between the 28 member countries of the European Union (EU) and the 79 states in the ACP group. In addition to adopting the objectives of the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions, the Agreement incorporates political dimensions, such as regional integration; economic aspects, such as gender equality; and environmental questions. The overall budget conferred in favour of ACP countries for the period from 2018 to 2020 totalled 31.5 billion euros. The European Development Fund (EDF) is the key mechanism available to the EU for the management of non-refundable aid, emergency assistance and aid for refugees, and the support of structural adjustment and regional integration.

For a number of years, the EU has been negotiating economic partnership

3 A number of African countries have undergone social crises resulting from the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

agreements (EPAs) with ACP countries, with a view to securing access for the majority of EU products to African markets. This pursuit of deregulation is more than a source of concern: African nations run the risk of seeing their agricultural and food products exposed to strong competition, while losing a substantial source of customs revenue. Only West Africa has concluded such an agreement. According to Concord, a European confederation of NGOs, this 'partnership', extracted virtually by force, 'provides less room for manoeuvre for the improvement of the living standards of its populations, and will nullify the impact of numerous development programmes' (Concord, 2015, p. 3).

In political and diplomatic terms, heads of state of EU members and African countries regularly organize 'summits' for the evaluation of cooperation and the discussion of future prospects. For example, the meeting in Valletta (Malta) in November 2015 was intended to address the challenges associated with the dramatic increase in the flow of refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants arriving on European soil in very large numbers. It was agreed that an action plan should be devised for the effective management of African migration and mobility.

From the above, it is clear that the EU, through the provision of aid, has contributed enormously to the availability of funding, skills and technologies in Africa since the time of independence. In return, in support of its own development, the EU has evidently benefited from preferential relations for the procurement of natural resources, which are primarily sourced from the African continent.

Africa: a valuable supplier of raw materials to Europe

Relations between Europe and Africa can also be gauged from the perspective of commercial trading between these two 'partners', particularly exports of African raw materials.

Africa is a rich source of raw materials, including energy sources, minerals, timber and agricultural products. These are primarily exported to Europe, the USA and China to meet the needs of the automobile, chemical and aeronautical industries, and for the manufacture of factory plants and equipment. These materials are also essential to the construction industry. Material exports were a source of over 50 million jobs in 2013 (Hellendorff, 2013, p. 2).

In 2013, the African continent accounted for 12% of global oil production⁴ and, according to plausible estimates, holds 10% of the world's reserves. Africa's forestry and agricultural resources have fuelled growth of about 35% since 2000.

4 In 2006, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Angola had economies which were over 70 per cent dependent on oil exports.

Overall, raw materials accounted for 80% of exports from Africa in 2011, mainly to Europe and North America.⁵ Metals for high-tech applications, demand for which is rising constantly, are a major issue for Europe, which is 48% dependent on external sources for the supply of copper, 64% for zinc and bauxite, 48% for nickel, and 100% for cobalt and platinum (Hellendorff, 2013, p. 4).

Consequently, a number of countries have experienced extraordinary growth, such as Angola, thanks to its oil, and Mozambique, once very poor, thanks to coal and natural gas. South Africa has the largest economy on the continent and has become an 'emerging' country. Its neighbour, Botswana, has been able to use the money generated by diamond mining to establish a stable democracy. Unfortunately, for other countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), natural resources wealth, being highly coveted, is a source of conflict and discord.⁶

Since 2008, there has been a European strategy in place, entitled the 'Raw Materials Initiative', with the goal of preserving key sources of supply in response to the threat of rising demand from emerging countries such as China and Brazil. The EU has initiated a political dialogue with a number of countries with a view to eliminating 'trade barriers', particularly restrictions on exports, including ACP countries. The latter, although highly apprehensive of the loss of income from customs revenue, will be obliged to conclude EPAs, or they will otherwise be subject to sanctions. In future, in the interests of securing freedom of access to natural resources, the EU will only extend its aid to those countries that have accepted free trade policies.

Some 40 minerals are currently the focus of particular attention. Fourteen of these (antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluorine, gallium, germanium, graphite, platinum, indium, manganese, niobium, tantalum, rare earths and tungsten)⁷ are classified as essential for European industries and, in consequence, must remain accessible by any means. With this in mind, in 2012, the European Investment Bank (IEB) granted 700 million euros of funding to ACP countries that were conducting mining research projects (Hellendorff, 2013, p. 12).

5 It should be observed, however, that Asia and China, in particular, is on the way to becoming the second-ranked partner of Africa.

6 In this context, reference has been made to 'the curse of natural resources'.

7 Germanium, for example, is used in fibre-optics, indium in photovoltaic cells, and tantalum in electronics.

Linguistic and cultural links

Since colonization, Europe and Africa have had cultural ties that are mainly expressed through the European languages used by Africans and the institutions set up to promote them. Africa is the continent where French is most widely spoken in the world.⁸ Established in 1970 in Niamey on the initiative of three African presidents (Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, Hamani Diori of Niger and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia), the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, or ACCT) brought together 29 African countries, mostly former French colonies. These were subsequently joined by other, primarily English-speaking countries, such as Egypt and Mauritius, and Portuguese-speaking countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. The promotion of the French language has progressed through the work of the Francophonie University Agency (Agence universitaire de la francophonie, or AUF)⁹ set up by Abdou Diouf in 1970, which represents over 800 higher education and research institutions, and more generally through the work of the International Organization of La Francophonie (Organisation internationale de la francophonie, or OIF)¹⁰ established in 1997.

English is the official language, or the *lingua franca*, in a number of former British colonies in Western Africa (The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone), Eastern Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) and Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Given its predominance in science and technology, and its widespread use in the world of business and international relations, English replaced French in 2009 as the official teaching language in Rwanda, which joined the Commonwealth thereafter. A large proportion of the population speak Portuguese in Angola (60%), Mozambique (50%), Guinea-Bissau (11%), and São Tomé and Príncipe (95%).¹¹

Although not their native languages as such, many Africans are obliged to use French, English or Portuguese for mutual communication in the light of the multitude of dialects and local patois in use in their countries.¹² In the main,

8 The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with 109 million inhabitants, around 50 million of whom are fluent in French, is the largest French-speaking country in the world.

9 Previously known as the Association of Partially or Entirely French-speaking Universities (Association des universités partiellement ou entièrement de langue française, AUPELF).

10 The OIF currently includes 93 nation states or governments.

11 These countries form part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), established in 1996.

12 The national anthems of many African countries are sung either in French or in English.

the elite strata of African societies have been educated at European universities, with whom they maintain links. Their lifestyles are frequently closer to those of Europeans than of their own compatriots. While some elect to return home after their studies, giving their respective countries the benefit of their expertise, others prefer to remain and settle in Europe, thus constituting a diaspora community of highly competent doctors, teachers and lawyers.

Clearly, these linguistic and cultural links have tended to favour European countries who, moreover, were guilty of the theft of numerous works of art and artefacts during military conquests and throughout the colonial era. The Sarr-Savoy report delivered to French President Emmanuel Macron in November 2018, in preparation for the restitution of African heritage artefacts, most of which are kept at the Quai Branly museum, which holds no fewer than 70,000 items belonging to former French colonies, is far from being the subject of unanimous agreement. In practice, this report raises many issues of a legal and practical nature.

Military relations with Europe

Independence did not put an end to military relations between Europe and Africa. In some cases, these relations have even been reinforced. Today, these assume a number of forms: technical military assistance, with an accent on the training of African armies, particularly to the south of the Sahara; the establishment of military bases; operations for the stabilization of regions of recurrent conflicts; or for the emergency assistance of heads of state in difficulty, etc. With over 40 military operations in Africa since 1951, France has been the most prominent European country on the African continent, even though, in recent years, it no longer acts alone following the replacement of defence and cooperation agreements by President Sarkozy with 'defence partnership agreements' (Cuttier, 2012, p. 9). French military forces are pre-deployed in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal.

In the late 1990s, Tony Blair changed UK foreign policy in Africa to promote programmes in favour of democracy and human rights. This resulted in UK military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, putatively for the protection of residents of UK origin in the country. Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and particularly Germany, through the provision of equipment and military resources, are assuming an increasingly active role in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions.

At present, the EU has a common security and defence policy vis-à-vis Africa. First, this policy is intended to prevent the 'fragmentation of states' in

crisis: this accounts for military interventions in Ituri for the prevention of the collapse of the DRC, and in Darfur, a region of Sudan, 'at the confluence of the Arab and African, Christian and Muslim worlds' (Cuttier, 2012, p. 7). Second, in the context of operation *Atlante*, which was intended to secure the north-west of the Indian Ocean for the safe passage of over 20,000 merchant vessels travelling to and from Europe, the EU has also been engaged since 2000 in the fight against Somali pirates, with resources involving the mobilization of twelve European countries.¹³ Third, support is provided to African armies for the reinforcement of their capacities and the maintenance of peace.

However, this common EU policy is not always consistent. It is clear this policy goes astray in terms of the fight against jihadists who have declared allegiance to the Islamic State (Hokayem, 2015). Once again proving that, whatever the circumstances, France remains the 'policeman of Africa'. It has found itself alone on the front line in the fight against Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Mali, and against the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). According to the Paris authorities, the security of persons of French origin in Mali, the constitution of an African force, and the International Support Mission to Mali (MISMA, later AFISMA), conducted under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), were the objectives of Operation *Serval*, which was launched in 2013 and ended on 15 July 2014 (Sow, 2013, p. 9). However, some have perceived in this operation a motive not publicly conceded: the protection of the economic interests of France in the region (Adam, 2013, p. 11).

Conversely, the EU has not shown the same enthusiasm for the fight against the terrorist actions of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, a movement linked to AQIM and al-Shabaab in Somalia (de Montclos, 2012, p. 4; Sow, 2013, p. 7).

A Europe concerned by African migration

For some time, migration to Europe, particularly from Black Africa, has been the subject of occasional xenophobic media attention and political debate. However, these movements of migrants are by no means recent. They date back to the time of independence, when a number of European countries were seeking a cheap pool of labour for the occupation of unskilled jobs. Many North Africans, Senegalese, Malians and Ivorians came to France, while Nigerians and Ghanaians headed for the United Kingdom. These two destinations are

13 These are Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Cuttier, 2012, p. 28).

explained by historical and cultural links. Scandinavian countries, which have no colonial past, did not host migrants until the 1970s and 1980s, mostly political refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia.

African immigration accounts for no more than 1 per cent of the population of the European Union, ranked by order of numerical significance in France, Italy, Germany, the UK, Benelux countries and Scandinavia. Migrants and refugees who find themselves on the European continent may have been exiled for political reasons (conflicts, wars, severe human rights violations), economic reasons (famine or poverty) or climatic reasons (drought in Ethiopia and the Sahel).

From the 1980s onwards, EU countries have enacted strict legislation for the control of their borders and the regulation of the residence of foreign nationals within their territories. Draconian measures have been implemented in terms of visas.¹⁴ Following the considerable expansion of the Schengen Area, making it more difficult to control new arrivals, particularly by sea, the Frontex agency was established in 2005 with the task of coordinating 'the integrated management of external frontiers'.

Despite all these restrictions, there has been a considerable growth in illegal immigration. Many young people have no hesitation in taking the gravest risks, crossing highly inhospitable desert territories and taking to the sea in makeshift boats in order to reach the European coast. Criminal networks of traffickers, police and customs officers have been formed, using increasingly sophisticated methods for the trafficking of migrants and the conduct of human trading. Obligated to work illicitly once at their destination, and thus deprived of certain rights, immigrants are discouraged by the lengthy processes associated with asylum applications and the acquisition of legitimate immigration papers.

This African migration is consistently stigmatized by radical right-wing movements and xenophobic populist parties, who are gaining considerable ground. They are to be found everywhere: in Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden, etc. Emerging in the early 1980s, they are now established on the political scene following the European elections of 2014, where they led the voting in three countries: the United Kingdom, France and Denmark (Monzat, 2015, p. 1). Essentially, these parties recruit from the middle and working classes. Whether they are the Front National (FN) in France, the Vlaams Belag (VB) in Belgium or the Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, they all bemoan the decline of the 'nation' and claim to be threatened by cultural and/or biological disappearance. Scapegoats

14 According to Beauchemin and Lessaut (2014, p. 35), the rate of refusal of entry visas to France is substantially higher for sub-Saharan Africans than for other nationals: these rates are, respectively, 19% and 15%.

are easily found: immigrants and Muslims are accused of being responsible for all the ills suffered by European societies, particularly unemployment and loss of security. Political refugees have long been well-treated in Scandinavian countries, but their lack of integration has gradually led to a xenophobia that is expressed openly, both by populist leaders and in daily life where we are beginning to observe a discreet but entirely insidious form of racism.

Illegal migration has undoubtedly become a preoccupation, responsibility for which falls upon both Africa and Europe. As Beauchemin and Lessault (2014) emphasize, this is neither an exodus nor an invasion; it is a phenomenon that calls for intervention by both continents. In this context, a summit of African and European heads of state was held in November 2015 in Valletta (Malta), resulting in the formulation of an ambitious action plan based on five elements: investment in development and the eradication of poverty; implementation of measures for the prevention of conflicts; consolidation of the rule of law and governance; the promotion of mobility for students, researchers and entrepreneurs; and the enhanced protection of refugees and displaced persons.

New and powerful partners of Africa

While Europe unquestionably remains the most favoured partner of Africa, it is now confronted by substantial competitors, which should be a cause for concern as they are arriving in force. After a long period of containment policy to counter Soviet influence, the United States disengaged somewhat after the end of the Cold War. They are now taking a renewed interest in the African continent, particularly in the fight against terrorism, but also in its oil supplies¹⁵, with US investments in Somaliland, South Sudan and the Gulf of Guinea (Hugon, 2010, p. 109). The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a law adopted in 2000, permitted access to the US market for some thirty African countries. In return, the latter are committed to the pursuit of a liberal economy and the implementation of policies for the reduction of poverty, democratization, and for effective governance.

Following the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Russia, conscious of preserving its position in Africa, has maintained links with Angola and Nigeria, which supply it with gas and oil, and with Namibia, which exports its uranium to Russia.

15 17% of Chinese oil imports originated from Africa in 2008. This figure is expected to have risen to 20% in 2015.

However, formidable competitors to Europe are now emerging in Asia, starting with China. Sino-African relations are of three types. The first of these are based on commercial relations, as China became the first-ranked trading partner of Africa in 2018. Chinese imports primarily involve oil and minerals from Sudan, Nigeria, Angola and the DRC, whereas Chinese exports of textiles, electronic devices and various low-cost but also low-quality products reached a figure of US\$100 billion in 2010. Second, Chinese investments continue to expand in the construction, raw materials and small and medium enterprises (SME) sectors, such as bicycle factories, etc. Finally, with an overall budget in excess of US\$60 billion, managed by 60,000 cooperation partners, China contributes over 10 per cent of the total development aid granted to Africa for the financing of infrastructures (roads, schools and hospitals) and for the training of managers (Delcourt, 2008, p. 2). To further penetrate African societies, the Chinese are building Confucius Institutes across the continent to teach the Chinese language. While Westerners provide assistance to Africans with a paternalistic attitude, the Chinese maintain relations based on 'South-South' solidarity and 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of states.¹⁶ In terms of military cooperation, China trains large numbers of African officers, sells increasingly sophisticated arms and equipment, and is becoming an impressive competitor to the Russians in Angola and Ethiopia. Following the model of the France-Africa Summit, Beijing organizes regular meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).¹⁷

India is the second largest country on the Asian continent to take an interest in Africa. Despite a long-term preoccupation with internal priorities, in recent years:

[T]he Indian State has entered the lists with its own captivating serenade to Africa, as an alternative to the bewitching music of the Chinese sirens. More than ever, Gandhi's immense homeland is deploying its diplomatic machine and its financial firepower with a view to securing a place for itself under the African sun (Kefi, 2018, p. 1).

To this end, it has one major asset: the Indian diaspora, which has been established for a very long time in Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as in Mauritius and Madagascar, thus helping to strengthen its trade relations with the African continent.¹⁸ The Indian Government is continuing to expand its scope of intervention: the India-African Development Fund has provided aid grants in excess of US\$1 billion to 13 countries in Western Africa for the

16 Using its right of veto in the United Nations Security Council, China is frequently accused of protecting authoritarian regimes, including those in Sudan and Burundi.

17 The one held in Beijing on 3 September 2018 involved leaders from 53 African countries.

18 India imports 70 per cent of its oil requirements from Africa.

funding of around twenty solar energy projects. At the same time, India has opened eighteen new embassies covering all zones of the African continent, thus facilitating the issue of visas to African business travellers and students, who are increasingly attending Indian universities as they are considered to represent an affordable cost option. The recent establishment of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), in collaboration with Japan¹⁹, represents, according to the political authorities, an alternative to the 'Chinese Silk Roads as a model for equitable, transparent and mutually beneficial cooperation in terms of growth, which does not infringe the sovereignty of any country' (Kefi, 2018, p. 4).

Finally, in terms of new partners, a number of Latin American countries have made remarkable inroads into Africa. It is well known that Cuba had been militarily involved in Angola for a number of years. Brazil is also endeavouring to consolidate its position, with massive exports of industrial products to Nigeria and South Africa. The same applies to oil-producing countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran), whose religious and economic influence continues to increase thanks to the Islamic Investment Bank.

From the Lagos Plan of Action to Agenda 2063

Economic results during the first ten years of African independence were poor, with low economic growth, budget deficits and negative trade balances (Robert, 2015, p. 1). It thus emerged that reliance upon bilateral and multilateral aid was no longer sufficient, yet there was still an additional and overriding need for 'endogenous and self-focused development'. This was the recommendation of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) launched in 1980 for the encouragement of populations to strengthen national economies by improving agriculture, industry, transport and communications, and by promoting new technologies and training (Robert, 2015, p. 2). Regional integration through the establishment of regional economic communities²⁰ was another means identified for the achievement of the objectives of the LPA.

19 In 2008, Japan was the largest provider of aid to the African continent (Hugon, 2010, p. 110).

20 The eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union as officially representative associations of nation states, in accordance with the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, are the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Results fell well short of expectations; they might even be described as disappointing for various internal and external reasons. Many countries were unable to free themselves of the economic structures inherited from the colonial era, while finding themselves increasingly marginalized in an international context. All this occurred against a background of authoritarian political regimes and civil wars that had devastated the continent (Kasse, 2010, pp. 3-4). According to some analysts, it was the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the World Bank in the early 1980s that dealt a fatal blow to the LPA.

In response, African heads of state established the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)²¹ in 2001, with the aim of setting their countries on the road back to economic growth and sustainable development, eradicating poverty and ending the marginalization of the continent. In pursuit of these objectives, six key sectors were identified: basic infrastructures, human resources, agriculture, the environment, culture, and science and technologies. Peace, security, democracy, respect for human rights and regional integration: these are all preconditions, in the absence of which everything will be in jeopardy.

For the present, the outcome of this 'African initiative' has been satisfactory. For example, Rwanda has enjoyed sustained growth for the last ten years and has considerably reduced its dependence on external aid. Cape Verde has now become a middle-income country, relying exclusively on its own resources, while Botswana has long since ceased to rely on international charity (Mayaki, 2011, pp. 1-5).

The fiftieth anniversary of the African Union in 2013 provided an opportunity to reflect on lessons from the past, to consider the future of the continent, and to formulate Agenda 2063. The latter is intended to 'build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, led by its citizens and constituting a dynamic force on the international scene' (African Union, 2015, p. 3). In practical terms, Agenda 2063 is intended to overhaul the relations of the continent, not only with Europe but also with the rest of the world.

Since taking over from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002, the African Union (AU) has been regularly accused of excessive bureaucracy and a notorious lack of efficiency. The institutional reforms introduced since 2016, under the leadership of President Paul Kagame²², are intended *inter alia* to achieve a drastic reduction of African dependence on international backers, particularly

21 NEPAD is the result of two proposals: the Omega Plan, formulated by former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, and the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme, conceived by former South African President Thabo Mbeki.

22 The Kagame Report puts it thus: 'We have dysfunctional organization, whose value to our member states is limited, which enjoys little credibility among our international partners, and which inspires no confidence in our citizens'.

the European Union (EU). African countries were called upon to pay a 0.2% tax on imports, while committing to the signature of an agreement on the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) provided under the terms of Agenda 2063 of the AU. The implementation of these reforms is proving difficult on the grounds of the reluctance of a number of heavyweight players to comply, including Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. In light of the above, it will undoubtedly be some time before the African continent can dispense with EU assistance altogether, particularly for the maintenance of peace and security.

Conclusion

Africa has maintained political, economic and cultural links with Europe since the colonial era. These relations continued after independence in the form of development aid. It must be conceded, however, that the African continent is no longer the 'exclusive preserve' of Europeans, for a number of reasons. First, today's Africa is no longer the Africa of the 1960s, notwithstanding those who claim, 'the drama of Africa stems from the fact that African people have not made sufficient impact upon history' or 'Africa is not ripe for democracy'. The African continent numbers 1.5 billion inhabitants and is consequently a highly coveted market for emerging countries such as Brazil, China and India. Second, because of the above, Africa has seen the number of its partners increase, particularly in the development aid sector. In other words, the cards have been redealt. Third, Africa has taken advantage of its own attraction to strike a new balance in its relationships. It has experienced sustained economic annual growth of around 4%, unlike other regions of the world. It is increasingly demonstrating its desire to free itself from overly burdensome European paternalism and is no longer afraid to say that it has values to protect, as evidenced by the AU's Agenda 2063.

Despite all the above, we should not lose sight of two points. First, Europe remains the principal investor and leading provider of development aid. It is practically the sole party that continues to intervene decisively in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Second, notwithstanding a number of significant advances in industrialization, Africa remains ensconced in its 'traditional' role as a supplier of raw materials to the West and emergent countries. For Africans, the coming years should be a time to position themselves to make their voices heard in the world, starting with 'the development of their own strategic thinking' (Konadje, 2013, p. 1). To achieve this, they have values such as resilience, *ubuntu* (humanism) and a spirit of equitable sharing, which currently seem more necessary than ever in the search for balanced relations between Africa and Europe.

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LEGACY OF APARTHEID

Patrick Harries

The Apartheid regime that dominated political life in South Africa between 1948 and 1991 was never a solid, homogenous block. Political reforms in the mid- to late 1980s brought an end to some fundamental Apartheid laws or curtailed their implementation. Reforms also brought elements of the Black population into the national political system for the first time in thirty years and opened the way for a power-sharing future. This eventually resulted in a negotiated transfer of power that left the state in the hands of the African National Congress (ANC), but that deprived it of meaningful control of the economy.

As the politicians discussed the shape of the new democracy, the National Party government dismantled Apartheid, suppressing over sixty pieces of racist legislation in June 1991 alone. The threat of violence rose sharply during this period of transition. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a powerful trade union movement, employed 'rolling mass action', a local variant of East Germany's 'Leipzig option', to bring tens of thousands of its members onto the streets. Often employing this threat of force, the ANC seized control of the governments of most of the Bantustans (Black homelands) in the country in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the major political parties organized active militias to support their varied interests. This led the armed forces of the government to open fire and kill, right-wing White demonstrators at Ventersdorp in August 1991 (Dubow, 2014, p. 271).

Elsewhere, a low-scale civil war developed, as the armed wings of the ANC and Inkatha fought to control territory. As violence threatened to engulf the country, President F. W. de Klerk, in November 1992, abandoned his demand for power sharing and accepted that power could be transferred to the Black majority. A year later, the politicians produced a constitution that provided for majority rule but included protections for minorities, such as a bill of rights and a limited devolution of power to nine provinces. As the date for elections neared, right-wing White demonstrators mounted an unsuccessful invasion of Bophuthatswana in an attempt to stop the ANC from seizing control of the platinum-rich Bantustan. An attempt by Inkatha militants to seize control of the business centre of Johannesburg in March 1994 resulted in a fusillade from ANC headquarters that killed 53 people. A month later, some 20 million South Africans, or 86 per cent of the electorate, went to the polls, and despite last desperate attempts to prevent the election, the country's first democratic government was elected (Welsh and Spence, 2011, p. 138).

The ANC won the support of just under two-thirds of the electorate. Once in power, and under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, its policies focused on appeasing and reconciling the hostile forces that had brought South Africa to the edge of civil war. To this end, Mangosothu Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha, was brought into government, eventually to serve as acting-president and, on his death, he received a state funeral. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission, headed by the Anglican archbishop Desmond Tutu, laid most of the blame for Apartheid on members of the clandestine security forces. While some members of the hit squads that operated on the edges of state control during the final years of Apartheid received lengthy jail sentences, the leaders of the various branches of the Apartheid state remained at liberty. Most tellingly, the ANC quickly abandoned its socialist policies and instead focused on the primacy of the private sector in the struggle to grow the economy and create jobs. In this way, the ANC extended its policy of reconciliation to industrialists and foreign investors who had built their wealth on the cheap labour of Black South Africans. It also came to terms with the governments of the capitalist world that, during the Cold War, had viewed the liberation movement-turned-political party with deep suspicion.

Nelson Mandela's image as a peacemaker grew as he interacted with the people who imprisoned him and embarked on visits to Western capitals. Mandela's primary task was to hold together a highly disparate population and allay Western fears about the ANC's intentions. He had inherited a strong state with an efficient tax gathering service, a developed system of means-tested welfare grants, and a system of education that now depended on school and

university fees rather than on race. The more difficult task was growing the economy and bringing about a redistribution of wealth.

The ANC Government initially left the transformation of the economy to the private sector. Companies contributed to 'Black Economic Empowerment' (BEE) by voluntarily providing politically influential individuals with shares and places on the board. Political life changed more rapidly as Black South Africans came to dominate elected positions and focus their attention on providing the mass population with education, housing, electricity and water. The spread of ideas about democracy and human rights seeped into the deepest rural areas where they brought about a dramatic transformation of local power relations as the Constitutional Court's notion of 'living law' confirmed the rights of women and others to own land and participate in local decision-making (Claassens and Cousins, 2008, chapters 6-7). However, problems built up as the economy continued to falter, unemployment rose, the value of social grants fell in real terms, and cuts were made to the social sector.

In 1999, Mandela handed the presidency to Thabo Mbeki. The new president's notion of an African Renaissance drew him to look for African solutions to the mounting HIV/AIDS crisis and to serve as a peacemaker in various African countries, but it also encouraged him to support and strengthen the role of rural chiefs. The passage of a Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act in 2003 accepted the old tribal boundaries of the Bantustans and the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 resorted to colonial legislation, which reinforced the powers of unelected kings, chiefs and headmen. These laws restricted the commercialization of land in the tribal reserves-cum-Bantustans and subjected people to static notions of 'custom and tradition' in ways that preserved political differences associated with gender, age and class. This made those living in poverty-stricken rural areas the 'subjects' of despotic traditional authorities, while those living in the economic heartland were the true 'citizens' who benefited from democracy (Mamdani, 1996).

Towards the end of Mbeki's first term in office, the economy surged as the country fed the Chinese behemoth with raw materials, serving as a springboard into Africa for foreign investors. By 2007, South Africa's GDP was growing at 5.5 %, and the state was playing a more interventionist role in the creation of wealth. BEE had resulted in the extraordinary enrichment of a small number of individuals but had done little to encourage the growth of a Black middle class. In 2004, the government attempted to correct this by introducing a formal system of Broad-Based BEE (B-BBEE) that brought into the economy greater numbers of South Africans 'formerly disadvantaged'

by race. The government had also brought changes to the civil service to better reflect the demographic composition of the country (Patel and Graham, 2012, pp. 193-207).

As the economy grew, demands for a more equitable distribution of wealth outstripped the codes of B-BBEE. This eventually led to the ousting of Thabo Mbeki in 2007-2008 and to the election of Jacob Zuma as national president in May 2009. The Zuma Government quickly provided antiretrovirals to those suffering from HIV/AIDS and it substantially increased the provision of means-tested social grants to 17 million recipients.

The economic crisis that enveloped the world in 2008 arrived as Zuma took office. An early sign of the coming storm occurred in May with widespread attacks on immigrants in Johannesburg and elsewhere. Apartheid had long divided the urban Black population into 'insiders' with occupational rights and 'outsiders' considered as temporary residents. The opening of the frontiers had allowed large numbers of foreign immigrants to enter the country in a way that threatened the sense of entitlement of some local communities. Communities with a long history of rebellion against the Apartheid state expressed their demands of the new democratic state through 'xenophobic' attacks, as well as through widespread protests due to the local state's inability to provide services such as running water, electricity or refuse removal. Just like the last years of Apartheid, the government responded to moments of excessive violence by sending the army into the townships. On one brutal occasion in August 2012, this led to the death of 34 men when police opened fire on striking platinum mineworkers at Marikana (Alexander, 2014, pp. 605-619; Paret, 2015, pp. 107-123).

The ANC has built on and consolidated the heritage of a strong state in various ways. Most notably, race remains a crucial determinant in the redistribution of wealth. Divisions in the Black African population also hark back to earlier times. Continuities might also be found in education, where language requirements and a sliding scale of fees confine those from poor backgrounds to overcrowded schools and universities and to inadequate teaching. But much has changed, and South Africa is like other developing nations, such as Brazil and Türkiye, a country building on the past to reshape the present. A vibrant democracy will help shape its future.

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CHAPTER 26

AFRICANITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Jean-Pierre Dozon

Globalization, contrary to how it is most often described, is not a radically new phenomenon, even if the era we live in since the fall of the Berlin Wall has some rather special characteristics. Indeed, the development of information and communication technologies and the intensification of capital flows and goods continue to connect all four corners of the planet in a way that is more intense and rapid than ever before.

As history and, specifically, global history now teaches us, there have been other times of similar phenomena, bringing into play close relationships between world regions, particularly through trade, and even sizeable population movements through which cultures and human knowledge have constantly invented and reinvented themselves. After all, the world of paleontology and genetics both agree that Africa is the cradle of humanity and, more precisely, the place where the process of hominization and the great migration of *Homo sapiens* to other continents began. We could just as well say that this is a global phenomenon and, consequently, that Africa is its earliest embodiment (Oppenheimer, 2004).

But far beyond this inaugural scene of sorts, it is now fairly well established, once we free ourselves from the Eurocentrism that has long prevailed, that during many other periods of human history, Africa played a significant role in the constitution and transformation of a world system that was both Euro-Asian

and African. Going back to at least the beginning of the era, conventionally called Christian, this world system, in accordance with the concept proposed by Immanuel Wallerstein (2006), first involved Eastern Africa, then West Africa through important trade links (gold and ivory in particular), but also through the formation, growth and then decline of powerful empires in the Sudanese regions (Ghana, Mali, Songhai). China, which today has forged strong economic, diplomatic and cultural ties with Africa, officially claims ancient links with the continent, believing that these began well before the relationships established with Europe from the fifteenth century. According to China, it had never taken the predatory turn that Europe has long imposed on the continent (Li, 2012).

Furthermore, how can we fail to recognize the African continent's role in the expansion of Islam, a global phenomenon, itself directly related to the development of its long-distance trade networks and consolidation of its state powers, such as those of the powerful Mali empire in the fourteenth century under the reign of Mansa Kankan Musa (Levitzion, 1973). In the same vein, it should be noted that the beginnings of Christianity took place several centuries earlier across Europe, Asia and the Horn of Africa, even before Islam spread to the Sahelian strip of the continent. But it is certainly the role played by Africa in the constitution of European modernity, from what was called the 'Renaissance', itself taking the form of a new world system, which is the best documented and best-known phenomenon, while still requiring a reassessment and a better appreciation of its importance.

Indeed, we know what influence trade with Africa had on the development of capitalism from the fifteenth century on the advent of circumnavigation, which generated an Atlantic world system with Europe as the central hub and the Americas as vast lands of conquest and European settlement (Thornton, 1992). The slave trades, perpetuated through the expansion of the earlier slave traffic in the Arab world, were the cornerstone of this traffic, but one to which trading in gold and a wide range of tropical products (ivory, skins, spices, etc.) was added. Considering what resulted from this on the other side of the Atlantic (and to a much lesser extent in the Indian Ocean), notably in terms of the mass production of sugar and cotton due to slave labour, it is safe to say that without this, the accumulation of capital would never have happened. In this instance, this led to industrialization and the enduring hegemony of the West over the rest of the world. But what is less known is that Europe's trade with Africa had many implications other than just economic and financial. It also had strong political consequences, given that this period is closely associated with the transplantation of millions of Africans to the Americas and the Caribbean at the same time

as a significant European population (British, Portuguese, Spanish, French, etc.) was settling there. This created the right conditions in the transatlantic colonies for communities wanting to free themselves from the tutelage of their respective European capitals (Anderson, 1996). But such a growth in nationalism did not only affect the colonial territories of the Atlantic world system, it also affected its central hub, resulting in a Europe that increasingly developed into rival nations and powers, while becoming, on a global scale, a place for the concentration of wealth, as well as socio-economic and technical-scientific transformations.

Once again, it must immediately be noted that Africa occupied a genuinely decisive place. Indeed, in the wake of the emancipation of many transatlantic colonies (including Saint-Domingue, which became the Republic of Haiti and the first Black nation at the turn of the twentieth century) and the abolition of slavery by those who had practised it on a large scale, the colonial conquests of Africa by the main European powers revealed their nationalism and their increasing rivalry as they ushered in a new phase in the expansion of capitalism. From this point of view, the occurrence of the First World War cannot be separated from the rising extremes it represented in which some saw an unprecedented process of brutalization (Mosse, 1999) in the rush to Africa that preceded it. The European nations (particularly France, Great Britain and Germany) engaged in fierce competition on the continent, each determined to garner as much territory as possible, but they also frequently committed brutal acts to suppress Indigenous resistance, such as the Herero and Nama massacres in South West Africa (now Namibia), which gave rise to concentration camps and is now considered as the first genocide of the twentieth century (Lindqvist, 1998).

All things considered, it is therefore impossible to truly appreciate Western modernity, which developed from the end of the fifteenth century, without Africa. Whether economically or politically, the African continent was the prominent place from which this modernity asserted and energized itself. It was seen as the sombre side of the seemingly more radiant face of Europe that had begun to display itself through the Enlightenment, serving as a guide to progress and the creation of nation-states as models of coexistence. Moreover, Africa was seen as a long-standing counterexample of this, embodying a humanity barely out of its youth, particularly in its equatorial regions, where a sort of ground zero of religious fervour prevailed, otherwise called 'fetishism', and where history was deemed not to have given rise to any major advances (Hegel, 1965). The vestiges of this counterexample were highlighted during the colonial exploitations of the nineteenth century, with the European powers justifying such enterprises. According to their ideologies, Europeans had reached a high level of civilization

and it would therefore bring humanity's development to the African peoples, who were still considered to be at a primitive stage of development and thus inferior, bringing them under their control.

However, shortly after being placed in this position of inferiority by the propagandists of colonization, and by a certain branch of science seeking to prove the inequality of the human races (Reynaud Paligot, 2006), the aftermath of the First World War mobilized the European literary and artistic avant-garde, leading to their scathing criticism of Western society. Insofar as Europe had dragged many of the world's peoples into unspeakable carnage and had sunk into a deep 'baseness' (*bassesse*) – to use André Breton's terrible word (Breton, 1930) – it was Europe that was ultimately inferior and the barbarian, not Africa. According to these avant-garde movements, on the contrary, Africa was judged capable of rehumanizing a Western society that had seriously undermined its own ideals of progress and its pretention to export them worldwide.

Instead of fetishes, long considered exemplary embodiments of superstition or some form of devilry, objects from Africa (masks, statuettes, ivory sculptures, etc.) were elevated to the rank of 'Negro art' while serving as models for what was becoming a veritable aesthetic revolution (Fauvism, Cubism, etc.) in painting and sculpture. But this vast inversion of values was even stronger when, in the wake of the Great War, together with the many dances and music, especially jazz, invented by the descendants of slaves in United States, several great names in literature from the Harlem Renaissance movement converged onto Europe. Black boxers were also in the spotlight. First came the American Jack Johnson at the outbreak of hostilities and, when they ended, came the Franco-Senegalese Battling Siki¹, both became heavyweight and middleweight world champions, respectively.

In other words, Africa, after several centuries of playing a major role in the rise of Western modernity, had finally installed itself at its heart, subverting it to a greater or lesser extent, and enriching it with its own cultural productions. More precisely, it is a certain Africanity, emerging from these 'new worlds' and conquered by Europe since the fifteenth century, which ultimately asserted itself and gained recognition on both sides of the Atlantic. Africa took on a global dimension, as strongly expressed by Léopold Sédar Senghor, towards 'the civilization of the universal' (Senghor, 1964). Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Alioune Diop founded the group and the magazine *Présence Africaine*, which circulated between Dakar and Paris. It was exactly

1 Under his real name Baye Fall, he was originally from Saint-Louis in Senegal.

this Africinity, rich in cultures, artists, writers and athletes, and soon its great political leaders, that was brought to the world's attention.

In fact, politically, it had manifested itself much earlier, even before the First World War, just as the colonial conquests of Africa by Europe were being completed. Indeed, it was in London in 1900, that a kind of global Africinity first emerged under the name of Pan-Africanism² during a conference that brought together representatives from the Americas, the Caribbean and Africa. This movement grew stronger over the decades thanks to the organization of other major congresses.

At these congresses, the most important of which took place just after the end of each of the two World Wars (Paris in 1919 and Manchester in 1945), there was a clear rejection of racial inequality, as theorized by Western scientists and ideologues. Indeed, there was a desire to recognize the value and dignity of the Black world, wherever it might be found, and it strongly challenged the colonial and post-slavery world order that had made it subordinate and discriminated against.

Moreover, if we look at things more closely, and even if the European colonizations of the African continent had not yet begun, the first signs of this global Africinity were already emerging during the nineteenth century with the creation of Liberia. Its creation had been outlined since the 1820s by the American Colonization Society, with Edward Wilmot Blyden of Saint Thomas (in the Caribbean) playing a leading role. A militant, long before Marcus Garvey, another Caribbean who fought for the return of freed slaves to Africa from the Americas ('Back to Africa'), as exemplified by Liberia, Blyden anticipated the Afrocentrism of Cheikh Anta Diop in believing that Africa was the cradle of civilization and that Egypt was its cornerstone. It could be said that Blyden was the first in a long line of figures, often from the Caribbean, who were particularly well educated, mostly authors of leading works, who were engaged in the defence of the Black world. For a century (1850-1950), they embodied a real cosmopolitanism by moving between three continents (America, Europe and Africa) and making both global and political sense of the various Black conditions that prevailed. After him, other grand figures would follow: the Trinidadian Henry-Sylvester Williams, the Afro-American William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, and the Haitian Anténor Firmin, the Franco-Senegalese Blaise Diagne, the Jamaican Marcus Garvey, and two more Trinidadians,

2 The Trinidadian and lawyer Henri-Sylvester Williams was responsible for the invention of the word and the initiative for this conference with Haitian figures like Benedito Sylvain (Geiss, 1974).

George Padmore and Cyril Lionel Robert James, who would take over and give more breadth and cultural and political content to this cosmopolitanism. While, for many of them (Du Bois, Padmore, James), their activism and their ability to travel between continents was closely related to their affiliation to the international communist movement and its various trends, they were nonetheless activists for the Black cause, for an Africanity which would free itself from the dominations and injustices it had long suffered. In its own way, the Negritude movement, led by Aimé Césaire, Léon-Gontran Damas and Léopold Sédar Senghor, translated an emancipatory desire into a French-speaking register. Yet, it also expressed its debt to the great English-speaking figures, especially Du Bois and his masterpiece, *The Souls of Black Folk*, published in 1903, as well as the Harlem Renaissance movement, rich in its diverse artistic productions.

By 1945, and the last great Pan-African congress outside Africa held in Manchester, the prospects of emancipation were all the stronger politically because they were fuelled by a century-old history of intellectual, cultural and militant movements between the Americas, Europe and Africa. It was as if this world system, set up at the end of the fifteenth century, found itself shaken up and even subverted by the descendants of those who were subjected to the slave trade through European colonization, and who were now travelling more freely and able to take history in the other direction by revisiting the links that had severely torn it apart.

However, with the onset of independence at the turn of the 1960s, these prospects for emancipation were only very partially realized. Instead of the Pan-African project, which had emerged strongly after the Second World War (such as through the political movement known as the African Democratic Rally) and had challenged the borders drawn by European colonizers in order to build a common African world – a sort of United States of Africa – we saw the establishment of nation-states modelled on those borders. This led to the failure of certain attempts at unification, such as the short-lived Mali Federation, which was supposed to bring together Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey. But, despite its ‘Balkanization’, barely counterbalanced by the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and despite the establishment of authoritarian state powers and the first military coups, the Africa of the first two decades of independence nonetheless embodied a certain Third-World hope, particularly through the implementation of original socialist development experiments combining Marxist associations and references to traditional African solidarities. In other words, through remarkable leaders, embodied notably by Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame

Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, Africa – or more specifically a certain Africinity – strongly intensified its presence on the world stage, continuing the work that had been so successfully carried out by the great African-American and Afro-Caribbean figures of the Black cause.

It should be added that this Africinity was all the more sustained because it had taken place between the two World Wars, and it was supported by original cultural productions, particularly through the creation of musical styles resulting from hybridization and exchanges between the Americas (notably Cuba), Europe and Africa. This was evidenced by the successes of highlife, born on the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana) and *juju* music in Nigeria, even before independence, or even those of the Afro-Cuban beats that would give rise to the famous Congolese rumba (*soukous*), the audience for which grew constantly over the post-war decades. Closely linked to the development of African modernity, as seen in the formation of cities, through the salaried workers and entertainment venues, these musical styles gained even more momentum in the early 1970s with the invention of afrobeat, which made Nigerian musician, Fela Aníkúlápó Kuti, a global star and an activist defending the cause of Black people, especially the voiceless masses suffering under the tyranny of rulers and the powerful. Added to this, at the same time, was the global success of reggae. Associated with the Rastafarian religious movement, it reconnected the Caribbean, particularly Jamaica, with Africa, just like Blyden and Garvey had imagined when they invited Afro-descendants to return to their homeland.

However, economically, Africa has once again, and more recently, found itself on the front line, this time under so-called neoliberal globalization. Indeed, this was implemented very early on through the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which began in the 1980s and expanded after the fall of the Berlin Wall, drastically reducing the expenditure of African states in order to force them to privatize entire swathes of their economies and public policies. This was followed by an increase in poverty and a succession of major socio-political crises (as well as epidemiological crises, such as HIV, which would in some countries reach prevalence rates of 20 per cent), placing Africa in the global media spotlight. The 1990s, therefore, saw the continent become the centre for the deployment of humanitarian aid and NGOs in ever-increasing numbers. Generally, the countries of the North took action in both emergency situations and local development projects so that most African states could carry out larger projects on a national scale. However, these SAPs also resulted in increased mobility towards the interior of the continent, but mostly to Europe or other regions of the world, which particularly affected younger generations.

Following the long period of the slave trade, another history of African diasporas would begin at the turn of the new millennium, making Africa a key player in the various flows (commercial, financial, technological, demographic, etc.) that were becoming intertwined with neoliberal globalization. While there is no doubt that contemporary history seems to echo the past, marked in turn by numerous trials and lives sacrificed along migratory routes, Africa, especially its youth, is nonetheless projecting itself onto the world, driven by the desire to reinvent its place and to fully participate.

During these journeys to places where they eventually settled, at least temporarily (Bredeloup, 2014), migrants acquired knowledge, experiences and skills on local ways of life, in the linguistic field, or in any field that was likely to offer opportunities for work and earn money. For example, with China's strong presence in Africa, in terms of access to its raw materials, investments in its infrastructures and through Chinese nationals engaged in business activities there, many Africans also traded with China, learning Mandarin and even studying in China.

In other words, beyond Europe, which is still an important destination for African migration, Africans are now part of a post-Western world, a multipolar world that is much less dominated than it was by the Atlantic economy and its planetary hegemony in the early days of circumnavigation. While Africa remains a highly coveted continent for its natural resources, it undoubtedly derives more advantages than disadvantages from the increasingly fierce competition between the many countries and multinationals seeking access to them.

The proliferation of very prosaic interests in Africa and its projection through migration to the four corners of the globe is certainly one of the major aspects of the current globalization. However, in this cross-movement, we are also seeing a new presence of Africa in the world that can be discovered in other ways than through economic or demographic flows (Dozon, 2015). In the same way that, during the time of the slave trade, cultural systems such as *voduns* and *orishas* crossed the Atlantic to become *candomblé* in Brazil or *santaria* in Cuba. There are also religious phenomena born in Africa during the colonial period that are now well established in several regions of the world. This is particularly the case with the Mouride brotherhood which, after establishing itself in Senegal, is now present in Europe, the United States and Asia, especially in China. Another example is the African independent church founded by the prophet Simon Kimbangu at the time of the Belgian Congo and which, similarly, has branched out over the last twenty years into Europe and other continents. In terms of cultural productions, we can include the importance of African artists in the growth of contemporary

art, well after Black art served to criticize Western modernity. Closely related to an Africa which, out of necessity, was able to develop a large informal economy that has led to the invention of many small trades, deployed with skilful abilities to recycle materials and industrial artefacts, often turned into popular art themselves (photography, shop signs, murals, vehicle decoration). This African aesthetic, made from various mediums and processes of hybridization and misappropriation, has now become a part of a global art which goes from one biennial to the next in the most prominent locations on the planet (Kasfir, 2000).

Through their multidimensional aspects (economic, religious, artistic), and without ever being cut off from the continent, African diasporas and circulations are not only multiplying their connections with the rest of the world, they are also shaping a true cosmopolitics, a global Africanity, and cultivating a very promising revival of the Pan-Africanism that fueled the African emancipation movement several decades ago.

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WHAT AFRICA CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE WORLD

Thaddeus Metz

Introduction: seeking an outward Africa

Africa has not been particularly outward over the past several centuries, by which I mean that a contributory relationship from Africa to other societies has not been salient. This has been so in two major respects.

First, nearly every African country was subjected to colonialism and other forms of oppression for a period of a few centuries. Africa was used – indeed exploited – mostly for its resources and labour. Being forced to give up material goods, such as minerals under the ground and workers above it, for the sake of other societies' lifestyles is not the same as sharing goods, perhaps even cultural ones, with them, which colonisers had come to appreciate. Indeed, in the colonial era, African cultures were at best ignored, and at worst denigrated and ostracized.

Second, since independence from colonialism, African societies, particularly those south of the Sahara desert, have tended to look inward, in the sense of wanting to recover what had been lost, to repair the wrongful harms that had been done, to distance themselves from any foreign influences (business or otherwise), and to seek 'African solutions for African problems'. In addition, former colonial powers, and probably most other countries, have viewed Africa as a place that must be helped, that is in need of 'development'. Both approaches are understandable, and some core elements of them are not unreasonable. However, they are both

ultimately one-sided. They lack the vision of Africa as a source of insight for the rest of the world, as being able to 'contribute meaningfully to global knowledge and civilization (Makgoba, 1998, p. 48).

This sort of outward orientation is important for Africa to nurture. For one, making visible contributions towards humanity's progress would be a natural source of esteem for the African psyche. For another, doing so would be meaningful for African peoples as a whole. It appears that in all long-standing large-scale societies, the meaning of life is thought to come particularly from helping others. Although great meaning might come from helping those related to you in some way (i.e. 'family first'), for most people, substantive meaning would also be conferred by helping others irrespective of their heritage or location. In addition, in the case of Africa, a kind of meaningful redemption would arguably come from healing the wounds of colonialism and then reaching out to help others (perhaps by preventing or healing similar kinds of ills); such a project would be analogous to an individual making something good from something bad earlier in one's life.

What, then, does Africa have to offer the world in addition to its material goods? South African Black consciousness intellectual, Steve Biko, responded thus: 'We believe that in the long run the special contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of human relationship. The great powers of the world may have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and military look, but the great gift still has to come from Africa – giving the world a more human face' (1971, p. 51). This view has been voiced by Africanists for more than one hundred years (for example, see Du Bois, 2007 [1897], 1924; Busia, 1962, p. 108; Mutwa, 1964, pp. 552, 691; Kaunda, 1967, p. 22; Iroegbu, 2007, p. 151).

Occasionally, their phrasings take the form of a prediction, and sometimes they seem to express an essentialism, deeming certain features to be inherent to Africans. However, these questionable points should not obscure what is a plausible and powerful claim, namely, that certain relational values that are characteristic of (not essential to) African societies would be (but not necessarily will be) beneficial for other societies to accept, or at least to respect as a potentially sound approach to life.

This chapter expounds Indigenous Afro-relational values and then considers how they might usefully be adopted when contemporary societies interact with each other. Specifically, the chapter notes the genuinely human or communal relationship that has been missing in the two contexts of globalization and international relations, and suggests a greater appreciation of this good by the rest of the world and what it would mean for all peoples.

In focusing on relational values and their implications for interaction across the globe, this chapter does not suggest that this is Africa's only contribution. Just as Africa has a gift to give, as some philosophers would abbreviate as 'the good' (morality, relationship), so it has additional gifts to bestow in the realms of 'the true' (knowledge, wisdom) and 'the beautiful' (the arts, creativity). These latter forms of contribution merit exploration, but they are beyond the scope of this chapter.

African relational values

This section presents a brief philosophical reconstruction of one major strand of moral thought that is salient among Indigenous African peoples. It is not intended to mirror the belief systems of any particular people or group but is rather a theoretical construction informed by perspectives commonly held by traditional Black societies. Furthermore, these perspectives are not meant to be essential nor restricted to, or solely representative of, African ethical views, and are instead put forth as having been particularly prominent over space and time, particularly in the sub-Saharan region.

As is well known by African scholars, Indigenous norms are often captured by maxims such as, 'a person is a person through other persons' and 'I am because we are' (for two examples, see Mbiti, 1990, pp. 106, 113; Mandela, 2013, p. 227). Explaining what these expressions mean for most sub-Saharanans will be a useful way to lay out relatively uncontested facets of relational salient values among traditional African peoples.

The above maxims have both descriptive and prescriptive elements that are intertwined in much traditional African thinking (see Wiredu, 1992). When it comes to describing human nature and, more generally, the way the world is, 'a person is a person through other persons' and 'I am because we are', they are meant to indicate that one's existence and identity as an individual necessarily depends on others. Generally speaking, one is essentially a person in a relationship with other people, such as members of a clan.

This chapter, however, focuses on evaluative and normative connotations of these sayings, of which the central one is that an individual's foremost aim in life should be to become a real person. Personhood is often thought to come in degrees: the more of a person one is, the better. For example, among Nguni speakers, such as Zulus, Ndebeles and Xhosas in Southern Africa, one's highest-order goal should be to exhibit *ubuntu*, literally 'humanness'. One should strive

to become a true human being or to live a genuinely human way of life. Such a perspective, in fact, is characteristic of Indigenous sub-Saharanans, as a useful survey of many African peoples' conceptions of humanness shows: 'In Africa, to be a human being is a project to be fulfilled by each individual. Being a human being is an ongoing process. Birth alone does not define humanity. One has to "become" a real *Muntu*. One becomes more fully human through one's "way of life", by behaving more ethically' (Nkulu-N'Sengha, 2009, p. 144; see also Menkiti, 2004).

If an individual failed to live morally, then traditional Africans would typically say of him that he is a 'zero-person' (Nkulu-N'Sengha, 2009, p. 144) or that he is 'not a person', in the same way as one might say that a jalopy is 'not a *real* car' (Gaie, 2007, p. 33). In more extreme cases of wrongdoing or wickedness, they would say that 'he is an animal' (Letseka, 2000, p. 186).

Such labels are not meant literally to the effect that an individual is no longer a human being in a biological sense and lacking full moral status. Instead of suggesting that an individual is not entitled to moral treatment from others, the terms are meant to indicate that the individual has failed to develop the valuable facets of his human nature, i.e. as one capable of moral excellence, and is instead living in a base manner, akin to a lower order of the world, such as the animal kingdom (Gyekye, 2010).

Now, one is to live humanly or become a real person 'through other persons'. In the first instance, this means that one exhibits other-regarding virtues, such as 'he is generous', 'he is peaceful', 'he is humble', 'he has respect for others' (Gyekye, 2010), and he is 'generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate' (Tutu, 1999, p. 34). A prominent suggestion about what all these and other virtues prominent in the African tradition have in common is that they are ways of communing with other persons or participating in harmonious relationships. To begin to understand what communion or harmony fundamentally amounts to, in terms of a philosophical ideal, consider these remarks from some renowned African theorists.

The Nigerian philosopher Segun Gbadegesin says of traditional Yoruba morality, 'Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards achieving the good of all' (1991, p. 65). Probably the most influential African political philosopher in the past twenty years, the Ghanaian Kwame Gyekye says:

A harmonious cooperative social life requires that individuals demonstrate sensitivity to the needs and interests of others.... Communitarian moral theory... advocates a life lived in harmony and cooperation with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the fate of the other.... (Gyekye, 1997, pp. 72, 76).

South African academic psychologist Nhlanhla Mkhize says, 'A sense of community exists if people are mutually responsive to one another's needs.... (O)ne attains the complements associated with full or mature selfhood through participation in a community of similarly constituted selves.... To be is to belong and to participate' (Mkhize, 2008, pp. 39, 40).

Lastly, the Kenyan historian of philosophy, Dismas Masolo, highlights what he calls the African values of 'living a life of mutual concern for the welfare of others, such as in a cooperative creation and distribution of wealth.... Feeling integrated with as well as willing to integrate others into a web of relations free of friction and conflict' (2010, p. 240).

These and other maxims from many other parts of Africa, about what it is to live harmoniously or to commune with others, evoke two recurrent themes (see Metz, 2017a). On the one hand, there is a relationship of *identity*, a matter of considering oneself part of the whole, sharing in the fate of others, belonging and participating, and integrating. On the other hand, there is reference to a relationship of *solidarity*, that is, being committed to the good of others, being sensitive to others' interests, responding to others' needs, and being concerned for the welfare of others.

The combination of the relationships of identity and solidarity, or, equally, of sharing a way of life with others and caring for their quality of life, is basically what English speakers mean by 'friendliness' or even 'love' in a broad sense. Hence, one can sum up one major swathe of traditional African thought about how to live this way: one should aim to become a real person, which one can do (only or mainly) by prioritizing communal, harmonious or friendly relationships. This philosophical analysis of ideas, recurrently associated with African morality, makes sense of Desmond Tutu's terse remarks of sub-Saharan values: 'We say, "a person is a person through other people". It is not "I think therefore I am". It says rather: "I am human because I belong." I participate, I share.... Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the *summum bonum* – the greatest good' (Tutu, 1999, p. 35).

These ideas are fairly uncontroversial when it comes to a large tract of African ethical thought. Living communally or harmoniously is central to exhibiting human excellence, particularly in the sub-Saharan tradition (although, again, this chapter makes no claim that it is the sole ground of all moral judgments). Note that this ethic makes good sense of several salient practices among Indigenous African peoples that are intuitively appealing, including (among

other things¹) the practices of collective harvesting and building, not leaving individuals to fend for themselves; resolving political disputes by giving all those affected a voice and seeking consensus among at least popularly appointed elders; enjoying an extended family, i.e. large networks of intimate relations and those who care for children; distributing wealth, so as to avoid great inequalities that would undermine meeting people's needs and thus risk fostering attitudes of envy and distance; and seeking reconciliation upon wrongdoing.

However, there are some contestations to note. For example, African thinkers differ when it comes to the question of precisely with whom or with what one is to harmonize or commune. Traditionally speaking, in order to develop personhood, it is clear that one must, first and foremost, commune with family members (Appiah, 1998) where, in an extended sense, that includes the 'living-dead', such as ancestors residing in an invisible realm on Earth (see Setiloane, 1976; Magesa, 1997; Murove, 2007). Some, more secularly inclined people these days, maintain that prizing harmonious relationships with other human beings, and perhaps with animals and other parts of nature, would be sufficient to live well.

Furthermore, there is disagreement among theorists whose views are informed by traditional African cultures about the ultimate reason to enter into communion with others. In the earlier example, Tutu suggests that doing so is a non-derivative and unsurpassable good. The Ugandan-based scholar of African religions, Peter Kasenene, seems to make a similar suggestion when he says that, 'in African societies, immorality is the word or deed which undermines fellowship' (Kasenene, 1998, p. 21). In contrast, others maintain that the value of communion or harmony, even if quintessentially African, is merely instrumental, to be sought solely as a reliable means either to enhance the vitality of one's society (Bujo, 1997; Magesa, 1997) or to realize the common good (Gyekye, 1997, 2010).

Regardless of whether communion is to be pursued as an end in itself or as an essential means to a value that is more basic, it is central to one large strand of Indigenous African thought about values. More specifically, a neat philosophical interpretation of at least the sub-Saharan moral tradition is that one should live in a way that prizes communal relationships with others, or that treats others as special by virtue of their relational ability to exhibit identity and solidarity with others. Such an approach on how to live differs from other long-standing moral traditions, such as Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam and Western liberal individualism. The rest of this chapter unpacks the Afro-communal

1 For these and other respects, and recurrent ways of life among traditional sub-Saharan peoples, see Metz (2017a).

principle in the context of two major issues that concern Africa's place in the world and, more generally, how societies should interact with each other in the twenty-first century.

Tempering globalization with communion

Globalization is a largely economic and cultural phenomenon that has arisen in the past 30 or 40 years. This chapter examines the value of communion and what it means for globalization. It argues that while some facets of globalization are welcome in the light of a prescription to live communally, others are not and should be changed and, where necessary, must be actively rebutted.

In general, globalization consists of greater integration of the various parts of the world, particularly when it comes to economics. The world has become more globalized, that is, materials from one part of it are transported to another; corporations based in one country open outlets in many others; people born in one country relocate to another for the purposes of work or education; products and services sold in one region are consumed in many others; barriers to markets have been lowered; and the currencies of different countries have themselves been subjected to global trade.

In the wake of these business-oriented forms of globalization, some more culturally-oriented ones have emerged. The latter include: information that was generated in one region becoming readily available (say, via the Internet) in another; music and other art forms originating in one locale being enjoyed or appreciated around the world; people from one culture traveling to another, different culture either to learn or to enjoy a holiday; and English becoming increasingly used in countries where it is not a first language.

The above description of globalization is largely neutral, in the sense of not using evaluative terminology to characterize it. However, implicit in the processes described are certain effects on people that require moral evaluation. Consider, now, the extent to which globalization is or is not consistent with African relational values, as spelled out in the previous section.

Taking the value of communion for granted, globalization of *some* kind is *prima facie* desirable. If what makes people special is their ability to relate, then there is some moral reason for them to do so, i.e. to foster cohesion between each other. A policy of isolation or self-reliance could be temporarily justified as a defensive response to aggression or other forms of subordination, but it is not the ideal. Instead, an ethic of communion prescribes interdependence and outreach, or at least

it welcomes, with hospitality, those who seek to engage on friendly terms. To take the example by Tutu: 'We are different so that we can know our need of one another, for no one is ultimately self-sufficient. A completely self-sufficient person would be sub-human' (Tutu, 1999, p. 214).

Furthermore, if one part of the world is enjoying certain goods, there is, on the face of it, reason for them to be shared with the rest of the world insofar as they would be of real benefit to it. The spread of smart mobile phones and Internet access, for example, were facilitated by a world market, and have arguably been good on the whole for a wide variety of different peoples and cultures.

However, the sort of economic and cultural integration that has taken place across the globe has unfortunately undermined communion in several serious ways. First, the rich have become astonishingly richer, to the point where it has recently been reported that just eight people own as much wealth as the bottom half of the world's population (Mullany, 2017). Although it is probably inaccurate to say that the poor have become poorer from globalization (particularly in the light of China's massive economic growth), it is likely the case that the poor are worse off than they could have been. Communing with people would mean distributing wealth in ways that meet their needs. It is inconceivable to flout the value of communion and amass riches that one does not need when faced with several hundreds of millions of people who suffer from hunger, illness and unemployment.

Of course, a number of rich individuals have given up major portions of their wealth. However, a global economic system that was communal would be such that they would not collect tens of billions of dollars in the first place. If that could not be prevented, without threatening other significant ways to meet others' needs, then at least others should not have to rely on the voluntary inclinations of the rich in order to meet their needs (including their own need to have something to share with others). A global taxation system of some kind appears essential to treat people as having dignity by virtue of their ability to be communed with and to commune.

The 'free trade' dimension of globalization, at least as practised so far, also has undermined communion. It is of course degrading for African countries to be told to open up their agricultural markets when European countries and the United States (notoriously) employ protectionist measures. However, note that a more just global order would require more than merely tit-for-tat, that is, a similar lowering of trade barriers. Instead, where Western farmers are, by and large, well off and African farmers are not, African governments should be allowed to protect their farmers, and Western governments should not interfere (see Moellendorf, 2009).

Another unwelcome effect of 'free trade' is the impact it can have on relationships within a country or region. Rather than export goods to the global market, African traders, or at least those who prize communion, would often prefer to make goods that would benefit their compatriots. There is something inherently wrong with a situation, such as in Togo, 'where in a country with coffee crops it is impossible to drink local coffee (there is only imported instant ones)' (Lubieniecka, 2013, pp. 11-12). Although all human persons matter insofar as they are by nature capable of communion, there is extra reason to serve those with whom one has actually communed. Therefore, a country that produces raw coffee beans, but lacks the technological means to process them, should go out of its way to acquire them, and other countries should enable it to do so. That would be a more fitting kind of aid than merely assisting farmers in 'developing' societies to compete on the world market.²

Another, more attractive kind of 'development' would be one that did not automatically reproduce the banking system that is prominent in the West. As many of those who have studied traditional African economies have pointed out, the profit motive has often conflicted with the prestige motive, namely, the intention to give without immediate expectation of net gain or even equivalent return (see Murove, 2009). In contrast to a private, profit-oriented banking model, it would be natural for those inspired by Indigenous African values to pool their resources and then loan them out, either without seeking interest, or at least on a profit-sharing basis for the many members of the scheme.³ Where globalization tends to standardize Western business practices, and typical development schemes seek to support them, Africa could instead create ones that are more communal in nature and inspire similar initiatives around the world.

For a final example of how globalization has been discordant, consider ways in which cultural homogenization and, specifically, Westernization are incompatible with communion and could be mitigated. Where people have, by and large, freely shared a way of life for a long while and it has become central to their self-conceptions, respect requires doing what one can to avoid undermining it. Too much of the English language and other forms of standardized art and architecture actually threatens people as members of cultural groups.

Why is it that an African airport plays Anglo-American music when it could feature local artists and enable visitors to purchase their recordings? Why

2 This example, the next one, and some others not mentioned here are in Metz (2017b).

3 See discussions of South African *stokvels* in Louw (2001, pp. 24-25), and of Senegalese *tontine* in Berg (2007, p. 552).

is the Radisson hotel in a given African city pretty much indistinguishable from what one would encounter in North America, when instead it could employ local architects and designers to impart African aesthetics, meanings and forms of engagement? Why does an African public television broadcaster pay for B-rate movies from Hollywood when it could find creative and inexpensive ways to produce local content, including teaching young people and the elderly how to conduct interviews and create short films? These examples from an African context are hardly unique; just consider the range of cities 'colonized' by McDonald's and Starbucks.

These suggestions on how globalization should be countered so as to protect and foster communion are unlikely to be viewed favourably by multinational corporations and the countries that profit from them. This means that African societies must be strategic and tenacious in the ways they negotiate the terms of economic engagement. A given sub-Saharan country is unlikely to be able to stand up effectively on its own. However, regional blocs are much more likely to be in a position to do so. Ideally, the African Union would develop standards for doing business that would apply to all its members. That way, a given corporation could not play African countries off against each other. A similar approach could be taken by Latin America.

Note that these suggestions are not a call for isolation from the world market, let alone from the rest of the world more generally. Self-reliance is unlikely to be effective in a world that is already so closely integrated, and, in any event, interdependence rather than independence is the moral ideal from the perspective of communion. Instead, these recommendations are an attempt to find ways of interacting with other countries that enable communion, both with them and within one's own country.

Towards more communal international relations

This section turns from economic and cultural issues, as affected by globalization, towards politics on the world stage. What could Africa teach the world about how organizations with political power, such as states, ought to relate to one another?

As briefly mentioned, it is likely that the value of communion was responsible for the sort of inclusive and even-handed decision-making that was common at the domestic level in traditional African societies (see Bujo, 1997, pp. 161-166; Gyekye, 1997, pp. 124-140; Wiredu, 2000). For example, it was routine for policy to be determined, not unilaterally by a king but rather by a group of

elderly people who had been popularly appointed and who sought to resolve conflicts in a way that would benefit everyone. Similarly, many Indigenous sub-Saharan peoples would seek to resolve conflicts of interest by hearing the views of any adult member of the community, and talking until consensus was achieved among them. Relational values of identity and solidarity make good sense of these practices. Widespread consultation and unanimous agreement would be particularly likely to instil a sense of togetherness and coordination, as well as the adoption of policies that would be good for everyone's sake, not leaning in favour of either a majority or a minority.

How might international relations be informed by a basic principle of prizing communion and the consensus-oriented approaches to decision-making? One possibility would be to seek consensus or at least a super-majority on key issues facing the United Nations, which – as is well known – currently tends to operate according to power blocs. Parties in search of unanimous agreements could be urged to point out non-negotiables and to offer constructive solutions in the light of the various necessary conditions mentioned. This negotiation technique was recently borrowed from Indigenous southern African peoples in order to resolve climate change disputes among nearly 200 countries in Paris (Rathi, 2015), and it merits extension to other global political contexts.

Perhaps consensus-seeking should also be required within a country before major shifts in the way it relates to another one, such as initiating a war against it (which the philosopher Uchenna Okeja has explored in his book, *Deliberative Agency: A Study in Modern African Political Philosophy*). Instead of a small group of executive branch elites deciding whether to attack another state or people, perhaps the elected representatives of those who will fight in the war and suffer its consequences should be constitutionally required to come to a unanimous agreement about whether to go to war. The suggestion is not that consensus would be sufficient to justify a military engagement or some other major change in policy with regard to another country, but that all those who have agreed to a certain decision might accept that they have made a mistake. Instead, the proposal is that a necessary condition for justifying a war or similar would be to obtain agreement from those representing *all* the people who have to bear its cost.

For a third and final example of how the principle of prizing communion might usefully guide global actors' political orientation towards each other, consider that Africa has already given a lesson to the world about how to respond to large-scale conflicts. Instead of seeking retribution in the form of trials and penalties, as befits the crimes, or deterrence in the form of retaliation,

those who exhibit enmity towards each other could strive for reconciliation, or as it is sometimes called, 'restorative justice'.

As alluded to above, at the domestic level a characteristic indigenous African approach to wrongdoing has been to seek to restore (or at least to create) harmonious relationships (see Aja, 1997; Idowu, 2006). It is no accident that reconciliation has been the key theme when looking at the ways that Zimbabwe, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Rwanda have dealt with gross human rights violations and other civil strife. Roughly speaking, sub-Saharan ideals of communion have grounded an approach to criminal justice, according to which those who have been extremely unjust ought to be given a chance to apologize, to make amends, by revealing the truth about their misdeeds and offering restitution for them, to become morally reformed (which could be achieved by means of punishment), and then to be reintegrated into society. This approach to conflict resolution has been particularly explored by South African theorists, activists and lawyers in respect of the country's influential Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see Tutu, 1999; Louw, 2006; Krog, 2008).

Although such commissions have so far mainly been employed in response to intra-national conflict, such as civil wars, there is no reason not to extend them to bitter and long-lasting international conflicts. How might reconciliation be achieved among, say, the Israelis and Palestinians, the Sunnis and Shias, or the Indians and Pakistanis? It is naturally to Africa that we pose such a question.

Conclusion

For the two topics of globalization and international relations, this chapter has noted Indigenous African communal values that have been missing in the twenty-first century and how a greater appreciation of them would be intuitively desirable. It has sought to avoid utopianism or to make suggestions that are impractical, while also trying to avoid prescriptions that are both obvious and easily made. Instead, it has sought something in between these extremes, offering recommendations about how societies should relate to one another so as to exhibit identity and solidarity that have not been salient in global debates and would take some effort, but that are also realistic. May this chapter spur the reader to come up with more suggestions of this nature, if not to help realize them in practice.

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THE ROLE OF AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS AND ARTISTS

Luis Kandjimbo

Introduction

The concept of the ‘dominant intellectual’ in African historiographic discourse is an offshoot of a Western model. Indeed, an analysis of theories developed by African scholars would reveal its limitations. This illustrates the spectrum of men and women of culture, writers, artists, filmmakers, musicians, philosophers, thinkers, teachers and researchers whose breadth of scope exceeds the limits of genealogy defined by one of the paradigms of Western modernity, that is, the triumphant predominance of graphocentric reason (Le Goff, 2000). This situation may be observed through recent historical research into the subject, for example, in the work of Ousmane Kane (2003)¹ on ‘non-Europhone intellectuals’. It allows us to acknowledge the existence of long-term pre-colonial African intellectual traditions, contemporaries of those constituting French historian Jacques Le Goff’s object of study (2000). In this sense, the successive generations in which these intellectual traditions may be observed structure an extensive narrative enclosing a crucial historical period, which

1 I agree with Ousmane Socé in considering that ‘*l’étude des intellectuels et du savoir europhones en Afrique sub-saharienne ne saurait se limiter à la seule tradition intellectuelle arabe ou ajami. Il faut également inclure les auteurs écrivant en langues africaines retranscrites en caractères latines.*’ [‘the study of intellectuals and Eurocentric knowledge in sub-Saharan Africa cannot be limited to the Arab or *Ajami* intellectual tradition alone. It must also include authors writing in African languages transcribed into Latin characters’] (Kane, 2003, p. 58).

– in the more general context of Global Africa – extends from the second half of the twentieth century to the dawn of the new millennium. The necessary process of conceptual decolonization should therefore spur the development of another concept, which is useful from an epistemological point of view. This concept is founded on a form of intention shared by individuals whose properties do not obey a logic, excluding the ‘other of reason’, and recognizing this mode of existence as distinct from a traditional intelligentsia or a traditional intellectual. The definition of the concept must therefore be both sociological and ontological (cf. Mafeje, 2005), encompassing musicians, painters, sculptors and filmmakers, as long as they reflect the condition characterizing the intellectual, whose effective existence may be identified by means of the cultural public policies of modern nations and whose production and implementation require the intervention of intellectuals and artists of Global Africa. The set of conventional normative instruments, approved during the second half of the twentieth century by the Organization of African Unity and the African Union, along with various United Nations agencies, confirms such a scenario, particularly in light of the apology made for the African rebirth at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

African intellectuals and artists’ agency

According to Joseph Ki-Zerbo’s pleasing definition, intellectuals constitute ‘motor groups’ in the context of alternative African modernity, playing, as they do, a decisive role by means of reflection and action, theory and practice (Ki-Zerbo, 2005, p. 78). They represent an elite, assuming the role of agents responsible for shifts in the cultural plane and in scientific investigation and teaching, with their activities prolonged in the diasporas of Global Africa. The set of references is based on four fundamental chronological frameworks, namely, those of Pan-Africanism, nationalism, political independence, and the process of political democratization. The first three periodological references – already dealt with in Volume VIII of the *General History of Africa* – are associated with the various generations to emerge and assume a leading role in an intellectual and cultural history, which paved the way for a landscape dominated by thought and practices, conforming to a new agenda in ideological terms. This chapter therefore covers the twentieth century, featuring an operative concept of the ‘intellectual’, which takes into account the pre-eminence of its social insertion in the following domains: politics, academic activity, theological reflection, literature, arts and music.

The role of the intellectual in the aforementioned domains underwent various shifts up until the time Africa's Portuguese-speaking countries gained independence, Southern Africa was liberated, and the waves of democratization began. This may be characterized by means of various collective attitudes and behaviours expressed in three phases known as the euphoria of liberation, disenchantment, and cultural rebirth (Mkandawire, 2005, pp. 10-55). As is known, the system of ideas sustaining Pan-Africanism and the form of nationalism stemming from a perspective of global Africanness have inspired intense activity among successive generations of intellectuals, including eminent politicians, writers, artists, researchers and university professors.

Various personalities became renowned for their work during the euphoria of liberation. This is the case for W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), 'the most towering intellectual of the black diaspora in the twentieth century' (Mazrui, 2003, p. 56), Jomo Kenyatta (1891-1978), Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906-2001), Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972), Alioune Diop (1910-1980), Aimé Césaire (1913-2008), Eduardo Mondlane (1920-1969), Agostinho Neto (1922-1979), Joseph Ki-Zerbo (1922-2006), Julius Nyerere (1922-1999), Cheikh Anta Diop (1923-1986), Amílcar Cabral (1924-1973), Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Mário Pinto de Andrade (1928-1990), and many others. The Pan-Africanist ideas and nationalist aspirations characterizing this era considered culture to be one of the most efficient means of revealing a singular ontology, referred to as the 'global African experience' by Abiola Irele (Irele and Gikandi, 2004, p. xvi). Founded in the French capital in 1947, with a publisher and bookshop of the same name, *Présence Afrique* is the finest example of a platform for theoretical and critical reflection, serving as the model for subsequent initiatives across the entire African continent and diaspora.

In terms of politics, one of the most significant initiatives made by Pan-African intellectuals was the creation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963. This historic moment marked the transition to state nationalism, the consecration of political solidarity and the triggering of struggles for national liberation on the continent, with the movement reclaiming civil rights within the American diasporas. Engagement among intellectuals – peaking in 'intellectualism' (Mazrui, 2003, p. 58) – can be seen in the level of support for the ruptures that provoked the independence won in 1958 in Guinea, followed by their involvement in the armed struggles for independence from Portuguese colonization from 1961 to 1974 in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Significant contributions were made by cultured men and women, writers and politicians, such as Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo Mondlane, and Deolinda Rodrigues (1939-1967).

In the academic sphere, the avant-garde was to be found in African universities where intellectuals also became involved by publishing important scientific works. The emergence of three historiographic centres for reflection across the continent also contributed to a revival of African Studies: the School of Dakar, the School of Ibadan, and the School of Dar es Salaam (Falola, 2004, pp. 228-253).

The School of Dakar was formed by Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Cheikh Anta Diop and Abdoulaye Ly. The publication of Cheikh Anta Diop's historiographic work shows its importance in its contribution to the fertile development of African Egyptology. It inspired new generations of historians on the scale of Global Africa, under the intellectual inspiration of Théophile Obenga, to undertake editorial and research initiatives, such as *Ankh - Revue d'Égyptologie et des Civilisations africaines*. The School of Ibadan, led by Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike (1917-1983), head of the Department of History of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, since 1954, comprised Saburi O. Biobaku (1918-2001), Jacob F. A. Ajayi (1929-2014), Adiele E. Afigbo (1937-2009), Tekena N. Tamuno (1932-2015) and Emmanuel A. Ayandele (1936-2014). Its contribution may be found in the exploration of new themes for legitimizing the institutionalization of the nationalist historiographic discourse and its teaching at the university. The School of Dar es Salaam was organized according to neo-Marxist currents of the time, with its headquarters in the Department of History at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with the contributions of Bethwell Allan Ogot (1929-2025), Isaria N. Kimambo (1931-2018), A. J. Temu, Gilbert K. Gwassa (1939-1982) and Walter Rodney (1942-1980), a historian of Guianese origin and fixed residence in Tanzania, particularly significant in the publication of the work *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972).

Next comes a heterogeneous, 'intermediate generation'² formed of professionals and specialists emerging in the 1980s from a wide range of knowledge areas in the space of Global Africa, covering all the sciences. In these areas, we see a growing presence of successful women of different generations, including Fatou Sow, Elisabeth Mudimbe-Boyi, Françoise Vergès, Aminata Diaw (1959-2017), Nkiru Nzegwu and Tanella Boni.

A significant event in terms of continental scientific production dates from this period, which is the creation of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Founded in 1973, CODESRIA is a non-governmental, not-for-profit Pan-African organization based in the Senegalese

2 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch uses the expression to refer to a generation of historians that formed the first three African historiographic schools of the twentieth century (Vidrovitch, 2013, pp. 111-127).

capital, Dakar. It aims to develop the social sciences and promote the research, publication and dissemination of works by African researchers, as well as to defend freedom of thought, to incentivize African inter-university cooperation, and to offer a balanced representation in terms of gender and geographical and linguistic origin. In 1990, academic freedom became subject to the Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility³, which was approved on 29 November at the symposium held by CODESRIA in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, attended by delegates and representatives from the African intellectual community. In terms of the African continent's social, political and economic context at the time, the Kampala symposium served as an important milestone in its intellectual history.⁴ As mentioned earlier, philosophical and theological thought constituted another field that revealed the talents of African intellectuals, asserting their presence at the highest levels of academic performance. Philosophical currents of thought and theological traditions of institutional dignity and academic legitimacy have been developed by means of specific reflections, with continental African theologians and the diasporas examples of this, thus contributing to the shaping of a modern theology (Ford, 2005).

The prolonged euphoria of independence sparked equally important repercussions in the development of the artistic experience, from the visual arts to music, cinema, photography, dance and theatre. Moreover, from the 1980s, the history of contemporary African art began to conquer new platforms, emerging from initiatives held on the continent. Markets and channels of distribution opened up to a wide range of cultural production, including books, cinema, music, theatre, dance and the fine arts. Examples include the Harare Book Fair, the African Music Festival (KORA), the Pan-Africa Music Festival, Brazzaville (FESPAM), the Pan-African Dance Festival (FESPAD) in Kigali, the Ouagadougou Cinema Festival (FESPACO), the Carthage Film Festival, the Cairo Biennial, Bamako Encounters African Photography Biennale, the Dakar Biennale (Dak'Art), the Johannesburg Biennale, CICIBA (International Centre for Bantu Civilizations) Fine Art Award, the Cultural Industry Fair (Abidjan), the Abidjan Market for Performing Arts, not to mention events with a more reflective slant held by CODESRIA.

3 On 19 April 1990, delegates from Tanzania's higher education unions approved the Declaration of Dar es Salaam on American Freedoms and Universities' Social Responsibilities (Mamdani and Diouf, 1994, pp. 388-398).

4 In the words of Mamadou Diouf, '... la rencontre de Kampala a marqué un tournant décisif dans l'histoire intellectuelle africaine, ...' [the Kampala meeting marked a decisive turning point in Africa's intellectual history...] (ibid. p. 367).

Contemporary visual artists

After the first Biennale of Contemporary Art organized by CICIBA in 1985 in the city of Libreville, Gabon, the participation of artists from Global Africa alongside Western artists in the *Magiciens de la Terre* exhibition held at the Georges Pompidou Centre in Paris in 1989, marked a shift in consciousness, highlighting the perspective produced in Europe's capitals, the Americas, Asia and Oceania. Other exhibitions were held during the period from 1990 to 2005, such as *Contemporary African Art: Changing Traditions* (in New York, 1990), *Africa Explores* (in New York, 1991), *Africa Hoy* (in the Canary Islands, 1991), *Out of Africa* (in London, 1992), *African Art Now: Urban Cultures from Africa* (in Tokyo, 1993), *Fusion: Artists from Western Africa* (at the Venice Biennale, 1993), *Documenta 11* (Kassel, Germany, 2002), *African Art Now* (in Houston, 2005), and *Africa Remix* (in Düsseldorf, London, Paris and Tokyo, 2005). As a consequence, collectors began to increase orders and visit the workshops of African artists, such as Chéri Samba in Kinshasa, Frédéric Bouabré in Abidjan, Seni Camara in Casamance, Georges Adéagbo in Cotonou, Georges Lilanga in Dar es Salaam, Vítor Teixeira (Viteix), António Ole, Jorge Gumbé and Francisco Van and Masongi Afonso in Luanda, and Alberto Chissano (1935–1994) and Nguib in Maputo.

In the 1990s, innovative artistic practices emerged, reviving traditional techniques for recycling materials and enriching the language of the fine arts with the introduction of installations and traditional mural painting (cf. Sylla, 1998, pp. 48–65). A revival of decorative techniques soon came to the fore by means of the polychromatic works of South African artist Esther Mahlangu, inspired by the Ndebele mural tradition. Installations seeking to explore the fine art virtualities of cave painting in an urban context found a pioneer in António Olé (Angola), as well as in the works of Yinka Shonibare (United Kingdom), who uses a mixed technique involving the application of wax and the use of structurally anthropomorphic dummies. Further ruptures in the language of artists from Global Africa also occurred, as represented by Seni Awa Camara's terracotta sculptures and António Magina's stone sculptures (1963–2011, Angola), and in the iconographic and calligraphic discourse produced by Frédéric Bruly Bouabré (1923–2014, Côte d'Ivoire), Jean-Michel Basquiat (1960–1988, USA) and William Wilson (Togo) (cf. Oguiibe, 2004, pp. 18–19).

Different generations of African photographers also occupy a prominent place in the historical narrative that is being woven on the continent. The Mozambican photographer Ricardo Rangel (1924–2009) records the marks of colonialism and

the birth of his independent country. For French-speaking countries, Malian Malick Sidibé (1936–2016) is one of the most important revelations of the Bamako Biennale of Photography. Critical discourse on contemporary African arts did however attain new levels of legitimacy upon its consecration in the 1970s with the institutionalization of specialist academic training and the constitution of the first sub-Saharan section of the International Association of Art Critics (AICA) in 1972 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly known as Zaire. In the decades to come, such an initiative would come to merge with the publication of specialist journals such as *Revue Noire* (Paris), *Nka* (New York) *Glendora* and *The Eye* (Nigeria) and *Gallery* (Zimbabwe), with the period also witnessing the emergence of African curators.⁵ By means of a contest among the various existing African sectors, the International Association of Art Critics organized a conference in the UK in 1996 on Art Criticism and Africa, with the participation of three African countries: Nigeria, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The 2001 publication of *Anthologie de l'Art Africain du XXe Siècle* by N'Goné Fall and Jean Loup Pivin in 2001, and the work organized by Olu Oguibe and Okwui Enwezor in 1999 entitled *Reading the Contemporary: African Art from Theory to the Marketplace*, and in 1997, Jean-Godefroy Bidima's *L'Art Nègro-Africain* represent efforts to respond to questions raised ten years after the *Magiciens de la Terre* exhibition on transformations to the universe of contemporary arts in Global Africa.

Filmmakers, dramatists and the performance arts

The history of cinema in Africa dates back to the 1960s when its precursors engaged in the medium for the first time. Paulin Soumanou Vieyra (1925–1987), Ousmane Sembène (1923–2007), Oumarou Ganda (1935–1981) and Moustapha Alassane laid the foundation, simultaneously engaging in reflection on the occasion of a lecture on documentary filmmaking held in 1966 in Vienna at the Dakar World Festival of Black Arts (FESMAN), as well as at the Carthage Cinematography Days and the Argel Pan-African Festival (PANAF). The Senegalese took on a leading role, with Paulin Soumanou Vieyra making the first film on immigration, *Afrique sur Seine* (1954), and Ousmane Sembène

5 Olu Oguibe believed the 1990s were productive because of the growing number of European and US institutions that requested intervention by African critics in the compiling of exhibition catalogues, providing opportunities for the use of the word (Oguibe, 1997, p. 103).

producing *Borom Sarret* (1963). The period culminated with the founding of the Ouagadougou Festival of Cinema and Television (FEPACI) in 1970.

Among English-speaking countries, cinematographic production was rather scarce. In Nigeria, Ola Balogun led an emerging group of filmmakers with 1972's *Alpha*, followed by musicals such as *Music Man* (1976), *The Rise and Fall of Dr Oyenusi* (1978), *Black Goddess* (1979), *Aiye* (1981), and *Cry Freedom* (1982). It was in the 1980s that cinema got into its stride with output from across the continent's different regions, with a new generation reviving the language of cinema and its subjects with a wave of new films, such as *Yeelen* (1987) by Souleymane Cissé, which was recognized at the Cannes Film Festival, *Yaba* (1989) and *Tilai* (1990) by Idrissa Ouédraogo (1954-2018), *Finzan* (1989) by Cheick Oumar Sissoko, *Bal Poussière* (1988) by Henri Duparc (1941-2006), *Zan Boko* (1988) by Gaston Kaboré, *Sarraouina* (1987) by Med Hondo (1936-2019), *Heritage Africa* (1988) by Kwaw Ansah, and *Sankofa* (1993) by Haile Gerima, winning the grand prize at the African Film Festival in Italy and the best photography award at FESPACO.

This period also saw the establishment of cinema produced in Africa's Portuguese-speaking countries, with an outpouring of documentaries and narrative films. Many names stand out. Indeed, Angola's film industry is one of the biggest in Africa. The number of short and feature-length fiction films is proof of this, as can be seen in the filmography of some of its filmmakers, such as Ruy Duarte de Carvalho (1941-2010) with *Nelisita* (1983), Orlando Fortunado with *Comboio da Canhoca* (1989), and Zézé Gamboa with *Mopiopio* (1991). Kuxa Kanema is the documentary production project that, between 1978 and 1979, opened up a new cinematic discourse in Mozambique, of which Camilo de Sousa is its most representative filmmaker. Of all the filmmakers in the Portuguese-speaking area, Flora Gomes from Guinea-Bissau received the most awards. His movie *Mortu Nega* (1988), a story about the liberation struggle in Guinea Bissau, won the Oumarou Ganda prize at FESPACO the following year.

The 1982 publication of *Manifesto de Niamey* revealed African filmmakers' position on the problems affecting the continental cinema market, demanding governments make changes to legislation on national film policies. Significant shifts then occurred in the field, with South African film emerging onto the continental circuit in the 1990s upon Nelson Mandela's release and the fall of Apartheid. Nigeria also became the centre of one of the most extraordinary success stories in the audiovisual industry with the explosion of what is known as 'Nollywood', featuring films that go straight to video, with a much-documented effect on the Nigerian economy. Audience numbers were strong across the

continent thanks to subtitles in official European languages and for taking into account distribution channels that expanded to satellite TV channels. The volume of business was significant, in a production chain involving both direct and indirect employment.

Dozens of years after the creation of the first traditional African ballet companies in Guinea and Senegal, university research and teaching produced a wave of new dance and theatre productions, with plays written in African and European languages, and representing an African theatre aesthetic at international festivals. While university theatre companies drew interest from urban elites in Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia in the 1970s, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of dramatists, directors and choreographers with an interest in a theatrical and performance practice acquired from new tastes. Significant strides were made in West Africa, such as in Mali and Burkina Faso, with Ousmane Sow's Kotéba National Ballet and Prosper Kompaore's At  lier-Th   tre Burkinabe⁶. Another example is Congo Brazzaville's Rocado Zulu Theatre founded by Congolese writer and dramatist Sony Labou Tansi (1947-1995), which received international renown at French festivals and thus contributed to the artistic decade with its international impact. Initiatives creating professional contemporary dance companies also abounded as a means of applying choreography from research into traditional African dance, as conducted in the performative arts departments of the continent's universities and in the African diasporas. In addition, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, digital art also became an important tool for the renewal of African artistic practices and languages.

Musicians

The internal flux of Global African musical currents, sometimes established in an intermittent fashion between the continent and its diasporas located on the eastern, Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, remained active for centuries, with soul, funky, rap, salsa, samba and reggae as iconic twentieth-century examples of the phenomenon. The ongoing dialogue with other dominant musical styles peaked with the Osibisa music group. Formed in London in 1969 by four immigrants from the African continent and three from the Caribbean, they produced their own eclectic style of music. With a wide-ranging discography and a spectacular history of performances held across every continent, the

6 *Notre-Librairie*, No. 75-76 (July-October 1984), pp. 135-41; and *Notre-Librairie*, No. 101 (April-June 1990).

group exerted a strong influence on new generations of African musicians, maintaining this influence up until the dawn of the current century. As the most recent of the musical styles to have originated from the African diaspora in Jamaica, reggae is also an expression of vitality, with one of its brightest stars, Bob Marley, participating in the performance marking the Zimbabwean Declaration of Independence in 1980. Afro-reggae represents a continental interpretation of the genre, with Alpha Blondy (Côte d'Ivoire) its lead figure.

In East Africa, *taarab* best represents the dialogue between Asia and the Middle East via North and East Africa. In the 1980s, the rhythm originating from Oran in northern Algeria, deeply rooted in the music of Bedouin shepherds and known as *raï*, gained international renown, thanks to the eclecticism characterizing its best performers. Cheb Khaled came to enjoy international fame, particularly with the album *Kutché* (1988), as did other Algerian musicians such as Houari Benchenet, Raïna Raï, Mohamed Sahraoui, Cheb Mami and Cheb Hamid. Across the continent as a whole, music came to be intrinsically associated with dance, achieving fame on a global level.

In Kinshasa, a wave of rhythms and dances emerged known as *soukous*, *kwassa-kwassa*, *ndombolo* and *tchatcho*, going on to conquer African, European, American and Asian audiences in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to artists such as Papa Wemba (1949-2016), M'bilia Bel, Yondo Sister, Madilu System, Awilo Longomba, Aurlus Mabele, Koffi Olomide, and the band Viva la Musica, as well as guitarists such as the Congolese Diblo Dibala and the Malagasy Freddy de Majunga. The fertile nature of African music, characterized by 'the musician's role as a social critic' (Kouvouama et al., 2007, p. 183), helped future generations spur a revival across the entire continent, paving the way for a re-evaluation of traditional musical instruments. Such a revival was also behind the cultural and artistic phenomena to have occurred in Southern Africa at the end of the twentieth century, as a consequence of the cycle of political independence initiated with Angola and Mozambique, and followed by Zimbabwe and Namibia and the fall of Apartheid.

The lamellophone instrument from Southern Africa known as the *mbira*, assumed an unprecedented importance in this context, driving the growing renown of Mozambican groups and female Zimbabwean singers, such as Stella Chiweshe, Irene Chigamba and Chiwoniso Maraire (1976-2013). Chimurenga, the Zimbabwean political music genre cultivated by Thomas Mapfumo, came about in a similar fashion, as did the fusion of other rhythms by Oliver Mtunkudzi (1952-2019). From Luanda, the cosmopolitan urban rhythms and dances of Kizomba and Semba appeared. In 1980s Mozambique, a similar phenomenon

occurred with *marrabenta*, a genre of music and dance appreciated in urban environments and made particularly popular by the voice of Fany Pfumo (1928–1987) combining South African influences with an international engagement thanks to the Orchestra Marrabenta Star de Moçambique.

Showbusiness demands provided opportunities for the emergence of artists whose music satisfied audiences from a wide range of backgrounds, exemplified by guitarist Remmy Ongala of Congolese origin, whose style of social-political commentary rang out across stages in East Africa, as well as Ray Lema (Democratic Republic of the Congo), a pianist and skilled experimentalist, and singers such as Cesària Évora, 1941–2019 (Cape Verde), Angélique Kidjo (Benin), Bonga (Angola) and Youssou N'Dour (Senegal), who have all staged international tours.

Writers

The question of what might constitute the Pan-African spirit came to dominate the poetic and narrative landscape of the continent's literature scene after the first decade of independence. Three Ghanaian authors best illustrate this, through the 1965 publication of Ama Ata Aidoo's play *The Dilemma of a Ghost*, which explores the marriage between two children of Africa separated by nothing more than the Atlantic Ocean. Ayi Kwei Armah's 1972 novel *Why Are We So Blest?* strikes a similar note. With his 1973 book of poems entitled *Ride Me, Memory*, Kofi Awoonor (1935–2013) weaves a poetic lyricism focused on the dramas of an experience in the US.

In the 1960s and 1970s, writers expressed the collapse of the dream of independence through a literary output that reflects the disenchantment and dilemmas of nationalist intellectual elites under authoritarian political regimes. The leading work in this genre comes from West Africa, with the 1965 publication of Nigerian Wole Soyinka's novel *The Interpreters*, followed in 1966 by Chinua Achebe's (1930–2013), *A Man of the People*, a satire on corruption, and in 1968 by Ghanaian author Ayi Kwei Armah and his novel, *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born*. The tone of literary discourse shifted gradually as the condemnation of neocolonialism, political violence and the depraved nature of the political elites came to take centre stage in the continent's literature, such as in David Rubadiri's (1930–2018) 1967 work, *No Bride Price*, Robert Serumaga's (1939–1980) 1969 work *Return to the Shadows*, Peter K. Palangyo's (1939–1993) 1968 work *Dying in the Sun*, Leonard Kibera's 1970 novel *Voices in the Dark*,

Alioum Fantouré's 1973 work *Le Cercle des Tropiques*, Ghanaian playwright Joe de Graft's (1924-1978) 1976 play *Muntu*, and Ngugi wa Tiongo's 1977 novel, *Petals of Blood*. The dramaturgical and narrative discourse with a political stamp came to the fore in African literature of the 1980s with the publication of works such as Wole Soyinka's play, *A Play of Giants* (1984) and Chinua Achebe's 1987 novel, *Anthills of the Savannah*.

Feminist discourse is also a vehicle for denunciation, whose echo resonates particularly strongly in the work produced by an influential group of writers, such as Efua Sutherland (1924-1996) with *Edufa* (1967), Ama Ata Aidoo with *Anowa* (1969), Flora Nwapa (1931-1993) with *Idu* (1969), and Mariama Bâ (1929-1981) with *Une Si Longue Lettre* (1979).

In the French language space, Yambo Ouologuem (1940-2017) and Ahmadou Kourouma (1927-2003) made significant contributions with the publication of two seminal novels on autocratic regimes and dictatorial powers, *Le Devoir de Violence* (1968) and *Les Soleils des Indépendances* (1968), respectively. The subject was to be revived in the following decade in works by new authors, such as *Le Bel Immonde* (1976) by V. Y. Mudimbe, *Les Crapauds-brousse* (1979) by Tierno Monénembo and *La Vie et Demie* (1979) by Sony Labou Tansi.

During the period prior to the liberation of the Maghreb region, activity among intellectuals focused on a valorization of Arab and Berber cultures, with the use of the French language an expression of the instrumental harnessing of a European language. The literary successes of writers such as Mohammed Dib (1920-2003, Algeria), Kateb Yacine (1929-1989, Algeria), Driss Chraïbi (1927-2007, Morocco) and Albert Memmi (1920-2020, Tunisia) paved the way for later generations of writers and intellectuals of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, with such standout names as Abdelkébir Khatibi (1938-2009), Tahar Ben Jelloun, Rachid Boudjedra, Rachid Mimouni (1945-1995) and Tahar Djaout (1954-1993). The various literary generations of the Maghreb also feature female voices, such as Assia Djebar (1936-2015) and Aïcha Lemsine. A reflection on modernity and its connections with the Arab world in Africa finds its champion in Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (1935-2010), Moroccan philosopher and professor at the University of Rabat, who concluded in his book *Introduction to the Critique of Arab Reason* that modernity should differ according to its space and historical experience, with European modernity therefore differing from Chinese modernity, for example. The development of a defensible concept of modernity in Africa in the twenty-first century will therefore be based on two pillars: the universalism of the human condition and the relativism of human knowledge.

It was in 1978 that Agostinho Neto, intellectual, poet and president of the Republic of Angola, one of the countries to have emerged in the armed struggle for national liberation in the 1970s, expressed his dissatisfaction with the African continent's deplorable circumstances in a speech at the OAU summit in Khartoum. Neto declared: 'Today Africa is like a motionless body, and every carrion vulture is anxious to tear a piece out of that body' (Neto, 1979). Neto also rejected the blind adoption of the aesthetic models favoured by communist countries, such as socialist realism (Neto, 1982). However, the situation did inspire Angola's writers to form an association, the Union of Angolan Writers, in 1975, the year the country became independent. Iconic literary works were published, some of which exploited urban social satire. This was the case for Manuel Rui's novella, *I Wish I Were a Wave* (1982) (Rui, 1999). Others uncovered the contradictions characterizing the dilemmas and psychology of organic and guerrilla intellectuals during the armed struggle, such as the case of Pepetela's *Mayombe* (1980) and *The Utopian Generation* (1990). A condemnation of the excesses of authoritarian power is also represented in *Os Anões e os Mendigos* (*Dwarfs and Beggars*, 1984), a novel by Manuel dos Santos Lima, or *Maio Mês de Maria* (*May, Month of Mary*, 2001) by Boaventura Cardoso. Generations of writers and intellectuals came to draw on the liberation of Lusophone Africa from Portuguese colonialism. By introducing interpretations of experiences that had previously been ignored, new waves of intellectuals were also produced in the run-up to the 1990s, featuring women of culture and writers from Portuguese-speaking Africa, with works published by Deolinda Rodrigues (Angola), Ana Paula Tavares (Angola), Maria Celestina Fernandes (Angola), Vera Duarte (Cape Verde), Dina Salústio (Cape Verde), Noémia de Sousa, 1926-2002 (Mozambique), Graça Machel (Mozambique), Paulina Chiziane (Mozambique), Odete Semedo (Guinea Bissau), and Alda do Espírito Santo, 1926-2010, Conceição Lima and Innocence Mata (all from São Tomé and Príncipe).

Disenchantment among intellectuals and political democratization

Disenchantment among intellectuals and artists became widespread in the final decade of the twentieth century as a symptom of a larger collective malaise. This was due in part to the stasis of autocratic political regimes, the prolonging of civil wars that ravaged the continent in Angola and Mozambique, wars

of secession and border disputes from the Horn of Africa to Cameroon and Nigeria, and the fight against the racist regimes of Zimbabwe and South Africa. The struggle was one of freedom from fear, with writers paying with their lives or sometimes with exile, such as Nigeria's Ken Saro-Wiwa (1941-1995) and Malawi's Jack Mapanje. The entry into force of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1986 can be considered the culmination of a centuries-old unfinished effort to exercise sovereign, epistemological and political discourse. Thus, pessimism did not triumph, with intellectuals reiterating their united engagement with the founding of the Pan African Writers' Association in Accra in 1989, under a pertinent theme: African Unity, A Liberation of the Mind. The association's founding date of 7 November was then consecrated by the African Union as the International African Writer's Day.

With the political, social and economic dynamics characterizing African nations, and the deepening crisis that was ferociously attacking the world of culture and academia, the close of the period witnessed the processes of democratization. This was initiated by the so-called 'sovereign national conferences' and the establishment of multipartism in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the communist Eastern European countries under the *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* policies launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite criticism for the model of liberal democracies, intellectuals and artists have played an important role in the establishment of democratic regimes, especially in terms of their struggle for the freedoms associated with literary, scientific and academic production. However, during the period under consideration, the reference point for the role of African intellectuals from a reflective standpoint is the Dakar Declaration, adopted on 25 May 1996 at the International Meeting of African Intellectuals and Personalities of Culture, which called for the invention of Africa's future in the context of the new millennium.

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CHAPTER 29

ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DISSEMINATION OF AFRICAN THOUGHT

Pierre Kipré

Introduction

Unlike in ancient times, which were characterized mainly by oral tradition with restricted scope for dissemination, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are, more than ever before, those of thought transcribed through a written medium, with all that it implies. It is a form of thought aimed at an audience that has mastered this tool, and can enjoy its intellectual and aesthetic benefits; even contemporary aesthetics are based on the underlying presumption of writing. This explains the scale of the challenges facing contemporary African thought in terms of its widest possible dissemination. These challenges are institutional, technical and financial. They also concern the relationship between the 'producers' of African thought and an audience that is generally sceptical or distrustful, when in fact it is yet to be formed. How does Global Africanity meet these challenges, and at what cost? What are the current and future results?

Existing resources for the dissemination of African thought

Books were the original source of accessible knowledge in Africa. In August 2000, an international symposium, 'Within Nations and Beyond: The Place of the Book', was held in Brazil under the auspices of UNESCO. Organized as part

of the programme 'Pathways of Thought at the Dawn of the Third Millennium' to promote 'a renewal of thought in view of contemporary challenges', the purpose of this meeting was 'to examine the place of books today in terms of what they reveal about the cultural challenges of modernity.' Whether they are 'agents of historical transformation' (Eduardo Portella) or 'silent' because of 'the single mindset that hinders the search for new ideas' (Francisco Delich), it must be agreed that, 'the book as we know it today remains inextricably linked to the organized system of knowledge reproduction' (Maurice Aymard). This observation is particularly true in Africa where, with its derivatives, i.e. all new information and communication technologies (NICTs), it also allows for the renewal of knowledge. Consideration of book-related matters in the present context highlights a twofold issue: first, the constitution of the raw material in the form of research that precedes the book itself, and second, the physical availability of books, which is hampered by publishing issues and the economic concerns associated with this eminent cultural good.

Books and the place of research in Africa

The weight of history in the transition to a book-based culture: the basis of a paradox

Alongside the keepers of oral traditions, 'non-Europhone' intellectuals in Africa are those who originate from non-Western written cultures, such as Arabic and Amharic. In addition, Ousmane Kane (2003) rightly observes that, 'there is no single epistemological order in Africa, but several spaces of meaning', describing those intellectuals who, in sub-Saharan Africa for example, wrote in Arabic, or in an African language using Arabic characters before the days of colonial takeover. However, the role of European colonization in the spread of book culture on the continent must be noted, as it spanned decades. Often accompanied by authoritarian measures that linked knowledge to the needs of colonial rule, it was expressed through the secularization and systematization of education through books. Detached from the religious influence (Islam or animism), which colonization sometimes artificially opposed (esoteric knowledge/exoteric knowledge), knowledge gradually became a given, revealing both a culture and a tool to shape modernity. Thus, even in the most Islamized countries of Africa, which had known books for centuries, literacy and the secular acquisition of new knowledge went hand in hand with their widespread use.

Today, everyone agrees that books are one of the cornerstones of Africa's scientific and cultural heritage. But situations vary, even if progress has been made since the colonial period. The continent, which boasts many major thinkers and writers, whether published in Africa or elsewhere, stands out as the least influential in the world in this field: with 1.4% of global publishing output for 14% of the population. Indeed, the book sector in Africa is struggling to take off, even though demand is strong. Where does this paradox come from?

*Universities and research centres at the heart
of the written culture in Africa*

Universities and research centres, which support the aims of written culture, are core facilities for the dissemination of new knowledge, representing the starting point for the composition and renewal of knowledge. The results of this work, in the form of publications (books, articles, etc.), are a necessity; less for the purposes of individual promotion than for the reporting of the essential functions of universities and research centres. For the in-depth development and ongoing renewal of Global Africa, these are essential elements if Africa is to make its specific contribution to the world. But what do we see in reality?

From an analysis of public policies, research emerges as the 'poor relation' of African politics. In practice, over and above the imbalanced division of knowledge to the detriment of social sciences – a worldwide phenomenon identified by successive global reports on this issue (UNESCO 2010, 2013, 2016) – it is noted that public research policies in Africa are characterized by a lack of objectives, inadequate infrastructure, and generally poor funding. African nations that, in practice, link research to a forward-looking social model, which is consistent with the aspirations of a society under construction (or reconstruction), are a rarity. Post-Apartheid South Africa is probably one of the exceptions. The majority of other African countries see research as a simple tool for individual promotion in higher education and the research environment. In terms of infrastructures, and particularly funding, the sparsity of allocated budgets is the most common factor.

In part, this is one of the consequences of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1990s, which were imposed on the majority of African countries by international financial institutions. Above all, this reflects the impact of strategic choices, which assumes that there is no need to 'reinvent the wheel', thus exposing Africa to every external trend. These policies are reflected in the existence of three groups of African nations: first, the exceptional case of South Africa, where the government devotes around 0.7% of GDP to research;

second, some 20 countries where this figure ranges from 0.4% to 2% of GDP; lastly, some 30 countries where this figure is lower than 0.2%. Research is not a priority of public policy in North Africa and virtually throughout sub-Saharan Africa, even though the *book* (and its derivatives), i.e. the downstream product of research, is now recognized as a 'cultural good'.

Let us consider the definition of a cultural good. A concept forged primarily by economists, it describes an intellectual product, whether a book or a work of art, the acquisition of which confers an emotional, intellectual and spiritual well-being (Nyahoho, 2001). A cultural good differs from a utilitarian asset in that it constitutes a recreational or experiential asset, the quality of which can only be appraised after its consumption (Caves, 2000); some economists describe this as a 'belief-based asset' (Kretschmer et al., 1999), giving rise to an associated 'aesthetic experience'. A book is the cultural good that is most accessible to the broadest population, in any location. In this regard, the book raises three issues in Africa.

The first issue concerns the intellectual raw material that forms the basis of book production. Universities and research centres, through their research work, are the custodians of a vast 'sleeping library' comprised of theses, memoirs, research reports, etc. The current state of affairs in this field indicates that, in the various African universities and in diaspora communities, there is a growing number of these university-produced works, notwithstanding the frequent absence of reliable inventories of theses. Reference, for example, to catalogues of theses on Africa, which are sponsored in the West and frequently produced by Africans, gives some idea of the wealth of this pool of new knowledge, even allowing for the fallow periods experienced by non-African universities. The French example provides a useful basis for analysis in terms of the benefits involved and the role of African issues in French scientific production. This is associated with both the colonial past of France and the strong presence of an African diaspora community in the country, with one accounting for the other. In this regard, France shares similarities with other former colonial powers, such as the United Kingdom or Portugal. In general, in France, social sciences accounted for only 20.6 % (71,772 theses) of a total 348,482 theses sponsored by universities from 1985 to 2016. However, notwithstanding this modest share, at the Sorbonne, for example, during the period from 1980 to 1989, the catalogue of sponsored theses indicates that, of the 3,503 theses sponsored, 527 were related to Africa (for all African countries and all social sciences combined), or 15% of the total. Nationally, a similar proportion applies, with over 6,000 theses sponsored over the period from 1985 to 2016. Generally speaking, Africa is denied access to this major resource, which is owned by the French universities and research centres.

Table 1. *Production of articles on social sciences in Africa from 1987 to 2011*

Countries	Proportion in Africa 1987-2007 (%)	Rate of growth 1987-2007 (%)	Proportion in Africa 2007-2011 (%)
South Africa	50.7	+185	44.7
Nigeria	16.5	-27	12.3
Egypt	(?)	(?)	5.3
Kenya	8.1	+127	5.1
Zimbabwe	4.6	+54	1.5
Ghana	(?)	(?)	5.1
Ethiopia	(?)	(?)	3

Sources: Table based on *World social science reports*, UNESCO 2010, 2013, 2016 (© Pierre Kipré).

The second issue concerns the publication of research results, particularly in the social sciences. A variety of situations apply. As Table 1 shows, a handful of countries are responsible for the majority of publications on the African continent: South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia accounted for 75.5 % of publications from 2007 to 2011, with the remaining 24.5% divided between the rest of the continent. However, since the period from 1987 to 2007, and notwithstanding gaps in documentation, there has been a growing trend in the production of publications. This is not the result of a change in public policies; rather, it stems from initiatives on the part of universities themselves, specifically inter-university cooperation. Many researchers also prefer to be published in non-African reviews as they tend to have a broader content, enjoy a higher profile, and provide greater accessibility to the 'global scientific community'. However, this does not entirely resolve the issue of publications on the African continent, which is not so much associated with the absence of peer review than with the capacity of journals to 'survive' in terms of the funding provided by universities, which frequently lack resources.

The third issue concerns the 'brain drain', which undermines the capacity of African human resources for renewal. 'Junior' researchers are increasingly numerous compared with the 1980s or 1990s. However, there is very little (or nothing at all) on offer in the long term that can help in their development, keep them in universities and research centres, or help them integrate into national or inter-African scientific communities, except for a number of remarkable initiatives and actions, such as those conducted by CODESRIA or the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa. In the case of 'seniors', there are

even more reasons for the brain drain: greater incentives available abroad for the pursuit of a career, which started in their home country, or for reasons that could be more political in nature (in many cases, enforced exile of university academics and intellectuals in crisis-affected countries). However, this brain drain is not exclusively associated with drawbacks. It provides Africa with the opportunity for the dissemination of its talents, and for the establishment of bridges with other intellectually productive spaces and scientific environments, to the extent that nations have been able to convert what was originally a loss into a benefit.

Other issues persist, including the question of multilingualism and the translation of academic language into African languages, for example. These are issues raised by our global societies, which reflect the impact of certain dominant non-African cultural models. Universities and research centres generally reflect their associated communities. However, with the advent of the 'revolution in new information and communication technologies' (NICTs), twenty-first century Africa is now called upon to address other related issues.

The NICT 'revolution' and new opportunities for dissemination

What is the state of the NICT revolution in Africa? It would appear that fears of a deep digital divide between the continent and the rest of the world seem less pressing than at the end of the twentieth century. Barbara Freitag (2001) quite rightly observed that, 'books, in whatever form, have a critical role to play. Their constant reading and rereading, with the reflection and discussion which they encourage, are the only means of refining and inculcating the values which will connect new generations to the information society, in a practical sense, ensuring respect for democracy, human rights, education for all, religious freedom, universal suffrage, etc.' While the book remains irreplaceable, in Africa more than elsewhere, it is also interesting to observe how the continent has harnessed its participation in the NICT 'revolution' over the last decade. The period from 2005 to 2010 marks the genuine digital revolution in Africa when the continent was connected to the rest of the world by submarine fibre-optic cables. Undoubtedly, Africa remains far from the levels achieved by other continents: the bottom 25 places in the global ranking of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2016 were occupied by African countries, and the average NICT development index in the sub-Saharan zone is 2.48 points, versus the global

average of 4.94. However, the shift in the rate of acquisition of computers and software in this region, and in rates of Internet penetration, are frequently higher than in other parts of the world. The number of users increased seven times faster than anywhere else between 2000 and 2012 (cf. Internet World Statistics, 2013): from 29% in 2016, the rate of Internet penetration has now reached 40% (in 2025), versus a global average of 63%, as reported by the International Telecommunications Union. Universities and research centres do their best not to lag behind in a field that will allow them to make qualitative leaps in both the dissemination and production of knowledge. The development of Internet access via mobile devices has accelerated purchases of this type of device, at the expense of stationary (or heavy-duty) terminals such as computers. This is a benefit that is expanding in Africa, given that NICTs are conducive to exchanges and the dissemination of knowledge and because they have an impact on numerous aspects of everyday life. This represents a genuine opportunity for African thinking and its promotion. Accordingly, for the rapid and less expensive publications, African universities are increasingly aware of the Open Access option, as demonstrated by the Fourth Conference on Electronic Publishing, organized by the CODESRIA in Dakar in 2016. Useful opportunities are available. However, there is flip side to the coin.

In practice, this type of arrangement poses numerous limitations and risks to African thought, primarily associated with production. As Ugo Ruiz so perfectly describes in his work on the Internet-proofing of literature (2015):

[T]he Web is not conducive to the emergence of literary works, as this process is based upon the editorial system and the hierarchical structure dictated by textual categories. The Web also compromises the status of author, in the strictest sense of the term, in that writers are called upon to engage in direct contact with their readers.

This is equally true of all the arts, including music. Add to this the consequences of the excessive mediatization of games, leisure activities, personal exchanges on social media (Africa accounted for 14% of the worldwide total in 2014), and e-commerce. These aspects eclipse the potential benefits for the dissemination and deeper exploration of African thinking.

The final type of difficulties experienced by the African system involves the impact of crises on the means of production and dissemination of its particular type of thinking.

The impact of crises on the production of thinking in Africa

Without dwelling on the human cost of African crises (deaths, exile, etc.), our focus here is on the material destruction they create. Cases of destruction and looting of libraries, museums and galleries are numerous. The destruction in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia or Côte d'Ivoire during civil wars, the crimes perpetrated by Islamists in northern Mali in 2012, or the atrocities committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria since 2009 reflect the gravity of situations experienced in the production centres of African thinking. The constant closures of these places of thought to the slightest national political crisis are as widespread as the suspicion and occasional hostility towards innovative thinking in Africa.

This hostility is translated by the massive closure of cinemas and theatres in many countries where, on unsubstantiated religious grounds, they are considered 'places of perdition' rather than cultural venues (by radical Islamists, Pentecostal Christian movements, etc.). Not only are the infrastructures of cultural heritage restricted as a result but, above all, these acts disrupt the links between the spiritual and intellectual dimensions in our understanding of human life.

All in all, from research to infrastructure, the difficulties confronting the dissemination and promotion of our Global African identity are considerable and, at times, lie at the very heart of the how we view it. Given the conditions for their production, we may ask how books can change this view.

Deficiencies in publishing and obstacles in the dissemination of African thinking

Publishing is affected by numerous deficiencies and constraints. Some are structural while others are associated with the need for investment in the cultural sector, which is frequently viewed as secondary in nature.

Structural deficiencies in publishing on the African continent

When examining public policies on books, it is easy to be misled by the fact that the national government is either a shareholder (whether majority or otherwise) in publishing houses or the principal client of these publishing houses, when it places massive orders for school textbooks, for example. This is not what it seems. At best, national governments go no further than the minimum education requirements,

including in the new arts, and tax incentives are few. In addition, there is often no policy for the training of technicians, whether in the book sector or in the performing arts. When education shifts towards African languages, in order to reconnect with endogenous mastery of thought (Arabic in North Africa or certain languages in sub-Saharan Africa), the state mainly produces textbooks, often without providing the necessary support for all forms of renewal of endogenous thought. South Africa and Nigeria are among those rare African countries to attempt innovative initiatives in 'scholarly' African language publishing. The reason is often the same: pressing development issues constrain national governments to invest in training tools (*primum vivere deinde philosophare*). Indeed, the situation is grim: publishing in Africa is underfunded, poorly organized, and frequently in the thrall of multinational publishers. The lack of resources and the disorganization of publishing houses in Africa are recognized by all observers.

We know that publishers are entrepreneurs who, in their productions, bring together the dual cultural and economic nature of books. They assume a financial risk by initiating a publishing project, marshal the requisite technical expertise to produce a book, and effectively organize its distribution to a target audience, real or potential. What do we see on the African continent? 'More a printer than a publisher', according to the criticism of many observers in French-speaking Africa, where the practice of 'self-publishing' is most common. The publisher has no easy access to bank credit and is required to bear production input costs. In addition, publishers do not have technicians with a good command of all stages of publication, including accurate market research. As a result, books are generally expensive and objectively viewed as a luxury item by the majority of the population. These factors explain why non-African multinational publishing companies dominate almost everywhere on the continent. In South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya and other English-speaking countries, there are three or four British publishing houses. In French-speaking countries, there are French publishing houses. As an example of distribution, there are two books exported from French-speaking Africa for every 98 French books imported. By controlling most local publishing, these large publishing houses dominate the book market. The same situation can be found in music. Added to these problems are the protection of produced works (piracy) and the frequent disregard for authors' rights.

In addition to the poor dissemination of new ideas, the choice made by governments to focus solely on school textbooks poses problems and also highlights the long list of shortcomings. For example, to take the well-known case of African history, only a few of the extraordinary advances in African historical

research have ever been incorporated into school curricula and therefore make it into the textbooks published by national governments, mostly in francophone Africa (Kipré, 2008). Foreign textbooks continue to be imported, either directly by publishing houses or indirectly by NGOs. In some cases, the textbooks no longer correspond to the curricula in Western countries, still less to the aspirations of our African societies that are struggling to present their own discourse to the world.

The constraints of a system which performs better outside the continent

In many cases, this African discourse finds a sufficiently effective system to ensure it is heard outside the continent. It is not only the diaspora community seizing this opportunity. Many major publishing houses are now increasingly open to the literature and works produced by African intellectuals. The arts are not lagging behind. It is no longer surprising to see these talents rewarded. In France, for example, 12 Africans were awarded major literary prizes between 1990 and 2013. Some have been multiple winners (Ahmadou Kourouma, France Inter 1999, Goncourt des Lycéens 2000 and Renaudot 2000). Publishers have seen a number of their African authors receive awards (Ahmadou Kourouma, Tierno Monénembo, Tahar Ben Jelloun at Seuil), and prize-winners have been published by various houses (Léonora Miano by Grasset, and thereafter by Plon). However, aside from these examples, the majority of African writers are published by 'specialist' publishers or in 'specialized' collections. Even if this is an exaggeration, there is a risk of confinement to an 'editorial ghetto' that could undermine the project of universal thought.

The fierce competition between publishers and, above all, between authors highlights the dual issue of the aesthetics on offer and the expectations of the non-African audience for whom these publications are intended. Many editors prefer the immediate visibility of Africa, its discourses and messages over issues that are a source of disturbance or global engagement. A balance still needs to be struck between the 'ghetto' and the open inclusion described above.

Between internal deficiencies and external constraints, the difficulties associated with the dissemination of African thinking through books conjures up the long road that still lies ahead. National governments bear no less of a responsibility, in fact, a greater responsibility. And yet, the model within which book production operates does not leave much room for public policy, unless we return, more resolutely, to the very nature of books and works of art as cultural goods.

Outlining a balance

Between the dissemination of cultural goods falling short of the ambitions of Global Africa and the proliferation of initiatives aimed at correcting this situation, the results remain mixed.

Dissemination which falls short of the ambitions of Global Africa

A number of the deficiencies described earlier are due to a system in which cultural life is also dominated by economic rules. Debates on whether or not states should intervene in this area of trade are stirring up organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). In Europe, Benzoni (2014), following other economists, observed: 'Many intellectual works are traded for a financial consideration, i.e. are the subject of commercial exchanges. Public sector intervention [is intended to offset] only those deficiencies which do not permit the achievement of a level of production, quality or diversity of supply which are capable of satisfying the general interest.' In Africa, the 2016 review of the MASA (Marché des Arts du Spectacle Africain or Market for African Performing Arts), which is held in Abidjan, reflected not only the success but also, and above all, the limitations of such an undertaking. Indeed, national governments frequently fail to honour their own financial commitments, which are overtaken by more urgent matters in a sometimes chaotic socio-political context. Today, due to the Internet, even the rules deployed by European countries to safeguard their cultural identity can be circumvented. As everywhere else, Africans – whether part of the diaspora community or not – contribute to this global 'bypassing', thus participating in the 'globalized' consumption of cultural goods. Some economists have concluded that a liberalization agreement on cultural goods, far from imposing a dominant culture, would likely strengthen global exchanges while preserving cultural diversity (Nyahoho, 2001). Others believe that cultural goods are an economic singularity and therefore cannot be subject to free trade rules (Peltier, 2003). But all agree that the protection of cultural diversity is essential, whatever the approach. However, it is far from certain that Africa has the tools required to protect this diversity.

In its relations with other countries, particularly former colonial powers, the tendency towards imbalances, which are detrimental to Africa, continue to hold sway in numerous forums of thought and action. The objectives of cultural domination, under the pretext of globalization, can hide behind an agreement on 'cultural cooperation' or financial support. Ultimately, the commercial circulation

of cultural goods and services conveys the tastes and values of those who produce, finance, distribute, purchase and consume them (Benzoni, 2014).

We must nevertheless choose intelligence over commercial laws and have faith in the power of exchange to serve the common good. Internal and external resistance, and the growing number of partnership opportunities between Africa and other continents, give us cause for more optimism.

Internal resistance, and the purpose of new external cooperation

Internal resistance and the readjustments in external cooperation that are currently underway show that all is not lost. Quite the contrary. In the arts, for example, we are seeing the tentative emergence of a new form of patronage in Africa. Indeed, in Nigeria and South Africa in particular, African collectors are finding profitable investment opportunities, even if the expected returns are not guaranteed. In other countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire (the Rotonde des Arts since 2009 and the Charles Donwahi Foundation) and Benin (the Zinsou Foundation), patrons are supporting an active artistic life that is attentive to the world and to local achievements. More officially, the idea of organizing a market for the arts in Africa is wholly accepted. Hence, the establishment of the MASA in Abidjan in 1993. Following a lengthy interruption, due to the political crisis of 2000–2011, this event has now resumed. In 2016, it brought together 45 countries (32 African countries, 7 from Europe, and 6 from the Americas and the Caribbean). The 2024 edition brought together nearly 500,000 spectators and representatives of 59 countries. This biennial event provides a forum for the discovery of other countries, and a showcase for new art (short stories, public readings etc.). A new form of action is also emerging in the world of ideas, with key players in the book industry lobbying African governments to develop genuine book policies. These should go beyond textbooks to aim for greater availability and lower prices for books in general (novels, essays, etc.). This should involve reducing taxes on inputs and heavy equipment, and training technicians.

The multiplication of initiatives will also depend on the more pragmatic reorganization of cooperation. Hence, the establishment of joint publishing agreements between publishers in the North and those in Africa, supported either by banks or national development aid agencies (Norad in Norway, Sida in Sweden, Danida in Denmark, CIDA in Canada, etc.), together with a number of major publishers. Already established in English-speaking Africa, this movement has come close to covering the whole of French-speaking Africa over the last decade. International agencies are now quick to support this new approach to international cultural cooperation, which respects the diversity of viewpoints and regional cultural identities.

More pragmatically still, it is encouraging to observe the spread of new initiatives for the distribution of books. These include the use of Open Access, online platforms, e-readers and mobile phones. For example, Kalahari, one of Africa's leading online retailers, launched a digital download section in 2010 with a catalogue of 220,000 e-books and 50 electronic journals. The group has also launched its own app for computers and mobile phones, enabling users to read e-books sold online. The Egyptian group, Kotobarabia, has also launched its own download portal, becoming the leading distributor of e-books in Arabic, with nearly 11,000 titles. In South Africa, the publishing house HSRC Press, offers free, open access to social science research content. However, e-readers are mostly found among the wealthiest segment of the population, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa; in 2011, only seven countries had access to a Kindle, as the device was still expensive compared to the average cost of living. However, initiatives do exist, notably in Ghana, where in 2010, the Worldreader organization distributed Kindles to students. Today, several countries are launching special operations to help universities acquire low-cost laptops and tablets. These are still tentative initiatives, but they are very real and are often led by NGOs from the diaspora, thus heralding a brighter future.

Conclusion

Overall, many challenges and therefore serious shortcomings remain and still need to be overcome both from within and outside Africa. But it is in the depths of crisis that new hopes are born. Africa remains open to all possibilities. The issue of 'cultural exception', which many countries in the WTO associate with the idea of protecting cultural identity, is still considered a smokescreen in Africa, at least in practice.

As a culturally diverse continent, it is possible that, through its difficulties and often in spite of itself, Africa is experiencing the intrinsic richness of this diversity. If this challenge is to be met, the price to be paid remains high given the weight of heritage and the propensity of many elsewhere to refrain from exchange, which is the very basis of cultural dialogue. Ebrima Sall (2010, pp. 44-45), former executive secretary of the CODESRIA, has indicated that, from an African perspective, 'the challenge of independence and the development of interpretative frameworks which are scientific, universal and relevant – and thus "adapted" to the analysis of Africa and the world from the viewpoint of Africans themselves – remains a reality.'

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SECTION III

AFRICA AT THE TURN OF THE
THIRD MILLENNIUM:
CHALLENGES AND DYNAMICS

INTRODUCTION

Faranirina V. Rajaonah

Introduction

The contrasts in Africa at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century sustain two opposite ‘mythologies’ (Copans, 2010). Some people lean towards Afro-pessimism, which is justified because of famines, conflicts related to political ethnicity or bad governance, for example. For them, development is a thing of the past (Lachenal and Mbodj-Pouye, 2014). Obstacles to a real take-off are multiple: low diversification of economies, state powerlessness, limited scope for countries facing pressure from international institutions as they fall prey to companies privileged by globalization, notwithstanding the inevitable collusion of their leaders, are just some of the shortfalls. Other people are resolutely Afro-optimistic.

Indeed, some clues suggest that Africa could join the ranks of India and China in an ‘emerging triad’ (Courade, 2014). Thanks to its demographic growth and the youth of its population, giving it an advantage over ‘ageing’ Europe, Africa could contribute, in just a few decades, towards a ‘pull of the global economy’ alongside the two Asian powers (Songwe, 2018, pp. 70-72). The continent also has vast areas of land and an important share of remarkable reserves of raw materials and minerals. Africa continues to attract foreign investors, sparking real competition. This is seen in the field of electrical

power. Following on with the 'Power Africa' plan, launched by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2013 and the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative, the African Union decided in 2015 to enlist Japan, the European Union, Canada and the United States. But China and Russia are also present in the electricity market where much remains to be done. Indeed, these companies are raking in substantial profits, although the lack of electrical power supply is actually an impediment to development (Bernier, 2018).

On a completely different level, despite the consequences of structural adjustment policies, African societies have shown resilience and have faced up to the challenge. One of the most stunning pieces of evidence is the holding of national conferences for democratic transition. Since then, we have witnessed the renewal of political life with, in particular, the interventions of civil society, in which the middle classes have played an important role thanks to their level of education, their openness to the world, and their tendency to dispose of community constraints (Jacquemot, 2012).

In fact, the 1990s and the first decades of the twentieth century represent a significant milestone in the history of the continent. This, of course, is part of a more general movement, marked, in particular, by the political reconfigurations following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and an acceleration of globalization, but Africa also has its own pace. Thus, the end of Apartheid in South Africa marked a key moment in the changes that have affected the continent. Even if all the problems are far from being resolved in the 'rainbow nation' and despite competition from other states, particularly Nigeria, South Africa is still the most industrialized country on the continent and the portal of Africa, a status confirmed by its admission to BRICS membership after the intergovernmental organization expanded from its original group of Brazil, China, India and Russia. Another key moment for Africa was the transformation in 2001 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), created after independence (1963), into the African Union (AU). The same is true of the creation in the same year of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which has become, since January 2018, the African Union Development Agency. This institution has a role in implementing the agenda of the African Union by 2063, which was first drafted in 2015 but also takes into account projects announced at the fiftieth anniversary of the OAU (2013).

The goal of Africa and its diaspora in its ambitious 'Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want' is 'an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, led by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force on the world stage.' Thus, the mobilization of domestic resources is one of the priorities of the 2063 Agenda. However, despite

the dynamism of the 2000s, driven by the commodity boom, tax revenues remain low. Widespread poverty, current antisocial behaviour, the scale of the informal economy, exemptions granted to foreign investors settled in the special economic zones all complicate the implementation of effective tax policies (Faujas, 2018). Moreover, the global growth outlook of the wider continent is overshadowed by the diversity of internal, national situations. Some countries are in great difficulty because of continuing conflicts, all sorts of security issues and poor governance. Conversely, Ghana is experiencing a remarkable boom thanks to the exploitation of gold and oil, as well as investments in agriculture and industry. Since the 1980s, Botswana and Mauritius have distinguished themselves by their continuing successes, based on the judicious use of annuities derived from the exploration of diamonds for Botswana, and sugar and textiles for Mauritius. Public policies in stable countries, characterized by good governance as well as the timely 'representation of the interests of social groups in designing economic and political institutions usually associated with their ability to generate development' were instrumental in both their paths (Silve, 2012). While not necessarily serving as models for other countries, the Botswana and Mauritius pathways suggest the possibility of a real take-off if a fitting policy is adopted.

Nevertheless, even countries facing major problems have never ceased to show real dynamism and their ability to take advantage of globalization. This is particularly true in the field of culture in the broader sense. Far from being content with mimicry (to use one of the most popular criticisms directed at colonized people and revisited in a postcolonial situation), some writers and artists have gained international renown and are true ambassadors of their culture. Section III of this volume examines these dynamics, sometimes in response to the challenges that societies face.

The self-enriching approach by different disciplines, without necessarily being multidisciplinary, seem inevitable when dealing with current problems, while always taking history into account. We take this opportunity to thank the staff of the United Nations agencies who participated in this project on a voluntary basis. Demographers, doctors, economists, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, art and literary critics as well as historians, diverse in their specialties, are among the authors. It is impossible to deal with all aspects of a period bustling with historically-important events and, because of technological innovations, events are happening at an accelerated rate. The limits are also editorial. Choices were made regarding the themes.

Half the themes are set in Africa in general. The rest are examined on a smaller scale, comprising a region, country or city, with the aim of reporting on the diversity

of the continent as much as possible. The issues were thus defined according to the areas and authors' fields of expertise. This facilitated relevant updates. After a study of demographics, with a focus on urban growth, this section analyses the resources of Africa through the interest it arouses internationally, and the achievements of its nationals. Social relationships are then examined from the perspective of gender and intergenerational relations. If Africa, as part of a globalized world, is one of the section's common threads, the latter part of this section focuses on its global contemporary contributions through its cultural flows. It is undoubtedly in these progressions that the links between the diaspora and Africans established on the continent are best able to participate and give weight to global African identity.

Population and urban growth

The demographers Cécile Zoungrana and Pierre Klissou recall that with the rise of its population, especially over the last three centuries – marked by trafficking and colonization – Africa eventually overtook Europe (in 2000) and the American continent (in 2010) in terms of population, currently ranked second after Asia. This dynamism, which is reflected particularly in the continent's youth and in the growth of its cities, is more relevant to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, the study, which also partly covers the future, raises the dangers of uncontrolled growth, such as its increased pressure on agriculture and growing instability. It is therefore important to organize the resources of the demographic dividends in a sensible way through good governance which caters to the integration of youth into production systems. But authorities must also be able to curb a number of disasters, natural or otherwise, including epidemics and famines.

Marie-Roseline Darnycka Bélizaire and Daogo Sosthène Zombre, doctors from the World Health Organization (WHO) in the African Region (sub-Saharan Africa and Algeria), share with us their latest field experience in the fight against epidemics, while sketching historical and anthropological perspectives. Since its inclusion in the successive world economies, Africa has inherited diseases from foreign lands, sometimes in epidemic form, that could become endemic. Africa itself is home to diseases carried to other continents from centuries of trafficking. The acceleration of globalization evidently increases the risks of spreading epidemics. In Africa, the belief in supernatural forces, customary practices, and low levels of education and resources provide a breeding ground for the spread of epidemics. In response to these challenges, in addition to country-specific measures, the states of the

WHO African Region developed in 2001 a strategy of ‘integrated disease monitoring and response’ that includes communities.

Like Lagos, Douala, Cairo and Johannesburg, Kinshasa is a megalopolis. Historian Charles Tshimanga has traced its past since its founding and analysed its current dynamism. Except in neighbourhoods created at the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, which are still shaping the economic and administrative centre, the Kinshasa region owes nothing to Western urban standards. The city has developed in an uncontrolled manner at the initiative of its inhabitants, mostly natives of the city, who possess endless ingenuity to organize themselves into a chaotic Kinshasa, as it is seen by foreigners¹. Despite its poverty and multiple tensions, and based on the model of Douala (a city in Cameroon), the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a place of innovation, linked to the rest of the world.²

However, dynamism is not inherent in megalopolises and big cities alone. It is also relevant to mid-sized cities. Moreover, more than two-thirds of city dwellers live in cities of less than one million inhabitants, and 70 per cent of urban development takes place in secondary cities in increasing numbers. This is the case in Ghana, Togo or Burkina Faso (Hilgers, 2012). Starting with the international impact triggered by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouaziz, a citizen of Sidi Bouzid (Tunisia), Madani Safar Zitoun, an urban sociologist, studies the ‘new social dynamics’ at work in mid-sized cities of the Maghreb, which are undergoing remarkable growth since the 1990s and arousing the interest of younger generations of researchers. As ‘alternative’ relocation destinations to the big coastal agglomerations, these cities, as ‘areas in development’, led by local elites with different resources depending on the country, portray a fair picture of the movements that deeply structure the societies of the Maghreb. In fact, openness to the outside world does not mean abandoning the fundamental values for communities or the principles attached to specific groups.

Social dynamics: gender and generations

While birth can be decisive in determining life journeys, the prospect of travel, studies, creativity and wealth are all endeavours likely to ensure a social ascent and to allow departures from norms, even if escaping from the pressure of elders or the holders of power is never easy. Relationships between generations

1 For the history of Kinshasa, see also Didier Gondola (1997).

2 For Douala, see Dominique Malaquais (2005).

in Africa (Gomez-Perez and Le Blanc, 2012) are indeed more complex than they appear at first glance. From this point of view, the chapter on the Comoros is very informative.

Anthropologist Sophie Blanchy examines the functioning of the system of age and generation in the Comoros, which invites a comparison with other societies of East Africa.³ The chapter highlights the diversity of situations found on the four islands of the archipelago. It is in Ngazidja and Mwali that the system remains the most efficient, with the rite of passage of the 'sons' category to the 'fathers' category, accessible only to those who perform the 'Grand Mariage', often with the eldest daughter in a family. By way of this ritual, the woman also transfers her house to her daughter, as the home where the couple will live after marriage. If the position of younger children is less prestigious, it nevertheless allows them more freedom. In addition, immigration for work or study offers young people the opportunity to enjoy recognition and to contribute to the life of cities, unless they truly emancipate themselves, introducing new values, such as religion, for example. But the social pressure of seniors can be very strong.

In the aftermath of independence, the Mozambican youth, studied by the historian Didier Nativel, were mobilized by the FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) to build the nation, and the RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), which recruited young people and even children during the civil war. However, this stranglehold on young people and their marginalization for some of them, did not prevent them, once released, from demonstrating their ability to become 'social actors', in particular, to 'sit on the boundaries between local and global', 'between the near and the far' (De Boeck and Honwana, 2000). Didier Nativel evokes their expertise in music. The contributions of miners returning from the Rand, as well as new technologies, stimulated the inventiveness of young people, who are well aware of their role in enriching the national culture, without sparing the leaders their criticism.

Besides the age hierarchy, the term 'generation' also means a cohort of people who went through the same significant experiences in a given period. This is the case of African grant students who left for Cuba, China and Eastern bloc countries, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. A research programme, initiated in 2011 and completed in 2016, was dedicated to this exchange,⁴ and there are

3 Such a system resembles some found in other East African societies. In this regard, see Anne-Marie Peatrick (1999).

4 This refers to the research programme ELITAF (African elites were trained in the countries of the former Soviet bloc).

publications focused on grant students returning to their countries (see Yengo and Saint Martin, 2017).

In her chapter, the historian, Tatiana Smirnova, takes another perspective. Based on surveys and interviews, she follows the itineraries of a few former Soviet government grant students who remained in Russia after the disintegration of the USSR. She only shares success stories. This is a deliberate choice because she wishes to examine the ingenuity of these former students who took advantage of their links with academic institutions and liberalization to better leverage their status as go-betweens, with guaranteed income thanks to their creative initiatives. Through their talents and their efforts to make Africa known, or through their integration into the host society, some of these 'PhD students' became ambassadors of the continent. This challenges the stereotype of the destitute African migrant.

Among Africans who have studied in the East are military officers. On the Malagasy side, they were part of the 'generation of the socialist regime' (1975 to 1990), unlike their elders who began their careers during the colonization or the First Republic, and who had the opportunity to develop in France. In general, the soldiers who headed to the East undertook an internship after having graduated from the military academy in Antsirabe, Madagascar, which was created in 1967. However, despite differences between the generations, and the fact that the army only led the country for four months in 1975, military elites have always maintained close ties with the state and the political class. Thus, the historian, Tovonirina Rakotondrabe, is in perfect agreement with researchers specialized in studying uniformed military corps in Africa (Debos and Glassman, 2012). The military officers also intervene in the political field: 'shaped by state policies', 'emerging in the shadow and from within the state'. Flouting all neutrality, military elites call upon different networks to advance their careers. Lastly, military jobs remain almost exclusively male despite the recommendations of international organizations regarding the reform of the security system (Debos and Glassman, 2012).

The problematic of gender is treated by two historians, Olufunke Adeboye and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, on the one hand, and a sociologist, Rokhaya Cissé, on the other. The attention given by the African Union to education, as well as the achievement of gender parity, called for a chapter in the 2063 Agenda, on female education, in addition to several paragraphs emphasizing the ability of women (and youth) to initiate change. The subject of how educated women can contribute to transforming their societies, including how they can find their place in society based on their skills, is at the heart of Olufunke Adeboye's writings on West Africa. This is a real challenge. Indeed, we need to close the gender gap

(particularly with regard to access to high school and university) that has lingered since colonization, despite significant improvements during the last decade of the twentieth century. In addition, the impact of representations is also evident in the tendency to judge women, first and foremost, by their capacity to procreate, and to confine them to the domestic sphere or to poorly valued professions. However, it is also their responsibility to fight against these clichés and not to avoid civic life. A difficult challenge, but one that many women have overcome.

For a century, women have enjoyed unquestionable prestige in a handful of professions associated with care services (for example, teachers or midwives) (Barthélémy, 2010). However, they are less present than men in high-level positions, nationally or internationally, although things are changing. Some women have acquired, if not conquered, a remarkable stature in society, resulting in simultaneous changes in their personal status thanks to the actions of lawyers.⁵ To the list of conquests reported by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, one can add the acquisition by Egyptian women in 2000 of the right to divorce, although ending in compensation to the husband to whom the dowry is reimbursed. This leaves little room for manoeuvre for women with modest means (Bernard-Maugiron, 2007). Let us also note the lifting (in August 2017) of the ban on Tunisian women marrying non-Muslims. African women are increasingly present in the public arena, engaged in politics (up to the presidency), in business and in creative economic initiatives to support other women. Women writers, of course, play a fundamental role and are being heard far beyond their country and the continent. In a non-exhaustive list, we can mention Nadine Gordimer (South Africa); Aminata Sow Fall, Fatou Diome and Ken Bugul (Senegal); Léonora Miano and Calixthe Beyala (Cameroon); Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (Nigeria); and Scholastique Mukasonga (Rwanda), guest of the July 2017 International Literary Festival of Paraty in Brazil on the theme of slavery. This event honoured Black writers, with women (24) slightly outnumbering men (22) (Mukasonga, 2018). Just like these writers, African migrant women also benefit from foreign opportunities, but in a different context.

After recounting the history of migrations of Senegalese women from the countryside to cities and abroad under the 'family reunion' motive, Rokhaya Cissé studies the growing 'feminization' of international migration since the 1990s characterized by temporary stays, with the prospect of accumulating resources to continue studying or to act as entrepreneurs. These women, who leave their homes alone or with their children, return home with more autonomy

5 See also N'Diaye (2011).

and are thus more likely to 'renegotiate the decision-making power within the household' and, more generally, to introduce innovation to their societies. Although optimistic about female travellers' capacity to innovate, Rokhaya Cissé remains cautious about their margin for manoeuvre in the redefinition of their social status, as their departures generally fall under 'family dynamics'. In any case, migration not only benefits relatives but also the broader communities.

Partnerships, foreign coveting? African initiatives and reactions

Through the exchanges it stimulates, globalization has positive economic and cultural effects. But it also carries dangers. Africa, which attracts foreign investors, is at the heart of many issues at the international level. This is not a new occurrence. The continent has been 'coveted' since its participation in successive world economies, but it still finds itself in a marginal or semi-marginal position. The New Silk Roads project initiated by China, Africa's largest trading partner since 2009, seeks to better anchor the continent to the rest of the world. Although under different actors, whose interests do not necessarily converge, the growing presence of China on the continent has pushed other countries to intensify their relations with Africa (Chaponnière and Jozan, 2008). To what extent can the continent take advantage of this competition to achieve one of the aspirations of the 2063 Agenda, that is, to become a strong, united and influential actor and partner? This would require the realization of the Pan-African vision, yet the tendency is often the assertion of one's own identity at varying degrees.

The labourious implementation of regional integration shows, in part, the reluctance to let go of national sovereignty. However, the hope of carrying out regional economic programmes to integrate the dynamics of globalization and, ultimately, to achieve unity is close to fiction. The political scientist, Willy Jackson, demonstrates that even after independence, the continent has not freed itself from the mechanisms of foreign domination. After the failure of the first consolidation projects during nation-building attempts, the difficulties of the 1990s and the retreat of the socialist model strengthened the influence of partners attached to liberalism. So far, the strategy of market integration has only a limited scope, although intra-African trade has more than doubled since 2000 (Songwe, 2018). The exchanges that contribute towards regional integration take place partly outside institutional control and derive from structured trade organizations and parallel foreign exchange markets (Egg and Herrera, 1998). However, Willy

Jackson does not rule out an optimistic outlook, provided that the process is thought through at the political community level and includes the diaspora. In any case, the project of an African common market (African Continental Free Trade Area – AfCFTA) was on the agenda (March 2017) in Kigali. Moreover, Africa can distance itself from its colonial heritage and its relation to Western powers by diversifying its partners, an opportunity offered by the BRICS, for example, which is made up of countries with emerging economies.

The accession of South Africa in 2010 to the BRIC, now BRICS, is a crucial step for Africa and for this group which, at its Durban summit in 2013, clearly expressed its ambition to influence world governance. Does the BRICS not shelter two-fifths of the population of the planet, and does it not own one-fifth of its wealth? (Habchi and Martinet, 2013). In any case, the development in Durban of a comprehensive strategy for Africa, with a ‘partnership for integration and industrialization’ as a guideline, as well as the establishment of a development bank headquartered in Shanghai, and the Africa Regional Centre in Johannesburg, are clear signs of BRICS interest in the continent.

For the economist Evgeni Korendyasov, by initiating an ‘alternative cooperation model’ the BRICS–Africa alliance helps the continent make itself heard and contributes towards its distancing from the ‘neoliberal consensus of Washington’. In return, in general, the BRICS countries, increasingly present in Africa, rely on the support of African countries in international forums. But these countries, different in their economic weight, do not necessarily have the same approaches to cooperation. Furthermore, Evgeni Korendyasov, in his chapter, specifies that each of them favours different courses of action in Africa, and what they get out of it also differs. Brazil intervenes mainly in Portuguese-speaking countries and values its achievements in agriculture, industry and medicine. For Russia, the main investments are in hydrocarbons against the purchase of agricultural commodities. However, India and China dominate the group and compete against each other.

It could be added that India organized its first summit with Africa in 2008 and that more than three million Indians live in Africa, the majority of them in Eastern and Southern Africa (Dubey, 2018, p. 90). Since the arrival of the first recruits in Mauritius, as part of the ‘coolie trade’ following the abolition of slavery in 1834, migrations from India have become increasingly important. Seventy per cent of Mauritians are of Indian origin (Servan-Schreiber, 2014). This allows India to make Mauritius, with its dynamic economy and attached as much to its African identity (or its Creole identity) as to its Indian identity, one of ‘the main gateways to the continent’ (Silve, 2012, p. 188).

As for China, whose recent aggressive policies in Africa have often been questioned, it is important to remember its historical relations with this continent where different categories of Chinese migrants or their descendants have settled, some having arrived more than a century ago. These are, in general, better integrated than the migrants of the last few decades. The Chinese presence has given rise to some reservations, particularly owing to the sometimes complicated relations between investors and employees, and because of the lack of integration of Chinese in the host companies. Similarly, traders may fear competition from the Chinese who can offer opportunities to young Africans. Some traders take advantage of this by creating resale networks of sought-after products because they are cheap (Marfaing, 2015). Be that as it may, China, which defends the principle of a 'win-win partnership', supported by the state and multinationals, is a major player in the transformations in Africa. This can be seen in the patterns of consumption as a result of the import of relatively affordable goods and the spread of a development model 'reviving post-independence dreams of the 1960s' (Kernen, 2014). In return for its achievements in the field of infrastructure, China is interested – like other foreign powers – in the natural wealth of the continent. Demba Moussa Dembélé investigates the coveting of Africa in his chapter through the rush for its arable land that is reminiscent of the ambitions of the imperialist powers in the late nineteenth century.

This approach, favoured by the economist Demba Moussa Dembélé, who does not discount the issue of mineral resources, a subject of the AU's African Mining Vision 2050, is justified by the primordial role of agriculture in Africa to satisfy the needs of the population and as 'an engine for growth and development'. Agriculture and farm labourers have been neglected since the colonial period, which has led to misleading arguments about land grabbing, as explained by Dembélé in his chapter on economic policy. The coveting of Africa's resources should be replaced in the context of a systemic crisis of financial capitalism and the emergence of countries of the South, given the soaring agricultural prices, food insecurity or energy deficit. The race for agricultural land, like mining, has a fatal impact on African societies (Rubbers, 2013). However, countries can benefit from the competition among investors and, in the same vein, develop strategies in a subregional, if not continental framework. Natural resources should then cease to be seen by some as a curse, to the extent that states should astutely negotiate with their partners. They also need to diversify their economies to protect themselves against the effects of fluctuations in commodity prices. Similarly, they might also gain from other contributions made by migrants living abroad.

From a political and humanitarian point of view, the issue of migration continues to make international headlines from the various sides of a win-

win-win (for the receiving countries, the departure countries and the migrants themselves). Issiaka Mandé, who discusses the countries of departure in his chapter, examines the theoretical differences between migration and development: an 'open-minded' concept limited to a 'measurable growth' for some, while having a broader meaning associated with the development of man's full potential for others. It thus aligns with the concerns of other researchers (Bagalwa-Mapatano and Monnier, 2022). At a time when local development is increasingly discussed, Issiaka Mandé presents three examples – Morocco, Senegal and Burkina Faso – illustrated through different contexts. Migrants create a dynamic in their region of departure, according to various modalities. But their action would be more effective if it relied on truly inclusive national policies of migrants and diasporas in all areas of development. While this process is underway in some countries, much remains to be done.

The analysis of economic links with foreign countries ends on a note that encourages optimism, even if it is moderate. In fact, Vusi Gumede shows how, since the early 1990s, Africa has gradually become a new centre for financial activities. At the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, there were about thirty stock markets in Africa. Investor interest in Africa results from the liberalization that has affected the continent and the deregulation of financial markets within the circle of dominant powers. Good governance is also a fundamental factor. Financial markets have an obvious ripple effect on economies, but only in relatively wealthy countries. For Africa, to the south of the Maghreb, Vusi Gumede cites Ghana, Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa as contributory countries. While highlighting some specific obstacles to investments in South Africa and others, related to problems of regional or continental integration, he ends with a focus on the financial importance of this 'gateway to Africa' via Johannesburg. However, it is undoubtedly on the cultural level that the dynamism of Africa is most manifest, despite some shifts in terms of beliefs.

Africa at the pace of the world

If, as mentioned earlier, cities are privileged places of exchanges with the world, the countryside is not immune from the cultural influences exerted upon Africa as a whole in a globalized world. An example can be seen in the footprint of *tsapiky* studied by ethnomusicologist Julien Mallet. The *tsapiky* was born of the amalgamation of village music from southwestern Madagascar and modern music

from southern Africa, through radio or records. From these rhythms, young city-dwellers have created something new. These musicians keep in touch with the elders, who are the organizers of ceremonies, livened by their orchestras in towns or in the countryside (Mallet, 2009). Thus, opening up to a globalized reach does not exclude the claim of an identity whose roots are sometimes very localized.⁶ What comes from abroad gives rise to an inner quest but in a dynamic of innovation. This approach has influenced fields as varied as music, arts, fashion or religion.

The end of the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, were marked in Africa by the rise and greater visibility of religious movements in relation to political liberalization (Marshall-Fratani and Péclard, 2002; Lasseur and Mayrargue, 2011). The generalized crisis and personal failures pushed some individuals to seek solutions in the religious field, which are historically important in the structuring of African societies (Marshall-Fratani and Péclard, 2002). The sermons, especially effective in cities, particularly affect young people. But religious service has diversified, thanks to a greater fluidity of exchanges around the world and the proselytizing of religious entrepreneurs who profit from the lack of investment from the state in social sectors (education and health) (Marshall-Fratani and Péclard, 2002). Multiplicity appears as a fundamental characteristic of the rise of religion on the continent. As such, there is one God, but multiple Islams, running through the same Salafism (Vallet, 2018, p. 59).

Abdoulaye Sounaye traces the 'plural genealogy' of Salafism in West Africa. Admittedly, the recruitment of students trained in madrasas or, later, in universities in Africa, financed by Saudi Arabia, was decisive in the expansion of Salafism, but its followers also used it as a 'trend for enlistment'. Thus, in Hausa, Salafists claimed the jihad of Usman dan Fodio (Sounaye, 2012). Its extension from earlier movements in Africa and, more generally, the importance of local dynamics in the emergence of Salafism in 'Sahelistan' (from Mauritania to Somalia) were also highlighted by other researchers (Perouse de Montclos, 2015). Presented as one of the expressions of African authenticity, Salafism is associated with the rejection of neocolonialism and Western powers' imperialism. The Salafists, who aim to 'establish a new sociopolitical order', act in their own societies and, through militarization, work to transnationalize their beliefs in the subregion. By their expansion and their multiple connections outside the continent, or their monopolization of the media (Apard, 2015), the followers of the Salafist trends in Africa prove their perfect integration in a globalized world.

6 Generations of Malagasy singers, who began their careers in the 1970s and 1980s, express themselves in songs known as 'from the terroir' (*vokatry ny tany*).

It is the same with the faithful of new Christianity for whom Africa is 'the laboratory' (Jenkins, 2011, quoted by Fath and Mayrargue, 2014). Christianity in its various denominations, introduced by European and American missionaries, was appropriated and Africanized. Some 165 million Africans are faithful to Pentecostal, independent or evangelical churches, often with porous borders and a history which, for some, goes back to the first decades of the twentieth century.⁷ Wyatt MacGaffey joins other researchers with a powerful formula for describing these churches: 'international, modern and African'. They are rooted in an 'ambiguous' continent, seen from the angle of Christianity. This is perceptible, for example, in the idea that one is fundamentally 'pagan' or promised to Christianity, or in the manner that 'crusaders' of the new churches live their faith, without letting go of their 'pagan' resolve, or in the incitement of the Catholic Church to respect the 'traditions', while condemning the clergy who use it to help the faithful. Moreover, the explosion of Pentecostalism, which practices a demonization of pagan spirits and ancestors, is accompanied by an upsurge of witchcraft and the development of a 'healing market', with remedies coming from traditional healers but also independent churches (Fancello, 2008). The members of these new churches are mostly from underprivileged backgrounds. But their proselytizers, who aim to spread their message around the world, are often very rich and use advanced technologies. At an international level, the new churches encourage the link between Africa and diasporic communities, although probably less than music, particularly rap, 'one of the most recent emblems of global Black music culture', as observed by Olabode Omojola.

A research series on rap in Africa, published in recent years⁸, highlights Global Africa and the importance of cultural dissemination in a globalized world in general. More specifically, rap outreach testifies to the dynamism of societies on the continent when appropriating music from elsewhere, and also 'a transnational Black history little known until now' (Cuomo, 2014), which is used to express their 'Blackness' (Fouquet, 2014). Rap, music of the 'Black Atlantic' (Aterianus-Owanga and Guedj, 2014), a genre born in the violence of trafficking and slavery, is one of the major aspects of Global African identity. For Olabode Omojola, rap fits well within the register of a 'musical cosmopolitanism' (Omojola, quoted by Turino, 2000), particularly in that it refers to 'alternative

7 For work on these churches, see Fath and Mayrargue (2014).

8 See issues 136 (December 2015) and 141 (March 2016) of *Politique africaine*, having, respectively, as themes 'Blackness' and 'Polyphonies of rap', or issue 254 (2015/2) of *Afrique Contemporaine* ('Musique et pouvoir. Pouvoir des musiques dans les Afriques').

laws⁹ created, on the one hand, in rupture with the laws established by the colonial powers but, on the other hand, within a diaspora derived from servile communities' experiences. Olabode Omojola speaks, as expected, of the political uses of rap by African youths, often to challenge but not exclusively.¹⁰ However, one of the originalities of his study lies in his 'cosmopolitan Black aesthetic' approach which, on both sides of the Atlantic, incorporates multiple African performances. Another very interesting point in his chapter comes from the fact that it affects different regions and that it follows the routes of each musical genre, including rumba.¹¹ Finally, his analysis of hybrid rap in Nigeria highlights the creativity of youth that perfectly combines foreign contributions, especially English, as well as Nigerian cultural elements: languages, rhythms, popular musical genres. Moreover, 'transnational cultural expressions and national symbolic practices' converge in the same manner as in Algeria (Miliani, 2002).

While Jan Vansina allocated a section to cinema in one of the chapters of Volume VII of UNESCO's *General History of Africa* (Vansina, 1998), the importance of the art of cinema and the latest research on this topic made it necessary to revisit this theme. Aboubakar Sanogo does so, and from a fundamentally different perspective. Leaving aside an approach by country or by region, he proposes a very structured synthesis of the archaeology of contemporary African cinema. This history, which goes back to the origins of cinematic art, is reflected in politics, from colonization to the present day, passing through the decisive decades of decolonization and independence. Each cinema era corresponds to one of these three periods and has its own characteristics. There are, however, two permanent threads. On the one hand, Africans have always been able to seize the opportunities offered by this art to become actors, even in the context of domination. On the other hand, cinema has contributed to the broadening of their horizons on a continental scale, thanks notably to film festivals and to their access to the globalized world by virtue of Nollywood and the 'diasporization of the political economy' in its various aspects (technological advances, development of cinema in collaboration with great directors, financing of films, etc). Reminiscent of the era of structural adjustment policies, the stakes are such that states are again meeting the challenges of cinema: decline in cinema attendance, production crisis, and competition from other media.¹²

9 Omojola agrees with White (2002).

10 In Tanzania, for example, hip-hop artists invite Pan-African dialogue. See Clark (2014).

11 See also White (2002).

12 See also Forest (2011). He emphasizes the importance of going to the cinema, a small investment on the economic level, but an 'instance of high symbolic value' for films and directors.

The title of Mshai Mwangola's chapter, 'Reading *Leso*. African Fabric as a Gateway to the World', examines a common type of clothing, occasionally considered as a simple indicator of ethnic identity that has never changed. This is true for Swahili attire (*leso* in Mombasa or *kanga* in Ugunja), but both are nevertheless complex products with a long history of trade between the eastern coast of Africa and Asia, but also America and Europe. Far from being mere consumers, Africans have obtained fabrics from foreign manufacturers that they have adapted to their own taste.¹³ However, these fabrics, which mark the continent in a globalized world, are especially meaningful for East African societies in specific contexts, because all clothing is language.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the *leso*, just like the *bogolan* in West Africa, has penetrated the world of fashion and, as a result, has recently started another journey (Touré, 2018). Indeed, since the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, African creations have gained a place in the fashion world at an international level, represented by stylists – men and women – living on the continent or members of the diaspora, including those established in Paris (Berloquin-Chassany, 2006). These are some of the many signs of African dynamism, with Caribbean artists also seeking to reconnect with their roots and giving substance to Global African identity.

As illustrated by her career, Yolanda Wood is ideally placed to talk about artistic movement between the shores of the Atlantic. She takes the examples of Cuban and Haitian people, whose islands have privileged relations with the continent from where they descend, making the Atlantic 'just a stream between Brazil and Africa', according to President Lula da Silva (Mukasonga, 2018, p. 93). These relations have gained importance since the independence of African countries and the changes in world geopolitics, following the affirmation of the Third World and the strengthening of South-South cooperation. The 1960s and 1970s saw the exchanges of musicians between Cuba and Africa, resulting in interesting cross-experiences. But these exchanges, within the framework of an interstate cultural partnership, were affected in Mali by political dynamics (Djebbari, 2015). Yolanda Wood focuses on the visual arts. Established in 1984, the Havana Biennial, identified as the Third World Biennial, welcomed artists from all over Africa at its second session, who thus stood to gain international recognition. For its part, the AfricAmerica Foundation of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, began organizing in the late 1990s a transcultural forum of contemporary art,

13 Jeremy Prestholt, quoted by our colleague Mshai Mwangola, has done detailed research on these processes. See also Prestholt (2008).

14 Such as attire made for election campaigns, see Grassin (2016).

a place of expression of great diversity (from sculpture and painting to cuisine). Moreover, Caribbean artists draw inspiration from Africa. Barbara Prézeau, who is Haitian, chose Senegal to realize a geography of art, imagined in terms of mixed space. The Cuban Manuel Mendive, known for his depictions of *orishas*, went on a journey to discover Yoruba culture.

All the chapters in this section testify to the 'integration of African societies into global historical processes, thus clearly breaking with the presumptions of isolation and anti-historicism that were attributed to them for a long time', to quote Thomas Fouquet in his remark about the African construction of 'Blackness' (Fouquet, 2014). This integration involves the opening up to other opportunities, which consequently has given rise to a remarkable inventiveness. The processes resulting from these encounters always result in creativity. Indeed, despite the challenges and crises of the last decades of the twentieth century, African societies have always demonstrated their ability to act, with the expression and scope of action depending, obviously, on relevant contexts, settings and categories.

The energy of youth and changes in gender relations have come to the surface through education and the greater individual mobility of women. In addition, the propensity of city-dwellers to open up to horizons broader than those of rural populations has been evoked on frequent occasions, although the latter are now better connected to the rest of the world. Thus, 'the city is the place par excellence where African cosmopolitanism is redefined and a new Afropolitan urban culture is being invented' (Awondo, 2014). Achille Mbembe, who reminds us of the concept of Afropolitanism, and who appeared in the African diaspora in London and in the cities of South Africa, uses it to account for the 'fluidity and constituent movement of African history' (Awondo, 2014). This implies the acceptance of various legacies and hybridization phenomena. Such a position obviously sparks debate, particularly because the concept, moreover elitist, is only relevant to cities.

In any case, we can only reaffirm the ever-changing fabric of foreign identities towards which the continent is increasingly opening itself. At the same time, Africa's peoples and the diaspora aspire to see Africa endowed with a strong identity and faithful to the ideals of Pan-Africanism, according to Agenda 2063. In a way, the challenge is to become part of the world, while preserving Africa's values and wealth.

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CHAPTER 1

POPULATION GROWTH IN AFRICA, THE IMPACT OF NUMBERS

Issues and Challenges

Cécile Marie Zoungrana and Pierre Klissou

Introduction

This chapter examines four main points related to the population explosion in Africa and its challenges: i) the demographic weight of Africa in the world; ii) the situation in some countries; iii) the key consequences of population growth; and iv) the challenges to be met to take advantage of this growth.

This topic has been investigated intensively, as shown in the work of the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (INED) led by Gilles Pison and represented by the publications by Tabutin (1991) and Tabutin and Schoumaker (2004). Our main sources include INED's 'Population and Societies' series (Pison, 2015) and data supplied by the UN (World Population Prospects), which collects information annually from national bureaus of statistics and international organizations. Similarly, we have used specific indicators from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and world population reports by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Africa's demographic weight

Overview

According to the United Nations, in 2015, the planet was home to 7.35 billion people, with 1.19 billion of them Africans. This African population had exploded: from 229 million in the 1950s to over 1.19 billion in 2015, with a projected 2.5 billion people by 2050 in less than 35 years (Table 1). Although population growth in every other region was slowing down, Africa's population has continued to rise: from 9.4% in 1960 to 11.9% in 1990, to the 2015 level of 16.1%, with a projected 25.5% by 2050 (Table 1 and Figure 1). This means that in the future, one person in four will be African. According to Tabutin (1991), 'we are witnessing a real rebalancing of the human population on a global scale because Africa is actually catching up with a demographic lag resulting from the past three centuries of slave trading and colonization.'

Table 1. *Population of the world and major areas from 1950 to 2050 (According to the medium variant projection, UN estimate, July 2015; population in millions)*

Region	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015	2050
Africa	9.1	9.4	9.9	10.8	11.9	13.3	15.1	16.1	25.5
Asia	55.2	55.9	57.6	59.1	60.3	60.6	60.2	59.8	54.2
Europe	21.8	20.1	17.8	15.6	13.6	11.9	10.6	10.0	7.3
Latin America	6.7	7.3	7.8	8.2	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.1
North America	6.8	6.8	6.3	5.7	5.3	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.5
Oceania	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6
World	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Population size	2,525.2	3,018.4	3,682.5	4,439.6	5,309.7	6,126.6	6,929.7	7,349.5	9,725.2

Source: Zoungrana and Klissou, based on United Nation (2015).





FIGURE 1. *Population growth rates (2010–2015) in African countries*
Source: Zoungrana & Klissou, United Nations projections (2015).

Many African countries (if not the majority) have an annual growth rate of around 3%. If nothing changes, this figure is set to double on average every twenty-five years (see Graphic 1). According to INED (Pison, 2015), seven of the thirty most populous countries in the world in 2015 were in Africa: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. By 2050, eleven of the thirty most populous countries will be in Africa, representing an extraordinary increase.

There are several reasons for this rapid increase. First, the high birth rate. In general, families have many children and there is a slow and steady decline in fertility. On average, an African woman has 4.7 children, compared to the global average of 2.5. In Niger, for example, the average family has 8 children (the highest birth rate per woman in the world); with 6.6 children in Somalia,

6.2 in the Central African Republic, 6 in Burkina Faso and 5.5 in Nigeria. The high fertility rate in the region is mainly due to: i) early and universal marriage; ii) low use of modern birth control; and iii) a decline in breastfeeding and post-partum sexual abstinence due to pressures of work, urbanization, and a loss of momentum for traditional norms in African societies.

Second, there has been a significant drop in mortality rate (disrupted by epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, and more recently, Ebola). Improvements to sanitary conditions have boosted life expectancy at birth to 58 years compared to the 1960s. Nevertheless, infant mortality remains high (59%) with almost 100 deaths per 1,000 children under the age of one in several countries: Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone (92), Chad and Angola (95), DRC (108) and Central African Republic (109).



GRAPHIC 1. Average annual population growth rate (%)
per major region from 1950 to 2050

Source: Zoungrana and Klissou, based on United Nation (2015).

Diversity in major regions

The population growth rate is slower in Southern and Northern Africa, which have more urbanized areas, whereas Central and East Africa, with more rural populations, have the highest growth levels, followed by West Africa. The countries most affected by a decline in fertility are shown in blue (North America) and green (Europe) in Graphic 1. According to projections by the United Nations (2015), by 2050, the population will reach 453 million in East Africa and 435 million in West Africa, compared to 14 million in North Africa.

Table 2. *Socio-demographic indicators for African regions in 2015*

Region	North Africa	West Africa	East Africa	Central Africa	South Africa	Africa	World
Population (in millions)	223.9	353.2	394.5	152.0	62.6	1,186.2	7,349.5
Total fertility rate (number of children per woman)	3.4	5.4	4.8	6.1	2.7	4.7	2.5
Life expectancy Both genders (in years)	70.5	55	61	52	61	59.5	71
Population growth (%) 2010-2015	1.89	2.74	2.81	3.03	1.17	2.55	1.18
Gross national income per capita in 2014 (in US dollars)	9,741	4,041	1,928	2,684	12,288	4,720	15,103

Source: Zoungrana and Klissou, United Nations (2015), INED (Pisons, 2015).

By 2050, changes are predicted in the figures for the following countries (in order): Nigeria (398 million), DRC (195 million), Ethiopia (188 million), Egypt (151 million), Tanzania (137 million), Kenya (95 million), Niger (72 million) and Mozambique (65 million). Countries with a high population growth rate include Niger (3.9%), Burundi (3.3%), Burkina Faso (3.2%) and DRC (3%).

Major consequences of high population growth

One feature of this rapid population growth is the youthful profile of the population in all the countries south of the Sahara. In fact, while around one in four people in the world are under 25 years of age (26%), this percentage rises to 41% in Africa overall, ranging from 43% in West and East Africa to 46% in Central Africa. Indeed, the 45% mark is exceeded by most African countries south of the Sahara. This high proportion of young people poses serious and well-recognized challenges relating to social needs, such as investments in education, health and jobs. Failure to meet these needs can result in growing insecurity, an increase in criminal activity, and disturbances to public order, especially in cities.

Furthermore, population displacement towards cities and out of rural areas creates problems directly linked to high population growth and, of course, to the living conditions of the population overall. In 2010, UN-HABITAT published its report *The State of African Cities* which indicated that the number of city dwellers, 400 million people in 2009 or 40% of the population, would jump to the billion

mark by 2040 (60%). The most urbanized regions are the coastal areas. Today, 45% of city dwellers reside in megalopolises such as Abidjan, Cairo, Casablanca, Dakar, Johannesburg, Kinshasa and Lagos. According to the same source, Lagos and Kinshasa were likely to become the eleventh and twelfth largest cities in the world by 2025. Today, Kinshasa is ranked twelfth and Lagos is ranked thirteenth (according to the World Population Review 2025), showing how the 2010 report was remarkably prescient. One out of two Nigerians lives in an urban environment. However, this level of urbanization is not the same for all countries. The urbanization rate in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia and Uganda barely exceeds 25%. This development poses enormous challenges in terms of city management as well as the consequences of large-scale emigration of people to neighbouring countries or towards the West, as evidenced by many articles on the topic in the international press in recent years. Other consequences of urbanization include the difficulty of accessing decent housing and the creation of slums on the outskirts of cities, with increasing marginalization of certain sectors of the urban population.

Finally, a further major consequence of this population growth is related to the 'pressure on exerted agriculture'. According to NEPAD: 'Feeding 1.2 billion people in 2015 and 2.5 billion by 2050 is a huge challenge that Africa will have to face' (NEPAD, 2013). Indeed, according to FAO statistics, one in four malnourished people in the world lives in Africa; this malnutrition particularly impacts children, stunting their development potential. Given the prevalence of family agriculture, which relies mainly on labour by family members, African countries need to introduce a new vision that simultaneously tackles a number of agricultural, demographic, social (poverty, employment, inequality, gender), environmental (protection of natural resources and biodiversity), territorial (spatial planning, population control) and food-related issues. In 2010, out of the 44 African countries that had available data, only nine had reached or exceeded the objective of spending 10% of public expenditure on agriculture. Given the importance of agriculture, which supports almost 48% of Africa's population, a radical change in governance is therefore necessary.

The demographic dividend or how can population growth become a development tool?

Several challenges stem from this unprecedented population boom in Africa. This summary focuses mainly on two key elements: good governance and the harnessing of the demographic dividend by African states. Indeed,

as Pison observed: 'humanity will not, however, manage to avert an extra 1 to 3 billion inhabitants between now and the next half century because of demographic inertia that no one can prevent. On the other hand, it is possible to take action on lifestyles immediately to make them greener and resource-efficient' (Pison, 2011). The real concern now is how to mobilize political will in order to recognize the problems and inequalities and therefore remedy them by implementing appropriate strategies that allocates sufficient funds for programmes. The post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, adopted by the United Nations in September 2015, focuses on a development that meets the needs of current generations without compromising the capacity of future generations to respond to their own particular needs. It is a great opportunity to capitalize on youth, and to recognize young people's rights and the advantages of the 'demographic dividend'.

The demographic dividend is defined as the potential economic growth that can result from shifts in a population's age structure, mainly when the share of the working age population (ages 15 to 64) is greater than the non-working-age share of the population (under age 15). With fewer dependents to support, a country has a window of opportunity for rapid economic growth, as long as this is accompanied by appropriate strategies to promote human capital, employment and investments in health, education and governance.

Of course, given the diversity of situations in Africa, harnessing the demographic dividend will not be uniform. The demographic transition has begun in countries in North Africa and in some African countries south of the Sahara, such as Kenya. The youthful profile of the population in most African countries should provide an opportunity to make strategic choices and invest in education, health (especially reproductive health and family planning), employment and new technologies to increase productivity and future economic returns.

It might also be appropriate to address some of the disagreements caused by the demographic dividend. In fact, it is a concept that deserves more scrutiny by socio-political and economic players, that is, it should not demystify the terminology but facilitate the exploitation of the window of opportunity it provides. As observed by PPD: 'The demographic dividend isn't just contingent upon birth rates, it also requires social and economic policies, especially an openness to trade, flexible employment markets and investments in human capital, including education and public health' (PPD, 2013). In fact, 'it's not... automatic that the rise in labour per inhabitant as a result of a favourable age structure and increased supply of female labour produces a demographic dividend' (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003, quoted by Canning et al., 2016).

Similarly, countries with better governance and market-orientated economic policies enjoy significant economic advantages when youth fertility and dependency rates decline. 'However, when good governance and appropriate economic policies are absent, the effects of labour supply can be wasted and countries may miss their demographic window of opportunity and subsequently fail to benefit from the demographic dividend' (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2003, quoted by Canning et al., 2016).

Conclusion

Despite numerous disruptions (social and political crises, HIV-AIDS, various epidemics), Africa's population has exploded on an unprecedented scale. This population is also characterized by a high youth profile in almost every country. However, could the economic miracle experienced by countries in East Asia, such as China, India, Malaysia and Thailand, become a reality for many African countries? That depends on their ability to create a stable economic, social and political environment conducive to growth, and above all, that creates the conditions for young people to make a healthy and safe transition from adolescence to adulthood. The youth would have access to the skills base necessary to secure satisfactory employment, achieve success in a dynamic economic context, enjoy and exercise their human rights, and realize their full potential. The promotion of growth via the demographic dividend will require an investment in youth.

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CHAPTER 2

EPIDEMICS IN AFRICA AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A Continuous Threat and a Major Challenge for Health Systems

Marie-Roseline Darnycka Bélizaire and Sosthène Zombre

This chapter discusses three key aspects of the problem of epidemics in Africa: their trajectories in relation to international trade; their recurrence and key prevention strategies undertaken by the countries; and their early detection and effective response.

An epidemic is defined as the rapid and sudden spread of an infectious disease to a large number of people in a certain area. A pandemic, meanwhile, is the spread of an epidemic to a whole continent or to the whole world. Outbreaks can be bacterial or viral. They are, in most cases, highly contagious with a very high rate of propagation. Epidemics have always presented a great challenge to humanity. Communities are often gravely affected by loss of life, economic depression and social chaos. Often of unexpected origin and with an unidentified past trajectory, they have been known to decimate between twenty to thirty per cent of the population of affected communities. In 430 BCE, for example, a smallpox epidemic shrank the population of Athens in Greece by twenty per cent (Retief, Cilliers, 1999).

This contribution provides a brief update on major epidemics in Africa in the early twenty-first century, focusing on sub-Saharan Africa and on the response measures undertaken by countries, with the help of partners, to minimize their impact.

Flows and spread of epidemics to Africa

The Justinian Plague began in 541, lasted nearly 200 years and killed about 50 million people in the Middle East, Asia and the Mediterranean basin. By the year 567, it had spread to North Africa, brought by travellers. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Europeans travelling in this part of the continent described a series of infectious diseases. Most of these were probably introduced by immigrants from Europe or the Middle East. The third plague pandemic began in the late nineteenth century (1894) in Yunnan in China. By 1896, it had struck Madagascar.¹

Several diseases, becoming endemic in Africa, have also been introduced from other continents. Cholera is one such example. First encountered in the Indian subcontinent, the disease spread worldwide during the nineteenth century along the trade routes (Sarkar, Kanungo and Nair, 2012). The six subsequent cholera pandemics have killed millions of people on every continent. The current pandemic, the seventh, started in South Asia in 1961 and reached Africa in 1971, where cholera is now prevalent. Smallpox was also imported into Africa in the sixteenth century by European settlers (Collins and Burns, 2014). This disease was introduced in 1755 in Cape Town, South Africa, by infected Europeans from East India. In 1864 and 1865, a major epidemic struck Namibia and Angola which practically led to the annihilation of trade due to the depopulation of central Angola. In the twentieth century, the influenza pandemic, commonly known as 'Spanish flu', whose Chinese origin is still uncertain and which resulted in the deaths of between 20 to 50 million people worldwide, pursued its rampage in North and South Africa in the last months of 1918 (Philips, 2014).

More recently, in the early twenty-first century (in 2000), a meningococcal NmW135 cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic spread from Saudi Arabia. It travelled across the African continent, affecting countries including Burkina Faso, Central Africa, Chad, Niger and Senegal. In 2002, this strain resulted in more than 1,447 deaths in Burkina Faso (Nicolas, 2012). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), first reported in China in 2002, affected South Africa in April 2003.²

Today's extraordinary network of connections, especially by air, has shortened distances, brought people closer and transformed our world into a very compact and connected 'village'. A 2017 report by the International Civil Aviation

1 Geneawiki. *Nos ancêtres et la peste*. https://fr.geneawiki.com/wiki/Nos_ancêtres_et_la_peste

2 World Health Organization (WHO). *Preparedness and response: Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS*, 11 July 2003.

Organization (ICAO), indicated that 3.7 billion passengers travelled on scheduled services worldwide in 2016.

Africa accounts for 3% of the global market for international passenger air traffic, measured in revenue passenger kilometres (RPK); the African international air traffic market grew from 2.3% in 2015 to 5.7% in 2016.³ The exchanges have had a positive impact on African economies, but they have also increased the risk of spreading infectious diseases, not only within the continent but also from Africa to other continents and vice versa. Consequently, we have witnessed an increase in the number of outbreaks in the first two decades of the twenty-first century compared to the last decades of the twentieth century.

Africa, permanently exposed to the risk of epidemics

With its environmental, economic, social and cultural characteristics, Africa was and still is, in the twenty-first century, a continent where communicable diseases spread easily and rapidly, and they are frequently deadly.


The continent has undeniable environmental assets: a steady climate and a rich biosphere, mainly in the tropical and equatorial regions. However, this situation is also conducive to the proliferation of disease vectors (mosquitoes) and of microorganisms responsible for various diseases, affecting a large number of its inhabitants.

According to scientists, yellow fever evolved in Africa 3,000 years before our era. It was exported to the American continent on ships carrying enslaved people from West Africa at the turn of the seventeenth century.⁴ Typhus and tuberculosis also appeared during the seventeenth century in Africa. The spread of epidemics on the continent is due to a number of factors, that include poor economic and sanitary conditions, a capped slice of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dedicated to health, inadequate health care systems and poverty, all of which limits people's access to care. In addition, traditional rituals and beliefs based on myths and legends lead to behaviours that are detrimental to health. The great majority of Africans officially proclaim to be Christian or Muslim, but they have not relinquished their local religions or customs (Tshibangu, Ade Ajayi and Sanneh, 1998). Funeral practices provide a good example, which involves

3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In 2016, increase in airline traffic and profitability were important elements of air transport.

4 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Office of Surveillance, Epidemiology and Laboratory services. Scientific Education and Professional Development Programme. History Timeline Transcript of Yellow fever.

washing and dressing the corpse, lengthy vigils, prayers for the dead, and burials that relatives and friends attend in large numbers. In Guinea, 60% of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic was the result of relatives participating in washing and dressing the deceased.⁵ Other practices that are likely to promote the spread of epidemics include eating from the same plate, using only hands in places with very poor hygiene, sleeping on the same large mats, and frequent visits to the sick.



GRAPHIC 1. *Epidemics' frequency between 2000 and 2006.*

Source: Marie-Roseline Darnycka Belizaire and Sosthène Zombré, based on Epidemic Overview 2011-2017, OMS AFRO, March 2017.


Moreover, despite the recommendations made by the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union in 2005⁶, the literacy rate remains low on the continent: in 2016, 26% of illiterate adults in the world lived in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷ All these socio-cultural factors contribute to the spread of outbreaks.

5 WHO. *Alerte au niveau mondial. Obstacles à un endiguement rapide de la flambée de maladie à virus Ebola*, 11 August 2014.

6 African Union (AU), UNESCO document, Education and culture in Africa's quest for development, Conference of Ministers of Education of the AU (COMEDAF II), 1st Ordinary Session 8-11 April 2005, Algeria, http://ocpa.irmo.hr/resources/docs/COMEDAFII_Unesco_EdCultRole-en.pdf

7 UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS). 2016. *Information Bulletin*, No. 38, September, <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/fs38-50th-anniversary-of-international-literacy-day-literacy-rates-are-on-the-rise-but-millions-remain-illiterate-2016-fr.pdf>

In accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR), from 1969 and revised in 2005, countries must notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of epidemics affecting them and posing a threat to the international community. As a reminder, the IHR impose an obligation on the Member States to put in place the minimum requirements to detect, notify and respond to public health emergencies in a timely and adequate manner. The regulations are organized around 19 technical areas.



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The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

FIGURE 1. *Geographic distribution of epidemics in Africa*

Source: Marie-Roseline Darnycka Belizaire and Sosthène Zombré, based on Epidemic Overview 2011-2017, OMS AFRO, March 2017.

The WHO region of Malawi⁸ recorded 602 infectious incidents (including poliomyelitis) from November 2000 to December 2006 (Figure 1). For this period, the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported 12.29% (74 out of 602) of the epidemics: an average of 14 infectious incidents per year (2001–2006) and at least one epidemic per month. This is followed by Nigeria at 10.13% (61/602). Uganda and Kenya were also severely affected, with more than 30 reports. However, discrepancies between these figures and the exact extent of the disease burden is likely because many of the cases go undetected due to weaknesses in surveillance systems and countries' fears of the negative impacts on the population, trade and tourism. The most common diseases are cholera, yellow fever, meningococcal meningitis, measles, wild-type poliomyelitis, typhoid fever and shigellosis. In total, there were 164 cholera epidemics between 2001 and 2006. In 2003, 18 cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) were reported.

From 2011 to 2017⁹, a total of 447 outbreaks were reported in Africa. The polio epidemics are excluded from this tally, as this critical illness was the subject of a special reporting process throughout this period. The most common infections are of zoonotic viral origin. However, pathogens of bacterial and parasitic origin also play an important role in the proliferation of epidemics on the continent. The most affected countries have common characteristics: vast territories, a high number of inhabitants, and a low Human Development Index (HDI) of between 0.353 and 0.527. Nevertheless, these countries have benefited from the programme to strengthen the epidemiological surveillance system for part of the studied period (Figure 1).

The analysis of outbreaks per year, during the second decade of the twentieth century, shows a curve with peaks of over 70 incidents in 2012 and 2016. The situation was fairly stable between 2013 and 2015, with rates ranging between 61 and 63 epidemics. It should be recalled that the years 2014–2016 were particularly marked by the deadly Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic. However, outbreaks have been on the rise since the beginning of 2017. A total of 134 outbreaks occurred in 39 countries during 2017, the most common of which were due to viral haemorrhagic fever (28%), cholera (10%) and measles (8%).

8 The WHO African region comprises 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, plus Algeria for North Africa.

9 The analysis was conducted in March 2017 by the Infectious Risk Management Programme of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme. The data was collected up until February 2017.

The fight against epidemics, and prospects for the future

Measures to combat epidemics are logistical, operational and financial in nature. To protect their populations, African countries are getting organized: opening quarantine wards in hospitals, building medical centres and clinics, raising public awareness, and implementing vaccination policies (routine immunization and public campaigns). Thanks to the development of vaccines and antibiotics, some diseases, which were previously devastating, such as smallpox, meningitis, measles, cholera, tetanus and diphtheria, have seen a significant reduction of their impact on mortality rates in Africa.¹⁰

Since 1998, Member States in the WHO African Region have developed an Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy across the continent. The first edition of the *IDSR Technical Guidelines* was widely adopted and adapted throughout the African region at the beginning of the twenty-first century (2002). The IDSR system integrates and empowers communities to get actively involved in prevention strategies (community-based surveillance). This makes it possible to set up early warning systems and to quickly organize the response. The social mobilization of populations is therefore essential for implementing this strategy.

While the Ebola outbreak between 2014 and 2016 posed a potential threat to regional and global health security, it nevertheless drew attention, once again, to the implementation of IHR 2005 and the need for countries to have strong health systems to respond to such incidents. Aware of this, governments have adapted their readiness and response to public health emergencies according to the different global and regional strategies. Between 2016 and early 2018 on the African continent, 35 countries conducted an assessment of their readiness and response to public health emergencies. A joint external audit assigned scores to the 48 core capacity indicators of the IHR, while identifying priority measures for each country according to its capacities at the time of the assessment. These priority measures must be used to develop a national action plan for health safety, to which all concerned partners must align.

These strategies go beyond the tackling of epidemics. Indeed, countries are strengthening their capacities to be ready to respond to all hazards (biological, chemical, radioactive, natural disasters) that could pose a public health concern

10 WHO. *Statistiques sanitaires mondiales 2014*, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/131954/1/9789240692688_fre.pdf?ua=1; WHO. *La santé des populations: les mesures efficaces : Le rapport sur la santé dans la Région africaine*, <https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/164352>; WHO. *Activités de l'OMS dans la région africaine : Rapport biennal 2014-2015 de la Directrice régionale de l'OMS pour l'Afrique*, <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/195009/9789290312178.pdf>.

of international scope. The initiatives were put in place in collaboration with various partners (Global Fund,¹¹ GAVI,¹² IHP+,¹³ HHA¹⁴ and others) who are active in health programmes on the continent. Key agreements were drawn up with Pasteur institutes to identify certain types of infectious agents causing epidemics, and for quality control in laboratory diagnostics. Similar agreements were made with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC Atlanta) in the USA regarding quality control and the enhancement of laboratories' capacities, epidemiological surveillance, and training in field epidemiology. Operations development partners (multilateral or bilateral cooperation, international NGOs) have supported access to care initiatives for populations, thus contributing to strengthening global health security. The United Nations system supports governments in all aspects of epidemic management and other health emergencies. In 2005, the UN adopted the sectoral responsibility approach to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian action. Indeed, the WHO, as a leader in the health sector, encourages and continuously advocates active leadership and a more substantial commitment from governments in identifying the needs and management of aid in Africa. It provides support in development, makes available manuals and guides, and promotes wide-ranging training in all countries on the continent. Indeed, the WHO assists countries in adopting key strategies for managing epidemics.

Operationally, African countries have put in place coordination mechanisms at both national and multinational level, in collaboration with partners, NGOs and the communities themselves. Many countries have established health emergency operations centres. Today, there is a concerted effort to consolidate national programmes for the prevention and control of infections, the treatment of cases, the empowerment of national laboratories, epidemiological surveillance and the development of emergency logistics, including the provision of emergency services in locations identified during periodic risk assessments.

11 Established in 2002, the Global Fund is an international public-private financing mechanism and not an executive agency. The Global Fund, however, works in partnership with countries and executive agencies to improve health prospects.

12 The GAVI Alliance (previously, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization), established in 2001, is a global public-private partnership that brings together developing countries, private and public partners, international organizations and the vaccine industry in industrialized and developing countries to increase access to vaccinations in the most deprived countries.

13 IHP+ (International Health Partnership) was created in 2007 to improve MDG (Millennium Development Goals) prospects and ensure universal access to health services. It became UHC2030 in 2016 to advance health-related SDGs.

14 HHA (Harmonization for Health in Africa) is a regional mechanism established in 2006, which includes the regional directors of United Nations institutions and development agencies active in the health sector.

The tackling of the EVD epidemic has highlighted the importance of getting people involved in risk management. This has optimized the chances of obtaining convincing results. By being more aware of life's hazards, but also by anticipating them, populations can better protect themselves through the acquisition of knowledge and by changing their behaviour, drawn from memory, life experience and family education. Community involvement is essential in counteracting outbreaks. While many response and prevention strategies must be implemented and coordinated by the state to be effective, the fight must include a set of actions undertaken by communities that integrate them into their cultural practices. These actions must also lead to an adaptation of funerary rites to ensure the safe and dignified burial of the deceased, as demanded by the communities. The lessons learned from tackling the EVD were evident in the recent handling of the plague epidemic in Madagascar in 2017, when steps were taken to ensure burials respected local customs while adhering to health regulations.

Governments need to foster close cooperation with the communities through health campaigns that integrate health concepts into people's daily lives so that the remedies in cultural behaviour can also happen naturally. Communities need to be actively involved in public health to benefit more from services and to get better results in impacting the lives of individuals. Countries must work with communities to obtain their collective and individual commitment to fight epidemics. It is now imperative to involve the community in public health actions when there is no epidemic so as to ensure consistent conduct when an epidemic does arise. For example, mass vaccination programmes at multinational level were implemented across Africa in the fight against polio, measles and meningococcal meningitis. In 2010, the meningitis belt countries launched a large-scale vaccination programme against meningococcal meningitis A using a revolutionary vaccine that provided immunity for more than ten years. More than 100 million people were vaccinated between 2010 and 2015, and more than 116 million in 2017.

In 2006, the 'Yellow Fever Initiative' was launched to ensure a global supply of yellow fever vaccine and to boost immunity in the population. From 2007 to 2016, thanks to this initiative, 14 countries conducted preventive vaccination programmes against yellow fever and more than 105 million people received the vaccine. After the epidemic, the 193 WHO member states adopted a new programme designed to address all the risks that could endanger public health swiftly, appropriately and with the principle of 'no regrets'. This programme has

helped to meet the immediate needs of populations affected by health crises and, at the same time, lowered their vulnerability.¹⁵

On the financial side, most countries have formulated their own plans for the speedy provision of resources. The regional economic communities, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ensured coordination at the subregional level.

In 2012, the African Public Health Emergency Fund was created. It is funded by contributions from all 47 members of the WHO African Region with the purpose of helping countries in difficulty. It is essentially a solidarity fund for epidemics. Countries also have the opportunity to appeal to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) established by the United Nations System. Other logistics partners and donors also have rapid financing mechanisms for emergencies that are available to countries in need, with the aid either paid directly to governments or through international NGOs.¹⁶ Through the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE), the World Bank has supported West African countries in enhancing animal and human health systems to fight against infectious diseases. With a budget of US\$114.06 million, this project covered the period 2017-2023 and comprised five main components: i) surveillance and information systems; ii) laboratory capacity enhancement; iii) emergency readiness and response; iv) human resource management for effective disease surveillance and preparedness for epidemics; and v) strengthening the institutional capacity for project management and coordination.

Thus, epidemics remain a major public health issue in Africa. Indeed, the continent is the epicentre of the health challenges of the twenty-first century. Significant efforts to tackle the problem are being made by countries and the international community, with encouraging results and sustained enthusiasm. However, while some diseases are becoming scarce, new micro-organisms are emerging that are resistant to antimicrobials and are threatening to destabilize

15 WHO. *Statistiques sanitaires mondiales 2014*, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/131954/1/9789240692688_fre.pdf?ua=1; WHO. *La santé des populations : les mesures efficaces : Le rapport sur la santé dans la Région africaine 2014*, <https://iris.who.int/handle/10665/164352>; WHO. *Activités de l'OMS dans la région africaine : rapport biennal 2014-2015 de la Directrice régionale*, <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/195009/9789290312178.pdf>

16 WHO. *Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR)*. 2010.

not only health systems but also African economies, making the fight against epidemics a crucial component of development. It is also important to note the presence of other humanitarian crises (armed conflicts, massive displacements of populations, terrorism), which increase the risks of epidemics and hamper their management. Nevertheless, African states should use the fight against epidemics as an opportunity to enhance their health systems as a whole and to advance towards establishing a universal health system, not least because a population deprived of basic health care cannot ensure its economic and social development.

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CHAPTER 3

KINSHASA

An African Metropolis and a Singular City

Charles Tshimanga

Introduction

Kinshasa, a tropical city, is located between 4°19' South latitude and 15°18' East longitude on the southern bank of the Congo River in the Pool Malebo (formerly Stanley Pool) region. The city has several geographical advantages, including the Congo River and its tributaries. The river, 4700 km long, is the gateway to central Africa and, from Kinshasa, it offers a navigable network of over 10,000 km, giving access to regions as far away as Katanga in the southeast. It thus constitutes a dense communications hub whose immense economic potential grew exponentially in 1898 with the arrival of the Matadi-Léopoldville (Kinshasa) railway. A riverside plain, with an altitude of about 300 m above sea level, spreads out to Maluku and offers nearly 250 km² of land suitable for urbanization (Pain, 1984, p. 33). What is referred to as the 'lower town' (*ville basse*) developed here. Hills rise to an altitude of between 600 m and 700 m, including Mount Ngaliema, Ngafula, Amba, Djelo-Binza and Binza-Antenne in the west, and the Batékés plateau and Mangengenge Peak in the east. These hills surround the 'lower town' and it is on these flanks that an 'unplanned city' emerged following independence in June 1960. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the entire site occupied 9,965 km², with an urbanized area of about 500 km².

The capital city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the centre of political power, Kinshasa is also, since 2006, one of Congo's twenty-six provinces. It dominates the whole country in several demographic, economic and cultural domains. With approximately 12 million inhabitants (or fifteen per cent of the country's population) as of 2015, Kinshasa has become one of the great African urban areas after Cairo (Egypt) and Lagos (Nigeria). It is a megalopolis composed of several districts and municipalities, specifically: an ancient nucleus that dates back to 1881 and spreads along the river; cities built between 1907 and 1960; 'peripheral' and 'eccentric' municipalities that developed in the years following the country's independence in 1960; and, finally, more recent rural districts/communes, such as Maluku, Nselé, Menkao, Kingakati, Mambukuta, Kinzono, etc. (Figure 1).

Spatial evolution and uncontrolled growth of the city

The town developed around an initial nucleus, the site of Chief Teke Ngobila's former village where explorer Henry Stanley built a settlement post called Leopoldville in December 1881 (formerly Mount Leopold and former West Leo, now Mount Ngaliema). A second, more active pole, located in the east, named Kinshasa or Léo Est, was 'created' in 1883. This second pole takes its name (Kinshasa) from the village of Chief Teke Ntsuvila and groups together port, rail and commercial activities, while industrial establishments mark the life of Ndolo. A third nucleus developed between the first two, in Kalina, from 1930 onwards. It was there that the state's administrative services, European residences, schools and a hospital were installed (Tshimanga, 2001, pp. 57–58). These three poles located in the northwest region – the political and economic centre of the city up to the beginning of the twenty-first century – are stretched along the river.

It was at this original location that the workers' camps called 'Indigenous cities' were built between 1907 and 1960, the oldest of which became in 1957 the municipalities of Kinshasa, Lingwala (formerly Saint John) and Barumbu. In the same period, the 'city' of Kintambo was founded in the southwest. Between 1945 and 1955, the 'new cities' were built, called Dendale (now Kasa-Vubu), Ngiri-Ngiri and Limete, as well as the Kalamu districts: Renkin (present-day Matonge, 1952), North Yolo (1954) and South Yolo (1955), Camp Cito (now Camp Kauka, 1955) and Foncobel (now Kimbangu). Prior to independence, there were also the municipalities or 'satellite cities' of Ndjili (1954), Bandalungwa (1955), Matete, and Lemba (Fumunzanza Muketa, 2008), all built according to an urban plan.

When Congo gained independence in June 1960, demographic pressure led to the rapid growth of Kinshasa, without a plan and beyond the control of the urban authorities. The new dynamic allowed the city to continue to expand in its eastern region and gave rise to the 'spontaneous neighbourhoods' as well as the 'peripheral' and 'eccentric' communes of Masina, Kimbanseke, Nsele and Maluku. Some of the new neighbourhoods are located on the hillsides, and the majority are without public transportation and/or sanitation services.




FIGURE 1. Map of Kinshasa

Architect Sébastien Goethals (2015), working with Congolese researchers from the Institute of Public Buildings and Works (IBTP) and Chinese researchers from Tongji University, predicted that Kinshasa's population would exceed 17 million in 2025, and more than 30 million in 2050 if strong measures were not taken. They stressed the need to reconfigure Kinshasa into a polycentric city incorporating a second economic and commercial hub located in the east of the megalopolis. They also suggested connecting the original city core in the northwest with the peripheral neighbourhoods by constructing roads and subways.

A young and diverse population

Since its origins, Kinshasa's population has always comprised both the native population of the capital and immigrants. The Belgians recruited thousands of soldiers and workers from Zanzibar, Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the early decades of colonialism. Many of these immigrants settled in Kinshasa and were joined there by Angolans, Asians (originally from Macau) and Europeans, mainly Belgians. In the postcolonial period, people came from Central Africa (Angola, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, etc.), West Africa (Guinea, Mali, Senegal, etc.), China, Lebanon, and European countries, including Belgium. Reliable statistics are not available, however, to reveal the number of foreigners living in Congo's capital. While studies suggest that they make up two per cent of the capital's total population (UNDP, 2009, p.5), it should be emphasized that many foreigners live in Kinshasa illegally without residence permits.

The city's population has grown mainly because of migrants from other parts of the Congo, from the neighbouring provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu, but also from Kasai and Equateur, although the rural exodus seems to have slowed down around the 2000s. That said, there are now more and more people born in Kinshasa; in 2005, they represented 74.8% of the population (INS, 2005). In addition, the majority of Kinois are young: 50.3% are under the age of 20 (UNDP, 2009). Kinshasa is thus a city composed of populations with a wide variety of origins with their own specificities, but they are also developing new identities that continue to evolve as they become Kinois.

Kinshasa: an effervescent popular culture

The suggestions of Sébastien Goethals (2015) and other architects sought to respond to Kinshasa's multiple urbanization challenges. These architects wanted to provide an infrastructure that would link the various agglomerations of this megalopolis of about 12 million inhabitants. Connecting the different neighbourhoods/communes to the west and east of the Ndjili River would provide the beginning of a solution to the lack of urban policy observed in the capital. Indeed, the problems are numerous, including the large number of unfinished houses, inadequate water and electricity supply networks, poor management of household waste, and the lack of hygiene, sanitation and school facilities. There are also the very serious problems of inadequate transportation

in this sprawling city, a tight labour market, the very rapid increase in living costs, increasingly glaring social disparities and tensions between the expanding 'gated city of the rich' and the 'city of the poor' (Maximy and Pain, 1982).

The continuing unplanned anarchic growth in the capital leads to degradation through regressive erosion that aggravates instability and increases the danger of landslides in the hill region (Wouters and Wolff, 2010). In his study, Muamba (2007) found nearly 400 erosion points, posing a serious threat to the city and its inhabitants. In several neighbourhoods/communities, such as Mokali, Kimwenza and Maman Mobutu City in the commune of Mount Ngafula and Camp Badiadingi, these eroded areas threatened to engulf and/or destroy houses, school buildings and clinics (Radio Okapi, 10 March 2014). Similarly, the erosion cuts off roads and makes parts of the city inaccessible, sometimes causing loss of life.

Kinshasa is also characterized by transportation difficulties due, in part, to the configuration of the city. The business centre, as well as the main national and international institutions, are located in Gombe municipality, where many Kinois converge for work and shopping. Every morning during working days, there are movements of people towards the 'city' (the Gombe); in the evening, after working hours, the opposite happens, this time with a very large number of people leaving the Gombe for other districts. All this movement causes monstrous traffic jams and pollution, not to mention the poor condition of the roads. Since the majority of Kinois do not have cars, they pile into taxis and buses, some of which are called 'death spirits'. These vehicles would not be considered roadworthy if they were subject to normal technical inspections. Brakes and radiators are often defective, and most of these buses and taxis lack taillights and exterior rear-view mirrors. According to the newspaper *Le Phare*, these cars are 'moribund wrecks fit for a post-war automobile museum' (*Le Phare*, 21 January 2014). More recently, motorcycle taxis have appeared in the capital and have slightly eased transportation problems, but they are also frequently involved in traffic accidents.

The examples mentioned above are only a small sample of the daily problems experienced by the Kinois. For the untrained observer, the lack of infrastructure and the many other difficulties make Kinshasa a chaotic and dysfunctional city. However, anthropologist, Filip De Boeck, argues that such an analysis does not capture what is invisible. De Boeck does not analyse the city in its materiality or in its declining architecture. On the contrary, borrowing the concept of 'invisible city' from AbdouMalik Simone (2004), he examines the city that non-Kinois do not perceive and describes it in its relationship 'with the words and bodies' of its inhabitants (De Boeck, 2006, p. 84).

Faced with the urban crisis and the lack of political will to address it, the city's inhabitants are redoubling their ingenuity to find a variety of solutions. In the commune of Ndjili, for example, auto repair shops can adapt any car part from one make of car to a car of a different make. Thus, parts from a Renault car are 'adapted' to a Toyota or a Peugeot. Similarly, public places, such as the street, the market, bars, churches, etc., offer meeting spaces where the people of Kinshasa invent their city. This ingenuity can also be found in the city's architecture. One example can be seen in the construction of a Fina gas station that opened in Mont-Ngafula in 2002, which has taken over several other economic activities, including an Internet café, bars and the local bus and taxi terminal (De Boeck, 2006, pp. 89-90). Thus, Kinshasa boasts these many 'signs of life' that Lye Mudaba Yoka (1999) has described, but which an untrained eye does not perceive.

This portrait of Kinshasa, 'invented' and 'reinvented' continuously by its inhabitants, is also shown in *Félicité* (2017), a film by Alain Gomis. The film combines a depiction of the difficult living conditions in the capital with the theme of gender. It tells the story of Félicité, a bar singer in Kinshasa, whose son, injured in a motorcycle accident, requires urgent and costly surgery. The picture of the city and its inhabitants painted in Gomis's film reminds us of Joseph Gugler's description of the unique role that films shot in Africa can play in introducing Westerners to Africa and African populations. Gugler argues that films 'integrate in individual characters multiple aspects of politics, society and culture that tend to be compartmentalized in academic writing, and they endow abstract concepts with readily accessible meaning' (Gugler, 2010, p. 2). On the one hand, the film introduces the viewer to the ruthless world of the dilapidated capital, where corruption is rampant and everything can be bought, from the refuse lying in the streets threatening inhabitants with contamination, to chaos and misery, and to hospitals that treat the sick only for profit. On the other hand, the film illustrates the ingenuity that Kinshasa men and women demonstrate in their daily lives. Félicité will fight to raise the money needed for her son's surgery.

The capital, an indefinable city where women negotiated new statuses

Defining the city of Kinshasa is not an easy task, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo's capital refuses to be locked into a specific category. Moreover, its continual changes during the colonial period and since independence make any

characterization difficult. Any (outside) analysis must therefore be combined with the view that the Kinois themselves have of their city.

The Kinois, the women from Kinshasa, have found ways to 'express themselves', mainly through music, one of the most popular forms of cultural expression. The music that has developed in Kinshasa is itself the product of several cultural encounters and exchanges, including Ghanaian highlife from West Africa (Bender, 1991), European music, and Latin American musical styles (Gondola, 1994, pp. 59-61). As Gondola's analysis explains, this music, which was dominated by men, allowed women to negotiate new socio-economic roles and gender relations in Kinshasa. The musicians sang about women who, in turn, accompanied and promoted the music; they became bar owners. Recognized as members of elegant societies, the Kinois adopted new ways of life and forged new identities. They smoked cigarettes, refused to marry, sometimes had more than one partner, and earned their own money through investments in informal trade. These new ways of life clashed with African 'customs' and Belgian colonial 'norms'.

Women have continued to increase their gains since the country's independence, during which time the role of the Kinois has amplified. They are present in music culture and the business world (Gondola, 1994). In the 1980s and 1990s, they travelled regularly to Lomé, Brussels, Helmond (the Netherlands) and Paris, but also to Bologna and Rome (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 2000). They bought fabric, shoes and other goods, which were then sold in the markets of Kinshasa. Since the 2000s, these women have been travelling to Guangzhou (China) or India to buy clothing, hair pieces and other items, which are then resold in Kinshasa. Economic power gives them financial independence that allows them to deal on an equal footing with men in a Congolese society that is still patriarchal.

Kinois (and Congolese women in general) have also adopted the *pagne*, or wrapper, a hybrid garment with African, Indonesian and Dutch origins (De Boeck and Bolya, 2005). During the period of President Mobutu Sese Seko authenticity movement, women were prohibited from wearing trousers and other forms of Western clothing, and the *pagne* became mandatory. Nonetheless, Kinshasan women appropriated it and used it to 'express themselves' and 'talk' (Bakana, 1997). From a semiotic perspective inspired by Roland Barthes, the *pagne* offers a variety of meanings, and introduces different aspects of Kinshasa and Congolese culture. Indeed, the designs printed on the fabrics, the way the *pagne* is worn, how it is tied around the hips, and even the number of *pagnes* worn by a woman convey multiple messages. The Kinois, these subordinate

women, participate in the creation of meanings that are discourses used to express their views in Congolese society. The Kinois thus make their voices heard in the public arena and sometimes contradict what men say about women, thus complicating male-female relations.

Popular movements in Kinshasa

Kinshasa, the political capital of Congo, is also the scene of mass political movements that have significantly marked the country's history. Led by ordinary citizens and civil society, they reflect the long quest for a 'social contract' in which the supreme power would come from the people and, correspondingly, the Congolese people's aspiration to establish a rule of law.

Among these movements were the riots of 4 January 1959, which began after the cancellation of a meeting of ABAKO, the political party of Joseph Kasavubu. The meeting was to be held at the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) but was cancelled by the Belgian colonial authorities. On the same day, there was a soccer match at the Tata Raphael Stadium between Mikado and Victoria Club (V Club); the latter lost. As they left the stadium, V Club supporters encountered ABAKO militants at the YMCA square. These two groups of discontented people formed a kind of tacit agreement and started riots that lasted three days. This incident accelerated the Belgian colony's process of independence. Congo became independent a year and a half later, in June 1960.

The life of Kinshasa has been (and continues to be) punctuated by student movements. During the presidency of Joseph Kasavubu (1960-1965), the student associations of Lovanium University, including the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC) and the General Assembly of Students at Lovanium (AGEL), organized demonstrations during the 1964-1965 academic year. During these very first years of the independent Congo, the students' demands focused on the Africanization of the university. They wanted the university to be 'decolonized' and that its mission, governance and curriculum be Africanized to enable future graduates to solve Congolese and African problems (Mumpasi Lututala, 2012, pp. 28-29).

During the Mobutu years (1965-1997), students took numerous actions against the regime in 1968, 1969, 1971, 1977, 1980 and 1990-1991. Certainly, the students wanted an improvement in their living conditions. However, their criticism of the Mobutist regime went much deeper. At the Third Congress of the UGEC in 1966, the students opted for a 'scientific socialism' that would

not consist of an alignment with Moscow or Beijing, but which would base its analysis on the political, economic and cultural realities of the country. In conceptualizing the theme of 'scientific socialism', Congolese college students chose socialism as an instrument for building the nation-state (Tshimanga, 2001, p. 290). This 'university Marxism', to use the terminology of Jean Copans (1990, pp. 326-341) was, in the case of Congo in the 1960s, an anti-colonialist, Third-Worldist and nationalist construction. During the following decades (1970s, 1980s and 1990s), the student struggle was mainly directed against the Mobutu dictatorship and its excesses. The students also criticized the major contradiction between, on the one hand, the 'authentic nationalism' proclaimed by Mobutu but, on the other, the alignment of Congo/Zaire with the economic and financial interests of Western countries. Student movements continued after Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila, father and son, came to power in 1997 and 2001, respectively. According to Bernard Mumpasi Lututala (2012), the demands took place in the context of a 'non-state', i.e. a non-existent state. Their criticisms, which focused on the living and working conditions of the students, were ultimately a call for the establishment of a rule of law that would provide its citizens with a minimum of services.

Kinshasa also hosted the National Sovereign Conference (CNS) from 1990 to 1992, which brought together delegates representing all regions of the country as well as members of the diaspora. The SNC offered the Congolese the opportunity to discuss the political crisis and to propose solutions that would put an end to the Mobutist regime and allow for the advent of democracy and the Third Republic. Organized by the Congolese, the CNS was an important meeting that aimed to find solutions to the country's problems. However, in true Machiavellian style, Mobutu managed to weaken the CNS and even block its work, triggering the riots and looting that took place on 22 and 23 September 1991 by the Congolese army's airborne troops. To demand the resumption of the work of the CNS, which Mobutu had suspended, the Christians of Kinshasa organized a peaceful march on 16 February 1992. Mobutu's police and army did not hesitate to shoot at point-blank range, killing hundreds of unarmed people (Ndaywel è Nziem, 1998, pp. 417-439).

In January 1993, new riots and looting took place in Kinshasa following the payment of the Congolese military's monthly wages in 5 million Zaire banknotes. These notes had been used by the relatives of President Mobutu, but they had no value because they had been demonetized by Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi. Furious that shopkeepers refused to accept the currency, armed soldiers decided to loot shops and villas, during which several hundred people were killed.

Kinois also took to the streets in January 2015 during what *The Guardian* newspaper called 'Congo's #Telema Protests', to oppose a bill that would have allowed President Joseph Kabila to remain in power beyond the end of his last term in December 2016. The Kinois used social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, to organize anti-government protests and to post photos of the demonstrations as well as those of the police crackdown. The people of Kinshasa used their smartphones as powerful tools to share their grievances against the Congolese political regime with the rest of the world. Their use of social media shows that Kinois are part of the 'digital revolution' and are using its many innovations to bring about significant change in their country. Borrowing the suggestion made by Chris Barker and Emma Jane (2016), I argue that social media and cyberspace, in general, weaken official discourse and reinforce existing conceptions and practices related to democracy. Social media has enabled the Kinois to offer narratives that contradict official speeches and government media coverage of the January 2015 protests. Furthermore, their initiatives demonstrate their efforts to introduce democracy in Congo. It was no coincidence that the Congolese Government decided to cut off the Internet and social media in order to weaken the protests.

Socio-economic-political crisis, 'witch children' and the growth of revivalist churches

Kinshasa's economic and industrial fabric is relatively fragile. According to a 2009 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study, 11.9% of Kinois were employed by the public administration; 5% worked in the broader public sector; 8.8% in the formal private sector; 65.6% in the non-agricultural informal sector; 5.2% in the informal agricultural sector; and 3.5% in associations. The rate of production in Kinshasa was 42.3%, while the national average was 60.2%; the unemployment rate in 2009 was 15%. The informal sector, therefore, dominated the economy, employing nearly one million people and providing income for 89.5% of Kinshasa's population. The UNDP analysis showed that nearly half of the Kinois lived in poverty and that Kinshasa was far from achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The average monthly income per capita was US\$45 in Kinshasa compared to US\$22 for the country as a whole. The average monthly household income in Kinshasa was US\$84 compared to US\$42 for the whole country. The lowest incomes were found among Kinois who worked in the informal agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and among those employed by the public administration.

In addition to the economic crisis, the capital has been the scene of much political tension that has shaken the country. For example, the National Sovereign Conference (CNS, 1990-1992) was supposed to mark the end of the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko and establish democracy in Congo, but it ended in failure. More recently, the country has also experienced, among other upheavals, the crisis that followed the chaotic presidential elections of November 2011. While the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) had declared Joseph Kabila the winner of the 2011 elections, the Catholic Church, the European Union and the Carter Centre questioned the results' credibility. The European Union doubted their plausibility because of 'numerous irregularities and fraud'. Opponent Étienne Tshisekedi, whom the CENI had placed second, refused to recognize the CENI's conclusions and declared himself president-elect, plunging the country into a serious institutional crisis. Five years later, the political crisis had deepened due to the failure to organize the presidential elections that were due to take place in November 2016, which marked the end of President Kabila's second and final term. These political crises are characterized by widespread violence in public places. Protest marches by the population demanding the organization of elections, for example, are often violently repressed, with protesters arrested and even killed by the police and army.

Young people are the main actors in the culture of violence that has taken hold in Kinshasa. Tshikala T. Biaya (1997) observes that the streets of Kinshasa are teeming with young people who spend most of their time there, day and night. They are called *ballados*, *Shege*, *phaseurs*, *moineaux* or *Kulunas*. These young people live on the streets because their parents can no longer feed them or because they have been driven out of their families. Living on the street, they are cultural creators and contribute to Kinshasa's popular culture. Lesley Nicole Braun (2016) observes that they use discarded household objects to invent new musical instruments that produce percussive sounds. Similarly, these young people invent new dance steps that are then popularized by professional dancers and musicians. Young people are also characterized by acts of violence and engage in illegal activities and practices, such as drug use, rape of girls, prostitution, theft, looting of shops and attacks on property and people.

The disintegration of the social-economic-political fabric has also given rise to a new phenomenon: accusations of witchcraft against children as young as five or six years old, as well as eighteen-year-old adolescents. The number of 'witch children' is estimated to be between 20,000 and 25,000 (Pirrot, 2004). According to Filip De Boeck (2000) they lie at the intersection of what he calls

the worlds of the 'visible' and the 'invisible', the 'first world' and the 'second world'. They occupy a central place in the 'second world', which seems to discard and supplant the 'first world' or that of everyday reality (De Boeck, 2000, pp. 36). These 'witch children' are the subject of much interest from the revivalist and Pentecostal churches that have grown rapidly in Kinshasa.

Pentecostal churches claim to be fighting Satan and other occult forces, such as witchcraft. They deploy modern means, including the nine television channels that belong to some of these churches, in order to fulfil their mission (Delanaye, 2001). Katrien Pype (2012) describes how they use television programmes to broadcast and share their religious messages and their concepts and practices with a wider audience and to recruit new followers. De Boeck (2000, p. 40) highlights the ambivalent role of these churches with regard to witchcraft. In a sense, they place particular emphasis on witchcraft and other evil forces. However, the growing interest in witchcraft, in turn, contributes to increasing its visibility in the social sphere. In other words, according to Ballet, Dumbi and Lallau (2009), Pentecostal churches legitimize witchcraft and use it as a source of income because they also offer 'solutions' designed to defeat these evil forces. De Boeck and other anthropologists' analyses of 'child witches' expose the various factors at work in the Congolese capital: a deep crisis that affects almost all sectors of Kinois life; uncontrolled urbanization; tensions between tradition and modernity; globalization (in its economic and cultural dimensions) including the arrival of Pentecostal churches; and a new form of economy or 'business', which Van Dijk (2000) calls 'millennial capitalism'.

Conclusion

In 2017, at just 136 years of age, Kinshasa was experiencing uncontrolled spatial growth without urban planning. Its evolution was closely linked to a very rapid increase in population, estimated at 12 million. The recent expansion of the city aimed to meet the housing needs of the Kinois and has often taken place on the outskirts of the city, where buildings are precarious and there is a lack of infrastructure and basic services, such as roads, paved streets, electricity and running water. That said, with great ingenuity, the Kinois have made this African megalopolis – exposed to various currents of globalization – their own. They invent and reinvent it every day, creating a melting pot of dynamic urban popular culture, and giving the city a unique and complex identity.

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CHAPTER 4

MID-SIZED CITIES IN THE MAGHREB

An Expression of Internal Logic?

Madani Safar Zitoun

Introduction

The issue of mid-sized cities as a unique spatial but also social and political reality has sparked renewed interest among observers about the development of the Maghreb countries since the beginning of what is known as the ‘Arab Spring’. It was mainly the media’s reconstruction of the founding episode of the Tunisian revolution – the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 – that brought the ‘mid-sized’ city of Sidi Bouzid (49,000 inhabitants) crashing into history and the new modern myths.

It is true that the subsequent revolutionary events took place mostly in the capital, Tunis, a large urban metropolis comprising one-third of the country’s total population. However, here too, the main protest movements came from the outlying districts, which are like large villages, duplicating in specific ways a sort of mid-sized urban life, still encircled by the rural world and characterized by the local social bond dominant in mid-sized cities within Tunisia. Similarly, in the other Maghreb countries, current political developments have highlighted the somewhat unprecedented nature of the protest movements that have emerged and developed in certain mid-sized cities (such as the Arouch movement in

Kabyle).¹ They set out to conquer the capital, the centre of political power, bringing to the fore the existence of dynamics and contradicting the traditional plans of centre and near or far outlying districts.

In this context, events also showed the structure and strong relationships connecting these inner settlements with the new outlying districts of the large metropolises, the often informal settlement areas housing the city's migrant populations. Built urgently and hastily to counter and overwhelm, through their numbers and strong community structure, the normative and repressive logic of the administration, these neighbourhoods are, due to their size and demographic dimension, equivalent to the small or medium-sized towns in the interior from where their inhabitants originate. This reinforces the solid hypothesis highlighted by a number of researchers that the size of these spatial-social entities is a key determining factor in the construction of urban social ties.

Without going so far as to consider that this urban size produces the same effects in the suburbs adjacent to large agglomerations and in small and medium-sized cities that are spatially distinct, we can, as Aziz Iraki points out, acknowledge both 'the specific nature of the social wealth of small and medium-sized towns (strong interconnections between individuals)' and 'therefore recognize...that, at this level of urbanization, "technocracy is forced to contend with local forces"' (Iraki, 1999, p. 11). This would mean that behind the demographic definition, behind the designation of an urban entity by a size classification category supposed to produce some sort of 'scale effect', other complex realities are hidden, all of which revolve around the local social bond. The construction of urban lives in the settlements, on a small and medium scale, would spread across such settlements on the 'human scale' regardless of their location in a more personalized and direct way, thus offering an area more favourable to the expression of more collective, often community-based, ideas and citizen demands.

1 The Arouch movement (Arouch being the plural of the word Arch meaning tribe in Maghrebi Arabic) is defined, according to its leaders, as a 'citizen movement' that aims to represent the demands of the Kabyle people with the Algerian Government. Created in Kabyle, following the Kabyle Black Spring of 2001, this movement organized a march on 14 June 2001 from the mid-sized city of Tizi Ouzou to the capital Algiers, bringing together tens of thousands of people.

The mid-sized city: a new sociological and anthropological subject

It is in fact completely obvious that far from being just a convenient statistical category into which settlements are classified using size criteria, the mid-sized city has gradually become a sociological subject in itself, as evidenced by research developments over the last twenty years.

In this regard, it should be noted that according to Kharoufi (1999), the anthropological dimension that had been somewhat overlooked by Maghrebi urban research – which in the 1960s and 1970s focused entirely on analysing extreme urbanization affecting large urban coastal areas, with the problems generated by the rural exodus such as impoverishment, slums and informal settlements – is returning to the forefront of the scientific scene. Since the early 1990s, new generations² of researchers from these mid-sized cities, many of which have seen new universities established, have focused their interest and academic work on local subjects. This is primarily for geographical reasons, linked to the explosion of mid-sized cities in all Maghreb countries, as indicated by population and housing censuses carried out from 1980 to the present day. But also for sociological, economic and political reasons, and above all, for reasons of identity and symbolism directly linked to this explosion. These researchers are involved not only in describing the phenomenon of mid-sized cities through numerous monographs but also in exploring more cross-cutting themes that question the way social ties are structured in the localities where they live and work, indirectly answering the question of their place as representatives of the new modern and educated elites.

Their curiosity focuses on sociological objects that had tended to be overshadowed by the modernist and developmentalist ideology that dominated the scene in the 1970s, that is, tribal and community ties and their spatial and political expressions and transformations. The thesis presented by Dhedhari (2017) on the small city of Aflou in the central region of the Algerian Saharan Atlas is, in this respect, symbolic of this new view. It shows the strong influence of a revisited, reignited tribal bond on other types of bonds in all aspects of social life in the city. It describes how the original affiliations of the newly

2 'New researchers' refers to the generation of young researchers who have come to scientific production in the field of urban studies over the last ten years by completing doctoral theses and publishing scientific articles (mostly in Arabic) in the journals of universities or laboratories launched by new universities in the country's interior.

urbanized populations are projected directly into the space through the creation of districts with highly unified lineage, but also the strength of the traditional communities in controlling the ordinary aspects of social life, and how they have become powerful means of political pressure on the municipal administration.

Our questions therefore arise in this context, that is, the emergence and strengthening of the reality of small and mid-sized cities that have become powerful key interlocutors of the public authorities, with this dynamic bolstering the societal position of their populations and elites. In this chapter, it will be shown how this tremendous expansion of the mid-sized urban phenomenon in Maghreb countries has brought about often radical changes for the Maghrebis in relation to their environment and to the very notion of social and political centrality, developed to extremes by the excessively centralist nation-states built in the Maghreb after independence.

The extraordinary development of the mid-sized urban reality in the Maghreb countries

In the four Maghreb countries, various population censuses show an extraordinary urbanization divided into two main phases. After the post-independence decades, during which the large national metropolises absorbed most of the internal migration, there followed in the 1990s a movement to fill internal spaces that saw the emergence of new urban agglomerations and the strengthening of small towns inherited from the colonial period.

All this took place in ways specific to each country, depending on the imperatives of building new nation-states in their territories, which led to administrative restructuring and the redrawing of internal areas.³ In this respect and to varying degrees, the powers resulting from decolonization tried to a certain extent to remodel and control the unbalanced structuring processes of the territories through deliberate policies that asserted their presence in the heartland.

In his study, written in the late 1990s, Mustafa Kharoufi noted 'the beginning of a rebalancing of regional disparities in terms of the concentration of the city population', which had tended to cluster in the coastal areas since the 1960s. He

3 On this subject, see the work edited by Pierre Signoles (2014), which describes the instability of the territorial administrative arrangements in the large urban areas of the Maghreb, reflecting the search for the difficult equation to balance the strong tendencies towards the excessive centralization of local authorities and the need for the new states to give up some powers to the local elites.

observed that these coastal areas 'remained the preferred location for cities', but he highlighted a significant fact: 'the intensification of relations between the major centres (Algiers, Casablanca, Tunis) and their peripheries' (Kharoufi, 1999, p. 12).

More recent works, however, produced since the early 2000s by geographers analysing population censuses using quantitative indicators and indices (primacy index, hierarchy index, etc.) do, however, bring a number of reservations to this general picture. There is a stark contrast in local situations. Starting from the different levels of urbanization at independence, the three countries studied certainly experienced an explosion in the 'mid-sized' urban reality (small cities and medium cities)⁴. But they do so according to the degrees of evolution in each of the urbanization strata, which obey two movements that combine or cancel out their effects: state intervention on the one hand, which leads some authors to refer to 'voluntary promotion of agglomerations' in the case of Algeria⁵ and, on the other hand, more endogenous factors linked to more local development processes elsewhere, particularly in Morocco.

In this regard, there has been a reduction in the demographic weight of large agglomerations and metropolises and a considerable strengthening of intermediate cities. For example, these intermediate cities have gone from 8.78% of the population in 1950 to 33.32% in 2005 in Algeria. However, this does not seem to be the case in Morocco where the demographic weight of intermediate cities and small cities fell during the same period, nor in Tunisia where the growth in intermediate cities appears to have taken place at the expense of small cities, thus maintaining the 'macrocephaly' and considerable influence of Tunis in the urban system.

These contrasting developments are summarized by Kasdallah (2013) who, after classifying the Maghreb cities according to the primacy index, notes: 'the macrocephaly of the capital (Tunis) and the Tunisian cities which have not developed at the same rate' and 'the growth of the small Algerian cities', and the fact that, 'Algiers [is] also characterized by a very pronounced primacy that

4 The criteria for defining cities according to their size differ across the three Maghreb countries. While there is agreement on the size of small cities (which are in a bracket of 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants), the mid-sized cities have between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants in Algeria (2008), Morocco and Tunisia. The problem is that cities of a size between 100,000 and 250,000 inhabitants are sometimes classified, from a functional perspective, in the category of mid-sized cities and sometimes that of large cities, depending on the geographical context. This is why Kasdallah (2013) proposes integrating the category of mid-sized city and a city of more than 100,000 inhabitants into an 'intermediate city' category. This intermediate city: 'depends jointly on the capital and small cities which constitute its base and support.' 'The intermediate city is one that provides the transition between large cities or the capital and the remaining cities and vice versa from the base level to the summit.'

5 In the case of Algeria, Chadli and Hadjiedj (2003) talk about 'administrative promotion as an essential factor in the growth of key cities'.

evolves quite differently compared to 'Tunis'. She goes on to point out that 'the Moroccan system, for its part, is characterized by a high concentration of large cities, with the primacy of the first city being virtually absent due to the presence of two political and economic capitals (Rabat and Casablanca)' (Kasdallah, 2013, p. 62).

This leads her to conclude, after ranking medium-sized cities, that 'from a theoretical point of view, it is the Tunisian intermediate cities that seem the most harmonious'. She adds: 'However, they have the lowest growth rates compared to Moroccan and Algerian cities, the latter having recorded the largest increase from 16.5% in 1950 to 59.9% in 2005, ensuring overall coverage of the territory, while Moroccan cities are characterized by a deficit of management' (Kasdallah, 2013, p. 63).

In other words, if the reasoning is understood correctly, urban structures in the three Maghreb countries have developed in contrasting and different ways, insofar as the emergence and growth of medium-sized cities have not responded to the same determinants in terms of land use choices and socio-economic dynamics. While the studies on Algeria clearly show how the growth of small and mid-sized cities has essentially been driven by the public authorities under an active policy of promoting the regions through the location of primarily economic but also administrative and cultural projects⁶, this does not seem to be the case in Moroccan mid-sized cities.

Indeed, in Morocco, mid-sized cities have evolved in the context of less intervention from the central state and in a more liberal economic environment, which has allowed social, economic and even political structures to play an important part in the processes and actions of local stakeholders. These powerful tropisms therefore explain why Moroccan urban research (Rachik, 2012) seized upon the 'mid-sized city' subject in its different socio-political variations and dimensions⁷ much earlier and more resolutely than Algerian and Tunisian research, which succumbed to the abject adoration of an omnipotent and omnipresent central state, at least until the early 2000s.

In these cities, often created out of nothing in the 1970s from small rural centres and having since experienced considerable growth rates, dissertations and theses produced in recent years have examined the new informal settlements

6 The erection of mid-sized cities is to act as the key cities of the *wilayas* (prefectures) and *dairas* (sub-prefectures) with the accompanying administrative jobs, facilities and infrastructures.

7 See particularly the works by Aziz El Maoula Iraki (2002) and Abdelghani Abouhani (2000) that explore the mid-sized urban reality in detail.

produced by an unrestrained rural exodus. The research pays attention to the new urban lives that have been built in the large estates of collective social housing, but also to the anthropological dimension of the settlement of rural groups and communities in the city. It reveals the persistence of community and tribal ties, the difficult emergence of local economic and political elites, and the problematic nature of the autonomy of elected municipalities in relation to the power of central governments. These mid-sized settlements have often increased their populations tenfold since the 1960s.

The current new social dynamics in mid-sized cities

Does this growth in mid-sized urban reality and its dissemination through country-specific methods reflect the real dynamics of local social and economic development that change in relation to burdens and obstructions? In one of his works on Moroccan 'traditional cities', Naciri blames the 'traditional cities' of the past of being 'strategically essential, economically vital for the central power, but politically weak and institutionally fragile for their own management' (Naciri, 2012, p. 452), and of not being up to the challenges of development. Even more seriously, according to him, 'the city' whether traditional or a recent creation has 'remained incapable of being an engine for the famous economic take-off predicted at length in editorials for over half a century, but never realized', mainly because it suffered from a lack of autonomy in relation to the central power. Indeed, he adds that 'while [the Moroccan cities] are now beginning to establish a municipal power, this power has not yet constituted a force for economic proposals and achievements', mainly because of 'a lack of leadership in handling the promotion of urban projects' (Naciri, 2012, p. 453).

We are therefore faced with a development paradox whereby mid-sized cities, despite their extraordinary demographic and spatial expansion, are constrained in their growth dynamics by the central power. As Pourtier pointed out: 'Daughters of the State, born of an initial function of administrative control' (Pourtier, 1993), the mid-sized cities remain closely monitored politically by the central administrations and are too dependent on the financial resources they are granted, failing to ensure their transition to a virtuous 'autocephaly', as Max Weber observed (1982 translation) when talking about the ideal type of 'Western cities'.

Behind this common characteristic, however, substantial contrasts appear in terms of their degree of autonomy in relation to the centre, given the

unequal influence of the state in their formation and control. According to Iraki (1999), Moroccan mid-sized cities would therefore be the preferred forum for expression for the 'local elites' in their rural profundity, giving important political roles to landowners, those so-called 'underground developers'. This is not the case with the Algerian elites who are comprised mainly of administrative personnel and their political cronies. The Algerian political system, built around the distribution mechanisms of oil revenues, is able to afford a much greater dose of proactiveness in the development of land, which does not exist in the neighbouring countries. This has produced a more balanced urban structure, less sensitive to regional social roots. However, at the level of local economic dynamics, the development of new economic and social dynamics owe nothing to political proactiveness. These are mainly economic processes driven by the market, as part of the liberalization of Algeria's economy since 1994, and are completely unrelated to the onerous local presence of the 'developer' state, despite the range of tax and administrative incentives contained in the SNAT of 2010.⁸

New industrial and commercial centres (such as Bordj Bou Arréridj for electronics and Biskra for agriculture in Algeria) illustrate the entrepreneurial strength of new atypical local elites, while other protest movements by representatives of the social strata, promoted by the widespread availability of public education⁹, reflect the emergence of social divisions. Such divisions mainly arise from a demand for better local management of the needs and expectations of the populations of these mid-sized cities, most of which have become cities for 'new arrivals'¹⁰ and reception places for migrants.

Indeed, unlike the situation in earlier periods, mid-sized settlements had become 'an alternative settlement location to the large city, offering easier living conditions for the migrants' (Iraki, 1999, p. 17). The social and economic weight became increasingly important, generating conditions and social movements that were believed to be the prerogative of the large cities, places of all contradictions and all disputes and demands.

However, it is important to highlight that the mid-sized Maghreb city, as an alternative and easier solution for migrants, does not offer a model of 'modern'

8 Schéma National d'Aménagement du Territoire (National Land Development Scheme), JORADP [2010] of 21 October 2010.

9 The example of the movement of 'unemployed graduates' from Ouargla (a city with over 100,000 inhabitants located in the middle of an oil-producing area in the Algerian Sahara) illustrates the frustration of local graduates over the competition for jobs from the large cities in the north of the country.

10 According to the well-known expression coined by R. Ezra Park, founder of the Chicago School.

urban life in the Weberian sense of the word. Due to the still very strong influence of traditional lineage references in land occupation and in the tone and functioning of social relations that incorporate and mobilize local mediation networks, the mid-sized city has become the experimental laboratory for an 'intermediate' urban life in stark contrast to the artificial and internationalized urban life of the large cities.¹¹

This makes it possible to say definitively that the new societal contract that is being constructed in these spaces, which are not yet fully 'urbanized' (Rémy, 1978), often expresses the violent confrontation between the tendency to gloss over differences and identities, as supported by neoliberal modernity, and the affiliation and recognition modes inherited from the past but still at work in local societies that lack most of the decision-making power.

With that in mind, these intermediate social and political entities express, perhaps more clearly and accurately, the extensive restructuring movements in Maghrebi societies in their spaces and in their relations with the central powers. From the perspective of the longer history of the Maghreb, if we examine Ibn Khaldoun's theory about the expansion of *Açabiyya*¹² from the outlying area to the centre of *Badarwa* to the *Hadhara*,¹³ the extraordinary creation and consolidation of the intermediate cities, in social forms that are not yet fully stabilized, can be interpreted as a sort of reminder of the heartland's capacity for existence and recognition. The new pages of the history of the Maghreb will no longer be written solely in the large coastal agglomerations but also in these new spaces that are taking shape.

11 The many academic research publications produced in recent years in Arabic by universities from mid-sized university cities have, in most cases, focused on the way in which 'intermediate' urban lives are constructed from the remobilization of traditional and tribal references in the practices of land occupation and local political action.

12 The word *Açabiyya* is difficult to define according to Vincent Monteil in his preface to the translation of the *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle* (El Muqaddima) by Ibn Khaldoun. He suggests: 'clan spirit; tribal spirit; tribalism; community spirit; blood ties; consanguinity; and even "vitality" according to Enan' (Monteil, 1978, XXXIV). *Hadhara* means 'sedentary culture' and *Badarwa* means 'Bedouin life' or 'Bedouinism' according to the same author.

13 The famous theses by Ibn Khaldoun written about the Maghreb of his time (fourteenth century), and the movement for the conquest of the city and the attributes of power and urban life by strong Bedouin groups structured according to a sense of periphery/centre.

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CHAPTER 5

AGE AND GENERATION IN THE COMOROS:

Initiation, Solidarity and Change

Sophie Blanchy

'The bottom palm says to the top palm: I was here first.'

(Comorian proverb)

Introduction

The word 'generation' refers both to the position of parents and children in filiation, and to the group of contemporaries who have lived through the same historical period. It is used to perceive the temporality of personal and collective life. In Africa, certain societies are structured by age and generation systems (Peatrik, 2003). Those of the Comoros are a good example.

Age and generation system

The Union of the Comoros is made up of three islands (1,862 km²) with 734,917 inhabitants in 2013, half of whom were under the age of twenty. There is still a very active male age system on the islands of Ngazidja (Grande Comore) and Mwali (Mohéli), whereas the age classes are much less structured on Ndzwani (Anjouan). They have recently disappeared from Maore (Mayotte), the fourth island that remains under French administration.

On Ngazidja, the age classes are structured around the generational categories of 'Sons' and 'Fathers' (Blanchy, 2003, 2010). The Fathers make up an assembly, a true village government in which these terms of kinship take on a political significance. Boys become Sons between the ages of 15 and 20, when they enter the age system. They collectively climb the age echelons until they become Kings of the Sons, responsible for the practical organization of the village. They can enter into one or more marriages according to the Islamic law in force in this Muslim society. They then live with their wives and children. In the Comoros, the post-marital residence is uxori-matrilocal (at the wife's house, at her mother's). They become Fathers in the age system by celebrating their *Grand Mariage* (Great Marriage), a matrimonial union accompanied by significant exchanges of goods (called *āda*) between the two families and with the various social groups in the local area, or even the region or the whole island. This is achieved through mutual family support between the sexes and between the generations, along with contributions to social groups. The Great Marriage brings the bridegroom into the fellowship circles of the Fathers, which are akin to clubs, and in which he participates through new payments, notably when he organizes the Great Marriage of his daughter or niece, or the circumcision of his son. The Fathers are also known as 'accomplished men', since their progression through the age echelons, with the move from one generation to another and the actions they perform, mark the fulfilment of their social being. The age pyramid shows that around 40% of the male population are of the age to be Sons, and 10% to be Fathers. The latter, at King level, reign over the whole system and benefit from the advice of the elders, who retire once they have made all the possible payments.

Table 1. *Age and generation system on Ngazidja*

Generational category	Age echelon
Pères (Fathers) or Hommes accomplis (Accomplished men)	Vieux (Elders)
	<i>wafahd'wahaya</i>
	Rois de la cité (Kings of the city)
	Fils au bonnet (Capped Sons)
Great marriage	
Fils de la cité (Sons of the city)	<i>maguzi</i>
	Rois des Fils de la cité (Kings of the Sons of the city)
	<i>wazug'wawa</i>
	<i>washondje</i>

Source: Sophie Blanchy.

Filiation is matrilineal on Ngazidja (and Mwali): kinship groups, called lineages or houses, are formed through the maternal line. A young girl's Great Marriage – which must be her first union – makes her a 'daughter of *āda*' in the context of the exchanges. Her mother, who gives her in marriage, acquires the political status of 'mother of *āda*' on this occasion. The Great Marriage of a family's eldest daughter means that she succeeds her mother in the matrilineal group and in the ancestral home, or any other house provided by her family, where she will reside all her life with her successive husbands. The eldest daughter, married through a Great Marriage, becomes the 'mother', responsible for her home and its members. It is her responsibility to organize her brother's Great Marriage and, later, that of her daughter, a step that will signify she has reached the stage of accomplishment. The relationship between mother and daughter is compared to that of brothers in the same age bracket: shared interests and common actions, as if they were a single person embodied by the house.

Family relationships

The age system sheds light on the relationships between the ages, generations and sexes, acting as landmarks through life's course on the four islands (Blanchy, 1992). Children are subjected to the authority of various paternal figures during their upbringing (Blanchy, 2010): their fathers, but also their Quranic masters and maternal uncles included in the household, along with the successive husbands of their mothers or classificatory mothers, to whom 18% of 5- to 15-year-olds are entrusted through fosterage (Blanchy and Allaoui-Chami, 2004; DGSP, 2012, p. 223). The relationships established can be more or less positive for the children. They also grow up within peer groups, where they develop the ability to act together and help one another. The system of matrilineal kinship on Ngazidja and Mwali determines a complementarity between the figures of the maternal uncle, who is very authoritarian, and the father, who is warmer and closer. On the other two islands, where filiation is undifferentiated, the reverse is true, with the maternal uncle the more familiar of the two, playing the role of counsellor. The Koranic masters and schoolteachers enjoy great respect from their pupils. These are the people to whom boys and girls are most devoted after their own mothers.

As teenagers, boys have to sleep away from their mothers and sisters in bachelor huts, in which they remain until their first marriage. Young girls are closely supervised after puberty, to guard against pregnancy out of wedlock, considered dishonourable for the parents. An average of 10% of Comorian

women marry before the age of 15, a rate that has remained stable from one generation to the next, although there may be a delay of several months or years before the couple begins living together. These early marriages or unions with much older men ready to celebrate a Great Marriage are a form of violence imposed by parents on their daughters, albeit softened by the fact that the victims will continue to live surrounded by all their maternal family members, who will still look after them. When these early or arranged marriages are coupled with sending girls to France, they experience great isolation in relation to their husbands before adapting to their new lives. Nevertheless, girls still aspire to get married and have children, whatever their professional plans thereafter. Younger sisters, who are not subjected to the Great Marriage and receive less help from their families, are freer in their marriage choices. It is sufficient for their suitors to have a social status identical or superior to theirs to be admitted to the house. In this hierarchical society, the descendants of slaves, and even of fishermen, are still stigmatized, and the marriage choices of students who meet abroad (in France, Madagascar, Morocco or Senegal) may encounter strong opposition from their parents if they do not meet these criteria.

Intergenerational relationship

Boys who are part of the age system receive technical, social, economic and political training. They make contributions on numerous occasions, in kind or in money. They learn to speak in public, to submit to elders and to instruct their younger brothers, and sometimes they oppose the Fathers when the balance of power is in their favour. The punishment for refusing to submit to the rules is a ban from the customary activities of the village, along with the imposition of fines. When the guilty party resists submission, this threatens the system and obliges the Fathers to employ a discreet go-between to bring him to reason. The fine is then strongly negotiated and the Son almost always comes out on top. The Fathers, however, have great power over the Sons: that of enabling them to move up the age ladder, and finally marrying them to their daughters or nieces in Great Marriage – the key to admission into the Fathers' generation. Graduates who find employment in executive roles are integrated, albeit belatedly, into the system by their older brothers, who are interested in their resources and knowledge. The Sons are thus able to carry out improvements, such as moving the management of village funds to a bank account with several signatures, putting a stop to the unequal sharing of profits between influential Fathers, and introducing a tax on

āda expenditure to fund village development. In spite of these tensions between the generations, they nevertheless unite to defend the honour of the village vis-à-vis the outside world. The matrilineal houses are represented by the sons and brothers in the age classes and commensality (the act of eating together) circles, a close link that gives the two institutions greater coherence and efficiency. The establishment of municipalities on Ngazidja, bringing together several localities and retaining the coming of age at eighteen as a criterion for citizenship, has struggled to elicit the same degree of collective mobilization.

Comorian society experienced an unusual reversal just after independence, under the Marxist regime of Ali Soilihi (1975–1978). He wanted to free the society from the burdens of its traditions by forbidding the ceremonies attached to the age classes and Great Marriage, as well as the practices of divination and magic mingled with Islam (Vérin and Vérin, 1999). A generation of young activists was suddenly brought to power and called into action against the generation of their parents. This period nevertheless raised awareness of inequalities, and the hierarchical criteria were weakened when the age system was restored.

Generations and migration

The age system, a framework for transmitting the moral values and social skills most appreciated by Comorians, including the ability to act together or alone, has proved very adaptable to change. Migration is an increasingly important phenomenon, principally affecting young people aged between 20 and 30 (African Development Bank, 2011, p. 12). After three generations who emigrated to Zanzibar and then Madagascar, the flow moved in the direction of France (or Reunion and Mayotte) in the 1970s. It has also diversified, particularly in the context of university study, to countries in Africa or the Middle East (Vivier, 1996). Migration is often a family project with a view to securing a Great Marriage, as well as educating young people and seeking employment for the adults, accompanied by the desire to send financial support to parents remaining in the home country (remittances represented 22.5% of GDP in 2012). One-third of the population of Ngazidja, some of whom are dual nationals, have emigrated, mostly to France. The majority of these individuals are aged between 25 and 45. Many young people, obsessed with the idea of moving abroad, are leaving the family fields where their parents cultivate food crops and products for export (spices and perfumes). This migration differs from that of the Ndzواني farmers, who are leaving poor, insufficient plots of land to

farm in Mwali and work for meagre wages on Ngazidja or on the French island of Mayotte, where they are fighting against illegal immigration (Blanchy, 2014).

The largest proportion of the Comoros GDP comes from agriculture, livestock and fisheries (39.6%), along with the service sector, particularly commerce (27.5%) and public administration (13.1%) (African Development Bank, 2025). Despite a growth rate of 2.5% to 3% and an increase in the level of education, the energy crisis (limited provision of electricity) and unemployment, which affected 24% of the population in 2012, especially young people (including graduates), are marks of economic troubles. There is a striking difference between the generations when it comes to the number of people who have not had a formal education: 67% of women aged 45 to 49, compared to 16% of 15- to 19-year-old girls, and 30% versus 8% for men in the same age groups (DGSP, 2012, p. 27). The creation of a university in 2003 should enable the middle classes to avoid the costs of study abroad. The success of private schools, which compensate for the weaknesses of the public system, demonstrates the value placed by parents on education.

Other situations of intergenerational confrontation

Intergenerational tensions also come into play in the context of religion. Almost all Comorians practice the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam. Islamic science students enrolled in Arab universities have been bringing back reformist ideas. Having criticized devotion to the Prophet (celebration of *maulid*) and the ceremonies of the Sufi brotherhoods, they have reintegrated into religious institutions, at the same time setting up new *madrasa* to train subsequent generations (Ahmed, 2005). Each cohort renews this fundamentalism, contributing to the continuous Islamization of society and maintaining tensions between young and old holders of religious knowledge, tensions which also form part of the historical hierarchies between social categories. On Ndzwani, young farmers and reformists, unable to convince their elders, built a second mosque in their villages for Friday prayers, undermining the unity of the community. By embracing ideas brought in from outside during their studies, via missionaries or the Internet, the younger generation is breaking free from a power structure based on age and the monopoly on knowledge transmission.

Physical violence among young people, which has long been channelled into the age system through the work to be accomplished and its multiple regulatory mechanisms, most often breaks out in sports arenas, particularly

football matches. These clashes are also used to settle old conflicts of status. They reveal the untapped energy of young people left idle or marginalized, unable to realize their plans to migrate. On Ndzwani, young people who joined militias during the island's secession, from 1997 to 2008, subsequently benefited from the post-war reintegration programmes of international agencies, while women of all ages were engaged as peace mediators in the villages, with a considerable local impact.

Generational transmission

Many factors influence the quality of intergenerational relations. In addition to urban or rural contexts, social differences affect access to education, whether Islamic or Western, and the capacity for reflection that it promotes. In order to pass down to their children the moral or material assets they have received or acquired, parents in various environments develop in them the values of respect and submission that have become the norm.

They nevertheless remain open to young people's plans for mobility, even when risks are involved, and generally trust their children in this context. In contrast, a certain level of material and cultural poverty is eroding family relationships, even leading to violence, and leaving young people in a state of anomie. The village or neighbourhood community, which is generally very efficient in the Comoros, then struggles to restore a minimum of cohesion. This is particularly true of Ndzwani, where rural society has been destructured over the long term by the violence of economic relations.

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CHAPTER 6

BETWEEN GENERATION AND NATION

Cultures and the Youth in Mozambique
Didier Nativel

Introduction

In Southern and East Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, colonization often played a brutal role in forming an interim generational group between children and adults. The introduction of capitation, the search for agricultural or mining labour, the need for armed forces and, finally, urbanization disrupted the classic pattern of the orderly passage from childhood to adulthood in most African societies. Historians have also shown how, particularly through the educational establishment and associations, colonial missions and administrations were fully involved in the emergence of a new social category they sought to control (see d'Almeida-Topor et al., 1992; Tshimanga, 2001). Nationalist movements, and then the nation-states created after independence, were not to be outdone.

Targets of discourse and objects of intense attention, the 'young' have often only implicitly been able to develop sensitivities, forms of sociability and natural imaginations. Language, clothing and artistic productions, sometimes born on the fringes of public spaces, have been and remain important indicators of the challenge of integrating adolescents and young adults into society, whose demographic weight has escalated in the twentieth century. While sociologists and anthropologists usually refer to youth as a time of uncertainty and even indefinite expectation, this whole stage in life raises questions for African societies. We are

seeking to show how the state of Mozambique, born after independence, relied explicitly on young people to build the new nation. However, the civil war and subsequent liberalization of the country have worsened inequalities and left this heterogeneous social group, whose demographic weight has steadily increased, to its own devices and made the flaws in public action all the more apparent. How have the actors themselves experienced and perceived these profound changes?

Decolonizing and nationalizing the youth in Mozambique

From the late nineteenth century and throughout the colonial era, migrations linking the south of Mozambique with the Rand in South Africa represented a certain rite of passage for young people driven out by their fear of forced labour or to search for income to pay the *lobolo* (a dowry). In mining areas, they would experience the harshness of dangerous jobs together, but at the same time, they would build a unique daily life imbued with cultural references and a material life removed from those they knew in their villages of origin. Consequently they developed new subjectivities (Harries, 1994).

In the same era, on the margins of the European city centres of Lourenço Marques, the capital, and Beira, the second city, a new concept of leisure time emerged, mainly affecting young workers. For example, Mozambique's first African football clubs sprang up around migrant associations (Domingos, 2012). These male-dominated social meeting places brought mixed-race and/or 'assimilated' middle-class children, educated by the Catholic or Protestant missionaries (the Mission de la Suisse Romande in particular), into contact with dockers and domestic servants from the rural world.

Quite belatedly, in a phase of rising nationalism and then a war of independence (1964–1974), the Portuguese became aware of the need to make up lost ground in the overlooked education of Africans (Castiano, Ngoenha and Berthoud, 2009, p. 254). At the same time, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front), founded in Dar es Salaam in 1962, called on young people (men and women) who wanted to put an end to colonization. The party itself was led by individuals barely out of adolescence (such as Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza and Sérgio Vieira)¹. Militarily and ideologically

1 Both Chissano and Guebuza became presidents of the Republic: the first between 1986 and 2005, and the second from 2005 to 2015. Vieira was one of the first leaders of FRELIMO in the 1960s, before occupying high-level government positions shortly after 1975.

trained in the rear bases in Tanzania, recruits (exiles and refugees) were given a major role. The vanguard of a national liberation war and an ongoing revolution, some of these fighters were as much literacy workers as propagandists in the so-called liberated areas of northern Mozambique. In the eyes of the FRELIMO leaders, Eduardo Mondlane and then Samora Machel, their youth was therefore the reserve of energy needed to build the nation and socialism.

It is not surprising in these circumstances that, just after independence, the Mozambican Youth Organization (*Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*) bringing together people aged from 14 to 30, adopted a programme inspired by the guidelines of FRELIMO, then in power. This mass organization offered a certain number of strictly defined leisure activities. However, the ideological supervision of children and adolescents mainly took place in schools that not only taught literacy skills but also aimed to develop a shared patriotic and revolutionary culture in a break from colonial education.

In both the city and the countryside, particularly in the 'community villages' (*aldeias comunas*) where production means were collectivized, young people were monitored and educated to fiercely denounce the 'profiteer' figure, nicknamed Xiconhoca.² Many 'undesirables', not exclusively but often young people, such as street vendors, petty criminals, prostitutes and single women who associated with prostitutes (Hanlon, 1984), became the targets of the regime, as they had been several years earlier in Tanzania (Burton, 2007). During the 'production operation' launched in 1983 by the head of state Samora Machel, these 'unproductive individuals' were hunted down and sent to 're-education camps'.³ It was also in this authoritarian period that the urban cultures inherited from colonial times were banned (Lachartre, 2000). Under these conditions, it was difficult to express reservations, let alone criticisms, or even aim to create independent associations.

In the rural world, it was just as difficult to keep village traditions for the passage into adulthood alive. Indeed, FRELIMO fought against initiation rites, as it saw them as signs of archaism and, in the case of young girls, female oppression (Arnfred, 2001). The new party-state thus took over from the Portuguese colonizers in their desire to control the youth and, in this way, consolidate its hegemony. However, the civil war (1977-1992), which began just after independence, weakened this intention.

2 Xico was the name of one of the African torturers in the Portuguese political police, the PIDE/DGS (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direcção Geral de Segurança*, International and State Defense Police/General Security Directorate) in Lourenço Marques. 'Nhoca' means 'snake'.

3 According to Benedito Machava, over twenty detention camps for individuals deemed 'undesirable' were opened during the first year of independence (Machava, 2011, p. 603).

Political and economic violence: survival cultures

According to Alcinda Honwana (2006), the conflict directly or indirectly affected millions of children. Among them, 250,000 became orphans or were separated from their families. An even larger number lived as refugees in Mozambique or in neighbouring countries among the six million displaced people. Furthermore, it is estimated that between 8,000 and 10,000 children under 15 fought, primarily on the side of RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, Mozambique National Resistance). Often kidnapped, boys – sometimes as young as seven or eight years old – were ‘programmed’ to become killing machines with no possibility of escaping, while girls became sex slaves. These terrible situations continued to weigh on the Mozambican collective imagination, even after peace returned. While displaced young people (*deslocados*) who settled in the major urban centres, such as Maputo, were eventually able to put down roots (Vivet, 2012), others arriving alone joined gangs of street children, like Nélio, a key character in the successful novel by Henning Mankell, *Comédia Infantil* (1995). These tragic conditions explain the emergence of a ‘survival culture’ (Lugalla and Mbwambo, 1999), associated with delinquency, such as the *dumba nengue* (informal trade), which developed in the late 1980s. The child street vendors, economically essential to their families cut off from the rural world during the civil war (Loforte, 1994; Bénard da Costa, 2007), developed a special shared language, testifying as much to their vulnerability as to their rejection of the dominant norms.⁴ While a small number were able to escape the world of the streets, many sank further into it. Indeed, those who escaped poverty, such as Mário Macilau, are rare. Born in 1984, he spent most of his childhood working in the streets of Maputo before becoming a renowned photographer and documenting his experiences through exhibitions worldwide.

At the same time, after the return to peace, other sources of destabilization emerged, such as violent theft, mainly among young people. Many factors explain this increase. Since the 1990s, the liberalization of the economy and the rise of individualism in society have had contrasting effects. The desire for consumption spread massively, alongside the country’s urbanization. But how many has it really satisfied, apart from a handful? Thus, while mobile phones quickly became widespread in the 2000s, initially they only highlighted the precarious situation of most of their owners (Archambault, 2010).

4 As Sambo (2001) observes in the case of Madagascar.

It is important to focus on the decisive role of cities in the creation of youth cultures. In 2015, nearly 46% of the population lived in urban centres; most of them were aged under thirty and treated unequally. Economic frustrations, the lack of prospects and increasing urban inequality had potentially explosive effects, also identified elsewhere in Africa over some twenty years (El-Kentz, 1995). Moreover, in the case of Mozambique, the demobilization of soldiers from the civil war did not lead to profound peace in society insofar as firearms continued to circulate. In many cities, gangs developed and, consequently, so did armed robbery and informal trade based on fencing (Maloa, 2012). The increase in violence also took a political turn. The young activists of RENAMO, the main opposition party, were quick to take up arms in a context of very few political alternatives. In Beria, others of the same generation refused to be conscripted in the army to fight RENAMO (Cahen, 2015). Elsewhere, such as in Maputo, in 2010, young people were still protesting against the high cost of living and clashing with the police.

The cultural productions resulting from this generation are therefore more of a direct demonstration of the great fragility of a social category with fluctuating contours. As Diouf and Collignon (2001) observed, the duration of youth can either be very short or, on the contrary, drawn out, depending on social environments and contexts. More than ever, this period of time, overly determined by the living conditions of one's family, was becoming one of uncertainty and a prolonged wait to fully enter adulthood (Honwana, 2012). How has the music created and appreciated by young Mozambicans accounted for their gradual self-assertion since colonial times?

Music as a generational questioning of the nation

During colonial times, it was primarily adolescents or young adults who were the source of the principal city music genres. Then, in the 1940s, *marrabenta* was born from contact with migrants who came from the countryside of southern Mozambique, some of whom had passed through the Rand mines. Many performers of this iconic genre started as children or adolescents, playing on guitars cobbled together from oil cans (*viola de lata* or *xigogogwana*) before acquiring more conventional instruments in the city or in South Africa. Semi-professionals therefore satisfied a social demand that developed in the segregated periphery of Lourenço Marques: the *Canico*⁵ (Sopa, 2014). As recalled in a

5 The word means 'bulrush', a building material that has long been predominant in this part of the city.

poem by Nelson Saúte in his collection *Maputo Blues*, growing up in the 1960s and 1970s in the capital and elsewhere, meant listening to songs by Fanny M'Pfumo⁶ (1929-1987) recorded in the Johannesburg region and even those by the group, Djambo.⁷ In fact, in those days, transistor radios brought from the Rand by the miners were used to listen to the programmes of Rádio Clube Moçambique⁸ or the SABC (South-African Broadcasting Corporation) – as they were windows into African, Western and Brazilian music. Adolescents drew their inspiration from these, from the Willy and Aníbal brothers or Yana.⁹ Groups that performed cover versions of Afro-American soul and rock artists began earning some success, such as the Galtons, the Cruzados and the Geysers. Wazimbo, one of the principal Mozambican artists still alive today, made his début in the 1970s in the Geysers (Nativel, 2011).

Many American and South African musical influences had a strong impact at the end of the colonial era such that, after 1975, FRELIMO wanted to restrict their reach. Only a small group of musicians benefited directly from the new situation by joining official orchestras such as Grupo Rádio Moçambique or semi-official ones like the Orchestra Marrabenta Star. Other minority musicians were exiled to South Africa, the ultimate enemy country in the 1970s and 1980s. One was Jimmy Dlodlu, a jazz guitarist, who has since fully integrated into the musical scene of the Cape (Nativel, 2015).

It was not until the 1990s that the fragile record and entertainment industry gradually freed itself from the state. Some artists, such as the duo formed by Carlos and Zaida Chongo (1970-2004),¹⁰ deeply rooted in the Mozambican heritage of *marrabenta*, were able to take advantage of this new development. Many young women, and indeed young men, were able to identify with this free-spirited partnership, both members of which died prematurely in the 2000s. Meanwhile, American rap and even South African *kwaito* encouraged young musicians and music lovers from the country to leave behind the difficult chapter of the revolutionary years and the civil war.

In recent years, a small audience of privileged young people, including high school or university students, children of salaried workers and young entrepreneurs,

6 This legendary musician achieved most of his success in South Africa before finally returning to Mozambique just after independence.

7 This group, famous in the 1960s, is one of the few to have recorded an album in Lourenço Marques itself.

8 This is the main colonial radio station in Mozambique.

9 These artists, who were born in the early to mid-1950s, became famous just after independence.

10 Zaida Chongo had a brief but memorable career. Indeed, this singer and dancer has remained one of the most popular figures of contemporary Mozambican music.

have frequented concert halls in the big cities and particularly the capital, Maputo (such as the Gil Vicente, built in colonial times). They also attend festivals featuring *marrabenta*, jazz, African music or – based on Western and South African models – they participate in television programmes where the winners of the Mozambique Music Awards are picked using SMS voting. These young television viewers undoubtedly recognize themselves in the clips of favourite singers such as MC Roger and Neyma.¹¹ These artists cultivate a certain consumerist and ostentatious hedonism, sometimes not without humour, but very far from the difficult daily lives of most young Mozambicans. With other artists like Dama do Bling, the assertion of a more independent female sexuality still seems like provocation even though, particularly in Maputo and the tourist centres, young girls engage in intimate relationships with foreigners and take material benefits from them for themselves and their relatives (Groes-Green, 2011).

More rarely, certain other artists express criticism of the authorities. The rapper Azagaia ('spear') is one example. He denounces corruption and the cynicism of the elites he believes are guilty of betraying the ideals of the war of independence long taught at school.¹² This theme of the sacrifice of young generations is prevalent among many young artists in Africa (Künzler, 2012). However, it does not yet entail a political mobilization as strong as can be found in Angola around activists and rappers such as MC Kappa or Ikonoklasta (Buire, 2016).

Much more widely, many musicians, and indirectly their audiences, through their musical practices, question how they belong to the Mozambican nation. Admittedly open to multiple external influences, young musicians are no less aware of the contribution of their elders. In 2005, two young artists, Chiquito and Chonyl, joined forces with two *marrabenta* veterans, Dilon Djindji and Lisboa Matavel, to record an album of great richness called 'Soul Marrabenta'. Six years later, Moreira Chonguiça, a jazz saxophonist, who emigrated to South Africa but is still very attached to his Mozambican roots, also created an intergenerational musical project, asking some ten older artists to sing on his album 'Khaninambo'. Moreover, by championing the use of a specifically Mozambican city slang language in his songs, the rapper Dice¹³ agrees in his own way with the writer Mia Couto (2012). Indeed, he exhorts the young people of his country to cultivate the resources of their complex local culture and to distance themselves from a standard, soulless cosmopolitanism.

11 Former television presenter MC Roger promotes personal success in his clips filmed in Maputo or Brazil. The singer Neyma began her career in 1995 at the age of 16. Since then, she has won several awards in her own country and is beginning to be recognized elsewhere in Africa.

12 One of his most famous works is titled 'Minha geração' (My generation).

13 In his songs 'O nosso calão' and 'Chinês' (Our Slang and Chinese).

Conclusion

Mozambican youth cultures, created in the space and time interstices of the colonial and postcolonial cities, still bear the mark of the immense challenges this changing country must address. Although Mozambique's population growth is slowing and its GDP per capita is rising, inequalities are increasing and, with them, the phenomena of violence in its multiple forms.

As elsewhere on the continent, youth represents an elastic period of time, pointing to an often precarious collective condition. But it is also a rich time that reflects an imagination that it would be wrong to consider as solely 'presentist' (Hartog, 2012). Indeed, fuelled as much by education as by globalization, youth cultures also tell us how, increasingly, young people are becoming true agents of social change, more critical than ever of their elders and aware of their contribution to the affirmation of a national culture.

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CHAPTER 7

TRAJECTORIES OF AFRICAN GRADUATES IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

Tatiana Smirnova

Introduction

As African states gained their independence, they experienced a strong need to train management-level professionals and, therefore, they took advantage of the scholarships offered by the countries of the Eastern bloc. During the Soviet period, Africans were obliged to return to their home countries at the end of their studies. Generally, upon their return, the young graduates worked for the state.¹ This situation changed with the dissolution of the USSR and the disruption this brought to the academic and cultural agreements between the African countries and those from the East. Some African students remained in their host country due, in particular, to the political and social transformations taking place in their countries of origin. This article focuses on those who came to the USSR for their higher education in the 1980s but did not return to their countries of origin and settled permanently in Russia. Thanks to their university education and experience of everyday life, through the prism of socio-political transformations taking place in post-Soviet Russia, they acquired skills and

1 Their trajectories were nevertheless far from linear. After working in their country of origin, young people who had graduated in Eastern bloc countries could then go to France to train, before returning to their country of origin once more, and then relaunching their career abroad. See de Saint-Martin, Scarfo Ghellab and Mellakh (2015).

know-how that enabled them to cleverly navigate from one professional field to another. They sometimes combined several activities, becoming recognized and respected in their areas of expertise.

The image portrayed of these Africans by the media, but also in academic literature, has often reduced them to the status of victims (Alina-Pisano and Alina-Pisano, 2007), obscuring their genuine contributions to society in both Russia and Africa. Indeed, presenting them in this way disregards the fact that they were also able to become artists, engineers, political scientists, philosophers, musicians, journalists, university professors and formidable business leaders. This chapter examines the trajectories of some of these individuals through the prism of socio-historical dynamics: the collapse of the USSR and the rise of the Iron Curtain in 1991; the market liberalization of the 1990s; the escalation of xenophobia; and Russia's asserted return to the geopolitical scene in the 2000s. The chapter examines how Africans appropriated these dynamics and seized upon their 'otherness' in order to build their relationship with the world.

This empirical analysis will not only provide a better understanding of what happened to the individuals who were originally sent back to participate in nation-state building, but also to bring out the complex connections between Russia, Africa and the West, as put in motion by these African students. To what extent did they contribute to the transformation of Russia, which was undergoing radical change in the 1990s? What role do the connections they embody play in building a global reference to Africanity and 'Blackness'? (Marable and Agard-Jones, 2008). This text is based on work carried out since 2012 within the ELITAF research group.² It draws on thirty interviews and, specifically, four stories: of two Ethiopians, Tedros and Kassa, who arrived in the USSR in 1989 and 1985, respectively, to study human sciences; and two Nigerians, Adam and Emmanuel, who arrived in 1986 to study economics and medicine, respectively.

2 'African students and elites trained in the countries of the former Soviet bloc' (ELITAF) is a research project set up in 2012 by the coordinating members of the Réseau International Afrique Monde, with the support of the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme and the Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur les Enjeux Sociaux. Field research and trips in December 2015 were funded by the PRES HESAM Transformations et Défis Africains (MDA) programme, within the framework of the collaborative space 'Élites africaines dans le monde'.

Settling in Russia in the early 1990s: the structuring role of the academic and university environment

The majority of individuals interviewed described their decision to live in Russia as one made somewhat 'in spite of themselves', 'by default' and initially perceived as a temporary rather than a definitive solution. Indeed, in the early 1990s, a large number of African countries were marked by significant social and political transformations. The regimes that sent students to the USSR (when it still existed) were no longer in place. In some cases, this posed a serious problem for the students they sent abroad to study. Tedros and Kassa, who had been close to the powers in question, could no longer return to Ethiopia without risking their lives.³ Russia did not send the two Ethiopian students home; rather, they were granted the status of doctoral students, even though the Ethiopian Embassy refused to give them any of the usual support necessary for the continuation of their studies. The situation of students from other countries, who had completed their studies in the early 1990s, was just as complicated. Adam, who arrived from Nigeria in 1986, explained how, as a young economics graduate in 1992, he found himself 'caught between two crises'. He did not wish to return to his country where the Sani Abacha military dictatorship had been installed. At the same time, he was aware of the difficulties of life in Russia, which at the time was in the midst of economic transition. He nevertheless decided not to leave and he enrolled in a doctorate programme, which was the only way to stay legally in the country without being married to a Russian.⁴ Consequently, the status of doctoral student allowed these four Africans, as well as many others, to stay in Russia, restructure their future trajectories and shape their relationships with the world.

Historically, the academic community has always been associated, in one way or another, with the powers that be (Davidson and Filatova, 2007). The dissolution of the USSR had diminished the political clout of the academic institutions linked to Africa, but they still remained centres of reference. Thus, African participation in them continued to be important. African research in Russia is today chiefly concentrated in two major institutions: the Museum of Anthropology in Saint Petersburg (Arseniev, 1999) and the African Institute in Moscow. As part of their studies, the African students occasionally took part in seminars dedicated to Africa, either as speakers or as members of the

3 Ethiopia experienced the fall of the Mengistu regime on 28 May 1991. See Prunier (2007).

4 Interview with Adam, 13 December 2015, Moscow.

audience as a way of coping with the nostalgia they felt for their countries of origin, as well as learning what researchers thought of them, as pointed out by Adam, the Nigerian doctoral student in economics.⁵ In addition, Ethiopians, Nigerians and Malians taught African languages (Amharic, Oromo, Hausa and Bambara) in various institutions, thus establishing strong links with researchers. Indeed, some of the researchers had a profound effect on the African students' political commitment. This was true of the Saint Petersburg anthropologist Nikolay Girenko, a defender of human rights, who worked with Malian Aliou Tounkara, the president of the association 'African Unity' (discussed below) in the years 1990 to 2000, to raise public awareness of the problem of racism. For Africans in Russia, the academic world was much more than a university space where knowledge about Africa was produced. It also acted as a forum for the expression of ideas, where they could assert their rights to improved living conditions or indeed provide an alternative viewpoint on the socio-political situation in their countries of origin. A doctorate – but also a network of relationships associated with it – not only contributed to personal prestige, it was also a means of positioning themselves and ensuring that they were respected within the associative community of Africans settled in Russia.

Market liberalization: the staging of otherness as a means of affirmation

The lifting of the Iron Curtain, along with the liberalization of the economy and political life, contributed to the emergence of several niches in which Africans were able to successfully position themselves based on their personal and professional skills as well as the structural opportunities of the world of work. The status of foreign doctoral student did not give them the right to work for a Russian company. They thus turned towards the many foreign companies looking to invest in the promising new market. For example, Kassa and Tedros worked for Nestlé, successfully dealing with store sales negotiations. Tedros, a former government official responsible for propaganda issues in Ethiopia, explained that 'selling a drink and selling a system are one and the same.'⁶ At the same time, Adam was recruited by a foreign company thanks to his expertise in English-language accounting, which was acquired through remote

5 Interview with Adam, 13 December 2015, Moscow.

6 Interview with Tedros, 13 November 2014, Moscow.

training provided by a university in England, in addition to his main studies in Russia. The fact that these doctoral students had qualities and skills, not only linguistically but also on a professional level, which were rarely accessible to Russians at the time the Iron Curtain was lifted, meant that they were able to play the role of intermediary between Russians and the foreign companies newly established in this market.

The early 1990s also coincided with the emergence of multiple opportunities linked to the world of business (Smirnova, 2015). Many Africans who had succeeded in accumulating a small amount of savings during their studies in the 1980s, through the sale of jeans, video recorders and other 'luxury' items bought in Europe, invested in creating their own companies. Their business activities made a real mark on the economy and the society of their host country. Thus, one of the first translation offices in Moscow was created by a Burkinabé. Another doctoral student, a Guinean, who had studied Russian languages and civilization, had the brilliant idea of launching a newspaper in Chinese, the very first intended for Moscow's Chinese community. It was an Ethiopian who had the initiative to establish Russia's first sex shop in Moscow. Similarly, the first wholesale imports of computers from Singapore were carried out by a group of Nigerians. Others opened Russia's first nightclubs, a risky endeavour, since the 'world of the night' was run by criminal organizations.⁷ Emmanuel, a native of Nigeria and a doctor of medicine, thus founded 'Zebra', explaining that this name embodied his personality: 'It's me – I'm black and white.' This nightclub was frequented by African students but was not limited to them. It existed for eight years, which was remarkable for the time. This success was due to Emmanuel's exceptional ability in deciphering codes and negotiating with administrative authorities, criminal groups and police alike. He also played on the notion of 'exoticism', opening 'Afro-Bar', a luxury restaurant serving crocodile, snake and ostrich meat. Emmanuel thus positioned himself within this niche created by the nouveaux-riches, successfully appropriating their codes: he drove around in a red Mercedes, bought an apartment, and said that, at the time, everyone 'was afraid of him'.⁸

In an era when Russia was opening up to the 'outside world', African doctoral students were investing in their position as 'mediators' in the economic, political and social transformations of the 1990s. They thus seized upon multiple

7 For example, a Nigerian national who opened a luxury nightclub on Saint Petersburg's Nevskiy avenue, the equivalent of the Champs-Élysées in Paris, was assassinated in 1996 as part of a settling of scores.

8 Interview with Emmanuel, 25 December 2015, Moscow.

opportunities to bring their 'otherness' to the fore. They were able to achieve this thanks to their linguistic skills, which they were able to draw upon to work for foreign companies, or indeed they relied on the experience and know-how they had acquired during their visits to and from Europe.

'African' solidarities in transition

In the years 1990 to 2000, various solidarities between Africans of all countries were forged, based on a range of different factors. They grew in strength in the 1990s and early 2000s built on the notion of mutual protection against the upsurge of xenophobia and skinhead attacks. For example, the Malian Aliou Tounkara founded an association called 'African Unity' which, in coordination with the municipal authorities, participated in a programme to raise public awareness of the problems of racism. The association organized several public lectures on this subject in colleges, high schools and even universities (Boltovskaya, 2012). In 2004, a friend of Aliou Tounkara, Nikolay Girenko, an anthropologist working on Southern Africa, but also a judicial expert in cases linked to racism, was killed by skinheads. His assassination was a trigger for the strengthening of ties between Africans who, in cooperation with human rights organizations, launched the annual 'anti-hate' marches that began in 2004. With the change in the political situation, the authorities attempted to resurrect this movement, denouncing the assassinations of various opposition activists. The last major step was in 2009. At the same time, skinhead attacks diminished because of a series of important trials that saw several leaders of right-wing groups sent to prison in 2010 and 2011. This led to a weakening of the associations of Africans, which had formed mainly around the fight against racism.

Other forms of solidarity began to emerge associated with Russia's ambition to return to the geopolitical scene, especially on the African continent.⁹ Africans endeavoured to set up individual or collective initiatives in order to develop commercial and cultural ties between their countries of origin and Russia. For example, Adam was involved in the operation of an association called the 'Nigerians in Diaspora Organization', a powerful network working alongside embassies, with subsidiaries in both Europe and the United States. Similarly,

⁹ This return was primarily seen in the strengthening of economic relations between Russia and Africa. Gazprom thus established business in Nigeria, Rusal and Severstal in Guinea, Alros in Angola, and so on.

Emmanuel, a 1990s businessman who enjoyed credibility among both the Russian and Nigerian authorities, actively contributed to the strengthening of trade ties between Russia and his country of origin. Aliou Tounkara organized several visits of Malian artisans to Saint Petersburg and Moscow, at his own expense.

These solidarities, aimed at fostering bilateral relations between Russia and the countries of origin of the Africans in question, contrasted with the 'exotic' image of Africa still conveyed by the pop scene and the Russian media. Indeed, in the early 2000s, Africans seen on television were mainly featured in film episodes, sometimes playing one of the leading roles,¹⁰ but also through music. In 2002, Cameroonian Pierre Narcisse became the star of the Russian equivalent of Pop Idol (*Fabrika Zvezd*) for his song 'The Chocolate Rabbit'. The title speaks for itself, but Pierre Narcisse's popularity was not an isolated phenomenon and was accompanied by the emergence of other stars who were less famous on the national pop scene but recognized on a more local level. In 2008, 2009 and 2015, various music festivals thus took place in Moscow and Saint Petersburg: Afro-Plus, Moscow-Africa and Afrofest. A very diverse range of groups performed, mostly made up of university students. They played sophisticated pieces from their countries of origin, such as *Kimbata*, presented in Kikongo, Lingala and French languages. At Afrofest-2015, there were even special guests: an internationally recognized Rwandan ensemble, *Inganzo Ngar*, and the Beninese theatre troupe *Oshala*. However, the Russian media's interpretation of these events sometimes demonstrated the extent to which the African continent remained unknown and exotic. Commenting on the festivals, the editor-in-chief of one of the TV channels slipped up repeatedly with the notion that 'Africa is a beautiful country'. Nevertheless, Africans played on this exotic and unifying image. Tedros, for example, who became a recognized research lecturer in the mid-2000s, launched his own trademark, Ethnos Diplomacy, a travel and events organization company. Others associate themselves with the image of 'African-Americans', as one of the many examples of this type attests: a rap song by a musical duo formed in Russia by a Zimbabwean and a Kenyan. Their English language song 'I go hard like Vladimir Putin' gained great popularity and they had even been invited to talk about it on several television shows. The singers use the word

10 For example, the Nigerian actor Andrew Souberu played one of the leading roles in the television series 'Legenda o Tampouké' [The Legend of Tampouk] directed by Andrei Benkendorf (2004). The film tells the story of a certain Manang, a native of Morocco, who finds himself at the heart of the tormented life of Russia from the 1990s to the early 2000s, becoming a criminal leader and millionaire.

Nigazz to describe their style, a mixture of 'niger' and 'jazz', explaining that they wish to address 'all Black people, not just those living in Russia'.

In addition to the bilateral associations and solidarities linked to cultural events, some Africans were able to position themselves between the two, immersing themselves deeply in the community in which they lived and, at the same time, transforming the image of Africa they conveyed in society through their works. The most significant example is probably that of an elected representative of a small town in the Tver region, a couple of hours away from Moscow. Jean-Grégoire Sagbo arrived in Russia from Benin in 1982 to study economics. At the end of his studies, he returned to Benin, where he was arrested and spent two years in prison for his political opinions. He managed to escape and returned to the USSR in 1989 to rejoin his wife and son. Like many of his compatriots, he went into business, which enabled him to buy an apartment and live comfortably with his family in Novozavidovo while working as a volunteer for the borough. He gradually became known among the local people, who were grateful to him for his development work. In 2010, he was offered the opportunity to stand in the local elections, which he won, thus becoming a deputy; the 'Russian Obama', as he was called in the press. In September 2015, he won elections at the regional level.¹¹ Jean-Grégoire considers himself profoundly Russian, a view shared by the people with whom he works and the populations he represents: 'He has a Russian soul!' confirmed the mayor of the borough (Jego, 2011). Another example is the Malagasy figure Fofa Rabearivelo, a distinguished painter who trained at the highly prestigious Leningrad Mikhina School of Art and Industry where he brilliantly completed his studies in 1991. He returned to Madagascar with his wife and son. Failing to find employment on an island seriously affected by economic crisis, he returned to Saint Petersburg to try to make his living through his passion: art. He gradually became known in the artistic circles of Russia, Madagascar and France, as well as in other European countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, where he exhibited. Fofa Rabearivelo works a long way away from Madagascar, between Saint Petersburg, Moscow and Paris, which allows him to perceive and construct his country of origin through an alternative gaze. Drawing inspiration from music and the world around him, he uses his works to create the modern myth of Madagascar founded on elements of modern and post-modern art, along with magic realism.¹²

11 Interview with Jean-Grégoire Sagbo, 10 December 2015, Novozavidovo, Tverskaya region.

12 Interview with Fofa Rabearivelo, 9 November 2014, Saint Petersburg.

Thus, since the collapse of the USSR, 'African' solidarities have been constantly undergoing radical changes – part of the social and political transformations of Russia. These dynamics show the extent to which Africans, far from the image of victims projected by the media, are at the heart of these changes, transforming 'Africa' through both political demands and economic development, and making the continent, in turn, an exotic object and work of art.

Conclusion

The world of the Africans who have been settled in Russia for over thirty years may appear very heterogeneous and, at first sight, disjointed. Indeed, the fields in which they work vary immensely (mobile communications, the media, nightclubs, etc.). Nevertheless, they are brought together by their links with the academic and university sector, which fuels their singularity, individuality and legitimacy. This becomes crucial given the context in which the media portrays a unifying and exotic image of Africa, which they, in turn, are able to appropriate in order to bring out their 'Africanity', their 'Blackness', and transform this 'otherness' into something more than just a strategy for existence and survival. Through their academic and research pathways, economic investments, and social, associative and political commitments, they participate in building experiences that circulate between Russia, Africa and the West. Their position as 'mediators' is also expressed through the structural complexity of the professional fields in which they position themselves (academia, business, art, journalism, etc.). It is probably thanks to the specific nature of their positioning that we can speak of them as elites outside their countries of origin.

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CHAPTER 8

THE SOCIAL RISE AND POWER OF GENERATIONS OF MILITARY ELITES IN MADAGASCAR

Tovonirina Daniela Rakotondrabe

Introduction

The first three decades of the postcolonial era were those of Praetorianism in Africa (Martin, 1990 and 1993), of which the ‘authoritarian decompression’, which began in the 1990s, seemed to sound the death knell. However, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, given the involvement of the armed forces in many unconstitutional regime switches (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), it seems logical to examine whether the turn of the 1990s marks a break in the relationship between the armed forces and African societies, or whether it is just a simple episode in the long-standing dynamics between military elites and political classes. This chapter attempts to address this question using the specific case of Madagascar as an example.

The emergence of the postcolonial military elite

Formed in the wake of independence and moulded on the French model, the Malagasy Army was principally comprised of the Army and the National Gendarmerie supplemented by the symbolic National Air Force and Navy. These elements were part of the attributes of the new state’s sovereignty. Until the end of the 1960s, the first generation of officers was trained in French military schools,

including Saint-Cyr-Coëtquidan Military Academy, Melun Police Academy, the Naval Academy at Brest, the Air Force Academy at Salon-de-Provence, and the École Supérieure de Guerre (ESG) war school in Paris. Most of these officers were in the French Army before the early 1950s and had taken part in Indochina and North African campaigns during decolonization initiatives. This was the case for two future heads of state. The first, Gabriel Ramanantsoa, having had a career in the French Army and attained the rank of colonel, became Chief of Staff in 1960 and Division General when Philibert Tsiranana, facing the pressure of student revolt (of high school and college students), transferred full power to him on 18 May 1972 as head of a military-civilian government. The second, Richard Ratsimandrava¹, having also served in the French Army, notably in Morocco and Algeria, went on to do a stint at Melun in 1963. A third head of state, Didier Ratsiraka, did his baccalaureate at the Jesuit College of Saint-Michel in the capital, Antananarivo, before being admitted to the preparatory class (advanced and special maths) at Lycée Henri IV in Paris. He then qualified as an engineer at Brest Naval Academy. The crowning achievement for any senior officer was admission to the École de Guerre in Paris, which later became the Collège Interarmées de Défense (CID).

There was, however, another path, less brilliant but still renowned. Some, who did not attend prestigious schools, served as non-commissioned officers in the French Army before joining the new Malagasy Army as officers trained in schools such as EFORTOM at Fréjus.² This was the case for General Ramarolahy, who became Chief of Staff of the Army (1972-1975) under Ramanantsoa, as well as Colonel B. Rajaonarison, his military adviser (1972-1975). The same was true for Gilles Andriamahazo who was appointed President of the Military Directory, an organization launched the day after the assassination of Ratsimandrava on 11 February 1975 and which he served until 13 June 1975.

At the beginning of independence, this first type of elitist trajectory was reserved for sons of families privileged by birth or social advancement, most of whom came from the Central Highlands (Imerina, the heart of the Merina Kingdom). This was also the case for descendants of the ruling oligarchy during the nineteenth century (Archer, 1976). In order to break this Merina monopoly, President Philibert Tsiranana³ opened two schools aimed at training a new generation of officers. First

1 Internal strife forced Ramanantsoa to hand over power on 6 February 1975 to his Minister of the Interior, Colonel Ratsimandrava, who was assassinated five days later. Ratsiraka seized power in June 1975 until 1992 and regained it after the elections in 1997.

2 Training school for officers from the Overseas Territories, launched in 1956 and closed in 1965.

3 Portrayed as the 'Father of independence', Tsiranana was the first president of the Republic (1959-1972).

came the Military Academy at Antsirabe, 160 km south of Antananarivo. From 1967 to 2017, this institution trained over 3,500 Malagasy and around 150 African cadets,⁴ with the specific mission of preparing sons of less privileged families or men from the provinces for this career path. The best graduates from this school could access training centres abroad, considered to be the ultimate career goal. Vice-Admiral Hyppolite Ramaroson is a good example. Having attended high school at the most famous Catholic schools in the capital (Saint Joseph, Saint Michel and Sainte Famille), he joined the sixth class at the Military Academy (1972). Admitted to the Naval Academy in Brest, he graduated as an engineer and went on to study at the Naval War School in Paris. He finally rounded off his studies with a training stint in the United States at the College of Security Studies (Hawaii) and the United States Defense School. President Tsiranana then launched the *École Supérieure de la Gendarmerie de Moramanga* for future gendarmerie officers. To meet the needs of the 'popular army' that was more in line with the revolutionary socialism he wanted to create, in opposition to their Western-trained elders who were hostile to this political mission, Didier Ratsiraka sent his officers to communist countries (China, North Korea, USSR) from 1975 to 1991. Internships abroad were viewed as a favour and a pledge of political allegiance.

The unattainable Praetorian State: the close collusion between military and political elites

The incursion of the armed forces in politics took place between 1971 and 1975, symbolized by Colonel R. Ratsimandrava. The first Malagasy Commander of the Gendarmerie in 1969, he was summoned by Tsiranana to quell the peasant revolt in the south in 1971.⁵ The violent repression contributed to reinforcing the image, among the rural population, of the gendarmerie as the armed wing of the administration (Raison-Jourde and Roy, 2010). Appointed Minister of the Interior after the fall of Tsiranana in 1972, Ratsimandrava would serve briefly as head of state (from 6 to 11 February 1975). His assassination, following dissension between various military factions, crystallized the decentralization debate. Despite the continued presence of soldiers at the upper echelons of the state from 1972

4 Including two heads of state: Captain Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso) and General Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (Niger), both seizing power during a coup and subsequently assassinated.

5 A peasant revolt led by the MONIMA party with Monja Jaona at its head broke out on 1st April in Androy, one of the poorest regions in the south of the island. It was violently crushed by the gendarmerie, with hundreds dead and thousands taken as prisoners.

to 2002 (Rabenirainy, 2002), and in governing bodies to the present day, it is difficult to speak of a military regime *stricto sensu*. The establishment of a Military Directorate for four months, followed by exceptional measures until 15 June 1975, appeared to be a departure from tradition: a state of emergency, martial law, suspension of all political activity, media censorship and limited basic human rights. This military junta, comprised of nineteen officers presided over by General Andriamahazo, was self-proclaimed on the basis of the same criteria used to determine the constitution of a civilian government: concern for parity between ranks, taking into account the different weapons, and a concern for the famous ethnic-regional balance. Following a secret in-camera vote, in keeping with the political culture of Madagascan elites, the Military Directorate dissolved and transferred power to Ratsiraka. This episode aside, with regard to Praetorianism or even a military dictatorship, as in some African countries, does not appear to make much sense; nor does it seem at all relevant to speak of the militarization of the political system or of the politicization of the armed forces, as the collusion between the ruling class and military elites is embedded in the political culture. In fact, the military elites do not impose their methods but intervene and participate fully within the framework of the reorganization of power, in line with the rules and implicit criteria that were already established.

The connection between the military elites and the political elites stems initially from the dynastic continuity of influential families, either with a precolonial territorial anchor (as in the case of Imerina and the South-East) or because they consolidated their prominence during the colonial period (in other regions in Madagascar), or because they benefited from decolonization (Galibert, 2011). Some descendants of *andriandehibe*⁶ families, with a presence in the circles of power since the nineteenth century in Imerina, such as Generals Rabetafika, Ramahatra and Ranjeva, who all graduated from Saint-Cyr, demonstrate the shifting of officers towards political positions. Ranjeva served in three successive regimes. As Commander of the Military Academy under Didier Ratsiraka, he ran the Malagasy Office of Tobacco, and became Minister of Defence (1996) under Albert Zafy⁷. Confirmed at the Ministry of Defence (1997-2002) after Ratsiraka's return, he went on to become Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002-2009) under Marc Ravalomanana⁸, with the rank of Lieutenant General.

6 Literally the 'great *andriana*'. This phrase refers to princes who are members of Merina high nobility.

7 Elected against Ratsiraka in 1992, but failing to complete his term, Zafy would be defeated by Ratsiraka during the presidential elections in 1997.

8 Recognized as President of the Republic after the 2002 post-election crisis, Ravalomanana was re-elected in 2007.

Some trajectories are linked to the rise of certain families from outlying provinces who consolidated their position in the state apparatus straight after independence because of the rank of their representatives in the armed forces (Galibert, 2011). This was the case for General Sylvain Rabotoarison from the South-East who graduated from the first class at Antsirabe Military Academy and Moramanga Gendarmerie Academy, and who later served under four successive regimes: Minister of the Interior (1991-1993); then special advisor to the Prime Minister (1993-1996) under Albert Zafy; Minister of the Interior (1996-1997); Commander of the National Gendarmerie (1997-2002) under Ratsiraka; Minister of the Environment (2002-2008) with the rank of Major General under Marc Ravalomanana; and finally, President of the National Reconciliation Council (2010-2013) after his retirement during the transition led by Andry Rajoelina.⁹ The ruling class understood that the academy and the army were excellent ways to access circles of power and tap into related privileges, as well as sources of state income conferred to those in senior positions of responsibility. The Ministry of Defence has therefore devolved to the military since 1972, with the exception of a fleeting period between 2008 and 2009 when the position was held by a civilian.¹⁰ By integrating themselves into the machinery of power, the military elites fit perfectly into the usual practices of the administration, such as corruption and influence peddling, and into the game of political competition characterized by alliances, reversals and factional struggles. They adapt almost naturally to the patrimonial, even predatory, logic of the state.

A military elite: reflection of the political class

The military elite experienced the same contradictions and fracture lines inherent in the political class. Somewhat apparent at the time of General Ramanantsoa's arrival in 1972, they established themselves rapidly from 1975 then spread during major regime crises: Ratsirakist officers (loyal to Ratsiraka) against Zafy's supporters in 1991; Ratsirakist officers against Ravalomanana's supporters in 2002; and supporters of the latter against the group of colonels

9 Ravalomanana was ousted on 17 March 2009 following protests led by the mayor of the capital, Rajoelina, who was backed by a fringe of armed forces. The latter introduced a transitional regime that would last until the end of 2013.

10 Early in 2008, Ravalomanana appointed Cécile Manorohanta to the Ministry of Defence to temper the divisions generated by the crisis of 2002. A member of the political bureau of the presidential party, she was married to Colonel Dominique Manorohanta, a former director of the Intelligence Services. She resigned the day after the bloodbath of 7 February 2009 in front of the Presidential Palace and joined the Rajoelina camp.

engaged in the Rajoelina camp in 2009. But reversals and defections, according to the political crises that punctuate modern history, do not spare the military elite, as was the case for Vice-Admiral Hyppolite Ramaroson. Having been the head of the International Relations Department and Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defence, he was appointed Minister of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources by Ravalomanana (2002–2007). The Military Directorate, of which he was a member, and to whom Ravalomanana handed authority on 17 March 2009, stepped down and gave full power to Andry Rajoelina, having been pressured to do so by mutinous officers. The latter appointed Ramaroson as a special advisor. Having become one of the key officers in the transition regime, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs in February 2010.

Just like the *merina* army in the nineteenth century (Andrianarison, 1983; Decary, 1966; Jacob, 1992), the first problem that plagued the armed forces was clientelism, inaugurated under Ratsiraka's regime during the mid-1970s and consolidated by successive regimes to this day. The system is based on the careful management of the careers of general and superior officers via the 'politicization' of career advancement, and the appointment of leadership roles and access to the privileges of senior civil and quasi-public services in line with two key criteria: ethnic-regional quotas, and the degree of allegiance and personal loyalty to the head of state in office. This strategy has continued to fuel the divisions within the military elite (Rabenirainy, 2002) and fostered the emergence of a 'military bureaucracy' (Vallée, 2017) that persists within the state machinery and seems to have a bright future ahead. The organizational chart of the Ministry of Transport in 2017 was a prime example: eight generals and about fifteen colonels, with a wide range of weaponry, occupied key positions at the heart of the upper levels of the ministry and supervised agencies (directors-general, presidents and members of the Administration Council, technical directors and regional directors). The appointment of a general officer to the Prime Minister has become a tradition even in times of peace, such as Charles Rabemananjara (Gendarmerie, 2007–2009) under Ravalomanana, Albert Camille Vital (Land Army, 2010–2012) under Rajoelina, and Ravelonarivo (Air Force, 2015–2016) under Hery Rajaonarimampianina.

Corruption and extortion were other causes of trouble within the military institution. During the 2009 coup (Ramasy, 2012) and the new transition period (2009–2013), during which the armed forces were on the verge of collapse, most of the commanders opportunistically sided with Rajoelina.¹¹ The venality of many

11 The colonel-led mutiny on 8 March 2009 at Capsat (Army Corps of administrative personnel and technical services), where the capital's main weapons and ammunition depot was located, spurred Rajoelina's takeover on 17 March. In May 2010, another mutiny broke out among soldiers of the Gendarmerie intervention forces demanding their wages.

senior officers and generals involved in the coup was then common knowledge, especially as the latter were then rewarded with rapid promotion and important positions in the administrative machine. During corruption perception surveys run by Transparency International – Initiative Madagascar, the Gendarmerie ranked high alongside administrative bodies (legal system, police, land registration services) and decentralized groups. Another paradox adds to this picture: an excessive number of generals, inversely proportional to the rise in internal security issues (rural and urban organized crime: theft of zebus, armed robberies, kidnappings) and external security concerns (rise in illicit trade of natural resources such as precious woods and turtles), with the involvement of senior officers and generals regularly making headlines. The transition made it commonplace for the military leadership and a martial elite, at the intersection of power and business networks, to aspire to lucrative positions in the patronage-based state, just as much as the political elite.

Do the armed forces exert a pull, particularly on young people, because they are potentially a way to climb the social ladder? The lack of transparency of official sources makes it impossible to establish accurate figures for the total number of armed forces personnel, all branches combined. Estimated at around 20,000 at the end of the 1990s and around 24,000 at the turn of the millennium (Rabenirainy, 2002), the number in 2024 was 21,000 active military personnel, with just over half (12,000) in the Gendarmerie. It should be noted that the Gendarmerie leads the war against cattle theft and instability in the Great South and maintains law and order in the face of growing urban trade union and social movements, alongside the national police. Data regarding the last two student officer classes in July 2015 and July 2016 indicate a certain stability, which has been confirmed in subsequent graduations. With an average of 60 sub-Lieutenants per graduation¹², the Military Academy will have trained about 300 officers between 2015 and 2019, and at least one-third of these will attain the rank of general before retirement, meaning about 100. Already estimated at 100 during the political and military crisis of 2002, the number of generals has continued to grow since, which has helped to stimulate interest in this career field.¹³ In 2016 alone, in all of the armed forces, 52 generals were promoted, including 35 new brigadier generals, and 17 attaining a higher rank (divisional generals). Similarly, in 2017, graduation included 58 generals, 38 of whom were

12 The 36th graduation class, 2012–2015, 66; 37th, 2013–2016, 63; 38th, 2014–2017, 60; 39th, 2015–2018, 60; 40th, 2016–2019, 60 (source: Military Academy, Research and Training Department, 2017).

13 A novelty since the early 2010s, the entrance examination process has been open to female candidates with five to six student officer training places per class.

new and 20 were promoted. As a rank is held theoretically for three years, and the average number of generals promoted is 55, one can imagine the cost to the state budget of maintaining the martial elite.

The military institution reflects the various problems of the Malagasy nation, including the growing politicization of the social sphere by successive governments that have failed to develop a defence policy adapted to the new challenges and issues of the third millennium. It is urgent to sever the umbilical cord that binds the military to the regime in power rather than to the nation. The question is if, when, and how the political class and the military elite will be so inclined to act.

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CHAPTER 9

WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN WEST AFRICA SINCE 1990

Olufunke Adeboye

Introduction

Niara Surdakasa, in a 1982 publication, queried the nature of the social order to which women were being relegated in post-colonial Africa. This was intended to draw attention not only to the rationale behind the type of education offered to women on the continent but also to underscore the long-term implications of the quality of this education on the wider society (Surdakasa, 1982, p. 285). Elsewhere, Nigeria-based writer, Charmaine Pereira, draws attention to two perspectives on education. The first is to consider education as an end in itself and also as a means to an end. In this regard, education is seen as a means not only to develop the mind and outlook of its recipient but also to facilitate socio-economic and political development in the larger society. The second perspective sees education as a form of empowerment for the individual, to enable them to control their own destiny, fight for justice and pursue inner growth, culminating in wisdom, tolerance and compassion (Pereira, 2007, p. 3). Pereira, like Surdakasa, also expresses concerns about the kind of society that various educational structures and their associated institutional practices are in place to create.

In order to appreciate the extent to which education has facilitated the development of the individual female, her empowerment and ultimate contribution to societal progress, we need to recall precolonial and colonial

antecedents on women's education in Africa. The training given to girls in traditional societies ranged from formal instruction on domestic skills embedded in female initiation rites to local apprenticeships and to female craft specialists. In the nineteenth century, Christian missions offered Western education in various colonial territories in West Africa. In the twentieth century, British and French colonial administrations launched various educational schemes. Newly independent states in West Africa in the 1960s inherited educational systems and an administrative workforce in which women were minimally represented. The concern of scholars and feminist activists in the post-independence dispensation was not only for states to give women unfettered access to education at all levels but that such training be comparable to that given to men.

The issues explored in the following pages are derived from the above concerns and related matters. How much parity has been achieved in male and female education at all levels? How much of women's education is tailored to prepare them to play meaningful roles within the public space? To what extent have such educationally empowered women mobilized their new skills and status to overcome local impediments and ascend corporate, political, economic and other institutional ladders in society? And ultimately, how has the education of women transformed gender relations in West Africa to create a new social order?

Overview of women's education in the colonial period

Neither British nor French authorities had any clearly defined policy on education for their West African colonies in the nineteenth century. They abdicated responsibility in this regard to Christian missions. The first schools in Senegal were established by the Catholic Sisters of St. Joseph of Cluny, a teaching order on Dakar's Gorée Island and in the coastal city of St Louis. According to Diane Barthel, these early attempts enjoyed limited success because the schools were elitist, could not attract many pupils, and taught no practical skills to the few they admitted (Barthel, 1985, p. 140). The schools were meant to facilitate the conversion of local girls to Christianity, teach them the French language, and generally acculturate them to the French way of life. In the early 1900s, French authorities took charge of the educational system with uniform policies that affected not only Senegal but also Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta. By 1930, the enrolment of boys in Senegal in government schools ranged between 2,500 to 5,000, while that of girls in mission schools was between 200 and 500. Girls' education stagnated

because both French and Islamic patriarchal ideologies had no intention of emancipating women. Catholic schools, which previously held sway, were now sidelined due to a new alliance between French colonial authorities and Muslim Africans (Barthel, 1985, p. 140).

It was only in the 1930s that the French moved to redress their neglect of women's education by establishing schools for girls. The purpose of such schools was to train girls in European ideas on health and childcare, produce suitable wives for French-trained elites, and socialize future generations in French cultures and mores. The first of such institutions was the elite *École Normale de Jeunes Filles* founded in Rufisque, Senegal, in 1938 as a post-primary institution. It was set up to produce teachers and candidates for the midwives' section of the medical school. It attracted girls from all over French West African territories (Barthel, 1985, p. 140). It has been argued that the graduates of this school were not passive subjects but creative and ambitious actors who promptly converted their newly acquired skills into stepping stones to 'command positions in education, government and private business in Senegal and throughout former French West Africa'. The school delivered more results than its founders anticipated: it produced 'not only homemakers and primary school teachers but women professionals as well' (Barthel, 1985, p. 148). Nevertheless, there is a limit to the level of success that could be attributed to a single regional institution, which was not immediately replicated in other French West African colonies.

In British West Africa, the education of girls and also boys was initially left in the hands of Christian missions. The first primary schools in Nigeria were founded in the 1840s. The first girls' school was the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Girls' Seminary in Lagos, founded in 1869. The Wesley Girls' Seminary, also in Lagos, was established in 1879. Several of the other schools were coeducational. The goal of missionary education for girls was to instil correct morals and modest behaviour. It was not meant to offer rigorous academic training or prepare them for jobs outside the home. British Victorian gender ideology emphasized domesticity in the training of women. Women were not expected to work outside the home or be involved in public life. It is to the credit of Yoruba women in Nigeria that they adapted additional domestic skills acquired in schools to fit their cultural expectations and meet individual needs (McIntosh, 2009, pp. 169-173).

In the Gold Coast (later renamed as Ghana), Christian missions similarly had free rein to operate. It must, however, be noted that before missionaries began to flood the Gold Coast area, there was already a tradition of 'private' European-style schools operated by the large European trading companies

at their forts along the coast. The first of such schools was established by the Dutch in Elmina in 1644. Others were founded by trading companies in Cape Coast and Christianborg in present day Accra. These schools served 'mulattos' and children of African traders. The gender composition of such schools is not clear, however. Christian missions began to establish schools in the nineteenth century, including the Wesleyan, Bremen Mission Society and Basel Society. By 1881, there were 139 schools in the coastal area. Only three of these were run by the colonial government, and it gave some of the mission schools grants-in-aid from time to time (George, 1974, p. 29).

The report of the American Phelps-Stokes Educational Commission set up in 1920 to investigate the state of education in West, South and Equatorial Africa highlighted the indifference of colonial authorities to education and the weaknesses in mission education. It was this report, among other things, that made the British Government decide to play a more active role in the education of Africans in its colonies, especially in the provision of higher education. Before then, the major institution that offered higher education in British West Africa was Fourah Bay College in Freetown (in present-day Sierra Leone), founded by the Church Missionary Society in 1827.

The British thereafter proceeded to establish Achimota College in the Gold Coast in 1927 to provide education for young Africans. According to Prof. Cati Coe, Achimota was established as a coeducational boarding school to give 'teacher training, technical training and general secondary education' (Coe, 2002, pp. 23-46). In Nigeria, the British also established the Yaba Higher College in 1932. By 1934, it had students enrolled in 'medicine, agriculture, engineering and teacher training' (Fafunwa, 1995, p. 153). Its purpose was to produce well-trained 'assistants' for various departments of government and private enterprise. It was an all-male institution and also the first tertiary college in Nigeria. Apart from its administrative problems and high attrition rates among students, the college suffered immensely during the Second World War. According to Babs Fafunwa, 'its campus and medical school were acquired by the army for war purposes and the student body was dispersed' (Fafunwa, 1995, p. 153). The college was finally absorbed by University College in Ibadan, which was inaugurated in 1948. Meanwhile, the Elliot Commission was set up to examine the contemporary state of higher education in British West Africa and had recommended, in its majority report, among other things, the establishment of two universities in West Africa (Fafunwa, 1995, p. 154). It was in response to this that University College Ibadan was founded. The second university was established in the Gold Coast, also in 1948, and was then known as the University College of the Gold Coast.

By the end of colonial rule in West Africa, not only was the general illiteracy rate high but there were also fewer girls than boys in the available schools. In Nigeria, by 1960, there were 15,703 primary schools spread across the country. Altogether, these schools had 2,912,618 pupils, of whom 1,829,421 were boys and 1,083,142 were girls. There were 883 secondary schools with a total enrolment of 135,364 pupils, of whom 106,826 were boys and 28,538 were girls (Onabamiro, 1985, p. 229). A picture, therefore, emerges of greater participation of girls in primary than in secondary education. The situation at the higher education level was even more acute. Enrolment figures at University College Ibadan (the only university prior to Nigerian independence) revealed an under-representation of female students. In 1952, the institution had 327 male students and 11 female students. By 1957, of the 514 students in the university, only 31 were females (Tamuno, 1973, pp. 37-38). The Inter-University Council, which moderated higher education in British West Africa, had observed this disparity in 1957 during their members' visit to University College Ibadan. The Council expressed some concern in its report, but it warned against the introduction of a quota system that might lower academic standards. Instead, it recommended an expansion of secondary schools with Higher School courses and 'other social changes' to tackle the problem of inadequate representation (Tamuno, 1973, p. 37).

There were several reasons for the low enrolment of girls in the various levels of education, as examined earlier. These could be summarized as socio-economic factors. First, traditional gender division of labour in Africa allocated domestic work to women, both old and young. Young school-age girls were usually overburdened with domestic responsibilities in low-income and economically disadvantaged households. Second, many of them were also involved in productive activities in the fields of agriculture, crafts and commerce. A 1954 survey, covering one-quarter of Accra's school children, observed that 36% were 'gainfully employed'¹ (Acquah, 1958, p. 76). Jack Lord's illuminating study on child labour in the colonial Gold Coast presents children as vital economic actors and agents as he juxtaposes the persistence of illiteracy in modern Ghana with the intricacies of financial trade-offs between labour and formal school learning. Although his data were drawn primarily from probation reports on youth offenders, compiled by the colonial Department of Social Welfare (responsible for juvenile justice), alleged delinquents in Accra were not only

1 Ione Acquah, 1958, p. 76, cited in Jack Lord (2011).

boys but also girls. His study revealed that girls worked as maids, cooks and trading apprentices, running errands and hawking goods on the streets. In terms of derivable economic benefits, a working adolescent could augment an average household's income by up to 30%, or undertake unpaid domestic labour of an equivalent value at home (Lord, 2011, p. 97, p. 102).

Conversely, girls from affluent households were not encumbered with domestic chores and other productive activities because their parents employed maids from poorer backgrounds. Closely related to the above is the inability of poor families to afford the cost of education. While primary education was hugely subsidized in West Africa in the closing decade of colonial rule, secondary education remained expensive and beyond the reach of poor families. In addition, the use of education to alienate pupils from their religions affected school enrolment. Western education provided by Christian mission schools became a tool for converting Muslim children to Christianity. To avoid this, some Muslim families kept their children at home. Where the colonial administration offered alternative schools, the children did not miss out on their education. However, in areas where available government schools only provided for boys, girls suffered educational denial. In French colonies, where the central administration controlled education, Christian missions still played important foundational roles by providing early education for girls, which was not available to many Muslim girls.

Post-colonial developments in women's education

The period between political independence and the 1990s saw a lot of global currents sweeping into Africa with significant repercussions for women's education. It began with the international conventions and agreements within and outside the continent on gender equity and human rights. Among these was the Convention Against Discrimination in Education adopted by UNESCO on 14 December 1960. There was also the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights signed in 1963 by African countries and adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1981, and which came into force in 1986. Another relevant international treaty was the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, and subsequently ratified by several African and non-African nations. All these instruments later became reference points for scholars and feminist activists advancing the cause of women.

The economic crisis experienced by African states in the 1980s also left its mark on the educational sector. As various African governments sought the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) they were made to implement, among other things, prescribed acute budgetary cuts. This affected the funding of education, even as user fees were paid by students from the primary to tertiary level. While these economic adjustment prescriptions officially supported the expansion of basic education, they were very harsh on higher education. These policies, according to Assie-Lumumba (2006), 'have had immediate and long-term impact by hindering any effort to eradicate gender inequality.' Although scholars have noted that university enrolment increased despite restrictions imposed by the SAP regime, this increase was lopsided in favour of men (Assie-Lumumba, 2006).

A critical issue that has come up in the literature on the development of education in the period under review is the perennial problem of illiteracy. Hubert Oswald Quist noted that this problem is particularly severe in West Africa (Quist, 1994, pp. 127-145). By 1960, the percentage of illiteracy in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo was over 90% in each of those countries. Only Ghana and Nigeria had 75% illiteracy rates, which was due to the special intervention made by the leadership of both countries to address the problem. In 1951, Ghana began to implement the Accelerated Development Plan for Education, while Western Nigeria later commenced the Universal Primary Education (UPE) scheme in 1955. These interventions reduced overall percentages of illiteracy compared to other states (Quist, 1994, p. 129). Again, gender disaggregated data from West Africa (1970-1980) showed that women comprised a greater percentage of the illiterate population throughout the subregion (see Table 1). It is also important to note that most of the countries in West Africa fell into the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), placing them among the poorest nations in the world. The list included Benin, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo.

Table 1. *Number and percentage of the illiterate population by age and gender 1970–1980*

Country	Year of Census or Survey	Age Group	Illiterate Population Male	Illiterate Population Female	Illiterate Population Total	% of Illiterate Male	% of Illiterate Female	Total
Benin	1980	15+	556,300	814,400	1,370,700	60.2	83.2	72.1
The Gambia	1980	15+	116,200	151,800	268,000	70.9	88.4	79.9
Ghana	1970	15+	1,285,320	2,008,000	3,293,320	56.9	81.6	69.8
Côte d'Ivoire	1980	15+	1,302,100	1,587,900	2,890,000	55.2	76.0	65.0
Niger	1980	15+	1,201,000	1,359,400	2,560,400	86.0	94.2	90.0
Nigeria	1980	15+	10,801,700	15,956,900	26,758,600	54.4	77.0	66.0
Mali	1976	15+	1,469,632	1,766,608	3,236,240	86.5	94.3	90.6
Togo	1970	15+	318,997	503,028	822,025	73.1	92.9	84.1
Burkina Faso	1975	15+	1,272,593	1,530,847	2,083,440	85.3	96.7	91.2
Liberia	1974	15+	313,658	400,844	714,502	71.0	89.7	80.4

Source: UNESCO, 1983.

Factors responsible for these high illiteracy rates include low levels of government expenditure on formal education; increasing drop-out rates – this was higher for girls because of broken homes, lack of funds, teenage pregnancy, and negative traditional ideas on girls' education; and rural poverty. Noticeable at this period was the neglect of non-formal education, such as adult literacy programmes. Meanwhile, the bulk of food consumed by these nations was produced by an illiterate adult population.

There was also the question of whether African governments should spend their limited funds on the expansion of higher education rather than target the eradication of adult illiteracy, which is often dismissed as 'informal' education. While general adult illiteracy is rightly seen as counterproductive, female illiteracy wreaks even greater damage in any society. It promotes early marriages and lower enrolments in secondary and higher educational institutions. It is equally implicated in high birth rates, lower access to non-agricultural employment and, ultimately, lower incomes (Youssef, 1976, p. 206 seq.). In fact, university-level training cannot take place without a proper foundation in basic literacy provided by primary schools. To achieve progress and national

development, it is essential to focus attention on formal education alongside adult literacy programmes. This understanding has made African governments pay more attention to informal education. By 1990, the illiteracy figures in West Africa had fallen in almost all the states, with Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria having illiteracy rates of less than 50% (see Table 2).

Table 2. *Illiterate population—growth rate and percentage change in West Africa, 1990*

Country	Population (000)	Age 15-19	Age 15 and over				
		Illiteracy Rate %	Number of Illiterate		Illiteracy Rate % 1990		
			(000)	% Change			
		1990	1990	1970-90	Male	Female	Total
Benin	4,741	59.4	1,904	34.3	68.3	84.4	76.6
Burkina Faso	9,007	66.8	4,137	41.5	72.1	91.1	81.8
Chad	5,679	...	2,280	19.1	57.8	82.1	70.2
Côte d'Ivoire	12,596	...	2,941	23.8	33.1	59.8	46.2
Ghana	15,020	12.5	3,258	-0.9	30.0	49.0	39.7
Liberia	2,554	32.7	839	28.5	50.2	71.2	60.5
Mali	9,362	32.7	3,398	15.4	59.2	76.1	68.0
Niger	7,369	...	2,683	19.4	59.6	83.2	71.6
Nigeria	113,016	22.3	28,723	20.2	37.7	60.5	49.3
Senegal	7,369	...	2,525	25.9	48.1	74.9	61.7
Sierra Leone	4,151	...	1,830	36.1	69.3	88.7	79.3
Togo	3,455	36.8	1,070	23.4	43.6	69.3	56.7

Source: UNESCO, 1991.

Women's education since 1990

Global developments continued to underscore the value of women's education and gender equality beyond 1990. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 advocated gender equality and mainstreaming. In 2000, the World Education Forum adopted the Dakar Framework for Action on Education for All (EFA). In the same year, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were inaugurated. Goal 2 advocated for universal primary education for all, while Goal 3 canvassed for gender equality and the empowerment of women. Despite all these agreements and expectations, female participation in education still lagged behind that of males. In countries where primary education was publicly subsidized and made compulsory, substantial progress was made in terms of increased access. But the same cannot be said of other levels of education (secondary and tertiary), with large disparities in male/female enrolment ratios. The Millennium Development Goals Report, published in 2015 by the United Nations, admitted that despite the gains made by the MDGs, great inequalities persisted and that even the progress made had been uneven (United Nations, 2015, pp. 3 and 8).

Evidence of progress made could be seen in improvements to the quality of lives of educated women. According to Assié-Lumumba:

... there are positive correlations between female educational attainments and capacity to make informed decisions about various aspects of life including health, marriage and reproduction... there is a positive correlation between educational attainment and economic productivity, exercise of social and political responsibility and the authority to demand the respect of individual and group rights (Assié-Lumumba, 2006, p. 12).

This means that educated women are able to make informed choices about critical issues in their personal lives and wider social engagements. Harry A. Sackey, in a 2005 study on Ghanaian women, demonstrated how education positively affects female labour force participation in the nation. He also noted the decline of fertility among educated women active in the labour force. Improvements in child survival rates, later marriages and the availability of family planning services all contributed to this drop in fertility. From 6.5 births per woman in 1977, the fertility rate dropped to 4.79 in 1998 among educated women. This reduced family size ensured improvements in the well-being of women in particular, and their families in general (Sackey, 2005). Education thus empowers women to play a more productive role in the labour force.

Another achievement of expanded access for women in education is the increasing participation of women as primary school teachers. The UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report of 2016 paints a picture of near total feminization of pre-school teaching staff. The percentage of female teachers engaged in pre-primary education in 2014 ranged from 96% in Côte d'Ivoire, 94% in Togo, 92% in Mali, 90% in Niger, 85% in Burkina Faso, and 82% in Sierra Leone. The Gambia was the only West African nation with a less than 70% female presence in pre-primary teaching staff (UNESCO, 2016, pp. 447–448). Female teachers also have a substantial presence in primary education, but at the secondary level, they are still far behind their male counterparts. With only 24% of female teachers in secondary schools, Ghana still had the highest representation of women at that level across the entire West African region. The situation at the tertiary level was even worse.

Rather than celebrate the feminization of pre-school teaching staff and the inroads being made by female teachers at the elementary level, scholars have warned that more women should be encouraged to acquire additional education and move up into higher education instead of concentrating at the lower level of the educational cadre. This is because the type of research knowledge that can mould educational processes, institutions, impact policy formulation and, ultimately, combat inequalities in the system can only take place in tertiary educational settings (Assié-Lumumba, 2006, p. 23). Thus, while men have moved up into higher education as academics, so too should women, not least because most of the issues affecting women's performance, visibility and output can best be understood and treated by women. Moreover, the feminization of professions also has other disadvantages. Such professions are downgraded in terms of the incomes they attract and their social prestige. They are made to project the 'domesticity' of women, which could also be seen as a perpetuation of patriarchal values carried over from the colonial period (Assié-Lumumba, 1997, p. 310).

There are several areas of persistent educational inequalities in West Africa. As of 2014, Liberia and Niger topped the global list of countries with the largest out-of-school-numbers and rates (UNESCO, 2016, p. 183). The learning environment in most schools has remained gender insensitive. No West African nation had a one hundred per cent provision of basic sanitation facilities, such as toilets, in all its schools – rural and urban. Again, some West African nations had high rates of early marriages and early pregnancies. Particularly worrisome are figures from Chad, Mali and Niger. The percentage of girls aged 15–19 years already married by 2014 was 47.8% in Chad, 42.2% in Mali and 59.8% in Niger (UNESCO, 2016, p. 447). Consequently, early pregnancy rates were highest in those three

countries. The implication is that young girls not only lose the opportunity to go to school but they are also exposed to the complications of teenage pregnancies.

Persistent inequalities are also to be found in higher education. Total female enrolment in Nigerian universities increased from 10.1% in 1956 to 33.6% in 1991, showing a 23.5% increase, spread over a period of 35 years (Pereira, 2007, p. 91). This shows that despite the efforts made by various governments, men still continued to outnumber women in the pursuit of higher education. Female representation among academic staff in universities was even lower. In the 1997/98 academic session, data derived from 23 Nigerian universities on academic staff showed that only two of the institutions had more than 20% female staff: the University of Jos (21.3%) and Akwa University (21.5%) (Pereira, 2007, p. 91). The University of Bauchi had the lowest percentage with just 2.5 academic female staff. By 2001/2002, the majority of female staff occupied junior and medium academic cadres. Only three universities had more than 10% of female professors: the University of Agriculture at Umudike (16.7%), the University of Ibadan (13.1%) and the University of Lagos (12%). Eight of the 23 universities in the survey had no female professors at all.²

The context and utility of training offered to women at the higher education level have also been implicated in the perpetuation of gender inequality in the wider society. Philomena Okeke-Ihejirika argues that African political elites have yet to regard education as a major tool for the emancipation of women. The philosophy behind the training of women is still largely influenced by prevailing gender ideologies that see them as care providers. She notes that 'many of the training facilities developed for women's civic and political education are the result of the concentrated efforts of emerging female activists and non-governmental organizations' (Okeke-Ihejirika, 2004, p. 488 seq.). This also buttresses a previous observation that women need to get into decision-making circles in order for some of these issues to be addressed.

Furthermore, the inequality suffered by women goes beyond their training. The few women who had managed to acquire technical education alongside men found it difficult to secure relevant jobs. Some employers preferred men for jobs they considered 'masculine'. Again, educated women employed in public or formal sector jobs experience additional discrimination. In countries like Nigeria, these such women pay higher taxes than their male colleagues because they have no automatic allowances for children. Also, women cannot take

2 For additional details, see Pereira (2007, pp. 139-141).

annual and maternity leave together in the same year (Pereira, 2007, p. 37). In general, it is more challenging for women than for men to move to more senior jobs and positions. The metaphorical glass ceiling is yet to be completely broken.

For gender equality to be realized in largely patriarchal societies, as exists in Africa, it has to be engineered from within the educational sector, with other spheres playing crucial roles. The states should prioritize education in their budgetary allocations and work towards reducing enrolment disparities at all levels of education. The concern here should not only be on broadening access but also to enable everybody in society to work towards removing cultural barriers that still hinder the full development of women as students, professionals and leaders. Furthermore,

[a]ny attempt to improve the quality of African women's education at the tertiary level must take into consideration the broader forces that shape the social construction of who they are and what they can do in relation to their male counterparts. Often social policies that purport to integrate women into national development do not recognize them as equal partners with men in nation-building whose contributions must extend beyond their role as caretakers. The unlimited role women were assigned to play in post-colonial Africa fed into a narrow conception of what formal training should accomplish for them and the nation (Okeke-Ilhejirika, 2004, p. 488 seq.).

Educational institutions also have a significant role to play in ensuring gender equality. They need to enhance female participation in science and technology at all levels. Apart from direct political engagement, women can also influence policy design through academic research at the higher education level. Such policies are expected to break the cycle of gender imbalance and promote sustainable development. A gender-sensitive environment devoid of sexual harassment, unsanitary conditions and other institutional challenges would encourage girls to finish their courses of study and reduce the attrition rate.

All these issues correspond to some of the concerns raised in the Sustainable Development Goals launched by the United Nations in 2015. The new emphasis is on 'substantive equality' for women, not just statistical parity in education and other fields, or legislation to widen female access to educational institutions. This revised goal, targeted for 2030, rests on a tripod. According to the first leg of the tripod, women's socio-economic disadvantage has to be redressed. The second leg opposes stereotyping and violence. Stereotyping manifests in the 'feminization' of professions, also called 'horizontal segregation' in the labour force. This can be combated by providing special incentives to encourage girls to take up science, technology and so-called 'masculine' disciplines. School lessons could be redesigned to

combat such stereotypes. The third leg is to strengthen the agency and voice of women. This underscores the empowering dimensions of education, with women encouraged to participate in civic life, community improvement programmes and general politics (Peppen Vaughan, 2016, pp. 4-18).

Conclusion

Inherited colonial values that promote the domestic and 'private' importance of women have perpetuated gender inequality, especially in the education sector. Modern African political elites, with their patriarchal cultural ideals, also conceived a public space in which men exercise dominion. This represents the old social order that has to be reformed, especially as norms of gender equality continue to be promoted through the removal of socio-economic barriers limiting women, helping them to overcome horizontal segregation in the labour force, and fostering the agency and voice of women. It is hoped that as more women acquire education and participate in decision-making at the highest levels, a new social order of gender equality will emerge. The task ahead is not easy because much of the socio-economic disadvantages and other limitations besetting women are situated in patriarchal contexts, firmly anchored by religion and other cultural values considered sacrosanct. However, since the initial transformation has begun in various nations, it is hoped that in the not-too-distant future, especially with increasing global pressures, African society, like others in the developed world, will experience more gender equality. Whether that future will come in 2030 or not, only time will tell.

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TOWARDS VISIBILITY AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch

Introduction

From the beginning of colonization, a small number of women activists played a significant role in trade unions and politics. This was the case in South Africa since the dawn of the twentieth century (Walker, 1982), and in Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo since the period between the two World Wars. They were exceptional, but they are becoming 'normal'. They remain fighters in countries where male supremacy is still very strong. Their fundamental struggle continues to be for women's rights to protect their access to education, their financial empowerment, and their political role.

Women's rights

A number of women have chosen legal careers: lawyers, attorneys, magistrates. Female lawyers tend to be teachers, while female magistrates tend to be judges. This is because their fight to change the law in their favour is essential (Mafela, 2007).

The decisive moment came with the Decade for Women (1975-1985), as declared by the United Nations. Previously, except in South Africa, between 1950 and 1956, thousands of women demonstrated against the law which required them to carry a pass, until then reserved for men. Action was mainly

taken by a handful of political figures, including Sekou Touré, in the early years of his reign, and President Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, who was a true feminist. There were educated women, often the daughters of a father with a high professional status (a diplomat, for example) or a teacher, committed to educating his daughters as well as his sons, or perhaps the children of a mother trained at the school for midwives in Dakar, or the school for women teachers in Rufisque, created in 1938 (Barthélémy, 2010), which were the only careers offered to women under French colonization. In Madagascar, however, the School of Medicine was accessible to young women as early as 1926.

In 1975, Agnès Fatoumata, a Malian sociologist and early feminist (her aunt was a teacher), joined the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa following the first World Conference on Women in Mexico City. A former activist of the RDA (African Democratic Rally), she participated in action programmes that supported women in her country and which called for the abolition of polygamy and virginity tests for girls before marriage (a test still in use at the time in Senegal) (AFASPA, 2010).¹ In 2002, lawyers and women's associations organized protests and sit-ins in Porto Novo, the political capital of Benin, to demand what they had been denied twice by parliament in 1965 and 1973: a change in the country's 'customary law', which still referred to a 1931 text: 'the woman has no legal power... she is part of a man's property and his inheritance' (AFASPA, 2010, pp. 24-25). Fatoumata became the president of the Association of Women Lawyers of Benin, and ran twice for the office of President of the Republic in 2001 and 2006. Unity Dow, from Botswana, whose father was a farmer, became a lawyer in 1983 and won an appeal after a five-year battle for equal rights, resulting in the adoption of the Citizenship Act, which stipulates that a Botswanan woman married to a foreigner can pass on her nationality to the couple's children. A divorced mother of three, she became president of the Supreme Court of Botswana (AFASPA, 2010, pp. 22-23). In 2003, Nigerian human rights lawyer Hauwa Ibrahim obtained the acquittal of Amina Lawal in the Katsina Sharia Court of Appeal, who had been sentenced to death by stoning for adultery (AFASPA, 2010, pp. 26-27).

In 2003, the African Union passed the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, a text incorporated into the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 2005. The driving force behind the adoption of this text was the Congolese (Brazzaville) lawyer Julienne Ondziel-Gnelenga, who was appointed

1 Many of the examples cited are taken from this book.

in 1998 as special rapporteur on women's rights in Africa within the Committee on Human and Peoples' Rights, which she joined in 1995. At the time, there were only two women on the commission. Eventually, gender parity was achieved at the Durban Conference in 2002, which increased the number of women to five out of eleven members (AFASPA, 2010, p. 36). The protocol recognizes 'the crucial role of women in the preservation of African values and condemns all forms of verbal or physical violence, whether in the public or private sphere, in times of peace or in situations of conflict, including all forms of genital mutilation ... sexual intercourse'. The minimum age for marriage is set at 18 for girls, and the text calls for 'the elimination of all harmful cultural and traditional practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either sex or on stereotyped roles for women and men.' It provided for equal protection before the law and women's participation in the political and decision-making process. It committed the states to 'protect girls from any form of abuse, including sexual harassment' (AFASPA, 2010, p. 17).

Tunisian women succeeded in 2014, through joint political action, in defeating a retrograde draft constitution that sought to make women 'complementary to men'. Success is rarely so clear-cut elsewhere, even in Algeria, where in 1984 women demonstrated against the regression of their rights when the Family Code (enacted in 1984 and amended in 2005) made them minors for life. Progress has been made thanks to a small minority of determined women: lawyers, magistrates, jurists, teachers, doctors, trade unionists and community activists, who are making their voices heard at international conferences, such as the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the Third Congress of Black Women in Kinshasa in 2014.

Women activists are not necessarily educated. They have therefore focused on grassroots action, taking the initiative to set up associations and NGOs. This is exemplified by Rebecca Lolosoli of Kenya, who – with 15 other women – created the village of Umoa ('unity' in Swahili). Equipped with a drinking water cistern, it provides shelter and helps women who have fled domestic violence into productive craft activities (AFASPA, 2010, p. 40).

Women and finances

In 1999, the percentage of women in paid or informal employment was estimated at over 60% in most African countries (compared with 40–49% in France and Germany). It's not because you go to the beauty salon or change your

clothes four times a day that you're called a woman. Today's woman is someone who tries to earn a living,' explains a female car mechanic in Bukavu (DRC), where the APROFA association trains women in mechanics, carpentry and masonry.

The role of women in the informal sector is well known, but today the informal sector does not necessarily correspond to either illiteracy or rudimentary skills. Some women have seized the opportunities presented as start-ups by international organizations or by the Ministry of Women in Senegal. An example is Anta Dia, who only received a CM2 level education (last year of elementary school), yet she became involved in the development of 'micro-gardens' using organic farming methods, which were first introduced in 1999 in Cambérène (around Dakar) (AFASPA, 2010, p. 98). Today, these community gardens have spread all across the country. Another example is the 375 women of the Thiaroye-sur-Mer collective group (in Senegal) who have been supporting the families of those who have died in illegal emigration, and educating their children since 2006 (AFASPA, 2010, p. 102). Similarly, Hasna Saïd has set up a cooperative in a village in the Afar region, 'the first of its kind in Ethiopia', specializing in market gardening to supply the town with food 80 km away (AFASPA, 2010, p. 102).

A significant number of highly educated women are promoting the training and education of others, thanks to women's NGOs. Some have made it their career, such as Saran Kaba Jones from Liberia, founder in 2009 of Face Africa, a non-profit organization that provides drinking water to thousands of Liberians in rural areas. Lalao Randriamampionona, a Malagasy independence activist and an opponent of the regime of the First Republic when she was a Ph.D. student in France, developed a vast village network that included, in 2002, 670 women's associations. She was the founder and president of the Taratra organization, which coordinates the activities of the water and sanitation network (AFASPA, 2010, p. 118). Some of these women have reached top ministerial positions for the advancement of women. Joséphine Ouédraogo, an ambassador's daughter, served for three years as Minister for Family Development and National Solidarity under Thomas Sankara, President of Burkina Faso from 1983 until his assassination in 1987. In 1997, she became the head of the African Centre for Gender at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The Senegalese sociologist, Soukeyna Ndiaye-Ba, created a microfinance network, the FDEA (Femme Développement Entreprise en Afrique), which has impacted some 100,000 people across the country, and which is dedicated to training and helping women entrepreneurs. She was its director until she became Minister of Decentralized Cooperation and Regional Planning (2002-2010).

Women in business

In short, this kind of essential activity is becoming 'commonplace'. What is newer is the emergence, alongside men, of businesswomen of national and international stature. They are becoming numerous (ten per cent of African entrepreneurs) even though countries vary greatly in their promotion of women, which is a function of their changing customs and laws. These women, whose education and background make them a successful part of the country's human resources, have often studied at the best universities. They are highly skilled at using the tools of contemporary capitalism, including the Internet.

Admittedly, a number of them, especially the previous generation, were able to take full advantage of the prominent position of their families or husbands. For example, Pascaline Bongo, the eldest sister of former Gabonese President Ali Bongo, managed her father's fortune. She had control over Delta Synergie, an investment holding company that owned shares in numerous companies, including the BGFI Group and the powerful Compagnie du Komo. Martine Coffi-Studer, an Ivorian married to a colleague of Vincent Bolloré (she sits on the group's board of directors), was the CEO of Océan Ogilvy, a communications group operating in five West African countries. She has been implicated in embezzlement linked to the coffee and cocoa industry. Another example is Alizéta Ouédraogo, a Burkinabe woman who was the most prosperous woman in Burkina Faso. After making her fortune in leather in the 1990s, she moved into real estate and public works. Her meteoric rise coincided with the marriage of her daughter to François Compaoré, the president's brother. She was president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2011.

However, it is the unquestionable abilities of many women, most of whom – but not all – come from families with a privileged background, which has enabled them to earn prestigious American degrees at MIT or elsewhere, qualifying them to obtain top jobs in banks and international finance. They eventually emerged from their quasi-clandestine situation thanks to their international exposure, as national careers remained largely inaccessible due to strong male resistance. These qualified women were first recruited by the various UN bodies, more often working in Geneva or at the World Bank than in their own countries. They began to prove themselves, like Marie-Angélique Savané, expelled in 1968 from the University of Dakar as a 'subversive organizer', who then made a career in Pan-African women's organizations in Geneva. She was one of the first French-speaking women to be noticed, with the exception of Aoua Keita, who was an African Democratic Rally (RDA) activist and the first and only woman elected to the Constituent

Assembly of Sudan-Mali in 1958. It took the intervention of the then head of state, Modibo Keita, to have her presence accepted by the other deputies. Today, among many others, one can mention Rwandan Valentine Rugwabiza, who for seven years (until 2012) led the World Trade Organization (WTO) review of member states' trade policies. A founding member of the Rwandan Chamber of Women Entrepreneurs and the Rwandan Private Sector Federation, she served as Rwanda's ambassador to the UN in Switzerland.

African businesswomen started getting noticed in Africa around 1999 when the Pan-African Business Women's Association held its first congress in Accra, a city where women traders have long dominated. The second took place in Addis Ababa and the third in Orlando, Florida (United States) (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2002, pp. 199-211). Since the Durban conference, this kind of initiative has proliferated, particularly, but not only, in English-speaking countries (South Africa of course, but also Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria, among others). Today, there are many women who are leaders of modern businesses of their own. Previously in Bamako (Mali), Aminata Traoré, a trained sociologist, who was Minister of Culture and Tourism (1997-2000), became a pioneer 30 years ago by founding a luxury company designed to showcase the beautiful artisanship of her country (weaving, pottery, basketry, etc.). There are many such examples of successful and dynamic women, even if they are still relatively unknown. Fashion designers and female artists are best known in the West because of their growing international clientele.

Jeune Afrique periodically publishes the list of the 'Twenty-five most influential businesswomen in Africa'.² Coming from a wide variety of countries, these graduates and owners of their own businesses do not originate from the 'micro-credit' generation and no longer fit the stereotypes of 'street vendor' or 'First Lady'. These women executives have asserted themselves as leaders of their region's economy. They are taking on profitable, cutting-edge sectors. Evidently, there are South African women among them: Yolanda Cuba was only 29 years old when she was appointed CEO of the Mvelaphanda Group, a conglomerate listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Phuti Mahanyele, also South African, was the CEO of the Shanduka Group, which is a wholly Black-owned company. In 2007, she was selected by the World Economic Forum as a Young Global Leader.

Female business leaders are also very present in intertropical Africa. From 2008 to 2012, Stella Kilonzo, a trained accountant, was the managing director of

2 Maury, F. *Jeune Afrique*, 6 May 2003. The newspaper is inspired by the blog of Nigerian Mfonobong Nsehe, author of 'The African Chronicle' column in the American financial magazine *Forbes*.

Kenya's Capital Markets Authority, whose job is to regulate the financial markets. Evelynne Tall, a Senegalese national, was the number two at the Ecobank Group from January 2012 until her retirement in 2017. She was responsible for relations with the political and financial authorities in each country where the group operates (33 subsidiaries), as she once said: 'This means three weeks traveling out of four'. Laurence do Rego, Ivoirian, is a former Chief Financial Officer of Ecobank. She returned to Benin in 2002 after a 22-year career in France and the United States. She says she had to fight 'a lot of opposition' and described 'not being allowed to make mistakes'. According to her, Ecobank is a model of 'what Africans are capable of building'. In 2012, Cina Lawson, from Togo, was named Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum, then ranked among 20 of Africa's most powerful young women by *Forbes* magazine. A graduate of Harvard, she was responsible for the strategy and development of France Telecom in New York after a stint at the World Bank. Returning to Togo, she made the democratization of the Internet (lowering communication prices, increasing penetration rates) her leitmotif.

Women and politics

While women continue to be relatively numerous in international institutions that seek to improve gender parity, they are also becoming important at the national level. Many are respected journalists, such as Julie Gichuru, who was one of the most experienced radio and press journalists in Kenya, and head of Citizen TV Kenya for two decades. Funmi Iyanda is a very popular Nigerian TV journalist and producer.

Women of action, feminist activists or business women have also sought to influence the legislative and political fields. In many African parliaments, for instance in Senegal or Rwanda, there are proportionately more women members of parliament (MPs) than in Western parliaments. Rwanda has the largest share of female MPs in the world (at 63.8% in 2024). The phenomenon even predates the genocide. At the time, the prime minister – as well as in Burundi – was a woman. Despite this, according to a 2014 study of Burundi, there is a gap between the number of women engaged in politics and their lack of de facto power due to socio-cultural and political-ethnic reasons (Minani Passy, 2014).

For activists, the political path is the preferred way to influence the law, which has always been in the hands of men, until now. The older generation began their careers, or rather their experience in politics, as anti-colonial or anti-apartheid

activists. One such a woman was Winnie Mandela, whose path was to effectively support Nelson Mandela, even though she would later make mistakes. Other political activists in South Africa include Ruth First and Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma. Ruth First, a prominent anti-apartheid activist in Rhodesia at the time, was a communist (and White). She was killed in Mozambique by a parcel bomb shipped from South Africa. Nkosazana Dlamini (born in 1949), in contrast, had a long career. A Zulu from Natal, she was an anti-apartheid activist and later became the Minister of Health from 1994 to 1999 under President Nelson Mandela. She subsequently became the Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2009, and finally the Minister of the Interior under President Jacob Zuma, her ex-husband. In 2012, she was elected Chair of the OAU Commission before returning as the head of the African National Congress.

There are countless women ministers or senior officials in posts encompassing a full and diverse range of responsibilities, and not just for women. There is Nialé Kaba, Minister of Economy and Finance of Côte d'Ivoire from 2012 to 2016. As someone close to Amadou Gon Coulibaly, Secretary General of the Presidency, she worked in the late 1990s with Prime Minister Daniel Kablan Duncan. A formidable technocrat, she actively participated in the review discussions of the economic and financial programme (2012) with the IMF envoys. Another political luminary is Aminata Niane, who was a special advisor for infrastructure under Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade. Appointed in 2000 as the CEO of the Agency for the Promotion of Investment and Major Projects (APIX), until 2012, she oversaw most of Abdoulaye Wade's major projects, including the Blaise-Diagne airport. A technocrat, trained in France and England, she is also a member of the board of directors of ATOS, a listed group in Paris. After Wade's defeat in the 2012 elections, her talents earned her an appointment as Special Advisor to former president, Macky Sall. Ingrid Awadé, former director general of Togo's powerful and controversial tax office, formed part of the Togolese president's closest circle. She was nicknamed the Iron Lady after taking office in 2006, for having enforced severe tax adjustments on businessmen considered, until then, as 'untouchables', including Ram Shriyan (Ramco Group) or the Lebanese Bassem El Najar, protégés of the brother of Faure Gnassingbé, the then president of Togo.

Another example is Clare Akamanzi, who was trained in Uganda, joined the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) in 2008, and became its director general. She was a negotiator with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva on behalf of her country. Wangari Muta Maathai (1940–2011), a Kenyan biologist and political and environmentalist activist, became in 2004

the first African woman to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for 'her contribution to sustainable development, democracy and peace'. Finally, sub-Saharan Africa is the only subcontinent in the world that can boast three women heads of state (and no longer simply 'first ladies' of eternal heads of state): in Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, from 2006 to 2018 (Nobel Peace Prize 2011 with Leymah Gbowee, also Liberian); Joyce Banda, from 2012 to 2014 in Malawi (where there are, however, only two female members of parliament out of 193); and Catherine Samba-Panzam, from 2014 to 2016 in the Central African Republic. Two of them came to power following brutal civil wars. Their approach, which appeared more practical and less entrenched in a system of conventions and male privileges, is a sign of confidence. Only time will tell if power is 'gendered'!

Young women and the future

Today, it is women who are assuming ever greater responsibility and power. This is probably why the idea of an African future 'in the hands of women' is increasingly commonplace. Despite the prevalence of male superiority, women now have access to better economic opportunities, especially in cities, and are increasingly taking on family responsibilities. This is because, in most African countries today, parity in primary education is almost equal between girls and boys – and now also at secondary level. As a result, an increasing number of girls are attending university, and just like the boys, they are sent by their parents directly from local middle school to pursue higher education in the United States, Canada or elsewhere. As in most of the world, girls work harder than boys at university because they have much more to prove. As a result, they graduate better educated, which has triggered ultraconservative reactions from men aimed at curtailing the rising power of the female gender (in particular, through retrograde family codes). It is important to highlight that this sometimes virile masculinity extends far beyond the Muslim world.

The evolution of the political and social status of women is therefore inevitable, even if it is a long-term process. Nevertheless, even though women are extending their reach to all levels, including the still-illiterate women who suffer in rural and precarious urban environments, this encouraging picture should not obscure the fact that this progress is still only a reality for a tiny minority of particularly ambitious women. Even more so than for young men, access to quality education is crucial for African women to earn their deserved place in society.

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THE DYNAMICS OF SENEGALESE FEMALE MIGRATIONS

Rokhaya Cissé

Introduction

A growing feminization of migrations has been noticeable in Africa since the 1990s. These movements of women are even greater within the same country or in border regions. As the strategies for closing borders in northern countries become increasingly complex, and middle classes begin to emerge in developing countries, international destinations are being favoured by women. The reason for the feminization of this mobility can no longer be due to family reunification alone. It is much more inherent in the expression of women's entrepreneurship and makes the international world an attractive arena for generating resources, according to the different types of migration of various duration, including one without long-term settlement in the destination countries.

However, the feminization of migrations is not a new or universal trend (Donato et al, 2006, p. 2011; Gabaccia, 1996; Piya and Donato, 2013; Schrover, 2013). In Africa, in particular the increased participation of women in international migration flows has not been sufficiently documented, mainly because – more often than not – such data is not broken down. Furthermore, the meaning of the word 'feminization' is not always clear. While the majority of studies understand it as an increase in the proportion of women among the migrants (Castles and Miller, 1998; Boyd, 2006), others use it to describe the rise in the absolute levels

of female mobility (UNFPA, 2006), and for a third group, it more specifically represents an improvement in the economic mobility of women (Piper, 2005).

It is therefore important to distinguish between these different dimensions and to note that an increase in the relative proportion of women among the people who cross borders is not necessarily accompanied by a growth in their absolute numbers, which qualifies the interpretation of the feminization of flows (Vause, Toma and Richou, 2015). However, for decades, women have emigrated independently and over longer distances in the search for a job to satisfy their basic needs and those of their family. Today, because of their status as migrants and their financial independence, women are beginning to have a professional identity, which influences their personal identity. While migration alone is a long way from explaining the improvement in the status of women, it can contribute to the emergence of new behaviour models that facilitate and accelerate changes in societies.

It is therefore important to study female migration in terms of changing practices over time, and its forms and dimensions on the scale of West Africa, in this case, by taking Senegal as an example.

Deep roots of internal female migrations

The importance of the presence of women in migration movements in Africa, and particularly Senegal, has only belatedly been recognized in publications (Adepoju, 2000; Findley, 1991, 1997; de Bocquier and Traoré, 2000). This established fact can be attributed to the narrow perception of labour migration, driven by men, for example in the maritime areas of Europe or in the diamond-producing regions of Central Africa.

In Senegal, although it is difficult to date them accurately, it can be estimated that female migrations from rural to urban areas, to work as household employees or to sell processed agricultural products, date from the first half of the twentieth century. It was the women of the Waalo who first travelled to the nearest city, Saint Louis, then the capital of Senegal, and later to Dakar.

The second group to migrate, also during the colonial period, were the Joola. While the creation of a trousseau (a bridal trove of personal items) was the primary reason for travel, contributions to tax payments was another, equally important one. The migration of Serer women seems to have started in the 1960s. It is striking to note that today, they still have the same type of occupation, selling processed grain, peanut shelling and doing the laundry in other people's homes.

These were short-term migrations with the aim of building a nest egg, then returning to the village to settle down permanently and to start a family.

Abdou Salam Fall (1991) studied the Serer of the Siin who, faced with the crisis in the agricultural sector, found a way to survive by migrating. However, this migration did not take place outside the country but rather within its borders in the form of seasonal mobility. It was facilitated within the family sphere using networks formed by close relatives but also through other relationships, such as neighbours in the village, extended kinship, colleagues or school companions. The modest incomes from this internal migration were mainly used to provide for the family's needs during the groundnut crisis in the 1980s and 1990s, following the 1972-1973 drought. This resulted in the mass departure of women to cities where they lived precariously while generating survival income for their rural households. These shuttle migrations have gradually changed to the extent that they have led these female workers to settle on the edge of the cities, only giving them the opportunity to visit their village for family ceremonies, or religious or cultural events.

The women originally from Casamance were more likely to undertake internal, seasonal migrations, despite the productivity potential of the rice paddies and the importance of forest and tree resources in their homeland. The cultural vitality in the southern region was part of this synergy between background and migration. The city activities of the Casamance women barely differed from those of the Serer, who came from the central regions. The agricultural crisis was long lasting, resulting in women offering their traditional cooking services in the cities. To a large extent, the imbalance between the large geographical areas explains the permanence of seasonal female migration.

Women migrating from the northern regions were attracted to the city of Saint Louis, on one side, and to Mauritania on the other, which offered domestic work and certain service activities. Eastern regions sent migrants to the Senegalese capital and 'crossroads' cities, such as Kaolack, in the centre of the country. Subsequent female migrations from these regions were more focused on family reunification in Europe. While all migration flows are male dominant, seasonal migrations still progressively mobilized more rural women in Senegal. They explored employment niches, built households, and forged an entrepreneurial momentum in the services sector. A return to the community of origin became more complex and uncertain due to the hybridization between urban and rural, particularly the continuity between these two spaces. The early migration studies, however, did not mention the existence of smuggling or trafficking in these movements. This paradigm only appears in publications at the start of the twenty-

first century and, more specifically, alongside the strong growth in irregular international migrations. Consequently, there are reconfiguration dynamics with the construction of new forms of mobility with specific rationales and a diversification in the destination locations. This is due to the restrictions in the granting of visas for regular emigration by air routes and the policies of closing and strengthening the security of land borders applied by the various destination countries (Fall, 1998, 2003; Fall and Cissé, 2013; Fall, 2003, 2004).

Female migrations: new trends and practices

According to the 2013 population and housing census (ANSD, 2014), over the previous five years, 156,676 Senegalese left for a foreign country, i.e. 1.2% of the population (see below for the figures). The principal destinations are Europe (for 44.4%) and the Central African countries (for 27.5%). The major reason for departure was work (for 73.5% of migrants).

The greatest travel intensity is recorded for the following age groups: 35-39 (2.9%), 20-24 (3.3%), 25-29 (3.2%) and 30-34 (3.1%). In these groups, the proportion of men and women remains almost the same at 2.8% and 2.7%, respectively. Family or social reasons represent 47.4% of migration, compared with 10.5% for job search, and 8.7% for studies and apprenticeships. 'Job search' and 'studies or apprenticeship' concern more migrants leaving the regions of Ziguinchor (13.7% and 24.7%), Fatick (14.9% and 17.8%) and Matam (15.4% and 13.0%).

Nationally, there are more male than female emigrants, 82.9% and 17.1% recorded, respectively. There are more women from between the 20-24 (20.0%) and 25-29 (17.1%) age groups. They leave in search of work in hairdressing, commerce, child minding or elderly care, seasonal farm labour or waitressing. This situation is more pronounced between the ages of 45 and 65, in which men represent over 90% of emigrants (ANSD, 2014).

Nevertheless, recent studies go beyond the traditional economic analyses of labour migration that focus on the individual nature of the phenomenon and the search for a better income to justify movements. Indeed, migration is also becoming a collective strategy (Barten, 2009; Fall, 1991). Migration is a joint decision that involves members of the household, the extended family, even the neighbours or the entire village. The family invests in financing the journey by various means. The right to migrate is universalized to such a point that categories *a priori* not 'eligible' find themselves in makeshift boats, i.e. those with physical

and mental disabilities or even 'pregnant women or who have recently given birth with their babies, who land on the Spanish coasts every day' (Fall and Cissé, 2007).

It is true that the current female migration model breaks from the vision of a certain dependency of women on men. A sizeable proportion of these female migrants are travelling independently to accomplish their own mobility projects. These migrations are no longer solely of a family type, with wives or girls accompanying a husband or father. Migrant women are becoming more autonomous.

International migrations: from family reunification to female entrepreneurship

Female migrations are multiform. From family reunification to entrepreneurship, as well as other strategies; for example, women who rely on intermediary networks that recruit domestic personnel for Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco, where culinary skills offer possibilities as undeclared labour with the wealthier classes.

Family reunification and short-distance internal migrations are no longer the case. Women from the middle classes perform home-based activities, and their products follow long distribution channels. The goods on offer are handcrafted. Women are in the beauty trade (African fashion, hairstyles), importing items they bring back from Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

This is migration without definitive settlement in the destination environment. They go there for a few weeks to sell their products in the weekly markets and through other community channels. In the first instance, they make their sales, paid for by their customers over an agreed time period. They then contribute to supplying the wholesalers in the large markets in Dakar. This short channel is preferred because of the risks of non-payment when the transaction is set over a long payment period. Consequently, they are said to 'buy time' because, as soon as they arrive, and depending on the originality of the items, the shopkeepers buy the articles in bulk, leaving them free to consider new journeys. The more rotations they have, the better their profit margin.

More generally, migrant women, who do not settle definitively, are specialized in purchasing objects likely to appeal to consumers in Senegal from the markets in certain countries in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.

In order for women to practice this type of migration, negotiations with husbands or close family would have been required. Those with small children

take the children with them as they travel.¹ During their travel abroad, they recruit people to look after their young children. Consequently, some suggest that husbands, and especially in-laws, cannot bring up the issue of childcare or even other household matters to object to their travel. In this way, women achieve greater economic autonomy by positioning themselves as the main source of household income.

Similarly, the reasons for migration are not always economic or political, they can also be educational, religious or cultural. Empirical research in West Africa shows that migration cannot be seen solely as an economic process but should also be considered from a social perspective. Indeed, migrations are comprised of groups defined by gender and age, according to their ethnic and religious affiliations, which result in a multiplicity and increased complexity in the migration matrices. Mobilities can no longer be viewed simply from the perspective of the search for work in a more conducive environment. The ability of actors to act on their own in a new context and in times of crisis, using ingenuity, support networks and the possibility to reinvent living conditions, now needs to be central to the analysis of migration (Fall and Cissé, 2013).

Alongside more traditional migrations, some migrations aim to build skills over a short duration. This is the case with students who work during the holidays to cover their enrolment fees and buy school provisions and clothes.

Migration and the strengthening of female autonomy

The study of female migration and its impact on strengthening women's autonomy can be appreciated through four components of power: access to resources, access to skills, control over their body, and participation in decision-making. It is important to note the significant disparities among the women depending on the personality of the migrant woman, their level of school education or qualifications prior to migration, age, matrimonial and maternity status, religion, and their affiliation with certain origin groups. Each factor has an impact on the migrant woman's ability to acquire more power. However, despite the contrasts, residence in the city, increased autonomy due to distance to family and the community, and the acquisition of income and skills sow the

1 The relatively high intensity level of current migration in the 1-4 age group can be explained by the fact that these children often migrate with their parents who, for the most part, are in the 20-34 age group (ANSD, 2014).

seeds of change which, even if they have not yet upset the gender and power balance in families, are contributing factors towards female autonomy.

Thus, autonomous female migration is increasing, particularly in the direction of Europe with the change in flows. In addition, the profile of the female Senegalese migrant is different compared to their male counterparts: she leaves at a younger age and returns earlier. The growth in female autonomy is also confirmed by the reasons for migration. Family reunification still reflects the male influence and is still conventional. However, most women leave for the same reasons of work and study (Sakho, Diop and Awissi-Sall, 2011).

Access, control and use of resources

The gender-based division of labour confines migrant women to socially devalued, low-skilled sectors that are a continuation of activities in the domestic sphere. These occupations place them on the bottom rung of the urban economy. The savings they acquire after working long hours in difficult conditions are used for the family's survival and not to access or control more wealth. It is important to concentrate on the fact that the successful cases cited are in the minority. Most migrant women, particularly in terms of internal migration, remain poor, with no improvement in their living conditions.

Conversely, in countries with the oldest and most numerous Senegalese migrations, such as Italy, France, Spain and, more recently, the United States and Canada, women obtain jobs that pay better than those of men who have settled in the northern countries for longer. Women are acquiring greater economic autonomy, and the relationships with their children are also changing, which helps prevent the use of violence in family conflicts. Women no longer aspire to live in migrant households in France. The relationships with their in-laws, who remain in Senegal, are also re-evaluated.

The image of the migrant woman and access to skills

In Senegalese society, the social perception of the migrant fuels the dream of a better life. According to these representations, the migrant woman is someone who has international and, if possible, Western experience. A first observation to be made is that the work performed by the migrant woman enables her to acquire an economic power which, in turn, gives her the opportunity to gain autonomy and precipitate changes in the female identity. It is important to acknowledge women's efforts to gain social capital through their presence and participation in

family or cultural events. Senegalese society values the social capital gained from this contribution, which comes from expanding networks and earning respect for realizing goals. Studies on the urban integration of migrants have highlighted the development opportunities offered by the city, ever since colonial times (Bocquier et al, 1992). Most migrant women have no recognized professional qualifications. Apart from the women who go to the capital for studies or training, the great majority do not benefit from training or schooling opportunities available in the city.² However, they develop some resilience by building on proven skills in traditional cooking, ironing or other local services that have an economic value in the cities, and can position women in local entrepreneurship (Fall and Cissé, 2013).

Renegotiating decision-making power within households

In most cases, migration gives those who migrate the opportunity to mix with other cultures, reaping benefits from this by adopting other ways of doing things and offering lifestyles that lead them to value their cultural legacy in a dynamic of cultural hybridization: modern versus traditional, urban versus rural. Many villages were developed by their citizens who migrated to the cities of Senegal or abroad. Migration and contact with the city have enabled migrant women to adopt other lifestyles, enriching their socialization experiences. In the village, they have adopted other styles of construction, decoration and furniture, resembling the styles used in the city. Their diet also changes, with women incorporating new ingredients promoted by television. They not only reproduce an urban lifestyle, they re-evaluate their life by creating synergies thanks to the gains afforded to them by their changing social environment (Fall, 1998).

With the income earned in the city, a large number of migrant women occupy a position that gives them a certain power within the family and in their community. Indeed, there is a relationship observed between being able to generate personal income, having a sense of autonomy created by the distance of the family circle for varying periods, and by the redefinition of the gender-based roles, particularly at the family and community level. However, it remains difficult to conclude that women's 'power' has changed the social-gender balance within the couple or family in a sustainable way. Relating specifically to the decision to migrate, even if the desire is personal, the option to leave is only effective if the father or husband formally consent to it. Moreover, it is typically also up to the men, particularly husbands, to decide to put an end to migration, not least because

2 Churches and some NGOs, such as ENDA, offer literacy classes, formal education and professional training.

the marriage of a young girl often terminates any prospects for travel. Indeed, migrant women are fully aware that migration is part of a family dynamic. Thus, should they decide to leave, it must be approved by the head of the family (either the father or the husband) who, generally, do not object, given the importance of the income brought in by the women in providing for the family and in terms of the benefits they reap in reducing their own contributions.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the complexity of the migration phenomena and the plurality of the female trajectories. It focuses on the start of social transformations created by female migrations, during which they become more autonomous. Internal migrations appear to be a dynamic process, which changes depending on the socio-economic context, and presents specific characteristics depending on gender and class. This is reflected in a feminization of migration movements that are accompanied by a gradual increase in autonomy for women despite the social control exercised by the community of origin. The reasons for this female mobility are often related to the increasing poverty and unemployment of men due to the economic crisis. The acquisition of the wedding trousseau and the desire for social recognition are also reasons for female migration. Differences in development between the cities, regions and neighbouring countries make certain areas more attractive to migrant women.

Migration results in changes in the male and female identities when considered individually. However, studies do not reveal whether migrations have accentuated the power of women and changed the social-gender relations within a couple or family in every situation and in absolute terms. In Serer society, for example, the decision to migrate or the redistribution of income is often the result of a social consensus, a negotiation with the spouse, the family or the community in general. Women's power appears to be increased through the renegotiation that takes place and the acquisition of status, giving women more autonomy in the social environment. Among the Joola, their mobility appears to increase as they enact individual, personal decisions: women have acquired enough of a status to give them agency over their social identity. However, regarding employment opportunities, migrant women still remain confined to arduous work that are a continuation of activities in the domestic sphere. These jobs only provide them with low incomes.

Migrant women who make return trips from abroad to their home country acquire a certain status that upsets the prior evidence and places them in more

attractive roles, with greater latitude to change their relationships positively with their spouses, families, neighbours and their community. Future research should re-evaluate the understanding of women's migration from a gender perspective, recognizing them as active agents of their own mobility.

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AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION, GLOBALIZATION AND DEPENDENCY

Willy Jackson

Introduction

Since the late 1980s, Africa has experienced a renewed enthusiasm for regional integration, a stated objective for both national leaders and international players. Consequently, many economic development organizations were created on the continent during this period.¹ This movement was itself carried along on the wave of similar processes observed elsewhere in the world.² However, it was during the 1960s, in the wake of newly acquired independence, that regional integration projects emerged in Africa, most often continuing on from and replacing the

1 These include IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) created in 1986, the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arabe/Arab Maghreb Union) in 1989, the SADC (Southern African Development Community) in 1992, the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) in 1993, the CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale / Economic Community of Central African States), the UEMOA (Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine/Economic Community of West African States) in 1994, and the CEN-SAD (Communauté des États Sahélo-Sahariens /Community of Sahel-Saharan States) in 1998.

2 Including the creation of APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) in 1989, MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) in 1991, the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Agreement), a trade treaty agreed in 1991 within the framework of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations created in 1967), and the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1992. On this resurgence of regionalization in the world (see Bourguiat, 1993, pp. 3-16; de Melo, Montenegro and Panagariya, 1993, pp. 7-49).

experiments started by the former colonial powers.³ Regional integration, therefore, seems like a relatively old phenomenon in Africa. Hence, the need to question the meaning, relevance and credibility of current experiments, not only regarding the supposed virtues of regional integration but also the challenges facing Africa. How does this new regionalism differ from earlier ones? In an open and globalized world, in which the logics of domination and emancipation clash (see Chemillier-Gendreau, 1995, 2013), are these new integrations likely to contribute to African countries' quest for a real, not a purported, independence? Furthermore, how do they fit within the Pan-Africanism ideology and global political response of Africans to the various forms of historical domination (slavery, colonization, neocolonialism) imposed upon them?

The question of Africa's dependency, and its introduction into the asymmetrical relations of multifaceted domination, remains highly relevant. In this context, it is important that the integration processes underway be questioned as to their real ability to break free from these dependencies and establish a credible alternative for the future of Africa. How can we foster a process of regional development in a context of fast-paced globalization?

To try to answer these questions, it is important to confront the different processes of African regional integration. The first section examines the African countries' failed ambition to free themselves from the structures and mechanisms of foreign domination through regional integration. The second section shows how, in the context of current globalization, this actually helps to perpetuate the neocolonial relationships of domination in African countries.

Regional African integration, between separation discourse and dependent practices

Before their independence, African countries experienced colonial integration processes. This is the case, for example, with the French colonial empire, where the federations of the AEF (*Afrique équatoriale française*, French Equatorial Africa) and the AOF (*Afrique-Occidentale française*, French West Africa) were formed.⁴

3 Examples include the UDEAC (Union douanière et économique de l'Afrique centrale / Central African Customs and Economic Union) dating from 1964, the UDEAO (Union douanière des Etats de l'Afrique de l'ouest / West African Customs and Economic Union) replaced in 1973 by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), and the EAC (East African Community) of 1967.

4 The same processes of territorial groupings can be seen in the British (Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and Belgian (Ruanda-Urundi) colonial empires.

The breakup of these federations, under the effect of the Defferre Framework Law of 1956, was followed by abortive attempts to reconstruct large territorial entities started by the Africans themselves (Ghana-Guinea Union, Federation of Mali, Conseil de l'Entente, Greater Somalia, etc.) (Decraene, 1960; Dreux-Brézé, 1968, 2010). Nevertheless, the idea of integration was up and running, and nothing was going to stop it, especially as it was supported by African thinkers like Cheikh Anta Diop (1974 [1960]), and justified for reasons of economic efficiency.

Indeed, once political sovereignty had been achieved, African states quickly realized that they were not gaining economic self-reliance, without which it would be impossible to talk of true independence. In fact, they saw their unequal integration into the global economy as an obstacle to development.

So as to not be economically disadvantaged by the small size of their respective territories (Yondo, 1970; Anguile and David, 1965), they felt it necessary to combine their efforts by creating regional groups to promote a dynamic of solidarity within the framework of endogenous, self-reliant development. The stated political objective of regional integration was its alleged ability to protect the so-called developing countries from foreign domination. This ambition, to position itself as a weapon of emancipation, was defended, in particular, in analyses, which – inspired by Marxist thought – distinguished between two trends in the economic integration of developing countries. The first, described as ‘progressive, anti-imperialist’ (Maximova, 1974, p. 177) endeavoured to defend the national interests of these countries, promote their development, and consolidate their independence. The second trend, defined as ‘anti-democratic, imperialist’ (ibid., p. 177), favoured the dominance of capitalist nations and their monopolies over these countries. While this second type of regional integration sought to perpetuate capitalist power relationships by maintaining the traditional international division of labour, the first type set out to promote development by eliminating the capitalist exploitation relationship (Panlakai, 1976, p. 18). It is therefore understandable, as Axline states, that ‘without a policy to reduce dependence, the degree of success of regional integration in the third world will be sharply limited’ (Axline, 1977, p. 97). In fact, the fundamental objective of the strategy of developing countries was to establish the economic bases of political independence (Michalet, 1983).

This perception of regional integration as an instrument of independence, and breaking away from their dependence on foreign powers, was demanded by the African countries. For example, in its preamble, the charter of the short-

lived Union of Central African States (UEAC)⁵ provided that its Member States declare themselves 'firmly resolved to safeguarding and consolidating hard-won independence and sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of their States and combating colonialism and neocolonialism in all their forms'.

Regional integration was therefore clearly invested in the task of challenging the dominant world order, a struggle that was met at the level of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as the more overall level of what was, for some time, referred to as the 'Third World'. In the mid-1970s, developmentalist optimism, fuelled by the reformist illusion that African countries could catch up with Western countries through international aid, finally lost its credibility owing to the economic crisis then affecting Africa. From that moment, a trend reversal began, drawing on the sources of the protest movement, which began in Latin America. This united the intellectual community, who were critical of the dominant imperial system, in its attempt to understand the mechanisms of dependency, the accumulation of wealth at the centre of power, and the spread of underdevelopment in the peripheries. These analyses of underdevelopment, as a phenomenon of extraversion applied to Africa (Afana, 1966; Amin, 1972, 1976; Tévoedjré, 1978; Diouf, 1984, 2002), were viewed positively by the continent's leaders. In 1973, the African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence, which noted the ineffectiveness of the resources implemented by the United Nations for the development of Africa, was adopted. A true indictment of international strategies, this paper interprets 'Africa's problems' as resulting from the 'legacy of colonization or by-products of the vertical relations of domination exercised over Africa by developed nations' and 'the constant desire of developed countries to retain, particularly in Africa, areas of both political and economic influence.' Its signatories declared themselves 'determined to defend the economic independence of Africa'. Consequently, the rejection of 'Africa's integration with this or that foreign economic power' was advocated. The focus was on the use of the 'immense natural and human resources' in Africa and on the need to establish a united front in view of a 'profound transformation of the international situation.' The corrective function of regional integration was also highlighted in that it promotes 'harmonization and strengthening of African positions in external relations and consequently

5 Formed in 1968 between the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic and Chad, following the withdrawal of the two latter countries from the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), the UEAC never truly succeeded in functioning. The Central African Republic withdrew from the organization in December 1968 to rejoin the UDEAC.

their effective contribution to the change in the international context in a way likely to influence the emergence of conditions conducive to development’.

This chapter develops the whole theme of the new international economic order established in 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly⁶ and defended by other international bodies, most notably the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, the function of African regional integration was to help disconnect from the mechanisms of foreign dependency. This is evidenced by several documents from the time, including the Kinshasa Declaration of 1976, recommending the creation of an African economic community within 15 to 20 years, the Monrovia Declaration of 1979, supporting the idea of a self-reliant development backed by economic integration, and the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) of 1980, the analyses of which lagged behind some of the other positions of the same era and which defended the idea of Africa’s accelerated insertion into the global economy (Berg, 1981; Brandt, 1980). According to the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos (annexed to it), only regional integration is likely to ‘end Africa’s near total dependency’ and ‘achieve collective autonomy’. Furthermore, the option for an African economic community would result in the adoption of the Abuja Treaty, which established such a community in 1991. Among its objectives was ‘the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development’ as well as ‘self-reliant development’ (Article 4, paragraphs 1a and 1b).

In terms of exiting the global system of dependency, regional integration had the effect of creating solidarity groups and the national definition and implementation of community policies of economic ‘disconnection’ (Amin, 1986), and self-reliance as its resources. The instruments of these coalitions were the customs union, built around a protected domestic market,⁷ and the economic union, comprising both sectoral policies and a regional development strategy.

This first wave of African regional integrations was disappointing in terms of results. A lever for economic integration, the large regional market remained unobtainable because overlapping the national markets was not enough to create a single, uniform whole: ‘adding is not merging’, Bourguinat rightly wrote (1968, p. 115). The economic groupings established never succeeded in triggering a

6 Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974.

7 The domestic market consisted of forming an economic area free of any obstacle to the circulation and establishment of production factors as well as a healthy competition policy. It was protected by both customs and trade.

regional dynamic of prosperity and solidarity, as planned in the initial project, which sought to challenge and circumvent the dominant world order, nor did attempts to cultivate an alternative endogenous development correct the reported extraversion. Multifaceted power relationships were actually infused into progressive discourse. From the 1990s, the effect of undermining the supposedly autonomous regional integration schemes favoured the emergence of a new project characterized by African countries agreeing and accepting to be subject to regional integration for the sake of globalization and the continuation of neocolonial relationships.

Thus, the failed attempts by African states to challenge the world order highlighted the contradictions of the progressive discourse of regional integration. For the countries participating in these groupings, the first requirement was to consolidate the nation-state and its established powers, in other words, national integration (Asante, 1998, p. 804; Diaïté, 1983, pp. 364-390; Constantin, 1976, pp. 70-102; Jackson, 1993, p. 516 et seq.). Consequently, there was a lack of real political will among the leaders to promote regional integration. The application of joint texts struggled with the obstacle of national sovereignty, symbolized by the difficulties in introducing community law into the law of the Member States (Sarr, 2008), together with the practice of mass expulsions of community nationals who were in fact protected by the provisions relating to free movement and the right of establishment (Loungou, 2010, pp. 315-330). Furthermore, political rivalries between states, particularly Cameroon and Gabon, within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale – CEMAC), or even Gabon's rapprochement with former Zaire during the creation of the Economic Community of Central African States (Communauté Économique des États de l'Afrique Centrale – CEEAC) to counteract Cameroon's influence in Central Africa, confirmed the negative influence of conflicting bilateral relationships on regional integration processes (Jackson, 1993).

The difficulties of regional integration in the context of globalization: the permanence of the relationships of domination

The turning point in the 1990s, characterized by an acceleration in globalization, was marked in Africa by a setback in the initial hopes for regional integration. The reversal of these early processes were due to the combination of

several factors that only entrenched the new processes of regional groupings in globalization as a phenomenon of dependency.

This was the case at the end of the Cold War when capitalism and socialism clashed due to economic integration, as Krasnov pointed out: 'economic integration is one of the main areas where peaceful competition takes place between socialism and capitalism' (Krasnov, 1975, p. 6). The collapse of the socialist system and, as a result, the integration model it had produced⁸ gave free reign to the expansion of capitalist economic integration and its ideological support – liberalism.

The other remarkable fact is undoubtedly Africa's marginalization, demonstrated by its limited participation in trade and its share in foreign direct investment.⁹ For capitalism, which established itself in the 1990s, this marginalization of Africa was an intolerable anomaly. Indeed, in view of its new-found supremacy, this system was incompatible with the subsistence of territories, eluding its logic of expansionism and profit maximization. Released from the socialist barrier that had confined it to certain geographic and economic zones, it now aimed to integrate and control the areas that were still rebellious to its rationale. Indeed, regional integration emerged as one of the best ways of achieving this objective: '...to the extent that the globalization of market mechanisms condemned all isolated development strategies to wane, the new liberal congruence of economic policies has greatly facilitated, more actively than in the past, the positions of regional openness' (Petiteville, 1997, p. 515). In the 1990s, the rise in the discourse around Africa's marginalization and Western countries' abandonment of Africa to appease their tormented conscience from having benefited from the mechanisms of world domination, converged towards the same goal: to bring about and accelerate the insertion of Africa into neoliberal globalization through regional integration (Bruckner, 2002).

Finally, the economic collapse of the African states forced them to reassess their development models and strategies. Thus, they gradually adopted a new doctrine of regional integration based on the liberal credo of openness to the market: 'A faster regional liberalization, alongside a general trade liberalization,

8 COMECON, a common market of socialist countries founded in 1949, was officially dissolved on 28 June 1991 in Budapest.

9 The following figures show sub-Saharan Africa's share of global exports: 3.3% in 1950, 2.9% in 1960, 2.4% in 1970, 2.5% in 1980, 1.2% in 1990, 1% in 1993 and 0.8% in 1996. The share of its imports for these years develops in the same way: 3.1%, 3%, 2.3%, 2.2%, 1.1%, 1.1% and 0.9%. See United Nations. 1999. *United Nations, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1996/1997*, New York, Geneva, p. 23 and 25. As for foreign direct investment, this increased 14-fold globally between 1973 and 1993 to reach US 350 billion dollars. Africa's share was just US 5 billion dollars, which is 1.4% of the total.

could accelerate the development of commerce and provide benefits not offered by a unilateral liberalization' (World Bank, 1989, p. 4) It was therefore suggested that, in the interests of the principle of competition, regional preferences be disregarded. This discourse, which advocates 'minimal protectionism' (Berg, 1993, p. 64), has become recurrent at the World Bank and the IMF – now defenders of regional integration after long opposing it – on the pretext that it had promoted the creation of protectionist bastions in Africa (Robson, 1993, p. 859; Delorme et al., 1995, p. 16). This turnaround was part of an investment strategy for the global space now free from the obstacle of the socialist counter-model. Consequently, regionalism was no longer considered a barrier to the expansion of multilateralism insofar as the 'world domain' was pacified around a capitalist control of the economy. In this context, regional integration as a gateway towards globalization could be restored and promoted in developing countries, particularly in Africa, as argued by Alassane Ouattara, then deputy managing director of the IMF: 'for most of these countries, regional integration can facilitate integration into the world economy.... The real challenge is to ensure that regional organizations are perceived as effective vehicles for the integration of developing countries into the world economy.... Clearly, French-speaking African countries – particularly the CFA zone countries – have already subscribed to regional integration as the driving force for their integration into the world economy'.¹⁰

A variant of this strategy of diluting and dissolving regional markets into the global market lay in creating new forms of integration. Integration no longer brought together just the southern countries but also countries from both North and South in a kind of imperial grouping dominated by the northern partner. According to Petiteville, the NAFTA is a prototype of this 'conformist model' (Petiteville, 1997, p. 517). Other experiments are based on the same logic of a frankly, neocolonial 'vertical integration' (Berg, 1993, p. 66; Guillaumont and Guillaumont-Jeanneney, 1993a, pp. 83–112, 1993b, pp. 381–408; Echinard and Guilhot, 2007, pp. 775–792; Daniel, 2011, pp. 19–37; Diouf, 2002; Tsiyembe, 2012), that is, economic groupings created by France in Africa (centred around the franc currency), such as the association of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of Countries with European partnership, and the Indian Ocean Commission¹¹, of which France is a member

10 'Regional Integration in Africa. An Important Step Toward Global Integration', *Statement to the First Conference of Ministers of Economy and Finance of French-speaking Countries (Francophone)*, Monaco, 14 April 1999. Available at <https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/041499f.htm>.

11 In addition to France, the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles are members.

through its overseas territory of Reunion. As Samir Amin wrote, regionalization is, in this context, an 'element of reinforcement ('building block') of the construction of the globalization that really exists, i.e. capitalist and imperialist (two inseparable characters)' (Amin, 2014).

It was in this context of a widespread and conquering offensive of the new imperial forces that the African organizations of the 1990s were created from the ashes of those formed in the first wave of regionalization. Thus, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC were founded in 1994, following the devaluation of the CFA franc on 1 January of the same year.¹² In their constitutional texts, all these groupings included provisions for accepting the principles of an open and competitive market economy, favouring export and foreign investment strategies instead of self-reliant development models.

In this instance, their policies involved standardizing the legal framework for economic activities. Several obligations were therefore imposed on member states, such as the convergence of macroeconomic policies, subject to structural adjustment programmes, the dismantling of customs and trade protections, as stipulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the adoption of national and regional investment codes conducive to foreign investment, and the establishment of uniform regulations for business law, guaranteeing investment security.¹³ At the same time, making African regional integration processes conform meant borrowing from other channels and mechanisms, including Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), with adverse effects on African regionalization (Jennar, 2005; Berthelot, 2014). These included international trade negotiations in which African countries, along with other developing nations, had little influence (Sanoussi, De Lombaerde and Tussie, 2011; Tandon, 2015; Illy, 2012, chap. 8, p. 217 et seq.), and the introduction of competition in the LPA through NEPAD¹⁴ which, by reintegrating Western powers on the African stage, contributed towards the continent's dependency (Mbaye, 2004; NALEDI, 2002).

At a continental level, in 2002, the African Union (AU) succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and put regional integration on its political agenda (Abdulqawi and Ouguergouz, 2013; Cissé, 2008, pp. 58-60;

12 On the restructuring of regional groupings in Southern Africa, see Gibb (1998, pp. 287-306).

13 For the franc zone, note the establishment of the Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA) on 17 October 1993, the Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets (CIMA) on 10 July 1992, and the Inter-African Conference on Social Security (CIPRES) and the Economic and Statistical Observatory for Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRISAT) on 21 September 1993.

14 English acronym for New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Kerekou, 2011; Tshieyembe, 2002). The fundamental objective of its strategy was to make the African Economic Community operational, as provided for in the Abuja Treaty (ECA, AU and ADB, 2012). However, it remains caught up in the still unresolved contradiction between the disconnect from the mechanisms of the global market, as advocated on the continental level by the Lagos Plan of Action, and the positions of liberal openness recommended within the regional groupings. Its continental unification strategy, organized around its eight officially recognized economic communities,¹⁵ was destroyed by the growth and proliferation of Africa's regional organizations that saw states overlap between several of these, apparently without noticing any incompatibility with the overall intended goal, as noted, 'One of the main challenges facing Africa's Regional Economic Committees (RECs) in implementing their integration programmes is overlapping membership' (ECA, AU and ADB, 2012, p. 1). Difficulties in implementing this shared vision led the African states to fall back on a Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) (Commission of the African Union, 2010), a convergence and coordination mechanism for the RECs around areas of cooperation identified as priorities. It is worth noting that the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area, which brings together 26 countries, is a precursor to the African Continental Free Trade Area and designed to enter into force in 2017 (according to the programme for its accelerated implementation ratified by the African Union Summit of January 2012).

Although the new African regional integrations were characterized by the expansion of their sphere of competence, taking into account the challenges highlighted in the context of globalization (political instability of states, conflict prevention, security, terrorism, environment, etc.), thus moving from an economists' approach to a global approach,¹⁶ they were nevertheless held back by the slow pace of African development, as established since the creation of the OAU in 1963.

It was therefore considered that the departure from regional groupings was the best strategy for achieving African unity. Experience has shown, however, that this truncated path towards Pan-Africanism only leads to a stalemate.

15 These are: CEN-SAD, COMESA, ECA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, UMA. The rationalization of regional communities is a concern for the African Union: on this subject, read African Union *Study for the Quantification of Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Rationalization Scenarios*, Final report, provisional version, Ideaconult, May 2011.

16 Hence, the semantic shift from regional economic integration to regional integration (Tchaméni, 2013).

Must Africa's future hang in the balance under the slow and uncertain pace of trade liberalization agreements and treaties? The damaging effect of this strategy can be seen in the nationalization of African political issues and the reversal of the Pan-Africanist project, which dates back to the aforementioned Defferre Framework Law. By having local politicians primarily concerned with mostly national affairs, this law in fact contributed to the rise and fall of the Pan-African ideal.

Conclusion

In the 1960s, during their quest for independence, African countries perceived regional integration as an instrument that would enable them to break the bonds of foreign domination in which they were embedded due to their unequal integration into the mechanisms of the global economy. However, globalization in the 1990s undermined their attempt at a radical break with the global system. Thus, we witnessed African countries internalizing the globalized regional integration strategy, which was adopted and implemented by the new African regional groups. What, then, is the prospect for successful African integration?

Initially, this was built upon the widespread and deepening crisis of capitalism, particularly the illusory belief, maintained within this system, of a broad dissemination of wealth within the framework of globalization. This neoliberal globalization in fact generates inequalities and is characterized by the polarization of wealth. The Africa of new integrations is already, and increasingly risks being, disillusioned. Consequently, the share of intra-regional trade within these regional groups is still largely insignificant,¹⁷ demonstrating the failure of the market integration strategy.

Future questions about the model imposed on Africa cannot therefore be ruled out. The new social forces of civil society (political parties, unions, employer organizations, professional bodies, etc.), freed by the democratization processes of the 1990s, must therefore be involved in the debate to stimulate and encourage regional integration. The socialization of the issues is thus likely to force political leaders to revise regional integration plans that work against

17 In 2013, it represented 1.6% of exports and 3.1% of imports for CEMAC; 7.5% and 10.4% for ECOWAS; 6.9% and 5.8% for COMESA; 11.7% and 14.8% for SADC; 13.5% and 10% for UEMOA; 3.3% and 3.9% for UMA. See Ngattai-Lam Merdan. 2012. *Intégration régionale et échanges commerciaux intra sous-régionaux : le cas de la Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale, CEMAC*. Ph.D. thesis, UPJV, Amiens.

the interests of their people. It is pleasing to see that regional integration is now incorporated into how these sectors approach civil society.¹⁸ However, in the context of global Africanity, it would undoubtedly also be appropriate to arouse the interest of the African diaspora,¹⁹ considered by the African Union as the continent's 'sixth region', on the issue of regional integration. Through its financial power, it may contribute to the creation of structured regional development projects in Africa.

A change of direction may also take place by revising Pan-African thought around the notion of political community (Mandé and Jackson, 2015, pp. 61-77). Taking note of the historical failure of the common project, this would mean fostering a new unified dynamic, supported by the vision of a real political purpose of substantial emancipation. Now, more than ever, African regional integration needs to be uncoupled from international domination mechanisms: 'The fact that regional integration cannot hope to see the expected results as long as regional partners remain integrated in the international system cannot be overemphasized. In other words, regional autonomy is incompatible with global and transnational integration' (Asante and Chanaiwa, 1998, p. 81). Visionary leaders enamoured of Pan-African patriotism must therefore look to explore this range of possibilities.

Without political drive, today's African integrations are unlikely to offer hope to African populations suppressed by the mechanisms of international domination. Regional integration must therefore be built on a political process of continental unification, which may result in a loss of sovereignty for states. There is no promising future for Africa within the framework of narrow national sovereignty. Only an expanded sovereignty that is continent wide is likely to allow Africa to develop and play an important role in global affairs. In this regard, the debate on allocating two permanent seats at the United

18 Gérard Gagnon, Cheikh Tidiane Sarr and Ghislain Valade (2004) prepared a study for the Canadian International Development Agency (www.afriquefrontieres.org); lobbying by the FOPAO (Federation of West Africa Employers' Associations) and UNIPACE (Union des Patronats d'Afrique centrale) for regional integration, <http://www.magazinedelafrique.com>; creation of the Confédération africaine pour la promotion des relations économiques et financières (CAFREF), an NGO for a large inter-African economic and commercial market; REPAOC (Network of NGO platforms in West Africa), *Comprendre et participer au processus ouest-africain d'intégration régionale. Manuel pédagogique sur l'intégration régionale à destination des acteurs non gouvernementaux*, April 2011.

19 Consisting, according to the African Union of *people of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union*. Its geographical location in 2010 was as follows: 39.16 million people in North America; 112.65 million people in Latin America; 13.56 million people in the Caribbean; 3.51 million in Europe.

Nations Security Council to Africa must be revised.²⁰ In reality, this request has only aroused an appetite for power among the African countries seeking the role of continental leadership, rivalries that are also regional where there are power clashes among states (Pascal and Luc, 2000, pp. 915–940; Darbon, 2000; Damien and Awoumou, 2008).

It should also be highlighted that a strategy of diversifying international economic relations and directing investments from new partners towards prominent regional projects may help loosen the constraints imposed on African states within the framework of globalization. The emergence of new players in Africa (such as Brazil, China, India, etc.) and their involvement in regional integration heralds this new trend (Lauriello, 2011; Schiere and Rugamba, 2014; Yin Gao and Wei Shan, 2015).

Africa is facing its destiny. The failures of past experiences in terms of regional integration has led to renewed critical thinking by its leaders. But which political project will support this reworking of African perspectives? Should African nations emancipate themselves from foreign domination or accommodate the neocolonial ties? (Mandé and Jackson, 2015, p. 76). Now is the time for courage in politics.

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20 The African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: 'The Ezulwini consensus'*, Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary Session, 7 to 8 March 2005, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), document Ext./EX.Cl./2(VII).

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CHAPTER 13

AFRICA-BRICS

An Alternative Cooperation Model

Evgeni Korendyasov

Introduction

The coalition of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) in Africa has led to major changes in the political and economic landscape of the continent. It has stimulated the reorientation of African trade towards emerging economies while deepening South-South cooperation. The diversification of partners has strengthened Africa's capacity to participate in the reconfiguration of global governance.

The increase in trade and investment flows from the BRICS group is part of the development programmes set out by the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In this context, Africa-BRICS relations are becoming an essential factor for structural transformation and sustainable development on the African continent (UNECA, UNEP and BRICS, 2014, p. 7).

While the Africa-BRICS partnership carries some risks and challenges, the momentum gained from the Africa-BRICS partnership appears to continue, as it is consistent with the process of global transformation and the strengthening of an alternative cooperation model.

How BRICS began

The acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was created in 2001 by Jim O'Neill, an economist at the investment bank Goldman Sachs, to refer to four emerging economies capable of catching up with economically advanced countries. But another fate awaited this grouping.

In 2006, representatives of these four countries began negotiations to define the modalities of a union in the face of the drastic shifts in the global economy and international relations on the eve of the twenty-first century. In 2009, the city of Yekaterinburg (the capital of the Urals region, Russia) hosted the first summit of the emerging BRIC countries. The joint statement after the summit stressed that the BRIC country group: 'want a just multipolar world order based on the application of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making by all states.'¹ Participants decided to hold annual summit meetings.

In 2010, BRIC accepted South Africa into the group, and its president, Jacob Zuma, took part in the third summit in China (2011). The BRIC group had become BRICS. The profile of the African dimension of BRICS became clearer during the fifth summit held in Durban, South Africa, in March 2013. Some 15 African heads of state, the first leaders of the African Union and the eight RECs, as well as other Pan-African structures took part. The theme of the discussions was 'BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialization'. The BRICS heads of state and African leaders held a forum-dialogue with the topic 'Revealing African Potential: BRICS Cooperation – Africa in Infrastructure'. Indeed, infrastructure development was declared the central focus of the partnership.

Breakthrough in Africa

In 2016, BRICS represented 40% of the world's population, 27% of global GDP (by purchasing power parity) and 20-22% of world trade and financial flows, and they were strongly present throughout the continent. BRICS-Africa trade between 2002 and 2012 increased tenfold to US\$360 billion in 2014, and about 30% of Africa's foreign trade was with the BRICS countries. The total investment commitments of the BRICS for the period 2006-2014 were estimated at US\$80

1 Joint statement by the leaders of the BRIC country group, 16 June 2009.

billion. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from BRICS was estimated at 25% of the annual flow and 14% for the stock.

China is Africa's largest partner. It accounts for more than 50% of trade (US\$200 billion) between the countries of the continent and the BRICS. Its investments in Africa exceeded US\$35 billion from 2006 to 2015.

India's trade volume exceeded US\$70 billion, with direct investments (stock for 2009–2014) at US\$20 billion (UNCTAD, 2016, p. 38).

The volume of trade between Brazil and Africa has increased sevenfold since 2002, reaching US\$28–29 billion in 2013, with investments possibly valued at US\$4–5 billion (Deych, 2015).

Russia is accelerating its return to Africa. At the time of writing, trade reached US\$10–12 billion, and the amount of direct investment was valued at US\$5–6 billion (*ibid.*).

South Africa's trade volume was US\$24 billion and US\$26 billion for FDI stock from 2009 to 2014. The BRICS had signed 78 investment agreements with African countries. They also received 96,500 students from African countries (Deych, 2015; UNCTAD, 2016, p. 38; Garcia, 2016, p. 14; UNECA, 2015, p. 32).

Visions, modes of action

The vectors and mechanisms implemented in BRICS–Africa cooperation, reveal significant differences in partners' approaches, perceptions and targets.

Brazil

Brazil, encouraged by its rise in power, sees Africa as a pole of economic and geostrategic expansion. Brazil–Africa relations are 200 years old and they have developed strong cultural affinities.

The administration of President Lula da Silva (2003–2010) completely changed the African dimension of Brazilian foreign policy. Three factors account for this. First, the attractive conditions of African land for achieving new successes in the agricultural, industrial and technological fields. Brazil also saw the possibility of escaping the supremacy of the United States in Latin America and the possibility of gaining African support to strengthen its weight on the international stage, including the quest for a seat on the UN Security Council. The Brazilian authorities are currently presenting themselves as promoters of a strengthened South–South cooperation. These positions are closely linked with their concerns to facilitate access for domestic companies to enter African markets. Between

2000 and 2010, trade between Brazil and Africa increased from US\$4 billion to US\$20 billion. In the same decade, Brazil signed 160 agreements with African countries, ranging from trade to energy, to academic and military cooperation. Brazil is especially appreciated for its technological performance, which is easily adaptable in many African countries due to the geophysical similarities of the soil and climate (Carrilione et al., 2011, p. 4 and 6).

Five key areas of cooperation are particularly favoured: tropical agriculture, tropical medicine, vocational training, energy, and the social sector. Here are some examples:

- For agriculture, there are the following projects: the Cotton-4 project in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali; the development of agricultural innovation in Mozambique; and rice farming in Senegal.
- For health: 53 bilateral health agreements with 22 African countries for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and malaria, and the construction of a pharmaceutical plant in Mozambique.
- For vocational training: the construction of vocational training centres in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Brazil has also built a public television station in Mozambique that is broadcasting programmes in 49 African countries.

Almost all the major Brazilian companies are engaged in Africa: Petrobras (with oil projects in ten countries), Vale (mines, electricity in seven countries), Odebrecht (mines, oil, gas, construction and infrastructure in nine countries), and Embraer (aviation in six countries).

Brazilian companies are particularly active in the Portuguese-speaking countries of the former Portuguese colonies. In Angola, some 100 Brazilian companies employ more than 30,000 Brazilians and Angolans. In all, Brazilian companies are present in around 30 African countries. They are, in fact, beginning to seriously compete with African companies (Deych, 2015).

Russia

For Russia, an initiator of the BRICS, strengthening cooperation within this group is a key focus of its long-term policy. It wants the organization to become an effective mechanism for coordination and interaction around the strategic and current problems of international politics and the global economy.

Russia would like to use its participation in the BRICS to expand opportunities, to promote its programme, to alter the architecture of the global

economic and financial system, and to diversify its international cooperation and to resist pressure from Western countries.

Russia's transition to a market economy has been accompanied by a sharp decline in cooperation between new Russia and African countries. State cooperation management structures (there were about 70 services for Africa) have been abolished in favour of private companies. Russia gave up on all ideological considerations. Instead, freedom of enterprise, mutual interest and pragmatism have been proclaimed as fundamental principles of international cooperation. The turning point came during the period of the 1990s and 2000s when Russia-Africa relations began a rather timid recovery.

In the period 2000-2014, the amount of Russian-African trade increased eightfold: from US\$1.8 billion to US\$12.2 billion. In 2015, Egypt's share of Russian-African trade stood at 36.7%, Algeria's at 17.9%, and South Africa's at 7.5%.

Approximately, 26% of Russian exports to Africa are made up of food and raw materials, and 73% of Russian imports from Africa consist of food and agricultural products (wine, tea, cocoa, citrus fruits, fruits, vegetables and flowers).

The bulk of Russian companies' investments (US\$10-12 billion) are concentrated in the hydrocarbons and mining resources sector. The Russians are working to secure access to African deposits, to internationalize the activities of domestic companies, and to consolidate their influence in the markets.

It should also be noted that the complementarity of Russian-African interests in mining has been strengthened. Indeed, following the demise of the Soviet Union, a significant number of metal and mineral deposits ended up abroad in the former Soviet republics. Russia currently has a 100% deficit in manganese, 80% in chromium, titanium ore and bauxite, and 50-60% in tin.

Forty major Russian companies are engaged in mining production in Africa: Alrosa (diamonds in Angola with an investment of US\$ 0.7 billion); Lukoil (oil in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Sierra Leone); Renova (manganese, ferro-alloys in Gabon, Mozambique and South Africa, for an investment of US\$1 billion); Rosatom (atomic energy in Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa); and Rusal (bauxite in Guinea). The presence of Russian companies is also becoming increasingly evident in the banking, telecommunications (satellite launch), agribusiness and infrastructure sectors.

In the 2010s, aid exceeded US\$9.5 million (in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Mali and Somalia). As part of its aid programmes, Russia has erased the debts of Ethiopia for US\$4.8 billion, Libya for US\$4.5 billion, Algeria for US\$4.3 billion, and Angola for US\$3.5 billion.

Health and education remain important drivers of cooperation. About 100,000 Africans hold university degrees from Russia. In 2016, there were

10,000 Africans studying in Russian universities. Each year, 1,700 state grants are awarded to nationals of African countries.

India

In India, Africa is seen as a 'great reservoir of opportunity'. Thus, in 2014, the volume of trade increased from US\$3 billion to US\$70 billion. India (like China) is a major supplier of manufactured goods.

The India-Africa Forum serves as an essential mechanism for the coordination and management of the India-Africa partnership. The first summit was held in 2008. The third summit, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was declared a 'renewal summit of bilateral cooperation'. Its record participation confirmed that India-Africa relations are part of a long-term vision. The Indian authorities have committed to providing loans at reduced rates of US\$10 billion (US\$7.4 billion in 2008-2014) for the period 2016-2020. At the same time, donations were reduced from US\$1.2 billion to US\$0.6 billion.

The Indian Government provided Africans with 50,000 scholarships over a period of five years (2016-2020), twice as many as in the previous five years. It also proposed to expand the Pan Africa E-Network to establish the connections of 48 African countries with and between India.

India's presence in Africa is broad and diverse. The diaspora represents an important bond. It comprises about 2.7 million people (2015), more than half of whom live in South Africa, and one-third in Mauritius.

In contrast to China, the private sector is at the helm of Indo-African cooperation. For example, Bharti Airtel, the multinational telecommunications company, dominates the market in 18 African countries. With the acquisition of Kuwaiti company Zain in 2010, Bharti Airtel became the second largest mobile operator in Africa with more than 78 million subscribers (2015).

Tata Africa Holdings, based in Johannesburg, South Africa, operates in 11 African countries. Apart from vehicle assembly, the company is engaged in information technology, chemical production, steel, energy and mining. Its investments in 2016 were estimated at US\$1.45 billion (Rao and Kuwoni, 2016).

India's pharmaceutical industry is performing spectacularly in Africa, thanks in part to its antiretroviral drugs. Indian entrepreneurs have been able to reduce the cost of antiretroviral therapy from US\$10,000 to less than US\$400 per patient. In fact, around 15% of India's pharmaceutical exports go to Africa (Ndiaye, 2016).

Much of India's investment is in energy. Oil Videsh Limited (OVL), a division of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), has invested US\$2.5 billion

in oil exploration and production in Sudan. It has exploration rights in Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Ghana. Indian companies are often faced with Chinese competition. For example, during a tender for an exploration block in Angola, the China National Petroleum Corporation offered US\$2.3 billion to snatch the contract from the Indians (Ndiaye, 2016).

Nearly 80 Indian companies have invested about US\$2.5 billion in the agricultural sector in Africa. In terms of trade, Nigeria was India's largest partner in 2010-2015, with an import-export volume of US\$1.6 billion, followed by South Africa with US\$1.1 billion (ibid.).

China

The scale of China's economic anchorage in Africa has reached such a level that its impact has become systemic. China had pledged that, by 2020, trade would reach US\$400 billion, with US\$200 billion in investments. China is the only member of the BRICS group that has an official programme of cooperation with Africa under the title 'The White Paper: The African Policy of the People's Republic of China'. The document sets out the goals, objectives, mechanisms and modalities of action for the development of China's cooperative relations with regard to the African continent. The Chinese authorities have proved their country's membership in the developing world and their commitment to the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and South-South cooperation. Four principles are highlighted in its strategy: equality of partners; no attempts to impose its ideology or its political system on Africans; a win-win partnership; and mutual respect (China, 2006; Deych, 2015; South Africa, 2015b).

China's affirmation in Africa is an integral part of a 'comprehensive' strategy. The African space is seen as a means of securing market access for the raw materials that are essential to the Chinese national economy and as a platform for China to become a major decision-maker of global governance. Today, Chinese companies in Africa are ubiquitous, both geographically and sectorally.

China had aimed to reach US\$400 billion in trade with Africa (US\$220 billion in 2014) and US\$200 billion in investments on the continent (loans, grants, credits) by 2020. China invests in 50 African countries. But the 11 top destinations are Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe accounts for 75% of China's total FDI stock (South Africa, 2015b; UNCTAD, 2015, p. 1). Chinese FDI for non-level projects in 2003-2014 exceeded US\$30 billion, including US\$13.3 billion for manufacturing and US\$8.7 billion for extractive industries (UNCTAD, 2015).

The natural resources component is closely linked to the infrastructure sector. The phenomenon is referred to as the 'Angola model' of exchanging resources for infrastructure construction projects. The formula has proved to be very attractive. Forty years of uninterrupted growth in China has led to a major boom in demand for raw materials. Africa holds about 30% of the world's mineral reserves and produces more than 60 types of minerals and metals. But it does not have the means to develop them, while China has considerable financial resources. The points of common of interest are obvious. Africa is becoming a key link in China's mineral resource security system. The modalities of action are sophisticated, often new, always pragmatic.

The Hong Kong-based China International Fund granted a line of credit (valued by the World Bank at US\$9.8 billion in 2003-2009) for the construction of three railway lines to connect the three main ports on the coast: Luanda and Lobito in Angola, and Walvis Bay in Namibia. Chinese bank Exim provided US\$4.5 billion for oil projects (Aldendu and Alvesdu, 2010).

In Gabon, China pledged to invest US\$3 billion in the construction of a 560 km-long railway against the exclusive rights to the Belinga Iron Ore Project. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Chinese provided a US\$9 billion loan, including US\$6 billion for infrastructure and US\$3 billion for the mining sector. The refund terms (like the contracts with Angola and Gabon) provide for rights to the country's natural resources, mainly mining and forestry concessions (*ibid.*).

More than 500 infrastructure projects (2014) have been carried out by China across the continent. The Chinese and Africans have adhered to their strategy to create three infrastructure networks: rail, road and regional air (Deych, 2015, pp. 212-213). A memorandum on the subject was signed between China and the AU's African Commission.²

Africa is also significantly involved in the Belt and Road (BRI) Initiative, a new 'Silk Roads' project advocated by China. More than 50% of the Chinese investments planned under this project are earmarked for construction sites in Africa, mainly for port facilities.

The broad and judicious development of soft power resources has surprisingly helped China achieve its spectacular breakthroughs on the continent, elevating its image in the eyes of Africans. In terms of donations, the Chinese build schools, colleges, universities and scientific research laboratories. Links of inter-university cooperation, with joint teams of scientific research in different fields,

2 AU and China agree big infrastructure deal, *news24*, 27 Jan. 2015. <https://www.news24.com/african-union-china-agree-big-infrastructure-deal-20150127>

have been implemented. Fourteen agricultural innovation technology centres have been built and 5,000 agribusiness executives have been trained (Institute of African Studies, 2015).

More than 40,000 Africans have graduated from higher education in China. For the years 2013–2015, 18,000 scholarships in China were awarded to students from African countries. For the years 2016–2020, as part of technical assistance to the training of local elites, China is committed to building regional education centres.

Health is another key focus of Sino-African cooperation. More than 18,000 Chinese doctors have been dispatched to 47 African countries since 1963. Between 2010 and 2013, 43 medical teams were made available to the African authorities. At the same time, China has built 30 hospitals (*ibid.*).

China is also attentive to cultural relations. Currently, there are 67 Confucius Institutes (2025) in Africa. About one million Chinese tourists visit African countries annually. China's African strategy has been resolutely implemented, despite difficulties and economic vagaries.

The 2008–2009 global economic crisis did not undermine Beijing's engagement in Africa. Indeed, China's appetite for African resources and for new market opportunities has not decreased. As a result, 'the future of Africa seems to be more of a China-like position every day' (Aldendu and Alvesdu, 2010). This is particularly visible in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia.

African countries have increasingly mixed feelings about China's actions on the continent. Nevertheless, Africans are enthusiastic about the abundant flows of Chinese investment. Indeed, China's development strategy model appeals to African elites. However, we must also note the growing number of critical opinions expressed by African partners.

South Africa

With the implosion of the Apartheid regime, the 'Rainbow Nation' carried out a profound reconfiguration of its foreign policy. The South-South axis advanced to the front line.

With its dual hats as both a member of the African Union and the BRICS group, South Africa serves as a kind of link between these two prestigious international organizations. It proclaims itself as a 'gateway to Africa'. Indeed, the country has reason to say so. Its GDP is equivalent to 25% of African output as a whole and 33% of Southern Africa (BRICS, 2013).

Forty per cent of the continent's industrial production and 45% of metals and mining products come from the Republic of South Africa. Some 90% of portfolio investments in Africa pass through the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. South Africa is working to build on these strengths so as to meet its ambitions and interests (BRICS, 2013; Van der Merwe, 2009).

The South African authorities initiated and materialized the NEPAD project, which has become the founding document of African countries' development strategies. South Africa has made a significant contribution to strengthening the African Union, integrating processes in South Africa, and resolving conflicts. However, this South African activism has been met with hesitation by other countries. Kenya and Nigeria have both declared themselves the continent's 'gateways'.

Neighbouring countries, and East and West Africa, are important areas for the multifaceted expansion of South African companies. Particularly active are Sasol (petrochemicals), present in Mozambique (gas) and Nigeria (oil); AngloGold Ashanti (for gold in Guinea, Mali, Namibia and Tanzania). MTN (telecommunications) operates in 19 African countries. Standard Bank Group is represented in 20 African countries. The value of South African investments in the rest of the continent exceeds US\$20 billion (Dieng, 2016).

Furthermore, in South Africa itself, the positions of the other BRICS members are growing stronger. South Africa is China's largest trading partner. China is the leading competitor to South African interests to the extent that former President Thabo Mbeki remarked that the importation of Chinese manufactured goods will eventually 'condemn South Africa'. Indeed, the textile industry was the first victim (*ibid.*). Moreover, the South African economy and high-tech sectors, in particular, are heavily involved in global networks of interconnections. Arbitrary disturbances, therefore, have large negative consequences. All the more today as Western countries are becoming more assertive in safeguarding their interests. In this regard, it should be mentioned that 90% of US imports of chromium come from South Africa. It also provides 50% of the European Union's consumption of manganese and chromium.

A pillar of Africa's development policy

Over the decade (2007-2017), large swathes of development networks, mutual interests and multifaceted affinities developed between African countries and the BRICS. These networks serve as a lever for expanding Africans' access to capital, technologies and markets that are all the more valuable in a context

where traditional partners are devoting more and more of their resources to meet their own concerns. The BRICS meteoric breakthrough has largely contributed to the continent's progress towards structural transformation, industrialization and integration. It is also clear that, through partnership with emerging economies, Africa is increasing its capacity to act in all directions.

In alliance with the BRICS, African countries are widening the margins of self-governing action, demanding that their voices be respected and respectable, and affirming their resistance to attacks on sovereignty and external interference. Yet BRICS-Africa cooperation has more than just benefits. It also carries certain risks and failures. In this regard, we might see a broad domination of China among the new partners, or the fact that about 50% of the volume of cooperation comes from seven to ten African countries. The invasion of cheap products from emerging countries in fact poses a threat to the informal and artisanal economy in Africa. These phenomena could call into question the stability of cooperation and its multiplier effects. The African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa insist on the development of a common strategy of economic cooperation with the outside world, which will minimize risks and maximize the benefits of cooperative relations (UNECA, UNEP and BRICS, 2014).

African analysts insist that in dealing with BRICS countries, African countries should position themselves more as actors than observers. They should ensure that duty-free market access is reserved for all their export products. India, for example, has established a duty-free regime at 98% of tariffs, but excluded coffee, tea and spices, which are strategic exports for a significant number of African countries. In Africa, there should also be greater emphasis on technology transfer in order to move up the value chains and extract greater added value from the continent's resources.

Alliance for a new international architecture

It is clear that the model of cooperation between Africans and the BRICS has been moving away from the principles of the neoliberal 'Washington consensus'. Carlos Lopes, executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2012-2016), said that the way the BRICS-Africa is partnered has features that could present itself 'as a special form of relationship with the continent's external partners.' Indeed, some of these features are already visible (UNECA, 2013).

The Africa-BRICS partnership is based more on mutual benefits and standards of solidarity than on outright commercialism. Mutuality, expressed

by the 'win-win' formula, is called upon to prevail in relations between partners. Among financing instruments, interest-free loans and grants are a key tool. The lack of political conditionality of assistance is another major feature of the cooperation of the BRICS with Africans. Last but not least, the inclusion of investment projects in national development programmes reinforces the attractiveness of the partnerships with BRICS.

Equal relations, reciprocity, mutual esteem and consideration of the particularities of African society are the pillars of a partnership model advocated in the framework of Africa-BRICS cooperation. This model presents itself as a complex combination of market instruments and approaches based on solidarity, and as a pragmatic balance between the state and private enterprise in order to obtain an effective and appropriate formula. However, the development of a model of cooperation, as an alternative to the philosophy of the 'Washington consensus', ultimately depends on the implementation of a new architecture in the system of economic relations and the institutions of global governance.

At the end of the twentieth century, the international system experienced drastic shifts. The old balances had been shaken, and the balance and distribution of power have changed in favour of the countries of the South. A shift in global economic dominance towards emerging and developing economies is becoming increasingly evident. In 2015, the GDP (by purchasing power parity – PPP) of the G7 countries was only 2% higher than that of the BRICS. According to its GDP (by PPP), China has already surpassed the United States: US\$19.39 trillion and US\$17.94 trillion, respectively, in 2015. For the period 2005-2015, the contribution of the BRICS to global growth was estimated at 50% of its growth (IMF, 2016).

The system of global governance, designed and implemented in the years following the Second World War, no longer reflects current realities. Emerging countries are not given a seat at the table. They are neither duly represented nor heard. Their demands for the establishment of a new architecture of the global system, along with structural reforms of the respective institutions, constitute a fundamental pillar and the *raison d'être* of the BRICS-Africa alliance. The BRICS activities and their cooperation with African countries are particularly dynamic in this area.

To accelerate the transition to a new economic and financial system architecture, the BRICS created the New Development Bank (NDB) and a Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, which operates within the IMF and World Bank mandates.

In addition, the BRICS summit in Goa, India (15-16 October 2016) announced the creation of a rating agency, 'with the aim of consolidating the

global financial architecture'. A system of coordination of the monetary policy of the Central Banks of the BRICS countries was also implemented. The Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB) is included in the basket of currencies relating to special drawing rights (SDRs).

At the time of writing (2016), the capital of the New Development Bank (NDB) of the BRICS was set at US\$100 billion, with contributions distributed as follows: US\$41 billion for China, US\$18 billion each for Russia, India and Brazil, and US\$5 billion for South Africa. The NDB was initially called upon to co-finance infrastructure projects. It is headquartered in Shanghai, China, with its African Regional Centre based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

In early 2017, the NDB launched the first round of loans totalling US\$811 million to finance energy projects in Brazil (US\$300 million), India (US\$250 million), South Africa (US\$180 million). The NDB has developed an activity programme for the period 2016-2020, which defined the admission requirements for new contributors.

The Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund, like the IMF, is responsible for addressing the potential monetary difficulties of its clients. However, it would be incorrect to perceive the BRICS reform initiatives in terms of confrontation. The BRICS and African countries stand united behind the idea that the G20 serves as a central body for the development of structural reforms of international institutions (on the basis of a convergence of interests).

Challenges of the future

BRICS represents something new. It is one of the first international organizations of the post-Cold War era to exist in a globalized and interconnected world. History has refuted the pessimistic predictions that prevailed when the BRICS project first took off. This interstate grouping now presents itself as a key player in the international arena.

African countries, in turn, have reaffirmed their desire to strengthen broad cooperation with the BRICS. However, in the face of volatile international conditions and macroeconomic uncertainties, all forecasts carry a great deal of risk. Changes in behaviour at the level of BRICS member countries and at the level of African states cannot be ruled out under the pressure of such circumstances as political and economic crises, and the worsening of international insecurity. Nevertheless, the objective factors that are the basis of this grouping will remain powerful enough to overcome contradictions and prevent negative trajectories.

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AFRICA IN THE FACE OF LAND RUSH CHALLENGES

Demba Moussa Dembélé

Introduction

The rush for the African continent's natural resources is a very old phenomenon. African resources and labour were fundamental to the initial establishment of capitalism at the turn of the fifteenth century and its subsequent global system. This was long before the Berlin Conference of 1884, during which the European imperial powers of the time agreed on how to effectively occupy and share African regions (Amin, 1976, 1988; Rodney, 2001).

Today, the coveted nature of African land is simply the continuation of an age-old strategy. Nevertheless, since the dawn of this century, the African continent has perhaps received more attention and been at the centre of more international debates than ever before. As the global economic crisis deepens, Africa's economic performance is being hailed on all sides, illustrated by some of the highest growth rates in the world, after those of countries like China and India. These positive economic indicators, whether real or supposed, rely mainly on natural resources, the prices of which have risen significantly due to sustained demand, particularly from China, which has become its leading trade partner.

Indeed, in the current context, Africa's substantial growth rates and abundant raw materials place it at the heart of a major geostrategic shift. This was reflected in the historic United States–Africa Leaders Summit in Washington in August

2014, in response to the rapid development of ties between Africa and both China and India, two of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Africa has even been hailed as ‘the future of France’ (Sénat français, 2013).

Overview

Africa is among the richest continents in terms of natural resources. These include its land, forests, water, hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas) and also precious stones (gold, diamonds). It has vast tracts of arable land and abundant mineral resources (Box 1).

Box 1. *Africa's natural resources*

The African continent has many natural resources, including:

- vast areas of fertile land
- abundant mineral resources
- vast areas of forest and wood resources
- 12% of the world's oil reserves
- 42% of the world's gold reserves
- 78% of diamond reserves
- 82% of manganese reserves
- over 95% of vanadium reserves
- over 55% of cobalt reserves
- 45% of aluminium reserves
- 60% of arable land
- 60% of platinum group metals
- 44% of chrome reserves

Source: Demba Moussa Dembélé, from UNECA and AU, *Economic Report on Africa 2013*.

Reserves of coltan, copper, bauxite, uranium and other strategic commodities can be added to the above list.

Raw materials, particularly agricultural and mining resources, form the backbone of the African economy. In many countries, they represent the principal source of national wealth and also the main source of livelihood in rural areas. They provide the basis for the income of large segments of the African population and are one of the main sources of tax revenue for the states.

Agricultural resources

In a general sense, agricultural resources bring together the resources of the primary sector, namely, land, water, forests, and those of the sea, as well as livestock. Africa has immense areas of arable land, as well as several large rivers and streams. More than 60% of the African population lives in the countryside, and this proportion increases to over 70% in several countries. Between 65% and 70% of the population derive their income from activities related to agriculture, which employs almost 90% of the rural labour force. The agricultural sector contributes an average of 35% to the continent's gross domestic product (GDP), while exports of the commodities it generates, such as coffee, cocoa, cotton and peanuts, are the main source of foreign exchange income for several countries, often providing over 40% of their export earnings (UNECA and AU, 2011, 2007).

Mineral resources

Foreign direct investment mainly focuses on hydrocarbons and the abundant mineral resources. One of the major problems in exploiting these is the nature of their links with other sectors of the economy. In light of this, in February 2009, the African Union published a document setting out its vision for the continent's mines. Entitled *Africa Mining Vision 2050* (Box 2), it proposes a framework for leveraging the continent's mineral resources to best effect.

In 2011, African leaders endorsed the plan of action proposed by the African Union. In December 2013, natural resource ministers, along with civil society and other experts from the continent, launched the African Minerals Development Centre (AMDC) in Maputo, Mozambique, to implement the Africa Mining Vision plans (Igbor, 2014).

The implementation of this 'vision' will nevertheless face significant challenges, including transparency in the management of revenues from mineral resources. For this reason, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has convinced several countries to join initiatives to increase the requirements for the disclosure of information by investors and states (AfDB, 2008), such as the Kimberley Process (for diamonds) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Box 2. *The Africa Mining Vision*

The African Union advocates:

- A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that effectively garners and deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender and ethnically inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by surrounding communities.
- A mining sector that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant and globally competitive industrializing African economy.
- A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive African infrastructure platform, through the maximization of its propulsive local and regional economic linkages.
- A mining sector that optimizes and husband Africa's finite mineral resource endowments and that is diversified, incorporating both high value metals and lower value industrial minerals at both commercial and small-scale levels.
- A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national, continental and international capital and commodity markets.
- Better negotiation of mining contracts, paying more attention to the environment, ensuring that natural resources are valued and developing the skills of Africans. Its objective is to help the continent make better use of its resources to stimulate growth.

Source: Demba Moussa Dembélé, from African Union (AU, 2009).

The race for control of Africa's natural resources

Africa's natural resources are increasingly coveted, especially in the context of the current crisis of capitalism.

A new global context

This covetousness in relation to African resources is part of a global context characterized by the systemic crisis of capitalism and the emergence of countries from the South, which is challenging the hegemony of the Western powers. In certain circles of the dominant system, it is believed that, thanks to its raw materials, Africa holds the solutions to the current crisis of capitalism. Hence, the repeated calls to invest in an 'emerging Africa', notably in hydrocarbons, mines and agriculture. The Gulf of Guinea, where most of

the continent's oil reserves are located, is intensely coveted by major Western oil groups (Dembélé, 2015).

The scramble for African resources has been marked, above all, by the rush to control arable land. The interest of foreign investors has intensified following the recent food crises. These lands have also become a new Eldorado for financial speculators, shaken by the upheavals in the derivatives market following the 'subprime' debacle that triggered the international financial crisis of 2007-2008 (GRAIN, 2011; Dembélé, 2015).

The political economy of land grabbing in Africa

For decades, agriculture did not receive the attention it deserved from governments, despite its importance for the African economy. Indeed, the share of agriculture in the GDP of sub-regional economic communities averaged 29.2% between 1979 and 1981 and 24.6% between 2002 and 2004, compared to a worldwide proportion of 7% and 3%, respectively (UNECA and AU, 2009). Family farming, nevertheless, still largely dominates a sector in which women are the main actors, accounting for around 70% of the continent's food production.

Agriculture should therefore remain a priority sector, not only to meet the continent's food needs but also as the main driver of growth and development. African heads of state demonstrated their growing awareness of this sector at the Maputo Summit (Mozambique) in 2003, during which they adopted a programme for the development of agriculture, the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security, which included goals for 6% annual growth of agricultural GDP and an allocation of at least 10% of the national budget to the agricultural sector. To mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of this programme, 2014 was declared the year of Agriculture and Food Security in Africa. However, at its summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in June 2014, the African Union found that few countries had achieved the targets set, despite some progress in the growth rate of agricultural GDP, valued at an average of 4% from 2003. In reality, despite the good intentions proclaimed, agriculture has generally been the 'poor relation' of public policy in most countries since their independence.

Agriculture is neglected

What is the reason behind this criminal negligence with its devastating consequences? One explanation could be the adoption of development models inherited from colonization, characterized by outward-looking economies and turned towards the old metropolises. Another explanation could be the priority given to the interests of the urban petty bourgeoisie to the detriment of the large number of pastoral communities and the rural population.

This point of view would appear to be shared by the great French agronomist René Dumont, author of the controversial work *L'Afrique noire est mal partie*, published in 1962. In this text, he refers to the policies of the new regimes at the dawn of independence, which did not acknowledge agriculture nor provide the resources it deserved given its importance. In place of colonial agriculture, which prioritized export crops, Dumont advocated for subsistence agriculture, placing his trust in the African farmers who would benefit from training. He criticizes the 'privileged caste' – foreign leaders, officials and 'experts' – who are far removed from the concerns of the pastoral masses. The consequences of this neglect are well known: rural exodus, a decline in food production, the explosion of rural poverty, and the worsening of Africa's food dependency. These were among the causes of the multifaceted crisis that hit African countries and led to the intervention of the international financial institutions from the early 1980s.

Structural adjustment programs and African agriculture

In response to African countries' external debt crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank imposed policies with the principal aim of ending government intervention in favour of market forces (AfDB, 2008). In rural areas, these policies have mostly resulted in the dismantling of the majority of institutions set up to assist the farmers, with priority given to export crops to the detriment of food crop production. The result is greater food dependence on the outside world and large outflows of foreign exchange for the purchase of foodstuffs. When prices soared in 2007–2008, several countries were shaken by 'hunger riots', sometimes with a loss of life (Delcourt, 2013).

The dismantling of the role of the state in the rural world was accompanied by reforms aimed at privatizing the land under the pretext of 'revalorizing' it. This accelerated the rush for arable land, a phenomenon amplified by the triumph of neoliberal ideology on the one hand, and the global food and financial crises on the other, which have severely affected Africa.

The land grabbing scramble

This rush was reinforced by certain myths conveyed by international institutions, in particular, the World Bank (2008). The first myth concerned the existence of abandoned, ‘uninhabited’, almost ‘virgin’ lands that investors could ‘develop’, which would provide jobs and income for the farmers. The second myth was that the large-scale exploitation of agricultural land for commercial purposes would help solve food shortage problems. Lastly, according to the third myth, the crisis of the rural world and its prevailing poverty resulted from insufficient investment, especially from the private sector (TNI, 2013).

These arguments were undermined by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, as well as by the realities on the ground. Investors are essentially driven by profitability and have no inclination to satisfy the needs of the African people. In reality, it is the millions of small producers, the majority of whom are women, who ensure the production of food consumed by African populations. Their contribution accounts for around 30% of the continent’s GDP (PLAAS, 2011).

Box 3. *Land grabbing*

Land grabbing refers to the acquisition of large tracts of agricultural land from developing countries by transnational and state enterprises. The term refers mainly to large-scale foreign investment, as a result of rising global food prices. Water resources are generally crucial, and there is thus a tendency associated with water grabbing.

A better way to approach land grabbing is from a political economy perspective. According to this view, land grabbing essentially equates to the power to control land and other associated resources, such as water, forests and minerals, in order to reap the benefits of their use. Land grabbing is therefore, essentially, a political phenomenon, since the issue at stake is the power to decide how and for what purposes land and water can be used today and in the future.

Land grabbing must be analysed in the context of the power of capital – national and transnational – where thirst for profit outweighs all other land management considerations, uses and systems rooted in local communities. Land grabbing thus ushers in a radical change in the use of land and associated resources.

Source: Demba Moussa Dembélé, from Transnational Institute (TNI), February 2013.

The magnitude of the phenomenon in Africa

Given the weakness of African states and the relatively high level of poverty, Africa offers abundant opportunities to find fertile land at a cheap price. According to several sources, land grabbing affects a large number of countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and several others (Delcourt, 2013).

Foreign investors – private and public – participate in a scramble for the land that is most fertile and closest to water sources to the detriment of local populations. An estimated 32 to 50 million hectares were traded during the 2007–2009 period, and the phenomenon could be even more significant than these figures indicate (TNI, 2013). The most affected countries are said to be the DRC (around 8 million hectares), Ethiopia (around 5.3 million hectares), Madagascar and Sudan (PLAAS, 2011).

Certain large private groups have been main drivers in this phenomenon. An example is Daewoo, a company from South Korea, which had rented vast tracts of land for many years in Madagascar. This provoked a popular revolt, which resulted in a political crisis and led to the fall of the then President of the Republic, Marc Ravalomanana (Delcourt, 2013; TNI, 2013).

In France, banks, including Crédit Agricole and Société Générale, along with insurance companies, such as AXA and groups like Bolloré and Louis Dreyfus Company, have created ‘green funds’ and invested large sums in acquiring millions of hectares. The Bolloré group is said to have a presence in more than 40 African countries (Delcourt, 2013).

Main factors explaining the scramble for African land

This phenomenon has been accelerated by soaring prices for agricultural and energy products, growing pressure to ensure food security, and financial speculation on agricultural land (Dembélé, 2015; TNI, 2013).

The surge in food prices in 2007–2008 led several countries, including those of the Gulf and East Asia, such as South Korea and China, to re-evaluate their strategies and seek to secure land and water outside their borders with the aim of meeting their populations’ food requirements (GRAIN, 2008).

The energy crisis and climate change have prompted governments and private companies to turn to alternative energy solutions, such as biofuel production to replace gasoline and diesel. Thousands of hectares were thus diverted away from

food production, which contributed to rising food prices, and meant that food was unaffordable for low-income groups (Wilson, 2012).

The international financial crisis, illustrated by the implosion of the international financial markets in 2008-2009, led investors to look for other more profitable investments and they turned to agricultural land with a view to capitalizing from the growing demand for food and biofuels (Dembélé, 2015; TNI, 2013). Furthermore, multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), had urged African countries to privatize land to attract investors (WTO, 2010).

The consequences of the scramble for agricultural land

By signing agreements with agribusiness multinationals or foreign countries, African governments sometimes had their hands tied for decades, not least because some of these agreements contained clauses that imposed restrictions on state action in several areas. For example, investors' rights to export their products, even in the event of food shortages, generally outweighed the governments' right to protect the basic needs of their populations (PLAAS, 2011).

Violation of users' land rights

In many cases, the land rights of existing users were violated. This phenomenon has been fairly widely observed, particularly in Africa, where most people own land on the basis of customary rights. Indeed, even when land is not cultivated, land transactions have had a devastating impact on pastoral communities in West Africa, as well as in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, where pastoral commons have been privatized. This led to the displacement of local populations who subsequently lost their land rights (Delcourt, 2013; PLAAS, 2011).

A barrier to women's empowerment

Women are the main victims of land grabbing because of their prominent role in supplying food to their households. When populations are displaced, they are, essentially, responsible for the cost of rebuilding livelihoods and social renewal. This leads to further inequality between men and women (Kassé, 2011).

The issue of access to water

The right of investors to access water is an integral part of the agreements signed with African countries. Most investors favour land with good access to water and potential irrigation. Contrary to the World Bank's predictions, there is little interest in investing in rainfed crops. Large industrial water consumers can thus control vast quantities of water to the detriment of pastoral communities. This inevitably exacerbates conflicts between users (PLASS, 2011).

Natural resources and industrialization

The scramble for Africa's natural resources raises the nagging question of their transformation on the domestic front through industrialization. This issue was at the centre of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), adopted in 1980, which saw industrialization as the means of achieving self-sustaining development for the continent. Nevertheless, a few months later, the World Bank published the so-called Berg Report (1981), which inaugurated structural adjustment programmes. Most African leaders filed the LPA away in their drawers and followed the neoliberal prescriptions of the Berg Report. One of the consequences of this has been the de-industrialization of the continent, illustrated by the destruction of emerging industries and public and parastatal sector enterprises (AfDB, 2008). Between 1980 and 2009, with the exception of North Africa, the share of manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP fell from 16.6% to 12.7% (UNECA and AU, 2013, p. 74).

In the current global context, the continent's industrialization strategy needs to be rethought based on its commodities. The success of this industrialization strategy nevertheless depends on two conditions. First, the mining industry must establish strong links with other sectors of the economy to avoid 'Dutch disease'.¹ Second, this industrialization must, more than ever before, be envisaged in the context of regional and continental economic spaces, the creation of which would remove certain internal barriers, such as the multiplicity of small national spaces competing with each other (UNECA and AU, 2011b). The acceleration of subregional integration and the formation of a continental market would thus

1 In the 1960s, the discovery of significant oil deposits in the Netherlands led to a considerable increase in export earnings, to such an extent that the national currency appreciated greatly. This forced other sectors to align their wages with those of the oil industry, thus causing a loss of economic competitiveness. The Netherlands was unable to export anything other than oil. Since then, economists have used the term 'Dutch disease' by extension to refer to the harmful consequences of a significant increase in a country's exports of natural resources.

strengthen intra-African trade, which in turn would stimulate the continent's industrialization (UNECA, 2015; UNCTAD, 2009).

Which dynamics for Africa?

Up to now, the continent's immense resources have not been used to boost efficient agriculture capable of feeding Africa, nor to initiate industrialization as a catalyst for economic and social transformation. On the contrary, African resources continue to be highly coveted. This explains why Africa is a major focus of attention this century due to its demographic weight (a population of 1.5 billion, the majority of whom are young people) and the abundance of its natural resources. These coveted resources inevitably give rise to various dynamics, stemming from both external and internal forces.

Intensification of competition to control resources

The intensification of competition to control resources runs the risk of increasing military interventions and even seeing foreign bases established on the continent. It is difficult to envisage a long-lasting occupation without a military presence to protect investments and prevent competition from rival powers. This process has already begun with the U.S. AFRICOM project and the French military interventions, using the 'war on terror' as their main rationale.

Indeed, the spectre of terrorism has become one of the best arguments for legitimizing and even strengthening Western military presence in African countries, and thus infiltrating African armies. The right to 'humanitarian intervention' has also become a key element in this strategy.²

Diversification of partners and greater scope for action

The increased number and range of partners, with the rise in participation of the South, is conducive to negotiating agreements that are more favourable to Africa. China has become the continent's main trading partner, which has contributed

2 The invasion of Libya and the assassination of President Gaddafi by NATO forces, under the leadership of the United States, supported by France and the United Kingdom, clearly indicated the intentions of the principal Western countries, demonstrating their will to continue using brutal force to influence the fate of the African continent. It should be noted in passing that the invasion of northern Mali, along with the increase in Western interventions and the rise of terrorism in certain countries, particularly in the Sahel, are the direct result of the destruction of Libya. All African leaders should draw upon this lesson – they must avoid blindly falling into the traps set by the Western powers.

to a rise in the prices of African raw materials. South-South partnerships have become an alternative that can be used to put pressure on Africa's traditional partners. The existence of these alternatives has undoubtedly contributed to African countries' resistance to the pressures placed on them by the European Union that, since 2007, has sought to impose Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – free trade agreements in line with WTO rules.

This diversity of partners and the emergence of powerful economic countries of the South are all assets that should allow for better negotiation of agreements and treaties with both public and private investors. However, to make this possible, it would be desirable for Africa to be able to speak with a single voice, at both subregional and continental level.

Coordination of subregional and continental economic policies

The coordination and harmonization of economic policies in the various subregions would give African countries more negotiating power. This would avoid the dispersion of effort and competition in attracting private investors, enabling them to impose their own conditions. Policy coordination would provide a more conducive framework for industrialization projects. On a domestic level, such projects could be used to transform a proportion of the country's natural resources with a view to creating added value and jobs, especially for a dynamic and imaginative African youth eager to contribute to the development of their continent.

Role of the African private sector

This is also true of the African private sector, which has demonstrated its ability to meet the continent's development challenges in several areas. States and institutions, at both subregional and continental level, should involve the private sector more as a key player in the ongoing transformations. More attention and trust should be given to African 'captains of industry', some of whom are just as capable as their counterparts in Western or emerging countries. This is especially true given that experience has shown that Africa loses more than it gains through foreign direct investment, as illustrated by the figures provided in the report by the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa led by former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, along with those published by the AfDB and a North American NGO (UNECA, 2015b; AfDB and GFI, 2013).

Requirement for better management of natural resources and income

It was partly against the plundering of the continent's resources that, at the turn of the millennium, an alter-globalization social movement emerged. This opposed the neoliberal paradigm advocated by the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland), the World Bank, IMF and WTO, with their privatization and liberalization policies imposed on African countries.

These movements intensified through the struggle waged against the strategies for the control of the continent's resources. Against this backdrop, the October 2014 edition of the African Social Forum (ASF) was held with the theme: Crises, wars and external military interventions for the control of resources. The purpose of this forum was to draw more attention to the strategies of some powers to seize the continent's resources. It was also intended to strengthen the awareness-raising work of citizens' movements fighting, in several countries, for better management of national resources and an end to corruption, in particular, by promoting transparency in the exploitation of natural resources, along with more equitable distribution of the revenues generated. In this regard, the social movements have succeeded in imposing more transparency in negotiations, particularly in the mining sector (see the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI), thereby reducing cases of tax evasion by investors and substantially increasing revenues for the countries in which the mining sites are located.

Need for developmental states

In order to better defend Africa's interests in negotiations with partners from both the public and private sector, as well as preserving sovereignty over natural resources, the continent needs active developmental states that fully assume their economic and social functions. This is one of the important dynamics observed in several countries that are trying to break from the neoliberal creed, which has been destructive for many states in the context of its structural adjustment programmes. Rehabilitating and reconstructing African states is an imperative if the continent is to aspire to genuine industrialization: a guarantee of economic and social transformation (CEA and UA, 2011a; UNCTAD, 2007). Africa needs to build developmental states in order to stand a chance of meeting the African Union's Agenda 2063 objectives.

Conclusion

In a world confronted with deep systemic crises, Africa is increasingly perceived as the continent of the future thanks to the abundance of its natural resources, particularly agricultural and mining resources. In order to ensure that priority is given to its peoples, Africa faces two major challenges. The first is to successfully manage foreign covetousness so as to preserve its sovereignty over its resources. The second is to change the development paradigm, using these resources as the basis of its industrialization and moving away from the commodity export model. This would appear to be the recommendation of the UNCEA and the African Union (UNCEA and AU, 2012, 2013, 2014).

The scramble for African raw materials is a very old phenomenon, which reached its highest point towards the end of the nineteenth century, after the continent was divided up between the European imperialist powers. It is sometimes suggested that the current process of land grabbing is akin to a new form of colonization based on the control of land.

Nevertheless, the contemporary context is marked by a growing awareness among African peoples and leaders regarding the control of resources, which must be used to serve the fundamental interests of Africa. Therefore, although this scramble poses serious risks, it also has the potential to generate internal and external dynamics that could lead to profound transformations in the interest of the continent. The international outlook, marked by the diversity of its partners, offers more favourable conditions for Africa to take better advantage of the exploitation of its resources. Domestically, changes in African societies are expected to lead to the emergence of a more vibrant private sector and citizens with greater awareness of their rights, which will significantly alter the development and implementation of public policies.

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MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

African Perspectives
Issiaka MANDÉ

Introduction

The prominent place occupied by migration issues in political debates contrasts with the relatively low number of international migrants: 214 million, just 3% of the planet's population.¹ Another observation that emerges from the survey by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the almost equal size of South-North (62 million) and South-South (61 million) migration flows. Although this South-South mobility is growing, it is hindered by the 'obsession with borders' (Foucher, 2007). Indeed, ever more walls and barriers are being erected, creating borders as obstacles to migrants, even if the effectiveness of the measures remains to be seen and they are frequently implemented only to reassure an electorate. Tougher legislation with regard to migrants, particularly those from countries in the Southern Hemisphere, is partly due to stereotypes. Furthermore, in many regions of the world, and even in Africa itself, migration issues have become a variable of internal and international security, thus undermining the fundamental rights of migrants.²

1 OECD. 2013. *World Migration in Figures. A joint contribution by UN-DESA and the OECD to the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development*, 3-4 October 2013.

2 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 13:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

The issue of African migrations in international relations: the question of development

While it is acknowledged that there can only be a better analysis of international migration through a multi/interdisciplinary approach, certain views remain that have been shaped by doctrinal trends. For realists, regulating migration is a necessity, particularly to protect the interests and security of states, the main actors of international order. However, from a liberal perspective, immigration is central to the state's economic policy and, therefore, the regulation of international relations should depend solely on the market. This is why foreign workers are seen as variables to be adjusted according to market dynamics. For constructivists, it is important to go beyond state-centrism in the game of international relations. Indeed, other actors (such as cities or regions, for example) are involved in regulating flows because the inequalities of development affect regions on different scales. In these doctrinal approaches, it is important to take into account the stereotypes and amalgams that echo the collective imagination and how immigration is represented, especially in terms of African immigrants. However, the continent's migration flows are primarily intra-African.

The migration systems of Africans are located in regional sets because the actors favour destinations close to their country of origin. The migrants there work hard, make sacrifices, and adapt to the networks and new forms of socialization. For some of them, they use these destinations as springboards or steps on their migration journey. In West Africa, for example, many studies report on the complexity of migration flows and the diversity of migrant routes. There, migrations bring new challenges for the state due to their multidimensional nature, involving several actors at different levels and challenging the very notion of territory.

The dynamics that underpin this mobility are primarily those of increased wealth in the reception countries, particularly through the demand for labour in high productivity sectors, but also increased wealth in the departure regions through transfers of money and goods by the migrants. Furthermore, there are strong links between migration and development, which is the subject of countless publications and meetings at summits between states and international organizations.

Migration-related issues generate intense debates, which are shaped by political and ideological viewpoints. Does migration promote development, given its varied aspects and definitions? Indeed, it is plurivocal and pluriform (Legouté, 2001; Rist, 2007). This is why, for some analysts, it was very quickly assimilated

with growth and, as a result, could be measured. For others, such as the South Commission, which was run by the former Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere, it was a case of: 'a process which enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment' (Commission sud, 1991). Hence, for developmentalists, migrants are actors of social innovation and economic expansion through their remittances, gifts, and by returning to their communities. Those theorizing the dependency and connection of production modes see the mobility of the workforce to regions undergoing significant economic expansion as regional imbalances attributed to financial capital. The current paradigms underline the global management (migration management) developed at a later stage (Piché, Geiger and Pécoud, 2011).

There are nagging questions: Are migrants and the diasporas involved in the economic upswing of their regions owing to monetary transfers and their expertise? Does the mobility of the workforce ensure the economic upswing of certain regions in the world, particularly in Africa? From recent surveys and academic publications, it appears that the effects of migrations on development are in fact variable and that a differentiation should be made based on the length of migratory stay and the gender of the migrants, particularly with regard to monetary transfers.

This chapter uses three examples as an analytical framework, which are considered significant: i) the migrant communities in the Senegal River Valley in Africa; ii) the Moroccan migrant development associations in Europe; and iii) the effects of international migrations on development in Burkina Faso.

Migration and development: a time-honoured partnership

Migration theories point to obvious links between migration and development. However, the perceptions and analyses have always been ambiguous (Piché, 2013b). Since the 1990s, there have been lively debates on the reduction of official development assistance on the one hand, and on the other, the steady increase in financial transfers made by migrants, combined with their ability to mobilize available resources within the framework of decentralized cooperation. Consequently, in the North, research has favoured harnessing the financial resources of migrants for development projects in the South under the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions and regional

development banks.³ In fact, these resources compensate for the low levels of foreign direct investment and the social effects of the structural adjustment policies. For the most part, publications highlight the need to channel the influx of money from migrants outside the current or conspicuous consumption channels in order to finance endogenous development policies in the migrants' countries of origin. The diasporas are then seen by the scientific community and international organizations as agents of development for their countries, in reference to the 'win-win-win' philosophy, namely, international migration benefits the countries of origin, represents an opportunity for rich countries, and benefits the migrants themselves due to the substantial increase in their incomes. It should also be noted that one actor's gain does not necessarily mean another actor's loss, at least for the others.

Migration has also taken on a new dimension due to the change in thinking and the paradigm shift on development (Rist, 2013), the emphasis now being on local development projects. The argument that, once again, underpins this approach in the post-structural adjustment era is the inadequacy of the state structures and the many initiatives needed to work around the bureaucratic constraints of African administrations. Migrant associations have therefore become key players for the NGOs and state and community agencies in the execution of various infrastructures. Indeed, in their management process, they incorporate the general rules of accountability. Unlike the regional authorities, they are able to respond to members' expectations at different decision-making levels: local, regional, national and international. Furthermore, these associations can mobilize specialists, particularly international volunteers or national competences, at lower costs, based on regional affiliations (Mandé, 1996).

Examples include the case of the NGO Migrations & Développement (M&D)⁴, created in the 1970s in Marseille, France, to mobilize resources to assist the populations of the Moroccan Atlas and Lesser Atlas in times of drought, from where its initiators originated. Today, this NGO is recognized as a model for pooling funds collected from community organizations of the European Union and resources obtained from the Moroccan Government at different levels

3 Several briefing notes including the annual series on migration and financial transfers are published by the World Bank. They give an overview of migrations and remittances for all the world's countries, regions and income groups. See www.worldbank.org/migration
The Migration and Development initiative of the African Development Bank gives a better idea of the work undertaken by this bank under the theme of migration: <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/migration-and-development-initiative/afdb-migration-activities>

4 <http://www.migdev.org/>

(national, regional and local) as well as from first-generation Shilha (Berber) migrant structures (Charef, 1999; Lacroix, 2009). As a result of the NGO's management capability it was able to replace the Moroccan state by financing and creating important public amenities (electricity, hydro-agricultural developments, etc.). However, although the NGO works in partnership with state structures, its schedule does not necessarily align with the implementation of amenities by the kingdom's institutions. Nevertheless, efforts are made to avoid misalignment when implementing development plans in regions with communities that include large contingents of migrants and other groups. This affects the social sector in particular (health, education, access to drinking water, etc.). In their quest for greater amounts of funding, these large NGOs end up being bound to the development institutions and incorporating their discourse into their project proposals, as was the case in Morocco, Burkina Faso or in the Senegal River Valley.

Sylvie Bredeloup (1993, 2007) has conducted extensive research into the history, sociology and economy of the migration movements of immigrants from the Senegal River Valley towards the diamond-producing regions of Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and some countries in Central Africa. She explores all the dimensions of the usual trajectory of the migration process and specifically analyses the connection between the economic and social role of migrant populations in the development of the regions from where they originate but also in the host countries. However, this latter dimension has less of an emphasis in the research. She re-examines history by retracing migration pathways over more than a century, from the rush to the diamond mines of the De Beers company in South Africa to the early days of the migration movement from the Senegal River Valley (Senegal, Mali, Mauritania). In the community created by these migrants in these mining areas, some actors remain essential: brokers or couriers and the *njaatigue* (landlords and intermediaries who receive the new arrivals at the mining sites). These mining extraction and commercialization regions are very often areas of insecurity and crime, hence the need for these migrants to offer a supportive environment and help each other. This connection very often manifests itself in the revival of inter-village alliances, the pooling of welfare funds and, in particular, the use of Islam as the unifying religion.

As with all African migrants living outside the continent, the migrants working in the diamond industry, originally from the Senegal River Valley, invest a large share of their earnings in their village, their region and in the capital, Dakar. The activity sector in which the migrants invest their money depends largely on the location. Thus, as a general rule, investments in the villages and regions of origin are exclusively related to farming and agriculture, whereas in Dakar, they are more

focused on the import-export trade and property. Despite their willingness to invest in the development of their village, region or even in their country, these migrants encounter a lack of support from national Senegalese institutions. Consequently, there is a significant gap between the official discourse, which, on the one hand, focuses on promoting national businesses and, on the other, the excessively burdensome and frustrating practices of the administration and banking establishments towards these mostly illiterate investors.

The analysis of the effects of migration in the regions of origin of the diamond miners shows their very strong connection to their territory and a desire to develop urban social networks, particularly by repatriating assets and investing in places of worship and property, for example. According to many authors, migrants on the African continent are increasingly adopting the same economic behaviours and favouring personal and family investments. However, Africans settled in Western countries are quicker to make collective and social investments. This approach to the migration-development pairing also considers the return of remittances as compensation for the departure of workers. This is also the central thesis of the comprehensive approach to migration management, which argues that migration, when well managed, can be positive for everyone. Migrants see their plans as part of a collective effort and a family strategy to mobilize resources and create transnational networks (if not international networks). Critics argue that this migratory process essentially promotes the misguided concept of co-development that is part of the policies of Northern countries and international institutions. This makes Burkina Faso an interesting case to study.

The ambiguity of monetary transfers: the Burkina Faso example

According to Victor Piché and Dennis Cordell, since the independence of African countries, studies on migration and development have revealed several identifiable stages (Piché and Cordell, 2015). In the 1960s, the approach corresponded to micro-individual migration theories, with the migrant playing a central role in the rational calculation of costs and benefits. Migration was analysed as a 'positive force for change, either by spreading modern attitudes and behaviours, or by enabling a rebalancing of the supply and demand for labour in a context of rapid industrialization, synonymous with development... and returning migrants are seen as agents of modernization' (Piché and Cordell, 2015).

In contrast, in the 1970s and 1980s, 'macro-structural, neo-Marxist-inspired models' were developed that challenged micro-individualist assumptions and emphasized the importance of structural factors in migration movements. The global system was analysed using a centre-periphery view and, consequently, migration was seen as perpetuating inequalities. However, the second undercurrent analyses the connection between modes of production, the monetization of the economy, and labour emigration towards places of capitalist production. For proponents of the new economy, migration is, ultimately, a strategy adopted by households to diversify their income sources. In this respect, seasonal migrations in the Sahel could be explained by frequent food shortages and population growth. The temporary mobility of men therefore alleviates the shortfalls in agricultural crops in the villages: 'These circular mobilities therefore reveal a relationship of unprecedented interdependence with their departure areas' (Boyer and Mounkaila, 2010).

Is migration beneficial or harmful? Piché and Cordell attempted to answer this question with regard to Burkina Faso by examining the literature and data from socio-demographic and socio-economic surveys. Using a sequential approach, their research identified the following trends.

Migration surveys and the abundant research that was carried out in the 1960s and 1970s showed that migration had no impact on development; on the contrary, it 'led to stagnation and under-development'. For the population, however, the answer is ambiguous. Piché and Cordell argued that these two visions can be reconciled if the macro-economic aspects of migration (and not just the effects of mobilities on rural societies) and the migration strategies of families are taken into account. On monetary transfers, they note that the volume had grown to the point that it is a perceptible variable in the national budget. However, in terms of the loss of active labour within national borders and the low levels of individual savings, Burkina Faso benefits less from the exploitation of its citizens' labour than the destination countries (in this instance Côte d'Ivoire, owing to the development of cash crops).

Over the decades, from 1970 to 2000, remittances from migrants were highlighted in the literature using data from three national surveys on household living conditions (1994, 1998 and 2003). The previous decade's trends were confirmed by the low levels of investment in the productive sectors: food (46 per cent), creation or maintenance of economic activity (16 per cent) and care healthcare (12 per cent). A new element is the distinction between intercontinental migration, which provides higher incomes, and intra-African migration, which generates income that is invested in non-agricultural sectors.

In addition, returning migrants use their knowledge or their financial capital, more often than not, far from their region of origin. From the Burkina Faso example, with regard to the rise in poverty in the country, one can agree with the two authors: 'migration is not a panacea for development in the absence of national policies aiming 1) to reduce, and even eliminate, the structural constraints which limit the possibilities of using monetary transfers in a more productive way and 2) to profit from the dynamism of migrants on the paid labour market, in particular in the informal sector and that of small, independent businesses' (Piché and Cordell, 2015).

The analysis of the relationship between migration and development has evolved over the years amid controversy, although one constant remains: migration affects growth and contributes not only to the social and economic development of the countries of origin but also that of the host countries. However, public policies today tend to focus more on security issues related to migration, with international cooperation agreements recognizing diasporas as major players in international relations. Their role has increased in importance and goes beyond simply supporting their family members. They are seen as agents of development who contribute to the stability of those countries that channel remittances from these communities abroad into productive sectors. For these reasons, policies that help migrants in the host countries and also support them to return home are increasingly put forward. Indeed, the economic success of migrants still fascinates young people in their countries of origin, especially when remittances play a decisive role in the family sphere and help fund collective activities, regionally and nationally. Moreover, the sharing of experiences among migrants abroad has prompted researchers to re-evaluate the issue of brain drain, which is now considered 'brain circulation' given today's emerging knowledge networks among the diasporas.

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AFRICA AS THE NEW FINANCIAL HUB

Vusi Gumede

Introduction

Increasingly, stock markets and/or securities exchanges are growing in importance in Africa, playing an increasingly important role in international finance while advancing socio-economic development on the continent. Many of the fastest growing economies in the world are in Africa, hence the 'Africa rising' narrative. This narrative is, however, debatable because Africa (particularly south of the Sahara, the focus of this chapter) remains behind other regions in many indicators of human development or in well-being more broadly.

As argued elsewhere by many others, one of the main features of the contemporary global economy is financialization. The growing financialization of the global economy, in which shares, bonds, mutual funds, certificates of deposits, equities, derivatives, etc. have an ever-greater role, suggests that stock markets are more important to the global economy now than ever before. Africa, south of the Sahara in particular, has been playing its part in the context of emerging markets. There are pros and cons in the increasing financialization of the global economy. Among the main challenges is the fact that the global economy has become even more prone to crisis. While integration of African economies – through stock markets, for instance – might be good for economic development in Africa, the economies that are more integrated with the

financialized global economy are more vulnerable to economic shocks. This is the fundamental reality of the global capitalist system, which is beyond the scope of this chapter; rather, this chapter examines the increasing role that stock markets and/or securities exchanges play in Africa and the global economy.

To begin, financial institutions – as financial intermediaries – play a vital role in stock market development and in the growth of an economy, as many scholars and commentators have argued. Financial intermediaries facilitate savings and borrowings and provide access to an array of financial instruments. Financial intermediaries also play a key role because they manage risk and create diversification, provided that financial markets are well developed.

Indeed, the debate on whether a direct relationship exists between financial intermediaries and stock market development, or between stock market development and economic growth, has not been resolved. Some researchers find a causal relationship, while others demonstrate that financial intermediaries are not developed enough to have a significant influence on stock market expansion or economic growth in Africa. This does not discount the vital role that stock markets and/or securities exchanges can play in economic development and well-being.

Stock markets in Africa: context, challenges and opportunities

Africa has witnessed the growth of stock markets in recent years – there are about 30 stock markets in Africa at the time of writing. Although capital markets have not played a significant role in financing the development of the African economy, Africa has seen the establishment of stock markets in Ghana, Malawi, Swaziland, Uganda and Zambia, for instance. According to Gray and Bythewood (1999), there are two major reasons why stock markets have not been more instrumental in the development of the African economy. First, commercial banks and development finance institutions were, initially, able to provide required funds at low cost. Second, equity was not an attractive option for either investors or issuers. The markets did not offer investors liquidity, and few firms were willing to be listed because of the dilution of family or government control, and because of tax consequences.

Today, however, African governments are focusing on the importance of moving towards more market-oriented economies and developing the financial market infrastructure to mobilize funds from both the private and public sectors. Stock market development has been central in the domestic financial

liberalization of most African economies. The increasing drive to establish and develop stock markets in Africa has largely been linked to developments in the global political economy (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). Leading economies have deregulated their financial services sector, and this has led to the establishment of new stock markets in Africa. We have also seen the internalization of markets and the introduction of new financial products, which has led to numerous and much bigger and riskier financial investments. We have also seen a growing number of institutional investors or actors who have taken the risk to pursue new markets abroad. These developments in the financial systems of advanced economies have led to the liberalization of international trade and services exchanges in world trade negotiations. The establishment of stock markets in African economies comes with a rise in the liberalization of capital accounts, as is now the global trend.

Indeed, stock markets and/or securities exchanges in Africa have undergone a number of regulatory reforms to allow them to grow further. Stock markets have experienced a revitalization of the regulatory framework, a modernization, of trading systems, and a relaxation of restrictions on foreign investors since the early 1990s. The establishment and development of new stock markets has led to an increase in domestic savings, as well as an increase in the quantity and quality of investments in Africa (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007).

An increase in stock market liquidity has played an important role in improving economic growth through liquidity injections, savings mobilization, and equity financing for industries and companies. As far as a direct role of stock markets and/or securities exchanges on the economy, Kanetsi (2014) found that there is indeed a relationship between stock markets and economic growth in Africa. It is interesting to note that stock markets influence economic growth only in moderately capitalized markets (Kanetsi, 2014). Upper-middle countries in Africa, such as Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa, benefit more from the existence of their stock markets. Frequently traded shares improve the investor's perception of a country. This supports the theory that well-developed markets benefit their economies more than underdeveloped ones.

The liquidity of stock markets enables companies to acquire much needed capital quickly, resulting in capital allocation, investment and growth. They further contribute by reducing investment risk due to the ease with which equities are traded. If foreign investors are involved, they can also improve transparency and disclosure in developing countries. This is because investors demand accountability from the management as well as clear shareholder rights in order to protect themselves (Kim and Singal, 2000).

As indicated above, factors that affect roles of stock markets include the macroeconomic environment, economic performance, the banking sector, and the robustness of institutions. Garcia and Liu (1999) found that 'income level, banking sector development, domestic savings and investment, and stock market liquidity' are also important as determinants of stock market development in emerging markets. Yartey and Adjasi (2007) found that a percentage point increase in financial intermediary sector development increases stock market development in Africa by 0.597 percentage points, when controlling for macroeconomic stability, the level of economic development, and the quality of legal and political institutions. They also found that good quality institutions, related to law and order, democratic accountability and limited corruption are also key determinants of stock market development because they reduce political risk and enhance the viability of external finance. Hearn et al. (2010), Andrianaivo and Yartey (2010) as well as Laderkarl and Zervos (2004) found that a lack of governance, lack of a regulatory framework and political interference are some of the major issues that hamper financial development (including stock exchanges) in Africa. Kenny and Moss (1998) underline that transparencies, efficiency and the credibility of banks are contributing factors to the development of stock markets. They further point out the need for more effective regulation of financial institutions.

African stock markets also suffer from severe infrastructure bottlenecks (Kanetsi, 2014). Adriavanaivo and Yartney (2010) note that some stock exchanges still operate on manual systems, resulting in transactions taking weeks to execute and implement. These clearing and settlement systems, coupled with restrictions on foreign participation, make African exchanges unattractive and inaccessible. Low liquidity also signals poor local support (Kanetsi, 2014). Consequently, many companies are choosing not to list, thus impeding financial integration in the long run. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996) assert that liquidity is imperative for economic growth as it helps with resource allocation.

Another hindrance to development of the stock market in Africa is the lack of benchmarks with which to provide pricing and risk measurement (Kanetsi, 2014). We also find a lack of transparency and information asymmetries, along with a lot of corruption, which make African stock markets less attractive. Investors place high value and importance on transparency. Accounting standards that provide robust and reliable information to outside investors make a country an attractive place. Africa also lacks a well-regulated environment. The legal environment is important as it assures that managers report accurately. Strong law enforcement provides investors with protection and rights (Bruner et al., 2002).

Clearly, there are many challenges that stock markets and/or securities exchanges have to overcome in Africa. As some researchers explain, the first is the challenge of stock market integration. Many analysts have argued for the regionalization of stock markets in Africa as a way of addressing the problem of low liquidity. Preconditions for successful regional approaches include harmonization of legislations, such as bankruptcy and accounting laws, and a liberalized trade regime. The second is the challenge of demutualization to solve the governance and profitability problems. The third and most critical issue is the need to eliminate existing impediments to institutional development. This would require a wider dissemination of information on stock markets and/or securities exchanges, the implementation of robust electronic trading systems, and the adoption of central depository systems. In addition, the soundness of the legal and accounting framework, private sector credit evaluation capabilities, and public sector regulatory oversight should all be strengthened.

Other constraints that have been written about include information asymmetries, weak public finances, low levels of domestic financial development and the inability to attract foreign investments, as well as political and macroeconomic instabilities for most African countries. However, it is said that Africa's financial systems have been deepened and broadened over the recent period, largely because of improvements in the macroeconomic and institutional framework, and also because of increased worldwide liquidity, resulting in more capital flows into Africa (Beck et al., 2010). Inevitably, the future of Africa's financial systems is closely linked to the development of global finance. Africa's financial sector stakeholders (bankers, donors and policy-makers) should guide the sector's reforms in a way that maximizes Africa's opportunities.

South Africa as a gateway

South Africa, as one of the most developed economies in Africa, can be seen as a gateway for the financial development of the African continent. The Johannesburg Securities Exchange plays a very important role in the context of global finance; it is, however, not obvious that South Africa's advanced stock exchange capacity directly benefits Africa. Although debatable, it can be argued that South Africa is an important component of Africa's financial hub. South Africa is also a member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), an advantage which, if properly channelled, can benefit Africa as a whole. It would seem, however, that South Africa is no longer playing as prominent a

role as expected in global affairs. For instance, South Africa's influence in the G20 or United Nations appears to have diminished. But this does not detract from the good infrastructure, physical and otherwise, that South Africa possesses. In addition, South Africa has been a top foreign direct investment (FDI) destination in Africa. The FDI coming into South Africa is said to be broad-based and multisectoral. According to Games (2012), South Africa has also been one of the biggest non-oil investors in Africa since the advent of democracy in 1994. Yet South Africa's total foreign investment in the rest of Africa remains low.

Another salient point is that South African multinational companies have expanded their African networks rapidly, building businesses and skills that foreign investors are eyeing up in order to build their own African footprint, resulting in a significant number of mergers and acquisitions (Games, 2012). South Africa has the biggest and best capitalized banks, attracting investors who want to access loans, trade finance and other products for African business. According to Games (2012), South Africa has also positioned itself as a private equity hub, and it is home to important development finance institutions, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which also finance infrastructure in various African countries.

However, there are both internal and external factors that can affect South Africa's position as a financial hub in Africa. Among those said to impact negatively on the country's status are:

1. Government/bureaucratic red tape: it is said that it is burdensome to establish a company in South Africa. This relates to permits for expatriates and widespread xenophobic attitudes.
2. Connecting Africa: the road and real infrastructure to other African countries, even within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is problematic. The South African airline is also expensive and does not fly to many cities on the continent. Lastly, as Games (2012) notes, the high cost of transporting goods across Africa has also led to companies shipping goods directly to markets from overseas countries rather than via South Africa.
3. Political struggles and public protests: the political uncertainty of the African National Congress (ANC) and the high number of public protests are said to impact negatively on South Africa as a financial hub.
4. The economy: the slow growth of the South African economy also has negative implications.

Conclusion

Stock markets or securities exchanges have undoubtedly become crucial in Africa. They play a critical role for the economy of the continent while also contributing to its global significance. As various studies indicate, stock markets or securities exchanges have a positive impact on economic growth in Africa – economic development also contributes to ensuring viable stock markets or securities exchanges. Although the Johannesburg Securities Exchange might be an outlier because of a relatively developed South African economy and a relatively advanced financial sector, it is a clear example demonstrating that Africa is increasingly becoming – if not already – a new financial hub, and stock markets are ensuring this outcome. Nonetheless, it will be essential for governments in Africa to tackle the obstacles that restrict Africa's potential to play a bigger role in international finance. Issues such as regulatory control, lack of transparency, corruption, infrastructure bottlenecks and information asymmetries must be addressed.

Lastly, partnerships are needed among all the relevant players if stock markets are to play an effective developmental role in the various countries in Africa, and on the African continent more broadly. It is particularly important for the private sector and the government to work together, but governments must additionally provide the necessary leadership, which also applies to South Africa. Leadership is critical for addressing the issues highlighted earlier that negatively impact South Africa's contribution to the economic development of Africa as a whole. Effective partnerships, especially between the private sector and government, are critical.

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THE AGE OF SALAFISM

Rupture and Restructuring in West African Societies

Abdoulaye Sounaye

Introduction

As an Islamic movement that has been popular since the 1990s, Salafism is expressed as a religious reform, which has brought about remarkable socio-political and cultural dynamics in postcolonial African societies. Its definitions and manifestations remain diverse, but all its forms share a concern for keeping the practice of faith within the exclusive limits of the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna). There is also the need to draw inspiration from the most pious ancestors (Salaf al Salih) from whom Salafism derives its name, and for the injunction to live a public life governed by Islamic law, far from corrupting innovations (*bid'a*). Highly influential since the 1990s, this Islamic movement has developed under various labels: Wahhabism, Izala, Ahlu Sunna, and Salafiyya.¹

In West Africa, its distinctive feature lies in its anti-Sufi discourse and a desire to transform society through reform, which it considers essential. Advocating scriptural puritanism, it opposes secularism that seeks to preserve the state

1 Wahhabism refers to the reform initiated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792); Izala refers to the movement that emerged in Nigeria in the 1970s; Ahlu Sunna refers to anti-Sufi Muslims, literally 'the people of the Sunna'; Salafiyya takes its model from the *salaf*, those who are believed to have been the most authentic Muslims.

and its institutions from Islamic influence, proclaiming the need for a moral and political framework based on Islamic norms, and making the imposition of Sharia law a leitmotif. It insists on a dress code intended to distinguish authentic Muslims from those who are not. It is therefore understandable that Salafism has led in some circles to a form of militancy that is not only rebellious but above all violent. In its simplest form, Salafism can be divided into three types: quietist Salafism, which is mainly expressed through personal and social agendas; political and associative Salafism; and jihadist Salafism, whose most notorious manifestations can be found in Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat), Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoun, and the more recently formed Macina Liberation Front.

Religious reform and new social dynamics

As a reform, Salafism poses a major challenge to the discourse and practices that have, until now, characterized the religious sphere and the role of Islam in the daily life of African societies. As such, it leads to a rethinking of the complex relationship between religion, state and society (Kobo, 2012; Masquelier, 2009; Umar, 1993). Indeed, one of the characteristics of Salafism is its desire to redefine Islamic practice and establish a new socio-political order through a theological and historical break with the past. In practice, this involves, among other things, the reaffirmation of monotheism (*tawhid*), a renunciation of pre-Islamic values, the correction of the Sufi model of Islam, and the rejection of Western norms. Among the targets of Salafi discourse are the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (*Maulud*), considered a blameworthy innovation (*bid'a*) introduced well after his death, the veneration of saints and divination rites, which Salafi ideology reduces to polytheism (*shirk*). With its mission to revive the Sunnah, Salafi doctrine criticizes the role of marabouts who are unconcerned with the authenticity of their practices (Wright, 2015; Sounaye, 2009).

In the African socio-political and cultural context, this argument for a return to a golden age has been the source of confrontations and positioning struggles between, on the one hand, the supporters of Sufism, particularly those of the Tidjaniyya and Qadiriyya, who had previously dominated the Islamic domaine, and on the other, the new Salafi reformers seeking to position themselves and gain influence (Umar, 1993; Brigaglia, 2012; Kane, 2003; Loimeier, 2011; Kobo, 2012; Seeseman, 2005). It must be emphasized that Salafi puritanism also rejects all religiosity – Muslim or not – that deviates from the Qur'an and

the Sunnah. This has led to a conflict of norms, with Salafism criticizing the institutionalized secularism of the state, Christianity, Sufism, Shi'ism, and local religious practices, commonly referred to as African religions.

In any case, in its rise in West Africa, Salafism has been able to take advantage of the dynamics of globalization and democratization that emerged in the early 1990s. Freedom of association and worship, increased mobility of religious actors, and communication and information technologies have contributed not only to the popularization of Salafist ideas but also to their appropriation by segments of society that are now at the heart of public life in their communities. A new expression of political Islam has emerged. This is illustrated, for example, by the wave of Sharia law in northern Nigeria at the beginning of the 2000s (Ostien, 2007). It was initiated under the pressure of an elite and especially by the trans-nationalization of the Izala movement, a Salafi movement born in the 1970s in northern Nigeria and which has extended to the countries of the subregion (Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Ghana) since the early 1990s.

New actors for a reform enterprise

To establish itself permanently in West Africa, Salafism needed agents and vectors, the most important of whom were urban women, traders and young people charmed by Salafism's modernist rationalism and its anti-clerical and anti-Western theses. It was at the crossroads of these appropriations, characterized by individual and collective questioning, aspirations, and sometimes revolutionary societal projects, that a Salafist entrepreneurship emerged, offering alternatives in a resolutely open religious market (Fourchard, 2005; Moustapha, 2014). One of the immediate consequences of this process has been the fragmentation and restructuring of the religious sphere through the emergence of a new generation of preachers who no longer hesitate to fit Salafism into their personal agendas and local conditions (Brigaglia, 2012; Sounaye, 2015).

On closer inspection, these transformative dynamics in African societies only reached their full scale thanks to the so-called Medina graduates: African students generally trained in Saudi Islamic institutions, notably the Islamic University of Medina, whose return to their countries of origin initiated a reconfiguration of hierarchies within Muslim communities but also a redefinition of the political role of Salafism. In the Sahel countries, for example, it was mainly in the 1980s that the Saudi offensive took off, targeting the institutions that produced the Muslim elite and revitalizing its *da'wa* (call to Islam) missions, which were the

anchor points for unprecedented proselytism. Moreover, most of the leaders of Salafism in Africa were trained under these conditions and often in institutions wholly or partly funded by Saudi Arabia, such as the Islamic University of Say in Niger and numerous madrasas in African cities, such as Bamako, Kaduna, Ouagadougou and Cotonou. When this was not the case, these religious leaders found a major source of inspiration in the Saudi Salafi model. In short, it is thanks to such developments that, for example, Nigeria, a favourite destination for Saudi support in sub-Saharan Africa, has become one of the most important centres of globalized Salafism.

Like their predecessors, the elites who emerged from these initiatives also wanted to leave their mark by popularizing Salafi ideas and values, thereby shaping the aspirations and modes of political action of African societies. Entrepreneurial and sometimes irreverent, the local vector will be the most important agent of a new Islamic knowledge economy, driven by intellectual and political debates on the place of Islam in society. This intellectual life has given rise to literary practices, scholarly communities, and new modes of learning that have reshaped African epistemic horizons (Brenner, 2001; Kobo, 2012; Loimeier, 2009, 2012). In short, a history of religious ideas, or just ideas, cannot ignore this dimension of contemporary African life. If we pay attention to its historiographical references, and the symbolic and political imaginaries it mobilizes, we realize that Salafism remains, even today, poorly understood.

A plural genealogy and an ideological weapon

The genealogy of Salafism in West Africa generally emphasizes external factors, whether from proxies of Medina, the financing of Islamic educational centres by Arab countries, or the construction of mosques and social centres by Gulf countries in particular, all have been decisive in its expansion in the region. However, it should be added that, by becoming the primary reference point, Salafism has been enriched by local references and has ultimately become a *localized* tradition (Østebø, 2011; Sounaye, 2015). This is important because, on closer inspection and considering its everyday expressions, it becomes clear that this movement feeds not only on global discourse and symbols but also on diverse local dynamics. For example, in the cultural area of the Hausa countries, now strongly influenced by the Izala movement and Boko Haram, a key reference point for both quietist and violent Salafism is the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio (1754–1817), founder of the Sokoto Caliphate.

From this perspective, it is important to take into account both the global and local genealogy of Salafism. This dimension of its dynamics certainly reflects a new stage in the appropriation and perception of Islam in Africa. Salafism is no longer seen as a foreign tradition but, in many respects, as a local movement. For many, it remains the primary reference point in the quest for Islamic authenticity and the struggle against Western neocolonialism and imperialism. Moreover, it is because of its autonomist ambitions, nationalist pretensions and transnational reach that Salafism serves as an ideological weapon for jihad in northern Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and other countries around Lake Chad.

One cannot, therefore, discuss Salafism without mentioning its jihadist appropriations. Indeed, while the jihads of the nineteenth century were essentially revolutionary movements led by leaders who identified themselves as Sufis (Lovejoy, 2016; Hiskett, 1994; Last, 1967), today's jihadists are primarily inspired and led by Salafis who not only reject the logic of the existing state but also demand that governance standards be aligned with Islamic law. As the early 2000s show, their militancy paved the way for a militarization of Salafism and a politicization of Islam that transcend the boundaries of a specific state and are expressed in regional, if not global, terms. Examples include the Sahel-Maghreb case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or that of Boko Haram (Comolli, 2015), whose operations now affect all the countries in the Lake Chad basin and which, because of this trans-nationalization, is forcing a redefinition of how Islam is managed in the subregion. In fact, it can be said that, with the violence of Boko Haram and the social, economic and political consequences that have ensued, a turning point has been reached in relations between Islam and the state. If Islam has regained a central place in the lives of many African countries today, it is largely thanks to a combination of factors, directly or indirectly, linked to Salafism and its rise as an ideological, political and popular framework through which Muslims see themselves as members of their communities, citizens of their states, and citizens of the world. In West Africa, this historical awareness of being part of a globalized world shapes Salafism, not only in its demands for autonomy, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism but, above all, in its anti-Western positions, which are widely echoed by jihadism in the Sahel-Saharan region and the Lake Chad basin. In this context, one of the striking aspects of African societies is undoubtedly the rupture that Salafism introduces, as these societies negotiate their socio-political norms, establish themselves as actors in the twenty-first century, and rethink their relations with the rest of the world (Kobo, 2012; Sounaye, 2009; Triaud et al., 2007).

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NEW CHRISTIANITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Wyatt MacGaffey

Introduction

Christianity is always and inherently 'new' since the Gospel is about renewal, in whichever way it may be understood and realized. But the 'new' still needs the past to measure its own novelty. What is meant by the African past? For nineteenth-century Europe, Africa was the homeland of animism, fetishism, devil-worship, and everything antithetical to Christianity and civilization. This assessment lurks in the ideology of today's African-initiated Christian movements, which require their adherents to break with a pagan past, yet they still describe them using old missionary vocabulary. Consequently, profound ambiguities persist because the problems and their solutions, condemned by missionaries as superstitious, remain everyday realities for most Africans.

Under colonial rule, new Christianities, such as Kimbanguism in Belgian Congo, attempted to evade missionary control and make direct contact with the healing powers of God through the Holy Spirit. Colonial authorities inevitably saw such movements as subversive – as politics disguised as religion. In independent Africa, African-initiated Christian movements, in general, no longer face the repressive force of the state, and the 'orthodox' or mission-initiated churches, with which they compete, are now led by African bishops. Christianity itself is not 'new'; this generation's grandparents were already

Christian, and the community takes Christianity for granted even when many of one's neighbours do not practise religion.

Moral economy

The traditional African moral economy differs radically from that of the modern, capitalist world. Africans generally assume that life should be routine. They regard deviations from the norm in the form of unexpected fortune, good or bad, as the result not of chance or individual effort but of manipulation, by malicious and greedy people of hidden forces derived from the otherworld of the dead, including ancestors, chthonic powers and other deities. If such forces were not occult, they would be available to all and included in everyday planning. In English, this resort to the occult is called 'witchcraft' (French: *sorcellerie*), a term which evokes irrelevant European associations. Whereas for Europeans *sorcellerie* is evil, for Africans the same powers can be used for good or ill. As used 'behind the scenes' by leaders, such as chiefs, headmen and politicians, they are necessary for the proper functioning of society; only those who have access to the otherworld themselves are equipped to deal with malefactors in the occult.

Converts to Christianity have long assimilated the missionary condemnation of 'Satanism' (paganism) to their own Indigenous condemnation of the selfish, anti-social use of occult powers (*sorcellerie*). Satan serves as a kind of all-purpose witch, although, in the popular mind, the sources of evil are not one but many. Scholars of African religion and religious movements still refer to occult powers as 'beliefs', although anthropologists have long pointed out that 'belief' is a term applied by outsiders to assumptions they do not share. As Bruno Latour writes: 'Belief is not a state of mind but a result of relationships among peoples... The visitor knows; the person visited believes'. Almost all converts, as well as many missionaries and other foreigners, continue to regard the powers of the African otherworld and their effects as real, and dealing with them is an urgent practical matter. What the visitor calls 'traditional religion' is, to Africans, simply those features of everyday life that help one to diagnose and deal with severe and unexpected problems.

Scholars usually refer to African procedures, intended to counteract the harmful effects of *sorcellerie* as 'healing', but this term is misleading in that it implies that these procedures are analogous to those of scientific medicine. The effects attributed to *sorcellerie* are best called 'afflictions' rather than 'illnesses', as they range far beyond physical illness to include bad dreams, all kinds of bad luck,

crop failures, theft, unexpected death and unemployment. Twentieth-century converts expected Christianity, as a new kind of occult power, to deal with their afflictions. Many abandoned the church when it failed to engage in 'healing'; others held secret meetings on weekday evenings to give back to Christianity – on the authority of the Bible – what the church had omitted on Sunday. Rumours circulated of a 'true' Bible, which missionaries had withheld from Africans.

Pentecostalism, prosperity and the modern

There is no agreed term for today's new Christian movements. The common acronym 'AIC' transcribes variously as African Independent, Initiated or Instituted Church. Some scholars make do with 'neo-Pentecostal', which refers to the church's direct appeals to the Holy Spirit and to its historical connections with the international Pentecostal movement at the start of the early twentieth century. Others prefer 'charismatic', which identifies its characteristic focus on the leadership and example of a single inspired 'prophet'. For present purposes, we will use Birgit Meyer's term Pentecostal-Charismatic Church, or PCC. It is important to note that not all new religious movements are Pentecostal or even Christian. The diversity and constant evolution of PCCs are matched by contentious and shifting debates among scholars concerning their most characteristic features. Are they orthodox or heretical, foreign or indigenous, individualistic or collective? Let us just say that PCCs are in general International, Modern and African. Each of these terms bundles different themes and their associated ambiguities. PCCs also vary greatly in emphasis: some stress personal morality, others business success, healing or political ethics.

Most PCCs, even those that are local and ephemeral, include 'international' in their titles. The term implies that they transcend local, ethnic, racial and even national boundaries, as the founding prophet asserts that he has a commission from God to bring the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the whole world. It also refers to historical links between African Pentecostals and influential preachers elsewhere, particularly in the United States. Today, preachers and prophets exchange visits throughout the world, and are at least loosely linked in international religious associations. Africans, who are away from home, help to spread PCCs internationally. One of the most forceful movements, Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa/Forward in Faith International (ZAOGA/FIFMI), initially spread among migrant workers in East Africa from a Shona ethnic base and now claims branches in 122 countries. Nowadays, PCCs follow the modern diaspora of thousands who leave home every year to seek work

or business opportunities elsewhere in Africa, Europe, the United States, and Asian countries, including China.

Fundamentally Protestant, PCCs flourish best in former British colonies. The predominant language of worship and evangelism is English, sometimes French, but local languages are also used in worship. Nigeria is the homeland of the best-known movements, including seven out of the ten largest PCCs. Living Faith Church Worldwide, founded in 1981 by David Oyedepo, is said to have branches in 45 countries, including in the United States. Its Faith Chapel in Lagos, Nigeria, is the largest house of worship in the world, accommodating 500,000 worshippers. Large PCCs, drawing pilgrims to their home temples, contribute to international tourism and its economic benefits. The size of the congregation in such 'mega-churches' is an important feature of the worship experience they offer. It is in the midst of an ecstatically singing and dancing multitude that the faithful feel the power of the Spirit. PCCs regard the formal liturgies and ritual objects of traditional churches as distractions from true religion, even a form of idolatry, although many who attend the services are also regular members of traditional churches.

PCCs are deeply engaged in the Modern. They owe much of their success to media technology, from microphones and public address systems to video and television, but we should not overlook the importance of literacy, print and publishing. Pentecostalism was initially spread by pamphlets and other fugitive materials. Church leaders now spread their teachings through the books they write, though many also have websites, post on YouTube and Facebook, offer consultations by e-mail, invite their followers to make financial contributions online, and even have their own TV stations. Their billboards promise a 'Miracle Explosion!' and other signs and wonders. Some garner free publicity in the newspapers by cannily predicting the deaths of famous persons or by announcing sensational cures. A few have private aircraft for visits to far-flung congregations. Technology is a means to success and also a sign of it, proof that the church and its members are in touch with the world of celebrities, progress and prosperity.

In fact, however, though many adherents of PCCs are educated professionals and the well-to-do, the majority struggle with the unfulfilled ambitions and daily afflictions of the urban poor. Having abandoned the support systems of rural life, they are also free of the incessant demands of relatives. But for them, the self-sufficiency of the modern is still a mystery. How does one achieve comfortable access to the consumer society one sees on television? How is it that one's compatriots are wealthy, flaunting fine clothes and new cars? The prophets

offer the prosperity gospel: God wants you and your family to be healthy, secure and financially comfortable; entrust him weekly with the sacrifice of part of your income and he will reward you a thousand-fold. To underline this promise, Living Faith Church is also called Winners' Chapel. There is a clear parallel here between God and the secular patrons of everyday life, to whom one offers loyalty, praise, services and votes in the expectation of being handed a job, a sinecure, a contract, even perhaps a motor vehicle. In modern African conditions, when so few transactions are carried out in the rational manner of the ideal capitalist market and so many depend on back-stage, 'off-the books' agreements, the pursuit of wealth can seem occult and therefore dangerous. Those who have pulled off an exceptional deal may literally bring their gains to a prophet so as to have them spiritually laundered and rendered safe for consumption.

Secular cynics and journalists regularly indict PCCs as merely get-rich schemes for the personal benefit of their bishops and prophets, many of whom are fabulously wealthy by any standard. More surprisingly, church leaders frequently accuse each other in the same terms. Like other successful public figures, prophets may be accused, and even convicted, of affairs with women. To the faithful, however, the prophet's wealth, his celebrity, his clothes, his entourage, and his Mercedes Benzes are proof of the truth of his sermons, and they will accept his repentance. Supporters also point to the extensive social services their church occasionally supports: aid to the poor and the homeless, clinics, schools, universities.

The ambiguity of 'Africa'

Most PCCs are nominally connected to international Pentecostal associations, but their roots are distinctly – though ambivalently and controversially – 'African'. Catholic missionaries long argued that people anywhere must be aware, however dimly, of the presence of the universal God, and that they should seek in African cultures for signs of this awareness that might become 'stepping stones' to true belief. Critics called this approach 'intellectual smuggling', but some African scholars have taken it up, saying that the Holy Spirit is ever present in history. Most African intellectuals and African governments, like the Catholic and Anglican churches, try to honour the African cultural heritage, while setting aside aspects of it they consider deplorable and a hindrance to progress. Conversely, African Catholic clergy have repeatedly run afoul of their bishops by trying to meet the spiritual expectations of their congregations, taking *sorcellerie* seriously,

and engaging in 'healing' (the outstanding example is Archbishop Milingo of Zambia, whom the Vatican eventually disciplined). In 1999, a Catholic priest, Felician Nkwera, was defrocked after founding the Marian Faith Healing Centre in Tanzania, although he and his followers insist that they are still faithful Catholics. Evidently, it is not easy to distinguish the commendable from the deplorable aspects of common heritage and to persuade the faithful of the merit of such distinctions.

The internationally known Nigerian scholar Ogbu Kalu held that the new Christianities, in continuity with the earliest conversions in fifteenth-century Kongo and later ones in colonial times, respond to a profound African spirituality and a primal worldview. Scholars pose the question: Is such spirituality merely 'belief in spirits' (animism) or is it a proto-Christian spirituality? Can we document a worldview common to all Africans? (Scholars writing about new Christianities implicitly intend 'Africa' to refer to sub-Saharan or 'Black' Africa; North Africa is rarely mentioned). PCC prophets call upon the faithful to reject traditional culture entirely, separating themselves from the world and the devil, and opening the door to the modern. At the same time, however, they identify the devil with what they see as the reality of *sorcellerie* in daily life with a promise to cure its effects by the power of the Holy Spirit. Many of those who attend PCC services and 'crusades' do so experimentally. Seeing the church as one source of occult power among several, they are equally ready to seek help from traditional healers (in West Africa often called 'fetish priests' or *féticheurs*). Traditional priests point out the apparent parallels: they advertise similar healing services on billboards, 'because that's the modern way'; claim similar 'miraculous' cures; brag about their international clients; post videos on YouTube; and even make trips to New York and California. Prophets accuse each other not only of fraud but also of 'occultism', the code word for secret resort to *sorcellerie* and magical practices.

Conclusion

PCCs multiplied in the 1980s when structural adjustment programmes and failed democracy helped to destroy the economic and political promise of national independence. People turned to new Christianities in modern, urban Africa because the authority of village chiefs and elders may no longer have been effective, or even available to deal with social tensions and accusations of *sorcellerie*. But also because governments failed to provide badly-needed medical, judicial and welfare

services. The Gospel brings moral strength, psychological comfort and healing to the faithful, but traditional diviners and healers also offer resolution to clients who may have no one else to turn to for help with their problems. Judgement can only be made among these competing claims based on a faith commitment. To the uncommitted, a prophet's packets of 'holy water', promising the protection of the Holy Spirit, closely resemble the amulets of the *féticheur*, promising the protection of a local river god.

The founding prophets are now passing away, and their churches face the problem of routinizing charisma by providing for regular succession and the efficient management of buildings, institutes and programmes. Those who succeed will become 'old' and face competition from the 'new' as the social environment changes, and with it, the particular struggles of the poor, the ambitious and the bewildered.

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RAP AND HIP-HOP

Youth Movement and Black Cosmopolitan
Aesthetics in African Popular Music
Olabode Omojola

Introduction

Rap music has become a global phenomenon decades after its emergence in the 1970s in the Bronx, New York. Minimalist melodic and rhythmic material, and narcissistic or political lyrics rapped over instrumental and vocal ostinato patterns mark a new popular music culture that has become dominant in many parts of the world. In Africa, rap music designates a new cosmopolitan music that is both local and global. Its status as a local form derives from how it has adapted to specific African societies. However, in spite of its local versions around the world, rap music retains its recognizable identity as the music of the United States, a country that epitomizes the very idea of globalization, politically and culturally. More crucially, and for the purpose of this chapter, rap music also denotes a form of Black cultural and cosmopolitan musical aesthetic that speaks to the historical and cultural connections among Black peoples and communities around the world.

This chapter discusses the musical cosmopolitanism that follows Thomas Turino's use of the term to describe musical styles, genres or practices that have a global status but are practised differently in diverse parts of the world (Turino, 2000). Unlike Turino, however, I focus on alternative canons, by which I mean, musical genres and traditions that have attained a global status mainly

because they present a social worldview and musical discourse that diverge from, and even undermine, the canonical traditions of colonial powers. Bob White (2002) explains that such alternative canons constitute a cosmopolitan 'other' because they are created as part of a social life in politically dominated communities. Alternative canons – because they are often formed within Black diaspora communities – are marked by a bipolar identity that recalls the social and musical norms of an African past while reflecting current social, cultural and political experiences of diaspora populations. They owe their origins to the experiences of enslaved communities who created new musical traditions that sustained their African ancestral traditions as part of dealing with the challenge of slavery. Turino discusses such traditions as trans-state cultural formations that help to build cross-national identities along shared goals, experiences and desires (Turino, 2008, p. 117). It is in this regard that alternate canons are transnational in a politically significant way.

In this chapter, I argue that rap music and hip-hop culture signify a new global Black musical cosmopolitanism, and thus provide an effective musical and social framework for African youths to present Indigenous African music elements and performance practices in new contexts, forging politically active social networks within their societies. The process of indigenizing and reinterpreting rap music also provides an important channel for creating new forms of expression and for circulating them within and beyond Africa.

Defining a Black cosmopolitan aesthetic

African and Black diaspora music traditions share core stylistic and performance elements that point to a shared history and common heritage. As an example, Henry Louis Gates (1988) explains the significance and commonality of trickster figures between Yoruba and African American oral performances, by comparing the Esu in Yoruba performance with the African American 'signifying monkey'. He observes that both characters point to 'peculiarly Black rhetorical strategies', 'are related historically', and are 'distinct aspects of a larger, unified phenomenon' (Gates, 1988, p. xxi). Halifu Osumare, in explaining this phenomenon, draws on Brenda Dixon Gottschild's idea of an African dance aesthetic to ponder the dynamic significance of a global Black musical aesthetic (Dixon Gottschild, 1998). According to her, that aesthetic is defined by 'complex use of rhythmic timing, verbal or nonverbal rhetorical devices, and multiple layers of meaning that draw from its social context

and its audience' and which 'continues to reflect similar musical, dance, and oral practices that resemble those in West and Central Africa, the source of the Atlantic slave trade'. Speech-based vocal performances set to rhythmic accompaniment and designed as an integral part of a society are core elements of Africanist aesthetics in musical performance.

Modern African musicians are often highly perceptive about the form and function of speech-based performances in Africa and how such performances demonstrate the concept of a global Africanist aesthetic, drawing comparisons between African American rap music and Indigenous African verbal forms. Examples include *jeliya*, the music of the *Jeli* (performer of *jeliya*) of the Mande people in countries like Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea.¹ Performed to the accompaniment of the *kora* (a stringed instrument) and the *balafon*, the vocal narratives of the *jeli* (*jelimusolo* – female *jeli*) are used to praise royalty, re-enact history, and critique erring leaders. Other West African examples include the *taasu* of the Wolof people of Senegal and the *oriki* of the Yoruba people of Nigeria.² The phenomenal growth and popularity of rap music in Africa since the 1980s can be explained in terms of the similarities between these Indigenous African forms and African American rap.

It is instructive at this point to examine some of the ways in which rap has been indigenized in some selected African countries, especially in Ghana, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania, where rap and hip-hop culture has provided the impetus for the formation of new youth movements and pop culture. To give musical and historical context to my discussion and explain how new musicians build on the model provided in the works of earlier generation of African musicians, this chapter will also cover older African popular music genres, notably, the Congolese rumba.

Rap music, youth movement and politics in Africa

In Ghana, rap music is known as hiplife, which, as the name suggests, draws on African American hip-hop and *highlife*, the West African nationalist popular music genre forged during the colonial era. Hiplife, which emerged in Ghana in the 1980s, is characterized by a number of creative and performance strategies

1 *Jeliya* is a speech-oriented performance that is traditionally exclusive to an endogamous musical family that has existed since the reign of Sunjeita Keita of the Mali Empire in the twelfth century.

2 Although *oriki* is not tied exclusively to a hereditary clan, it is marked by speech-oriented performance that may be accompanied by a percussion instrument.

that carry important social and political messages. These performance strategies include neotraditional incorporation of Indigenous language and vocal idioms into new rap music (Osumare, 2012, p. 50); highlife-based sampling in which highlife rhythmic and melodic material provide the basis for new rap songs (Osumare, 2012, p. 41); and collaborative hip-hop and rap performances involving Black rappers and hip-hop artists from other parts of the world (Osumare 2012, p. 79). Neo-traditional performances are motivated by a desire for cultural revival, while highlife-based sampling recalls colonial-era music of nationalism. Collaborative performances with Black musicians from other parts of the world provide a means for identifying with a global Black identity. As expected, topical social and political issues recur in Ghanaian hiplife. In a song titled 'Kwame Nkrumah', for example, popular rapper Kwabena Okyere Darko (Obrafofour) calls for political unity in the country by singing about the inclusive politics of Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president and a strong advocate of Pan-Africanism.

The embrace of rap music and hip-hop culture in Senegal, a country often described as having the largest number of rappers in West Africa, has been crucial to the emergence of a powerful youth movement committed to social and political activism. Senegalese rappers often sing about the problems of political corruption, the negative consequences of globalization, and the need to build strong democratic institutions in their country. Senegalese musicians often rely on their popularity as hip-hop artists to mobilize the populace to engage in concrete political action, as was the case during the 2007 presidential elections when the musicians rallied Senegalese voters to cast their votes in support of a relatively progressive political party. That process continued during the 2011 elections when *Y'en a Marre* (Fed Up), a newly formed youth movement, was formed.³ In addition to organizing mass rallies and concerts, the group released albums *Y'en a Marre* and *Doggali* (*Let's finish*) to popularize social and political messages.⁴

As Patricia Tang observed, Senegalese rappers often draw parallels between their activism and the social roles of the traditional *gewel* (the griot). In the song entitled 'The Return of the Djelly', for example, popular Senegalese band, Positive Black Soul, describes itself as 'storyteller, teacher, and preacher', thus taking on a 'djelly persona' within the context of American rap-based

3 *Y'en a Marre* was formed by musicians Malal Talla, Cheikh Oumar Cyrille Touré and Killifeu, and a group of journalists, namely Sheikh Fadel Barro, Aliou Sane and Denise Sow.

4 For a broader discussion of the social and political impact of hip-hop in Africa, see Clark and Koster (2016).

performances (Tang, 2012, p. 86). Rap music helps the band to navigate and strengthen the connections between Black diaspora culture and 'motherland, Africa' (Tang, 2012, p. 88). In addition, by invoking griotness, Senegalese musicians 'construct a complex, new Africanized identity that draws upon American rap but then gains greater legitimacy through its roots in a historic African tradition' (Tang, 2012, p. 90).

Historically, the popular music of South Africa has maintained strong links with European music as well as African American music traditions. Decades of European colonization and Apartheid as well as contact with American musicians have helped to consolidate Western music practices in the country. Twentieth-century South African musical genres like *isicathamiya*, *mpaqanga*, *kwaito* demonstrate the influences of Western harmony, instrumentation and African American jazz elements, all of which are mixed with Indigenous South African vocal forms. These genres, in their multicultural character, served to energize political resistance and helped the people of the country to cope with the challenge of living under Apartheid. *Marabi*, for example, is typified by the use of American electronic pedal organs, guitars, acoustic bass and drums, blues-type progression, and a striking rhythmic drive that has come to define South African jazz. *Marabi* was performed in *shebeens* (ghetto bars), which provided a relaxed space for social interaction and the assertion of group solidarity among urban Black South Africans, notably in the 1920s and 1930s in cities like Johannesburg. Studio recordings of *marabi* music became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the emergence of a new genre known as *mbaqanga*, which was popularized by Mahlathini and the Mahotella Queens.

As in other parts of Africa, rap has become very popular in South Africa, which is played and popularized by musicians such as Cassper Nyovest, Tumi Molekane and Die Antwoord. Parallel to the musicians who embraced rap and hip-hop are those who continue to perform or allude to the older musical genres, described above, as a means of reflecting on Apartheid-related issues. These two directions of musical practice highlight the tension that defines social life in contemporary South Africa, notably, the challenge of moving ahead in a country with a long history of social and political turbulence.

In addition to straightforward rap and hip-hop is a prominent South African genre known as *kwaito* music, which may or may not combine rap with afro-pop, R&B, and apartheid-era genres like *marabi* and *kwela*. The music of Mafikizolo, a popular South African group, illustrates the projection of multiple styles in the same work or by the same musician or group. In the album *Kucheza*, for example, Mafikizolo combine different musical styles,

including R&B and afro-pop. Earlier albums like *Sibongile* (2001) and *Kwela* (2003) are striking for how they recall the apartheid-era *kwela* music. In songs like 'Ndihamba Nawe' (*Sibongile*) and Emlanjeni (*Kwela*), for example, Mafikizolo, through musical quotation of apartheid-era songs, dances and costumes, recalls the social and cultural life of traditional Zulu societies as well as the famous apartheid-era but racially-inclusive city of Sophiatown. As Livermon observed: 'sartorial, sonic and kinaesthetic' celebration of the past as demonstrated in the music of Mafikizolo could be interpreted as a subtle critique of political leaders of the post-apartheid era for their inability to successfully address the social and economic problems emanating from apartheid South Africa.' (Livermon, 2012, p. 185).

Rumba routes: from Cuba to Africa

A different type of cosmopolitan affiliation is revealed in the works of Congolese musicians from both sides of the Congo River who, in the colonial era, imitated and adapted Cuban rumba as part of the process of creating a new genre of popular music.⁵ Rumba as an Afro-Cuban form is characterized by musical and performance elements that African musicians can easily identify with, including call and response singing, the use of the clave – itself an Afro-Cuban adaptation of the West African bell pattern – and the prominence of communal dance. Building on the work of Jean Bosco Mwenda (1930–1990), who had helped popularize a unique African two-finger style in East and Central Africa, Congolese musicians and bands, including Wendo Kolosoy (aka Papa Wendo, 1925–2008), the Orchestra African Jazz (formed in 1959 and led by Joseph Kabasele and Tshamala [aka Le Grand Kallé]), and Orchestre Kinois Jazz (OK Jazz, formed in 1956), embraced the Cuban rumba as a compositional model. For example, Wendo Kolosoy's 'Marie Louise' (of Ngoma Records, 1948) is based on Moises Simon's 'El Manisero' (from 1928).⁶ Similarly, the song 'Afrika Moliki Mobimba' by Orchestra African Jazz is an adaptation of Celia Cruz's 'Madre Rumba'. But while 'El Manisero' is a peanut vendor's song, 'Marie Louise' is a love song, and while 'Madre Rumba' extols the qualities of rumba music, 'Afrika Moliki Mobimba' is a celebration of the global popularity

5 As observed by Bob White, rumba, which was spelled wrongly as rhumba, was popularized in Africa through recordings of Cuba music by Edison (US), Pathé (France) and later Columbia and Victor (US). Colonial radio stations, like Radio Congoliya, also helped to popularize the music on the continent.

6 Moises Simon was a Cuban musician (1889–1945).

of OK Jazz's music. Both African adaptations, however, follow the binary form of the Cuban rumba, the *son* and *montuno*, although – as shown in 'Afrika Moliki Mobimba' – the second section is often marked by a more dynamic rhythmic movement. This initial imitation of the Cuban rumba by Congolese musicians culminated in the emergence of a new Congolese genre known as *soukous*. In *soukous*, woodwind and brass instruments are less prominent, but with a corresponding rise in importance of the guitar, chorus and dance. The stylistic elements of *soukous* are illustrated in the music of the Zaiko Langa Langa, a group formed in 1969 by Wembadio Pene Kikumba (aka Papa Wemba). More recent developments in *soukous* are highlighted in the music of Koffi Olomide who has helped elevate the significance of visual representation through choreographed dances and video narratives.⁷

It should be noted that although *soukous* is strongly associated with the two Congos, it is a regional archetype that is popular in other countries, including Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It is also an antecedent of recent East and Central African rap music traditions, notably the Tanzanian *bongo flava*. Like its counterparts in South Africa (*kwaito*) and Ghana (hiplife), *bongo flava* is sustained and practised largely by younger musicians, who also often engage in social and political activism. In its dynamic and creative relationship with African American rap tradition, *bongo flava* provides a medium for domesticating and circulating rap music, and for showcasing Tanzanian musical identities globally. As Ntarangwi (2009, p. 20) observed, East African rap helps African musicians to 'make representations of Africa that are informed by local and global realities'. Ntarangwi further explains that 'East African hip-hop artists use hip-hop to represent Africa and African identity that takes three prongs: an Africa that stands in great contrast with Europe and the West both culturally and politically, an Africa that is vernacular and traditional, and an Africa that is cosmopolitan, holding onto its traditions while embracing transnationalism and transcultural realities' (Ntarangwi, 2009, p. 20).

This perspective is musically expressed by the Kenyan group, Ukooflani Mau Mau, in the song entitled 'All Over the World', as follows:

We're rolling' thick like the Bible quotin' scriptures of survival
 Touchin' masses upon arrival, hip hop is vital
 Represent your sphere, hip hop is global
 Represent your sphere, hip hop is universal (cited in Ntarangwi, 2009, p. 21).

⁷ Koffi Olomide started his career as a member of Viva La Musica, a band formed by Papa Wemba.

Hybrid rap: Gbamú Gbamù

In Nigeria, rap music has, since the mid-1990s, helped to define a dynamic youth and pop culture.⁸ Although early examples are imitative of American models, rap music in Nigeria has morphed into a new afro-pop style known as afrobeats, which is noted for hybrid rap and chant forms in English and traditional languages, and the incorporation of standard Nigerian rhythmic patterns, notably, the bell pattern.⁹ Also significant is the integration of rap with older Nigerian popular music genres like highlife, afro-beat and *fuji* through digital samplings. As Stephanie Shonekan explains: 'Nigerian rappers selectively utilize elements of style and thematic concerns inherent in a long line of Nigerian popular music genres, including and, more markedly, afro-beat' (Shonekan, 2012, p. 155). I have noted in another study, such crossover rap songs include 'Brymo's Ara', which uses highlife music; 9ice's 'Gbamú Gbamù', which uses *fuji*; and Wizkid's 'Pakurumo', which adapts *fuji* and highlife elements. 'Pakurumo' is packaged as a new form of Yorùbá àríyá (i.e. music performed as part of social ceremonies, such as weddings, funerals and housewarmings). Contrasting with these examples is Olu Maintain's 'I Catch Cold', which remains relatively faithful to the American-style rap tradition.

To gain more insight about the ways in which rap music has been indigenized in Africa, it is instructive to take a closer look at one selected example, 'Gbamú Gbamù' by a Yoruba rapper, Abolore Adegbola Akande (aka 9ice). Reworking African American rap idiom in Yoruba terms, 'Gbamú Gbamù' evokes Indigenous rural and modern, urban cultural and social spaces, often through the use of multiple codes, mainly Yoruba, pidgin and English texts. The juxtaposition of urban and rural spaces is initiated in the very opening moments of the music, when 9ice makes reference to the technical production of music, and the world of music business and music awards, as shown in the following lyrics:

Adigun singing
 Cabasa producing
 Coded tunes supersede
 Alapo-meji is distinct
 MOBO, Wembley MAMA Award na for real

8 As Loko has explained (2012, p. 17), prominent Nigerian rap artists include Tony Tetuila (Anthony Qlanrewaju Awotoye), and Plantashun Boiz (Ahmedu Augustine Obiabo), 9ice (Abolore Adegbola Akande), Davido (David Adedeji Adeleke), Wizkid (Ayodeji Ibrahim Balogun), Brymo (Olawale Ashimi), and D'Banj (Dayo Oyebo).

9 Afrobeats should not be confused with afro-beat, the music of Fela Anikulapo Kuti.

The rapper 9ice continues to sing about the modern world of rap music and the social spaces in which the music is performed, including disco parties, concerts and nightclubs. The technical and business world of rap music is, however, quickly contrasted with Yoruba rural life when he sings, as follows:

You wanna know my crib,

Lọ sábulé mi

Ko bèrè ọmọ iyá àgbà lókè aró

[If you want to know about my roots, go to my village, to my mother the wise old woman who resides in the compound known for its Yoruba cloth-dyeing vocation.]

Although Gbamú Gbamù lasts only for about four minutes, and it is a recorded performance, there is a sense in which it evokes an extemporized performance because of its constantly shifting spatial references and its focus on disparate themes. As in Yoruba traditional performances, the piece features a solo-dominated singing format that is interlocked within a Western verse-chorus structure. Unlike the typical verse-chorus form of European popular music, which is noted for its easy predictability, the structure of Gbamú Gbamù exudes a sense of momentum that derives from the use of the constantly shifting linguistic images and forms, like Yoruba proverbs, jocular sentences, figurative expressions and English texts. All these vocal procedures – the use of multiple codes, the juxtaposition of multiple spaces, and the use of Yoruba figurative expressions – can be observed in my transcription and translation of an excerpt from the song's lyrics, as provided below.¹⁰

'Gbamú Gbamù

Rapping in English:

Adigun singing

Cabasa producing

Coded tunes supersede

Alapo-meji is distinct

MOBO, Wembley MAMA Award na for real

10 My discussion of the song here is a revised version of my analysis of work in a previous study (Omojola, 2014).

Rapping in Yoruba:

Àwọn aláṣọ́rì bí i tì ẹ wọn n tákùtù ẹ́rẹ́

Wọn n ré ni lẹ́pá, wọn n lẹ́rì lé kà

Asán bánsá, ofo ọ́jọ́ kejì ọ́jà

Àràbàríbí, àríbíràbàtà

Àjábalẹ́ má kán sára

Ókù ókù ni ìbon n ró

E sí ma tò àra

Òrò mí jọ bí òwẹ, ọ́lọgbọ́n ló lẹ́ yé

Òrò mí jọ bí àsàmọ́ fún àwon tó gun igi kọ́já ewé

Òrò ayé mi, kò ẹ́ẹ́ fara wé

Ayé yí lójọ́, lójọ́rò, igi á rúwé

Ìkawọ́ ò lásọ́

Orí mi gbé mi dé ibi ire

Ọ́bọ́ nílàágùn irun ara ẹ́ ni ò jẹ́

Àmọ́ ẹ́lédè mi á dé Ọ́yọ́, ariwo e

láápọ́

Ọ́pọ́ la pè díẹ́ la ó fifún

Cuz ọ́fẹ́ kọ́ ni shayo

Ìfà nífani lápọ́ ya

Ọ́rẹ́ má mà múyọ́

Mo lémi lóyẹ́ tí mo fi n mu

atiana

[Do not play with narcotics/drugs

Wicked people are insane

They make boasts that are empty like the day following market day

The first sound of a gunshot suggests that there are more bullets to come (more songs are coming)

My enemies will wet their pants

I speak in proverbs; and to the wise only

It is a warning to those who have climbed up the tree beyond the branches.

They will experience a tragic fall

Do not be a copycat

Eventually, a tree will shed off its dry leaves

Success is my destiny

The sweat of a monkey is hidden by its fur

Although it may take a long time, a slow animal will reach Ọ́yọ́ town (eventually, success will be mine)

Many are called but only a few are chosen
This is because the good things of life are usually not free
Lack of self-control (or overindulgence) is dangerous
Do not be a copycat.]

This is definitely rap music with a difference. Western sampled instrumentation provides a framework for a speech-based performance that mixes Yoruba *fuji* music genre and traditional poetic devices to generate a local genre of rap music. It uses minimalist and repetitive rhythmic and melodic material, the use of proverbs, a strong element of dance, and fluid vocal narratives combining speech, chant and song, vocal imitation of instrumental rhythmic patterns, self-praise and self-advertisement. All these features simultaneously recall Yoruba and African American performance traditions, thus asserting a common Africanist identity, on the one hand, and constituting a neotraditionalist reinterpretation of Indigenous Yoruba performance, on the other, within the context of an African American-inspired rap performance.

Conclusion

The adoption of Black diaspora elements by African musicians often resonates with a strong political message. The Congolese adaptation of Afro-Cuban rumba is a case in point. Cuba's well known radical ideology, since the time of Fidel Castro, makes it an important symbol of anti-colonial struggles. For many Africans in colonial Congo, Cuba's music represented a symbolic foil to Belgium's oppressive colonial rule. Due to its popularity around the world, Afro-Cuban music has developed into a global tradition that is at once global and African, transnational and Black. It is therefore preferable to African musicians who associate European music with colonial domination. As White (2002) has argued, Afro-Cuban rumba is new, cosmopolitan and yet local, different, and yet familiar and liberalizing. It is the music of freedom.

It is important to note that although the cultural connections between Africa and the Black diaspora are historical, dating back to the time of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, those connections are contingent, performative and constantly renewed through new and emerging communities and social networks. For example, recently formed African communities in places like the United States recreate African practices in new ways to suit the demands of life in the diaspora. Modern technology, travel and the Internet also help to make African music

practices visible outside Africa, while helping to propagate Black diasporic music practices in Africa on a continuous basis. In addition, African American musicians travel to Africa more regularly than ever before, learning about African music practices and sharing their own music culture with African musicians and audiences. These factors, all of which are crucial to a globalized mobility of sounds, are crucial to the continuous process of inter-Black renegotiation, recombination and reinterpretation of Africanist or Black diaspora aesthetics across a variety of geographic spaces. They also provide the context for understanding the ways in which global musical idioms circulate into, within and out of Africa into Europe, the United States, Latin America, and indeed around the world. As the most recent icon of a global Black musical culture, rap music has helped to sustain and reinvigorate the concept of Black cosmopolitan musical aesthetics in an unprecedented way. For many African musicians, it provides a modern musical framework for reinterpreting African music elements and showcasing them to a global world.

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CHAPTER 20

IMAGING/IMAGININGS/ IMAGINARIES

Historicizing Contemporary African Cinema
at the Turn of the Third Millennium

Aboubakar Sanogo

Introduction

Over the past century, African cinema has been one of the privileged and indispensable spaces and media through which the continent has imaged and imagined, interrogated and projected, celebrated and critiqued itself. Cinema has since become one of the pre-eminent epistolary modes through which Africa speaks of herself and of the world, and reveals herself to herself and to the world. As such, the moving image has always played a part in the production of Africa's ever-changing identity and as an instrument in the overarching and enduring struggle for the continent's multiform emancipation. African moving-image makers have deployed their medium as a currency, standing for their longstanding commitment to the unmaking of colonial and neocolonial regimes, resisting historical amnesia, and securing Africa's agency and mastery over her own destiny. Indeed, at the heart of the project of African cinema is the impulse to bring African subjecthood into the field of visibility and audibility to claim, reclaim and reconquer the continent's due place in the world, in which visibility itself has become the hallmark of presence and existence as such.

It is in this regard that African cinema must be seen through its historicity, renouncing present-day bias while emphasizing its present strengths. It achieves this by exploring the core elements of contemporary history, as reflected in

figures, moments, events, institutions, movements, gestures, ideas, thoughts across three major eras, shapes and frames, present and future, practices and discourses of African cinema. Furthermore, the first appearance of the cinema as an object of inquiry, in the *General History of Africa* project, demands that we prioritize history, as any valid analysis of African cinema must, first and foremost, be historical.

Dialectic of objecthood and subjecthood in the first age of African cinema

This dialectic is symptomatic of the historical moment that underscores the continent's encounter with cinema. Indeed, when experiments led to the emergence of cinema as a technology, the African continent was falling prey to the European powers in the aftermath of the notorious Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. In encountering Africa through the prism of colonialism, cinema – for a large part – also endorsed the premises of the colonial project, which sought to turn Africa's subjecthood into objecthood and to develop important dimensions of its language through that prism. Thus, the first age of cinema in Africa was characterized by forces of objectification, embodied in cinema as a technology, an art form, and an object of commerce for over half a century. This was only matched by individual and maverick pioneering efforts from across the continent, thus claiming a place for itself in the world within and through this powerful medium.

On the cinematic objectification of Africa in colonial cinema

As a reminder, cinema emerged and was institutionalized outside the African continent, but in the course of its own understanding of itself in the world, it sought to interpret Africa in multiple ways. Among the most prominent figures to forge a name in the new world of the moving image were the Lumière brothers, Auguste and Louis, who are often associated with the invention of the medium itself. In the process of making their *cinématographe* known in their own country of France, the rest of Europe and across the world, the Lumière company also, arguably, became a pioneer in marking the entry of Africa into the world of the moving image. The brothers created an impressive corpus of at least 100 films on Africa, shot both in Europe and on the continent in the very early years of cinema. In Europe, for instance, they filmed groups of Africans in zoological

parks (Blanchard et al., 2011)¹, such as in the Jardin d'Acclimatation in Paris, France, as early as 1896 (Aubert and Seguin, 1996) and in such films as *Nègres en corvée* (demonstrating how they clean their living space) and *Baignade de nègres*,² in which young boys were asked to jump into a pond to look for coins thrown by a European man. In the same year, in Switzerland, the Lumière brothers also filmed *Cortège arabe* featuring Africans (including North Africans and Arabs but also Asians) entering the field of view of the Cinématograph (in a reflective parade of race), which was exhibited in Geneva for the first time. Finally, in 1897, in Lyon, the home of cinema itself, the Lumière brothers made 14 films of a group of Ashanti who were paraded as a human zoo with titles such as *Toilette d'un négrillon*, *Danse de Féticheur*, *Repas de négrillons*, *Défilé de la tribu*, *Danse de femmes*, *Nègres Achantis: leçon de danse*. The obscene voyeurism of the films is evidently revealed in several of the titles, which can be viewed as sociological and anthropological categories through which Africans were apprehended and dehumanized in the colonial era. Moreover, these films participated in establishing the baseline dictionary for the visual language and vocabulary used when representing Africa in moving image culture from the late nineteenth century to the present.³

However, the alignment of colonialism and cinema was not only the result of private companies and individual filmmakers but also of actions by the colonial state, which started actively engaging in cinema during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the First World War. The colonial state would erect barriers to filmmaking, effectively banning colonized Africans from filming themselves (the infamous Pierre Laval decree of 1934) (Diawara, 1992).⁴ At the same time, the

1 It must be noted that these exhibitions, which often took place in Europe after African armies had been defeated back on the continent, functioned not solely as war trophies but also as pseudo-scientific visible evidence of the insurmountable gap and trans-historical hierarchy between nature and culture, 'civilization' and 'savagery', Africans and Europeans. From the standpoint of media archaeology, they allegedly were the most popular form of mass entertainment in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, only to be displaced by the advent of cinema as the dominant mass entertainment medium of the twentieth century. See Blanchard et al. (2011).

2 *Baignade de nègres* and *Nègres en corvée* were shot between June and July 1896, merely six to seven months after the official public launch of the Cinématograph on 28 December 28, 1895.

3 It must be added that in the first decade of the cinema, the Lumière cinema helped globalize the moving image via Africa through specific trips to the continent's Mediterranean coast in countries under French and British colonial rule, that is, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt (1896, 1897 and 1903), further securing the medium's promiscuous engagements with the colonial project.

4 The Laval decree of 1934, named after Pierre Laval, then Minister of the Colonies, sought to regulate the moving image and sound recordings, by establishing censorship laws relating to the production, circulation and exhibition of film in the French African colonies. It implicitly prevented such pioneers as Paulin Soumanou Vieyra of Benin from making films in Africa. It was also used against French filmmakers sympathetic to the cause of African liberation, such as René Vautier, who spent time in jail both in Bobo-Dioulasso and Paris for shooting *Afrique 50* (1950).

colonial state offered its filmmakers logistical support in the colonies, indeed using the colonies as backdrops for films aimed at competing with Hollywood's vast landscapes and creating its own institutions of filmmaking (Slavin, 1997). Two of the most important institutions in the British context were the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment (BEKE) and the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) (Sanogo, 2012; Smyth, 1992). In the end, whether fictional or documentary, private, individual, amateur, studio or state-sponsored, the colonial cinema collectively helped reify and render more complex the representational paradigms introduced in the early era of silent cinema by the Lumière brothers and many other practitioners by effectively controlling the moving image in Africa.⁵

*Of an always-ready cosmopolitan tradition
of cinematic self-subjection*

This quasi-structural drive to cinematically objectify or 'thingify' Africans (in Aimé Césaire's words) by the colonial nations was, moreover, instantly matched by an irrepressible desire to domesticate the new medium and to use it for the purposes of self-representation. Thus, it is possible to observe within the 'Lumière Africa corpus'⁶ itself, particularly in the films about the Ashanti Village in Lyon made between April and June 1897, counter narratives as conveyed through the actions of Mr Oko, the teacher of the group. Mr Oko uses body language and gestures that appear to direct the actors and stage the action on screen,⁷ thus marking the first time an African is seen on camera as having a directorial approach. By re-casting humanity away from the zoological representation in and through cinema, Mr Oko enables us to revert African cinema back to the very beginning of cinema, marking him as one of the pioneers of cinema in Africa and perhaps beyond.

Another important figure in this period is the Tunisian Albert Samama Chikly, one of the pioneers of African and world cinema, who deserves to have his name added to those of such pioneering figures as Thomas Edison in the United States, the Lumière brothers and Georges Méliès in France, or Robert

5 The cinema of D. W. Griffith must also be included in this category, ranging from such early films as *The Zulu's Heart* (1907) to *The Birth of a Nation* (1915), his cinematic monument to racism.

6 The Lumière Africa corpus is a term designed by the author of this chapter to refer to 100 or so films made by the Lumière brothers about and related to Africa (Sanogo, 2009).

7 Indeed, in several of the 14 films devoted to Ashanti in Lyon, Mr Oko, the teacher of the group, is seen choreographing the gestures, movements, placements and dances of his fellow troupe members, insistently looking at the camera.

W. Paul, Cecil Hepworth and others in Britain. Indeed, Chikly was eclectic, a maverick and a world-travelled polyglot figure who was curious and open to all the innovations the modern world had to offer. He showed his faith in its potential by enthusiastically adopting early technologies, such as the wireless telegraph, the radio, the x-ray, photography and cinema. A man both of and ahead of his time, Chikly experimented with cinema, documenting the nation through newsreel footage and documentaries, filming war zones (First World War, including the battlefields of Verdun and the Somme) and pioneering fiction filmmaking in Tunisia with *Zohra* (1922) and *Ain El-Ghazal/The Girl from Carthage* (1924) (Mansour, 2000).

In the wake of these pioneers, numerous other figures emerged from the four corners of the continent to both domesticate the medium and affirm an African presence in cinema. They include, in East Africa, William Wilberforce Nadiope in Uganda in the mid to late 1930s (1935-37); in Southern Africa, Philippe Raberojo from Madagascar, who filmed *La Mort de Rasalama* (1937); in North Africa, Mohamed Osfour from Morocco, who directed *L'enfant de la jungle* (1941); Tahar Hannache from Algeria, who made *Constantine l'ancienne Cirta* (1951); in West Africa, Mamadou Touré from Guinea, who directed *Mouramani* in 1954; and again in East Africa, Sudanese Gadalla Gubara with *Song of Khartoum* (1955). Taken together, they offer a thoroughly polygenetic map of pioneering African film practice, which is deserving of further exploration.

These individual pioneering efforts, in many ways, conclude the first age of African cinema on the eve of independence, that is, its emergence in the world of cinema. Moreover, the desire for cinema continues to powerfully influence the present, despite the challenges posed by accessibility.

Projecting Africa through a Pan-Africanist and internationalist cine-cultural world in the age of decolonization and independence

One of the key challenges for African cinema has long been a certain incommensurability between the immensity of the ambition and the talent of the film practitioners, driven to adequately represent, unify and address their continent, and the relative difficulty for their works to reach their desired audiences in Africa and beyond. This is symptomatic of the disconnect between the various levels, stages and dimensions of film production, distribution, exhibition, circulation and

reception processes. The desire to overcome this gap – this communication and structural deficit – has been at the heart of most initiatives, debates and institutional creations in African cinema from the late 1950s to the present day.

*African cinema, the Présence Africaine movement
and the cultural politics of decolonization*

The second age of African cinema arguably starts around the years 1954 to 1957, coinciding with the acceleration of the decolonization processes and the growing access to independence of several African countries (Ghana, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia). In this context, numerous forms of cross-fertilization between the political, intellectual, artistic and the cultural milieu took place. African cinema both benefited from and played a major role in this overall decolonial/postcolonial structure, of which some effects are still being felt today.

In the so-called Francophone context, the mid-1950s also witnessed the first African film graduates from the Institut des Hautes Études Cinématographiques (IDHEC) in France. Led by Paulin Soumanou Vieyra and including Robert Caristan, Jacques Mélo Kane and Mamadou Sarr, they formed the Groupe Africain de Cinéma, which played a crucial role in the debates around the nature and future of African cinema, as well as in the creation of several of its significant institutions. Together they would direct the now iconic *Afrique sur Seine* (1955).⁸ They would later be joined by other towering figures of African cinema, including Ousmane Sembène, Timité Bassori, Moustapha Alassane and Med Hondo, in numerous initiatives and efforts to create an independent African cinema.

However, it was perhaps their relationship with the Présence Africaine movement that would have a more lasting impact on the destiny of African cinema. Indeed, contemporary African cinema is in many ways an heir, a product and a continuation of the tremendous intellectual and political history that unfolded around this movement since the late 1950s. Indeed, filmmakers took part in the two Présence Africaine World Congresses of Black Artists and Writers in 1956 in Paris, and in 1959 in Rome. They were involved and deeply immersed in exchanges and debates with the works of such luminaries as Cheikh Anta Diop, Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Frantz Fanon, among many others. The 1959 Congress, in particular, held a special session on cinema to explore the role

⁸ This film was groundbreaking, although it is often mistakenly referred to as the first African film directed south of the Sahara.

and responsibilities of the filmmaker in the aftermath of decolonization (Présence Africaine, 1959). In effect, any contemporary review of African cinema would reveal that the work of Frantz Fanon profoundly inspired the films of Ousmane Sembène and Med Hondo, among others. Likewise, Aimé Césaire could be seen as an inspiration and theorist for the 'Globalization Generation' of African filmmakers, particularly Abderrahmane Sissako and Mahamat-Saleh Haroun.⁹ It is well known that Paulin S. Vieyra went on to work for Léopold Sédar Senghor by heading *Les Actualités Sénégalaises* for many years. Moreover, Vieyra was the official film critic of the *Présence Africaine* journal for several decades; he published his major books with the journal and dedicated his feature film *En résidence surveillée* (1981) to founder Alioune Diop (1987).¹⁰ Likewise, Présence Africaine published several of Ousmane Sembène's novels and short stories (which he later adapted for the screen), and film scripts (which later became short stories or novels).¹¹ Finally, the conversion and post-conversion sequences of Med Hondo's *Soleil O* (1970) are known to have been inspired by Joseph Ki-Zerbo's now famous three Ms¹², characterizing Africa's encounter with colonialism. While a nightclub sequence in *Fatima the Algerian Woman of Dakar* (2004) pays homage to Cheikh Anta Diop, the same film deploys the figure of Fanon to articulate a sense of commonality between Africans north and south of the Sahara.

Forging a worldly African cinema through continental institutions

With most African states recovering their political sovereignty by the late 1950s and early 1960s, filmmakers sought – within, through and beyond these new dispensations – to create optimal conditions for carrying out what they saw as their role and responsibilities in the production of a new Africa. This new Africa would be cognizant of her history, proud of her culture, and boldly looking towards her future while critically engaging with her present. Achieving these goals meant setting up and controlling the entire infrastructure of cinema from production to distribution, exhibition and circulation to discursive production

9 Sissako uses extended excerpts of Césaire's *Cahiers d'un retour au pays natal* in his film *La vie sur terre/ Life on Earth* (1998), while Mahamat-Saleh Haroun took the title of one of his films *Un homme qui crie/A Screaming Man* (2010) from one of the lines of Césaire's *Cahiers*.

10 His books include *Le Cinéma et l'Afrique* (1969), *Ousmane Sembène, Cinéaste : première période 1962-1971* (1972), *Le Cinéma Africain des Origines à 1973* (1975) and *Le Cinéma au Sénégal* (1983).

11 His books include *Voltaire: la Noire de...* (the title of his first feature), *Le Mandat* adapted for the screen as *Mandabi*, his first colour film (1968), *Xala*, also adapted for the screen in 1974, and *Guelwaar*, first a film (1992) and later turned into a novel.

12 The three Ms refer to the missionaries, the merchants and the military (personal communication with Med Hondo).

and preservation (film archiving), and so on. To achieve this, countries created important institutions that would help realize that goal. We shall focus on the two most prominent film festivals on the continent as well as the actions of the longest-running filmmakers' organization, the Pan African Federation of Filmmakers (FEPACI), which are still profoundly shaping the destiny of contemporary African cinema.

The JCC and FESPACO as liberated zones for African cinema

One of the very first major gestures by African filmmakers was the creation of 'liberated zones' for African cinema in the form of film festivals that represent controlled spaces in which African films could circulate for a given time (one to two weeks), transitively reaching African and global spectators without the mediation of often private-owned and profit-driven distribution and exhibition companies. Although there currently exist hundreds of film festivals across the globe which feature African films anytime of the year, the two most important and prestigious remain the oldest ones: the Journées Cinématographiques de Carthage (JCC) in Tunisia and the Pan-African Film and Television Festival of Ouagadougou (FESPACO) in Burkina Faso.

The JCC was founded in 1966 by Tahar Cheriaa and the Federation of Tunisian Cine-Club Movement and it is known as the very first film festival organized in Africa, as part of a larger effort to create an autonomous Tunisian national cinema (Khémis, 2016; Corriou, 2015). One of the originalities of the JCC is its unique identity as an Arab and African film festival. In this way, it addresses the double heritage of the organizing country, while bringing into conversation the non-exclusive twin cultural and political philosophies of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, thereby playing an active role in bridging Arab and African cultures. That the festival's original top award, the Golden Tanit, went to Ousmane Sembène's classic *La Noire de...* (1966) illustrates this point. Indeed, Tahar Cheriaa always highlighted the fact that Ousmane Sembène was a cofounder of the festival (Khémis, 2016, p. 20).¹³ Over the years, the JCC has grown to become one of the most important sites for the emergence of new cinematic voices on the continent and a privileged place of memory and becoming for African cinema (Bourguiba, 2013, p. 9).¹⁴

13 Dixit Cheriaa: 'In 1965, I went to Cannes in April to prepare the festival. There, I met Sembène, who for me is the co-founder of the festival....'

14 Sembène is also known for famously stating that, 'Carthage has revealed me to others, but more importantly, the JCC has revealed me to my people, to Africa'.

But perhaps more than any other film festival in the world, FESPACO resonates in the minds of many with the idea of African cinema. Founded in 1969 by African filmmakers and by the Burkinabe Cine-Club movement hosted by the French Cultural Centre in Ouagadougou (Ouédraogo, 1995) and institutionalized in 1972, it was made a biennial in 1976. FESPACO has over the years become one of the most important cultural events on the continent. Every other (odd) year, the festival hosts filmmakers, actors, technicians, producers, distributors and exhibitors, academics, critics and other film professionals from across Africa and her diaspora. Through its existence alone, it embodies the sense of perennity of African cinema as a project, and it has become an inspiring lighthouse for cinephiles in Africa and across the world. The festival also incarnates a certain radically internationalist and globalist ethos. Here, the world is reimagined with a sense of proximity, far from the arena of geopolitics. Connections, linkages, bridges and routes are made and built, culture is shared, knowledge is produced, aesthetic communion is enabled, and a general 'family of the cinema' comes into being. Contagion takes place, and generational conflicts and transmission occur, conspiring to make Africa the centre of the cinematic world for the ephemeral duration of the film festival.

Created in the context of an absence of clear cultural policies, in a country with mostly newsreels and educational documentaries (Dupré, 2012), FESPACO contributed to enabling a lasting film culture in Burkina Faso, ultimately making it the centre of African cinema. Within a year of the festival's creation, the Burkinabe state nationalized film distribution and exhibition (in 1970), and used the funds thus generated to produce the country's first two feature films, Mamadou Djim Kola's *Le Sang des parias* (1973) and René Bernard Yonli's *Sur le chemin de la réconciliation* (1975). Over the years, numerous institutions of African cinema would be hosted in Burkina Faso, including the CIDC–CIPROFILMS (Dupré, 2012; Boughedir, 2011)¹⁵, INAFEC (Ilboudo, 1988)¹⁶, FEPACI¹⁷ and the Cinémathèque Africaine de Ouagadougou.¹⁸

15 CIDC refers to Consortium Interafricain de Distribution Cinématographique, and CIPROFILMS refers to Centre Interafricain de Production de Films. These two regional institutions, founded respectively in 1974 and 1979, are now defunct, and their disappearance contributed to intensifying African cinema's dependence on outside funding (primarily European) while temporarily marking the demise of relatively comprehensive regional African cinematic cooperation.

16 The Institut National d'Éducation Cinématographique de Ouagadougou was created in 1976 by the Burkinabe state with assistance from UNESCO. It lasted a decade and closed as result of financial and structural problems. It trained many of the major voices in Burkinabe cinema, including Idrissa Ouédraogo, Moustapha Dao, Fanta Régina Nacro, Dani Kouyaté, among others.

17 The Pan-African Federation of Filmmakers has been headquartered in Ouagadougou since Burkina Faso, under Thomas Sankara, hosted the third FEPACI Congress in 1985.

18 The Cinémathèque Africaine de Ouagadougou was created by FEPACI, in collaboration with FESPACO, in 1989, on the occasion of the celebration of the festival's twentieth anniversary.

Some of the festival's most important transformations occurred during the Thomas Sankara-led revolution between the years 1983 and 1987, often fondly remembered as the Golden Age of FESPACO. Thomas Sankara was himself a cinephile¹⁹ who had also managed cinema as Secretary of State. Upon assuming power, he continued to support both FESPACO and African cinema more generally. Among his signature achievements are his contribution to the rebirth of FEPACI by funding its third Congress in 1985 and helping to move the secretariat and the headquarters to Burkina Faso. He also intervened directly to finance one of the most important historical epics of African cinema, Med Hondo's classic, *Sarraounia* (1986)²⁰, and he opened up FESPACO to the African diaspora, culminating with the creation of a diaspora category.²¹ This opening reinforced the festival's Pan-African stature by bringing major figures of Afro-diasporic cinema, arts and culture to Ougadougou.²²

FEPACI, a unique filmmakers' organization

While festivals like the JCC and FESPACO are indispensable episodic events during which African films are shown, sold and debated, their ephemeral nature called for the existence of more permanent institutions in charge of advancing the African cinema project. It was for this reason that a continent-wide organization with diasporic branches, and copied after the (O)AU, was founded at the JCC in 1970 as the Pan African Federation of Filmmakers (FEPACI).²³ Indeed, this arguably unique filmmakers' organization in the world was officially recognized by such continental, regional and global institutions as the African Union, UNESCO, the Arab League, the European Union and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (Cheriaa, 1995, p. 253). Over its half century of existence, FEPACI has contributed to the project of creating viable institutions for African cinema by

19 Indeed, paraphrasing Jean-Luc Godard, Sankara exhorted African filmmakers to tell 'the truth 24 times per second'.

20 This involved extending a loan to Med Hondo, as well as assisting with Burkinabe extras (soldiers from the army) cast, crew and equipment to enable the shoot.

21 Although initiated under Sankara, it was launched in 1989, following his assassination. This allowed films from the various African diasporas to compete in their own category for an award named after the late African American actor-activist Paul Robeson. In recent years, films from the diaspora have been allowed to compete for the Yennenga Stallion (the festival's top award) on the same footing as those of the continent.

22 These include Raoul Peck (Haiti), Felix de Rooy (Curaçao), John Singleton (USA), Alice Walker (USA), Tracy Chapman (USA), Danny Glover (USA), Clyde Taylor (USA), Stephen Williams (Jamaica-Canada), Arnold Antonin (Haiti), among others.

23 Founding figures of FEPACI include such pioneers of African cinema as Ousmane Sembène (Senegal), Tahar Cheriaa (Tunisia) and Paulin Soumanou Vieyra (Senegal), among others.

playing the role of a think tank, a database and a library of ideas on the possibilities of African cinema. It has also had a longstanding relationship with African states, exhorting them to create, host, fund and support national, regional and continental film institutions such as FESPACO (Cheriaa, 1995, p. 255)²⁴, the Cinémathèque Africaine de Ouagadougou (1989) and the now defunct CIDC-CIPROFILMS. FEPACI also boasts an illustrious liberationist (through its unconditional support for filmmakers from national liberation movements in countries that were still under colonial dominance) and internationalist heritage through alliances with other filmmaking traditions. It shares analogous neocolonial conditions, including Latin American cinema and progressive cinematic traditions in Europe and North America, which it occasionally translates into quasi-doctrinal texts, resolutions, charters and manifestos (Cham and Bakari, 1996, pp. 17-24, 25-26).²⁵

Finally, the second age of African cinema saw the emergence of larger numbers of filmmakers from more countries across the continent, while affirming their domestic, regional, continental and global recognition. No longer confined to isolated pioneers, African cinema became increasingly strengthened by a dynamic of filmmaking, which saw the emergence of national cinemas that made it possible for most countries on the continent to have filmmakers with filmographies cutting across newsreels, documentaries and fiction films. This multiplying effect also led to the appearance of some of the most powerful voices on the African continent, including Ousmane Sembène, Djibril Diop Mambéty and Safi Faye in Senegal; Moustapha Alassane and Oumarou Ganda in Niger; Idrissa Ouédraogo and Gaston Kaboré in Burkina Faso; Désiré Ecaré, Roger Gnoan M'Bala and Henri Duparc in Côte d'Ivoire; Souleymane Cissé and Cheick Oumar Sissoko in Mali; Jean-Pierre Dikongué Pipa in Cameroon; Haile Gerima in Ethiopia; Med Hondo in Mauritania; Omar Khelifi, Ferid Boughedir and Nouri Bouzid in Tunisia; Mohamed Lakhdar-Hamina and Merzak Allouache in Algeria; Tewfik Saleh and Youssef Chahine in Egypt; and Flora Gomes from Guinea Bissau, among numerous others.

This was also the era where some of the major thematic and aesthetic concerns were outlined, including revisitations of national liberation wars, explorations of lingering issues of class, gender and religion in the context of a decolonized continent, the question of the challenges of cultural transformation in the contemporary world, the status of the oral tradition and, more largely,

24 FEPACI has also encouraged the creation of national cinema weeks across the continent (Niamey, Dakar, Nairobi, Bamako, Djibouti, Harare, Maputo, Bissau), as well as the now defunct MOGPAFIS, among other initiatives.

25 Among the most notable are the Resolutions of the Third World Filmmakers' Meeting in Algiers in 1973 and the Algiers Charter of African Cinema adopted during the Second FEPACI Congress in 1975.

of the continent's past (precolonial and colonial), the critique of corrupt and myopic elites, migration and diasporicity, all of which have been explored through a wide range of formal propositions, extending from the social realist and documentary to the avant-gardist.

The quest for global horizons in the third age of African cinema

Spanning the late 1980s and early 1990s to the present, the third age of African cinema was ushered in by narratives of ending and beginning. Indeed, the late 1980s brought about seismic shifts, which put Africa and its cinema under profound and quasi-irresistible pressures from both outside and inside the continent, and thoroughly transformed them from within.

From the outside, the global geopolitical experiment of Marxism as a state project and as an alternative to triumphant capitalism was coming to an end. Indeed, Burkina Faso, the home of African cinema, was also, incidentally, the space where one of the last such experiments took place anywhere in the world. It was brought to an abrupt end in 1987 with the assassination of Captain Thomas Sankara. This quasi-inexorable shift reached its apex two years later with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, which arguably concluded with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The new era of capitalism, which emerged from these ruins, rested on a new technological infrastructure intended to facilitate it, the features of which included networks and computerization, satellite technology, and the digital revolution with its hardware and software, with profound implications in all spheres of life including cinema (Kellner, 2002, p. 287). Indeed, the rise of technocapitalism (Suarez-Villa, 2009) helped multiply the modes of access to and production of cinema, both fragmenting and expanding its audiences. Meanwhile, interrogating the primacy of the theatrical model and slowly bringing an end to the analog world of celluloid cinema, techocapitalism ushered in a new world of digital based cinema (superimposed over aspects of the electronic).

This context underwrote African cinema's transition to its third age by undergoing tremendous transformations. Two of its most notable responses to these shifts were the emergence of a continent-wide tradition of popular/commercial cinema best incarnated by Nollywood, the cine-cultural industry of Nigeria, and the resilience and expansion of the critical auteurist tradition of filmmaking in a context of existential crisis and renewal.

The rise of Nollywood: A popular cinema tradition with global ambitions

Indeed, it was perhaps in Nigeria that a tremendously creative impulse was able to take the most advantage of these geopolitical and technological transformations in the cinema domain. It should be recalled that the country found itself in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the throes of IMF-World Bank enforced structural adjustment with scarce foreign currency and increased pauperization leading to a general sense of insecurity. This led to de-theatricalization and the unaffordability of celluloid technology, which in turn facilitated the rise of an informal economy of film piracy, adapted to the widespread use of VCRs and camcorders. In this context, Nigerian filmmakers took advantage of available video technology to make films, initially baptizing them 'video-films', gesturing toward a terminology that would account for the moment known as 'media convergence' (Jenkins, 2006) and, in the process, begetting the globally renowned popular tradition of cinema known as Nollywood, considered today one of the three most prolific film industries in the world.

Unlike its predecessors on the rest of the continent, and decidedly turning its back on anti-commercialism, Nollywood went on to create an important industry, infused with the codes of popular commercial cinema, including melodramatic excess, genre films and social mobility narratives with domestic inflections foregrounding the occult as a primary explanatory factor for sudden wealth, as aptly illustrated by its original blockbuster, *Living in Bondage* (1992), directed by Chris Obi Rapu. With a twin embrace and critique of materialism, Nollywood arguably ushered in the African middle class as the centre of its representational project. Indeed, Nollywood makes it a point to flaunt the excesses, trials and tribulations of African affluent classes, undercutting the proverbial representational exceptionalism of the continent as the ultimate *terra povera*. Instead, it celebrates the taken-for-grantedness of a consumerist African cosmopolitanism embodied by a glamour-oriented star system with such figures as Genevieve Nnaji, Ramsey Nouah, Desmond Elliott, Stephanie Okereke, Ini Edo, Omotola Jalade Ekeinde, among numerous others, many of whom have become household names worldwide (Akudinobi, 2015, p. 139; Omafumeme, 2016).

To further secure and expand its status as a global cultural phenomenon, Nollywood uses all the global distribution and exhibition means available. Starting with VHS and VCD in the 1990s, it later deployed itself through DVD and Blu-ray, and invaded cable television worldwide, with specific channels devoted to it. It also entered online distribution with the creation of distribution

platforms dedicated to Nollywood, such as Iroko TV²⁶, Ibaka TV, AfriNolly, as well as a presence on Netflix (the global hegemon in the field), and others, and it has adopted and created apps for cell phones and tablets. Finally, in order to curb piracy, it has reinvested the theatrical space, without relinquishing its dominion over domestic familial consumption.

Beyond the cinematic, Nollywood is also a cultural, political and economic phenomenon, having become Nigeria and Africa's ambassador abroad. Culturally, it creates and disseminates moving images of lifestyles, fashion, styles, accents and mannerisms across the African continent, among the diaspora and beyond, which are often emulated. Moreover, this industry, which produces over 1,000 films a year, has now become the second largest employer in Nigeria after agriculture and ahead of oil and natural gas, as well as the fourth largest industry in terms of GDP, behind agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, crude petroleum and gas (Oh, 2014; Radwan and Strauss, 2011).²⁷ Thus, ushering in the age of the cultural industry for the first time in African history, founded on the moving image. It is thus not surprising that other countries have sought to follow suit with their own versions of Nollywood (Akudinobi, 2015; Garritano, 2013).²⁸ As an industry and a cultural form, Nollywood may be considered one of the ideal spaces where the ways in which Africa shapes and is shaped by the forces of globalization become most legible.

On the 'globalization generation' of the critical auteurist tradition in African cinema

Like Nollywood, the tradition of *auteur* filmmaking in Africa was also subject to the double pressures brought about by the transformations of the global geopolitical landscape and the profound changes in the ecologies of cinema. Indeed, with regard to geopolitics, the demise of the state under the whirlwind of neoliberal forces and its temporary retrenchment from the field of culture under the structural adjustment demands of the Washington Consensus participated

26 Iroko TV is arguably the hegemon in the field today, screening over 2000 films per year. See Omanufeme (Steve), *Runaway Success*.

27 According to Erick Oh, in 2014, Nollywood generated about USD 600 million annually for the economy and employed about 1 million people. See https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/erick_oh_nigerias_film_industry.pdf. Also see Radwan, I., Strauss, P. and Nwagbosa, C. 2010. *Achieving the Promise of African Cultural Exports*. <https://user-wb8ncdk.cld.bz/Microsoft-Word-Achieving-the-promise-of-african-cultural-e>

28 Ghallywood in Ghana, Hillywood in Rwanda, Kaniwood in Northern Nigeria, Bongowood in Tanzania, Riverwood in Kenya, etc.

in temporarily foreclosing the possibilities of a financially autonomous and self-sustaining *auteur* cinema on the continent, resulting in the momentary demise of initiatives toward building a continent-wide cinema infrastructure. In its wake, the *auteur* African film community was increasingly forced to rely on survival and accommodation strategies to maintain filmmaking activity on the continent. In that context – further complicated by a generally non-enthusiastic private sector (itself marginalized by filmmakers for a long time) and steep currency devaluation²⁹ – a proliferation of foreign actors helped keep cinema alive on the continent, while also contributing to a profound dependency of African film practice. Thus, traditional participants in the political economy of African cinema, like France and the International Organization of La Francophonie, were joined by the European Union (at the supra-state level). Throughout the 1990s and up to the present, additional state and state-derived actors (CNC, Fonds Sud), as well as institutions of world cinema, including European television (Canal +, Channel Four, ZDF, TSR, Arte, TV5, among many others), and film festival-based funding (the World Cinema Fund in Germany, the Sundance Lab [US] the Hubert Bals Fund [The Netherlands], Hot Docs [Canada]), among others, made it possible for films to be made. Private international initiatives also emerged (such as Africa First in the US and One Fine Day Films in Germany, among others), multiplying modes of access to filmmaking across the continent (Sanogo, 2015c).³⁰

This transformed political economy also coincided with changes in the ecologies of cinema. Indeed, the techno-capitalist dimension of globalization engendered an additional identity crisis within cinema itself with computerization, digitization and the network society profoundly transforming how cinema is viewed. Moving images were no longer confined to theatres and television for their production, distribution and consumption in that they could also now count on all aspects of the digital universe to further extend their reach.

Thus, the metaphoric ‘diasporization’ of the political economy of African cinema, combined with that of the ecologies of cinema itself, demanded new responses from the African film world. One of them was the actual diasporization

29 In particular, in Francophone countries, where the bulk of this tradition was based, the CFA currency was devalued by half in January 1994.

30 Africa First was a highly successful albeit short-lived US-based initiative spearheaded by African American producer Kisha Cameron-Dingle, in partnership with Universal Studios-owned Focus Features to produce African short films. By its end, in 2013, about 20 films had been produced. One Day Films was a production company founded by German film director Tom Tykwer in partnership with Deutsche Welle Akademie, Rushlake Media, the Festival Agency and Ginger Ink (a Kenyan company) to train filmmakers and produce one feature film per year. See One Fine Day Film: <https://www.onefinedayfilms.com/>

of film personnel across the world. Indeed, if the 1960s and 1970s were marked by a quasi-requirement for African filmmakers, alongside civil servants and others, to return to Africa to contribute to building the continent from the ground up, the past three decades has not been equally obligatory for contemporary generations of African filmmakers to return, and who have received their training mostly in Europe and North America. Like many other directors, they choose to become diasporic subjects, not only to secure easier access to sources of funding but also in part because, in this age of migration, Africa is arguably everywhere and thus needs to be celebrated and defended everywhere. Moreover, they contend that their deployment of the insider/outsider gaze offers them particular insight and lucidity vis-à-vis the problems of the continent.

A group of filmmakers self-consciously embodied this ethos and came together in the 1990s under the banner of a movement known as 'La Guilde Africaine des Réalisateurs et Producteurs' (Guild of African Filmmakers and Producers). As the first generation of a cinema of globalization in Africa, they defined themselves as wanderers and nomads for whom cinema is a vehicle (La Guilde Africaine, 2011) and the digital universe as a means to establish a break with previous practice while acknowledging continuities. Adopting migration, as one of the grand narratives of their cinema, and self-inscription and reflexivity as their signature, they have, in the past decade, become some of the strongest cinematic voices in Africa and around the world, contributing significantly to fiction and documentary forms. Among the most prominent names are Jean-Marie Teno (Cameroon), Nadia El Fani (Tunisia), Abderrahmane Sissako (Mauritania), Jean-Pierre Bekolo (Cameroon), Mahamat Saleh Haroun (Chad), Fanta Régina Nacro (Burkina Faso) and Jihan El-Tahri (Egypt). Their fluency with the language of globality and flexible identification (Cottrell Studemeyer, 2015) is also translated by an intense sense of mobility and movement.³¹ They have now become the global face of African cinema in the international film festival circuit, vying for awards at the various major festivals and at the Academy Awards, and involved in the world cinema circuit, with some of them counting as genuine masters of cinema at the world level. Indeed, they are incessantly courted to participate in international juries, in global omnibus projects, and in making statements about the state of Africa and its cinema. Although their practice in no way exhausts the wide and varied range of experiences of filmmaking across Africa today, they leave in their wake many new directors

31 Abderrahmane Sissako has made films in countries as diverse as Mauritania, Mali, Angola, Tunisia, Russia and China, while Jihan El-Tahri's films have taken her to Saudi Arabia, France, Egypt, South Africa, the United States, the UK, among other countries.

who have also engaged (consciously or not) in work resonating with what might be termed the 'Guilde paradigm'.³²

From a cinematic standpoint, an important dimension of this paradigm has been the exploration of prospective textual practices, which foresees the positivity of the imaginary as one of the spaces through which aesthetic and political propositions could be made, pertaining to both the present predicaments of the continent as well as potential avenues for its destiny. Among them, one may include an increasing corpus of anticipatory, futurist and counterfactual films that occupy the utopian-dystopian range of possibilities. Abderrahmane Sissako's *La vie sur terre* (1998) and *Bamako* (2006), Jean-Pierre Bekolo's *Les Saignantes* (2005) and *Le Président* (2013), along with films by non-Gilde members, such as Wanuri Kahiu's *Pumzi* (2009) and Sylvestre Amoussou's *Africa Paradis* (2006) and *L'Orage africain : Un continent sous influence* (2017), partake in this mode of filmmaking, in which something that is often impossible to actualize in the real is transformed into the fictional and the imaginary.

Conclusion

From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, African presence in cinema has without a doubt encountered and surmounted tremendous challenges in the more than a century of existence of this unique medium. It has grown from a context of anthropo-zoological exhibition in Europe, to its current status as one of the indispensable voices in world cinema. This has been achieved through the work of individual filmmakers as well as the ubiquity of some of its film practices. This is indeed an unprecedented trajectory. African cinema is today a global presence, accessible as much in theatres, television and online as through tablets and smartphones. African films are routinely selected and awarded at film festivals. Through their radical openness to the world, they have imbibed references from every cinematic tradition around the globe. Likewise, their influence is increasingly being felt the world over with non-African filmmakers adopting many of their political and aesthetic strategies.³³ Knowledge of African cinema is increasingly seen as general knowledge of cinema, no longer the preserve of erudite cinephiles.

32 Several major contemporary filmmakers may arguably be said to have followed this paradigm. These include Alain Gomis (Senegal/France), Newton Aduaka (Nigeria/UK), Faouzi Bensaidi (Morocco/France), Nabil Ayouch (Morocco/France), Raja Amari (Tunisia/France), Kivu Ruhorahoza (Rwanda), among others.

33 Several members of The L.A. Rebellion film movement have acknowledged their debt to African cinema, in particular to Ousmane Sembène. These include the two most prominent voices of the movement, Charles Burnett and Haile Gerima. See Perrin and Tiprez, 2007.

While daunting challenges remain, recent initiatives, including the return of the state, the establishment of regional funding mechanisms³⁴ and the involvement of continental bodies³⁵, as well as the growing presence of the private sector in the industry, supported by driven, dynamic, talented and original filmmakers in every corner of the continent, combine to give rise to optimism and a promising future for moving image practice in Africa. This practice will be fueled by a desire to reconquer the continent's dignity by filming its beauty, its complexity, its doubts and uncertainties, as well as its attitudes toward life, the body and spirituality. African filmmakers will continue to use cinema to affirm their humanity (often denied by cinema itself) underscoring their sameness with the world but also, and importantly, celebrating their exceptionalism vis-à-vis the world in light of their dual status as both the history and the future of humanity.

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34 Regional and continental institutions, like the West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and indeed the African Union (AU), are increasingly getting involved in supporting African cinema. For the latter, see Christopher Voulias, African Union launches commission to boost the continent's industries. *Variety*, 25 June 2016. <http://variety.com/2016/film/news/african-union-launches-commission-to-boost-the-continents-industries-1201803550/>

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CHAPTER 21

READING *LESO*

African Fabric as a Gateway to the World

Mshai Mwangola

Introduction

As an artefact, the cloth known popularly as *kanga* or *leso* is a fascinating reminder of tradition, as a channel of practices in the present through which the past engages the future.¹ It has recently enjoyed a resurgence, becoming one of the most ubiquitous markers of East African identity in the regional creative industries market, particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. Emerging from the culture of the Swahili people of the western rim of the Indian Ocean, this is a fabric with a fascinating history, connecting it to a myriad of other places and peoples, and reaching both into the precolonial past as well as into the foreseeable future. In this paper, the terms *leso* and *kanga* are used interchangeably to amplify a history of belonging that is, today, associated most prominently with two national spaces, but that also serves as a reminder of the multiplicity of origins, influences and experiences intertwined within this iconic textile.

Each *leso* is a rectangular piece of cloth measuring about 150-165 cm × 105-115 cm. Printed on one side, it has four main elements to its design. *Leso* traditionally come

¹ The cloth is known as *kanga* (also spelled *khanga*) in ki-Unguja, the dialect spoken in the biggest Zanzibari island, Unguja, in Tanzania. In ki-Mvita, associated with Kenya's biggest island, Mvita (Mombasa), the cloth is known as *leso*. The former has gained more traction, probably as a result of the British designation of ki-Unguja as the dialect chosen as 'official' Kiswahili by the colonial state, and therefore the basis for 'Kiswahili Sanifu' taught in both countries. At independence, this was maintained, even in Kenya. Unless otherwise stated, all non-English words in this paper are in Kiswahili.

in pairs (known as *doti* or *gora*), with the two mirror halves of the pair separated by a line indicating where to cut them to get two roughly equal pieces. Indeed, its precursor was known as *nguo mbili* (two cloths), as each piece is big enough to wrap around the body, and the two pieces were traditionally used to complement each other. Originally, *leso* were made exclusively from cotton; today, they are made in a variety of fabrics, such as polyester.

The design of the fabric incorporates several elements. There is the border (*pindo*), which surrounds the *mji* (main body) of the cloth. Most, but not all, *kanga* have a written text or message (*ujumbe*) centred inside a rectangular box just above the lower border, and there is usually design information on the selvedge as well. Together, these design elements function as a form of palimpsest, a testament to Eastern Africa's rich history as a cosmopolitan hub, long before the colonial era was established at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In this chapter, I shall first give a brief history of the *leso*. I will then look at the design elements in detail, focusing on how they contribute to the *leso*'s reputation as a 'cloth that speaks'. Lastly, I shall reflect on the ways in which *leso*, despite its intimate association with the Swahili communities of its birth, continues to evolve as the bearer of many identities, celebrating the cultural complexity of Africa.

Origins

There is written evidence that cotton has been grown and woven in Eastern Africa since the twelfth century in a handful of communities, particularly in the north. Mogadishu, in present-day Somalia, for example, was widely known as a centre for cotton manufacture as far back as the fourteenth century. However, it was trade with India, especially from the fifteenth century, that set cotton on a journey of becoming better known and more widely available in wide swathes of the region, stretching from the Swahili coast to as far inland as Ujiji in present-day Western Tanzania. Trade caravans in search of ivory, gum copal, copra, hides, jute, grains and enslaved people brought with them a variety of goods, not least of which was cotton. Over the centuries, the Indian Ocean cotton trade would flourish that, in time, top-of-the-range cotton would compete at the most favourable prices in the market, making it widely available as the material of choice for clothing across the entire region.



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FIGURE 1. Mola turehemu kwa yaliyotufika
(*God be merciful to us for what has happened to us*). Mali.

For centuries, most of the cotton imports to the region came from the Indian subcontinent, from places like Kutch and Surat in Gujarat.² In the nineteenth century, this monopoly was challenged as ships began to bring in cotton from Europe as well as American cotton, which became known locally as *merikani*. The American Civil War and its aftermath made *merikani* difficult to source and more expensive, and the trade advantage therefore swung to India, which was not only the transit point for much of the European cotton but also a manufacturing centre in its own right.

It was during this time that *kanga* first emerged as a distinct textile on the liminal space of the Swahili coast. By this time, imported cotton was well on its way to becoming the material of choice for clothing in the region, replacing other alternatives, such as mud-cloth or leather, in use at the time. There was, for example, *kitambi*, a cloth that may well have given its name to the Kiswahili

2 Kutch, in Gujarat, is also home to some of the community of people known as the Sidhi. While most of the Sidhi are believed to have descended from enslaved Africans, brought to what is today modern-day India from East Africa during this period, there are also those who are believed to have voluntarily migrated for professional reasons.

word for cloth, *kitambaa*. It was generally dyed red or blue and came as imported cotton, sometimes plain and sometimes featuring little patterns. Women from different communities in the region, particularly those living in communities associated with thriving trade routes and coastal ports such as Zanzibar and Mombasa, became adept at wearing what in Kiswahili would eventually be dubbed *nguo mbili* (two pieces of cloth), which was wrapped around the body in various ways. The wearing of cotton cloth became a status symbol and, with time, desirability was determined by a variety of factors: the quality of the cloth; the fashionable colours of the moment; the strategically added additions, such as a contrasting strip of colour or a fringe, added to make the edge more distinctive; and later, different prints on the cloth. All these became determining factors in deciding which cloth would command the market in the different places in the region. Cloth was sourced from a variety of markets by this point, even with the establishment of cotton plantations that were worked by enslaved people in the region, with imports from the Netherlands and Switzerland joining the American and English products in the East African market.

With the availability of fabrics came creativity. The Indian factories benefited from their close association with the emigrants to the East African coast, who had settled as traders and become important as middlemen versed in the intricacies of the regional cotton trade. Many of these traders had migrated in the early decades of the nineteenth century from places like Kutch to ports like Zanzibar, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo, but still maintaining close ties with Indian factories. They were well placed to understand and anticipate the demands of a sophisticated market with varied and fast-evolving tastes and an unforgiving insistence on quality. The traders could, and did, enter into profitable alliances with the Indian factories, researching, anticipating and facilitating fashion trends as a way of winning an advantage in what was, and still is, a demanding market. It soon became evident that the Eastern African market would not simply accept what was sent to it indiscriminately. For example, *kisuto*, a cloth that may well be the prototype for one of the most well-known of *kanga* designs, the *kisutu*, was first made from English cotton at a time when it was struggling to compete with *merikani*, then the gold standard for cotton imports into the Swahili coast. Innovative factories in Bombay began to 'enhance the value' of the plain cotton before its export to East Africa by adding simple motifs to the fabric, such as polka dots, or by dyeing the material blue or red; colours that had proved attractive in the East African market. Jeremy Prestholdt (2004) demonstrates how the influence of this market was felt in the global textile industry throughout this century, forcing factories in England, the

Netherlands, Germany and India to make a number of adjustments to cater for the specific tastes of the East African cotton market. The cloth that emerged by the end of the nineteenth century, as the distinct fabric we know as *kanga* today, is a reflection of this unique mix of historical, social and economic influences bearing upon the rich and diverse cultural space served by the Eastern African cloth market. That there are competing narratives to its specific origins only add another layer of complexity, resisting the notion of the *kanga* as a marker of identity neatly packaged and conveniently delivered for sale as a mere consumer product for the global marketplace.

The word *leso* allegedly comes from the Portuguese word for kerchiefs or scarves, *lenço*. In the market since the sixteenth century, they had become common items in the major Swahili ports. Somewhere in the latter half of the nineteenth century, *lenço* were innovatively combined to make a single cloth, big enough to cover the body. Women would sew together two rows of three unseparated pieces to make a single piece of cloth of roughly the same size as one half of the *nguo mbili*. As it grew in popularity, it became known as *leso ya kushona* (*lenço* sewed together). This, some say, is the origin of the basic design, with the *pindo* as a definitive edge, and the repetitive block patterns of the *mji* becoming the singular characteristic that set *leso* apart from other *nguo mbili* designs. Combining *leso* in this way had another added advantage in that it was cheaper than other types of print designs, making it more affordable for many more women to own printed fabric, generally considered more fashionable than blocks of colour. These designs became so popular that by 1870, manufacturers were using the *lenço* design as a prototype for cloth-runs of specific sizes that they could only sell in this market.

There are competing narratives for the origin of the word *kanga*. The most popular refers to the painstaking practice of block printing unbleached *merikani* by hand, adapting indigenous process and materials to create repetitive patterns on the material. It is said that it was indeed this process that led to the iconic spotted design reminiscent of the plumage of the guinea-fowl (*kanga*) for which it was then named. Another tongue-in-cheek explanation, also referencing the *kanga*, is that the word was appropriated as a synecdoche for a group of women (wearing it), allegedly because 'their chatter sounded like the sound of a guinea fowl!' Sharifa Zawawi also points out that when the cloth is written as *khanga*, it is most likely that its name derived from the Arabic (Omani) word *kharquah* (piece of cloth), in turn derived from *kharq* (to tear or split), which recalls the related Fulani word (and cloth) *kherka*.³

3 See Zawawi (2005, p. 129).

These myths of origin point to the different influences bearing upon the East African coast and the growing popularity of cotton, and particularly the creativity embedded in the concept of *nguo mbili*, which enabled a range of innovative ideas to flourish and come together in this fabric. It is likely that, even as some communities were becoming accustomed to fabric produced and used in one of these ways, others were embracing the alternatives. Some of the processes used to decorate the cloth, such as blockprinting, were indigenous; others, like the adaptation of tie-dyeing, used to create the *bandhani* design on saris, were adopted and became endogenous. Somewhere along the way, the basics came together. Moreover, in a region where cloth would soon become the standard for clothing, slowly an agreement came together on what constitutes *leso*, that is, a distinct fabric that would later become popular in the region, such as *kitenge*. That this still exists – despite the proliferation of uses and communities that have now adopted the *leso* as part of their own culture – is a testament to its simple genius design that hit upon the right balance between innovation and standardization.

It is also important to reflect on the global nature of this fabric whose origins manifest the historical economic significance of the East African coast, not only within the Indian Ocean world but also reaching across as far as North America. Today, when the economy of this region seems to languish at the periphery of the world, this simple fabric serves to remind us that success is not a given. Its story highlights the importance of local priorities in policy matters and when determining the future of the regional textile industry, for example.

‘The cloth that speaks’

Most *kanga* scholars and connoisseurs focus on two aspects in their discussions about this fabric: aesthetics and communication. *Kanga* can be considered functional art in that a lot of its value is invested in its visual appeal. Indeed, *kanga* is becoming more and more popular, not only as a basic fabric for African fashion and interior design, especially from the East African region, but also as a resource for a range of professional artists. There is also the communicative aspect. *Kanga* are used as a form of speech in their own right, as identified by women in particular. Indeed, Saida Yahya-Othman (1997) argues, with reference to Swahili culture, that *kanga* is a critical facilitator of resistance and indirectness. These two aspects are enabled by the design of the *kanga*.

As noted in the introduction, each *leso* comes as a rectangular piece of cloth, half of an identical pair that are usually sold together. There have a number of design elements, which can be divided into two forms: the visual (images) and the verbal (words). The visual elements can be further categorized into two: the first comprises the different motifs that are combined to create a unique design on the cloth, and the second is the colour of the cloth. The verbal elements can also be categorized into two, the first of which is the public message prominently displayed in most *leso*, just above the lower selvedge, and the secondary element that is printed more discreetly on the border. Each *leso* has two names by which it may be known: one referencing the most prominent of its visual motifs and the other by its verbal public message.

The basic visual design is made up of various motifs arranged in geometric patterns in two sections of the cloth: the main part at the centre, the *mji*, and the decorative edge, the *pindo*. The *mji* can be as simple as one giant motif set off in a plainly coloured background. It can also consist of a single motif meticulously repeated in horizontal, vertical or slanted lines, or it can even be made up of blocks of intricate patterns. The *pindo* is the decorative border enclosing the *mji*. This is typically a rectangular block, often of the primary motif in the *mji*, especially in designs that feature a single centred motif. There are exceptions to this, for example, commemorative or homage *kangas* featuring the face of a person or a symbol representative of an organization or institution, or where the intricacy or detail of the representation of a physical element, such as a building, would make it difficult to reproduce. In some cases, the *pindo* may be of a contrasting design to the *mji*. For example, a *kanga*, where the *mji* is made up of simple lines of dots, might be enclosed in a *pindo* of abstract or realistic motifs, such as fruits or flowers. Some *kanga* also have corner motifs known as *vilindo* (guards) at the four corners of the cloth. Simple geometric shapes, like circles, are popular motifs, as are abstract designs, such as those resulting from batik processes originating in Indonesia. One will also find realistic representations of everyday objects like fruit or flowers, or even intricate images of human-made items, such as teapots, or infrastructure, like buildings or bridges. The primary motif on a *kanga* becomes the source of one of its *jina*.

There are also *leso* whose meaning is clear and unlikely to be misinterpreted. For example, *leso* with religious imagery, such as a mosque, may be set aside for use in related settings and contexts, or used as a marker of religious identity. During particular seasons, for example, during elections, some political parties or candidates may distribute *leso*, bearing their images or symbols, to their supporters. In such cases, the visual may also serve as a marker of identity. In other cases, the meaning

is more ambiguous and sometimes specific to a particular group who, for one reason or another, may be expected to understand the symbolism of a particular motif. For example, the ever-popular *korosho* (cashew nut) and *embe* (mango) fruit, which recall the Indian teardrop shape known as *ambi*, are considered by some to symbolize fertility, and they are popular as bridal wedding gifts as well as for use in other contexts such as farming. There are those who, therefore, consider it inappropriate for young, unmarried girls to wear *leso* with these motifs.

There are also situations where individuals or groups might choose to assign meaning to a particular motif, regardless of whether that meaning was originally intended or not, or whether others embrace it as such. Some believe that the tiny crosses on the popular *kisutu* design were inspired by the advent of the first Red Cross ambulances to be seen in Zanzibar during a particularly devastating cholera outbreak in the late nineteenth century. Others point to the purported association with the Portuguese *lenço*, speculating that the crosses may have derived from designs incorporating the cross as a religious symbol. Thus, a particular *kanga* may bear personal or collective meaning within a specific context to some, while signifying something entirely different – or nothing at all – to others.



FIGURE 2. Wakuu wa nchi za jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki. *The leaders of the countries of the East African Community. Note the allusion to fertility (prosperity) in the pindo denoting fertility (prosperity).*

Colour is another visual feature that ‘speaks’. Most *leso* feature two to five colours or are printed in a variety of colours, giving consumers alternatives to choose from. Colours range from simple black and white designs to elaborate palettes. In general, personal tastes determine which one gets picked over others; however, there are instances where colour conveys meaning and is therefore selected for reasons other than aesthetic preference. Colour can serve as a marker of identity. For example, when it came to bridal *kisutu*, blue has been the colour historically associated with Mombasa, in contrast to the Zanzibari preference for red. This use of colour, as a marker of identity, is not confined to the Swahili; for example, red has been the preferred colour for many Maasai clans, such that some *leso* are now popularly associated with that colour. Colour can also be used to transmit subtle messages. For example, a Swahili woman might wear a red and black pair of *leso* in the bedroom, or cover the bed with a red *leso* to indicate to her partner her unavailability for sexual intimacy.

The incorporation of written text as part of the design is one of the most celebrated characteristics of *kanga*. It is generally credited to the ingenuity of a Mombasa-based trader, Kaderdina Hajee Essak (also known as Abdulkader, or simply Abdulla). He was, reportedly, the first to commission the addition of *misemo* (sayings) printed just above the lower *pindo*, probably in consultation with his customers. It is unlikely that he could have anticipated the impact this would have. Within a few years, *misemo* became such a major feature of the design that they are a – if not *the* – primary consideration for most *kanga* connoisseurs. Initially, these inscriptions, many of which were religious, appeared in the Arabic script, in which Kiswahili was first written. Some of the sayings were also in Arabic. When the British imposed the Latinization of Kiswahili, the sayings were gradually printed in roman script. By the mid-twentieth century, those in Arabic script had all but disappeared in the region, although they can still be found in places like Oman. While Kiswahili remains the dominant language for *kanga*, English is also used, especially for *kanga* issued for commemorative purposes, or intended for special events or specific groups, such as tourists.

The *misemo* are also the source of the *jina* by which most individual designs are known. *Jina* can be categorized into several different groups, falling within the broad categories of collective and individual messages. One might think of *leso* messaging as a broad continuum, from the very general to the extremely personal. Some bear commemorative, congratulatory or felicitous inscriptions, marking an event, such as a national anniversary or an auspicious occasion, like Eid-a-Fitr or Christmas. Or they may be inspired by a leader’s rise in power, or a visit to the region of a significant leader or an eminent personality. Others

feature or allude to well-known proverbs, folk wisdom or song lyrics. These can be displayed as a benign affirmation of the 'truth', but they can also be deployed to make veiled commentary or send a coded message to an intended audience, who is expected to recognize the message being communicated. Still, others pass on a civic, commercial or political message that might also serve double duty, revealing the wearer's identity, affiliation, personal beliefs or commitments. There are also the carefully chosen personal messages, which are sent as a riddle, and depend on factors such as context, audience, and the relationship between the parties involved. These include the most benign of messages (for example, commiserating death, or rejoicing in the good fortune of a loved one), or the most cutting of remarks (maybe to warn off a rival) or defiant declarations (such as reprimanding gossipers). *Lesò* bearing intimate declarations of love might be discreetly set aside for private use, while those with spiteful commentary are flaunted in the most public of spaces and contexts – or vice versa. Either way, as Rayya Timmamy and Amiri Swaleh (2016) note, when skilfully deployed, *lesò* provide a memorable message system that has become the subject of much discussion both in academic and popular circles.

Perhaps the most important feature of this aspect of *kanga* design is the ambiguity that surrounds this 'short message service' system. The limited space on the cloth means that the printed message is both precise and concise. Allusion is commonly used. A few words may point to song lyrics or poetry that bears the intended message, creating a privileged audience privy to the message and made up of only those able to recognize its source. Additional meaning may be layered onto the *jina* depending on the context in which a *kanga* is shared, worn or used, and on the roles taken or conferred to those present or implicated in the 'performance'. In this sense, *kanga* can be used to create communities of belonging depending on who is 'in' or 'out' of the group. As Rose Marie Beck (2001) argues, the ambiguity of the message means its recipient can honestly be at a loss as to whether or not the intended message is correctly inferred, or if she or he is making a fatal mistake in misinterpreting the intended message. This aspect of *kanga* performance can be controversial, and some wearers prefer *kanga* with no message on them because of the ambiguity, referred to as *kanga bubu* (mute *kanga*) for this reason. Conversely, this can be an empowering space where women can make 'strong statements about their concerns, while at the same time avoiding any direct conflict which may arise from their individual actions' (Yahya-Othman, 1997, p. 135).



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FIGURE 3. Wachemshe hao hao kwangu utapoa (*Boil those ones [over there]; with me, your [heat] will cool down*). Note the relationship in this case between the main motif in the mji and the msemu. The pindo might also suggest fertility or prosperity. One possible interpretation: 'Fight other people not me, if you want to prosper'. Mali.

The second kind of verbal messaging is less publicly visible but also plays an important role. Discreetly printed on one of the edges, usually the lower selvedge, are copyright details about the *kanga* that distinguishes each design. Typically, this comprises a design number and the name of the commissioning business: occasionally the factory and, more rarely, the designer's name. This information is valuable for two reasons. On the production side, it serves to document each design, making it easy to communicate new or similar orders based on a design already produced. At the same time, it gives consumers a chance to make informed choices. Some master-designers and factories have become so well known that their name has become a hallmark of quality. This is the case, for example, with the famous 'Mali la Abdulla', the Mombasa shop associated with the family of Abdulkader, the trader reputed to have first commissioned *leso* with inscriptions. In the boom years for the different countries that have dominated the *leso* market – India, Japan, Kenya and others – this additional information on the location of manufacture is a way of attracting customers, either because clients associate the country's products with superior quality or because it offers a particular characteristic, or appeals to a sense of patriotism or solidarity. For example, the inscription 'Pamba ya Tanzania' (Tanzanian cotton) is valued in

Tanzania, following its independence, by patriotic customers preferring locally-made textiles to imported ones. Information about the weight of the cloth (heavy or light) is also conveyed: depending on use, women might choose either heavy or light, with the former preferred for household duties and the latter particularly favoured for hot and humid conditions.




FIGURE 4. Leso RK Nzito khangas, Mombasa Kenya, D No. 2171109 with corner of the cloth displaying one of the four vilindo as well as the pindo. K.H.E. Mali ya Abdulla, Mombasa Kenya with pindo detail showing.

Finally, it is worth noting that the very action of wearing a *kanga* can be interpreted as communicating a message. Beyond the obvious identification of the fabric as 'African cloth', the manner or the context in which *kanga* is worn can make a statement about one's identity. In Swahili culture, an adult man will generally share a pair of *kanga* with his wife in the privacy of their bedroom. For an adult man to be seen in public wearing a *kanga* belonging to a woman who is not his wife is potentially a serious breach of social etiquette. Used as a shroud in the same culture, it communicates the message that the deceased was female. In other cultures within this region, the way a *kanga* is worn says something about a person's identity, their ethnicity, their age or social status, their religious or professional affiliation, etc. East Africans, particularly

of Tanzanian or Kenyan origin, living in diaspora in different parts of the world, today often wear or display *kanga* as a performance of various identities, not least their affiliation with the region. Perhaps the most notorious manifestation of the communicative potential of the *kanga* came in Jacob Zuma's assertion at his 2006 rape trial that he had interpreted the wearing of a *kanga* by the plaintiff as an invitation to consensual sex. *Kanga* have been worn in the streets of South Africa, including outside the court room, and have appeared in multiple other places since then as a symbol of protest, especially against sexual violence.

Leso as identity

While the origins of *leso* incontestably come from Swahili communities, especially from Tanzania and Kenya, this cloth has become an integral part of contemporary African identity. *Leso* is probably the only cloth that can be considered ubiquitous throughout Eastern Africa, particularly in its countries of origin, including in parts of the region far removed from its Indian Ocean coastal home. Today, while *leso* retains its connection with Swahili and its central place in Swahili culture, it has also become embedded in other communities. There are, for instance, *leso* designs in Kenya and Tanzania that are now identified with the different Maa-speaking communities. One can now enter a shop and ask for a design, associating it not with a particular visual or verbal *jina* but with a particular community or clan that has chosen a particular design to distinguish itself from others. These 'Maasai' *leso* are so commonplace they have all but replaced the traditional barkcloth that the Maasai once wore. This evolution of 'traditional dress' can also be found among the Giriama, one of the Miji Kenda communities of the Kenyan coast, who have also embraced the red *kisutu* as a marker of identity, alongside the cotton *hando* for which they are known.⁴

Over the first century of its existence, *kanga* evolved from being a fashionable form of *nguo mbili* on the Swahili coast to being the *de facto* national fabric of Kenya and Tanzania. Further south, *kanga* has inspired other cloths that bear text, such as the *lamba hoany* of Madagascar. It has also spread into the hinterland; it is not uncommon to find *leso* on sale and in use all over Eastern, Central and Southern Africa. Perhaps this is due to its versatility, and the genius that came with not prescribing how it should be used or worn. Perhaps

⁴ *Hando* is a two-colour skirt, historically red, blue and white, made from layering cotton to exaggerate the hips of the wearer. *Kisutu* is often now used to cover the upper body when wearing *hando*.

it is because *kanga* is just one iteration of a fabric tradition that has long and deep roots across the entire region. This has facilitated its assimilation into the myriad cultural traditions and practices of the region, making *kanga* an integral part of contemporary traditions and practices, performing the composite cultures of twentieth and twenty-first century African communities, nations and regions. For example, today, there are few Kenyan weddings where *kanga* does not feature in one form or another, irrespective of the ethnic, racial or social background of the individuals or families involved. In many communities, even those historically and culturally far removed from the Swahili coast, they are exchanged today as gifts between two families, or used to 'bless' brides and thank or affirm the female relatives of the bridal couple, thus playing an essential part in the rituals of transition into marriage, albeit in different ways. Most Kenyan homes will have a *kanga* somewhere, if not as a handy piece of cloth used to wrap a baby or to wear as a kind of apron as one goes about doing chores at home or in the marketplace, or used as a decorative item.

Three decades ago, with the decline of the local cotton industry and the proliferation of cheap second-hand clothing imports into the region, it seemed as though *leso* was finally on the decline and would gradually disappear as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first. Today, however, there has been a surge of new interest in this fabric, championed in no small way by a new wave of fashion and home décor designers, as well as by other visual artists and cultural workers who have brought *leso*, once again, to the forefront of the creative industries of its home countries, and who are, themselves, influential leaders of the regional economy. Indeed, there has even been a discernible shift in the kind of colours and designs now appearing in the marketplace, with a clear attempt to seduce a new generation of local connoisseurs who embrace the cloth, not only as an artefact passed down to them as heritage but also as a conscious part of their identity. This is partly the reason for the many experiments currently seen on the market, with *leso* now being produced in fabrics such as polyester and rayon, or sewn into a variety of clothing or cloth products, such as bags. Just as importantly, *kanga* is now emerging onto the global contemporary scene as a fabric in its own right, with roots to a particular history and space but also – as we have seen in the case of South Africa – able to 'stand' on its own two feet. This, coupled with a resurgence of interest in the communicative potential of the cloth, bodes well for the future of *leso* as an important signifier of identity, an effective 'short message service' provider, and a culturally and historically rich medium of artistic expression.



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FIGURE 5. Contemporary chiffon skirt inspired by the traditional Giriama *hando* using a red *kisutu* design. Here it is set against a traditional dark-blue cotton Mombasa *kisutu*. Note the blocks of patterns of the *kisutu* design, including the 'tangerine and crosses' mix.

Conclusion

The *leso* or *kanga* is a celebration of the pluralistic nature of interactions on the East African (Swahili) coast. Just as the multiple myths regarding its origins defy any singular narrative, this cloth embodies the complexity of African interactions and engagement with those who identify with this region in one way or another. In this brief history of its evolution, from its beginnings within the complex exchanges of the global cotton trade to its multiple iterations and interpretations throughout the East African Swahili coast, I have argued that *kanga* is a cultural palimpsest illustrating the global nature of many of the cultures of Africa. It is also a testament to the region's ability to influence the global economy in response to the priorities of its population, and to the latter's innovative potential to develop unique products whose appeal reaches far beyond its borders. As a performer of the rich cornucopia of African identities, concerns, priorities and realities, this cloth continues to 'speak' and unify Africa's peoples regardless of their ancestral origin or geographical location, through its design, its use, and its continuing ability to remain relevant through time and space.

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CONTEMPORARY CIRCULATION OF AFRICAN ART IN CUBA AND HAITI

Biennials, Exhibitions and Artists' Travels

Yolanda Wood

Introduction

The circulation of art is a theme of great interest in relation to the major trends of globalization, including that of artistic processes. This movement does not, however, affect all countries or regions in the same way. Indeed, these circuits have emerged under particular conditions related to a certain cultural hegemony that appeared in the so-called modern period. Within this system, Africa and the Caribbean represented subordinate spaces at the international level. The arts have not escaped this colonial arrangement of the world or its hierarchies in a context very much dependent on geopolitics articulated, even today, in terms of polarities and contrasts, centres and peripheries¹, North and South.

This chapter focuses on some of these artistic experiences, along with certain dialogues, between the imaginative world of Africa and those of two Caribbean countries, the historical and cultural formation of which are intimately linked to those of the great continent on the other side of the Atlantic, namely Cuba and Haiti. These two emblematic territories within the Caribbean were both affected by the slave trade. Enslaved men and women not only left a very important imprint

1 '[T]o enter the centre-periphery dialectic is to settle into a situation of power within which one squeezes the existence of another, stigmatized in a general sense...', considering that these categories should not be given an ontological value, 'such a characteristic does not emerge from an intrinsic quality they possess, but simply from a situation which, in the majority of cases, began as a colonial situation.' (Colombres, 2014, pp. 449-458).

on Antillean demographic formations, deriving from plantation-based societies, but above all, they enabled the cultures of the African peoples to produce one of the most impressive symbioses of original beliefs, languages, ways of life and thought. Laying claim to this heritage and presence has been an essential part of the whole – long and complex – process of building Caribbean identities and revolutionary struggles in these islands. Haiti was the first abolitionist republic in the Americas (1804) and the island of Cuba, with its twentieth-century revolution, has shown deep solidarity with Africa. In recent times, these two countries have been breeding grounds for pathways and alternatives to foster South–South artistic circulation between Africa and the Caribbean.

The Havana Biennials: exhibitions and artistic dialogues

In 1984, the Wifredo Lam Contemporary Art Centre, which had just been created (in 1983), organized the first Havana Biennial in the capital of Cuba. With its open solicitation of proposals from artists of all backgrounds, the event was a meeting place for artists from different latitudes and traditions. From its third edition onwards, its thematic character revealed the many uncertainties and concerns that were shared by artists near and far. Ever since, the Havana Biennial has forged ties that have allowed artists to broaden their visions and make them more contemporary. These events are attended by creators, critics, curators and international commissioners, encouraging the launch of internal projects that forge various types of connections with other territories, including through the participation of artists from Africa and, in a more general sense, southern countries.

This Biennial, which emerged behind the tutelary figure of Cuban artist Wifredo Lam (1902–1982), included the countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East from its second (1986)² edition onwards, in addition to the Latin American and Caribbean countries already invited to the first edition. This very important event thus began to be defined as the Biennial of the Third World, an expression very much in vogue in the international context of the time, and carrying political and cultural implications. This gave visibility to the artistic production of countries hitherto either relegated to the background or excluded from the major exhibition projects that circulated internationally. Of major

2 During the same year, the Casa de África (House of Africa) was founded in Havana. This institution has created an important collection of African art, presenting permanent or temporary exhibitions and offering ongoing conferences and workshops, keeping alive study and research into African cultures both on the African continent and in Cuba. https://www.ecured.cu/Casa_de_Africa.

note is the way in which artistic production and creators, as well as critics and thinkers, from southern countries entered into a transversal relationship. The catalogue for this second Biennial, for example, featured texts by Ghanaian Emmanuel Anku-Golloh and Malian Cheickna Hamalla Diarra.

From the third edition of the Biennial, the theme of which was 'Tradition and Contemporaneity', the Spanish newspaper *El País*³ praised the way the trends of contemporary African art appeared, through the works of artists from Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The same newspaper mentioned the major achievements of Egyptian artist Ahmed Nawar (born in 1945) who was guest of honour, as well as the work of Ethiopian painter Solomón Belachew, while an exhibition of African wire toys became a real attraction for the public.

Continuing this interest in the artistic practices of popular tradition, the fourth Biennial, in 1991, included an exhibition of Bogolan paintings from Mali, with their wealth of shapes and colours, as well as an exhibition of work by Ethiopian artist Zerihun Yemtgeta, demonstrating his artistic skill in his use of natural materials. Since then, and up to the present day, this important event has gained greater recognition internationally over successive editions, through its proposals for both exhibitions and art. These initiatives have allowed contemporary African art – with hundreds of participants – to secure a significant arena for exposure and circulation.⁴ This has been of benefit to renowned artists, some residing in the diaspora spaces of Europe or the United States, along with others from younger generations, such as South Africans Bridget Baker (born in 1971) and James Webb (born in 1975), Algerian Mohamed Bourouissa (born in 1978), and Senegalese artists Momar Seck (born in 1968) and Serigne Mbaye Camara. All these artists have demonstrated their openness to new conceptual trends in contemporary art, particularly in the use of digital media and computer-based design, as well as the symbolic enhancement of the body and recycled materials.⁵

3 Las tendencias del arte africano se muestran en La Bial de La Habana, 3 January 1999. http://elpais.com/diario/1990/01/02/cultura/631234803_850215.html.

4 In 2004, the first major exhibition devoted to contemporary African art was organized in Europe, *Africa Remix*, where 88 artists participated under the watchful eye of curator Simon Njami. The event gave rise to an important international tour.

5 South African Jane Alexander (1959) participated in the workshop organized in Havana by Cuban artist Alexis Leyva (Kcho) to coincide with the 10th Havana Biennial (2000). The theme was 'the dialectic between integration and resistance of identities in the age of globalization'. She exhibited her work *Aventura Africana: Cabo de la Buena Esperanza* (African Adventure: Cape of Good Hope), in which she questioned '...the cultural encounter between proclaimed Western values and those of the inhabitants of the African continent. Concepts like the authentic, the native, the exotic and the natural guide her founding discourse in the manner of essays.' (Leyva, 2009).

The work of Nigerian-born artist Victor Ekpuk was a particular focus of the critics' attention during a recent edition of the Biennial. All the walls of the Wifredo Lam Centre's exhibition hall were covered with his native country's *nsibidi* (an ancient proto-writing system). Thanks to this traditional writing, the artist was able to produce powerful imagery that drew upon the wealth of contemporary visual references around him, symbolically displacing these signs towards new graphic languages.

The African art exhibited at the Havana Biennials has been very current and full of originality, presenting a wealth of proposals rooted in tradition. Moreover, 'as an altermondialist alternative to international biennials, its profile soon had an impact on the global perception of visual production from the South' (Noceda, 2005-2006, p. 149-155).

In Haiti: the AfricAmerica Foundation

The work carried out in Haiti since 1999 by the AfricAmerica Foundation is another important transversal artistic experience, along with the organization of Foro Transcultural de Arte Contemporáneo (Transcultural Contemporary Art Forum) based in Port-au-Prince but with ramifications in other towns within the country. Although the cultural intention pursued here is not limited to the visual arts, AfricAmerica's activities have offered artists a significant arena, through workshops, artists' meetings and exhibitions, among other initiatives. In this context, Belgian-Congolese artist Mufuki Mukuna (1973) was able to complete an artistic residence in Villa Noailles, above the town of Hyères in southern France, forging links with an artisanal community taken as a point of reference in Haiti. Before then, Kossi Assou (1958), a painter, designer and cultural advisor from Côte d'Ivoire who had participated in all the forums since 2004, led a drawing workshop in Croix-des-Bouquets, an emblematic Haitian location, where there is a great popular tradition of creating sculptures from recycled metal (Muñiz Rojas 1991, pp. 210-220). He worked on the project 'Escultura por la paz' (Sculpture for Peace) in collaboration with Haitian artists from Grand Rue in the city of Port-au-Prince, well known for their objects carved from recycled materials. A body of artwork was produced during a collective workshop that took place in the public arena, viewed by spectators. It drew upon pieces of sheet metal that had come to the end of their useful lives, summoning them to be repurposed for a second lease of life.

As part of its efforts to disseminate African artistic production, the Foundation also shares experiences from other latitudes on its website (<http://www.africamerica.org/>). These include two Malagasy examples: Lalaina Ravelomanana's gustatory show and the work of Joël Andrianomearisoa, artistic director of the project '30 et presque-songes'. The exhibition of their achievements was designed to be presented during a long international tour that included the city of Port-au-Prince in September 2011. In the same year, two Cameroonian artists also participated in the Forum, Boris Nzebo and Hervé Yamguen, along with two more Malagasy representatives, Rina Ralay-Ranaivo and Temandrota. The Foundation's work, along with the organization of the Transcultural Forum, has created fundamental arenas for South-South encounters between Haiti and the artists of the African continent, as well as other latitudes.

Another important event in Haiti, which included workshops and artistic meetings, was the 'Espacio de memoria cultural: pinturas populares en el Congo y en Haiti' (Cultural memory space: folk paintings in Congo and Haiti). The presentation speech highlighted the commonality between these expressions of popular culture, and pointed out that, in both countries, this artistic process 'emerged...at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, with the attention and support of foreign patrons and promoters' (Célius and Jewsiewicki, c. 2015-2017) even though it was an expression closely linked to popular artistic forms. Conceived as a research and cultural action programme, the work carried out in the workshops and meetings was based on the hypothesis that '...certain elements survived the separation of places of deportation and transcended the era of slavery'; moreover, there had been an 'individual and social updating of contemporary culture shaped by commodification and monetization' (ibid.). Other points of interest for this project included 'reciprocal reception in Haiti and Congo of paintings produced in the other country, as well as fostering contact between the painters in the workshops, encouraging them to work alongside each other, then with each other' (ibid.). This was a process in which different eras and spaces intervened, giving the experience the nature of a route between Congo and Haiti.

In August 2004, Congolese painters Chéri Chérin and Monsengo Shula from Kinshasa, and Dominique Bwalya and Nkulu Likasi from Lubumbashi, worked together in a preparatory workshop along with Tinda Lwimba from Lubumbashi, who did not complete any paintings. This week-long meeting was held as part of the fifth edition of the 'Mémoires de Lubumbashi' programme, focusing on the theme *Memory of Violence and Violence of Memory*. From 11 to

17 February 2005, a second workshop was held in Port-au-Prince, bringing together three painters from the previous workshop (Nkulu Likasi was unable to travel), together with six Haitian painters, namely Pr  f  te Duffaut,   tienne Chavannes, Joseph Gracia, Lionel Paul (Onel), Reginald Prosp  re (Redgy) and Jean Id  lus Edm  . The meeting took place at the same time as an exhibition of nearly 90 paintings, entitled 'Peinture populaire du Congo' (Popular Painting of Congo), in Port-au-Prince.⁶ This time, no theme was proposed in the context of the workshop. Nevertheless, it is clear from observing the works produced that the Congolese artists endeavoured to draw upon the impact of their Haitian encounters (C  lius and Jewsiewicki, c. 2015–2017).

This restitutive action on the visual memory between Africa and the Caribbean was summed up in these simple but profound terms: 'an initiative with the ultimate objective of helping to restore the loop, encouraging a second round and circulating images artistically shaped by the popular cultures of the African continent and its diasporas across the Atlantic' (*ibid.*).

Back to Africa: artists' travels and encounters

Going back to Africa was part of a whole stream of thought and action in the Caribbean during the first half of the twentieth century, in a context of reaffirming ancestral identity and resisting the dominant colonial system. The flow of artists' trips, for similar purposes but in new circumstances, was a characteristic process in the second half of the last century, especially its last few decades.

Barbara Pr  zeau⁷, originally from Haiti, and Manuel Mendive, from Cuba, were not the only pilgrims to travel from these Caribbean territories to the land of their ancestors. Their trips nevertheless proved decisive for their respective creative processes, differing from their previous artistic careers but just as relevant. Barbara Pr  zeau participated in the Dakar Biennial in 1992 and returned to settle and work in Senegal between 1993 and 1995. These two years were fundamental for her career as an artist. She immersed herself in the sign language of African art,

6 A collective exhibition of 55 paintings at the Coll  ge Saint-Pierre's Haitian Art Museum, and an exhibition of 35 of Tshibumba's works organized on two sites, the Mus  e du Panth  on National Ha  tien and the Institut Francais d'Haiti. These exhibitions were part of the events entitled 'Peinture et imaginaire collectif du Congo-Kinshasa et d'Ha  iti', prepared in Port-au-Prince from 10 February to 21 May 2005 by Carlo A. C  lius with the help, in Haiti, of Mich  le D. Pierre-Louis and Colette P. Armenta, and thanks to the support of the Prince Claus Fund (Netherlands), the Chair and the AUF (C  lius, C. A. and Jewsiewicki, B. c. 2015–2017).

7 Founder of AfricAmerica and director of 'Foro transcultural de Arte contempor  neo' in Puerto Pr  ncipe, Haiti.

drawing upon it to inform her use of techniques and materials. After her training and studies in art centres in France and Canada, Barbara Prézeau was able to consolidate all her previous experiences during her trips to Africa. In her country of origin, these African roots manifest themselves not only in the number of descendants who were enslaved and who worked in the plantations of the French part of Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti), but also through their important cultural influence. This is especially true of popular culture, with which the artist has always identified. Her sensitivity to these themes allows her to see Africa as a source of alternatives: 'Barbara forms a link between two worlds, Africa and the Caribbean, apparently connected by the vastness of the Atlantic, but especially united by the most immense human passage in history, the inhuman passage of the slave trade and slavery' (Wood, 1998).

Leaving for Africa and living with its mythical strengths and creative potential was a transcendent moment in her artistic maturity, bringing to light a whole repertoire of energy-laden elements, such as charms, fabrics and visual signs. This transversal journey allowed her to synchronize everything she knew outside of her acquired artistic knowledge, which represented a substantial part of her being and cultural history. This was a conscious process for her. Barbara Prézeau rethought the geography of art in accordance with new symbolic coordinates. Her intention was to build up the metaphor of a mixed space in which myths and rites, both original and current, could coexist. Hence, her reiteration that: 'my [her] painting speaks Creole'. There is thus, in her return to Africa, 'a poetic claim and compromise that makes the analogy between pictorial expression and orality. This is found in the Creole language, the refuge of former slaves and the language of everyone in Haiti today – an authentic way of expressing the deepest feelings of the Haitian people' (ibid.)

Internationally renowned Cuban artist Manuel Mendive explained how he returned to Africa to seek his roots. Mendive is a multifaceted artist who practises Cuban worship and is steeped in the magical world of Yoruba presence on the island. In the 1980s, he inaugurated a work of representation and body painting that allowed him to renew his own creative arsenal, moving his work towards the scenic and public space. His painted bodies in streets and squares bring *orishas* to life within the public arena through a unique and personal language. It is no coincidence, therefore, that this artist, who already had an important body of work, decided in the 1980s to go back to the beginning of all beginnings. The artist summarized his experience as follows:

There are wonderful things to discover in Africa, images full of magic, and you start to remember things from Cuba and say: it's amazing.... After this trip to Africa, I also started to practise body art. I paint on the human body, using anatomy, muscles and movement to create new characters, with the idea that another person could emanate from one member, then another and another still, the whole then forming a big chain. When a muscle moves, these painted images come to life.... Everything comes from nature, and everything ends in nature (Prieto, 2015, part 2).

In the imagination of this great artist, nature represents a whole force that can be transfigured,⁸ 'the beginning and the end, the end and the beginning', an infinite chain of convergent relationships. Thus, in his work – as in life – the principle that 'no one is alone' is the ritual of existence. Mendive knows perfectly well that 'the tree does not make the forest; that too is very Yoruba'. He has returned and continues to return to this Yoruba world to rediscover, on his own land, this hill that is neither forest nor grove but the intense sound of drums that always recalls the Africa in the Caribbean of sugar cane and coffee.

Conclusion

Within the framework of a global aesthetic cartography, the contemporary circulation of African art in the Caribbean is part of a new transversal South-South relationship thanks to exhibition spaces, workshops and travel undertaken by artists. The Havana Biennial in Cuba and the AfroAmericA Foundation in Haiti are major institutions for the circulation of artists and their works. These two countries thus offer routes and alternatives to promote artistic circulation between Africa and the Caribbean, producing new kinds of exchanges and a greater recognition of African art. This does not only include traditional artistic production but also new developments in contemporary art from an international perspective. Such initiatives should be much more systematic in these islands, as in the rest of the Caribbean, to strengthen links with Africa and strengthen this circulation within different cultural domains. This would contribute to better publicizing and showcasing the arts on both sides of the Atlantic.

8 On these forms of relationship between art and the mythification of nature in the work of Manuel Mendive, see Wood (2012, pp. 181-183).

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Editor / Volume XI Introduction

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Esi SUTHERLAND-ADDY is an Associate Professor of African Studies at the University of Ghana. Her main research interests are written and oral literature, women's literature, and educational and cultural policy. Before pursuing her academic career, she served with the Ghana Government as the Deputy Minister for Higher Education, Culture and Tourism from 1986 to 1993, and from 1994 to 1995 as the Minister of Education and Culture. She has undertaken studies, particularly in education, for many international organizations including UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa.

Section I: Chapter 11 / Section III: Chapter 18

Wyatt MacGAFFEY is Professor Emeritus of Social Anthropology at Haverford College in the US. He is the author of *Modern Kongo Prophets* (1983), *Religion and Society in Central Africa* (1986) and other publications on the history, art and politics of Central Africa. A more recent work (2013) focuses on northern Ghana: *Chiefs, Priests, and Praise-Singers: History, Politics, and Land Ownership in Northern Ghana*.

Section I: Chapter 12

Olusegun MORAKINYO is currently a research associate at the Department of History, University of South Africa (UNISA), and a visiting scholar at Trinity College, Dublin, and Queen's University, Belfast. He is working on African collections in Irish museums and the history of African studies in Ireland. Dr Morakinyo is a former academic coordinator of the Robben Island Museum/University of the Western Cape African programme in museum and heritage studies. He was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the philosophy department at the University of Johannesburg before moving to the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare, and later to the philosophy department at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Section I: Chapter 13

Joseph TONDA is a Professor of Sociology and Anthropology affiliated with Omar Bongo University in Libreville. He is also a regular visiting instructor at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), Paris. He teaches sociology and anthropology of religions, sociology of health and medicine, and sociology of the imagination and power. His main research topics and projects focus on the power of healing in prophetic and Pentecostal churches, the power of the body, sexuality and money. His books include *Modern Sovereign: The Body of Power in Central Africa (Congo and Gabon)*, published by the University of Chicago Press in 2021.

Section I: Chapter 14

Mamadou FALL is a Senegalese historian. He earned a Ph.D. in History from the University of Paris (1985) and a Doctorate in Literature from the Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, where he has been a lecturer and researcher since 1986. He has also taught at Edouardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Mozambique, and UConn Stamford in the US. The configuration of space and Indigenous collective identities are the main focus of his approach to universalism and regional construction in Africa and Asia. He is the coordinator of the *General History of Senegal* project, which has produced 19 volumes to date.

Section I: Chapter 16

Jean-Luc MARTINEAU is a historian and a senior lecturer at INALCO (Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales) on the contemporary history of sub-Saharan Africa. He is a member of the CESSMA (Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques) laboratory (UMR 245). His research focuses on Nigeria, issues of identity construction, and the cultural, political and urban history of the Yoruba region in particular.

Section I: Chapter 17

Hélène CHARTON is a national expert at the European Commission. A history graduate and former student of the École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay Saint Cloud, she focuses her research on the history of Africa and on international education policies in Africa, using a dual socio-historical (history of education) and political (public education policies) approach.

Section I: Chapter 18 / Section III: Chapter 8

Tovonirina Daniela RAKOTONDRABE is a historian and political scientist, and a Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Toamasina (Madagascar), where he was also dean of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities (2010-2016). A member of the editorial board of the journal *Tsingy* and head of the doctoral research team Heritage, Spaces and Societies since 2015, he has published various articles in the journal *Politique africaine* and contributed to several collective works. After focusing his research on the colonial economic history of Madagascar, he is currently working on the themes of nation, identity and territory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Section I: Chapter 19

Dominic Richard David THOMAS is a Professor in the Department of European Languages and Transcultural Studies and Chair of Digital Humanities at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is a specialist in cultural exchange policies between Africa and France as well as on issues of immigration and racism in Europe. He has authored, co-authored, edited or co-edited many works on contemporary African and European culture and politics, including *Black France* (2007), *The Colonial Legacy in France* (2017), *Sexe, race & colonies* (2018) and *Olympisme, une autre histoire du monde* (2024). He edits the Global African Voices series at Indiana University Press that focuses on translations of African literature into English. He has translated works by Aimé Césaire, Sony Labou Tansi and others.

Section I: Chapter 20 / Section I: Chapter 22

Alan COBLEY studied at the universities of Manchester and York before earning a doctorate in African history at SOAS, London. At the University of the West Indies, where he was appointed Professor Emeritus in 2025, he held numerous leadership positions, including Head of History, Director of the School of Education, Dean of Humanities and Education, and Pro-Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate Studies. He also served as inaugural Chair of the UWI's Quality Management Team in 2018-2019 and was the founding Co-Director of the UWI/University of Johannesburg Institute for Global African Affairs (2018-2022) and Chair of the University Archives and Records Management Advisory Committee (2013-2024). His teaching and publications focus on South African, Caribbean and imperial history.

Section I: Chapter 21

Aaron KAMUGISHA is the Ruth J. Simmons Professor of Africana Studies and Chair of the Africana Studies Department at Smith College (US). He is a scholar of social, political and cultural thought of the African diaspora. He holds a doctorate in social and political thought from York University, and he was the 2007–2008 postdoctoral fellow in African American studies at Northwestern University. He has taught at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, for over a decade. He serves on the editorial boards of the following journals: *Small Axe: A Journal of Caribbean Criticism, Social and Economic Studies*, and the *Journal of West Indian Literature*. He is also the co-Executive Director of the *Race and Resistance* book series with Peter Lang Publishers, and an inaugural member of the Other Universals transnational research collective.

Section I: Chapter 23

Waibinte E. WARIBOKO is a Professor of African Social History at the University of the West Indies. His research focuses on West African history and, particularly, missionary involvement in African societies between 1865 and 1925, and the effects of European trade and politics following the abolition of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. His major publications include *Ruined By 'Race': Afro-Caribbean Missionaries and the Evangelization of Southern Nigeria, 1895–1925* (2007) and *'Race' and the 'civilizing mission': Implications for Blackness and African Personhood, 1800–1960* (2011). Prof. Wariboko's courses include socialism and development in twentieth-century Africa, and colonialism and underdevelopment in West Africa since 1880.

Section I: Chapter 24

Samir AMIN was a distinguished Professor of Political Economy of Development and the Director of the Third World Forum. He taught economics at the universities of Poitiers, Paris and Dakar. He published extensively on law, civil society, socialism, colonialism and development, with a focus on Africa and the Arab-Islamic world. His notable works include *Eurocentrism* (1988), *The Empire of Chaos* (1991), and *The Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism* (2013).

Section I: Chapter 25

Heather D. RUSSELL is a Professor in the Department of English and she currently serves as the Vice Provost for Faculty Leadership and Success (FLS) in the Office of the Provost at Florida International University (US). She holds a Ph.D. in English from Rutgers University and specializes in African Diaspora literature and theory, postcolonial studies, Anglophone Caribbean cultural studies, and African American literature. She is the author of *Legba's Crossing: Narratology in the African Atlantic* (2009) and co-editor of *Rihanna: Barbados World Gurl in Global Popular Culture* (2014). She has published widely on African American and Afro-Caribbean cultural and literary traditions.

Section I: Chapter 26

Helen LAUER is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dar es Salaam since 2015, formerly with the Department of Philosophy, University of Ghana, since 1988. She received her Ph.D. (1986) from the City University of New York Graduate Center. Compiling African anthologies that challenge tacit global assumptions for three decades, she also contributes to current analytic debates about social epistemology and collective intentionality. She is currently the editor-in-chief of *Utafiti Journal of African Perspectives*, the flagship journal of UDSM College of Humanities, co-published by Brill. In 2014, she was elected a Fellow of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Section II: Introduction / Section II: Chapter 6 / Section II: Chapter 12

Tayeb CHENNTOUF is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Oran in Algeria. He has held numerous academic positions, including Member of the Higher Council for Education, Member of the Executive Committee of CODESRIA, and Associate Professor at the University of Nice. He is the author of several books, including *Le monde contemporain* (The contemporary world), *L'Algérie face à la mondialisation* (Algeria and globalization), and *Le Maghreb au présent* (Maghreb today), and has contributed to numerous collective works. He has been involved in the UNESCO *General History of Africa* project since its launch.

Section II: Chapter 1 / Section II: Chapter 4

Amzat BOUKARI-YABARA holds a Ph.D. in African History and Civilizations from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS, School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) and is a former researcher at the University of Montreal. His work focuses on the political and cultural history of Pan-Africanism, as well as Pan-African political organizations and social movements. He has published *Nigeria* (2013), *Mali* (2014), *Africa Unite! A History of Pan-Africanism* (2014) and *Kwame Nkrumah* (2016).

Section II: Chapter 2

Tukufu ZUBERI is an American sociologist, filmmaker, educator and social critic. Currently, the Lasry Family Professor of Race Relations and Professor of Sociology and African Studies at the University of Pennsylvania (US), he has been a visiting professor at Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Among his film projects, Dr Zuberi wrote and produced *African Independence*, an award-winning feature-length documentary about the freedom fighters and leaders of the independence movement. He has also curated numerous exhibitions including *Tides of Freedom; African Presence on the Delaware* at the Independence Seaport Museum (Philadelphia) and *Black Bodies in Propaganda; The Art of the War Poster* at the Penn Museum (Philadelphia).

Section II: Chapter 3 / Section II: Chapter 13

Valter Roberto SILVÉRIO is a full Professor of Sociology at the Federal University of São Carlos (Brazil). He holds a B.A. in Political and Social Sciences from Fundação Escola de Sociologia e Política de São Paulo (1985), an M.A. in Social Sciences from Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho (1992), and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences from Universidade Estadual de Campinas (1999). He completed postdoctoral fellowships at the International Institute of Sociology of Law in Oñati, Basque Country (2006), and at Goldsmiths, University of London (2017). His research focuses on postcolonial studies, racial relations, Black transnationalism, the African diaspora, education, affirmative action, and Afro-Brazilians.

Section II: Chapter 5

Giulia BONACCI is a historian and Research Fellow at the Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD, Research Institute for Development) affiliated with URMIS-Université Côte d'Azur. She is the author of *Exodus! The History of the Return of the Rastafarians to Ethiopia* (2010; English edition, 2015), which received the IndieFab Book of the Year Award for History in 2015 and was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Title in 2017. Her research explores Ethiopia and the British Caribbean, with a focus on Rastafarianism, Pan-Africanism, return-to-Africa movements and popular cultures.

*Section II: Chapter 7 / Section II: Chapter 17 /**Section II: Chapter 20 / Section II: Chapter 21 / Section III: Chapter 12*

Willy JACKSON holds an M.A. in Development Planning for developing countries and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Paris Diderot University. He has taught at this institution in the Department of Law and Political Science, as well as at the School of International Relations (ILERI) in Paris. As an international consultant, he has served on the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as an expert on regional integration. For many years, he has served as a legal assistant in various proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Section II: Chapter 7 / Section II: Chapter 17 / Section III: Chapter 15

Issiaka MANDÉ is a historian and a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Quebec in Montreal. He is interested in the socio-economic history of contemporary Africa. Most of his work focuses on the populations of West Africa, with a particular emphasis on migration patterns. His latest publication (2025) is *L'Afrique subsaharienne au temps de l'anthropocène* (Sub-Saharan Africa in the Anthropocene era), which he co-edited with Pascal Vallières.

Section II: Chapter 8

Bahija CHADILI has been a Professor of African history at Hassan II University in Casablanca since 1986. A graduate of Paris Sorbonne University, she obtained her Ph.D. in Contemporary African History (Hassan II University, 2000) with a thesis on the political thought of Othman bin Foudi and the history of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. She headed the history department for ten years and also served as the Vice-Dean. Her research focuses on Islam and the state in Africa, Afro-Moroccan relations, and Africa in international politics. She is the author of several books, articles and critical editions of historical manuscripts.

Section II: Chapter 9

Gosnell L. YORKE (St. Kitts-Nevis) holds a Ph.D. in Religious and Biblical Studies from McGill University (1987) and studied law, linguistics and theology. Dr Yorke has lectured in North America, the Caribbean and Africa. He currently serves as Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Mediation of African Conflicts Programme in the Dag Hammarskjöld Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the Copperbelt University (Zambia) and as a translation consultant for various Bible translation agencies in Zambia, Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere in Africa. In addition, he is a former Extraordinary Professor at the Institute for African Renaissance Studies at the University of South Africa, and his country's former Honorary Consul to the Republic of South Africa (2003-2013).

Section II: Chapter 10

Kris MARSH is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland (US). Her research focuses on the Black middle class, with a particular focus on racial segregation in housing and education, demographic trends, and the social dynamics of singlehood. She is the author of the 2023 book *The Love Jones Cohort: Single and Living Alone in the Black Middle Class*. A 2017 Fulbright Scholar in South Africa, she has received several distinctions, including the Early Career Award from the Association of Black Sociologists in 2015 and the Medal of Excellence from the University of Maryland in 2017.

Section II: Chapter 13

Nilma Lino GOMES is a Professor Emerita at the Faculty of Education of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil, where she also coordinated the affirmative action programme (2002–2013). She holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology (University of São Paulo) and did her post-doctoral studies in sociology at the University of Coimbra. She is a specialist in ethno-racial relations and educational policies. A former member of Brazil's National Education Council (2010–2014), she headed the Nucleus of Studies

and Research on Ethnic-Racial Relations and Affirmative Actions (NERA) and the ANPED group on Education and Ethno-Racial Relations. She is also a member of the Brazilian Association of Black Researchers (ABPN).

Section II: Chapter 14

Yamina BENTABET is an Algerian sociologist and researcher at the University of Oran 2 Mohamed Ben Ahmed. Her work explores women's roles, education and social change in post-independence Algeria. She authored a doctoral thesis on female teaching staff and she contributed studies on women in Oran between tradition and modernity. Her research highlights the intersections of gender, education and modernization in Algerian society.

Section II: Chapter 15

Alexander BALEZIN is a part-time Professor at the State University of Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences and chief research fellow at the Academy's Centre for African Studies in the Department of Regional Studies, Institute of World History. He earned his two doctorates with dissertations on the transformation of traditional institutions in Uganda under colonialism and on the history of the community of German settlers in South West Africa/Namibia from 1862 to 1990. He has written some 200 articles on African history, the Soviet and Russian historiography of Africa and Soviet-African relations.

Section II: Chapter 16

Jean-Michel MABEKO-TALI holds a Ph.D. in History from Paris Diderot University. A specialist in contemporary Angola, he lived and taught in the country for many years and has published numerous works. A Professor of African History at Howard University in Washington, DC since 2002, he was a member of UNESCO's International Scientific Committee for the Pedagogical Use of the General History of Africa, responsible for developing African history textbooks for all levels of education in Africa.

Section II: Chapter 18

Vladimir SHUBIN is Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. He received his Ph.D. in History from Moscow University and an honorary doctorate from the University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Author of several works, including *ANC: A View from Moscow* and *The Hot 'Cold War': Soviet Union and Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa*, he has also published numerous articles and book chapters. Before his academic career, he was actively involved in supporting African liberation movements and was awarded the South African Order of the Companions of O.R. Tambo (silver) for his outstanding contribution to the struggle against Apartheid and colonialism.

Section II: Chapter 19

Moussa Willy BANTENGA is a Professor of Economic and Social History at Joseph Ki-Zerbo University in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). He is a member of the Association of African Historians (AHA) and CODESRIA. His research focuses on rural history, migration, the economics of small businesses and their relationship with globalization. He is the author of numerous articles, and he has edited and co-edited nine books. He is currently preparing a book on economic life in the former countries of Burkina Faso. In 2008, he was made a Knight of the Order of Academic Palms.

Section II: Chapter 22

Anshan LI obtained his Ph.D. (1994) from Toronto University (Canada) and is currently Professor Emeritus in the School of International Studies at Peking University (China). He has served as the Director of the Institute of Afro-Asian Studies and the Center for African Studies, School of International Studies, Peking University; Vice President of the Chinese Society of African Historical Studies; and Vice President of the Chinese Association of African Studies. A specialist in Sino-African relations, African studies and the history of overseas Chinese in Africa, he has lectured to top Chinese leaders and supervised graduate students from African countries.

Section II: Chapter 23

Fumilayo E. SHOWERS is an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Africana Studies at the University of Connecticut (US). Her research centres on race, gender and US immigration; the social organization of health and long-term care; health professions (nursing and medicine); care work; and immigrant workers. In particular, she studies African immigrants in professional health care settings in the US. Her work has been published in *Sociological Forum*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *Social Science and Medicine: Qualitative Research in Health*, and other journals.

Section II: Chapter 24

Joseph GAHAMA holds a Ph.D. in African History (1980) and a HDR (Habilitation à diriger des recherches) (1996) from Paris Sorbonne University. He is currently the Rector of East African University Rwanda after holding senior positions at the University of Burundi, Kigali Institute of Education, and the University of Rwanda-College of Education, where he directed the Department of History. He has also served as a research director and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Kigali Institute of Education. With extensive teaching and research experience in Africa and Europe, he has consulted for UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, the African Union and various governments and NGOs.

Section II: Chapter 25

Patrick HARRIES graduated in African Studies from the University of Cape Town (South Africa), and has a doctorate from SOAS in London. He became a Professor of African History at the University of Basel, Switzerland, in 2001, after teaching and conducting research in Cambridge (UK), Madison (US), Lausanne (Switzerland) and Berlin (Germany). A recognized specialist, he began teaching African history in 1975 and devoted his career to African studies. His work focused on forced emigration from Mozambique, the Mozbiekers community in Cape Town (1770-1880), and the history of knowledge production in Africa, particularly in the natural sciences.

Section II: Chapter 26

Jean-Pierre DOZON is an anthropologist and a Senior Research Director Emeritus at the French Research Institute for Development (IRD), a member of the Institut des mondes africains (IMAF), and Director of Studies at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS). Former Vice-President of the Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme, his research focuses on West Africa, in which he explores development, health, ethnicity, politics and religion, and Franco-African relations. The Académie Française awarded him its Prix du Rayonnement de la langue et de la littérature françaises in 2004 for his book *Frères et Sujets*.

Section II: Chapter 27

Thaddeus METZ is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, which he joined in 2020. A native of the US, he received his Ph.D. from Cornell University (1997). Dr Metz has published more than 300 scholarly books, chapters and articles. Many take an analytic approach to the meaning of life, philosophy of religion, African morality, human rights, biomedical ethics, and a range of related topics in value theory and moral-political philosophy. His recent books include *A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and Beyond the Continent* (2022) and *God, Soul and the Meaning of Life* (2019).

Section II: Chapter 28

Luís KANDJIMBO is a poet, an essayist, a literary critic, and an Associate Professor at Agostinho Neto University in Luanda, Angola. Recipient of an M.A. in Philosophy and a Ph.D. in Literary Studies, he has served as his country's Vice-Minister of Culture and cultural attaché in Portugal. He is a member of the Angolan Writers' Union (UEA), the Angolan Academy of Letters (AAL), the International Association of African Literary and Cultural Studies (AFROLIC), based in Brazil, and the Association for the Study of African Literatures (APELA) in Paris. He is a member of the International Scientific Committee for Volume IX of UNESCO's *General History of Africa*.

Section III: Introduction

Faranirina V. RAJAONAH is a Malagasy historian who was a full Professor at the University of Antananarivo from 1972 to 1999 and is now Professor Emeritus at Paris Diderot University since 2014. She holds a Ph.D. in History (University of Lyon 2, 1997) and specializes in the urban and cultural history of Madagascar and the Indian Ocean, particularly the city of Antananarivo, and Malagasy youth in the twentieth century. Her research focuses on urban markets, city cultures and cultural mixing. She has coordinated several collective works and has been a member of the International Scientific Committee for Volume IX of UNESCO's *General History of Africa* since 2013.

Section III: Chapter 1

Cécile Marie ZOUNGRANA holds a Ph.D. in Demography from the University of Montreal and a M.A. from the Institute of Demographic Training and Research (IFORD) at the University of Yaoundé (Cameroon). With over 25 years of experience in population, reproductive health and gender issues, she has worked with UN agencies, governments, NGOs and universities, and coordinated major programmes for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) in Burkina Faso, Uganda and Mauritania. She is the author of several publications on reproductive health, HIV/AIDS, gender equality and girls' education.

Section III: Chapter 1

Pierre KLISSOU is a demographer and was the UN Population Fund's (UNFPA) Senior Technical Adviser for the Democratic Republic of the Congo's population and housing census until his retirement in 2022. Previously, he served as UNFPA Benin Assistant Representative and Senior Technical Adviser for Mauritania's census. With extensive experience in UN agencies, civil society, universities and public administration, he focuses on capacity-building in data collection, analysis and use for development planning and decision-making. Formerly a demography professor at Benin National University, he holds a Ph.D. in Demography from the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

Section III: Chapter 2

Marie-Roseline DARNYCKA BÉLIZAIRE is a specialist in family and community medicine, and a civil servant with 20 years of experience in public health at both national and global levels. She has been working with the World Health Organization since 2015, serving as a team leader of the Health Emergency Programme in Mauritania as well as an incident manager of large and complex outbreaks in several countries. In Haiti, she worked as an HIV/AIDS medical officer, where she advocated for a holistic approach that included traditional healers in case management, and she expanded access to antiretroviral treatment in rural areas. In Europe, Dr Darnycka has worked as a senior public health expert for the project Episouth, which aimed to strengthen emergency preparedness in 27 countries in the Mediterranean region.

Section III: Chapter 2

Sosthène ZOMBRE is a public health physician with extensive experience in organizing and managing health systems. He held management positions for 15 years at the Ministry of Health in his country, Côte d'Ivoire, at district, regional and central levels. Since June 2006, he has worked for the World Health Organization as an officer in charge of health systems strengthening (HSS), focusing on planning, human resources for health, partnerships, health information systems, and public health emergencies.

Section III: Chapter 3

Charles TSHIMANGA is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Nevada-Reno (US). He holds a Ph.D. from Paris Diderot University, and his research focuses on such subjects as the African diaspora in France and on the concept of the nation-state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He teaches courses on precolonial and modern Africa, Islam in Africa, African cultures, postcolonial studies, diaspora, popular culture, and the modern world. He is the author of *Jeunesse, formation et société au Congo/Kinshasa, 1890-1960* (2001) and the co-author of *L'Abako et l'indépendance du Congo Belge* (2003). He has co-edited several books, including *Frenchness and the African Diaspora* (2009).

Section III: Chapter 4

Madani SAFAR ZITOUN is a Professor of Urban Sociology in the Department of Sociology at the University of Algiers 2. Since June 2012, he has headed the Laboratory for Socio-Anthropological Analysis of Territorial Development (LASADET) that examines new urban behaviours in the Algerian capital. His research and publications focus on urbanization, urban policies and housing, urban mobility, and the evaluation of social protection and action policies in Algeria and the Arab world. He is the author of numerous national and international publications.

Section III: Chapter 5

Sophie BLANCHY is a Research Director Emeritus at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and a member of the Laboratory of Ethnology and Comparative Sociology (CNRS – Paris Nanterre University). She has been conducting research in the Comoros since 1980 and in Madagascar since 1990. After completing her doctorate in anthropology with a thesis on daily life in Mayotte, she studied the age system and the ritual of the *Grand Mariage* in Ngazidja, analysing how matrilineality, age, Islam and migration interact in social and political organization. She continues her comparative work on other islands, and she monitors developments in personal law and practices in Mayotte since it became a French *département*.

Section III: Chapter 6

Didier NATIVEL is a Professor of African and Indian Ocean History at Paris Diderot University and, until 2024, a researcher at CESSMA (Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques). His main area of interest is the social and cultural history of cities in the Mozambique Channel region between the late nineteenth century and the 1980s.

Section III: Chapter 7

Tatiana SMIRNOVA is a conflict analyst and researcher, affiliated with the University of Montreal and the Sahel Research Group (University of Florida). She was previously with the Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques (CESSMA) in Paris. In 2012, she began participating in the ELITAF project on African elites educated in Eastern bloc countries and studying Africans in the former USSR, as well as cooperation between African and Eastern European women's organizations during the Cold War. Her postdoctoral research analysed the security situation in southeastern Nigeria linked to Boko Haram.

Section III: Chapter 9

Olufunke ADEBOYE is a Professor of Social History at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. She has held visiting research fellowships at York University's Harriet Tubman Institute, the University of Birmingham, the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst College, and the University of Cambridge. Her research spans gender in Africa, Nigerian history in the precolonial and colonial periods, Yoruba society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, African historiography, and Pentecostalism in West Africa. She has presented at major international conferences and published widely in journals including *African Studies Review*, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, and the *Canadian Journal of African Studies*.

Section III: Chapter 11

Rokhaya Cissé is a sociologist and a researcher at the Laboratory for Research on Economic and Social Transformations (LARTES) at the Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire, Cheikh Anta Diop University (IFAN/UCAD) in Dakar. She focuses on observing phenomena using a longitudinal approach. She is the author of numerous articles in various fields, including the dynamics of poverty and vulnerability, education, child protection, and internal and international migration and mobility from a gender and intergenerational comparative perspective.

Section III: Chapter 13

Evgeny KORENDYASOV is a Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Russian-African Relations and African States' Foreign Policy at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics and is an Associate Lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has served as the Ambassador of the USSR/Russian Federation in Burkina-Faso (1987-1992) and in Mali (1997-2001).

Section III: Chapter 14

Demba Moussa DEMBÉLÉ is an economist and President of the African Research and Cooperation for Endogenous Development Support (ARCADE) based in Dakar. A member of CODESRIA, CETIM and the World Forum for Alternatives, he has published numerous articles in African and international journals. He is the author and co-author of several books, including *Sortir l'Afrique de la servitude monétaire. À qui profite le franc CFA?* (2016), *Contribution à la déconstruction des théories conventionnelles sur le développement de l'Afrique* (2015), and *Samir Amin, intellectuel organique au service de l'émancipation du Sud* (2011).

Section III: Chapter 16

Vusi GUMEDE is a Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Economics, Development and Business Sciences at the University of Mpumalanga, South Africa. He was previously a professor at the University of South Africa and director of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute. Before entering academia, he held various South African government positions for 12 years, including eight under President Thabo Mbeki. He participated in multiple councils and editorial boards, notably as editor-in-chief of *Africa Insight* and *Africanus*. He earned degrees in economics and political studies, including a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of KwaZulu-Natal (2003). Since 2010, he has authored and co-edited numerous books and articles on African political economy.

Section III: Chapter 17

Abdoulaye SOUNAYE is a Professor from Niger. His research focuses on the transformations and redefinitions of the epistemic, ideological and cultural universes of Muslim societies in Africa. He heads the research unit 'Contested Religion: Between Religiosity, Morality, and Intellectual Culture' of the research group REMOBOKO (Religion, Morality, and Boko in West Africa) at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in Berlin (Germany). He is also an Associate Professor at the Abdou Moumouni University in Niamey (Niger).

Section III: Chapter 19

Olabode OMOJOLA is a Professor of Music at Mount Holyoke College and he teaches across the Five College Consortium in Massachusetts (US). He earned his doctorate at the University of Leicester and has held positions in Germany at the University of Cologne and the University of Applied Sciences in Görlitz through the Alexander von Humboldt programme. A former Musicology Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University, he currently chairs the Five College Council for African Studies. His publications include *Nigerian Art Music* (1995) and *Yoruba Music in the Twentieth Century: Identity, Agency and Performance Practice* (2012).

Section III: Chapter 20

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Section III: Chapter 21

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Section III: Chapter 22

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UNESCO GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA VOLUMES I-XI

Volume XI of UNESCO's *General History of Africa* explores the forces shaping Africa and its global communities today. Set against a complex history marked by enslavement, colonialism and post-independence struggles, it challenges traditional views by revealing how Africa's past shapes its diverse cultures and realities today.

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